[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 35 (Monday, March 27, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1738-S1740]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

                                 ______
                                 

                                SEAPOWER

 Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, over the past several years, our 
nation's military has become increasingly overcommitted and 
underfunded--facing problems from recruiting and retention, to cuts in 
active fleet numbers and a dwindling active duty force. Yet in spite of 
these problems, the United States' naval power, with it's fleet of 
nuclear-powered attack submarines, life-saving Coast Guard and Merchant 
Marine forces, and highly skilled sailors and mariners, is the best in 
the world. These components are a part of one of the most 
technologically sophisticated defense systems in the world. In Kings 
Bay, Georgia, we are fortunate to be home to the greatest submarine 
base in the nation, Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base. During my visits 
there, however, I have heard time and again how detrimental the growing 
gap between commitments and funding has become.
  I believe that by appropriating additional funds to our nation's 
defense system and by supporting efforts to create a larger force 
structure, we will resolve or at least begin to remedy some of these 
problems that are facing today's military forces. Since I came to the 
Senate in 1997, I have supported funding for procurement, research and 
development, and readiness. In order for the United States to retain 
it's role as a military super power, we must pay attention to the gaps 
that exist today and prevent further deterioration in our armed forces. 
If we do not reverse this trend now, a very high price will be paid 
tomorrow for our collective lethargy on defense issues and for the 
massive under-funding of our armed forces.
  Mr. President, I now respectfully request that an article from the 
January, 2000 edition of Seapower magazine be inserted into the Record, 
as I believe it accurately and appropriately outlines the existing gap 
between our commitments and resources, and effectively argues the case 
for remedying this situation.
  Thank you.

                 [From Almanac of Seapower, Jan. 2000]

                        A Tale of Two Centuries

                            (By John Fisher)

       The old century had come to an end and the United States, 
     its armed services triumphant from victory in a splendid 
     little war over a technologically inferior adversary, as 
     ready to take its rightful place among the major military and 
     economic powers of the world. A former assistant secretary of 
     the Navy, who became a national hero in that war, was soon to 
     become president and use his bully pulpit for, among other 
     things, the building of a Great White Fleet that was the 
     first step in making the United States a naval power ``second 
     to none.''
       That former assistant secretary, later president, Theodore 
     Roosevelt, was a shrewd judge of human nature and a life-long 
     student of American history. He knew that most of his fellow 
     Americans had little if any interest in foreign affairs, or 
     in national-security issues in general. Roosevelt himself was 
     a staunch advocate of the seapower principles postulated by 
     Alfred Thayer Mahan, whom he greatly admired. So to remedy 
     the situation he helped found the Navy League of the United 
     States in 1902, contributing significant financial as well as 
     moral support.
       There were many, of course, in the Congress and in the 
     media--indeed, in Roosevelt's own cabinet--who were not sure 
     that the Great White Fleet was needed. It cost too much and, 
     despite its fine appearance, would have little if any 
     practical value for a nation unchallenged in its own 
     hemisphere and unlikely ever to send its sons to fight in 
     Europe's wars, much less Asia's. Besides, there might be an 
     occasional colonial war here and there, but the possibility 
     of a direct war between the major powers of Europe was 
     becoming more and more remote with each passing year.
       Within less than five years the vision of a lasting peace 
     throughout the world was demolished when the Japanese Navy 
     shocked the world by defeating the Russian Navy in the Battle 
     of Tsushima (27-28 May 1905), sinking eight Russian 
     battleships and seven Russian cruisers. The Japanese fleet, 
     which started the war a year earlier with a surprise attack 
     on Russian ships anchored in Port Arthur, lost three torpedo 
     boats at Tsushima.
       Less than a decade later The Great War--``the war to end 
     all wars,'' it was called--started in Europe. The United 
     States remained a nonparticipant until April 1917, but then 
     entered the war in force. U.S. seapower contributed 
     significantly to the eventual Allied success. The joyous 
     Armistice of 11 November 1918, however, was followed by the 
     debacle at Versailles that sowed the seeds of World War II.
       Again, America and its allies were not prepared. The United 
     States once again stayed on the sidelines until jolted out of 
     its lethargy by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor: That 
     put 15 million American men and women in uniform, led to 
     total mobilization of the U.S. economy--and of the mighty 
     U.S. industrial base--and resulted in millions of deaths 
     later on the unconditional surrender of both Nazi Germany 
     and Imperial Japan. The century was less than half over, 
     but it was already the most violent in all human history.
       This time around, some lessons were learned--but not very 
     well, and they were not remembered very long. When North 
     Korea invaded South Korea the United States again was 
     unprepared--as it was a generation later in Vietnam. The Cold 
     War cast a nuclear shadow over the entire world for more than 
     four decades, though, and forced the much-needed rebuilding, 
     modernization, and upgrading of America's armed forces.
       As the world enters a new century, and new millennium, 
     those forces are the most powerful, most mobile, and most 
     versatile in the world. Moreover, the young Americans in 
     service today are the best-led, best-trained, and best-
     equipped in this nation's history. But that does not mean 
     that they are capable of carrying out all of the numerous 
     difficult and exceedingly complex missions they have been 
     assigned. The victories of the past are no guarantee of 
     success in future conflicts. And it is not foreordained that 
     the so-called ``American century'' that has now ended will be 
     extended by another uninterrupted period of U.S. economic and 
     military dominance.
       Operation Allied Force, the U.S./NATO air war over Kosovo, 
     is a helpful case in point. The precision strikes against 
     Serbian forces, and against the civilian infrastructure of 
     the former Yugoslavia, eventually led to the withdrawal of 
     Serbian troops from Kosovo and the occupation of that 
     battered province by U.S./NATO and Russian peacekeepers. The 
     one-sided ``war'' lasted much longer than originally 
     estimated, though. It did not ``stop the killings'' (of 
     ethnic Albanians), the original purpose of the war. And it 
     left Slobodan Milosevic still in power in Belgrade.
       It is perhaps inevitable that political leaders will focus 
     almost exclusively on the ``victories''--however fleeting and 
     however gossamer--that can be claimed. The prudent military 
     commander, though, will focus on the problem areas, the near-
     defeats and potential disasters, the ``What-ifs'' and the 
     close calls. There were an abundance of all of these in 
     Kosovo last year--just as there were in the war with Iraq in 
     1990-91.
       Logistics is the first and perhaps most important of those 
     problem areas--and the biggest ``What if'' as well. In both 
     conflicts. In the war with Iraq the question was ``What if 
     Saddam Hussein had not stopped with Kuwait but continued into 
     Saudi Arabia and all the way to Riyadh?'' The answer--on 
     this, virtually all military analysts agree--is that the war 
     would have lasted much longer and would have cost much more 
     in both lives and money. As it was, it took the greatest 
     sealift in history before the vastly superior U.S./
     coalition forces could defeat the previously overrated 
     Iraqi army. That massive sealift--more than 10 million 
     tons of supplies carried halfway around the world--would 
     have been impossible, though, were it not for the fact 
     that, on the receiving end, Saudi Arabia had built a 
     large, modern, and well-protected port infrastructure.
       Logistics was not a problem in Kosovo, either--but only 
     because the U.S./NATO air

[[Page S1739]]

     forces accomplished their mission (belatedly), and ground 
     forces did not have to be brought in. It was a close call, 
     though--more so than is generally realized--and the end 
     result was due more to good fortune than to careful planning. 
     The ports in the area that might have been available to U.S./
     NATO shipping are few in number, inefficient, extremely 
     limited in their throughput capacity, and vulnerable both to 
     sabotage and to attack by ground forces. Which is exactly why 
     U.S. sealift planners say that a ground war in Kosovo would 
     have been ``a logistics nightmare.''
       Nightmares aside, there are other problems, of much greater 
     magnitude, affecting all of the nation's armed forces. All 
     are underfunded. All are overcommitted--usually, in recent 
     years, to humanitarian and peacekeeping missions that, 
     however worthwhile in themselves, detract from operational 
     readiness and from the training required for actual combat 
     missions.
       There is more: The U.S. defense structure is the leanest it 
     has been in the post-WWII era. Funding for the acquisition 
     and procurement of ships, aircraft, weapons, and avionics/
     electronics systems has been cut precipitously in recent 
     years and the result has been a steady decline in the size--
     and, therefore, responsiveness--of the vital U.S. defense 
     industrial base.
       Except for the Marine Corps, all of the services also are 
     suffering from prolonged recruiting and retention problems 
     that, if not resolved, will lead to a ``hollow force'' of the 
     early 21st century similar to that of the late 1970s. There 
     is increasing evidence, anecdotal but mounting, that combat 
     readiness has declined.
       Following are some particulars about how the various 
     problem areas enumerated above have affected the nation's sea 
     services--balanced by a report on the current strengths and 
     capabilities, as well as needs, of each service.
       Since the end of the Cold War the Navy's active fleet has 
     been cut almost in half, and is now just over 300 ships, the 
     lowest level since the early 1930s. What makes the situation 
     worse is that the administration's future-years defense plan 
     (FYDP) calls for construction of only 6-7 ships per year for 
     the foreseeable future, whereas a building rate of 9-10 ships 
     is needed to meet the minimum requirement of 305 ships 
     postulated by the Quadrennial Defense Review. Independent 
     defense analysts say that a more realistic estimate of Navy 
     fleet requirements would be anywhere from 350 to 400 ships, 
     depending on the scenarios postulated. To maintain a fleet of 
     that size would require a building rate of 10-12 ships per 
     year.
       Exacerbating the ship-numbers problem is the fact that, 
     because hundreds of Cold War U.S. air and ground bases 
     overseas have now been closed, and hundreds of thousands of 
     troops have returned to CONUS (the Continental United 
     States), a much heavier share of the collective defense 
     burden is now borne by the Navy's forward-deployed carrier 
     battle groups (CVBGs) and Navy/Marine Corps amphibious 
     ready groups (ARGs). In many areas of the world the CVBGs 
     and ARGs are now the only combat-ready forces immediately 
     available to the national command authorities.
       The difficulties imposed on Navy carriers are particularly 
     heavy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have told Congress that a 
     minimum of 15 active-fleet carriers are needed to maintain a 
     continuous presence in the most likely areas of international 
     crisis--i.e., the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, and the 
     Western Pacific (particularly the waters off the Korean 
     Peninsula and, more recently, in the Taiwan Strait between 
     the People's Republic of China on the mainland and the 
     Republic of China on Taiwan). With only 12 carriers now 
     available--11 in the active fleet and one reserve carrier 
     used primarily for training purposes--the Navy has had to 
     adopt a ``gapping'' strategy that leaves one or more of these 
     ``hot spots'' without a carrier for several weeks, or 
     sometimes months, at a time. In today's fast-paced era of 
     naval warfare, the Navy League said last year, the gapping 
     strategy is ``not a prudent risk, as it is sometimes 
     described, but an invitation to conflict.''
       The Navy's fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines 
     (SSNs) is the best in the world, but also undersized to meet 
     all current as well as projected commitments. According to 
     force requirements provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by 
     the regional commanders in chief, more than 70 SSNs are 
     needed to meet all of the Navy's worldwide commitments--but 
     there will be only 50 available unless the QDR levels are 
     revised upward. This could pose major risks in areas where 
     land-based enemy aircraft and missiles make it difficult for 
     carriers and other surface ships to operate close to the 
     littorals.
       The Navy's SSBN (nuclear-powered ballistic missile 
     submarine) force continues to be the dominant and most 
     survivable leg of the U.S. strategic-deterrent ``triad'' of 
     SSBNs, manned bombers, and intercontinental ballistic 
     missiles. There are now 18 Trident SSBNs in the active fleet, 
     but only 14 are likely to be needed in the future. The 
     proposed conversion into an SSGN (nuclear-powered guided-
     missile submarine) configuration of the four SSBNs now slated 
     for deactivation would add significantly to the Navy's 
     overall power-projection capabilities and compensate to some 
     extent for current deficiencies in surface combatants.
       Perhaps the brightest stars in the current fleet inventory 
     are the Aegis guided-missile cruisers and destroyers that 
     played such a key role in the Gulf War and in several lower-
     scale combat actions since then. The combat-proven 
     effectiveness of the Aegis fleet has made it a strong 
     candidate to serve as the principal building block for the 
     national-missile-defense system favored by Congress and 
     likely to be built in the first decade of the new century.
       Navy aircraft and weapon systems also are the best and most 
     technologically sophisticated in the world. Because of the 
     continued underfunding in procurement and acquisition, 
     however, all of these fleet assets have been considerably 
     overworked, a spare parts shortage has developed, and the 
     maintenance workload has increased significantly.
       The U.S. Marine Corps has changed commandants, but 
     continues the march--and its proud tradition of always being 
     ``the most ready when the nation is least ready.''
       That mandate from Congress is more daunting on the eve of 
     the 21st century than it has been at any previous time since 
     the dark days preceding World War II and the Korean War. In 
     both of those conflicts the Marines suffered a 
     disproportionate number of casualties, particularly in the 
     early months of fighting--primarily because forward-deployed 
     Marine units had to hold the line until the nation (and the 
     other armed forces) could catch up to the Marines in 
     readiness.
       Today, all of the nation's armed services are in a 
     reasonable state of readiness. But the operating tempo is the 
     highest it has ever been in peacetime, and most deployments 
     in the past several years have been for humanitarian and 
     peacekeeping assignments rather than for combat missions. 
     Training has suffered, therefore, and there has been a slow 
     but steady degradation of combat readiness--well-documented 
     in hearings before the House Armed Services Committee.
       Under former commandant Gen. Charles C. Krulak the USMC's 
     senior leaders developed a cogent and forward-looking plan to 
     field a 21st-century Marine Corps that will be fully combat-
     ready to meet the assymetric challenges likely in the 
     foreseeable future. It will be up to Gen. James L. Jones Jr., 
     who succeeded Krulak on 1 July 1999, to implement that plan. 
     But significant additional funding will be needed for, among 
     other things:
       Maintaining the Corps at its current authorized strength of 
     approximately 172,000 Marines on active duty and in the 
     Reserves;
       Modernizing the Corps' Total Force with the aircraft, 
     weapons, rolling stock, electronics and avionics systems, and 
     other supplies and equipment needed to maintain combat 
     superiority on the littoral and inland battlefields of the 
     future;
       Building, upgrading, and maintaining a self-sustaining 
     expeditionary tactical aviation force, including the 
     revolutionary V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, which can 
     operate from aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, 
     and/or expeditionary airfields ashore.
       Expediting the early development and procurement of: (a) 
     the joint strike fighter, which USMC leaders have told 
     Congress is urgently needed both to maintain a modern 
     tactical aviation force and to replace the obsolescent 
     aircraft now in the Corps' inventory; and (b) advanced 
     amphibious assault vehicles capable of safely and swiftly 
     carrying Marines and their equipment to and over the beaches 
     to positions that in some combat scenarios will be far 
     inland; and
       Implementing Corps-sponsored initiatives to develop and 
     field the advanced-capability shallow-water mine 
     countermeasures systems needed to allow future Marine assault 
     forces to maneuver safely through the littorals.
       Alone of all the services, the Marine Corps has 
     consistently met its recruiting and retention goals in recent 
     years. Several studies suggest that this is because the 
     Marine Corps keeps a clear focus on its highest priorities--
     ``Making Marines and Winning Battles''--and that young men 
     and women respond more readily to that inspiring challenge 
     than they do to the less lofty appeal of material 
     benefits.
       Today's Coast Guard remains Semper Paratus--but just 
     barely, and at a very high price. The U.S. Coast Guard is 
     perhaps the most overworked and underfunded agency in 
     government today, but it carries out--efficiently and at 
     minimum cost to the taxpayer--a multitude of missions that 
     increase almost annually. Several studies suggest that the 
     Coast Guard returns a minimum of four dollars in services for 
     every tax dollar provided to the multimission service in 
     appropriations.
       The Coast Guard is also the world's premier lifesaving 
     organization, and in recent years has saved an annual average 
     of more than 5,000 lives--and has assisted many more 
     thousands of people in distress on the seas, on the Great 
     Lakes, and in the nation's inland and coastal waterways.
       But lifesaving is only one of the many ``services to 
     taxpayers'' in the USCG portfolio. In recent years the Coast 
     Guard has also, on average: conducted 44,000 law-enforcement 
     boardings, identifying 24,000 violations; seized 76,000 
     pounds of marijuana and 62,000 pounds of cocaine; 
     investigated 6,200 marine accidents; inspected 23,000 
     commercial vessels; responded to 12,400 spills of oil or 
     hazardous materials; serviced 55,000 aids to navigation; and 
     interdicted 10,000 illegal migrants.
       To carry out all of those missions in the future, however--
     and several others likely to be added--the Coast Guard needs 
     a major recapitalization of virtually its entire physical 
     plant: ships, aircraft, electronic and sensor systems, and 
     shore facilities. To its credit,

[[Page S1740]]

     the Coast Guard itself has taken the initiative by developing 
     a so-called IDS (Integrated Deepwater System) plan that, if 
     fully funded, would permit an orderly and cost-effective 
     replacement of cutters, aircraft, and other assets over a 
     period of years. Failure of the executive and legislative 
     branches of government to support and fully fund that plan 
     would cripple the Coast Guard's continued effectiveness--and 
     would cost the American people in numerous ways.
       Even today, very few Americans realize how dependent the 
     United States is on the U.S.-flag Merchant Marine for 
     national defense and its continued economic well-being. In 
     times of war or international crises that might lead to war 
     95 percent or more of the weapons, supplies, and equipment 
     needed by U.S. forces overseas must be carried by ship--
     usually over thousands of miles of ocean. It would be 
     military folly to rely on foreign-flag shipping to carry that 
     cargo.
       Most innovations in the maritime industries in the post-
     WWII era--e.g., containerization, LASH (lighter aboard ship) 
     vessels, and RO/ROs (roll-on/roll-off ships)--have been of 
     American origin, and the United States is by far the greatest 
     trading nation in the entire world. Literally millions of 
     U.S. jobs, and billions of tax dollars, are generated by the 
     import and export of raw materials and finished products into 
     and out of U.S. ports.
       The port infrastructure itself is badly in need of 
     renovation and remodernization, however. Because of short-
     sighted laissez-faire economic policies, U.S.-flag ships 
     today carry only a minor fraction of America's two-way 
     foreign trade. The result is the loss of thousands of 
     seafaring jobs, significantly reduced U.S. sealift 
     capacity, and a Merchant Marine that is now in extremis.
       The creation of the Maritime Security Program was a helpful 
     first step toward recovery, but it will take many years, 
     perhaps decades, before the U.S.-flag fleet can regain its 
     traditional title as ``the vital Fourth Arm'' of national 
     defense.
       Additional funding, and a larger force structure, will 
     resolve or at least ameliorate some of the most difficult 
     problems now facing the nation's armed services, not only in 
     procurement and RDT&E (research, development, test, and 
     evaluation) but also in readiness. More and better equipment, 
     combined with a lower operating tempo and higher pay, would 
     in turn have a salutary effect on both recruiting and 
     retention.
       There are more intractable problems, though, that all the 
     money in the world will not resolve--and that should be of 
     major concern not only to the nation's armed services and 
     defense decision makers, but to all Americans. The most 
     difficult and most obvious of these problems is the 
     proliferation in recent years of weapons of mass destruction 
     (WMDs), and the means to deliver them. There already are a 
     dozen or more nations--several of them extremely hostile to 
     the United States--that already possess (or are close to 
     acquiring) more destructive power than was unleashed by all 
     the armies and navies in the world during World II.
       It can be taken for granted that WMDs soon will be 
     available to terrorist groups as well. But what is even more 
     alarming is the near certainty that neither the United States 
     nor the so-called ``global community'' at large will take the 
     probably draconian steps that would be needed to counter this 
     unprecedented threat. Not, that is, until weapons of mass 
     destruction are actually used by terrorists. The only real 
     question here is not ``if,'' but ``when.''
       There are other dangers, other problems, other defense 
     issues of transcendent importance that must be attended to at 
     the start of this new century and new millennium. The 
     succession in Russia, for example. In China as well. The 
     mentally unbalanced military adventurism of the leaders of 
     North Korea. The list could go on and on.
       Quite possibly the greatest threats to world peace, though, 
     are American complacency and American lethargy. The history 
     of the 20th century shows that, once aroused to action, the 
     American people can and will unite to defeat any enemy, no 
     matter how long it takes or how much it costs. That history 
     also shows, though, that it takes more than education and 
     persuasion to unite the American people. It takes sudden and 
     painful shock.
       The problem here is that, in the past, the nation always 
     had time to recuperate from its initial losses, and even from 
     a Pearl Harbor. That may no longer be the case. There is now 
     a bipartisan consensus that the United States should build 
     and deploy a national-mission-defense (NMD) system as soon as 
     ``practicable.'' If that consensus had existed several years 
     ago the need today might not be so urgent. As it 
     is, relatively few Americans realize that the United 
     States is still absolutely vulnerable to enemy missile 
     attacks. Another way of saying it is that not one U.S. 
     missile-defense system has yet been deployed that could 
     shoot down even one incoming enemy missile. That is a 
     sobering thought.
       The old axiom says that leadership ``begins at the top.'' 
     But in a democracy that is not entirely true. If the American 
     people demand a certain course of action loud enough and long 
     enough,the elected ``leaders'' in the executive and 
     legislative branches of government almost always will follow. 
     In the field of national defense the American people have 
     demanded very little in recent years, and, with a few notable 
     exceptions, that is exactly what they have been provided.
       In his prescient ``Prize Essay'' (The Foundation of Naval 
     Policy) in the April 1934 Naval Institute Proceedings Lt. 
     Wilfred J. Holmes argued persuasively that the size of the 
     fleet (and, by implication, the size and composition of all 
     naval/military forces) should always be consistent with 
     national policy. ``Failure to adjust the size of navies to 
     the needs of external [i.e., national] policy--or, 
     conversely, to adjust external national policy to the 
     strength of the military fleet--has, in the past, frequently 
     led to disaster,'' Holmes said. At the 1922 Limitation of 
     Armaments conference, he noted, the United States 
     ``relinquished naval primacy in the interests of worldwide 
     limitations of armaments.'' Unfortunately, though, ``the 
     retrenchment in [U.S.] naval strength was not followed by 
     retrenchment in the field of national policy.''
       The circumstances are not exactly the same today--but they 
     are close enough. The current operating tempo, for all of the 
     nation's armed services, is the highest it has ever been in 
     peacetime. Commitments have been increasing annually, without 
     commensurate increases in funding. Ships, aircraft, and 
     weapon systems are wearing out--and so are our military 
     people. The ``gapping'' of aircraft carriers in areas of 
     potential crisis is an invitation to disaster--and, 
     therefore, represents culpable negligence on the part of 
     America's defense decision makers.
       Eventually, a very high price will have to be paid for 
     these many long years of national lethargy, for the massive 
     underfunding of the nation's armed forces, and for the 
     continued mismatch between commitments and resources. When 
     that time comes--sooner is much more likely than later--it 
     may well be the darkest day in this nation's history.
       Is there still time to reverse course? Perhaps. But not 
     much time. And the leadership may well have to come not from 
     those who hold high office in Washington, but from the 
     American people themselves.
       If they do provide that leadership, there will indeed be 
     another American century. It will not be another century of 
     violence, but of peace.
       Peace on earth, for all mankind.

                          ____________________