[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 34 (Thursday, March 23, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1687-S1691]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
KOSOVO AMENDMENT
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on March 9, I advised the Senate of my
intention to offer an amendment on Kosovo to the supplemental, assuming
that legislation comes up. If not, I will consider other avenues of
legislation to incorporate the basic structure of this amendment.
I have been joined in this effort by a thoughtful and well-respected
number of my colleagues; indeed, the distinguished Senator from Alaska,
who just departed the floor, and the distinguished Senator from Hawaii.
I placed a draft copy of the amendment in the Record at that time and
invited comment and constructive criticism. I am so pleased to report
that has happened in abundance.
I am here today to report to the Senate there has been an increasing
interest in this amendment--positive, in most instances. I will refer
to one bit of very constructive criticism momentarily.
We have taken into consideration the views of many. I will be putting
in today's Record an amendment which shows certain modifications,
technical modifications, which I hope will meet some of the very fine
constructive ideas I have received.
To summarize, the amendment would require our European allies to
fulfill a certain percentage of the commitments they have made to
provide assistance and police personnel to Kosovo before the entire $2
billion contained in the supplemental for United States military
operations in Kosovo would be made available.
The amendment would allow for the provision of 50 percent of the
money--over $1 billion--immediately for the use of the Department of
Defense. But the remainder would be dependent on a certification by the
President of the United States that our allies had provided a certain
percentage of their commitments of assistance to Kosovo.
If the President is not able to make that certification by June 1,
then the remaining $1 billion could be used only to conduct the safe,
orderly, and phased withdrawal of our troops from Kosovo--not a cut and
run; not a fixed timetable; I repeat, a safe and orderly phased
withdrawal.
Again, I have been pleased by the response that has been generated by
this amendment. It is clear, we have already achieved our first goal of
focusing attention on this very serious problem in Kosovo.
Actions on the part of our allies are being taken at an accelerated
rate, and much more detailed information on such actions, past and
present, are becoming available daily.
For example, this past week I received letters from Lord Robertson,
the Secretary General of NATO, and Dr. Bernard Kouchner, the head of
the UN Mission in Kosovo, outlining the increased efforts of
burdensharing of certain allies.
According to the letter I received from Dr. Kouchner--I would like to
quote a paragraph--I quote:
I very much appreciate the efforts that you have made so
far which have been instrumental in improving our budget
situation. Existing donor pledges have now been honored.
The next challenge will be to get new donor pledges and to
ensure that the pledges for the reconstruction budget of
17 November 1999 do materialize.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letters from Lord
Robertson and Dr. Kouchner be printed in the Record at the conclusion
of my remarks, with certain other documents that I will attach, and
letters.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibits 1 and 2.)
Mr. WARNER. In addition, I had the opportunity to meet yesterday with
Ambassador Guenter Burghardt, the European Commission representative in
Washington, who provided me with valuable information on the
contributions of the EU, particularly their efforts to streamline their
process for providing assistance.
Several weeks ago, it was very difficult to get accurate information
on what had been pledged by our allies--not that they were withholding
it; people just could not find it, in many instances, and put it into
writing--and almost impossible to get data on what had actually been
supplied to Kosovo.
Now we are clearly making progress on this front, but more remains to
be done.
I asked for constructive criticism. And within the hour, by pure
coincidence, because I planned to deliver these remarks, came a letter
from our former distinguished majority leader, and my very close friend
and mentor, Senator Robert Dole.
I ask unanimous consent to print a letter from Senator Dole in the
Record following my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibit 3.)
Mr. WARNER. Senator Dole wrote:
Accordingly, I would urge you to consider, at a minimum,
allowing a Presidential waiver authority based upon
compelling national security needs.
That sort of thing is often done. We carefully considered that. But
after consultation with my cosponsors and many others, we decided not
because it would make the amendment so weakened that it loses its
purport. Therefore, I say respectfully to my former leader that that I
cannot do. However, he has made other suggestions. And by pure
coincidence and timing, they have been incorporated in the revised
amendment, which I will file as a part of these remarks.
For example, he said:
That said, I believe in principle that you are entirely
right to try to hold the Administration's feet to the fire to
ensure that the United States continues to lead, while at the
same time preventing it from shouldering an inordinate share
of the international burden in the Balkans. The devil is in
the details, however, and I am concerned that some of the
targets identified in your amendment simply cannot be met,
and that the European powers are being held to a higher
standard than the United States. For example, is it realistic
for the United States and/or Europeans to be required to
disburse 33 percent of the funds needed for Kosovo
reconstruction by June 1, 2000?
Prior to receiving this letter, we had made technical changes from
``disbursed'' to ``obligated or contracted
[[Page S1688]]
for.'' This gives the flexibility that is needed to obviate the
problems raised by Senator Dole and others.
These technical changes, if I may enumerate them, give added
flexibility to the President of the United States in making this very
important certification. We have not, in my judgment, diminished in any
way the strength of this amendment, but it has given added flexibility.
No. 1, it makes it clear that the performance we are seeking on the
part of the allies is to be evaluated, as we put in our amendment, ``on
the aggregate.'' Performance of one nation which falls short, one
nation which may not be able to make it, will not prevent the President
from making the required certification. No. 2, we require that
reconstruction and humanitarian assistance must be, as I said,
obligated or contracted for. That point we covered in the recitation of
Senator Dole. This is in recognition that even if the money has been
set aside for Kosovo, some of these projects ``spend out'' at a slow
rate.
These are the types of constructive changes that have come to my
attention and we have incorporated them. We are still working on this.
As I say, I have also been engaged in discussions with a number of
administration officials over the past 2 weeks.
Last Friday, I had a productive meeting with the National Security
Adviser, Sandy Berger, on the eve of his departure on this important
trip the President is now undertaking. We were joined by OMB Director
Jack Lew and Under Secretary of Defense, Walter Slocombe. As a result,
of some of the technical information relayed to me at that meeting--it
was a very good meeting--I have redrafted my amendment to take into
account some of the concerns that were raised. While I think it is fair
to say the redraft which I and my cosponsors have agreed to will not
satisfy all the concerns of the administration, I believe our
consultations are making progress.
I ask unanimous consent to print the latest version of my amendment
in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibit 4.)
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the bottom line for the United States and
for the other nations involved in KFOR--that is the entire military
operation in Kosovo--is the current safety and well-being of our troops
being deployed there--U.S. troops and those of some 35 other nations
are involved and the formulation of a timetable, safety first, but the
formulation of a timetable. We can't do it right now, but if the
purport of this amendment is met, we will be able in the reasonable
future to formulate a timetable for the establishment of the
infrastructure, both economic and security, which will allow for the
safe return of our troops and those of other nations to their
respective homes.
Today, I had the opportunity to meet in my office with the Italian
Minister of Defense, for example. He shares the common goal of this
amendment.
We are now one day away from the 1-year anniversary of the start of
the NATO war on behalf of Kosovo, on behalf of human rights. The world
could not have stood by idly and watched the killing and the rape and
the pillaging of that nation and done nothing. It was a challenge to
figure out what to do. On a number of occasions, I consulted with
General Clark. Indeed, I was with him in part of that campaign,
watching the operations he directed, and directed very skillfully. We
could not have done nothing.
This is an appropriate time for reflection and assessment. What have
we accomplished and what remains to be done? Clearly, the large-scale
ethnic cleansing has stopped and hundreds of thousands of Kosovar
Albanian refugees have returned to their homes. For this, NATO should
be proud of their military action.
But what better way to express our pride in their successful
accomplishment of that military mission than for the United States, in
concert and partnership with its allies, to come forward in a timely
manner and meet the commitments to solidify the military gains? None of
us are totally satisfied. A regrettable chapter relates to the Serbian
people who lived in those areas, many of whom have left after the
cessation of the 78-day campaign. But I think the KFOR troops are doing
their best to provide equal protection and that we are continuing to
address that situation because we have to have an evenhanded policy.
Human rights, to be successful, has to be implemented evenhandedly.
Yes, the fighting has stopped. Unfortunately, the violence continues.
Recent events in Mitrovica and in the vicinity of the Presevo Valley
are cause for great concern. Bottom line, until there is an economic
structure in place, together with a security structure, we will not see
substantial progress in creating peaceful, civil society in Kosovo.
Until that happens, under the administration's current plan, U.S.
troops could remain indefinitely in Kosovo.
Earlier this week, General Reinhardt, the commander of KFOR, said--
and I believe I am quoting him accurately--that he believed KFOR troops
would be in Kosovo for up to a decade. To make such a declaration at
this time, I say, with respect to this fine professional military
officer whom I have met--I met him in Pristina about a month ago, right
in his office--I repeat, to make such a declaration at this time I find
unacceptable. This is one of the motivating factors behind the
amendment I have proposed. We cannot let General Reinhardt or anyone
else set a timetable of a decade. We need to see more progress on the
civil implementation side.
The U.N., the E.U., and the OSCE must move more swiftly to fulfill
their responsibilities for rebuilding Kosovo, and our European allies
must provide the assistance and personnel they have promised to provide
if these goals are to be achieved. Time is of the essence.
The amendment I and others have placed before the Senate is but one
approach to deal with the situation in Kosovo. I know other colleagues
have their own approaches on this issue, not necessarily dissimilar. We
share common goals. In particular, I commend Senator Robert Byrd, who
has proposed a concept for rapid turnover of the KFOR mission to the
European allies.
I now ask unanimous consent that the editorial by Senator Byrd be
printed in the Record following my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibit 5.)
Mr. WARNER. It outlines in full his concepts, which are very
interesting. I have been on the Senate floor with Senator Byrd so many
times. He is a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. No one
takes to heart more dearly the welfare of the men and women of the
Armed Forces and their families than Senator Byrd. He is concerned
about their welfare as am I. We have joined together at a meeting in
the White House, I think some 3 weeks ago, to discuss this very
subject.
He spoke up with great courage and determination to the President and
the Secretaries of State and Defense. It was quite an interesting
meeting. What we cannot allow to happen is for the current situation in
Kosovo to drift on for a decade. I say no. There are problems. Those
problems are surmountable if we work together. They must be addressed.
They must be addressed in a timely manner.
I hope the amendment in its present form, revised, will contribute to
this goal. I, once again, encourage my colleagues and others to come
forward with any constructive suggestions they may have. I continue to
say that this Senator--I think I can speak for my cosponsors--is going
to stand firm, firm in furtherance of the goals of human rights in
Kosovo, in furtherance of remaining as a vital partner of NATO, in
furtherance of creating a record to show that NATO can handle
peacekeeping missions. To do that, we need more timely assistance from
those who have committed to provide the infrastructure of economics and
security.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
Exhibit No. 1
Secretary General, NATO,
Bruxelles, March 15, 2000.
Senator John Warner,
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, Russell Senate
Office Building, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
My Dear John: I am glad we had the chance to talk by phone
yesterday. As I noted, I share your concern that the Allied
nations need to react more swiftly and forcefully to the
current challenges in Kosovo. I have been pressing hard to
ensure that nations provide additional forces for KFOR.
Dire press reports notwithstanding, progress has in fact
been made. Let me give you an update on what steps are being
taken.
[[Page S1689]]
On force levels for Kosovo, the European Allies are now
stepping up their contributions.
Italy has agreed to provide a manoeuvre battalion of two
companies for a limited time period.
France is putting under NATO command two companies that had
already been dispatched to Kosovo on short notice under
national authority, and is adding one further company.
Together, these three companies will form a new French
manoeuvre battalion.
This still leaves a shortfall of three companies relative
to the needs in theatre as identified by the Supreme Allied
Commander, General Clark, and the KFOR Commander General
Reinhardt. I have been in direct contact with several Allied
governments, and General Clark and the Military Committee
Chairman Admiral Venturoni have been in touch with Chiefs of
Defense. As a result of these contacts, a further five
countries have indicated that they are seriously considering
sending additional forces to Kosovo.
Even before the addition of these forces, European nations
are contributing a majority of the forces on the ground in
Kosovo. The following figures relate to forces to theatre on
13 March. While these figures fluctuate by small amounts on a
daily basis, the overall ratio of forces has been fairly
constant for some time.
EU nations makes up 60.3 percent of all the forces in
Kosovo.
European nations--leaving aside Russia and the CIS states--
make up 69.2 percent of the forces in Kosovo.
Adding in Russia and the other CIS states, European nations
account for 80 percent of all the forces in theatre.
The remainder is made up by Argentina, Jordan, the United
Arab Emirates, Morocco, Canada and, of course, the United
States, for a total of 38 nations contributing to KFOR.
On the civil implementation side, there has also been some
notable progress:
The European Union has started to disburse 45 million Euro
($43.6 million) of the 360 million Euro ($349 million)
pledged to UNMIK for the year 2000. Several NATO members
states have also increased their financial contributions to
both UNMIK and the KPC.
Germany, Italy and Turkey have strengthened their civil
police contingents to Kosovo, and the United Kingdom has
agreed to provide additional judiciary officials.
Let me emphasize in providing you this data that I am only
reporting to you what I have been told as Secretary General.
Implementation is key, and I will continue to press hard to
make sure that nations follow through both on their KFOR
contributions and on civil implementation.
With these points in mind, I have to convey to you my firm
belief that it would be wrong for NATO right now to have a
reduction or limitation on the U.S. commitment, just as the
situation in Kosovo is becoming more challenging and the
European Allies, who are already carrying a large load, are
beginning to do even more.
This is particularly true when looking at the situation in
the Presevo Valley, which is adjacent to the U.S. sector in
Kosovo. I hope the U.S. will play a strong role in heading
off a potential crisis there. The U.S. forces did a superb
job today in raiding a number of support bases in Kosovo for
extremists operating in southern Serbia. We need that kind of
effective military presence to continue.
On a related point, I understand your concerns for not
deploying American forces away from these Southeastern
trouble spots to help reinforce other Allies in Mitrovica.
But I would not want to see the U.S. position cast in stone
as a means of justifying lack of routine responsiveness to
the operational commander. Such a position would be at odds
with the principle of unity of command, which is essential to
the effective of NATO forces in multinational operations over
the long term.
I appreciate your ongoing concern for the success of the
KFOR operation. I am working very hard to ensure that the
European Allies hold up their end of the bargain--in both the
military and the civil implementation areas--and am counting
on you and your colleagues to help maintain the valuable U.S.
contribution.
All the very best.
George.
Exhibit No. 2
U.N. Interim Administration,
Mission in Kosovo,
Pristina, March 18, 2000.
Hon. John Warner,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator: Let me first of all thank you whole heartedly
for your unfettered support and assistance as Chairman of the
Armed Services Committee: the kind of tough questioning that
took place as a result of your interventions have been
instrumental in helping UNMIK achieve some of its objectives.
I want to give you an update on the situation regarding the
Kosovo Consolidated Budget, which is now in considerably
better shape than it was earlier in the year. Donor pledges
made at the end of last year have now crystallized into cash
in the bank. Recently the Kosovo Budget has received
contributions from the United States, the UK, France, Japan,
and the European Union. As you will see from the attached
tables, it is now estimated that the budget has sufficient
cash to carry us through the summer. Furthermore our revenue
collection is now improving. In particular, the European
Union has already paid in some of its contributions, and
clear and rapid procedures are in place for the remaining of
the Union's contributions to be paid in (another more than
Euro 55 Millions will be transferred to the Kosovo Budget in
the next three months). Further, and as planned, the Union
will contribute over Euro 240 Millions for reconstruction in
2000.
I would however also stress that there were never
sufficient pledges to cover the whole of the needs for the
year 2000. there is still an uncovered gap of about 35
million DEM, as per attached table, and any assistance you
can extend to us to cover that gap will be deeply appreciated
by this mission.
I very much appreciate the efforts that you have made so
far which have been instrumental in improving our budget
situation. Existing donor pledges have now been honored. The
next challenge will be to get new donor pledges and to ensure
that the pledges for the reconstruction budget of 17 November
1999 do materialize.
I look forward to a continued dialogue with you, and I hope
to see you soon.
Sincerely,
Bernard Kouchner,
Special Representative of
the Secretary General.
____
Kosovo Consolidated Budget 2000 Budget Update
background on this week's update
Attached are documents that detail donor pledges and
domestic revenue. Tables 1, 2, and 3 review donor pledges to
date. Table 4 projects cash flow through mid-June 2000.
Tables 5 through 9 review revenue estimates and actual
collections. Table 10 reviews budget 2000 revenue estimates
and summarizes donor support.
Noteworthy items are:
Donor pledges have started to arrive.--Since the last
report we confirm that roughly DM 76.9 million of donor
pledges for budgetary support are either in our account or
en-route, including (see Table 2): \1\ United States--DM 24.2
million; Great Britain--DM 15.9 million; France--DM 3.5
million; Japan--initiated transfer of DM 13.7 million;
European Union--initiated transfer of DM 19.6 million. A
further K35 million is expected shortly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Total pledges received to date are DM 79.6 million, which
includes the previously reported amount of DM 2.7 from
Canada.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cash Needs.--The recent influx of cash will allow the
Kosovo Consolidated Budget to continue functioning until mid-
June (see Table 4). Kosovo's cash requirements will be met
through September 2000 upon receipt of the European Union's
pledge of K35 million.
Revenue collections improve.--The last two weeks witnessed
a 55 percent increase in collections (from DM 5.8 year-to-
date to DM 9.8 million). Two factors appear to drive this
increase. First, sales and excise tax collection at the
Montenegro Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) has become
operational, collection over DM 756,684 in the last two
weeks. Collections at the ABL has the direct effect of
capturing lost revenue through that crossing, and an indirect
effect of re-diverting trucks back to previously established
border points for collection. Second, customs collections are
slightly higher because vehicle registration requires proof
of customs payment on imported cars. The former is expected
to continue, while the latter is a short-run effect that will
dissipate. (See Table 7.)
Pledge shortfall.--There still remains a pledge shortfall
of DM 38.5 million, based on revised revenue estimates (see
Table 10, Part 2).
TABLE 1.--KOSOVO CONSOLIDATED FUND BUDGETARY ASSISTANCE DONOR GRANTS FISCAL YEAR 2000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cash received (DM)
Donor Pledged Currency Approx DM Date received --------------------------------------------------------------------
equivalent Budget support Targeted support Intended program
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Netherlands......................... 15,000,000 USD 28,686,300 13 Dec................ 28,686,300 DM ................. Budget Support
USA................................. 5,000,000 USD 9,685,000 22 Dec................ ................. 9,685,000 KPC \1\
EU.................................. 5,000,000 EU 9,779,150 29 Dec................ 9,779,150 ................. Budget Support
USA................................. 3,000,000 USD 5,692,170 14 Jan................ ................. 5,692,170 Civil Registration \1\
Canada.............................. 1,000,000 CAD 1,296,913 14 Jan................ ................. 1,296,913 District Heating
GTZ................................. 1,700,000 DEM 1,700,000 28 Dec................ ................. 1,700,000 District Heating
EU.................................. 120,000 EU 234,699 29 Dec................ ................. 234,699 Peja/Klina Water \1\
[[Page S1690]]
WB.................................. 1,000,000 USD 1,875,915 6 Jan................. 1,875,915 ................. Budget Support
Germany \2\......................... 3,089,963 DEM 3,089 10 Dec................ ................. 3,089,963 KPC Salaries \1\
Germany \2\......................... 3,089,963 DEM 3,089 10 Dec................ ................. 3,089,963 Civil Registration \1\
Germany \2\......................... 3,089,693 DEM 3,089 10 Dec................ 13,389,839 ................. Budget Support
Netherlands......................... 2,750,445 EU 5,379,404 9 Dec................. ................. 5,379,404 Bulldozers \1\
EU.................................. 2,761,000 EU 5,400,046 15 Dec................ ................. 5,400.046 Electricity Salary
Ireland............................. 200,000 USD 372,508 6 Dec................. ................. 372,508 District Heating
------------------- ------------------- --------------------------------------
1999 total.................... ................. ....................... 89,671,870 ...................... 53,731,204 35,940,666
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Limited or no expenditures in this sector in Fiscal Year 1999. Balance will be carried forward to Fiscal Year 2000 for expenditures processed after 1999 fiscal year end.
\2\ Grants received from Germany increased by DM 588,765 this report, reflecting an appreciation in USD against this DM.
TABLE 2.--KOSOVO CONSOLIDATED FUND BUDGETARY ASSISTANCE DONOR GRANTS FISCAL YEAR 2000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cash received (DM)
Donor Pledged Currency Approx DM Date received --------------------------------------------------------------------
equivalent Budget support Targeted support Intended program
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EU.................................. 72,120 EU 141,054 DM 3 Jan................. ................. 141,054 DM Heating Repairs
EU.................................. 35,000,000 EU 68,453,000 DM ...................... ................. ................. Budget Support
EU.................................. 10,000,000 EU 19,600,000 DM 10 Mar................ 19,600,000 DM ................. Budget Support
EU.................................. 20,000,000 EU 39,200,000 DM ...................... ................. ................. Import Costs--Electricity
USA \1\............................. 10,000,000 USD 20,200,000 DM 7 Mar................. 20,200,000 DM ................. Budget Support
USA................................. 2,000,000 USD 3,959,180 DM 22 Feb................ 3,959,180 DM ................. Budget Support
UK.................................. 5,000,000 GBP 15,950,000 DM 7 Mar................. 15,950,000 DM ................. Budget Support
UK.................................. 2,000,000 USD 3,927,427 DM 19 Jan................ ................. 3,927,427 DM Civil Registration
Switzerland......................... 1,970,000 USD 3,703,600 DM ...................... ................. ................. .............................
Japan............................... 7,300,000 USD 13,724,000 DM 10 Mar................ 13,724,000 DM ................. Budget Support
Canada.............................. 2,000,000 CAD 2,719,202 DM 9 Feb................. 2,719,202 DM ................. Budget Support
Canada.............................. 3,000,000 CAD 3,890,739 DM ...................... ................. ................. Budget Support
World Bank.......................... 5,000,000 USD 9,400,000 DM ...................... ................. ................. Budget Support
France.............................. 12,000,000 FF 3,482,538 DM 22 Feb................ 3,482,538 DM ................. Budget Support
Italy............................... 375,000 DM 375,000 DM 13 Jan................ ................. 375,000 DM Pristina Hospital
Italy............................... 2,000,000,000 LIT 2,020,202 DM ...................... ................. ................. Budget Support
Sweden.............................. 60,000.00 DM 60,000 DM 14 Jan................ ................. 60,000 DM .............................
EU.................................. 45,600.18 DM 45,600 DM 7 Jan................. ................. 45,600 DM Building Refurbishment
Germany............................. 25,000.00 DM 25,000 DM 9 Feb................. ................. 25,000 DM Heating Repairs
Germany............................. 25,000.00 DM 25,000 DM 9 Feb................. ................. 25,000 DM Heating Repairs
------------------- ------------------- --------------------------------------
2000 Total.................... ................. ....................... 210,901,543 DM ...................... 79,634,920 DM 4,599,081 DM .............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ US contribution adjusted to reflect inadvertent double counting of $5 million contributed to IOM.
Exhibit No. 3
Washington,
March 22, 2000.
Hon. John Warner,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear John: To follow up on our recent conversation, I would
like to share a few further thoughts regarding the
Administration's proposed supplemental spending bill for the
Balkans.
You and I have worked together on Balkan issues for many
years and have more often than not agreed on the policy
direction that should be taken. We have frequently shared a
critical view of the Clinton Administration's policies and
their implementation. In addition, we have always agreed that
the President of the United States has the ultimate
responsibility to carry out U.S. foreign policy according to
our national security objectives, which include a strong and
effective NATO.
As you know, my support for U.S. military and other
operations in the Balkans is based on the firm belief that
democratization and stability in the region must be achieved,
and that the U.S. troop deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo are
vital to these goals. To this end, I am concerned that, as
drafted, the amendment that you are introducing to the
Administration's supplemental bill would, based solely upon
the action or inaction of a third party (our European
allies), prohibit the President from maintaining a U.S. troop
presence--even though he may have determined this presence to
be in our country's national interest. In my view, this
legislative restriction would tie the hands of the President
in a sphere of power that clearly lies within the prerogative
of the executive branch of the U.S. government. Accordingly,
I would urge you to consider, at a minimum, allowing a
Presidential waiver authority based upon compelling national
security needs.
Second, I am concerned that your amendment could, albeit
unintentionally, adversely affect our role in NATO and our
relations with our Alliance allies. Our credibility within
NATO and our strong bilateral relations with each of our
allies in the Alliance could be damaged by policies that link
our presence in the Balkans to extraneous factors, as opposed
to our national and collective European security objectives.
That said, I believe in principle that you are entirely
right to try to hold the Administration's feet to the fire to
ensure that the United States continues to lead, while at the
same time preventing it from shouldering an inordinate share
of the international burden in the Balkans. The devil is in
the details, however, and I am concerned that some of the
targets identified in your amendment simply cannot be met,
and that the European powers are being held to a higher
standard that the United States. For example, it is realistic
for the United States and/or the Europeans to be required to
disburse 33 percent of the funds needed for Kosova
reconstruction by June 1, 2000?
In my view, the Congress and those of us who support
stronger U.S. leadership in the international arena should
focus more on exerting direct pressure on the Administration
to implement policies that promote democratization, political
stability, and security in the Balkans. The issue, it seems
to me, is not so much whether our troops are deployed in the
region, but what they are actually doing on the ground. While
the United States and its allies can point to a number of
successes in Bosnia and Kosova, severe problems remain. At
times, it even seems as though we are taking steps backwards.
For example, I wholly disagree with the Administration's
failure to support General Clark's recent effort to deploy
U.S. troops in Mitrovica. The troops putatively in charge of
that sector of Kosova have clearly failed to perform their
mission to create a stable security environment. While their
actions have not put them in the league of their predecessors
in Bosnia's now infamous UNPROFOR, continuation on their
current course will almost certainly lead to a de facto
partition of Kosova--a highly destabilizing situation that
would put our troops at even greater risk. A resumption of
large-scale conflict may then follow. I would therefore urge
you and others in the Congress to do your utmost to ensure
that the Pentagon takes stronger action to get this situation
in hand as quickly as possible.
A second example can be found in Bosnia, where the U.S.-led
equip-and-train program for the Federation forces has
floundered. As you know, in 1996, the Administration secured
Senate majority support for the U.S. troop deployment in
Bosnia based on President Clinton's written commitment to
equip and train the Federation forces. In the past four
years, the United States has done far too little to honor
this commitment. When the war in Bosnia ended, an
Administration-commissioned assessment determined that, to
maintain adequate defenses, the Federation needed equipment
that would cost an estimated $800 million to $1 billion. To
date, only $250 million in equipment and training has been
provided to the Federation. Of this, the U.S. contribution
was only $100 million in Congressionally mandated drawdown
authority. Beyond these initial sums, the Administration has
neither proposed nor sought significant funding for the
program. In my view, the Congress should provide additional
drawdown authority for the purchase of the major equipment
and provision of the training that remain necessary for
Bosnia to be able to defend itself. It should also
immediately increase FMF funding so that the equipment we
have provided thus far can be adequately maintained.
Thank you for giving me this opportunity to share my views.
I wish you every success as you continue your leadership in
the Senate.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Bob Dole.
[[Page S1691]]
Exhibit No. 4
On page ____, between lines ____ and ____, insert the
following:
Sec. ____. (a) Of the amounts appropriated in this Act
under the heading ``overseas contingency operations transfer
fund'' for military operations in Kosovo, not more than 50
percent may be obligated until the President certifies in
writing to Congress that the European Commission, the member
nations of the European Union, and the European member
nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have, in
the aggregate--
(1) obligated or contracted for at least 33 percent of the
amount of the assistance that those organizations and nations
committed to provide for 1999 and 2000 for reconstruction in
Kosovo;
(2) obligated or contracted for at least 75 percent of the
amount of the assistance that those organizations and nations
committed for 1999 and 2000 for humanitarian assistance in
Kosovo;
(3) provided at least 75 percent of the amount of the
assistance that those organizations and nations committed for
1999 and 2000 for the Kosovo Consolidated Budget; and
(4) deployed at least 75 percent of the number of police,
including special police, that those organizations and
nations pledged for the United Nations international police
force for Kosovo.
(b) The President shall submit to Congress, with any
certification submitted by the President under subsection
(a), a report containing detailed information on--
(1) the commitments and pledges made by each organization
and nation referred to in subsection (a) for reconstruction
assistance in Kosovo, humanitarian assistance in Kosovo, the
Kosovo Consolidated Budget, and police (including special
police) for the United Nations international police force for
Kosovo;
(2) the amount of assistance that has been provided in each
category, and the number of police that have been deployed to
Kosovo, by each such organization or nation; and
(3) the full range of commitments and responsibilities that
have been undertaken for Kosovo by the United Nations, the
European Union, and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the progress made by those
organizations in fulfilling those commitments and
responsibilities, an assessment of the tasks that remain to
be accomplished, and an anticipated schedule for completing
those tasks.
(c) If the President does not submit to Congress a
certification and report under subsections (a) and (b) on or
before June 1, 2000, then, beginning on June 2, 2000, the 50
percent of the amounts appropriated in this Act under the
heading ``overseas contingency operations transfer fund'' for
military operations in Kosovo that remain unobligated (as
required by subsection (a)) shall be available only for the
purpose of conducting a safe, orderly, and phased withdrawal
of United States military personnel from Kosovo, and no other
amounts appropriated for the Department of Defense in this
Act or any Act enacted before the date of the enactment of
this Act may be obligated to continue the deployment of
United States military personnel in Kosovo. In that case, the
President shall submit to Congress, not later than June 30,
2000, a report on the plan for the withdrawal.
Exhibit No. 5
[From the New York Times, Mar. 20, 2000]
Europe's Turn To Keep the Peace
(By Robert C. Byrd)
A year ago, American and NATO warplanes began 78 days of
air assaults that halted the murderous assault of Slobodan
Milosevic on the Kosovar Albanians. If the United States has
learned anything in the nine months of peacekeeping that
followed, it should be that once again we are proving to be a
lot better at waging war than we are at managing peace.
Kosovo today appears to be on the verge of unraveling.
American and NATO peacekeepers skirt danger daily.
Reconstruction has been negligible. Mr. Milosevic remains
firmly in control in Serbia and, by most reckoning, is
stepping up his effort to foment trouble along the border
between Serbia and Kosovo. In the latest eruption of
violence, ethnic Albanian insurgents have begun attacking
Serbs across the border in Serbia.
The administration's response to this deepening crisis?
Stern words to the Albanians, urgent pleas to our allies for
more troops and money, and a request to Congress for a
supplemental $2 billion to continue American peacekeeping
business as usual in Kosovo.
Is that really the best we can do?
I see three options we can practically consider at this
juncture.
We can stay the course, reacting to events as they occur
and hoping for the best as we settle into a semi-permanent
role of soldiers on patrol and cops on the beat. We can pick
a date and simply pull American troops out of Kosovo. Or
Congress can give the administration unequivocal direction
and a reasonable period of time--say three months--to craft a
framework for turning the Kosovo peacekeeping operation over
to our European allies. Congress can then examine the plan,
gauge the progress being made, and vote either to stay or to
go.
It is my firm belief that the United States should take
steps to turn the Kosovo peacekeeping operation over to our
European allies. NATO undertook the Kosovo mission with an
understanding that Europe, not America, would shoulder the
peacekeeping and reconstruction duties. The United States,
with its outstanding military forces and weaponry,
effectively won the war; the European allies were to keep the
peace.
But now, as the United Nations interim administration in
Kosovo teeters on the brink of bankruptcy, NATO allies are
squabbling over the need for military reinforcements, and the
international police that were supposed to help bring law and
order remain undermanned, underfinanced, and unable to cope.
If Congress agrees to the administration's request for
additional financing for Kosovo, it should be with the clear
understanding that the money is tied to a plan for
establishing an all-European peacekeeping force. The plan
should have benchmarks, like numbers of European troops to be
added to the forces by particular dates, and Congress should
have an opportunity to vote on whether to keep troops in
Kosovo if those benchmarks are not being met.
Removal of American troops from Kosovo need not be abrupt
and need not mean that the United States is turning its back
on the victims of Slobodan Milosevic. We can continue to
support humanitarian relief and can provide support in
military logistics, communications, intelligence and
effective command.
It is just possible that the Europeans will excel at
peacekeeping duties in Kosovo if ever they are allowed to
emerge from the overwhelming shadow cast by the United
States. Unfortunately, we will never know if we do not tie
further American investment in Kosovo to a rock-solid plan to
turn the peacekeeping operation over to them--sooner rather
than later.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
____________________