[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 32 (Tuesday, March 21, 2000)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E365-E367]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO SOUTH ASIA

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. TIM ROEMER

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                        Tuesday, March 21, 2000

  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to congratulate the Administration 
for its decision to travel to South Asia. I strongly share its position 
that closer ties with the countries of the region, particularly India, 
will greatly benefit the United States. The President will be visiting 
the home to one-fifth of the world population and home to the world's 
largest democracy--India. The Subcontinent is a strategic part of the 
world for the United States. I have encouraged the Administration to 
use this opportunity to send a clear and strong signal to underscore 
India's great potential to be a leader in the international community. 
The trip will pave the way for a stronger and enduring relationship 
that highlights our common democratic traditions and values.

[[Page E366]]

  For the past three decades, India and Pakistan have been engaged in a 
nuclear rivalry that reflects a long history of conflict including 
three wars and a long-standing territorial dispute over Kashmir. U.S. 
nonproliferation policy faces a major challenge as an all-out nuclear 
arms race threatens to break out in South Asia. For these reasons, I 
submit the following policy brief entitled, ``Preventing a Nuclear Arms 
Race in South Asia: U.S. Policy Options.'' This concise and insightful 
paper was written by David Cortright, guest lecturer in the Kroc 
Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre 
Dame, which is located in my district, and Samina Ahmed, fellow at 
Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.
  Among its recommendations are that the United States demand that 
India and Pakistan both join the Non-Proliferation Treaty; that 
punitive sanctions, including curbs on the sale of military hardware 
and other technology, be deployed against those Indian and Pakistani 
entities responsible for the expansion of nuclear weapons programs; 
that such incentives as debt forgiveness and increased financial 
assistance for development programs in both countries be offered in 
exchange for concrete steps toward military and nuclear restraint; and 
that the U.S. fulfill the still unmet obligations to which it is 
committed by the NPT. I request that the enclosed copy be included in 
the Congressional Record.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly encourage my colleagues to review these 
policy recommendations as the President prepares to visit South Asia in 
the coming weeks.

   Preventing A Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia: U.S. Policy Options

                  By Samina Ahmed and David Cortright


                            Recommendations

       The United States must unequivocally demand that India and 
     Pakistan join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-
     nuclear weapon states.
       The United States should retain punitive sanctions which 
     target Indian and Pakistani institutions and policymakers 
     responsible for their nuclear weapons programs.
       Targeted incentives should be provided that seek to 
     diminish internal support for nuclear weapons in India and 
     Pakistan.
       The United States should fulfill its obligation under 
     Article VI of the NPT to achieve global nuclear disarmament.
       U.S. nonproliferation policy faces a major challenge as an 
     all-out nuclear arms race threatens to break out in South 
     Asia. An Indian draft nuclear doctrine released by an 
     officially constituted advisory panel to the Indian National 
     Security Council on August 17, 1999 envisages a nuclear triad 
     in which nuclear weapons would be delivered by aircraft, 
     submarines and mobile land-based ballistic missiles. While it 
     is not certain that New Delhi will opt for such broad 
     capabilities, the current direction of policy is clearly 
     toward nuclear weapons deployment. Since Pakistan's nuclear 
     policy is India-centric and reactive in nature, the 
     introduction of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems 
     within the Indian armed forces would greatly increase the 
     likelihood of a retaliatory Pakistani deployment. Operational 
     nuclear weapons and delivery systems will result in a South 
     Asian nuclear arms race that could have serious consequences 
     for regional stability, the stability of the Middle East, and 
     global peace.
       For the past three decades, India and Pakistan have been 
     engaged in a nuclear rivalry that is both a symptom and a 
     cause of their bilateral discord. India and Pakistan have a 
     long history of conflict including three wars and a long-
     standing territorial dispute over Kashmir. Each Indian
       Since a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan will 
     further destabilize a violent and conflict-prone region, 
     there is a pressing need for the U.S. to dissuade India and 
     Pakistan from deploying nuclear weapons and to reverse their 
     nuclear course. Beyond the immediate threats posed by such an 
     arms race to the one-fifth of humanity which resides within 
     South Asia, nuclear weapons deployment in India and Pakistan 
     would also have a far-reaching impact on the nuclear dynamics 
     in the region and beyond, threatening vital U.S. national 
     security interests. The deployment of nuclear weapons and 
     their delivery systems in Pakistan, for instance, would 
     strengthen the position of nuclear advocates in neighboring 
     Iran. The deployment of nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable 
     ballistic missiles by India would influence China's nuclear 
     doctrine. An India-Pakistan nuclear arms race could therefore 
     result in a parallel Pakistan-Iran and Sino-Indian nuclear 
     arms race. A South Asian nuclear arms race would also erode 
     the global non-proliferation regime, embodied in the Non-
     Proliferation Treaty (NPT), undermining the confidence of 
     signatory states in the treaty's ability to buttress their 
     security. For all these reasons, the U.S. must prevent the 
     incipient nuclear arms competition in South Asia from 
     becoming an all-out arms race.


                   U.S. Policy and Nuclear South Asia

       Some analysts and policymakers argue that the United States 
     has failed to prevent nuclear proliferation in South Asia 
     because of flawed policy directions and an over-reliance on 
     sanctions as an instrument of U.S. influence. Since the 
     initial U.S. emphasis on the rollback and elimination of 
     Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons capabilities failed to 
     contain South Asian nuclear proliferation, these analysts 
     contend, the U.S. should accept nuclear weapons in South Asia 
     and adopt the more realistic goal of ``arms control,'' which 
     merely seeks to limit their number and sophistication. 
     According to this view, Washington should concentrate on 
     encouraging India and Pakistan to refrain from a nuclear arms 
     race and seeking ways to reduce the risk of nuclear war. At 
     the same time, incentives should replace sanctions as the 
     primary means of influence. U.S. interests would be best 
     served, according to this view, by a policy of engagement 
     with India and Pakistan that goes beyond the one-point agenda 
     of nuclear non-proliferation.
       To prevent India and Pakistan from embarking on a nuclear 
     arms race, it is indeed important to examine the previous 
     shortcomings of U.S. nonproliferation policy in South Asia 
     and to identify alternative policy
       Proliferation may have occurred already in South Asia, but 
     India and Pakistan can be convinced to cap, rollback and even 
     abandon their nuclear weapons programs if the reasons that 
     prompted them to acquire nuclear weapons are addressed. 
     Indian and Pakistani decisions to acquire nuclear weapons 
     were the outcome of cost-benefit analyses of the presumed 
     benefits of nuclearization. The United States can play a 
     major role in influencing the present and future directions 
     of nuclear proliferation in South Asia by convincing Indian 
     and Pakistani decision makers that the costs of 
     nuclearization far exceed its benefits. This will require 
     clearly defined non-proliferation goals and the use of the 
     most appropriate instruments to reverse the nuclear 
     directions of India and Pakistan.
       In the past, U.S. policy goals and objectives were 
     contradictory. As a result, the tools of U.S. policy, 
     sanctions or incentives, failed to dissuade Indian and 
     Pakistani decision makers from pursuing their nuclear 
     ambitions. Cold War strategic considerations often took 
     precedence over non-proliferation objectives. U.S. policy 
     shifted from elimination to rollback and then to the current 
     emphasis on a cap on Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons 
     capabilities. Each shift in U.S. policy emboldened India and 
     Pakistan's nuclear advocates.
       Washington's use of policy instruments was also 
     ineffective. Sanctions and incentives only succeed if they 
     are properly targeted and consistently applied. These 
     preconditions were not present in South Asia. Washington's 
     reluctance to sanction India after its nuclear test in 1974 
     motivated Pakistan to follow the Indian nuclear example. In 
     the 1980s Washington again sent the wrong signal to Indian 
     and Pakistani decision makers. The United States not only 
     failed to sanction Pakistan for its nuclear development but 
     showered billions of dollars of military aid on the Zia ul 
     Haq dictatorship as part of the struggle against Soviet 
     involvement in Afghanistan. In the 1990s Washington offered 
     incentives to India and Pakistan to encourage nuclear 
     restraint, despite accumulating evidence of each country's 
     continuing nuclear weapons development.
       Following the May 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia, 
     Washington imposed mandatory sanctions on India and Pakistan 
     and identified five benchmarks for their removal: curbs on 
     the further development or deployment of nuclear-capable 
     missiles and aircraft, Indian and Pakistani accession to the 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), participation in 
     Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations, curbs on 
     the transfer of nuclear

[[Page E367]]

     technology and hardware, and an India-Pakistan dialogue on 
     normalization of relations. The imposition of sanctions 
     initially led to Indian and Pakistani concessions, including 
     their declared willingness to
       With tensions in South Asia remaining high, the United 
     States must clearly state its opposition to the presence of 
     nuclear weapons in South Asia. Washington must demonstrate 
     its resolve through targeted, consistently applied sanctions 
     and incentives designed to influence the cost-benefit 
     analysis of Indian and Pakistani nuclear decision makers. A 
     failure to do so will result in the deployment of nuclear 
     weapons and their delivery systems in India and Pakistan and 
     the likelihood of the first use of nuclear weapons since 
     1945.


                         Policy Recommendations

       1. In its policy toward India and Pakistan, the United 
     States must unequivocally demand that India and Pakistan join 
     the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. The current U.S. 
     emphasis on South Asian nuclear restraint is being 
     misconstrued or deliberately misrepresented by the Indian and 
     Pakistani governments as a tacit acceptance of their nuclear 
     weapons status.
       2. In an amendment contained in the U.S. Defense 
     Appropriations Bill, Congress has given the President 
     indefinite waiver authority to lift military and economic 
     sanctions, including those imposed automatically under 
     earlier legislation on Pakistan and India. This waiver 
     authority must be used judiciously. Broad and sweeping 
     economic sanctions that adversely affect the weaker segments 
     of Indian and Pakistani society should be removed. But 
     Washington should retain those punitive measures that target 
     Indian and Pakistani institutions and policymakers 
     responsible for their nuclear weapons programs. These include 
     curbs on the sale and supply of military hardware to 
     Pakistan, the transfer of dual-use technology to India, and 
     military and scientific exchanges with nuclear entities and 
     actors in both states.
       3. Targeted incentives should be provided, conditional on 
     progress towards nonproliferation, that would seek to 
     diminish internal support for nuclear weapons in India and 
     Pakistan. These could include the partial forgiveness of 
     India and Pakistan's external debt, increased U.S. assistance 
     for social sector development, and enhanced U.S. support for 
     developmental loans and credits from international financial 
     institutions to India and Pakistan. Such assistance should be 
     linked to concrete steps toward military and nuclear 
     restraint.
       4. In re-committing itself to the goals of non-
     proliferation, the United States should fulfill its own 
     obligation, under Article VI of the NPT, to achieve global 
     nuclear disarmament. This will encourage the advocates of 
     denuclearization in both India and Pakistan and strengthen 
     the norm against the development and use of nuclear weapons 
     not only in South Asia but throughout the world.

     

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