[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 26 (Thursday, March 9, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1373-S1376]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       KOSOVO AMENDMENT TO THE FY2000 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Presiding 
Officer.
  I ask unanimous consent to have an amendment appended at the 
conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Presiding Officer is familiar with the 
matter I bring to the attention of the Senate, and I thank him for his 
advice and willingness to participate in the undertaking to prepare the 
amendment which I will now address.
  I rise today to advise the Senate of a proposed amendment on Kosovo, 
a form of which I and other cosponsors intend to offer when the Senate 
considers the fiscal year 2000 Supplemental Appropriations Act. An 
experienced group of colleagues have worked together, and we will 
continue to work together on this legislation. I thank Senators 
Stevens, Inouye, Roberts, and Snowe for joining me as cosponsors in 
this effort.
  I inform the Senate about this amendment now so that other 
colleagues, officials in the administration, and, indeed, our allies 
and other nations and organizations will have sufficient time to study 
and provide constructive comment on this legislation prior to the 
Senate's consideration of the supplemental later this month.
  This is a vital issue, as our Presiding Officer knows full well. It 
is critical to the men and women of our Armed Forces that the U.S. 
Congress face up to this issue. It is equally critical to the brave 
troops of other nations serving in Kosovo. It is critical to the future 
of NATO, and it is critical to future peacekeeping missions.
  There are an ever-increasing number of problems in the world today. 
It is a far more complex and dangerous place than it was a decade ago 
or a decade before that. Indeed, as I look back on the cold-war era, 
there was a certain amount of certainty within which we were able to 
structure our forces, lay down a strategy, and perform our missions. 
Today, it is greatly different. The challenges posed to our national 
leaders, and particularly the men and women of the Armed Forces, have 
little precedent. Likewise, the diversity of the threats have now 
proliferated throughout the world. They are less and less nation 
sponsored, state sponsored; oftentimes, they are just small groups. 
There are conflicts in ever-increasing numbers, prompted by cultural, 
ethnic, and religious differences.

  As I publicly stated regarding this amendment, my intention in 
offering this legislation is to ensure that our European allies have 
stepped up to meet their share in providing the necessary resources and 
personnel for the civil implementation in Kosovo, the efforts to which 
we have all pledged as a group of nations to fulfill. Once the military 
mission was completed, then we committed among ourselves to take the 
next step to ensure the peace that was given as a consequence of the 
sacrifices and the professionalism of the men and women who promulgated 
that combat action for 78 days.
  During that period of combat, the United States bore the major share 
of the military burden for the air war, flying almost 70 percent of the 
total strike and support forces at a cost of over $4 billion to the 
American taxpayer. Many, many aviators and others took high personal 
risks. We were joined in that combat operation by another seven or 
eight nations that indeed did fly, willingly and courageously. However, 
it was the United States only--how well our colleagues know--that had 
the high-performance aircraft, the guided missiles, that support the 
transport aircraft. NATO did not have it. Those elements of our 
military, whether they were in or out of NATO, were brought together to 
promulgate this successful military operation.
  In return, the Europeans then promised to pay the major share of the 
burdens to secure the peace. So far, they have committed and pledged 
billions of dollars for this goal. I acknowledge that. They have come 
in diverse amounts at diverse periods of time, but the problem is not 
enough money has been put up thus far in a timely fashion to make their 
way to the Kosovo problems, and then begin to solve those problems.
  Why the delay? The troops and the public are entitled to know. As a 
result, our troops and other troops are having to make up for the 
shortfalls of failing to provide the police force--something we all 
agreed upon long before the first shot was fired. The troops today, 
therefore, are having to make up for those shortfalls by performing 
basic police functions, such as running

[[Page S1374]]

towns and villages, acting mayors, settling all types of disputes, and 
guarding individual houses and historic sites. The distinguished 
Presiding Officer visited this region just a month or so ago, as did I, 
and witnessed this.
  The troops are functioning in areas for which they were not 
specifically trained. However, there is an extraordinary learning curve 
for men and women in the Armed Forces of the United States of America 
and, indeed, other nations. The Presiding Officer and I know; we were 
privileged to wear uniforms ourselves at one time. We know how well 
these young men and women can adapt to challenges.
  They were not specifically trained, but they are doing the job, and 
they were doing it very well, but at a great personal risk, I say to 
the Presiding Officer, at a great personal risk. We have seen in the 
past few weeks, in Mitrovica and other areas, outbursts, we have seen 
woundings, we have seen deaths.

  That was not a situation we anticipated would take place if there had 
been a timely sequencing of the military actions and the placing of a 
civilian police force, infrastructure adjustments, and all the other 
things needed to bring together Kosovo as an operating society.
  Our troops engaged in a high-risk mission, along with others. Their 
courage, their professional work, as I said, was witnessed by the 
Presiding Officer and myself, on my trip, and by many others in the 
Senate. I credit the large number of Senators for taking the time to go 
over and visit with our troops to see for themselves the complexity of 
the situation and the risks that are being taken.
  As I said, our troops accept that risk. Indeed, the American people 
thus far have accepted that risk. But it is now incumbent upon the 
Congress of the United States to begin to exercise its authority and to 
show some leadership, hopefully in partnership with the administration. 
We need to show leadership to make certain, regarding the commitment 
made by our allies and other organizations--whether it be the United 
Nations, the E.U., the OSCE, or many others who are working in 
governmental organizations--that we are pulling on the oars together. I 
am proud to say our country, as best I can determine, has met in a 
timely fashion its obligations. But the purpose of this amendment is to 
draw the attention of our allies to the fact the record does not show 
that they are likewise fulfilling their commitments in a timely way.
  We braved those 78 days of combat. Along with other nations that 
participated we laid the foundation for peace in Kosovo. What we cannot 
and must not allow to happen is for the risk to our troops to endlessly 
drift on because of the failure of our allies to live up to their share 
of the commitments. This is the bottom line of this amendment.
  The amendment is simple and straightforward. Half of the funding 
included in the supplemental for the U.S. military operations in 
Kosovo--over $1 billion; that is one-half; it is a total of $2 
billion--would be provided up front, ready for prompt disbursal to stop 
the drawdown of the readiness accounts. This would pay for the expenses 
accrued by our military in Kosovo since the start of the current fiscal 
year, way back on October 1, 1999.
  The remainder of the money, roughly another $1 billion, would be 
available only--and I underline ``only''--after the President of the 
United States certifies to the Congress that the European Commission, 
the member nations of the European Union, and the European member 
nations of NATO have provided a substantial percentage of the 
assistance and personnel which they themselves have committed to the 
various civil implementation efforts in Kosovo.
  This is an important point that needs to be emphasized. In this 
legislation we are not seeking an arbitrary or unachievable standard. 
We are holding the Europeans accountable for the pledges and 
commitments which they have made. Recognizing that nations have 
different fiscal years and different procedures, we are not asking for 
full compliance within the context of this legislation. We expect 
eventually full compliance.
  In the critical areas of humanitarian assistance, support for the 
Kosovo Consolidated Budget--the money needed by Dr. Kouchner, to whom I 
will refer later; he is the head of the U.N. mission--to run Kosovo and 
the police for the U.N. international police force, the Europeans must 
provide 75 percent of the money or personnel which they committed to 
provide before additional U.S. taxpayer dollars for military operations 
in Kosovo would be disbursed.
  That is a formula I devised along with the others who worked with me 
on this, and the intention is to lay down the figures of who has done 
what, when they did it, and what is left to be done. Unless our 
President, through his leadership, and other world leaders, can bring 
this rough formula into play, then we have the triggering mechanism by 
which the President, if he desires not to certify, or cannot because 
the facts do not justify a certification. Then I will spell out what 
happens to the balance of that money.
  As I mentioned, on the reconstruction side--I wish to repeat that; it 
is important--it is a more long-term endeavor. We are requiring the 
Europeans to provide a third of the money they pledged for the 1999 and 
2000 period.
  I will readily admit I do not know if a third of the reconstruction 
money is a good benchmark because that is the category of aid for which 
I am having the most problem getting accurate data. I cannot tell you 
the hours and hours involved in consultation, trips and travel to the 
U.N. and elsewhere, to the Departments of our Federal Government, 
indeed, consultations with the White House. I found everyone trying to 
be constructive.
  We had a meeting at the White House with the Secretaries of State, 
Defense, the chairman of the Budget Office, the National Security 
Adviser. Trying to assemble the data is an awesome task. This amendment 
forces that task to be undertaken by that individual best qualified to 
do it, and that is the President of the United States, working in 
concert with these organizations and the other allies.
  It is so difficult to get the data, but we have plowed ahead as best 
we could. We know, for example, that billions have been pledged at two 
international donor conferences for Kosovo reconstruction, but I have 
not been able to find within the administration, at the U.N. or at the 
E.U., anyone or any document or fact that could advise me and inform 
the Senate on how much of that money has actually been disbursed.
  To put it in the vernacular, where are the canceled checks for what 
has come in already? It is as simple as that. The American people 
understand there has to be a record. That is part of the body of fact 
this Congress needs--and that is required by this legislation--as we 
decide whether or not to support a continuation of our military 
deployment, the U.S. troops which are part of the KFOR military 
structure.
  Again, I compliment that KFOR structure. It is working. It is meeting 
unanticipated problems. It is doing the best it can. There have been 
some problems recently. Our committee has had General Clark in, just a 
week or so ago. We went over this, carefully provided oversight about 
every 3 months or less on this situation.
  What happens, I ask, if our allies do not fulfill their commitments 
and the President is not able to make the certification required by 
this amendment? If the President cannot make the required certification 
by June 1, then the remaining $1 billion contained in the supplemental 
for military operations in Kosovo may be used only for the purpose of 
conducting a safe and orderly and phased withdrawal of U.S. military 
personnel from Kosovo.

  There it is. That is the bottom line. It has to be said. Someone has 
to say it. And I said it. I am very pleased with the support I have 
gotten from a number of individuals to step up and take on this 
responsibility.
  Further, no other funding previously appropriated for the Department 
of Defense may be used to continue the deployment of U.S. military 
personnel in Kosovo. We have to seal that up. It had to be said. I 
thought long and hard on the time and the moment I would come to this 
floor and state it. But I did it.
  We are not setting a deadline for the withdrawal of our troops. It is 
up to the President and his military advisers to decide how best a 
safe, orderly, and phased withdrawal should be done. Under this 
legislation, the President would have to submit his plan for the 
withdrawal to the Congress by June 30. In my opinion, that withdrawal 
should not take more than 18 months.

[[Page S1375]]

  The bottom line is it is not fair to our troops, to their families at 
home, to the other troops, to remain indefinitely in Kosovo with the 
political structure, be it our President, the Congress of the United 
States, the legislatures of the other nations and their leaders, not to 
take some strong, positive action now to ensure this peace.
  We cannot ask those people in uniform and, indeed, many civilians who 
are associated in this effort--there are a lot of volunteer 
organizations there--we cannot ask them to take the ever-increasing 
share of this burden and the risks, personal risks, simply because the 
nations are not willing, in a timely way, to provide the funding or 
personnel they promised for civil implementation in Kosovo.
  Some will criticize this legislation. That is all right. I am 
prepared to receive it. But what is a better solution than what we have 
devised? If there is a better one, please come forward and give it to 
us. I invite constructive criticism. I invite suggestions. Those who 
worked with me on this join me.
  Some may claim it holds the U.S. military deployment in Kosovo 
hostage to the actions of our allies; that we are in effect letting 
others decide whether or not our troop presence in Kosovo will continue 
by their inaction. I address that allegation now and say, quite 
respectfully, that our President has already made that connection. The 
exit strategy for our troops in Kosovo--as it is for our troops in 
Bosnia--is directly linked to the actions of the U.N., the E.U., the 
OSCE and others in achieving their goals on the civil implementation 
side.
  Our President said on October 15 in a letter to the Congress:

       The duration of the requirement for U.S. military presence 
     (in Kosovo) will depend upon the course of events. . . . The 
     military force will be progressively reduced based on an 
     assessment of progress in civil implementation and the 
     security situation.

  This legislation uses the same link, the same tie to the actions of 
others already adopted in concept by this administration.

  In Kosovo, the U.N., E.U., and OSCE are the groups charged with the 
civil implementation responsibilities. Up to this point, I must say 
quite plainly, these organizations are not doing the job they committed 
to do in a timely manner in Kosovo. The successful NATO-led military 
operation in Kosovo was undertaken--at personal risk to our troops and 
those of other nations, and with billions of dollars in costs to the 
American taxpayers and the taxpayers of other nations--with the 
understanding in America and, indeed, throughout Europe that the U.N. 
and other organizations would promptly move in behind and consolidate 
the military achievements. Now, as a result of little progress in that 
consolidation, U.S. troops and troops from over 30 nations, are 
required to perform almost all the tasks and are facing an indefinite 
deployment and indefinite risk in Kosovo.
  Personal bravery, international bonds of commitment, and prudent NATO 
leadership won the war in Kosovo, but will the slow pace of follow-on 
actions result in the loss of the peace? That is what we are facing.
  Recent events in Mitrovica show how fragile the peace is in Kosovo 
and how time and unfulfilled commitments play into the hands of those 
who oppose the peace, and there are several factions that oppose this 
peace.
  During a hearing in the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 2 
with NATO commander General Clark as the witness, I and other Members 
signaled our intention to take legislative action in connection with 
the upcoming Kosovo supplemental to be proposed by President Clinton. 
It has not as yet arrived in the Senate. It is to revitalize the near 
stagnant situation in Kosovo. That is the purpose of this amendment.
  Congress has a coequal responsibility with the executive branch, and 
we now must exercise leadership, again I say, hopefully in partnership 
with the administration. This is not a political document. Many went in 
with the best of intentions, but it is time we recognize that no matter 
how sincere those intentions may have been, we are not collectively, as 
a group of nations, fulfilling our responsibilities.
  We, a growing number of Senators, state:

       Other nations and organizations must follow through on 
     their commitments if U.S. troops are to remain a part of the 
     Kosovo military force.

  The United States has far too many commitments around the world. Our 
military is stretched too thin as it is. We cannot have an open-ended, 
possibly decades-long military deployment in the Balkans.
  We, together with other nations, went into Kosovo with the best of 
intentions--to stop the slaughter of tens of thousands of innocent 
people, to restore peace and stability to that region, and to help the 
people of Kosovo rebuild lives shattered by war and ethnic cleansing. 
But what has the situation achieved? What has this coalition really 
achieved? Clearly, the military has fulfilled its mission. To the 
extent possible, given the continued ethnic animosities--and how 
extraordinarily they persist--the military has stopped the large-scale 
fighting and created a relatively safe and secure environment, from a 
military perspective. However, unacceptable dangerous levels of 
criminal activity continue and put our troops and many others at risk. 
Therefore, we have little time left in which to address this problem. 
We have to figure out, given the precious little progress that has 
taken place to date, what we can do in the future. This is one idea by 
a very conscientious and thoughtful group of Senators.

  We must recognize the U.N. bears its share of the responsibility. We 
only say that because the U.N. cannot share all the blame or accept all 
the blame for the slow pace of progress in Kosovo. But we are mindful 
of the fact that international organizations are dependent on timely 
contributions of money and personnel from member nations. In other 
words, the U.N. acts as a funneling of these funds as they are 
contributed pursuant to commitments by the various nations. These 
contributions have been severely lacking, severely delayed in the case 
of Kosovo.
  When I was in Pristina in January, I had the opportunity to meet with 
Dr. Kouchner--an extraordinary man--the head of the UNMIK, the U.N. 
mission in Kosovo. He is a very dedicated and committed individual. He 
has given up much of his private life to go into that area to do the 
very best he can.
  We conducted that meeting with General Reinhardt at the KFOR 
headquarters, the headquarters, I might add, which on that particular 
night did not even have running water and the electricity was 
flickering. It is just an example of the inability to deliver the very 
basic necessities.
  I remember Dr. Kouchner said that night--he was bitterly cold--that 
there were people literally huddled in their homes without adequate 
food, heat, shelter, and the like, and it could have been alleviated, 
to some degree, had these nations stepped up and met their commitments.
  As I said, I was impressed with the professionalism and dedication of 
the general and Dr. Kouchner.
  Dr. Kouchner sounded a consistent and urgent theme. He desperately 
needed money if the U.N. was to achieve its goals in Kosovo. Dr. 
Kouchner has been going from capital to capital across Europe and, 
indeed, in this hemisphere--he visited here just a few days ago--urging 
nations to live up to the commitments they made, to send the money for 
his mission. General Reinhardt has been supporting Dr. Kouchner in his 
efforts, since the general understands the KFOR troops continue to bear 
the full burden if the U.N. mission does not succeed and the missions 
of all the organizations. According to General Reinhardt:

       The problem for Bernard Kouchner is that he doesn't get the 
     money to pay for what he knows he needs and wants for Kosovo. 
     . . . The international community--the same governments that 
     decided to get us here--doesn't give him what . . . he needs, 
     and it has a direct impact on my soldiers.

  On Monday, March 6, Dr. Kouchner and General Reinhardt, as I said, 
were at the U.N. to report to the Security Council on the situation in 
Kosovo. Dr. Kouchner told the Security Council:

       If we hope to build democracy in Kosovo, we must do more 
     than ensure the safety of its residents. We must allocate the 
     necessary resources to accomplish the job.

  I agree. Foreign donors must deliver immediately, as the United 
States has done, on their commitments and promises.
  My greatest concern is with the international police. The U.N. has 
said it needs an international police force of

[[Page S1376]]

4,718. To date, only 2,359 police have arrived in Kosovo. It is 
interesting, just about half of what was projected. The United States 
has done its share. We have already deployed 481 police, and the 
remaining police pledged by the U.S.--for a total of 550--will arrive 
in Kosovo shortly. Others, particularly Europeans, have to do their 
share by providing the necessary police forces. Overall, nations have 
pledged over 4,400 police. They must now deliver on these pledges. 
Pledges do not help with the current violence. We need to put it in 
words that Americans understand: ``Cops on the beat.''
  I commend my distinguished ranking member, Senator Levin, who has 
constantly hit that theme in open sessions over and over again. To a 
large measure, he joins me in the purport of this amendment. Hopefully, 
in the weeks to come, with his advice, and with others advice, we can, 
to the extent necessary--maybe not necessary--reconfigure some of the 
language of this amendment.
  We had a meeting today with officials of our administration in the 
Armed Services hearing, again, to show the amendment and to urge them 
to come forward and give us such suggestions as they wish to make.
  I spoke, by phone, with Secretary Cohen and National Security Adviser 
Berger. It is not as if we are out here operating on our own. We are 
trying to do our best. But remember, Congress has coequal 
responsibility and must exercise its best leadership.
  NATO's soldiers must get out of the business of policing. That will 
not happen until enough police arrive. Our troops are not policemen. 
They were not specifically trained, as I said, to perform these tasks. 
It should not be a part of their continuing indefinite mission.
  Since the air war began almost a year ago, the United States has 
spent over $5 billion for our military operations in Kosovo--$5 
billion. It was for a good cause. But $5 billion is desperately needed 
by our military today for its modernization. The distinguished chairman 
of the Appropriations Committee, at lunch--and the Presiding Officer 
was there--recounted program after program in terms of the airlift, the 
aging C-5, the aging C-41, the need to up the buy of the C-17. That is 
where these needed dollars are required.
  The annual price tag for the military commitment is over $2 billion 
in Kosovo. This is a heavy burden on the defense budget, but we are 
going to, hopefully, get it in the supplemental so that we do not take 
it, as we say, out of their operating accounts. That is the importance 
of this supplemental. Plus, it is a heavy burden on the American 
taxpayer.

  In addition to these significant sums of money, I am concerned, 
again, about the safety and welfare of the men and women in uniform. I 
will come back to that on every single pace. Each day that I am 
privileged to be a member of the Armed Services Committee--and now as 
its chairman--I think and begin every day asking myself: What is my 
obligation to work with this committee to better the lot of the men and 
women of the Armed Forces and their families?
  They are patrolling these towns and villages--as you and I are in 
this Chamber, and others--subjecting themselves to substantial personal 
risk while performing their duties. They are taking the risks. The 
American people take the risks.
  I believe we have reached a point in time where it is the 
responsibility of the Congress to take action to ensure that others 
step up and fulfill their commitments--other nations and 
organizations--and that the U.S. military commitment to Kosovo not 
remain an endless commitment.
  I place this draft in the Senate Record of today, rather than 
formally filing the amendment, to show our determination to put forth a 
constructive approach, not a ``cut and run''--there is never any 
intention to do that--but accountability for all trying to secure a 
lasting peace in Kosovo. That is the bottom line. I did not file it, so 
that, if necessary--if we get a good set of suggestions--we can change 
this document and improve it.
  I believe the American people will continue to support the U.S. 
involvement in Kosovo. I know they will if they know that our President 
and their Congress are acting in partnership, in concert, to get this 
job done that is fair to all. They want to see our allies also step up 
and be accountable and to do their part.
  I think--and I say this humbly--this proposal will help do just this. 
We invite the comments and suggestions of all.
  I thank the Presiding Officer, and others, for joining me in this 
effort.
  I yield the floor.

                             Exhibit No. 1


                            amendment no.--

(Purpose: To limit the use of funds for support of military operations 
                               in Kosovo)

       At the appropriate place, insert:

       Sec. __. (a) Of the amounts appropriated in this Act under 
     the heading ``overseas contingency operations transfer fund'' 
     for military operations in Kosovo, not more than 50 percent 
     may be obligated until the President certifies in writing to 
     Congress that the European Commission, the member nations of 
     the European Union, and the European member nations of the 
     North Atlantic Treaty Organization have provided at least 33 
     percent of the amount of assistance committed by these 
     organizations and nations for 1999 and 2000 for 
     reconstruction in Kosovo, at least 75 percent of the amount 
     of assistance committed by them for 1999 and 2000 for 
     humanitarian assistance in Kosovo, at least 75 percent of the 
     amount of assistance committed by them for 1999 and 2000 for 
     the Kosovo Consolidated Budget, and at least 75 percent of 
     the number of police, including special police, pledged by 
     them for the United Nations international police force for 
     Kosovo.
       (b) The President shall submit to Congress, with any 
     certification submitted by the President under subsection 
     (a), a report containing detailed information on--
       (1) the commitments and pledges made by each organization 
     and nation referred to in subsection (a) for reconstruction 
     assistance in Kosovo, humanitarian assistance in Kosovo, the 
     Kosovo Consolidated Budget, and police (including special 
     police) for the United Nations international police force for 
     Kosovo;
       (2) the amount of assistance that has been provided in each 
     category, and the number of police that have been deployed to 
     Kosovo, by each such organization or nation; and
       (3) the full range of commitments and responsibilities that 
     have been undertaken for Kosovo by the United Nations, the 
     European Union, and the Organization for Security and 
     Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the progress made by those 
     organizations in fulfilling those commitments and 
     responsibilities, an assessment of the tasks that remain to 
     be accomplished, and an anticipated schedule for completing 
     those tasks.
       (c) If the President does not submit to Congress a 
     certification and report under subsections (a) and (b) on or 
     before June 1, 2000, then, beginning on June 2, 2000, the 50 
     percent of the amounts appropriated in this Act under the 
     heading ``overseas contingency operations transfer fund'' for 
     military operations in Kosovo that remain unobligated (as 
     required by subsection (a)) shall be available only for the 
     purpose of conducting a safe, orderly, and phased withdrawal 
     of United States military personnel from Kosovo, and no other 
     amounts appropriated for the Department of Defense in this 
     Act or any Act enacted before the date of the enactment of 
     this Act may be obligated to continue the deployment of 
     United States military personnel in Kosovo. In that case, the 
     President shall submit to Congress, not later than June 30, 
     2000, a report on the plan for the withdrawal.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I understand that we are in morning 
business and that Senators may be recognized for 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. I ask unanimous consent that I be given up to 10 
minutes to make my remarks in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________