[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 25 (Wednesday, March 8, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1302-S1304]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            NUCLEAR WEAPONS

  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, the question of how to write Federal laws 
and consider treaties that enable our armed forces and diplomats to 
protect and defend the people of the United States is both important 
and difficult for Members of Congress to answer. To write laws that 
keep America safe, we must evaluate today's threats and tomorrow's 
threats, we must consider the plans presented by our military to meet 
those threats, and we must be vigilant against the understandable 
tendency to want to withdraw from the world. We must remember those 
moments in our past when lack of preparation and planning resulted in 
terrible loss and then prepare to defend against threats we face.
  We must also remember that freedom is not free, and that the price 
paid by

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those men and women who choose to serve us in active, reserve, and 
National Guard duty is considerable. They serve the nation. They are 
not just in the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and 
the Coast Guard; they are in the United States Army, the United States 
Navy, the United States Air Force, the United States Marine Corps, and 
the United States Coast Guard. This is a real distinction with a real 
difference.
  The difference is that United States forces do not just defend 
American shores. They defend liberty around the world. In the confused 
aftermath of the cold war, one thing should be abundantly clear: The 
fight for freedom is worth the price. From the end of the Vietnam War 
in 1975 to the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 there was an active 
debate about the value and importance of this fight. However, the sight 
of tens of millions of men and women celebrating the end of a political 
system that denied them freedom thrilled even those grown cynical about 
the value of cold war expenditures. The intellectual debate about the 
value of communism ended when we saw and examined the destruction that 
was done by political tyranny. The human spirit was reduced and 
squandered. The air, the water, and the health of the people were 
sacrificed. Even the development of economic standards of living--long 
thought to be comparable to America's--were shockingly inferior.
  Four times in my Senate career I have heard world leaders speak to 
joint sessions of the Congress to praise the price paid by America for 
their freedom. Duly elected as Presidents of newly freed people, each 
stood before us and spoke. Lech Walesa thanked us on behalf of the 
people of Poland. Nelson Mandela thanked us on behalf of the people of 
South Africa. Vaclav Havel thanked us on behalf of the people of 
Czechoslovakia. And Kim Dae Jung thanked us on behalf of the people of 
South Korea. Their message was simple: If the United States had not 
taken their side in the struggle for freedom, they would not have 
succeeded.
  Certainly we have made mistakes. Our actions have not been free of 
treachery, deceit, and failure. Sometimes our actions have brought 
shame and disgrace. Yet, we should allow ourselves to learn and be 
guided by these failures. We cannot permit them to discourage us from 
continuing the work of writing laws that enable us to hold the ground 
we have won and to continue, most of all, the effort on behalf of 
others held captive by the world's remaining dictators or those who 
choose to terrorize us with their unlawful actions.
  This rather long opening leads me to a simple discussion of just one 
of the questions we need to answer before we write the laws and 
negotiate the treaties that determine the nature, size, and shape of 
our defenses. The question is this: What nuclear force structure is 
needed to provide a minimal level of safety to the people of the United 
States? My intent in beginning this way is to make certain that I 
approach this question with the requisite seriousness to ensure that my 
answer will defend America rather than defending an ideology.
  The person who has been given the authority to command our strategic 
nuclear forces lives at Offut Air Force Base adjacent to Bellevue, NE. 
As Commander in Chief of Strategic Forces--or STRATCOM--his 
responsibility is to carry out the orders and instructions given to him 
by the President through his Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have had the 
pleasure and honor of visiting STRATCOM on many occasions. On each of 
those occasions I have been briefed on the plans and mission of our 
strategic nuclear forces. On each of these occasions, I have left with 
pride and enthusiasm for the patriotism, energy, and talent of the men 
and women who serve at STRATCOM. On every occasion I have left with the 
impression that Americans are getting their money's worth from this 
effort. With this in mind, I think it is important to describe for the 
American people what STRATCOM is and what it does.
  The mission of STRATCOM is simple, but it is also deadly serious. 
Their mission is to ``deter major military attack, and if deterrence 
fails, employ forces.'' In this effort, Adm. Richard Mies, the 
Commander of STRATCOM, controls the most effective and lethal set of 
armaments ever assembled by human beings: The strategic nuclear force 
of the United States of America. Yet, nearly a decade after the end of 
the cold war, many Americans no longer have an appreciation for the 
size and power of this force. I would like to take this opportunity to 
describe the force Admiral Mies controls.
  First, America's strategic nuclear weapons are based on a triad of 
delivery systems: Land-based, sea-based, and strategic bombers. The 
U.S. relies on this triad to ensure credibility and survivability. 
Because our forces are diversified in this way, a potential enemy must 
recognize that, regardless of any hostile action, the United States 
would be able to retaliate with overwhelming force.
  Currently, the U.S. has about 500 Minutemen III and 50 Peacekeeper 
missiles in the land-based arsenal. While some of the Minuteman III 
missiles are being modified to accept single warheads, the bulk of 
these missiles are armed with three warheads. These warheads have a 
yield ranging from 170 to 335 kilotons. The 50 Peacekeeper missiles are 
each armed with 10 individually targetable warheads with a yield of 300 
kilotons. In other words, our current land-based force alone can, upon 
an order and instruction from the President of the United States, 
deliver approximately 2,000 warheads to 2,000 targets on over 500 
delivery vehicles with a total yield of about 550 megatons.

  In itself, this is an awesome force. But it is only the beginning of 
what is available to U.S. military planners. At sea, we have 18 Ohio-
class submarines. These are the ultimate in survivability, able to stay 
undetected at sea for long periods of time. As such, our submarine 
force must give pause to any potential aggressor. Eight of these boats 
carries 24 C-4 missiles. Each of these missiles are loaded with eight 
warheads with 100 kilotons of yield. The other 10 subs carry 24 of the 
updated D-5 missiles. These missiles are also equipped with eight 
warheads with varying degrees of yield from 100 to 475 kilotons.
  This is close to 1,500 additional targets that we are able to hit 
accurately and rapidly, if the President of the United States merely 
gives the order--an awesome force, again, all by itself to be able to 
deter individuals or nation states from taking action against the 
United States.
  The third leg of the triad, the strategic bomber force, includes both 
the B-2 and the B-52 bomber. These bombers have the capacity to carry 
1,700 warheads via nuclear bombs and air-launched cruiser missiles.
  Talking about this force, I use--and others do as well--words such as 
``yield'' and ``kilotons'' or ``megatons.'' Unfortunately, most of 
these words to a lot of us have very little meaning. On previous 
occasions, I have come to the floor to describe what a single 100-
kiloton weapon would do to one American city, the kind of destruction 
not just to that American city but to the American economy, as well as 
to the psyche of the American people who would, to put it mildly, be 
terrorized as a consequence of this single action. I don't want to 
recount that narrative today, but I do think it is important for us to 
try to put the power of these weapons in perspective. Oftentimes we 
don't. The numbers are so large and the weapons systems so numerous 
that we get dulled in our recognition of what they can do.
  Let me use one example. On August 6, 1945, the Enola Gay dropped the 
first atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. That and the 
subsequent bombing of Nagasaki ended World War II. Little Boy was the 
name of the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. It destroyed 90 percent 
of the city. Instantly, 45,000 of this city's 250,000 inhabitants were 
killed. Within days, another 19,000 had died from the aftereffects of 
the bomb. This bomb had a yield of 15 kilotons. A 300-kiloton warhead 
such as can be found on top of our Peacekeeper missile is 20 times as 
powerful. We don't have in our strategic arsenal a weapon that is under 
100 kilotons. Each of the 50 Peacekeeper missiles in our arsenal 
carries 10 of these 300-kiloton weapons. In all, Admiral Mies, under 
orders from the President of the United States, can deliver 6,000 
strategic nuclear warheads with an approximate yield of over 1,800 
megatons.

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  Mr. President, I think it is very important, as we debate what our 
nuclear weapons system needs to be, that we understand this concept and 
that we sort of take a map and use some common sense and try to 
evaluate what 6,000 nuclear weapons with over 100 kilotons of yield 
each could do to targets inside of our principal reason for deterrence, 
maintaining that arsenal, and that is Russia today.
  I think common sense would cause us to pause and wonder whether or 
not we are keeping a level of weapons beyond what is necessary.
  The purpose of this description is to give my colleagues a sense of 
this force and what this force could do if brought to bear by order of 
our Commander in Chief. I think it is fair for the American people to 
ask, first, what is the purpose of this force. According to the 2000 
edition of the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the President 
and to Congress:

       Nuclear forces remain a critical element of the U.S. policy 
     of deterrence.

  Simply put, the United States maintains its nuclear arsenal to guard 
against an attack from any potential weapons of mass destruction 
threat. I think it is important for us as well to examine these 
potential threats and ask if our current nuclear forces are structured 
to adequately address them.
  As I see it, there are three main sources of threat for which we must 
maintain a nuclear deterrent. The first is the threat from rogue 
nations like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. While the United States must 
remain vigilant in the effort to confront the weapons of mass 
destruction programs of these nations, there is no evidence that any of 
these countries currently possess nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it 
would be hard to justify the expenditure of approximately $25 billion a 
year to maintain an arsenal of over 6,000 warheads to defend against 
the threat posed by rogue nations.
  If not rogue nations, what about China? While the threat from China 
has gotten a lot of attention lately, press accounts indicate the 
Chinese have no more than 20 land-based nuclear missiles capable of 
reaching the United States. Also according to the media, Chinese 
nuclear weapons are not kept on continual alert. Rather, nuclear 
warheads and liquid fuel tanks are stored separate from their missiles. 
It would take time for the Chinese to fuel, arm, and launch these 
weapons. Now, just one of these weapons would cause immense pain and 
devastation, but the likelihood of their use, accidental or 
intentional, is low. Once again, the maintenance of over 6,000 warheads 
is hardly justified by China's 20 missiles.
  The only other threat that can justify our nuclear force levels is 
the Russian nuclear arsenal. But what is the current state of the 
Russian nuclear arsenal?
  The Russian military relies on the same triad of delivery systems as 
we do. In their land-based arsenal, the Russians have approximately:
  180 SS-18 missiles with 10 warheads at 550 kiloton yields each,
  They have 160 SS-19 missiles with six warheads at 550 kiloton yields 
each.
  They have 86 SS-24 missiles with 10 warheads at 550 kilotons yields 
each.
  They have 360 SS-25 missiles with a single warhead each at 550 
kiloton yield, and they have
  10 SS-27 Topol M missiles with a single warhead at 550 kiloton yield.
  This is obviously an impressive force. Any one of these weapons could 
devastate an American city or cities. But the Russians are finding that 
many of these missiles are nearing the end of the service-lives. And 
budgetary constraints have slowed the pace of acquisition of their 
latest land-based missile, the Topol M, to the point at which they are 
having trouble maintaining the numbers of weapons that will be allowed 
under the START treaties.
  The collapse of the Russian economy, and the resulting strain on the 
Russian military budget, has also had disastrous consequences for the 
Russian Navy. Russia now has less than 30 operational nuclear-armed 
submarines. In fact, the slow op tempo of Russian submarines has meant 
that at certain times none of these boats are at sea. Regardless, 
reports indicate these subs maintain almost 350 nuclear delivery 
vehicles with more than 1,500 available warheads.
  The Russian Air Force has also suffered. At the end of 1998, Russia 
had about 70 strategic bombers, but not all of these were operational. 
Estimates are Russian strategic bombers have about 800 warheads on both 
nuclear bombs and air launched cruise missiles.
  Mr. President, the overall picture of the Russian arsenal force is 
that it is deadly, but it is decaying as well at an extremely rapid 
rate. Russian generals have said that they see a time in the near 
future when the Russian strategic arsenal will be measured not in 
thousands but in hundreds of weapons. It is this decay in the Russian 
arsenal which I believe poses the greatest threat to the United States 
and should encourage us to do more to find ways in which to achieve 
significant parallel nuclear reductions.
  Some will argue that we have in the process already a way to achieve 
those reductions and it is called START. Yet even if START II is 
ratified by the Russian Duma, the United States and Russia would still 
have 3,500 nuclear warheads on each side at the end of 2007. We can't 
afford to wait over 7 years to make reductions that leave the Russians 
with still more weapons than they can control.
  In response, some argue not to worry, START II is going to be quickly 
followed by START III. In discussions with the Russians on a possible 
START III treaty, the United States has told Russia that we are not 
willing to go below the 2,000- to 2,500-warhead threshold. This number 
is based on a 1997 study on U.S. minimum deterrence needs completed by 
the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili.
  While I have no doubt that this report was professionally prepared 
and evaluated on criteria available at the time, I believe strongly it 
is time to redo this study. The current size of the United States and 
Russian nuclear arsenals is not based on any rational assessment of 
need; rather, it is a relic of the cold war. As the former commander of 
STRATCOM, Gen. Eugene Habiger, has said, ``The cold war was a unique 
war. And when the war ended, the loser really didn't lose. We still had 
this massive military might on both sides staring each other in the 
face.''
  As I have described the accuracy, diversity, and power of our nuclear 
arsenal, I find it difficult to argue that the men and women at 
STRATCOM will be able to accomplish their objective of deterring attack 
with far fewer weapons. I don't know what the magic number is for 
minimum deterrence, but given our cooperative relationship with Russia, 
given the fact Russia is about to hold its third democratic election 
for President, and given our conventional and intelligence 
capabilities, I am confident we can deter any aggressor with less than 
6,000, or 3,500, or even 2,000 warheads. It is time we begin the 
process to come up with a realistic estimate of our deterrence needs.
  As long as nuclear weapons remain a reality in this world, the men 
and women at STRATCOM will have a job to do in defending our Nation. 
Their contribution to our safety cannot be underestimated. But just as 
they have a responsibility, we have a responsibility to act in a way 
that will decrease the danger of nuclear weapons and increase the 
safety and security of the American people.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.

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