[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 21 (Wednesday, March 1, 2000)]
[House]
[Pages H603-H609]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                   IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1999

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order 
at any time today to take from the Speaker's table H.R. 1883, with 
Senate amendments thereto, and to consider in the House a motion 
offered by the Chairman of the Committee on International Relations or 
his designee that the House concur in the Senate amendments; that the 
Senate amendments and the motion be considered as read; that the motion 
be debatable for 1 hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman 
and ranking member of the Committee on International Relations, or 
their designees; and that the previous question be considered as 
ordered on the motion to final adoption without intervening motion or 
demand for division of the question.
  The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the motion offered by the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the unanimous consent request 
just agreed to, I call up the bill (H.R. 1883) to provide for the 
application of measures to foreign persons who transfer to Iran certain 
goods, services, or technology, and for other purposes.

[[Page H604]]

  The Clerk read the title of the bill.


                      Motion Offered By Mr. Gilman

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.
  The SPEAKER. The Clerk will designate the motion.
  The text of the motion is as follows:

       Mr. Gilman moves to concur in the Senate amendments to H.R. 
     1883.

  The text of the Senate amendments is as follows:

       Senate Amendments: Page 2, line 3, strike out ``1999'' and 
     insert ``2000''.
       Page 5, line 7, strike out all after ``Order'' down to and 
     including ``person.'' in line 8 and insert ``No. 12938.''.
       Page 5, Line 9, strike out all after ``prohibition.--'' 
     down to and including ``terminate'' in line 12 and insert 
     ``Prohibition on United States Government sales to that 
     foreign person of any item on the United States Munitions 
     List as in effect on August 8, 1995, and termination of''.
       Page 5, Lines 16 and 17, strike out ``The President shall 
     deny licenses and suspend'' and insert ``Denial of licenses 
     and suspension of''.
       Page 8, after line 23, insert:
       ``(b) Opportunity To Provide Information.--Congress urges 
     the President--
       ``(1) in every appropriate case, to contact ion a timely 
     fashion each foreign person identified in each report 
     submitted pursuant to section 2(a), or the government with 
     primary jurisdiction over such person, in order to afford 
     such person, or governments, the opportunity to provide 
     explanatory, exculpatory, or other additional information 
     with respect to the transfer that caused such person to be 
     identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a); 
     and
       ``(2) to exercise the authority in subsection (a) in all 
     cases where information obtained from a foreign person 
     identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a), or 
     from the government with primary jurisdiction over such 
     person, establishes that the exercise of such authority is 
     warranted.''.
       Page 8, line 24, strike out ``(b)'' and insert ``(c)''.
       Page 9, line 11, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       Page 9, lines 12 and 13, strike out ``Russian Space 
     Agency'' and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       Page 10, Lines 11 and 12, strike out ``through the 
     implementation of concrete steps''.
       Page 10, Line 16, strike out all after ``systems'' down to 
     and including ``transfers'' in line 18.
       Page 10, Line 19, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       Page 10, Line 21, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       Page 11, Line 25, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       Page 12, Line 2, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       Page 13, Line 6, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       Page 13, Line 8, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       Page 13, Line 10, after ``Module'' insert ``, and for the 
     purchase (at a total cost not to exceed $14,000,000) of the 
     pressure dome for the Interim Control Module and the 
     Androgynous Peripheral Docking Adapter and related hardware 
     for the United States propulsion module,''.
       Page 13, line 15, after ``no'' insert ``credible''.
       Page 17, lines 15 and 16, strike out ``Russian Space 
     Agency'' and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       Page 17, lines 17 and 18, strike out ``Russian Space 
     Agency'' and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       Page 18, lines 1 and 2, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' 
     and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian 
     Space Agency''.
       Page 18, line 6, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space 
     Agency''.
       Page 18, line 10, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       Page 18, lines 13 and 14, strike out ``Russian Space 
     Agency'' and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or 
     Russian Space Agency''.
       Page 18, line 15, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space 
     Agency''.
       Page 18, Line 16, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space 
     Agency''.

  The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the order of the House today, the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. 
Gejdenson) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).


                             General Leave

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
on H.R. 1883.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, we have before us H.R. 1883, the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act of 2000. This measure was introduced by the 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Berman), and myself on May 20 of last year. There are almost 230 
cosponsors on this measure.
  When it came to a vote in the House last September, it was approved 
by a vote of 419 to 0. This vote was even more remarkable when one 
considers that the administration sent us a letter just before the 
House voted stating that the President's senior advisors would 
recommend that he veto the bill. Obviously, the administration's plea 
that we not approve the bill, that we instead allow more time for 
diplomacy, was rejected unanimously by the House.
  Just last week, the measure came up in the Senate, and the Senate 
brushed aside the administration's objection and approved the bill by a 
significant vote of 98 to 0.
  The unanimity of both chambers of Congress and the strong bipartisan 
support for this measure should send a powerful signal to would-be 
proliferators to Iran. Our Nation will not accept the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and missiles to Iran.
  Mr. Speaker, this situation is true today, and it will remain true 
even if the encouraging political developments we are beginning to 
observe in Iran lead eventually to major improvements in Iranian 
foreign policy. The fact is a democratic Iran at peace with itself and 
with the rest of the world will not need or want weapons of mass 
destruction, nor will they need any missiles capable of delivering such 
weapons.
  Political change in Iran may ultimately eliminate the need for this 
kind of legislation. But such change will never make us regret enacting 
it. Indeed, we fully expect that the leaders of a democratic and a 
peaceful Iran would have no complaints about this legislation because 
it would be wholly consistent with the policies that they would pursue.
  For now, however, Iran is continuing its programs to develop weapons 
of mass destruction, and this poses a great threat to our Nation, to 
our military personnel in the Persian Gulf, and to our friends and 
allies throughout the region. This legislation states to those nations 
and entities that are helping Iran's weapons programs that they must 
stop or face severe consequences.
  I am confident that the unanimous vote in both houses of Congress 
will compel the President to reconsider the administration's threat to 
veto this legislation.
  I want to clarify for the record that no major substantive changes in 
the legislation were made by the Senate amendment that was adopted last 
week. Due to the courtesy of the chief sponsors of the Senate companion 
measure to H.R. 1838, most notably Senators Lott and Lieberman, I was 
fully involved in developing the Senate amendment. Indeed, two of the 
most significant changes it made was suggested by me to the sponsors of 
the Senate amendment. I can assure our colleagues the changes suggested 
were intended to strengthen, not weaken, this measure.
  Most importantly, Mr. Speaker, the Senate amendment did not convert 
the bill from a mandatory sanctions bill into a bill merely authorizing 
the imposition of sanctions, as has been reported by the press. This 
bill always afforded the President discretion, discretion with regard 
to the imposition of sanctions, except in the case of the proliferation 
by entities under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation 
and Space Agency. The Senate amendment preserved that structure.
  In order to underscore that the Senate amendment was almost entirely 
cosmetic in nature, I prepared a summary of the changes made by that 
amendment. This summary makes clear that the bill was not weakened in 
any way by the Senate amendment.

[[Page H605]]

  Mr. Speaker, I include the summary for the Record as follows:

Summary of Senate Amendment to H.R. 1883, Iran Nonproliferation Act of 
                                  2000

       During the Senate's consideration of the Iran 
     Nonproliferation Act on February 24, 2000, a manager's 
     amendment was adopted making a number of minor changes in the 
     bill. These changes were largely technical or cosmetic in 
     nature. They include.
       The name of the bill was changed from the ``Iran 
     Nonproliferation Act of 1999'' to the ``Iran Nonproliferation 
     Act of 2000''.
       The word ``shall'' was deleted at several places in the 
     bill dealing with the possible imposition of sanctions on 
     entities that transfer weapons technology to Iran. This was 
     done to emphasize the fact (which is explicit elsewhere in 
     the House-passed bill) that the imposition of such sanctions 
     is discretionary rather than mandatory.
       Language was inserted to emphasize that the president may 
     contact entities suspected of transferring weapons technology 
     to Iran in order to afford them an opportunity to demonstrate 
     that they did not make such transfers. Again, this concept 
     was already contained in the House-passed bill.
       The name ``Russian Space Agency'' was changed to ``Russian 
     Aviation and Space Agency'' most places that it appears in 
     the bill in order to reflect the fact that the name of the 
     agency has been officially changed by the Russian Government.
       One element of the certification that the President would 
     have to make in order to provide Russian ``extraordinary 
     payments in connection with the International Space Station'' 
     was revised to eliminate a requirement that Russia 
     demonstrate its commitment to stop proliferation to Iran by 
     implementing ``concrete steps''. The key element of this 
     certification was not changed, however. The President would 
     still have to certify that there is no credible information 
     that any entity under the jurisdiction or control of the 
     Russian Aviation and Space Agency has proliferated to Iran 
     during the previous year in order to provide such 
     extraordinary payments to Russia.
       The Senate amendment expanded the exception to the bill's 
     restriction on providing Russia ``extraordinary payments in 
     connection with the International Space Station''. In 
     addition to extraordinary payments related to the Russian 
     Service Module (which were permitted under the House bill), 
     the amendment permits a total of no more than $14 million in 
     extraordinary payments by the United States in order to buy 
     from Russia two docking adaptors that will facilitate the 
     attachment of two U.S. modules to the International Space 
     Station. The conditions on making extraordinary payments 
     pursuant to the exception (e.g., no credible information that 
     a recipient of such payments has proliferated to Iran) remain 
     unchanged.

  Mr. Speaker, finally, I want to elaborate on one point that came up 
in the Senate debate on the measure. Senators Levin, Lott, and 
Lieberman agreed that, in deciding whether information is ``credible,'' 
and I put that in quotes, for purposes of the reporting requirement of 
this bill, the President is entitled to judge the credibility of 
information on the basis of all information available to him.
  This observation is unassailable so far as it goes. Obviously, one 
piece of information can be out of sync with all of the other available 
information that it is not believable. But this does not mean that 
incriminating information that is novel or surprising must be 
corroborated before it can be deemed credible.
  The Senators certainly did not mean to suggest that the President is 
entitled to judge one piece of specific information against the absence 
of other information, and on that basis conclude that one piece of 
information is not credible. Such will, in my estimation, be the 
typical case arising under this legislation, a piece of specific 
incriminating information will be found about a possible transfer, and 
there will be no other specific information pointing one way or another 
about that particular transfer. In this context, there really is no 
other available information against which the incriminating information 
can be judged. If the incriminating information is, on its face, 
believable, then the President will be required to report that 
situation to us pursuant to section 2(a) of the bill.
  The real point in here, Mr. Speaker, is the one emphasized in the 
report of the Committee on International Relations on the bill. The 
purpose of the credible information standard is to get away from the 
preponderance of the evidence standard the administration has applied 
under previous nonproliferation laws.

                              {time}  1330

  We do not want there to be any weighing of evidence or any burden of 
proof under the credible information standard. The test is whether the 
information is believable, not whether the President thinks it is 
likely true.
  I want to thank my colleagues for the support they provided to H.R. 
1883. And I urge them to once, again, cast a favorable vote on this 
measure.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I rise in strong support for this motion. While I have somewhat 
different interpretations than the chairman of the full committee, on 
some of the intent, the basic legislation does the job that we all 
sought to achieve in this nonproliferation act.
  What is clear is that the timing is somewhat unfortunate, as I think 
the chairman referenced so aptly in his remarks, because for the first 
time in many years, we are seeing within Iran the development of an 
opposition that seems to want to moderate the policies of that country.
  I certainly hope that no one would take that as a signal in this 
legislation that we have not recognized this great step forward, which 
is really a function, not of everything we have done or anything else, 
but a function of what the Iranians want for their country.
  No matter what happens around the globe, it is an important goal of 
this administration, and I think in the interests of the entire world, 
to restrict access to nuclear weapons, chemical, biological and missile 
technology. This is clearly a case where the world is not safer by more 
people having access to this technology.
  I think it is critically important for the Congress and the 
administration to work together to make sure that we do everything in 
our power, using Nunn-Lugar resources to reduce the availability of 
fissionable material and the technology expertise in the Soviet Union 
to further develop nuclear weapons and to proliferate.
  There are tremendous pressures in the Soviet Union, former Soviet 
Union, Russia, both from their own kind of old pride of having once 
been a major superpower; and I think, additionally, the pressures for 
economic advancement to sell some of these technologies. But it is not 
in the Russian's best interests. It is clearly not in the world's best 
interests. It is not in our best interests.
  I want to commend the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) 
and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and others who have 
participated in this legislation. It is an important piece of 
legislation. I am very excited to have it here on the floor, only 
somewhat distressed that it comes by accident of the Senate schedule 
today so close to what was a positive development in Iran.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time and I ask unanimous 
consent that the remainder of my time be controlled by the gentleman 
from Pennsylvania (Mr. Hoeffel).
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette.) Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from Connecticut?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner).
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 and urge my colleagues to vote in favor of 
this important message.
  In 1993, the administration invited Russia to join the International 
Space Station project. At the time the White House made it clear to 
Congress that Russian participation in the International Space Station 
was a key component of the administration's efforts to encourage Russia 
to adhere to a variety of nonproliferation norms and agreements.
  Many Members, myself included, expressed concerns about transforming 
the space station into a foreign policy program, but accepted the 
administration's argument that Russian involvement was important to 
halting the spread of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction.
  Since then, we have seen repeated reports in the Western and Russian 
media that a variety of Russian aerospace enterprises are assisting 
Iran's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic 
missiles. The CIA's 721 report of February 2, 2000 confirms these 
reports.
  Russia's aerospace enterprises are not private firms in the way U.S. 
companies are. In fact, most Russian aerospace enterprises are owned 
and operated by the Russian government.

[[Page H606]]

  In 1998 and 1999, the Russian government clarified its control of its 
aerospace industry by putting many of these Russian enterprises under 
the legal and economic jurisdiction of the Russian Aviation and Space 
Agency.
  Having paid the Russians some $800 million between 1994 and 1998, the 
administration announced in late 1999 its intention to make additional 
payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency.
  The administration's reliance on Russia has put the American taxpayer 
in the unacceptable position of possibly subsidizing the very Russian 
aerospace enterprises that are helping Iran develop weapons of mass 
destruction and ballistic missiles. The administration's current policy 
creates an unhealthy situation for both our space program and our 
nonproliferation efforts. H.R. 1883 addresses these concerns by 
requiring the President to make a determination about the extent of 
Russian assistance to Iran before NASA can make additional payments to 
the Russian aviation and space agency.
  Moreover, the bill holds the Russian government accountable by 
preventing payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency if it or 
any of the entities for which it is legally responsible are involved in 
inappropriate technical assistance to Iran. Certainly nobody in this 
body wants to see U.S. tax dollars inadvertently subsidizing the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles. H.R. 1883 helps prevent just such 
a prospect.
  While helping curb proliferation, the bill does not jeopardize the 
safety of our astronauts about the ISS or delay the delivery of the 
Russian hardware that NASA claims it requires in order to reduce U.S. 
dependence upon Russia in the space station program. Both of these 
issues are addressed in narrow and specific exceptions to the bill.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1883 is a sound step to prevent the spread of 
ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. It passed the House 
by a vote of 419 to 0 and the Senate by a vote of 98 to 0. I am proud 
to have joined the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the ranking 
minority member, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), and 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) as an original cosponsor of 
this bill and look forward to the day when the President signs it into 
law.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Berman).
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time, and I want to associate myself with the remarks of the previous 
speakers on this legislation.
  I rise in strong support of H.R. 1883. It gives the President 
authority to impose sanctions on foreign entities that supply Iran with 
technologies related to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and 
ballistic missiles.
  Two weeks ago we saw dramatic evidence of the yearning for change 
among the Iranian people. Despite efforts by the Council of Guardians 
to limit the pool of eligible candidates, reformers won an overwhelming 
majority in the Iranian parliament.
  Regrettably, this election landslide will not automatically translate 
into moderate Iranian policies. Supreme Leader Khameini and other 
conservative elements retain control over many institutions, including 
the securities services. And the intentions of President Khatemi and 
his reformist allies still are not completely clear.
  I would welcome an improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations, but a 
constructive and peaceful bilateral relationship must be based on 
Iran's willingness to abandon its quest for weapons of mass destruction 
and ballistic missiles, to drop its efforts to disrupt the Middle East 
peace process, and to improve its dismal human rights record. This 
legislation focuses on the first of these areas of concern. It goes 
without saying that an Iran armed with these fearsome weapons would be 
a serious threat to our allies in the Middle East and eventually the 
United States itself.
  Placing additional sanctions on Iran would have little if any effect, 
given that the U.S. has maintained a trade embargo on the Islamic 
Republic since the 1979 revolution. This legislation attempts to get at 
the problem by authorizing sanctions against foreign entities that 
continue to supply Iran with advanced technologies.
  According to a recent unclassified CIA report covering the first half 
of 1999, Iran remains, ``One of the most active countries seeking to 
acquire WMD technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting 
to develop an indigenous capability to produce various types of 
weapons, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. 
Iran focused its efforts to acquire WMD-related equipment, materials 
and technology primarily on entities in Russia, China, North Korea, and 
Western Europe.''
  The report goes on to say that ``entities in Russia and China 
continue to supply a considerable amount and a wide variety of 
ballistic missile-related goods and technology to Iran. Tehran is using 
these goods and technologies to support current production programs and 
to achieve its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of 
ballistic missiles.''
  It has additional comments on Iran's program with respect to nuclear 
weapons, which I will assert in my full statement. But, Mr. Speaker, 
these facts paint a very troubling picture. They reinforced my view 
that this legislation and other measures are absolutely necessary to 
prevent or at a minimum slow down Iranian acquisition of WMD and 
ballistic missiles.
  As the CIA report indicates, Russian entities have been among the 
worst proliferators to Iran. Some steps have been taken to prevent this 
technology transfer. Last year Russia passed a new export control law 
and placed monitors in key aerospace entities. Unfortunately, these 
modest efforts have not stopped the proliferation.
  I find it somewhat ironic that Russia objects so strenuously to U.S. 
deployment of a limited national missile defense system designed 
specifically to knock down missiles fired by countries like Iran, Iraq, 
and North Korea, given that the Russian entities are some of the 
primary suppliers of missile and WMD technology to those very 
governments and given that Russia may also be a target of those 
regimes.
  I am not under any illusions that this legislation will solve once 
and for all the problem of proliferation to Iran, but it is a step in 
the right direction, and more needs to be done. For example, we should 
initiate an intensive effort with our allies to develop a more 
effective multilateral export control regime to keep dangerous 
technologies out of the hands of anti-western regimes. The current 
Wassenaar arrangement simply is not up to doing the job.
  Last year we passed the Iran Nuclear Nonproliferation Act by a vote 
of 419 to 0, the Senate passed it by 98 to 0. I urge my colleagues to 
join me in supporting the Senate amendments today and sending the 
legislation on to the President.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Brady), a senior member of our committee.
  Mr. BRADY of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding 
me this time, and I thank him for his leadership on this important 
issue.
  There is no question the Senate has weakened in effect the strengths 
of this bill, but it is still very important that we go forward with 
it. It is still an important piece of legislation.
  Here is why. In this legislation we are giving Russia a clear choice. 
Russia can choose to continue to sell and arm America's deadliest 
enemies and to sell and arm Israel's deadliest enemies, or they can 
choose to be a partner in peace and prosperity and democracy with the 
United States. That is a fair choice for Russia to make.
  It is important to make the right decision because we all have a 
stake in their transition to democracy and to free enterprise as a 
nation. But it has been disappointing, and I think their conduct has 
been dangerous for America.
  Each year, in effect, Russia erects a tent, and to all within 
listening distance they proclaim, ``Come see the show on improving 
democracy and freedom in our nation.'' And each year America is the 
first in line with billions of dollars to help them make that 
transition. But each year when we walk inside the tent, it is empty, 
while out back, behind that tent, Russia is actively and aggressively 
selling technology and equipment to nations that simply are hateful to 
the United States and will disrupt the peace process in the Middle 
East.
  I think it is important that no American taxpayer have to finance our 
deadliest enemies. No veteran ought to be

[[Page H607]]

paying tax dollars so that Russia can arm our enemies. No single mom 
struggling to make ends meet ought to have her tax dollars going to 
damage our security. No service members, or members of our military, 
ought to ever have their dollars be used against them. But, in effect, 
today they are.
  I support this legislation. I support Russia making the right choice, 
and this choice is long overdue. As a member of the Committee on 
Science, I appreciate the leadership of the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) in 
adopting an amendment that I offered preserving the existing 
relationship with Russia on the space station. That was a very key part 
of this legislation, and overall this bill deserves our support.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Brady) 
for his supportive remarks, and I reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1345

  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to compliment the Chair of the Committee on 
International Relations for his leadership on this important issue. I 
want to thank the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), the 
ranking member, as well, and compliment both gentlemen for working 
together in a bipartisan fashion on this and so many other issues that 
bipartisanship serves our committee and this Congress well.
  The legislation before us, Mr. Speaker, is an attempt to stem the 
flow of weapons technology into Iran by authorizing the President to 
impose sanctions on nations and individuals that provide this weapons 
technology to Iran.
  The sanctions would include the denial of munitions, licenses, arms 
export, and dual-use licenses, and a halt to any United States foreign 
assistance.
  The bill requires the President to report to Congress when credible 
information exists of a transfer of dangerous weapons technology to 
Iran. The President must also report to Congress about whether he has 
imposed certain penalties on foreign persons as a result of such 
transfers.
  If the penalties are not imposed, the President must expose why those 
steps were not taken. The bill will also encourage the Russian Space 
Agency to cooperate with the United States in efforts to halt the 
proliferation of weapons technology to Iran by cutting off payments to 
that agency and to the International Space Station if those under its 
jurisdiction and control engage in such activities.
  We are all pleased by the initial reforms that are being made within 
Iran. Their recent elections give the world some hope that changes are 
coming. Unfortunately, while there are some encouraging signs, Iran's 
current policies continue to be a threat to the security of the world.
  There are four areas where Iran continues to threaten world peace. In 
the area of ballistic missiles, with their development of the Shahab 
missiles, at least one expert has testified to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee that the Iranians are working on a missile now with 
a range of 2,600 miles. We know that they have missiles with a range of 
1,200 miles and they are pushing ahead with this development.
  With nuclear issues, Iran is proceeding with plans to complete the 
1,000 megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr. While these nuclear plants 
probably are not able to be used for nuclear weapons purposes, the fear 
is that Iran will continue to obtain valuable expertise while building 
these plants that could be transferable to a nuclear weapons program.
  In the area of chemical and biological programs, while Iran signed 
and ratified the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the CIA reports that 
Iran continues to pursue purchasing dual-use biotechnical equipment 
from Russia and other countries ostensibly for civilian uses. Press 
reports indicate that they are also hiring Russian scientists.
  United States officials have publicly stated that Iran has a large 
chemical weapons program that has been made possible with the help of 
China; and Iran and North Korea reportedly have a relationship of 
exchanging missile technology.
  For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems continues to be one 
of the most significant threats to American national security.
  Rogue states like North Korea and Iran are actively pursuing 
ambitious ballistic missile programs and the technology needed to 
threaten our country and our allies. Iran's progress in this effort is 
being helped by the relationships with North Korea, with China, and 
with Russia.
  This legislation is a good first step that will send a signal to 
those who are aiding Iran that this aid will not be tolerated.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to 
emphasize again why we are sending this bill on to the President.
  Proliferation to Iran is a very serious threat to our Nation. It is 
one of the biggest threats we face today. Regrettably, entities in 
Russia and elsewhere have been actively engaged in this kind of 
proliferation. The bill sends a message, loud and clear, that our 
Nation cannot and will not do business as usual with such entities.
  We hope this legislation will inspire the governments of Russia, of 
China, and of other countries to do more to stop proliferation to Iran.
  North Korea is also a major concern when it comes to proliferation to 
the Middle East, and we need to take a good close look at that 
situation, as well.
  I want to assure my colleagues that our committee is going to remain 
vigilant.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 
1883, the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Any transfer of technology to Iran 
that would allow that country to develop weapons of mass destruction 
would represent a threat to Israel and other allies in the region.
  Passage of this measure sends a strong message to the international 
community. The United States will not be silent or inactive if any 
nation decides to aid Iran in production of weapons of mass 
destruction. By making it clear that we will impose sanctions on any 
authority that fuels Iran's dangerous motives, I hope we will be more 
successful in our efforts to prevent Iran's development of nuclear 
weapons.
  While the recent strong showing for reformers in Iran's parliamentary 
elections is encouraging, we still need to be extremely cautious and 
firm in our dealings with Iran. We must never allow any nation to 
develop weapons of mass destruction if we believe they may be targeted 
on our allies or on Americans. It is important to remember that Iran 
has been the world's largest exporter of terror for some time now and 
is an ardent opponent of the Middle East peace process. I am pleased to 
join my colleagues in supporting H.R. 1883 and sending the right 
message on behalf of all Americans, that we will not allow back-door 
maneuvers that aid Iran's dangerous plans for terror and destruction.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I speak today in strong support for the 
amended version of H.R. 1883, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999.
  Everyone in Congress is aware that Iran has continually threatened 
the peace and security of the Middle East. Iran is still committed to 
the destruction of Israel, opposes the Middle East peace process and 
supports terrorist groups such as Hamas. In fact, Iran remains the 
world's leading sponsor of international terrorism.
  Despite these very real security concerns, cash strapped Russia has 
supported the $800 million Bushehr project, a 1000-megawatt light-water 
reactor, in southern Iran. Why Iran needs such a reactor remains an 
open question because Iran has one of the world's largest oil and 
natural gas reserves. However, many security experts believe that such 
projects provide good cover to a nuclear weapons program and provide 
Iranian technicians with expertise in the development of nuclear 
weapons.
  Iran has successfully tested the Shabah-3 missile, which has a range 
of 800 miles, and has supplied Fajr rockets to Lebanon. These rockets 
are capable of hitting Haifa, and other parts of Israel. In fact, 
Iranian weapons supplied to Hamas are used against the Southern 
Lebanese Army, the Israeli Defense Forces and severely jeopardize the 
security of communities in Northern Israel.
  Iran's support of international terrorism poses a great risk to the 
Middle East and shows very clearly that Iran remains a threat to U.S. 
interests in the region. The results of an Iran armed with nuclear 
weapons are almost too horrifying to imagine. But, if current trends 
continue, it may become an all too real

[[Page H608]]

nightmare for the United States and our Middle Eastern allies.
  While I welcome the results of the recent parliamentary elections in 
Iran, I believe that we must wait and see if the victory of the 
reformists will translate into any real change. Before we start to re-
evaluate our policy, Iran needs to drastically change theirs, 
especially in areas of major concern to the U.S., such as non-
conventional weaponry and the support of terrorism. H.R. 1883 
reinforces those Congressional concerns and sends a clear message to 
countries that assist Iran's weapons program.
  I was proud to be an original cosponsor of the Iran Nuclear 
Proliferation Prevention Act of 1999, and I am proud to be a cosponsor 
of the Iran Nonproliferation Act.
  Mr. Speaker, the Senate passed the amended Iran Nonproliferation Act, 
98-0, last week and I urge my fellow Members to give this legislation 
the same overwhelming support on the floor today.
  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Speaker, I want to express my strong support for 
passage of the Senate amendments to the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Last 
week, this important legislation was approved by the Senate by 98 to 0. 
H.R. 1883 was originally approved by the House in September 1999.
  This important legislation gives the President the authority to 
impose sanctions against Russia or any other nation for supplying Iran 
with the technology to build missiles and chemical and biological 
weapons. The Iran Nonproliferation Act also provides for biannual 
reports on who around the world is transferring prohibited technology 
or information to Iran, and allows the President to take action against 
persons or entities found to be engaged in such activity.
  This bill also includes new steps to ensure the Russian Space Agency, 
which is a partner with NASA in the International Space Station 
project, is complying with Russia's official Iran anti-proliferation 
policy. If needed, the President is granted the authority to cut-off 
funds for the remaining payment of $590 million to the Russian Space 
Agency for helping the U.S. build the International Space Station. As 
much as we want to continue to work with Russia on joint efforts in 
space, we will not do so if they are contributing to this grave threat 
to our security. That said, the language as amended is much more 
workable in ensuring that the ISS moves forward.
  The threat is a very real and serious security concern for the United 
States and Israel, our nation's most-trusted ally in the Middle East. 
The CIA has reported Iran has the capability to launch a missile that 
will reach Israel, and it is well known that Iran is pursuing 
development of nuclear, chemical and biological weaponry. This 
legislation provides the Administration with useful tools to combat the 
spread of dangerous weapons technology and to discourage nuclear 
proliferation. H.R. 1883 also demonstrates our commitment to prevent 
the proliferation of dangerous nuclear weapons to countries that 
threaten our national security as well as the security of allies--such 
as Israel and Europe.
  The U.S. support for Israel must go beyond economic and military aid 
to Israel--it must meet the very real challenges that will face Israel 
and the United States in this new century, such as limiting the threats 
of weapons of mass destruction. It is well documented that technology 
provided to Iran increases its ability to develop its own intermediate 
range ballistic missile that is capable of reaching Israel as well as 
our European allies. By limiting Iran's access to such technology we 
can better protect these countries as well as our own troops in the 
Middle East and Europe.
  The people of Iran demonstrated in their recent elections an 
overriding desire to move toward reform and moderation in the future--
but it is too early to tell what this change will mean in practice. I 
hope that it is a sign that Iran will end its missile program and its 
support for international terrorism. This legislation also sends a 
strong message to Russia that U.S. aid and scientific collaboration 
will be limited if Russia doesn't stop missile proliferation to Iran. 
U.S. funding will be substantially limited unless the President 
certifies that the Russian Space Agency is not transferring technology 
to Iran. Acting Russian President Vladmir Putin has been receptive to 
restricting companies that sell missile technology and equipment to 
Iran. I hope his intentions are translated into action. Otherwise, our 
cooperation with Russia--both in space and elsewhere--may end.
  We live in a dangerous world--where terrorists and rogue nations are 
developing deadly weapons of mass destruction. Our action today will 
send a clear message to our allies and to our adversaries. By 
supporting this bipartisan legislation, we will demonstrate our 
commitment to limit nuclear proliferation and to create a safer, more 
stable world.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). Pursuant to the order of 
the House today, the previous question is ordered.
  The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Gilman).
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 420, 
nays 0, not voting 14, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 28]

                               YEAS--420

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Bliley
     Blumenauer
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Bono
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (FL)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth-Hage
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Conyers
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hansen
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (IN)
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     Kuykendall
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pease
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simpson

[[Page H609]]


     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Toomey
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--14

     Brown (OH)
     Campbell
     Cook
     Dingell
     Fowler
     Hall (TX)
     Kilpatrick
     Kleczka
     Larson
     Millender-McDonald
     Norwood
     Paul
     Vento
     Waters

                              {time}  1413

  So the motion was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated for:
  Mr. NORWOOD. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 28, I was unavoidably 
detained and, had I been present, I would have voted ``yea.''

                          ____________________