[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 21 (Wednesday, March 1, 2000)]
[House]
[Pages H603-H609]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1999
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order
at any time today to take from the Speaker's table H.R. 1883, with
Senate amendments thereto, and to consider in the House a motion
offered by the Chairman of the Committee on International Relations or
his designee that the House concur in the Senate amendments; that the
Senate amendments and the motion be considered as read; that the motion
be debatable for 1 hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman
and ranking member of the Committee on International Relations, or
their designees; and that the previous question be considered as
ordered on the motion to final adoption without intervening motion or
demand for division of the question.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the motion offered by the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the unanimous consent request
just agreed to, I call up the bill (H.R. 1883) to provide for the
application of measures to foreign persons who transfer to Iran certain
goods, services, or technology, and for other purposes.
[[Page H604]]
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
Motion Offered By Mr. Gilman
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.
The SPEAKER. The Clerk will designate the motion.
The text of the motion is as follows:
Mr. Gilman moves to concur in the Senate amendments to H.R.
1883.
The text of the Senate amendments is as follows:
Senate Amendments: Page 2, line 3, strike out ``1999'' and
insert ``2000''.
Page 5, line 7, strike out all after ``Order'' down to and
including ``person.'' in line 8 and insert ``No. 12938.''.
Page 5, Line 9, strike out all after ``prohibition.--''
down to and including ``terminate'' in line 12 and insert
``Prohibition on United States Government sales to that
foreign person of any item on the United States Munitions
List as in effect on August 8, 1995, and termination of''.
Page 5, Lines 16 and 17, strike out ``The President shall
deny licenses and suspend'' and insert ``Denial of licenses
and suspension of''.
Page 8, after line 23, insert:
``(b) Opportunity To Provide Information.--Congress urges
the President--
``(1) in every appropriate case, to contact ion a timely
fashion each foreign person identified in each report
submitted pursuant to section 2(a), or the government with
primary jurisdiction over such person, in order to afford
such person, or governments, the opportunity to provide
explanatory, exculpatory, or other additional information
with respect to the transfer that caused such person to be
identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a);
and
``(2) to exercise the authority in subsection (a) in all
cases where information obtained from a foreign person
identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a), or
from the government with primary jurisdiction over such
person, establishes that the exercise of such authority is
warranted.''.
Page 8, line 24, strike out ``(b)'' and insert ``(c)''.
Page 9, line 11, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
Page 9, lines 12 and 13, strike out ``Russian Space
Agency'' and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
Page 10, Lines 11 and 12, strike out ``through the
implementation of concrete steps''.
Page 10, Line 16, strike out all after ``systems'' down to
and including ``transfers'' in line 18.
Page 10, Line 19, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
Page 10, Line 21, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
Page 11, Line 25, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
Page 12, Line 2, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
Page 13, Line 6, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
Page 13, Line 8, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
Page 13, Line 10, after ``Module'' insert ``, and for the
purchase (at a total cost not to exceed $14,000,000) of the
pressure dome for the Interim Control Module and the
Androgynous Peripheral Docking Adapter and related hardware
for the United States propulsion module,''.
Page 13, line 15, after ``no'' insert ``credible''.
Page 17, lines 15 and 16, strike out ``Russian Space
Agency'' and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
Page 17, lines 17 and 18, strike out ``Russian Space
Agency'' and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
Page 18, lines 1 and 2, strike out ``Russian Space Agency''
and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian
Space Agency''.
Page 18, line 6, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space
Agency''.
Page 18, line 10, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
Page 18, lines 13 and 14, strike out ``Russian Space
Agency'' and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or
Russian Space Agency''.
Page 18, line 15, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space
Agency''.
Page 18, Line 16, strike out ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space
Agency''.
The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the order of the House today, the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr.
Gejdenson) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
General Leave
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks
on H.R. 1883.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). Is there objection to the
request of the gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, we have before us H.R. 1883, the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000. This measure was introduced by the
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), the gentleman from California (Mr.
Berman), and myself on May 20 of last year. There are almost 230
cosponsors on this measure.
When it came to a vote in the House last September, it was approved
by a vote of 419 to 0. This vote was even more remarkable when one
considers that the administration sent us a letter just before the
House voted stating that the President's senior advisors would
recommend that he veto the bill. Obviously, the administration's plea
that we not approve the bill, that we instead allow more time for
diplomacy, was rejected unanimously by the House.
Just last week, the measure came up in the Senate, and the Senate
brushed aside the administration's objection and approved the bill by a
significant vote of 98 to 0.
The unanimity of both chambers of Congress and the strong bipartisan
support for this measure should send a powerful signal to would-be
proliferators to Iran. Our Nation will not accept the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and missiles to Iran.
Mr. Speaker, this situation is true today, and it will remain true
even if the encouraging political developments we are beginning to
observe in Iran lead eventually to major improvements in Iranian
foreign policy. The fact is a democratic Iran at peace with itself and
with the rest of the world will not need or want weapons of mass
destruction, nor will they need any missiles capable of delivering such
weapons.
Political change in Iran may ultimately eliminate the need for this
kind of legislation. But such change will never make us regret enacting
it. Indeed, we fully expect that the leaders of a democratic and a
peaceful Iran would have no complaints about this legislation because
it would be wholly consistent with the policies that they would pursue.
For now, however, Iran is continuing its programs to develop weapons
of mass destruction, and this poses a great threat to our Nation, to
our military personnel in the Persian Gulf, and to our friends and
allies throughout the region. This legislation states to those nations
and entities that are helping Iran's weapons programs that they must
stop or face severe consequences.
I am confident that the unanimous vote in both houses of Congress
will compel the President to reconsider the administration's threat to
veto this legislation.
I want to clarify for the record that no major substantive changes in
the legislation were made by the Senate amendment that was adopted last
week. Due to the courtesy of the chief sponsors of the Senate companion
measure to H.R. 1838, most notably Senators Lott and Lieberman, I was
fully involved in developing the Senate amendment. Indeed, two of the
most significant changes it made was suggested by me to the sponsors of
the Senate amendment. I can assure our colleagues the changes suggested
were intended to strengthen, not weaken, this measure.
Most importantly, Mr. Speaker, the Senate amendment did not convert
the bill from a mandatory sanctions bill into a bill merely authorizing
the imposition of sanctions, as has been reported by the press. This
bill always afforded the President discretion, discretion with regard
to the imposition of sanctions, except in the case of the proliferation
by entities under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation
and Space Agency. The Senate amendment preserved that structure.
In order to underscore that the Senate amendment was almost entirely
cosmetic in nature, I prepared a summary of the changes made by that
amendment. This summary makes clear that the bill was not weakened in
any way by the Senate amendment.
[[Page H605]]
Mr. Speaker, I include the summary for the Record as follows:
Summary of Senate Amendment to H.R. 1883, Iran Nonproliferation Act of
2000
During the Senate's consideration of the Iran
Nonproliferation Act on February 24, 2000, a manager's
amendment was adopted making a number of minor changes in the
bill. These changes were largely technical or cosmetic in
nature. They include.
The name of the bill was changed from the ``Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 1999'' to the ``Iran Nonproliferation
Act of 2000''.
The word ``shall'' was deleted at several places in the
bill dealing with the possible imposition of sanctions on
entities that transfer weapons technology to Iran. This was
done to emphasize the fact (which is explicit elsewhere in
the House-passed bill) that the imposition of such sanctions
is discretionary rather than mandatory.
Language was inserted to emphasize that the president may
contact entities suspected of transferring weapons technology
to Iran in order to afford them an opportunity to demonstrate
that they did not make such transfers. Again, this concept
was already contained in the House-passed bill.
The name ``Russian Space Agency'' was changed to ``Russian
Aviation and Space Agency'' most places that it appears in
the bill in order to reflect the fact that the name of the
agency has been officially changed by the Russian Government.
One element of the certification that the President would
have to make in order to provide Russian ``extraordinary
payments in connection with the International Space Station''
was revised to eliminate a requirement that Russia
demonstrate its commitment to stop proliferation to Iran by
implementing ``concrete steps''. The key element of this
certification was not changed, however. The President would
still have to certify that there is no credible information
that any entity under the jurisdiction or control of the
Russian Aviation and Space Agency has proliferated to Iran
during the previous year in order to provide such
extraordinary payments to Russia.
The Senate amendment expanded the exception to the bill's
restriction on providing Russia ``extraordinary payments in
connection with the International Space Station''. In
addition to extraordinary payments related to the Russian
Service Module (which were permitted under the House bill),
the amendment permits a total of no more than $14 million in
extraordinary payments by the United States in order to buy
from Russia two docking adaptors that will facilitate the
attachment of two U.S. modules to the International Space
Station. The conditions on making extraordinary payments
pursuant to the exception (e.g., no credible information that
a recipient of such payments has proliferated to Iran) remain
unchanged.
Mr. Speaker, finally, I want to elaborate on one point that came up
in the Senate debate on the measure. Senators Levin, Lott, and
Lieberman agreed that, in deciding whether information is ``credible,''
and I put that in quotes, for purposes of the reporting requirement of
this bill, the President is entitled to judge the credibility of
information on the basis of all information available to him.
This observation is unassailable so far as it goes. Obviously, one
piece of information can be out of sync with all of the other available
information that it is not believable. But this does not mean that
incriminating information that is novel or surprising must be
corroborated before it can be deemed credible.
The Senators certainly did not mean to suggest that the President is
entitled to judge one piece of specific information against the absence
of other information, and on that basis conclude that one piece of
information is not credible. Such will, in my estimation, be the
typical case arising under this legislation, a piece of specific
incriminating information will be found about a possible transfer, and
there will be no other specific information pointing one way or another
about that particular transfer. In this context, there really is no
other available information against which the incriminating information
can be judged. If the incriminating information is, on its face,
believable, then the President will be required to report that
situation to us pursuant to section 2(a) of the bill.
The real point in here, Mr. Speaker, is the one emphasized in the
report of the Committee on International Relations on the bill. The
purpose of the credible information standard is to get away from the
preponderance of the evidence standard the administration has applied
under previous nonproliferation laws.
{time} 1330
We do not want there to be any weighing of evidence or any burden of
proof under the credible information standard. The test is whether the
information is believable, not whether the President thinks it is
likely true.
I want to thank my colleagues for the support they provided to H.R.
1883. And I urge them to once, again, cast a favorable vote on this
measure.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I rise in strong support for this motion. While I have somewhat
different interpretations than the chairman of the full committee, on
some of the intent, the basic legislation does the job that we all
sought to achieve in this nonproliferation act.
What is clear is that the timing is somewhat unfortunate, as I think
the chairman referenced so aptly in his remarks, because for the first
time in many years, we are seeing within Iran the development of an
opposition that seems to want to moderate the policies of that country.
I certainly hope that no one would take that as a signal in this
legislation that we have not recognized this great step forward, which
is really a function, not of everything we have done or anything else,
but a function of what the Iranians want for their country.
No matter what happens around the globe, it is an important goal of
this administration, and I think in the interests of the entire world,
to restrict access to nuclear weapons, chemical, biological and missile
technology. This is clearly a case where the world is not safer by more
people having access to this technology.
I think it is critically important for the Congress and the
administration to work together to make sure that we do everything in
our power, using Nunn-Lugar resources to reduce the availability of
fissionable material and the technology expertise in the Soviet Union
to further develop nuclear weapons and to proliferate.
There are tremendous pressures in the Soviet Union, former Soviet
Union, Russia, both from their own kind of old pride of having once
been a major superpower; and I think, additionally, the pressures for
economic advancement to sell some of these technologies. But it is not
in the Russian's best interests. It is clearly not in the world's best
interests. It is not in our best interests.
I want to commend the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner)
and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and others who have
participated in this legislation. It is an important piece of
legislation. I am very excited to have it here on the floor, only
somewhat distressed that it comes by accident of the Senate schedule
today so close to what was a positive development in Iran.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time and I ask unanimous
consent that the remainder of my time be controlled by the gentleman
from Pennsylvania (Mr. Hoeffel).
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette.) Is there objection to the
request of the gentleman from Connecticut?
There was no objection.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner).
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 and urge my colleagues to vote in favor of
this important message.
In 1993, the administration invited Russia to join the International
Space Station project. At the time the White House made it clear to
Congress that Russian participation in the International Space Station
was a key component of the administration's efforts to encourage Russia
to adhere to a variety of nonproliferation norms and agreements.
Many Members, myself included, expressed concerns about transforming
the space station into a foreign policy program, but accepted the
administration's argument that Russian involvement was important to
halting the spread of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction.
Since then, we have seen repeated reports in the Western and Russian
media that a variety of Russian aerospace enterprises are assisting
Iran's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missiles. The CIA's 721 report of February 2, 2000 confirms these
reports.
Russia's aerospace enterprises are not private firms in the way U.S.
companies are. In fact, most Russian aerospace enterprises are owned
and operated by the Russian government.
[[Page H606]]
In 1998 and 1999, the Russian government clarified its control of its
aerospace industry by putting many of these Russian enterprises under
the legal and economic jurisdiction of the Russian Aviation and Space
Agency.
Having paid the Russians some $800 million between 1994 and 1998, the
administration announced in late 1999 its intention to make additional
payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency.
The administration's reliance on Russia has put the American taxpayer
in the unacceptable position of possibly subsidizing the very Russian
aerospace enterprises that are helping Iran develop weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missiles. The administration's current policy
creates an unhealthy situation for both our space program and our
nonproliferation efforts. H.R. 1883 addresses these concerns by
requiring the President to make a determination about the extent of
Russian assistance to Iran before NASA can make additional payments to
the Russian aviation and space agency.
Moreover, the bill holds the Russian government accountable by
preventing payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency if it or
any of the entities for which it is legally responsible are involved in
inappropriate technical assistance to Iran. Certainly nobody in this
body wants to see U.S. tax dollars inadvertently subsidizing the
proliferation of ballistic missiles. H.R. 1883 helps prevent just such
a prospect.
While helping curb proliferation, the bill does not jeopardize the
safety of our astronauts about the ISS or delay the delivery of the
Russian hardware that NASA claims it requires in order to reduce U.S.
dependence upon Russia in the space station program. Both of these
issues are addressed in narrow and specific exceptions to the bill.
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1883 is a sound step to prevent the spread of
ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. It passed the House
by a vote of 419 to 0 and the Senate by a vote of 98 to 0. I am proud
to have joined the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the ranking
minority member, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), and
the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) as an original cosponsor of
this bill and look forward to the day when the President signs it into
law.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from California (Mr. Berman).
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time, and I want to associate myself with the remarks of the previous
speakers on this legislation.
I rise in strong support of H.R. 1883. It gives the President
authority to impose sanctions on foreign entities that supply Iran with
technologies related to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and
ballistic missiles.
Two weeks ago we saw dramatic evidence of the yearning for change
among the Iranian people. Despite efforts by the Council of Guardians
to limit the pool of eligible candidates, reformers won an overwhelming
majority in the Iranian parliament.
Regrettably, this election landslide will not automatically translate
into moderate Iranian policies. Supreme Leader Khameini and other
conservative elements retain control over many institutions, including
the securities services. And the intentions of President Khatemi and
his reformist allies still are not completely clear.
I would welcome an improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations, but a
constructive and peaceful bilateral relationship must be based on
Iran's willingness to abandon its quest for weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missiles, to drop its efforts to disrupt the Middle East
peace process, and to improve its dismal human rights record. This
legislation focuses on the first of these areas of concern. It goes
without saying that an Iran armed with these fearsome weapons would be
a serious threat to our allies in the Middle East and eventually the
United States itself.
Placing additional sanctions on Iran would have little if any effect,
given that the U.S. has maintained a trade embargo on the Islamic
Republic since the 1979 revolution. This legislation attempts to get at
the problem by authorizing sanctions against foreign entities that
continue to supply Iran with advanced technologies.
According to a recent unclassified CIA report covering the first half
of 1999, Iran remains, ``One of the most active countries seeking to
acquire WMD technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting
to develop an indigenous capability to produce various types of
weapons, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems.
Iran focused its efforts to acquire WMD-related equipment, materials
and technology primarily on entities in Russia, China, North Korea, and
Western Europe.''
The report goes on to say that ``entities in Russia and China
continue to supply a considerable amount and a wide variety of
ballistic missile-related goods and technology to Iran. Tehran is using
these goods and technologies to support current production programs and
to achieve its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of
ballistic missiles.''
It has additional comments on Iran's program with respect to nuclear
weapons, which I will assert in my full statement. But, Mr. Speaker,
these facts paint a very troubling picture. They reinforced my view
that this legislation and other measures are absolutely necessary to
prevent or at a minimum slow down Iranian acquisition of WMD and
ballistic missiles.
As the CIA report indicates, Russian entities have been among the
worst proliferators to Iran. Some steps have been taken to prevent this
technology transfer. Last year Russia passed a new export control law
and placed monitors in key aerospace entities. Unfortunately, these
modest efforts have not stopped the proliferation.
I find it somewhat ironic that Russia objects so strenuously to U.S.
deployment of a limited national missile defense system designed
specifically to knock down missiles fired by countries like Iran, Iraq,
and North Korea, given that the Russian entities are some of the
primary suppliers of missile and WMD technology to those very
governments and given that Russia may also be a target of those
regimes.
I am not under any illusions that this legislation will solve once
and for all the problem of proliferation to Iran, but it is a step in
the right direction, and more needs to be done. For example, we should
initiate an intensive effort with our allies to develop a more
effective multilateral export control regime to keep dangerous
technologies out of the hands of anti-western regimes. The current
Wassenaar arrangement simply is not up to doing the job.
Last year we passed the Iran Nuclear Nonproliferation Act by a vote
of 419 to 0, the Senate passed it by 98 to 0. I urge my colleagues to
join me in supporting the Senate amendments today and sending the
legislation on to the President.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Brady), a senior member of our committee.
Mr. BRADY of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding
me this time, and I thank him for his leadership on this important
issue.
There is no question the Senate has weakened in effect the strengths
of this bill, but it is still very important that we go forward with
it. It is still an important piece of legislation.
Here is why. In this legislation we are giving Russia a clear choice.
Russia can choose to continue to sell and arm America's deadliest
enemies and to sell and arm Israel's deadliest enemies, or they can
choose to be a partner in peace and prosperity and democracy with the
United States. That is a fair choice for Russia to make.
It is important to make the right decision because we all have a
stake in their transition to democracy and to free enterprise as a
nation. But it has been disappointing, and I think their conduct has
been dangerous for America.
Each year, in effect, Russia erects a tent, and to all within
listening distance they proclaim, ``Come see the show on improving
democracy and freedom in our nation.'' And each year America is the
first in line with billions of dollars to help them make that
transition. But each year when we walk inside the tent, it is empty,
while out back, behind that tent, Russia is actively and aggressively
selling technology and equipment to nations that simply are hateful to
the United States and will disrupt the peace process in the Middle
East.
I think it is important that no American taxpayer have to finance our
deadliest enemies. No veteran ought to be
[[Page H607]]
paying tax dollars so that Russia can arm our enemies. No single mom
struggling to make ends meet ought to have her tax dollars going to
damage our security. No service members, or members of our military,
ought to ever have their dollars be used against them. But, in effect,
today they are.
I support this legislation. I support Russia making the right choice,
and this choice is long overdue. As a member of the Committee on
Science, I appreciate the leadership of the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) in
adopting an amendment that I offered preserving the existing
relationship with Russia on the space station. That was a very key part
of this legislation, and overall this bill deserves our support.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Brady)
for his supportive remarks, and I reserve the balance of my time.
{time} 1345
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to compliment the Chair of the Committee on
International Relations for his leadership on this important issue. I
want to thank the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), the
ranking member, as well, and compliment both gentlemen for working
together in a bipartisan fashion on this and so many other issues that
bipartisanship serves our committee and this Congress well.
The legislation before us, Mr. Speaker, is an attempt to stem the
flow of weapons technology into Iran by authorizing the President to
impose sanctions on nations and individuals that provide this weapons
technology to Iran.
The sanctions would include the denial of munitions, licenses, arms
export, and dual-use licenses, and a halt to any United States foreign
assistance.
The bill requires the President to report to Congress when credible
information exists of a transfer of dangerous weapons technology to
Iran. The President must also report to Congress about whether he has
imposed certain penalties on foreign persons as a result of such
transfers.
If the penalties are not imposed, the President must expose why those
steps were not taken. The bill will also encourage the Russian Space
Agency to cooperate with the United States in efforts to halt the
proliferation of weapons technology to Iran by cutting off payments to
that agency and to the International Space Station if those under its
jurisdiction and control engage in such activities.
We are all pleased by the initial reforms that are being made within
Iran. Their recent elections give the world some hope that changes are
coming. Unfortunately, while there are some encouraging signs, Iran's
current policies continue to be a threat to the security of the world.
There are four areas where Iran continues to threaten world peace. In
the area of ballistic missiles, with their development of the Shahab
missiles, at least one expert has testified to the Senate Armed
Services Committee that the Iranians are working on a missile now with
a range of 2,600 miles. We know that they have missiles with a range of
1,200 miles and they are pushing ahead with this development.
With nuclear issues, Iran is proceeding with plans to complete the
1,000 megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr. While these nuclear plants
probably are not able to be used for nuclear weapons purposes, the fear
is that Iran will continue to obtain valuable expertise while building
these plants that could be transferable to a nuclear weapons program.
In the area of chemical and biological programs, while Iran signed
and ratified the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the CIA reports that
Iran continues to pursue purchasing dual-use biotechnical equipment
from Russia and other countries ostensibly for civilian uses. Press
reports indicate that they are also hiring Russian scientists.
United States officials have publicly stated that Iran has a large
chemical weapons program that has been made possible with the help of
China; and Iran and North Korea reportedly have a relationship of
exchanging missile technology.
For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems continues to be one
of the most significant threats to American national security.
Rogue states like North Korea and Iran are actively pursuing
ambitious ballistic missile programs and the technology needed to
threaten our country and our allies. Iran's progress in this effort is
being helped by the relationships with North Korea, with China, and
with Russia.
This legislation is a good first step that will send a signal to
those who are aiding Iran that this aid will not be tolerated.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to
emphasize again why we are sending this bill on to the President.
Proliferation to Iran is a very serious threat to our Nation. It is
one of the biggest threats we face today. Regrettably, entities in
Russia and elsewhere have been actively engaged in this kind of
proliferation. The bill sends a message, loud and clear, that our
Nation cannot and will not do business as usual with such entities.
We hope this legislation will inspire the governments of Russia, of
China, and of other countries to do more to stop proliferation to Iran.
North Korea is also a major concern when it comes to proliferation to
the Middle East, and we need to take a good close look at that
situation, as well.
I want to assure my colleagues that our committee is going to remain
vigilant.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R.
1883, the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Any transfer of technology to Iran
that would allow that country to develop weapons of mass destruction
would represent a threat to Israel and other allies in the region.
Passage of this measure sends a strong message to the international
community. The United States will not be silent or inactive if any
nation decides to aid Iran in production of weapons of mass
destruction. By making it clear that we will impose sanctions on any
authority that fuels Iran's dangerous motives, I hope we will be more
successful in our efforts to prevent Iran's development of nuclear
weapons.
While the recent strong showing for reformers in Iran's parliamentary
elections is encouraging, we still need to be extremely cautious and
firm in our dealings with Iran. We must never allow any nation to
develop weapons of mass destruction if we believe they may be targeted
on our allies or on Americans. It is important to remember that Iran
has been the world's largest exporter of terror for some time now and
is an ardent opponent of the Middle East peace process. I am pleased to
join my colleagues in supporting H.R. 1883 and sending the right
message on behalf of all Americans, that we will not allow back-door
maneuvers that aid Iran's dangerous plans for terror and destruction.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I speak today in strong support for the
amended version of H.R. 1883, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999.
Everyone in Congress is aware that Iran has continually threatened
the peace and security of the Middle East. Iran is still committed to
the destruction of Israel, opposes the Middle East peace process and
supports terrorist groups such as Hamas. In fact, Iran remains the
world's leading sponsor of international terrorism.
Despite these very real security concerns, cash strapped Russia has
supported the $800 million Bushehr project, a 1000-megawatt light-water
reactor, in southern Iran. Why Iran needs such a reactor remains an
open question because Iran has one of the world's largest oil and
natural gas reserves. However, many security experts believe that such
projects provide good cover to a nuclear weapons program and provide
Iranian technicians with expertise in the development of nuclear
weapons.
Iran has successfully tested the Shabah-3 missile, which has a range
of 800 miles, and has supplied Fajr rockets to Lebanon. These rockets
are capable of hitting Haifa, and other parts of Israel. In fact,
Iranian weapons supplied to Hamas are used against the Southern
Lebanese Army, the Israeli Defense Forces and severely jeopardize the
security of communities in Northern Israel.
Iran's support of international terrorism poses a great risk to the
Middle East and shows very clearly that Iran remains a threat to U.S.
interests in the region. The results of an Iran armed with nuclear
weapons are almost too horrifying to imagine. But, if current trends
continue, it may become an all too real
[[Page H608]]
nightmare for the United States and our Middle Eastern allies.
While I welcome the results of the recent parliamentary elections in
Iran, I believe that we must wait and see if the victory of the
reformists will translate into any real change. Before we start to re-
evaluate our policy, Iran needs to drastically change theirs,
especially in areas of major concern to the U.S., such as non-
conventional weaponry and the support of terrorism. H.R. 1883
reinforces those Congressional concerns and sends a clear message to
countries that assist Iran's weapons program.
I was proud to be an original cosponsor of the Iran Nuclear
Proliferation Prevention Act of 1999, and I am proud to be a cosponsor
of the Iran Nonproliferation Act.
Mr. Speaker, the Senate passed the amended Iran Nonproliferation Act,
98-0, last week and I urge my fellow Members to give this legislation
the same overwhelming support on the floor today.
Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Speaker, I want to express my strong support for
passage of the Senate amendments to the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Last
week, this important legislation was approved by the Senate by 98 to 0.
H.R. 1883 was originally approved by the House in September 1999.
This important legislation gives the President the authority to
impose sanctions against Russia or any other nation for supplying Iran
with the technology to build missiles and chemical and biological
weapons. The Iran Nonproliferation Act also provides for biannual
reports on who around the world is transferring prohibited technology
or information to Iran, and allows the President to take action against
persons or entities found to be engaged in such activity.
This bill also includes new steps to ensure the Russian Space Agency,
which is a partner with NASA in the International Space Station
project, is complying with Russia's official Iran anti-proliferation
policy. If needed, the President is granted the authority to cut-off
funds for the remaining payment of $590 million to the Russian Space
Agency for helping the U.S. build the International Space Station. As
much as we want to continue to work with Russia on joint efforts in
space, we will not do so if they are contributing to this grave threat
to our security. That said, the language as amended is much more
workable in ensuring that the ISS moves forward.
The threat is a very real and serious security concern for the United
States and Israel, our nation's most-trusted ally in the Middle East.
The CIA has reported Iran has the capability to launch a missile that
will reach Israel, and it is well known that Iran is pursuing
development of nuclear, chemical and biological weaponry. This
legislation provides the Administration with useful tools to combat the
spread of dangerous weapons technology and to discourage nuclear
proliferation. H.R. 1883 also demonstrates our commitment to prevent
the proliferation of dangerous nuclear weapons to countries that
threaten our national security as well as the security of allies--such
as Israel and Europe.
The U.S. support for Israel must go beyond economic and military aid
to Israel--it must meet the very real challenges that will face Israel
and the United States in this new century, such as limiting the threats
of weapons of mass destruction. It is well documented that technology
provided to Iran increases its ability to develop its own intermediate
range ballistic missile that is capable of reaching Israel as well as
our European allies. By limiting Iran's access to such technology we
can better protect these countries as well as our own troops in the
Middle East and Europe.
The people of Iran demonstrated in their recent elections an
overriding desire to move toward reform and moderation in the future--
but it is too early to tell what this change will mean in practice. I
hope that it is a sign that Iran will end its missile program and its
support for international terrorism. This legislation also sends a
strong message to Russia that U.S. aid and scientific collaboration
will be limited if Russia doesn't stop missile proliferation to Iran.
U.S. funding will be substantially limited unless the President
certifies that the Russian Space Agency is not transferring technology
to Iran. Acting Russian President Vladmir Putin has been receptive to
restricting companies that sell missile technology and equipment to
Iran. I hope his intentions are translated into action. Otherwise, our
cooperation with Russia--both in space and elsewhere--may end.
We live in a dangerous world--where terrorists and rogue nations are
developing deadly weapons of mass destruction. Our action today will
send a clear message to our allies and to our adversaries. By
supporting this bipartisan legislation, we will demonstrate our
commitment to limit nuclear proliferation and to create a safer, more
stable world.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). Pursuant to the order of
the House today, the previous question is ordered.
The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Gilman).
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 420,
nays 0, not voting 14, as follows:
[Roll No. 28]
YEAS--420
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Allen
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Baldacci
Baldwin
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Barrett (WI)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Becerra
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blagojevich
Bliley
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Bono
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (FL)
Bryant
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cannon
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth-Hage
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Condit
Conyers
Cooksey
Costello
Cox
Coyne
Cramer
Crane
Crowley
Cubin
Cummings
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Ganske
Gejdenson
Gekas
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hansen
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill (IN)
Hill (MT)
Hilleary
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Hooley
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inslee
Isakson
Istook
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E.B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy
Kildee
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kingston
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kucinich
Kuykendall
LaFalce
LaHood
Lampson
Lantos
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manzullo
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCrery
McDermott
McGovern
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Ose
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pease
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Phelps
Pickering
Pickett
Pitts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Reyes
Reynolds
Riley
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rothman
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Rush
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Salmon
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaffer
Schakowsky
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shows
Shuster
Simpson
[[Page H609]]
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sununu
Sweeney
Talent
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Thune
Thurman
Tiahrt
Tierney
Toomey
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Velazquez
Visclosky
Vitter
Walden
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Weygand
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--14
Brown (OH)
Campbell
Cook
Dingell
Fowler
Hall (TX)
Kilpatrick
Kleczka
Larson
Millender-McDonald
Norwood
Paul
Vento
Waters
{time} 1413
So the motion was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated for:
Mr. NORWOOD. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 28, I was unavoidably
detained and, had I been present, I would have voted ``yea.''
____________________