[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 18 (Thursday, February 24, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S761-S774]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                          U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, it is an honor to be here today with my 
distinguished colleague from Kansas, Senator Pat Roberts. We want to 
institute a process by which this body can increasingly come to grips 
with some of the challenges that persist in our foreign policy and 
continue to be, in terms of our defense, a challenge to us and to the 
young men and women of America.
  It is an opportunity for us to continue our dialog which we started 
in the Armed Services Committee over the last 3 years as we have 
encountered difficulties in the Middle East, southwest Asia, and as we 
see problems around the world. He and I have more and more come to an 
understanding that we have more in common than we do in disagreement.
  One of the things we have in common is that we asked some very 
important pertinent questions about our foreign policy and our defense 
as we go into the 21st century. We are delighted today to kick off, not 
so much a debate on American foreign policy but a dialog which we hope 
will develop a consensus of some basic first principles by which we 
ought to engage the world.
  We have the post-cold-war world, as it is called. I was with 
Madeleine Albright today, our distinguished Secretary of State, and she 
said it is probably not the post anything; it is just a new era. We 
have gone through the cold war and the terrors of that period, but we 
are certainly in a new era, and it does not even really have a name.
  We hope to provide for our colleagues in the Senate--and we hope they 
will join us--over the course of this year, an understanding of key 
national security issues and begin building the building blocks of a 
bipartisan consensus on the most appropriate priorities and approaches 
for our country in today's international environment.

  In launching this endeavor, I am very mindful of both the enormity of 
the undertaking and of my own limitations in addressing such a subject. 
Having been only 3 years, beginning my fourth year in the Senate, I 
certainly do not claim to have a solution to these problems about which 
we are going to talk, but I hope to ask some pertinent questions.
  American foreign policy is challenged because of the end of the cold 
war, and Senator Roberts and I approach these questions on the road to 
the future with great humility and certainly with far more questions of 
our own than answers. Yet I believe this dialog is one the Senate must 
have. We owe it to the other nations of the world, including those that 
look to America for leadership, as well as those that make themselves 
our competitors, and certainly we owe it to those that make us their 
adversaries. Even more, we owe it to those who serve our country in the 
Armed Forces and in the Foreign Service, whose careers and sometimes 
very lives can be at stake. Perhaps most of all, we owe it to our 
children and our grandchildren.
  I was with Senator Nunn last night at the State Department. He was 
being honored by the State Department. I always learn something from 
him whenever I am with him. We were talking about a particular country, 
a particular challenge in American foreign policy. He said: Yes, what 
happens there will affect our children and our grandchildren.
  It is astounding that the consequences of the decisions we make today 
will, indeed, affect future generations, so we must make these 
decisions wisely.
  Uncertainty, disunity, partisanship, and overstatesmanship will not 
serve this country well. We need to seriously consider what our global 
role in the 21st century is and what it should be. That decision will 
affect future generations more than we can possibly understand.
  One more point: I do believe a meaningful, bipartisan dialog on the 
U.S. role, which many believe is vital to our national interest, is 
also imminently doable even in this election year. While the subject 
matter is very important to our country and our future, it is not an 
issue of great use on the campaign trail. This great body is the place 
to discuss these great and momentous issues where we can lay it all out 
and talk about it in a way that does not impinge on anybody's 
particular partisan views. Simply put, neither the Presidential race 
nor the elections for the Congress will be determined by who has the 
partisan upper hand on foreign policy.
  Over the course of the year, Senator Roberts and I--and we hope a 
number of other Senators--will be engaging in a series of floor dialogs 
relating to the general direction of U.S. foreign policy and national 
security policy in the 21st century.
  We have actually chosen to sit together. We are on different sides of 
the aisle, but we chose to come from our back-bench positions to show 
that we stand actually shoulder to shoulder in this regard. We are all 
Americans, and we hope we can do something good for our country.
  Our current game plan is to begin today by considering frameworks for 
the U.S. global role with respect to priorities and approaches. In the 
weeks to come, this will be followed by sessions on U.S. national 
interests. Of course, the first question about American engagement in 
the world should be: Is it in our vital strategic national interest? 
That is question No. 1. The next session will be on U.S. national 
interests, what are they.

  Another phase of our discussion will be the use of our military 
forces. Quite frankly, this should be question No. 2 because if we do 
not have a military objective following America's strategic vital 
interests, why commit the military?
  Next is we want to engage the question of our relationship with 
multilateral organizations. We realize the United States is the world's 
foremost military and economic power, but that does not necessarily 
mean we can go it on our own everywhere. The issue of multilateral 
organizations and our relationship to them is an important one.
  After multilateral organizations is the foreign policy roles of the 
executive and legislative branches. One of the first things that came 
to my attention when I came to the Senate 3 years ago was something 
called the U.S. Constitution. Senator Byrd was kind enough to give me 
an autographed copy of the U.S. Constitution and the Declaration of 
Independence, which I proudly carry with me. Quite frankly, if you read 
the Constitution carefully, it gives the Congress the power to declare 
war, to raise and support armies, and to provide and maintain a navy. 
That is a responsibility we have, along with a unique role in the 
Senate of advising and consenting, particularly on treaties into which 
the executive branch may enter.
  The executive and legislative branches have to work together for 
foreign policy and defense policy in this country to actually work.
  Next is economics and trade. One can hardly separate economics from 
defense issues anymore. Economics and

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trade are absolutely mixed up with our foreign policy and defense 
issues. Arms control is certainly an issue we need to confront.
  Then there will be a final wrapup at the end of the year, probably in 
September.
  However, this is just a preliminary outline, and we want these 
discussions to be flexible enough to go wherever the dialog takes us--
that is the beauty of the Senate--and to include a wide array of 
viewpoints and illustrative subjects.
  We encourage all our colleagues, of whatever mind on the topics under 
consideration, to join in so we can have a real debate in this 
Chamber, one in which we, indeed, ask each other hard questions, not in 
order to score partisan points and not in a particularly prearranged 
set of choreographed responses between like-minded individuals but to 
seek a better understanding of each other's thoughts.

  That is exactly what we are after. We have determined that we will 
not tie this dialog, this debate, to any particular administration, any 
particular issue, any particular commitment, any particular budget 
item, any particular legislative proposal. We hope for a freewheeling 
dialog that we think can benefit the country.
  What we are hoping for is not to find final answers, for surely that 
would probably be too ambitious an objective, but, rather, to bring 
this body, which has a key constitutional role in the conduct of 
American foreign and national security policy, to the same kind of 
serious examination of our foreign policy goals and assumptions as is 
now underway among many of our leading foreign policy experts.
  I was thinking about this dialog today. I was thinking, how does this 
dialog differ from what might be termed, shall we say, an ``academic 
undertaking''? There are many seminars. There are thousands of courses 
on American foreign policy. There are numerous reviews of our defense 
strategy going on in this country and around the world.
  What makes this different? I think what makes this dialog different 
is that we are the ones who ultimately have to make the decision. This 
is not an academic exercise. I can remember voting for NATO expansion. 
It was an incredible experience for me to know that by the raising of 
my hand I could extend the security of NATO to three nations on the 
face of the globe that did not have that security before. That was an 
incredible experience for me.
  So we do not participate just in some academic exercise here. We are 
the leaders. We are the ones who have to ultimately bite the bullet and 
make the decisions. Therefore, we need to think these things through. 
That is the point.
  One of my favorite lines from Clausewitz, the great German 
theoretician on war, is: The leader must know the last step he is going 
to take before he takes the first step. That is the spirit of these 
discussions. At some point, and in some fashion, a bipartisan consensus 
on America's global role must emerge because our national interest 
demands it. It may not be as pure as in World War II when Senator 
Vandenberg said: Politics stops at the water's edge, but certainly at 
some point statecraft should overtake politics.
  If these dialogs can assist that effort, in even a small way, they 
will be time well spent. We hope our discussions will not be tinged 
with particularly partisan or highly personalized considerations 
because the subject matter clearly transcends the policies and views of 
any one individual or certainly any one administration. The challenges 
will be the same, no matter which party controls the White House next 
year or which party controls the Congress.
  With that, I yield to my good and distinguished friend and colleague, 
the Senator from Kansas. Let me say, in the time I have been in the 
Senate, I have found him to be a great source of reason and thoughtful 
pronouncements on national security matters. He has a marvelous sense 
of humor, which will come out whether we want it to or not in the 
dialogs. It is my pleasure to turn the discussion over to my 
distinguished friend and colleague, the great Senator from Kansas, Mr. 
Pat Roberts.
  Mr. ROBERTS. First, Mr. President, I thank my good friend, the 
distinguished Senator from Georgia, for the opportunity to join 
together in what we both hope will be a successful endeavor.
  As Senator Cleland stated, our objective is to try to achieve greater 
attention, focus, and mutual understanding in this body on America's 
global role and our vital national security interests and, if possible, 
begin a process of building a bipartisan consensus on what America's 
role should be in today's ever-changing, unsafe, and very unpredictable 
world.
  At the outset, I share Senator Cleland's sense of personal limitation 
in addressing this topic. As he has said, even the finest minds and 
most expert American foreign policymakers have had considerable 
difficulty in defining both what role the United States should play in 
the so-called ``New World Disorder'' or reaching a consensus on what 
criteria to use in defining our vital national interests.
  Now having said that, I do not know of another Senator better suited 
to this effort than Max Cleland. He brings to this exchange of ideas an 
outstanding record of public service, of personal sacrifice, and of 
courage and commitment. On the Senate Armed Services Committee, he has 
demonstrated expertise and a whole lot of common sense in addressing 
the quality of life issues so important to our men and women in uniform 
and, in turn, to our national security.
  As members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, we both share a 
keen interest in foreign policy and national security. In my own case, 
I was privileged to serve as a member of the 1996 Commission on 
America's National Interests. It was chaired by Ambassador Robert 
Ellsworth, Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, and Rita Hauser, and was sponsored 
by the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, the 
Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, and the RAND Corporation. The 
Commission was composed of 15 members, including Senators John McCain, 
Bob Graham, and Sam Nunn. In brief, our Commission focused on one core 
issue: What are U.S. national interests in today's world?
  The conclusion in 1996, 4 years ago--and the Senator, I think, will 
see some real similarities to some of our concerns as of today--in the 
wake of the cold war, the American public's interest in foreign policy 
declined sharply, and our political leaders have focused on domestic 
concerns. America's foreign policy was adrift.
  The defining feature of American engagement in the world since the 
cold war has been confusion, leading to missed opportunities and 
emerging threats.
  The Commission went on to say there must be a regrounding of American 
foreign policy on the foundation of solid national interests. They went 
on to conclude that there must be greater clarity regarding the 
hierarchy of American national interests and, with limited resources, a 
better understanding of what national interests are and, just as 
important, are not.
  Then the Commission prioritized what we felt represented vital 
national interests. It is interesting to note that the conflicts such 
as Bosnia and Kosovo did not make the priority cut at that time. That 
was 4 years ago.
  However, the real genesis for this forum that Senator Cleland and I 
have tried to initiate resulted from frustrations over continued and 
increasing U.S. military involvement and intervention both in the 
Balkans, the Persian Gulf and all around the world. Absent was what we 
consider to be clear policy goals, not only from the executive, but 
also from the Congress.
  We found ourselves on the floor of the Senate, and in committee, 
coming to the same conclusion reached by the esteemed and beloved 
longtime chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator 
Richard Russell of Georgia, who said this, following the war in 
Vietnam:

       I shall never again knowingly support a policy of sending 
     American men in uniform overseas to fight in a war where 
     military victory has been ruled out and when they do not have 
     the full support of the American people.

  Yet we continue to see our military becoming involved and taking part 
in peacekeeping missions, and other missions, where incremental 
escalation has led to wars of gradualism, where our vital national 
interests are questionable, and where the unintended effects of our 
involvement have been counterproductive to national security.

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  We met in Senator Cleland's office and discussed at length the proper 
role of the Senate in regard to the use of American troops. We talked 
about the War Powers Act. We talked about the future of NATO. We talked 
about our policy in the Persian Gulf. We noted, with considerable 
frustration, that Senators seemed to be faced with votes, but votes 
that were already foregone conclusions.
  Few were willing to oppose funding for U.S. troops--not many in the 
Senate or the House will do that--yet many Senators had strong 
reservations and questions about U.S. policy, our military tactics, and 
the lack of what some called the end game.
  We instructed our staffs to research the War Powers Act and any other 
possible alternatives that would provide an outlet for future policy 
decisions.
  Senator Cleland persevered, and along with Senator Snowe of Maine, 
authored and won passage of an amendment mandating that the 
administration report to the Congress on any operation involving 500 or 
more troops, and that report would include clear and distinct 
objectives, as well as the end point of the operation.
  In my own case, I authored and won approval of an amendment stating 
no funds could be used for deployment of troops in the Balkans until 
the President reported to Congress detailing the reasons for the 
deployment, number of military troops to be used, the mission and 
objectives of the forces, the schedule and exit strategy, and the 
estimated costs involved. Again, these amendments were after the fact, 
but they at least represented a bipartisan effort on the part of 
Senators who realized then and realize now that we simply must do a 
better job of working with the executive and searching for greater 
mutual understanding in the Senate in regard to foreign policy and our 
national security interests.
  In saying this, let me stress that this body and our country are 
fortunate to have the benefit of Senators with both expertise and 
experience with regard to foreign relations and national security. That 
certainly doesn't reside only with the two Senators here involved. When 
they speak, we listen. But the problem is, they do not speak enough, 
and when they do, many do not listen.
  The unfortunate conclusion I have reached is that too many Americans 
are not only uninterested in world events but uninformed as well. More 
and more today in the Congress, it seems to me that foreign policy, 
trade, and national security issues are driven by ideology, insular and 
parochial interests, protectionism, and isolationist views. Both the 
administration and the Congress seem to be lacking a foreign policy 
focus, purpose, and constructive agenda.
  The one notable exception has been the hearings held by the 
distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, 
who has held extensive hearings on ``Lessons Learned'' with regard to 
Kosovo. It is a paradox of enormous irony that the vision of knitting a 
multiethnic society and democracy out of century-old hatreds in Kosovo 
is in deep trouble. The danger of Kosovo is the fact that it may become 
another Somalia. These hearings have attracted little more than a blip 
on the public radar screen and little, if any, commentary or debate in 
the Senate.
  So as Senator Cleland has pointed out, over the course of the coming 
year he and I will engage in a series of floor dialogues relating to 
the general direction of U.S. foreign and national security policy in 
the 21st century. We begin today by discussing the framework for the 
U.S. global role. In the following months, as the Senator has said, we 
will discuss the defining national interests, deployment of U.S. 
forces, the role of multilateral organizations, the role of the 
Executive, Congress and the public, and the role of trade, economics, 
and arms control. As Senator Cleland has stressed, this is just an 
outline.
  We invite all Senators to engage in this series. The concept is one 
of a forum, a dialogue, that will and should include a wide variety of 
viewpoints. For instance, given the flashpoint situation today in 
Kosovo, with about 5,000 to 6,000 American troops at risk--and we may 
be calling in the Marines. I believe that topic certainly demands 
attention and discussion, however, in a different and separate forum. 
There should be some discussion and consideration in the Senate in that 
regard.
  As Senator Cleland has pointed out, we all know that foreign policy 
and national security are legitimate concerns that should be addressed 
in the Presidential and congressional campaigns; at least I hope they 
are addressed. But beyond this election year, the Senate will again be 
faced with our constitutional responsibilities in shaping this Nation's 
role in global affairs, national security, international stability, and 
peace. Simply put: Our national interest depends on reaching a 
bipartisan consensus. My colleague and I both hope this forum will 
contribute to achieving that goal and, in doing so, also contribute to 
greater public support and understanding.
  I thank the Senator for yielding and understand he has some 
additional remarks, as I do following his remarks.
  Mr. CLELAND. I thank the Senator. We appreciate working with him on 
this quite challenging and daunting task, but it is worth doing. It is 
an honor to be with him today and work with him. One of my key staff 
people, Mr. Bill Johnston, has done a momentous job of research for the 
speeches, the addresses, the facts, the figures, and the quotes I will 
be using in this dialog. I want to make sure he gets proper credit at 
this time.
  Mr. President, I will now set the stage for today's discussion by 
sketching a brief outline of the evolution of the main currents of U.S. 
foreign policy and, then, by providing a short look at what some 
leading voices are currently proposing for how America should make its 
way in the post-cold-war world.
  As in any transition period, we are feeling our way for the 
appropriate strategy and policies with which to maintain and enhance 
our national security interests in this period of a ``new world 
disorder.'' As the debates on NATO enlargement, Kosovo and the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty revealed, those leading voices on 
American foreign policy currently offer divided counsel on this issue. 
It is obvious that no clear consensus has yet formed as to America's 
post-cold-war strategy, and that, or course, is what we are looking to 
address in these discussions.
  Until the 20th century, it would be fair to sum up our general 
philosophy on foreign policy as an attempt to continue to follow 
President Washington's recommended approach contained in his Farewell 
Address of September 17, 1796:

       Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. 
     Cultivate peace and harmony with all. . . . The Nation which 
     indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual 
     fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its 
     animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient 
     to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. . . . Steer 
     clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign 
     world. . . . There can be no greater error than to expect or 
     calculate upon real flavors from nation to nation.

  Then Secretary of State John Quincy Adams further elaborated on this 
approach when he proclaimed in 1821 that:

       Whenever the standard of freedom and independence has been 
     or shall be unfurled, there will her [America's] heart, her 
     benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in 
     search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the 
     freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and 
     vindicator only of her own.

  As Henry Kissinger, a modern day commentator, has put it, this 
policy, augmented by the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 which sought to 
prevent European interference in the Western Hemisphere, made imminent 
good sense until early in the 1900s:

       In the early years of the Republic, American foreign policy 
     was in fact a sophisticated reflection of the American 
     national interest, which was, simply, to fortify the new 
     nation's independence. . . . Until the turn of the twentieth 
     century, American foreign policy was basically quite simple: 
     to fulfill the country's manifest destiny, and to remain free 
     of entanglements overseas. America favored democratic 
     governments whenever possible, but abjured action to 
     vindicate its preferences. . . . Until early this century, 
     the isolationist tendency prevailed in American foreign 
     policy. Then two factors projected America into world 
     affairs: its rapidly expanding power and the gradual collapse 
     of the international system centered on Europe.

  Woodrow Wilson took this increased American power and the shattered 
European order, added to it the traditional American view of our 
exceptional role in the world and developed

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what has become the dominant approach of modern American foreign 
policy-making. As he said in 1915:

       We insist upon security in prosecuting our self-chosen 
     lines of national development. We do more than that. We 
     demand it also for others. We do not confine our enthusiasm 
     for individual liberty and free national development to the 
     incidents and movements of affairs which affect only 
     ourselves. We feel it wherever there is a people that tries 
     to walk in these difficult paths of independence and right.

  Thus, for the first time in American history, the notion that it was 
our right and our duty to . . . wherever they might arise was 
established. While the details have changed from time to time, with 
some variation in the degree of enthusiasm for foreign interventions, 
this is still today the foundation in defining our role in the world. 
It was elaborated somewhat in the famous 1947 Foreign Affairs article 
penned by ``X''--later disclosed to be George Kennan--which guided our 
ultimately successful conduct of the cold war by urging, ``a policy of 
firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable 
counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon 
the interests of a peaceful and stable world.''
  To be sure, there has rarely been a time in American history when all 
voices have been united behind the dominant approach to the U.S. global 
role. Many in this body, including myself, participated in one way or 
another in the national turmoil over the application of the containment 
policy in Southeast Asia, in a place called Vietnam. But, while there 
was vigorous debate on the advisability of specific implementations of 
Wilsonian ``idealism'' there has never been a serious challenge since 
the Second World War to what might be called an ``internationalist 
interventionist'' model for the United States in its national security 
policies.
  Yet, as we begin the year 2000, the world has changed in significant 
ways from the one we have known since World War II. The Soviet Union is 
no more. The Communists did not, in the end, bury us, but with a few 
notable exceptions who currently survive in China, Cuba, Vietnam, and 
North Korea, it is they who have been buried by historical 
inevitability. Again, to quote, Dr. Kissinger:

       The end of the Cold War produced an even greater temptation 
     to recast the international environment in America's image. 
     Wilson had been constrained by isolationism at home, and 
     Truman had come up against Stalinist expansionism. In the 
     post-Cold War world, the United States is the only remaining 
     superpower with the capacity to intervene in every part of 
     the globe. Yet power has become more diffuse and the issues 
     to which military force is relevant have diminished. Victory 
     in the Cold War has propelled America into a world which 
     bears many similarities to the European state system of the 
     eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and to practices which 
     American statesmen and thinkers have consistently questioned. 
     The absence of both an overriding ideological or strategic 
     threat frees nations to pursue foreign policies based 
     increasingly on their immediate national interest.

  Just as the very different international environment facing America 
at the start of the 20th century--with growing American strength 
accompanying a collapse of the European order--occasioned the need for 
a fundamental reassessment of the U.S. place in the world, so the end 
of the 20th century--with an end to the bipolar cold war and the 
emergence of multiple, if not yet super at least major, powers--
necessitates another thoroughgoing review and evaluation of where we 
are and where we should be headed.
  And if one has been reading the foreign policy journals and white 
papers during the last few years, one finds a vigorous and thoughtful 
debate underway on just such questions. I'd like to take just a few 
minutes to provide the Senate with a small bit of the flavor of this 
dialog among American foreign policy commentators.
  In a 1995 article in Foreign Affairs magazine, Richard Haass of the 
Brookings Institute provided I think a useful starting point for our 
consideration by separating the debate on America's global role into 
two parts: the priorities or ends of American policy, and the 
approaches or means currently available to achieve those ends. As 
possible priorities, he lists Wilsonian idealism with its emphasis on 
promotion of democratic values, economism which--as the name suggests--
gives primacy to economic considerations, realism which is often 
associated with the traditional diplomatic concepts of balance of power 
and international equilibrium, humanitarianism which focuses more on 
alleviating the plight of individuals, and minimalism which could be 
thought of as ``neo-isolationism'' but accepts the need for selected 
and limited U.S. engagement in global affairs. On the side of means, 
Haass lists unilateralism which provides the dominant country--the 
United States--with largely unfettered freedom of action in pursuit of 
its goals, neo-internationalism or ``assertive multilateralism'' which 
relies on multilateral organizations and approaches to international 
problem-solving, and regionalism which he defines as U.S. leadership 
within alliances and coalitions.

  Writing in the Spring 1996 issue of Strategic Review, Naval 
Postgraduate School Professor of National Security Affairs Edward A. 
Olsen presented a view which might be termed as minimalism when he 
advocated a return to our pre-World War II approach which he 
characterized as one of ``abstention, benign neglect, and non-
interventionism within a policy of highly selective engagement.'' 
Professor Olsen distinguished his proposed policy of disengagement and 
non-intervention--which would be marked by less military intervention, 
less foreign aid, and fewer international entanglements--from 
isolationism because his approach would allow the U.S. ``strategic 
independence'' to determine for itself, independent of other countries 
or multilateral organizations, when and how to engage abroad.
  In almost direct opposition to the Olsen prescription, with goals 
akin to Wilsonian idealism and employing a largely unilateralist 
approach, William Kristol and Robert Kagan used a summer 1996 edition 
of Foreign Affairs to argue for a U.S. role of benevolent global 
hegemony in the belief that, ``American principles around the world can 
be sustained only by the continuing exertion of American influence,'' 
including foreign aid, diplomacy, and when necessary military 
intervention.
  In his 1994 book, entitled Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, provides a 
contemporary, updated version of the realist balance of power view:

       America's dominant task is to strike a balance between the 
     twin temptations inherent in its exceptionalism: the notion 
     that America must remedy every wrong and stabilize every 
     dislocation, and the latent instinct to withdraw into itself. 
     . . . A country with America's idealistic tradition cannot 
     base its policy on the balance of power as the sole criterion 
     for a new world order. But is must learn that equilibrium is 
     a fundamental precondition for the pursuit of its historic 
     goals.

  A quote that comes to mind for me is when President Kennedy said, 
``There is not necessarily an American solution for every problem in 
the world.''
  I think that is the real issue. Former Congressman Stephen Solarz 
espoused the humaniarianism goal in the Winter 2000 edition of 
Blueprint Magazine:

       Some, of course, will object to humanitarian intervention 
     as a violation of the principle of sovereignty, which 
     precludes military interference in the internal affairs of 
     other nations. . . . Yet it is clear today that the non-
     interference doctrine no longer trumps all other 
     considerations. This was obvious when the United Nations 
     sanctioned interventions during the 1990s in Northern Iraq, 
     Somalia, and Haiti. Where crimes against humanity or genocide 
     are involved, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is 
     increasingly accepted as a justification for violating the 
     otherwise inviolable borders of sovereign states.

  A particular variant of the regionalism approach is contained within 
Samuel P. Huntington's 1996 work, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking 
of World Order.
  I know that is a favorite of the good Senator from Kansas.

       In the aftermath of the cold war the United States became 
     consumed with massive debates over the proper course of 
     American foreign policy. In this era, however, the United 
     States can neither dominate nor escape the world. Neither 
     internationalism nor isolationism, neither multilateralism 
     nor unilateralism, will best serve its interests. Those will 
     best be advanced by eschewing these opposing extremes and 
     instead adopting an Atlanticist policy of close cooperation 
     with its European partners to protect and advance the 
     interests and values of the unique civilization they share.

  These are just a very few of the many ``think pieces'' which have 
been coming

[[Page S765]]

out of the American foreign policy community since the end of the cold 
war. Even this brief glimpse reveals a wide divergence in expert 
opinions on the preferred priorities and approaches for post-cold-war 
U.S. global engagement. To further evaluate the current debate among 
individuals with strongly held views on where we should be headed I 
asked the outstanding Congressional Research Service to provide me with 
a ``review of the literature'' on U.S. global role options.
  I ask unanimous consent that this CRS document be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

           A Review of Literature on U.S. Global Role Options

       1. Abshire, David M. ``U.S. Global Policy: Toward an Agile 
     Strategy.'' Washington Quarterly, v. 19, spring 1996: 41-61.
       Since the end of the Cold War, which was marked by the U.S. 
     promotion of a policy of containment, the U.S. and other 
     powers have entered a strategic interregnum (44) in which 
     foreign policy strategies have not been fully defined. 
     Abshire states that the U.S. should strive toward a policy of 
     agility: ``an agile strategy for the use of power and the 
     achievement of peace'' (41) which is characterized by 
     flexibility in action and long-range goals and is guided by 
     vital national interests. This strategy is proactive rather 
     than reactive and aims to ``return to classical formulations 
     of the proper uses of power to influence the behavior of U.S. 
     opponents, and indeed allies'' (46). Realism (49) forms the 
     foundation of a strategy of agility, acknowledging that 
     military conflict and economic competition are features of 
     world affairs. At the same time, this strategy recognizes the 
     importance of idealism (50) and the role U.S. democratic 
     ideals should play in international relations. Specifically, 
     this strategy represents a balance between short-term realism 
     and long-term idealism (48): In the short run, the U.S. 
     should defend its interests from immediate threats; in the 
     long run the U.S. should strive to promote U.S. ideals such 
     as democracy and free trade. This policy is opposed to 
     isolationism (51), but expects U.S. leaders to set clear 
     boundaries in U.S. foreign policy.
       2. Albright, Madeleine K. ``The Testing of American Foreign 
     Policy.'' Foreign Affairs, v. 77, Nov.-Dec. 1998: 50-64.
       Albright describes a four-part strategy for U.S. foreign 
     policy. The U.S. should encourage continuing relations with 
     other leading nations (51), aid transitional states in 
     playing a larger role in the international system (52), help 
     weaker states that are trying to overcome economic and 
     political problems (52), and ward off threats that affect 
     world security (51-53). This strategy is driven by vision and 
     pragmatism: U.S. foreign policy should incorporate a vision 
     of future policy concerns and should be shaped by pragmatic 
     approaches to foreign policy issues (54-59). The will and 
     resources to carry out policy are essential to implementing 
     this strategy (59-62). In the final analysis, U.S. foreign 
     policy is tested by ``how well our actions measure up to our 
     ideals . . . we want our foreign policy to reflect our status 
     as the globe's leading champion of freedom'' (63).
       3. Arbatov, Georgi. ``Eurasia Letter: A New Cold War?'' 
     Foreign Policy, no. 95, summer 1994: 90-103.
       The institutions of the West have supported Russian plans 
     for reform despite the plans' shortcomings and disastrous 
     results. Russia has not made progress toward building 
     democracy, and the West is partly responsible for Russia's 
     current woes. The West's role in supporting economic policies 
     unsuitable for Russia has spurred new distrust of the West 
     and notions of a Western conspiracy to introduce policies 
     that will harm the Russian economy (91-96). The West should 
     take part in stopping human rights violations against ethnic 
     Russians living in former Soviet republics (98). The U.S. 
     must recognize that Russia should play an important role in 
     international affairs (102). Both countries are responsible 
     for Russia's future and should seek cooperation (103).
       4. Blumenthal, Sidney. ``The Return of the Repressed Anti-
     Internationalism and the American Right.'' World Policy 
     Journal, v. 12, fall 1995: 1-13.
       Isolationism has been revived in a new form as an 
     ``inchoate anti-internationalism'' (2) on the part of the 
     Republican Right. This new anti-internationalism is marked by 
     vigorous opposition to the role of the United Nations and is 
     closely related to growing anti-government and xenophobic 
     sentiments. Although isolationist views were espoused by 
     members of both the Right and the Left in pre-World War II 
     America, by the end of the war, isolationism had become 
     strictly a cause of the Right and was combined with its 
     anticommunist movement (4-5). Advocates of this policy viewed 
     containment as a poor compromise and advocated a unilateral 
     military approach to Cold War threats. Unilateralism (6) 
     remained an important cornerstone of this policy up to 
     Reagan's terms in office, although Reagan eventually 
     disillusioned supporters with his policy of engagement with 
     Gorbachev. George Bush was criticized for his emphasis on 
     foreign affairs. As Clinton's first term in office 
     progressed, he paid more heed to anti-internationlism and 
     initiated policies to limit the U.S. role in multilateral 
     peacekeeping (9). The Republican platform, Contract with 
     America, advanced several anti-international principles, and 
     ``[f]or the first time since the inception of the Cold War, 
     tenets of anti-internationalism have become official dogma of 
     the Republican Party'' (10). Republicans who oppose anti-
     internationalism have not challenged this position within 
     their party. Idealist and realist approaches (11) to foreign 
     policy will be affected by this anti-internationalism if it 
     continues to flourish. Blumenthal identifies several versions 
     of realism. Augmented realism, or realism plus, (11) sees 
     conviction as a driving force in obtaining a leadership role. 
     Washington realism (11) focuses on international affairs at 
     the expense of domestic ones. Republican realism fails ``to 
     explain how internationalism can coexist with a social policy 
     that radically widens class, racial, and gender divisions . . 
     .'' (11).
       5. Calleo, David P. ``A New Era of Overstretch? American 
     Policy in Europe and Asia.'' World Policy Journal, v. 15, 
     spring 1998: 11-29.
       Clinton downplayed foreign policy when elected in 1992 and 
     in his first term ``quietly'' took on ``a sort of 
     devolutionist foreign policy'' (12-13). Clinton encouraged 
     the Europeanization of NATO and seemed to promote a foreign 
     policy in which the U.S. would serve as a balancing power in 
     a multipolar arena and would not aspire to Bush's vision of 
     the U.S. as the only superpower in a unipolar world (13). 
     Muted elements of Wilsonianism could be detected in some 
     Clinton policies to ``[prod] the world toward universal 
     democracy'' (13). Clinton began to take a more active role in 
     foreign policy in his second term and initiated efforts to 
     reassert American hegemony in NATO (14). U.S. interests in 
     NATO expansion suggest that the U.S. is adopting a maximalist 
     stance (16) and is ready to take a hegemonic role in Europe. 
     The U.S. has continued its long-standing role as a strong 
     presence in Asia. Calleo describes three proposed models for 
     a future security structure in Asia--``China the regional 
     hegemon, America the region's hegemonic balancer, and a 
     multipolar regional balance made up of China, India, Japan, 
     Russia, and the United States'' (19).
       6. DeSantis, Hugh. ``Mutualism: An American Strategy for 
     the Next Century.'' World Policy Journal, v. 15, winter 1998-
     99: 41-52.
       DeSantis describes the views of various foreign affairs 
     professionals: Liberal-internationalists, or neo-Wilsonians, 
     expect the value systems of various countries to move toward 
     each other; realists promote persuading other powers to 
     support U.S. policies; American nationalists, or neo-
     Reaganites, promote a unilateral policy in which the U.S. 
     strives to promote an ``enlightened empire;'' neo-
     isolationsists, including America Firsters, libertarians, 
     and pacifists, oppose U.S. involvement abroad (41). 
     DeSantis says that these seemingly different views are all 
     versions of American exceptionalism, the myth that the 
     U.S. is the natural model for other countries and should 
     be the leader of an unpredictable world (41-42). He 
     promotes as an alternative a ``non-American centered 
     framework'' called mutualism: ``an interest-based rather 
     than value-driven concept of international relations'' 
     (44) that avoids hegemony. Economies will be 
     interdependent and national and regional communities will 
     be emphasized in order to curb violent frustrations of 
     peoples ``marginalized by the process of globalization'' 
     (47). A cornerstone of mutualism is cultural tolerance and 
     the recognition that the American way is not the only way 
     to a free and harmonious society (48). Security operations 
     must be shared in order to avoid dependence on the U.S., 
     and Americans must ``abandon their triumphalism'' and 
     recognize the need for cooperation with other peoples 
     (51).
       7. Diamond, Larry. ``Why the United States Must Remain 
     Engaged: Beyond the Unipolar Movement.'' Orbis, v. 40, summer 
     1996: 405-413.
       The end of the Cold War has forced the U.S. to reexamine 
     its role in the world, and a new trend in favor of 
     isolationism has emerged. This neo-isolationism takes many 
     forms. Some of its supporters advocate free trade and foreign 
     aid while others reject any type of foreign involvement. 
     Other neo-isolationists want the U.S. to become ``a normal 
     nation in normal times'' (406). Despite variations on this 
     theme, all neo-isolationists call for the end of America's 
     role as a superpower. Scholar Eric Nordlinger, in his book 
     Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New 
     Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) has 
     articulated a new type of neo-isolationism that calls for 
     varying degrees of U.S. involvement in foreign affairs and 
     recognizes the usefulness of multilateral cooperation. 
     Nordlinger's ``liberal isolationism'' provides a thoughtful 
     approach to foreign policy but is problematic. He mistakenly 
     believes that the U.S. is insulated from outside threats; 
     that U.S. allies could compensate militarily for the loss of 
     a U.S. military presence abroad; that it is better to deal 
     with conflicts as they arise rather than try to predict 
     future conflicts; and that the U.S. would be able to defend 
     itself in the unlikely scenario of a threat to U.S. 
     interests. In fact, spillover from faraway conflicts prevents 
     true insulation; our allies would have difficulties meeting 
     military challenges without U.S. aid and might be forced into 
     bad compromises due to lack of power; the benefits of 
     predicting and deterring conflict can exceed the cost; and, 
     were the U.S. to become as isolationist as Nordlinger 
     proposes, it is unlikely it would be prepared to meet true

[[Page S766]]

     threats to security (407-411). The best strategy for the next 
     century is liberal internationalism (413).
       8. Gilman, Benjamin A. ``A Pacific Charter: A Blueprint for 
     U.S. policy in the Pacific in the 21st Century.'' Washington 
     Heritage Foundation, 1997 (Heritage Lecture no. 579).
       Asia will be the most important region to the U.S. in the 
     future, and the U.S. has the greatest power to influence 
     Asian affairs. As in the past, U.S. interests in Asia are: 
     ``regional stability; access to markets; and freedom of the 
     seas,'' (3) and, more specifically, ``the promotion of 
     democracy and the rule of law; human and religious rights; 
     market economies; and regional security for all'' (11). 
     Although the U.S. is ``responsible for the peace and much of 
     the prosperity'' (3) of post-WWII Asia, the U.S. role in Asia 
     is being challenged. The Clinton administration, through base 
     closings, has sent an ambiguous message to Asia, and most 
     Asian nations, which desire a strong U.S. presence in the 
     region, fear the U.S. will retreat to isolationism. The U.S. 
     must maintain a strong role in Asia and thwart the emergence 
     of a regional hegemon that could threaten Asian security. The 
     Clinton administration does not have a good policy to meet 
     these needs. Gilman proposes a ``Pacific Charter'' (7) to 
     outline the U.S. role in Asia. The U.S. must maintain strong 
     relations with Japan, increase relations with India, and curb 
     threats from China.
       9. Haass, Richard N. ``Paradigm Lost.'' Foreign Affairs, v. 
     74, Jan.-Feb. 1995: 43-58.
       The post-Cold War world is in a period of ``international 
     deregulation,'' marked by ``new players, new capabilities, 
     and new alignments'' but lacking ``new rules'' (43). Clinton 
     has advocated a new foreign policy centered around 
     international reregulation (44) and characterized by the 
     expansion of market democracies, but this strategy serves 
     more as an ideal than as pragmatic policy. In fact, no one 
     doctrine can encompass every aspect of foreign policy, but 
     the U.S. should strive toward a foreign policy ``that is 
     clear about ends--America's purposes and priorities--as well 
     as about means--America's relationship with and approach to 
     the world'' (45). Haass critiques five approaches to foreign 
     policy that are evident in the current administration. 
     Wilsonian promotion of democratic values is a ``luxury'' that 
     should not take precedence over other interests, such as 
     promoting security in the Middle East, even with non-
     democratic allies (46). Economism places undue emphasis on 
     the primacy of economics and can be similar to 
     neomercantilism (47). Realism correctly acknowledges threats 
     to the U.S. but neglects the ``internal evolution of 
     societies'' (48). Humanitarianism, which is almost ``post-
     ideological'' downplays immediate concerns and threats (49). 
     Minimalism ignores factors that affect U.S. security and 
     could lead to long-term problems that greatly threaten U.S. 
     interests (49). Haass describes three types of means to U.S. 
     foreign policy. Unilateralism allows the dominant country 
     freedom of action, but can be imitated and abused by other 
     powers and can break down international order (50). Neo-
     internationalism, also known as ``assertive 
     multilateralism,'' distributes power and responsibility, but 
     this power may clash with U.S. foreign policy interests (51). 
     U.S. leadership would position the U.S. as the leader of 
     alliances and coalitions, but could lead to problematic 
     compromises (52). Clinton has incorporated each mean and end 
     in some form, resulting in an inconsistent foreign policy. 
     Haass promotes ``augmented realism,'' or ``realism plus,'' 
     which would concentrate on threats to security but would be 
     broader than traditional realism. Haass states that U.S. 
     leadership is the most viable means to meet this form of 
     realism (55-56).
       10. Haass, Richard N. ``What to do with American Primacy.'' 
     Foreign Affairs, v. 78, Sept.-Oct. 1999: 37-49.
       U.S. foreign policy should promote multipolarity, 
     ``characterized by cooperation and concert rather than 
     competition and conflict'' (38). Post-Cold War society will 
     have four cornerstones: ``using less military force to 
     resolve disputes between states, reducing the number of 
     weapons of mass destruction and the number of states and 
     other groups possessing such weapons, accepting a limited 
     doctrine of humanitarian intervention based on a recognition 
     that people--and not just states--enjoy rights, and economic 
     openness'' (39). The U.S. should maintain its role as the 
     only superpower and should model itself after nineteenth-
     century Great Britain (41). The U.S. should persuade other 
     powers through consultations rather than negotiations (42-
     43). Regionalism, which involves regional cooperation, would 
     serve as a good balance between the extremes of perfect 
     internationalism and unilateralism (44), but is 
     problematic because many regions do not agree on the 
     definition of regional order. An American world system 
     involves external influences, but the U.S. must play an 
     active and discriminating role in deciding when 
     humanitarian intervention is necessary. Finally, America 
     must overcome its indifference to foreign affairs (49).
       11. Hillen, John. ``Superpowers Don't Do Windows.'' Orbis, 
     v. 41, spring 1997: 241-257.
       The U.S. should encourage a new security system which 
     recognizes the differing interests and military capabilities 
     of different countries and is founded on the principle that 
     the U.S., as the superpower, does not do the little jobs that 
     distract it from its larger role. Because U.S. resources are 
     limited, the U.S. should concentrate on broad security issues 
     and leave regional problems to its allies who will serve the 
     roles of ``local doctor and cop'' (243). The downsizing of 
     the U.S. military places strains on the U.S. military when it 
     acts in regional disputes, such as the Bosnia conflict, and 
     few post-Cold War conflicts have truly required heavy U.S. 
     involvement. The U.S. role in Europe, East Asia, the Middle 
     East, the Persian Gulf, and South America is one of 
     collective defense, which focuses on cooperative efforts to 
     ``defend against threats to the balance of power in a 
     region,'' rather than one of collective security, which 
     responds to a broad range of issues not limited to immediate 
     threats (251). In alliances with European countries, the U.S. 
     must preserve its role as a leader and needs to readjust the 
     division of labor in organizations such as NATO. The U.S. 
     should, however, be cautious in increasing Japan's 
     responsibilities in Asia. Within the Middle East, ``de facto 
     alliances'' serve the U.S. better than ``de jure alliances'' 
     that exist with European countries (255). No other regions 
     demand a U.S. presence.
       12. Huntington, Samuel P. ``The Erosion of American 
     National Interests.'' Foreign Affairs, v. 76, Sept.-Oct. 
     1997: 28-49.
       American identity has been defined by culture and creed, 
     ideals such as liberty, constitutionalism, limited 
     government, and private enterprise. This identity has been 
     constructed vis-a-vis a foreign ``other,'' which for much of 
     this century has been communism. The end of the Cold War will 
     affect American identity and has led the U.S. ``not to find 
     the power to serve American purposes but rather to find 
     purposes for the use of American power'' (35). Ethnic and 
     commercial interests now overshadow national interests in 
     shaping foreign policy. ``Commercial diplomacy'' (37) has 
     become a cornerstone of Clinton's foreign policy. Ethnic 
     groups now play a major role in shaping U.S. international 
     involvement; the drive for multiculturalism and an increase 
     in new immigrant groups who have resisted assimilation have 
     influenced the actions of the U.S. government toward 
     immigrants' native countries. The combined influence of 
     commercial and ethnic interests has led to a 
     ``domesticization of foreign policy'' (40). America's 
     strength is reflected in military, economic, ideological, 
     technological and cultural spheres, but America is 
     ineffective in influencing other countries (42-43). This 
     paradox is partly the result of a gap between American 
     resources and governmental power. The nature of American 
     power has changed. Immediately after WW II America directly 
     expanded its influence to other parts of the world. From the 
     1970s, U.S. power has shifted to ``the power to attract'' 
     (44), as illustrated by the power of the U.S. to raise money 
     from other countries for the Persian Gulf War and a shift 
     toward widescale lobbying by foreign governments. U.S foreign 
     policy, with its attention to special interests, is turning 
     into a policy of particularism. A policy of restraint (48), 
     which would limit attention to special interests, would 
     better position the U.S. to ``[assume] a more positive role 
     in the future . . . and to pursue national purposes'' 
     supported by the American population (49).
       13. Hutchings, Robert L. ``Rediscovering `The National 
     Interest' in American Foreign Policy.'' Washington, Woodrow 
     Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1996.
       The end of the Cold War has left the U.S. struggling to 
     redefine its global role. Encompassing principles like 
     ``democratic enlargement'' and ``new world order'' fail to 
     fully address U.S. foreign policy needs; ``new world order,'' 
     for example, has been ambiguous on the relationship between 
     principles and interests and has been constantly redefined 
     and reformulated (2). Foreign policy should not pit 
     principles against interests. Principles alone fail to solve 
     foreign policy problems. Interest-based policies should be 
     tied to U.S. capabilities (2-3). The U.S. placed top priority 
     on Eastern Europe in relations with Moscow and thus helped 
     contribute to ``an international environment conducive to'' 
     the success of Eastern European democracy movements (4). The 
     U.S. recognized the importance of German affairs to European 
     security. In other parts of Europe, the U.S. ``continued to 
     cling instinctively to a dominant role that [it was] no 
     longer ready to play and so found it difficult to cede 
     leadership gracefully to the Europeans'' (5). These 
     approaches to Western and Eastern Europe together helped 
     bring about the end of the Cold War, but the U.S. failed to 
     develop suitable policies to support post-Communist 
     countries. The Cold War should teach the U.S. that a stable 
     Europe, more than a stable Asia, is vital to U.S. security, 
     and U.S. leadership is necessary for European unity (6-7). A 
     stable Eastern Europe is most vital for a stable Europe. The 
     U.S. should not assume responsibility for Russian reform; the 
     task should fall into Russian hands (8). The U.S. should 
     ``invite'' Russia into the international arena and encourage 
     Russia to pursue peace (9).
       14. Joffe, Josef. ``How America Does It.'' Foreign Affairs, 
     v. 76, Sept.-Oct. 1997: 13-27.
       No alliance in history has persisted long past victory, and 
     yet the U.S. continues to build its alliance system even 
     after the end of the Cold War. Organizations like the EU 
     could challenge U.S. power, and Russia, China, and France 
     have paid lip service to ending U.S. hegemony, but allies of 
     the U.S. have yet to truly turn against America. The reason 
     for ``America's unchallenged primacy'' lies in the uniqueness 
     of America (16). The U.S. ``irks and domineers, but it does 
     not conquer'' (16). During WWI and WWII, the U.S., like 
     Imperial Britain, maintained a strategy of checking 
     hegemonies. More recently, U.S. policy has come to resemble 
     the

[[Page S767]]

     policies of Bismarck's Germany; the U.S. has built a ``hub 
     and spoke'' relationship with other countries in which 
     ``association with the hub [Washington] is more important to 
     them than are their ties to one another'' (21). As a result, 
     other countries cannot form old-style alliances against the 
     U.S. (24). The U.S. bears a great deal of responsibility in 
     upholding security for other countries, but this benefits and 
     provides for America's own security (27).
       15. Kagan, Robert. ``The Benevolent Empire.'' Foreign 
     Policy, no. 111, summer 1998: 24-34.
       Although foreign countries complain about U.S. global 
     leadership, many countries nonetheless have grown to rely on 
     American dominance. Although European and other nations call 
     for ``multipolarity,'' U.S. dominance in fact provides the 
     best option for global affairs (26). U.S. hegemony is a 
     benevolent hegemony (26). The U.S. has risked its own safety 
     for the safety of other countries, and Americans have 
     believed since WWII that ``their own well-being depends 
     fundamentally on the well-being of others'' (28). It is in 
     the best interest of the nations that benefit from this 
     benevolent hegemony to support rather than criticize U.S. 
     power. Advocates of multipolarity, and the similar 
     balance-of-power theory of global parliamentarianism, or 
     world federalism (30), fail to recognize that no other 
     country would be willing to truly take on the 
     responsibilities and sacrifices multipolarity entails. 
     Countries like France and Russia have not adopted measures 
     that would enable them to shoulder the burdens of 
     multipolarity; what these countries truly want is an 
     ``honorary multipolarity'' (32): ``the pretense of equal 
     partnership in a multipolar world without the price or 
     responsibility that equal partnership requires'' (32). The 
     growth of neo-isolationism in the U.S. satisfies European 
     calls for less U.S. involvement in international affairs, 
     but the U.S. must continue to recognize the ultimate 
     importance of its dominance (34).
       16. Kennan, George F. ``On American Principles.'' Foreign 
     Affairs, v. 74, Mar.-Apr. 1995: 116-126.
       Kennan defines a principle as a ``general rule of conduct 
     by which a given country chooses to abide in the conduct of 
     its relations with other countries'' (118). This principle 
     should provide a framework for policy and, with special 
     exceptions, should be ``automatically applied'' (119). A 
     principle should be set forth by a political leader who can 
     reflect the views of the population he represents. Despite 
     wide differences among Americans, most Americans agree on 
     certain ideals. In choosing when to intervene in other 
     countries' affairs, the U.S. should respond only to events 
     that truly threaten U.S. interests (124). U.S. policy must 
     embody John Adams' principle of foreign policy that the best 
     way to help other countries is through ``the benign sympathy 
     of our example'' (125) rather than through direct 
     intervention.
       17. Kennedy, Paul. ``The Next American Century?'' World 
     Policy Journal, v. 16, spring 1999: 52-58.
       For much of the early twentieth century, America looked 
     inward in its foreign policy. By the end of WWII, however, 
     America's role as the world's leader was clear; the twentieth 
     century had become the American century. Later, the Cold War 
     suggested that world affairs were dominated by a bipolar 
     system of Russian and American power, and anti-Americanism 
     abroad and domestic crises at home lent further doubts to the 
     primacy of America. The appearance of an ``America in 
     relative decline,'' however, was not fully accurate (55). The 
     U.S. held many advantages over a Soviet Union constantly 
     plagued with problems, and despite domestic difficulties, the 
     U.S. demonstrated its ability to renew its economic power in 
     the 1980s. The U.S. is influential in its ``soft power'' 
     (American culture) and ``hard power'' (military resources) 
     (56), and is a leader in finance and technology. These 
     advantages place America ``in a relatively more favorable 
     position in the world than at any time since the 1940s'' 
     (56). It is uncertain, however, whether the U.S. will sustain 
     its number-one position throughout the 21st century. The 
     spread of American influence could lead to a backlash against 
     the U.S., and other nations have the potential to develop 
     into superpowers.
       18. Khalilzad, Zalmay. ``Losing the Moment? The United 
     States and the World After the Cold War.'' Washington 
     Quarterly, v. 18, spring 1995: 87-107.
       The U.S. must develop a foreign policy for the post-Cold 
     War world in order to maintain its strength. Secretary of 
     Defense Dick Cheney's ``Regional Defense Strategy,'' (88) 
     which focused on strengthening alliances, preventing the rise 
     of regional hegemons, and eliminating sources of instability, 
     never took root under the Bush administration. Clinton 
     Administration foreign policy, outlined in National Security 
     Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (88) stresses similar 
     points but also emphasizes peacekeeping efforts, economic 
     issues, and the expansion of democracy. But the Clinton 
     strategy fails to prioritize foreign policy issues, and 
     Clinton's handling of foreign affairs has been controversial. 
     Possible alternatives for foreign policy are neo-isolationism 
     (89-91), a return to multipolarity (91-94), and global 
     leadership (94-106). Although neo-isolationism offers short-
     term benefits, in the long term it is likely to lead to power 
     struggles and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A 
     return to multipolarity and balance of power would allow the 
     U.S. to reduce defense spending and concentrate on economic 
     concerns, but depends on other major powers ``[behaving] as 
     they should under the logic of a balance of power framework'' 
     (93). Global leadership, in which the U.S. would maintain its 
     position and prevent the rise of rival powers, provides the 
     best option. For this policy to work, it must ``maintain and 
     strengthen the `zone of peace' and incrementally extend it; 
     preclude hostile hegemony over critical regions; hedge 
     against reimperialization by Russia and expansion by China 
     while promoting cooperation with both countries; preserve 
     U.S. military preeminence; maintain U.S. economic strength 
     and an open international economic system; be judicious in 
     the use of force, avoid overextension, and develop ways of 
     sharing the burden with allies; and obtain and maintain 
     domestic support for U.S. global leadership and these 
     principles'' (95).
       19. Kristol, William and Robert Kagan. ``Toward a Neo-
     Reaganite Foreign Policy.'' Foreign Affairs, v. 75, July/
     August 1996: 18-32.
       Kristol and Kagan advocate a conservative, ``neo-
     Reaganite'' foreign policy, in which American exceptionalism 
     is celebrated and in which America ``cheerfully'' takes on 
     the international responsibilities that come with its role as 
     the benevolent global hegemon (32). They assert that 
     ``American principles around the world can be sustained only 
     by the continuing exertion of American influence'' by such 
     means as providing foreign aid and playing a role in conflict 
     control or resolution in its diplomatic and/or military 
     capacity when appropriate; they further assert that ``most of 
     the world's major powers welcome U.S. global involvement'' 
     (20-28). Neo-Reaganite foreign policy differs from the 
     neoisolationism of the ``America First'' variety in that it 
     is a policy of engagement for the purposes of maintaining 
     peace and international order, as well as national benefit 
     (21-23). In addition, unlike the pragmatist foreign policy 
     under the Bush administration, neo-Reaganite foreign policy 
     justifies its engagement not only with practical or material 
     interests (such as jobs), but also with the goal of upholding 
     and ``actively promoting American principles of governance 
     abroad--democracy, free markets, respect for liberty'' (27-
     8). America ought to reassume that sense of responsibility 
     for global ``moral and political leadership'' which underlay 
     the ``overarching Reaganite vision that had sustained a 
     globally active foreign policy through the last decade of the 
     Cold War'' (28).
       20. Layne, Christopher. ``Rethinking American Grand 
     Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-First 
     Century?'' World Policy Journal, v. 15, summer 1998: 8-28.
       Layne favors the balance of power strategy over the 
     strategy of preponderance (synonymous with hegemony) that has 
     prevailed in U.S. foreign policymaking circles since after 
     World War II. The ``essence'' of the strategy of 
     preponderance is the creation of ``a U.S.-led world order 
     based on preeminent U.S. political, military, and economic 
     power, and on American values'' (9). Preponderance is 
     unsustainable for several reasons: one, hegemonic power 
     instigates its own demise--states that feel threatened will 
     endeavor to emerge as new great powers to balance against the 
     hegemon, thus destroying the unipolar situation(13); second, 
     the U.S. is at risk of strategic overextension when it must 
     defend its extensive interests throughout the world in order 
     to maintain its hegemonic status (17); and third, 
     preponderance as a strategy will be obsolete in the emerging 
     multipolar world, China, Japan, Germany and Russia being the 
     potential new great powers. The balance of power alternative 
     to preponderance is ``offshore balancing''(20). The premise 
     of the offshore balancing strategy ``is that it will become 
     increasingly more difficult, dangerous, and costly for the 
     United States to maintain order in, and control over, the 
     international system'' (21). As an insular great power 
     geostrategically shielded from most foreign threats, the U.S. 
     is in position to disengage itself from many of its military 
     commitments and global leadership role, thus avoiding 
     overextension. Offshore balancing lets the U.S. stand to the 
     side and achieve relative gains while other, less insulated 
     powers quarrel amongst themselves; it also lessens the U.S. 
     risk of war by allowing the U.S. to act last, when the 
     situation is clear (20-22). Geostrategic concerns are 
     paramount in offshore balancing; other issues such as 
     ``market and global economic welfare imperatives'' are to be 
     subordinate (24). U.S. power and strategic choice are 
     maximized through offshore balancing (24).
       21. Mastanduno, Michael. ``Preserving the Unipolar Moment: 
     Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold 
     War.'' International Security, v. 21, no. 4, spring 1997: 49-
     88.
       Mastanduno offers a discussion of realism and its two major 
     variants, the balance of power theory and the balance of 
     threat theory, and how these theories apply to different 
     aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Realism is not itself a 
     theory, but instead a ``research program that contains a core 
     set of assumptions from which a variety of theories and 
     explanations can be developed'' (50). Realist assumptions 
     include an anarchic international system and that states are 
     ``like units'' (52). Balance of Power theory states that a 
     hegemonic state will ``stimulate the rise of new great 
     powers'' or the formation of coalitions that will balance 
     against its preponderance (54). The rational course of action 
     under this theory is to accept the ``inevitability of 
     multipolarity'' and make the most of it, by adopting the 
     position of offshore balancer (see Layne)(56). Balance of

[[Page S768]]

     Threat theory assert that states are not threatened by power 
     (aggregate resources) alone; the presence of other 
     considerations such as ``geographic proximity, offensive 
     capability, and aggressive intentions'' is necessary to 
     constitute a threat (59). The rational strategy under this 
     theory would be to ``pursue policies that signal restraint 
     and reassurance''--be nonthreatening, in other words (59). 
     Balance of power guides U.S. foreign economic policy while 
     balance of threat informs U.S. security policy, and the two 
     theories thus applied has worked together in the scheme to 
     preserve U.S. global primacy (51). To ``dissuade'' and delay 
     challenges to U.S. hegemony, the U.S. must not allow economic 
     conflicts to undermine security relations; the U.S. must be 
     willing to shoulder the costs of a ``global engagement 
     strategy'', and the U.S. must consult and get the cooperation 
     of its allies (a multilateral approach) and refrain from 
     preaching and imposing U.S. values (87-8).
       22. Maynes, Charles William. ``America's Fading 
     Commitments.'' World Policy Journal, v. 16, summer 1999: 11-
     22.
       Maynes traces the American attitude toward multilateralism 
     since the Second World War. Multilateralism and international 
     institutions like the UN have fallen out of favor among the 
     U.S. political elite since the 1980s, due to the restrictions 
     multilateralism places on America's freedom of action. To 
     maintain that freedom, America has moved toward unilateralism 
     (``American isolationism in another form'') by acting alone 
     or through dominating its alliances (17). Maynes argues that 
     the multilateral experiment cannot be abandoned (21). 
     Globalization brings new transnational problems that must be 
     dealt with multilaterally, and the balance-of-power approach 
     to foreign policy is too prone to catastrophic failure to be 
     completely relied upon (20-21). America's unilateral approach 
     also creates resentment among other states (22). Despite 
     appropriate concerns about the erosion of sovereignty and the 
     erosion of democratic control, America must revive the 
     Wilsonian commitment to international organizations and 
     international law (also liberal internationalism), for ``the 
     hope for a more orderly and peaceful world lies in the 
     commitment to progressive multilateralism . . . [a hope 
     which] will never be fulfilled unless the most powerful 
     country in the world does its share'' (22).
       23. Maynes, Charles William. `` `Principled' Hegemony.'' 
     World Policy Journal, v. 14, fall 1997: 31-36.
       America has the ability to deter attacks against itself, 
     but often lacks the will and resources to compel other states 
     to act in accordance with its wishes (35). Maynes suggests 
     limiting the obligations of principled hegemony (specifically 
     in the human rights area) by restricting the U.S. role to 
     providing logistical and political assistance and acting as 
     an example, instead of taking over other states' 
     responsibilities, acting as global or regional policeman, or 
     imposing American views (35-6)
       24. Maynes, Charles William. ``The New Pessimism.'' Foreign 
     Policy, no. 100, fall 1995: 33-49.
       Influential authors informed by Hobbesian realist 
     assumptions express an unwarranted mood of pessimism for 
     America's future, Mayne asserts. The state of the world is 
     better than it has been for decades and there is much America 
     can do for a better future. The international system is 
     ``structurally sound'' because no great power is seeking the 
     hegemonic position (a goal repudiated by the Bush 
     administration)(44). Wars and conflicts are now more numerous 
     but on a much smaller scale--war doesn't pay like it used to; 
     there is also no ideology fueling a drive for world supremacy 
     (43). The U.S. should use this ``moment of unusual structural 
     stability in world affairs'' to ``found a structure of peace 
     for the future''(44), by devising a European structure that 
     would involve both Germany and Russia and to fully integrate 
     China into the international system (45-6). The American goal 
     must not be to counter the power of these emerging great 
     powers, but ``to channel it in directions that are more 
     benign and that respect the rights of [their] neighbors'' 
     (46).
       25. Maynes, Charles William. ``The Perils of (and for) an 
     Imperial America.'' Foreign Policy, no. 111, summer 1998: 36-
     48.
       America leads the world economically, militarily, and 
     politically (37). It already carries the burden of ``a 
     totally disproportionate share of the expense of maintaining 
     the common defense'' as well as being the ``world economic 
     stabilizer'' (37). Yet America should NOT go further and 
     attempt to pursue a policy of world hegemony, for four 
     reasons: ``domestic costs, impact on the American character, 
     international backlash, and lost opportunities'' (39). Since 
     there is ``no clear geographical limit to the obligations'' 
     imposed on an aspiring hegemon, America, should it elect to 
     pursue world hegemony, must be prepared for huge increases in 
     military and non-military spending, in dollars and in 
     bloodshed (40). Hegemony can be attempted ``only by using the 
     volunteer army,'' which would exacerbate the social 
     fragmentation between those who reap benefits from 
     globalization, and those who have to pay the price (42). 
     Dangerous too is the arrogance supreme power brings, and from 
     which America already suffers. Unilateral actions such as 
     economic sanctions and dictates to the U.N. and other 
     countries provoke alienation and resistance, making other 
     countries less cooperative (44). A policy of hegemony ``will 
     guarantee that in time America will become outnumbered and 
     overpowered'' (46). America should not waste this post-Cold 
     War moment on pursuing hegemony, but use the opportunity to 
     try to forge a new relationship among great powers.
       26. ``Old Challenges in a New Era: Addressing America's 
     Cold War Legacy, Defense, Economic & International Security 
     Concerns.'' Washington, Institute for Foreign Policy 
     Analysis, 1995.
       During the Cold War, ideology was the dominant factor 
     governing international relations. But economic 
     considerations have taken the place of ideology with the 
     collapse of the Soviet Union and following globalization. 
     Unlike during the Cold War era, the transfers of arms and 
     defense technologies to other states are being made largely 
     on the basis of economic considerations, not ideology. A 
     laissez-faire approach to arms transfers might have negative 
     impacts on regional stability and detrimental effects on 
     future international commercial relations and overall 
     political stability in the long term (Chapter 1).
       Even though the U.S. was the leader of the globalization of 
     the international economic system, it failed to adopt 
     internal policies to maintain its competitiveness in the 
     world market. In reality, however, the United States 
     considerably depends on importation. Consequently, it is 
     demanded that the United States continues to improve its 
     economic competitiveness in international markets if it is to 
     reverse the trend of dependency. (Chapter 2)
       The increasing competition incurred from 
     internationalization and interdependence of trade transformed 
     the structure of the U.S. economy. For example, wages of U.S. 
     workers were adjusted to the equilibrium of global wage 
     levels. This structural transfiguration of the U.S. economy 
     from industrial era to information age resulted in U.S. 
     defense downsizing. The U.S. defense drawdown appears prima 
     facie to have negative impacts on the national job market. 
     The impact upon the U.S. job market as a whole is, however, 
     minimal in the context and also can be ameliorated with 
     continued economic growth. (Chapter 3)
       Today's defense industrial base was formed during World War 
     II, and evolved during the quasi-warlike period of the Soviet 
     Union threat. The strategy of the U.S. military against 
     Soviet quantitative military advantages was technological 
     innovation with qualitatively superior weapon systems. This 
     also demanded large-scale industrial production of products 
     and a massive modernization of industry. But with the 
     collapse of the Soviet Union, the primary role of defense 
     industry disappeared and left dichotomous problems; ``how to 
     reduce the size of the US defense industrial establishment 
     without losing the capability to support the armed forces in 
     the near-term surge by major powers such as Russia and China, 
     or to respond to provocations from major regional states and 
     to concurrently facilitate futuristic armaments production 
     needed for long-term security needs.'' (Chapter 4)
       Regarding the direction of U.S. military industry, ``the 
     key objective of U.S. defense industrial policy must be the 
     preservation of critical design, engineering, and production 
     skills in the United States economy.'' Moreover, ``long-term 
     U.S. defense production is rooted in maintaining a robust 
     manufacturing base within the United States. Failure to 
     preserve a diverse manufacturing base will eventually result 
     in increased U.S. vulnerability to foreign veto over U.S. 
     security-related decisions.'' (Chapter 5)
       U.S. foreign dependency on military production will 
     naturally increase as the United States moves toward a 
     unified commercial/defense industrial base and prime 
     manufacturers continue to reorganize their supplier networks. 
     Within this framework, long lead-time products such as 
     aircraft, submarines, aircraft carriers, and tanks are not 
     vulnerable to foreign suppliers who might prove reluctant to 
     provide parts for U.S. defense production if tensions 
     develops in selected international relationships. The United 
     States currently has the technology to reestablish industries 
     if required but at a cost. The United States is more 
     vulnerable to stoppage of critical parts and components for 
     electric equipment and combat consumables needed for quick-
     response intervention operations. In the long-term, U.S. 
     vulnerability will depend on the scope and diversity of the 
     United States industrial base.'' (Chapter 7)
       Preserving international stability is of great importance 
     to the U.S. political, economic and military capabilities. 
     After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the security 
     condition of the world has been transformed, triggering a 
     dispute about how much military capability should be retained 
     under the new uncertain world order. The Clinton 
     Administration's Bottom-Up Review (BUR) postulated the United 
     States must be able to fight two nearly simultaneous major 
     regional conflicts (MRCs). But the U.S. force structure 
     planning has been complicated along with the continuous 
     change of the World and the diversity of potential missions 
     unlike during the Cold War. ``As a result of the changes in 
     global stability and Allied force levels, three questions 
     need to be reexamined. 1) what are the critical international 
     interests of the United States, 2) what are the emerging 
     threats to international stability, and 3) what military 
     capability does the United States need to defend those 
     interests.'' (Chapter 8)
       ``The twin goals of maintaining a viable U.S. defense 
     industrial base and promoting international stability are not 
     mutually exclusive. As long as discretion is exercised,

[[Page S769]]

     transfers of U.S. arms to non-aggressive states is more 
     desirable than the alternatives of allowing other arms-
     exporting states to dominate the trade, or cutting off 
     international arms supplies and encouraging the 
     development of indigenous arms industries.'' (Chapter 9)
       27. Olsen, Edward A. ``In Defense of International 
     Abstention.'' Strategic Review, v. 24, spring 1996: 58-63.
       Olsen advocates the return of American foreign policy to 
     its pre-Second World War program of ``abstention, benign 
     neglect, and non-interventionism within a framework of highly 
     selective engagement'' (58). The U.S. was pulled into a 
     collective approach to security by the special circumstances 
     of the Second World War and the Cold War, and even now 
     retains this ``anachronistic'' pursuit of world leadership 
     with little concern for national self-interest (58-9). Now 
     that the Cold War is over, the U.S. should return to a more 
     ``normal'' role in world affairs by disengaging itself from 
     the ``permanent allies'' and ``entangling alliances'' frowned 
     upon by the Founding Fathers (59-61). A policy of 
     disengagement and non-intervention is not isolationism; non-
     intervention merely provides the kind of ``strategic 
     independence'' that allows America to get involved ``when 
     Americans--not other countries or international 
     organizations'' decide it is wise (59). Less intervention 
     overseas, less foreign aid, and fewer entanglements will let 
     the U.S. shed burdens its allies can and should carry on 
     their own, and ``maximize U.S. geo-economic influence through 
     a demilitarization of U.S. involvement overseas,'' as well as 
     grant the U.S. a ``more benign and unprovocative image'', 
     facilitate ``trade and investment, and permit a wholesale 
     reduction in obligations without calling into question 
     American prestige and credibility'' (63).
       28. Pfaff, William. ``The Coming Clash of Europe with 
     America.'' World Policy Journal, v. 15, winter 1998/99: 1-9.
       The Atlanticist dream of an American-European political, 
     economic, and security union is unlikely to be realized due 
     to the oncoming Western European versus American clash over 
     economic and industrial competition (1). The euro (EU common 
     currency), if successful, will draw investments away from 
     U.S. securities as well as become a ``powerful rival for 
     denominating international trade products'' (3). Europe is 
     also expected to resist the globalization trend of mergers in 
     strategic industries such as aerospace and other high-
     technology sectors to achieve and maintain the ``industrial 
     and economic guarantees of sovereignty'' (5). European 
     economic and industrial interests serve to make European 
     countries more economically and politically integrated as a 
     union, as EU institutions and policies develop to maintain 
     these interests; further, these same interests will become a 
     ``new and fundamental factor of U.S.-EU rivalry and 
     competition,'' forming an obstacle to transatlantic 
     integration (3). Europe does not wish conflict with the U.S., 
     but these vital interests render conflict almost inevitable 
     (1). On a slightly different note, Pfaff argues against an 
     American claim on hegemony, because hegemony is an 
     ``inherently unstable'' position that provokes resistance, 
     because most of the world does not accept the idea of 
     American exceptionalism, and because American public opinion 
     does not support the kind of expenditure necessary for 
     hegemonic pursuit. (6-7).
       29. Rielly, John E. ``Americans and the World: A Survey at 
     Century's End.'' Foreign Policy, no. 114, spring 1999: 97-
     113.
       The latest quadrennial foreign policy opinion survey of the 
     American public and leadership, sponsored by the Chicago 
     Council on Foreign Relations, finds three major trends (1). 
     First, the American public prefers a multilateral approach in 
     U.S. response to crises abroad, while the leadership is more 
     willing to take unilateral action (112,100). Second, although 
     the public recognizes many vital American interests around 
     the world, it is disinclined to send troops or money overseas 
     except to defend national self-interests--a position Rielly 
     calls ``guarded engagement'' (105). Altruistic 
     internationalist causes (such as promoting human rights and 
     democracy and defending allies' security) are low priority. 
     Guarded engagement ``could prove problematic if global 
     leadership requires the United States to make tougher choices 
     in the next century'' as the ``world's only superpower'' 
     (113). Third, there is a marked contrast between public 
     pessimism (major concern being international violence) and 
     leadership optimism for the 21st century world (112). The 
     survey also finds that both the public and leadership groups 
     are upbeat about globalization (105), and that both are 
     viewing ``economic rather than military power as the most 
     significant measure of global strength'' (97).
       30. Rosati, Jerel A. ``United States Leadership into the 
     Next Millennium: A Question of Politics.'' International 
     Journal, v. 52, spring 1997: 297-315.
       The ``constraints and political uncertainty faced by 
     [American] presidents in today's domestic political 
     environment does not bode well for a strong proactive foreign 
     policy in the future'' (310). No longer do presidents have 
     the ``automatic or long-lasting'' support behind their 
     foreign policy like they did in the Cold War era (307); now 
     they must deal with a contentious public (307) and a more 
     assertive Congress which increasingly involves itself in 
     foreign policy (308). In addition, presidential policies are 
     constrained by what bureaucracies, usually more oriented to 
     the past than the present, are ``able and willing to 
     implement'' (309). Finally, the personal qualities of the 
     president also determine the success of presidential foreign 
     policy--whether the president has the persuasive power, 
     professional reputation, public prestige, and ability to make 
     good choices (311). The result of these combined factors is 
     that U.S. foreign policy ``has tended to become increasingly 
     reactive--as opposed to proactive--and, hence, incoherent and 
     inconsistent over time,'' rendering the exercise of the much-
     advocated sustained U.S. global leadership very difficult 
     (306).
       31. Rosenthal, Joel H. ``Henry Stimson's Clue: Is 
     Progressive Internationalism on the Wane?'' World Policy 
     Journal, v. 14, fall 1997: 53-62.
       Rosenthal explicates and distinguishes the philosophies of 
     conservative and progressive internationalism, and concludes 
     that ``a realist foreign policy and a `progressive' social 
     agenda did not have to be mutually exclusive'' (61). 
     Conservative internationalism is ``conservative in that it 
     sought modest, incremental change in international 
     relations'' and maintains the state-centered model in which 
     nations have sovereign control over their own territories and 
     domestic policies (56). Conservatives are concerned with 
     promoting American geopolitical and mercantilist interests, 
     not radical world reformation (56). Progressive 
     internationalism takes its cue from the American Progressive 
     movement and ``sought to extend the ideals and achievements 
     of the Progressive movement'' to the world, as reflected in 
     its emphasis on political democracy, and social and 
     economic justice worldwide (55-7). Progressives also 
     envision a ``One World'' international structure. 
     Rosenthal then writes that ``the story of American 
     internationalism is a history of how `national interests' 
     grow out of and are defined by domestic considerations'' 
     (54). Citing Morgenthau's idea that ``international power 
     depended on domestic power and that a key factor in 
     determining domestic power was the presence or absence of 
     moral principles,'' Rosenthal observes that even realists, 
     of whom Morgenthau is a prime representative, accept that 
     power rests not only on military and economic might, but 
     also has a moral basis--legitimacy (54). Working for and 
     achieving social progress at home is ``a prerequisite'' in 
     the extension of American power and interests abroad (61). 
     Thus although conservative internationalism is the more 
     mainstream policy, ``progressive aspirations cannot and 
     should not be jettisoned,'' for these aspirations of 
     equality in freedom and opportunity constitute the 
     ``purpose of American politics . . . [and] for various 
     historical, geographic, cultural and technological 
     reasons, `the area within which the United States must 
     defend and promote its purpose [had] become world-wide'' 
     (61). It is the American purpose and ethical obligation to 
     deliver on the progressive philosophy, domestically and 
     globally (the latter by example), in its role as the 
     ``indispensable nation'' (62). In short, moral principles 
     cannot be ignored in foreign policy.
       32. Rubinstein, Alvin Z. ``The New Moralists on a Road to 
     Hell.'' Orbis, v. 80, spring 1996: 277-295.
       American policy on aid to needy nations and especially on 
     military intervention against political injustices (like 
     ethnic violence) has come under the negative influence of a 
     group Rubinstein calls the ``new moralists'' (277). The new 
     moralists are a ``disparate group of influential notables in 
     the media, academy, and think tanks,'' who want to use U.S. 
     military power to ``spread democracy, protect the victimized, 
     and promote economic development,'' even where the U.S. has 
     no strategic stake (277). New moralists assume that the U.S., 
     as the sole world superpower, must shoulder global 
     leadership; that the international community is willing to 
     follow its lead; that civil and ethnic conflicts must be 
     stopped before ``they lead to great-power wars'' and that the 
     U.S. has a ``moral responsibility'' to promote democracy and 
     defend the downtrodden (278). They view national interest 
     through a moral, not strategic, framework (278). Rubinstein 
     criticizes the new moralists for misusing historical evidence 
     and for wrongly claiming international support (286-7). 
     Foreign policy ``must be affordable, supportable, and 
     demonstrably in the best interests of the country at large,'' 
     and based on ``sober calculations of fundamental U.S. 
     strategic, economic and political interests'' (293). ``Except 
     in cases of direct threats to the survival or vital interests 
     of the United States, the determination of which moral 
     goal(s) to emphasize is a matter of choice'' (294). Further, 
     the moral dimensions of foreign policy must be carefully 
     handled with the proper perspective and sound priorities, in 
     order to prevent trivialization, indifference, and self-
     righteousness (292).
       33. Rubinstein, Alvin Z. ``NATO Enlargement vs. American 
     Interests.'' Orbis, v. 42, winter 1998: 37-48.
       NATO enlargement is not in the U.S. interest. The decision 
     to admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO was 
     based on Clinton's bid for votes from voters with strong ties 
     to Central and Eastern Europe, and not on a cost-benefit 
     policy analysis (37). NATO enlargement will cost the U.S. 
     money, add to NATO's security burden, and force the new 
     members to divert money from economic and social development 
     in order to upgrade their defense system to NATO standards 
     (38-40). Given the new challenges and uncertainties facing 
     the U.S. in East Asia, it is unwise for the U.S. to take on 
     ``unnecessary responsibilities'' in Europe, where the 
     situation is stable (43). Introducing new elements into NATO 
     will disrupt its ``secure

[[Page S770]]

     strategic environment'' by affecting power structures and 
     member cohesion, possibly resulting detrimental consequences 
     (44). The key concern here is Germany. Admitting the Central 
     and Eastern European members will once again put Germany in 
     the center of Europe, with the potential for rekindling 
     adversarial Franco-German and Russo-German relationships, as 
     well as undermining European integration as France and 
     Britain assess Germany's new, more important status (45). The 
     addition of new members, all ``heavily dependent on 
     Germany,'' may affect intra-NATO politics (45). Finally, 
     ``any geopolitical development . . . that transforms Germany 
     from an ordinary nation-state into a strategic hub . . . will 
     pose problems for America's presently unchallenged 
     dominance''; in an enlarged NATO where Germany has NATO 
     members as a buffer against Russia (thus reducing its 
     security reliance on the U.S.), America may well lose its 
     leverage in NATO to Germany (45).
       34. Ruggie, John Gerard. ``The Past as a Prologue?'' 
     International Security, v. 21, Spring 1997: 89-125.
       Ruggie uses three past reconstruction periods in 
     international policy, 1919, 1945, and post-1947 to predict 
     future trends (109). He contends that in all three instances 
     American leaders advocated ``multilateral organizing 
     principles . . . to animate the support of the American 
     public'' (117). He states that these principles are embedded 
     in American nationalism and by their nature appeal to the 
     public. ``Multilateral organizing principles are singularly 
     compatible with America's own form of nationalism, on which 
     its sense of political community is based'' (109). However 
     the author is hesitant to define these acts as ``mere 
     rhetoric'' or idealism (117). He asserts that various factors 
     must be taken into account depending on the complexity of 
     each situation, with special focus on ``strategic interests 
     and collective identity'' (124). Ruggie argues that the 
     outlook for American foreign policy should be not simply 
     defined by historical instances or past successes but in 
     terms of the existing situation and political climate.
       35. Schild, George. ``America's Foreign Policy 
     Pragmatism.'' Aussenpolitik, v. 46, 1st Quarter 1995: 32-40.
       Schild discusses American foreign policy transition from 
     isolationism (33) to internationalism (34). The author states 
     that isolationism ``does not mean the complete decoupling of 
     the United States from Europe and from the world'' but rather 
     ``refusal to enter into lasting political commitments'' (33). 
     The change in U.S. foreign policy from isolationism to 
     internationalism was a result of four factors. The era of 
     isolationism between the two world wars caused a belief in 
     the American population that it left the country unprepared 
     for attack, as in the case of Pearl Harbor. The policy failed 
     to provide economic growth and the development of new weapons 
     expanded defense borders beyond American coastlines. Finally, 
     the Cold War created an adversary in which the general public 
     accepted the Soviet Union as an enemy (34). The combination 
     of these factors led to the emergence of internationalism, 
     defined as universal or transnational interests (34). 
     However, Schild declares that since the end of the Cold 
     War the trend toward isolationism has re-emerged, a trend 
     he calls ``pragmatic foreign policy'' (33).
       36. Schwabe, William. ``Future Worlds and Roles: A Template 
     to Help Planners Consider Assumptions About the Future 
     Security Environment.'' Rand Corporation, 1995.
       Schwabe discusses nine possible future roles for the U.S. 
     concerning international security. He explains the origin of 
     his roles by distinguishing between possible future worlds 
     and possible U.S. roles. Possible future worlds include ``new 
     era'' denoting improvements in economic and political 
     structures, ``baseline'' referring to status quo levels which 
     continue in the same fashion as it has since World War Two 
     and ``Malthusian'' meaning deterioration in which the 
     international system is failing and all countries struggle 
     (2). Potential roles for the U.S. encompass leadership, co-
     equal, and second tier (3). The leadership function maintains 
     that the U.S. will continue the role it has assumed for the 
     past half century, dominating in many aspects of 
     international relations and security. The co-equal option 
     posits that the U.S. will maintain its comparative advantage 
     in some aspects but recognize equivalent or superior ability 
     of other first tier countries. In this respect the U.S. will 
     ``abandon the modern version of manifest destiny and comes to 
     see greater value and security in not having to lead'' (6). 
     The second tier role presumes that the U.S. will decline in 
     status, falling below other leading industrialized nations. 
     Schwabe does not hypothesize on which of these possibilities 
     will occur.
       37. Schwenninger, Sherle R. ``Clinton's World Order: U.S. 
     Foreign Policy is Hastening--by accident--Arrival of the 
     post-American Century.'' Nation, v. 266, Feb. 1998: 17-20.
       Since President Clinton has taken office a ``new global 
     order'' has taken shape (17). Schwenninger states that 
     Clinton's policy of ``political isolation and economic 
     strangulation have hardened into an ideological commitment'' 
     (18). The author explains his theory through examples of U.S. 
     economic trade agreements and various attempts at sanctions. 
     He notes that American sanction policies especially have done 
     more to strain U.S.-European relations than they have altered 
     behavior of condemned countries. Schwenninger continues by 
     saying, ``It (the Clinton Administration) has mismanaged this 
     period of U.S. dominance in world affairs by pushing 
     ideologically driven initiatives (like NATO expansion), which 
     will bring little if any lasting benefit to U.S. interests or 
     the larger cause of a stable world order'' (20). The author 
     promotes U.S. foreign policy that includes labor and 
     environmental protections, more extensive domestic measures 
     to insure the majority of Americans benefit, and when needed 
     international regulatory structures needed to oversee 
     international capital flows (19-20).
       38. Shain, Yossi. ``Multicultural Foreign Policy.'' Foreign 
     Policy, no. 100, Fall 1995: 69-87.
       In the past century America's population has expanded 
     considerably. Ethnic groups living in America have altered 
     the shape and function of U.S. foreign policy. Those involved 
     in U.S. foreign political affairs have recognized this wave 
     of influence and have acknowledged the resurgence of 
     Wilsonianism (70). However, this presents a foreign policy 
     conundrum: foreign policy- makers must take into account the 
     demands of citizens but avoid undermining national 
     cohesiveness due to ethnic strains. With increasingly 
     powerful ethnic influences such as diasporic lobbies, ``one 
     should expect to see strong ramifications in U.S. foreign 
     affairs, including a redefinition of U.S. national 
     interest''. (73) Shain states two ideologies that ethnic 
     communities encounter when compelled by ethnic and U.S. 
     interests. Isolationists consider their culture superior to 
     American culture and reject cultural assimilation in the U.S. 
     (75). Integrationists endorse a vision of pluralist democracy 
     that includes cultural and political recognition from main 
     stream institutions (78). American policymakers will have to 
     carefully consider these factors when creating and 
     implementing foreign policy.
       39. Sloan, Stanley, R. ``The U.S. Role in the Twenty-first 
     Century World: Toward a New Consensus?'' Foreign Policy 
     Association, 1998: 64 p.
       Sloan contends that U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold 
     War era must be directed by executive leadership with the 
     acknowledgment of scholars, analysts, and Congress. A crucial 
     element in comprehending America's new role is to understand 
     world interdependency. Sloan proposes U.S. interests can be 
     ``affected by developments in any region of the globe'' (5). 
     Sloan suggests that the U.S. has been experiencing an 
     ``escapist'' period in foreign policy (36). He contends that 
     escapism is a result of America's uncertain international 
     role in the future and a misunderstanding of U.S. foreign 
     objectives. He recommends the current Administration 
     explicitly defining America's foreign policy agenda based on 
     common values, goals, and interests (59). The author reveals 
     that this endeavor would ``reflect post-cold-war realities 
     and would restore flexibility to U.S. policymaking'' (59).
       40. Travers, Russell, E. ``A new Millennium and a Strategic 
     Breathing Space.'' Washington Quarterly, v. 20, Spring 1997: 
     97-114.
       In a reevaluation of threats against U.S. security Travers 
     suggests eight general policy prescriptions to succeed during 
     the post Cold War period. Included in his recommendations are 
     rejection of isolationist and instant gratification policies 
     which he depicts as being two major mistakes in U.S. history 
     (110-111). He promotes the use of newly defined sovereignty 
     combined with neo-Wilsonian ideals ``because it is in the 
     U.S. national interest to help build such a world'' (112). 
     The author also suggests minimizing future threats by 
     addressing potential vulnerabilities including possible 
     domestic problems. He states that this can be accomplished by 
     creating a exceptional intelligence community with early 
     warning systems to thwart domestic and international threats. 
     Military preparedness should include readiness in low 
     intensity conflicts with small force packages of highest-end 
     U.S. technology integrated with 1980s- and 1990s-vintage 
     weapons (112). Essentially, Travers concludes that the U.S. 
     maintains a favorable strategic position in the post Cold War 
     era.
       41. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. 
     ``U.S. National Goals and Objectives in International 
     Relations in the Year 2000 and Beyond.'' Hearing, 104th 
     Congress, 1st Session, July 13, 1995. Prepared Statement by 
     Henry Kissinger, 12-22.
       Kissinger states that every major nation finds itself in a 
     transitional stage. ``The current world contains six or seven 
     major global players whose ability to affect nonmilitary 
     decisions is essentially comparable'' (13). For this reason 
     Kissinger believes that there are two stable options for U.S. 
     policy makers: hegemony or equilibrium. Hegemony would allow 
     the U.S. to dominate in the international sphere but has been 
     recently rejected by the American public (13). The 
     equilibrium or ``balance of power'' approach has also been 
     dismissed by U.S. society due to endless tension that many 
     feel it causes (13). However, Kissinger maintains that 
     ``the reality is that the emerging world order will have 
     to be based on some concept of equilibrium . . . among its 
     various regions'' (13). He also argues that the U.S. will 
     be forced to impose a variety of foreign policy 
     initiatives, based on U.S. relations and each nation's 
     political agenda. Concerning countries with which we share 
     common values and principles, Kissinger suggests emphasis 
     on democratic principles to usher in the new world order 
     (17). In the case of nontraditional U.S. allies he asserts 
     that we must avoid containment policies of a generation 
     ago. Containment may allow or possibly promote unified 
     defiance. (21). Kissinger stresses

[[Page S771]]

     the need for a well developed and supported international 
     policy, blind to partisanship. ``The national interest of 
     the United States does not change every four years; 
     foreign leaders judge our country by its insight and its 
     constancy'' (22).
       42. Van Heuven, Marten. ``Europe in 2006: A Speculative 
     Sketch.'' Rand, 1997: 16 p.
       U.S. foreign policy with respect to Europe in the next 
     decade should be founded on ``the fact that a secure, stable, 
     and prosperous Europe is vital to American security and well-
     being'' (13). Europe and America have had a long record of 
     cooperation as a result of similar interest and values. For 
     this reason political, financial, and social stability in 
     Europe is essential to prosperity in America. Van Heuven 
     stresses that because of our historical partnership 
     bipartisanship should not muddle U.S. foreign policy 
     objective in the region (15). Emphasis on pragmatic policies 
     such as those concerning the EU and open markets should 
     continue to be the American objective (15). In closing the 
     author states that there is a need for greater public 
     discussion about what the U.S. role should be concerning 
     Europe.
       43. Weston, Charles. ``Key U.S. Foreign Policy Interests.'' 
     Aussenpolitik, v. 48, no. 1, 1997: 49-57.
       Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. has remained the 
     only influence capable of international influence. Changes in 
     America politically and domestically have influenced U.S. 
     foreign policy decisions. Weston states that the current 
     Administration's policy combines ``idealism with pragmatism 
     and emphasizes democracy and human rights'', a reflection of 
     public sentiment (52). Despite international engagements such 
     as Bosnia, ``Washington is not at all keen about the idea of 
     an offensive and worldwide interventionism'' (52). The author 
     concludes that to overcome international challenges faced in 
     the 21st century the U.S. must lead alliances with examples 
     of coordination and cooperation (57).
  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, James Lindsay of the Brookings 
Institution, I think, well summed up where we in Congress are today in 
this great debate on America's proper role in the world in the Winter 
2000 Brookings Review, where he wrote:

       Much like friends who agree to dine but can't agree on a 
     restaurant, foreign policy elites agree that the United 
     States should do something, just not what. Congress naturally 
     reflects this dissensus, which makes it difficult for the 
     institution to function. Divided by chamber, party, ideology, 
     region, committee, and generation, Congress lists toward 
     paralysis whenever a modicum of agreement and a sense of 
     proportion are absent.

  In a nutshell, attempting to overcome this ``dissensus'' and 
``paralysis'' is what Senator Roberts and I are trying to do in these 
dialogs. I'd like at this point to yield to the distinguished Senator 
from Kansas for his comments.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding.
  Mr. President, Senator Cleland has very effectively outlined the 
evolution of our nation's foreign policy, from Washington and Adams 
(chary of foreign involvement and alliances) to the Monroe Doctrine to 
Wilson's idealism and all of the so called ``ism's''--economism, 
realism, humanitarianism, minimalism, unilateralism, regionalism, 
isolationism with intervention and non intervention tossed in. Now, 
that is quite a foreign policy tossed salad.
  But, the point is, discussion and definition must preface clarity, 
purpose and consensus and Senator Cleland has done just that along with 
a Clelandism, a new concept he will define in his closing remarks, 
``Realistic Restraint.''
  In setting the framework for discussion on the global role our nation 
will play in the 21st century, the benchmark used by virtually all 
observers is the post-cold-war period.
  Ashton Carter, professor of science and international affairs at the 
John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and an Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy in the first 
Clinton administration, put it very well when he recently wrote:

       The kindest thing that might be said of American behavior 
     ten years into the post-Cold War world is that it is A-
     STRATEGIC, responding dutifully to the (crisis du jour) with 
     little sense of priority or consistency.
       A less charitable characterization would be that the United 
     States has its priorities but they are backwards, too often 
     placing immediate intervention in minor conflicts over a 
     ``preventive-defense strategy focused on basic, long term 
     threats to security.
       This formula has become awkward, even embarrassing, as the 
     years go by. It is an admission that we do not know where we 
     are going strategically, only whence we have come. It is time 
     to declare an end to the end.

  In his recent article, ``Adapting U.S. Defense to Future Needs,'' 
Professor Carter has recommended identifying an ``A-list'' of security 
priorities to fill the current strategic vacuum. I was struck by the 
similarity between Professor Carter's A, B, and C lists determining 
threats to our national security and the recommendations by the 
Commission on America's National Interests four years previous that I 
mentioned in my opening remarks.
  And, Professor Carter did us another favor in his article by quoting 
George Marshall at the time of America's previous great strategic 
transition following the Second World War. In 1947 at Princeton 
University, General Marshall said:

       Now that an immediate peril is not plainly visible, there 
     is a natural tendency to relax and to return to business as 
     usual. But, I feel that we are seriously failing in our 
     attitude toward the international problems whose solution 
     will largely determine our future.

  The report by the Commission on America's National Interests in 1996 
expressed a similar view:

       The confusion, crosscurrents, and cacophony about America's 
     role in the world today is strikingly reminiscent of two 
     earlier experiences in this century: the years after 1918 and 
     those after 1945. We are experiencing today the third post-
     war transition of the twentieth century. In the twenty years 
     after 1918, American isolationists forced withdrawal from the 
     world. America's withdrawal undermined the World War I peace 
     settlement in Europe and contributed mightily to the Great 
     Depression, the rise of fascism in Germany and Italy, and the 
     resumption of war in Europe after what proved to be but a 
     two-decade intermission. After 1945, American leaders were 
     determined to learn and apply those lessons of the interwar 
     period. Individuals who are known now as the ``wise men,'' 
     including Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, 
     Secretaries of State George Marshall and Dean Acheson, and 
     Senator Arthur Vandenberg, fashioned a strategy of 
     thoughtful, deep American engagement in the world in ways 
     they judged vital to America's well-being. As a result, two 
     generations of Americans have enjoyed five decades without 
     world war, in which America experienced the most rapid 
     economic growth in history, and won a great victory in the 
     Cold War.

  To address this historical challenge and responsibility, what did the 
Commission recommend? We recommended the following:

       Challenges to American national interests in the decade 
     ahead. Developments around the world pose threats to U.S. 
     interests and present opportunities for advancing Americans' 
     well-being. Because America's resources are limited, U.S. 
     foreign policy must be selective in choosing which issues to 
     address. The proper basis for making such judgments is a 
     lean, hierarchical conception of what U.S. national interests 
     are and are not. Media attention to foreign affairs tends to 
     fixate on issues according to the vividness of a threat, 
     without pausing to ask whether the U.S. interest threatened 
     is really important. Thus second- and third-order issues like 
     Bosnia or Haiti become a consuming focus of U.S. foreign 
     policy to the neglect of issues of higher priority, like 
     China's international role or the unprecedented risks of 
     nuclear proliferation.
       Based on its assessment of specific threats to and 
     opportunities for U.S. national interests in the final years 
     of the century, the Commission has identified five cardinal 
     challenges for the next U.S. president: To cope with China's 
     entry onto the world stage; to prevent loss of control of 
     nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-usable materials, and to 
     contain biological and chemical weapons proliferation; to 
     maintain sound strategic partnerships with Japan and the 
     European allies; to avoid Russia's collapse into civil war or 
     reversion to authoritarianism; and to maintain singular U.S. 
     leadership, military capabilities, and international 
     credibility.

  Note the similarity in agreement in regard to Professor Carter's 
recent article in which he says, 4 years later:

       The public imagination, reflected in the press, abhors the 
     post-Cold War's conceptual vacuum. Under CNN's relentless 
     gaze, and in the absence of any widely accepted strategic 
     principles, the accumulation of a decade's worth of telegenic 
     events has begun to furnish the public with a conception of 
     strategic priorities that differs from an A-list as defined 
     here. Citizens watching the news (and even those few who 
     still read it) can be forgiven if they have begun to get the 
     impression that the security challenges of the new era (the 
     post-Post-Cold War era) arise in such places as Kosovo, 
     Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti, Rwanda and Somalia. These are the 
     issues that have dominated the security headlines in the 
     1990s. Indeed, there is even talk of the post-Cold War's 
     first presidential doctrine, the so-called ``Clinton 
     Doctrine'', dealing with precisely this issue. According to 
     President Bill Clinton: ``Whether you live in Africa or 
     Central Europe or any other place, if somebody comes after 
     innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of 
     their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it 
     is within our power to stop it, we will stop it.''
       The Kosovos and their ilk are undoubtedly important 
     problems: they represent not only atrocities that offend the 
     human conscience,

[[Page S772]]

     but if allowed to fester can undermine the foundations of 
     regional and international stability. However, it is also 
     true that such problems, while serious, do not threaten 
     America's vital security interests.

  Carter went on to say there are four dangers that he puts on the A 
list, the top priority concerns in regard to vital national security 
interests: No. 1, the danger that Russia might descend into chaos, 
isolation and aggression as Germany did after the First World War; No. 
2, the danger that Russia and other Soviet successor States might lose 
control of the nuclear and chemical and biological weapons legacy of 
the former Soviet Union; No. 3, the danger that, as China emerges, it 
could spawn hostility rather than becoming engaged in the international 
system; the danger that the weapons of mass destruction will 
proliferate and present a direct military threat to U.S. forces and 
territory; and finally, the danger that catastrophic terrorism of 
unprecedented scope and intensity might occur on U.S. territory.
  Professor Carter indicated these A-list problems do not take the form 
of traditional military threats and they have not, as a general rule, 
made headlines or driven our defense programs during the decade-old 
post-cold-war era. While neither imminent nor certain, the A-list 
problems will, to quote Marshall again, ``largely determine our 
future.''
  Both Professor Carter and the commission report go on to stress many 
additional policy recommendations. I commend both the report and the 
article to my colleagues.
  In trying to better prioritize our national security obligations, I 
think we are faced with two clear policy alternatives: The first I call 
the so-called Powell doctrine, named after retired Joint Chiefs 
Chairman, General Colin Powell, who focused on the dangers of military 
engagement and recommended limiting commitments that put America's men 
and women in uniform in harm's way to absolutely vital national 
interests; the second being the so-called Clinton doctrine, which 
emphasizes more of a global policing role for the United States.
  This debate does recall others. It was 40 years ago that President 
Eisenhower's emphasis on strategic deterrence was challenged by 
President John Kennedy's advocacy of something called ``flexible 
response.'' However, the difference is that once in office, the Kennedy 
administration increased defense spending, while in the last 10 years 
after engagement and sending more American service men and women 
overseas than any other President took place in tandem with cutting our 
military by one-third.
  Our current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Henry Shelton 
summed up the situation very well when he told the John F. Kennedy 
School of Government recently:

       The military makes a great hammer in America's foreign 
     policy tool box, but not every problem we face is a nail.

  He went on to say:

       As a world superpower, can we dare to admit that force 
     cannot solve every problem we face. I think that the decision 
     to use force is probably the most important decision our 
     nation's leaders can make. The fundamental purpose of our 
     military forces is to fight and win the nation's wars.

  General Shelton went on to echo what both the commission on America's 
interests and Professor Carter have said: Military intervention should 
be used for vital national interests, important national interests, and 
they have been used for humanitarian efforts. But the general cautioned 
that such efforts should be limited in duration and clearly defined.
  The general referred to the Dover test, named after Dover Air Force 
Base, the point of entry of the bodies of service members that are 
killed in action overseas. The general said: The question is, Is the 
American public prepared for the sight of our most precious resources 
coming home in flagged-draped caskets into Dover?
  He said this should be among the first things raised by Washington 
decisionmakers. Both Senator Cleland and I agree very strongly.

  The historical analogies aside, there is one clear difference in 
today's global world and what faced our political and military leaders 
of yesterday. That is what I call the information age of the CNN 
effect. Joseph S. Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs, said in a recent article:

       Today the free flow of information and shortened news 
     cycles have a huge impact on public opinion, placing some 
     items at the top of the public agenda that might otherwise 
     warrant a lower priority. Our political leaders are finding 
     it harder than ever to maintain a coherent set of priorities 
     on foreign policy issues that determine what is in the 
     national interest.
       The so-called ``CNN effect'' makes it harder to keep some 
     items off the top of the public agenda that might otherwise 
     warrant a lower priority. Now, with the added interactivity 
     of activist groups on the Internet, it will be harder than 
     ever for leaders in democracies to maintain a consistent 
     agenda of priorities.

  In closing, let me say that while this forum is intended to focus on 
debate and discussion, events of the day have a way of forcing the 
agenda.
  I paraphrase from the distinguished admiral who heads up the Defense 
Intelligence Agency when he said before a recent hearing: We must pay 
attention to uncertainties in regard to Russia, China, Europe, the 
Middle East, and Korea. They must be addressed. We must deal with rogue 
states and individuals who do not share our vision of the future and 
are willing to engage in violence. Rapid technology development and the 
proliferation in information technology, biotechnology, and 
communications, tactical weapons, weapons of mass destruction, pose a 
significant threat. A 50-percent reduction in global defense spending 
means both our adversaries and allies have not kept pace with the 
United States, but as we see after the war in Kosovo, it will result in 
asymmetric threats from our adversaries and reduced help from our 
allies. Demographic developments will stress the infrastructure and 
leadership in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Disparities in global 
weather and resource distribution will get worse. The reaction to the 
United States and western dominance will spur anti-U.S. sentiments now 
more pronounced since Kosovo, the law of unintended effects. 
International drug cultivation and production and transport and use 
will remain a major source of crime and instability. And lastly, ethnic 
and religious and cultural divisions will remain a prime motivation for 
conflict.
  To be sure, the Senate of the United States cannot solve all the 
problems, but these problems do indeed comprise current and emerging 
threats to our national security, international stability, and to 
peace. The question is, Can we reach consensus in this body to address 
them in a rational fashion as the leader in the free world?
  I think my colleague has some closing remarks, as I do.
  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, may I say my colleague from Kansas, as he 
so often does, put his finger right on it. The question is one of 
priorities. I appreciate him pointing out the CNN effect. The extent to 
which this country can respond to each and every problem in the world 
is limited. We have to recognize that; therefore, we must insist on 
dealing with our top priorities.
  I deeply appreciate the wonderful quote of General Shelton which I 
first heard at an Armed Services Committee hearing, that we have, in 
effect, a great hammer, but not every problem in the world is a nail. 
What a great way to phrase that particular point of view.
  I appreciate Senator Roberts' mentioning General Powell, one of my 
personal heroes. I once had the pleasure of visiting him in the 
Pentagon when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We spoke 
about the purpose of the American military. He said: My purpose is to 
give the President of the United States the best advice I can on how to 
use the American military to stay out of war; but if we get in war, win 
and win quickly.
  That is still probably the finest definition of the mission statement 
of our military forces I have ever heard.
  So I thank the Senator from Kansas for his insight and for his timely 
remarks.
  I will now conclude my prepared remarks today by offering some 
preliminary thoughts as we begin this dialogue on the U.S. global role. 
As I said at the outset, I certainly do not have any final judgments or 
answers to this critical question. In my view, no one has, or can have, 
all of the answers right now because so many of the elements of the 
post-cold-war world--including its geopolitical alignments,

[[Page S773]]

``rules of the game'' in dispute resolution and trade, and the role of 
non-national actors, including non-governmental organizations, the news 
media and unfortunately transnational terrorists--are in flux. But we 
cannot let this lack of certainty and finality deter our efforts to 
find the best set of policies we can now develop, not when challenges 
or potential challenges to our national interests continue to arise, 
not when the people of America are asked to sustain whatever policy we 
here espouse.
  I might say, as a Vietnam veteran who almost came back in a body bag, 
the Dover test, the Dover, DE test, or the ability of this country to 
measure the rightness of our actions based on the price we are willing 
to pay, is a powerful one.
  When our sons and daughters in the military are asked to put their 
family life on hold and their lives on the line in support of whatever 
the civilian authorities determine, they have a right to ask us if 
those policies are worth it.
  I have been deeply disturbed by the tenor of our recent debates in 
the Congress and with the administration on a host of important 
national security issues. Most recently, the Senate failed to ratify 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty after little meaningful debate and no 
Senate hearings. This was one of the most consequential treaties of the 
decade, and it was sadly reduced to sound-bite politics and partisan 
rancor.
  In addition to the CTBT, the Senate has made monumental decisions on 
our policies in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf, funding for the Wye 
River Accords and the future of NATO and the United Nations, all 
without a comprehensive set of American goals and policies. Simply put, 
I do not believe we can afford to continue on a path of partisanship 
and division of purpose without serious damage to our national 
interests.
  In addition, as the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services 
Personnel Subcommittee, I have been heavily involved in trying to 
improve the quality of life for our servicemen and women through such 
steps as increasing pay and enhancing health and education benefits. It 
is my deeply held view that not only do we need to take such action to 
address some disturbing trends in armed forces recruitment and 
retention, but we owe these individuals nothing less in recognition of 
their service.
  However, as important as these other factors are, the ultimate 
quality of life issues center on decisions made by national security 
decisionmakers here in Washington relating to the deployment of our 
forces abroad. It is these deployments which separate families, disrupt 
lives, and in those cases which involve hostilities, endanger the 
service member's life itself. This is not to say that I believe our 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are not fully prepared to do 
whatever we ask of them. But we on this end owe them nothing less than 
a full and thorough consideration each and every time we put them into 
harm's way.
  There are thirteen military installations in Georgia, and I visit the 
troops whenever I can. When I go to these bases, I see weary and 
beleaguered families who are doing their best to make it through the 
weeks and months without their husbands or wives. They are, indeed, on 
the point of the spear of this Nation's military force. They are paying 
a heavy toll for our military engagements around the world. It is a 
price they are ready to pay, but one I want the Senate to understand 
and appreciate as we continue in our commitment of troops aboard.
  For what it is worth, based on what I have seen and heard to date, I 
believe we in positions of foreign policy making responsibility in the 
United States need to be much more mindful of such traditional realist 
diplomatic precepts as ``balance of power'' and ``equilibrium.'' This 
is not to say that I believe our distinctly American approach to 
foreign policy, dominated throughout by idealist considerations and in 
most of the 20th century by what is often called Wilsonian 
internationalism has been wrong-headed or unfounded. Clearly, for the 
most part, it has served us well in advancing our vital national 
interests, whether those were securing our national independence, 
promoting the spread of self-determination and democracy, or defeating 
Soviet communism.
  But the post-cold-war period is a new day for America as well as the 
world. In my view, we need not, and certainly will not, renounce our 
ideals, but in this new era, those ideals must be grounded in a policy 
which realistically gauges what price Americans can or should pay in 
support of our global role.
  We have to ask the Dover, DE test: How many body bags do we want to 
see coming home? We have to ask what price we are going to pay for our 
military. We cannot continue to downsize our American military by a 
third and increase our commitments abroad by 300 percent, whether or 
not our commitments abroad are actually sustainable over a period of 
time.
  Last, I am struck by the words of the conservative editor of the 
National Interest, Owen Harries:

       I advocate restraint because every dominant power in the 
     last four centuries that has not practiced it--that has been 
     excessively intrusive and demanding--has ultimately been 
     confronted by a hostile coalition of other powers. Americans 
     may believe that their country, being exceptional, need have 
     no worries in this respect. I do not agree. It is not what 
     Americans think of the United States but what others think of 
     it that will decide the matter.

  Mr. President, I appreciate the indulgence of the Senate for our 
discussion here, and I thank my colleague for his tremendous insight 
and his marvelous research into the challenges we face in America's 
global role today. I look forward to continuing this discussion and 
this dialog in the coming weeks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Fitzgerald). The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, in closing, I again thank my colleague 
for undertaking this effort. As usual, his remarks have been on point. 
They have provided focus. They have been very thought provoking.
  I would like to recount a personal experience. Last spring, Senator 
Stevens led a Senate delegation to the Balkans, to Macedonia. 
Obviously, we didn't go into Kosovo at that particular time. Along with 
other Senators, we visited the Albanian refugees and the various 
refugee camps. This one was Brazda.
  Standing in the cold and in the mud amidst a circle of refugees, 
there came an old man with a stocking cap. It was pulled over his head. 
He was recounting, through his interpreter, his tale of human misery. 
He had refused to join his wife and family in fleeing their home. He 
didn't want to leave home. He urged them to leave the home because of 
his worry about their safety.
  Two sons had fled to the mountains. He did not know, since he fled at 
the last moment, where his family was. He was wearing the shoes of a 
long-time friend who was killed in the violence. His home was burned. 
His savings and life's wherewithal were destroyed. And with tears in 
his eyes he grabbed me by the lapels and he said: ``I believe in God, I 
believe in America, and I believe in you.'' That face will always be 
with me.

  Yet today, we see the continuing ethnic violence so prevalent in that 
part of the world. The Senator from Georgia mentioned Samuel P. 
Huntington's book, ``The Clash of Civilizations: The Remaking of the 
World Order.'' The central theme of that book is that culture and 
cultural identities, which we see so prevalent in the Balkans and in 
other places around the globe, which at the broadest level are 
civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, 
disintegration, and conflicts in the post-cold-war world.
  We should focus on that. I recommend his book to every Senator. It 
should be required reading. He has five corollaries to his main point 
which will help us shape our future foreign and defense policy:
  One, in the post-cold war world, for the first time in history, 
global politics has become multipolar, multi-civilizational; 
Westernization is not producing a universal civilization--a shock, 
perhaps, to many who call themselves decisionmakers in regard to 
Western civilization.
  Two, the balance of power among civilizations is shifting. The West 
is declining in relative influence. Asian civilizations are expanding 
their economic, military, and political strength. The Nations of Islam 
are exploding demographically, with destabilizing consequences for 
Muslim countries and their neighbors, and nonwestern civilizations 
generally are reaffirming the value of their own cultures.
  Three, a civilization-based world order is emerging. Societies 
sharing

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cultural affinities tend to really cooperate with each other. Efforts 
to shift societies from one civilization to another are unsuccessful. 
And countries group themselves around the lead or core states of their 
civilization. The West's universalist pretensions increasingly bring it 
into conflict with other civilizations.
  Finally, the survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming 
their Western identity and westerners accepting their civilization as 
unique but not universal, and uniting to renew and preserve it against 
challenges from nonwestern societies. Avoidance of global war of 
civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to 
maintain the multi-civilizational character of global politics.
  Simply put, Samuel Huntington says, leaders in Western nations, 
Members of the Senate, the President of the United States and his 
Cabinet, maybe we ought to concentrate on strengthening and preserving 
our values where they are cherished, they have been nourished, and they 
work well, instead of trying to impose them on countries where they are 
not welcome. If we do that, we will take a giant step in trying to set 
appropriate priorities in regard to our vital national security 
interests.
  I thank the Senator from Georgia. We have concluded our remarks. I 
yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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