[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 16 (Tuesday, February 22, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S658-S668]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1999--RESUMED

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, pursuant to the unanimous consent agreement, 
I call up amendment No. 2820, which is already at the desk. This is the 
so-called managers' amendment. I understand the amendment will be 
agreed to and the motion to reconsider will be laid on the table.


                           Amendment No. 2820

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Lott], for himself, Mr. 
     Daschle, Mr. Levin, and Mr. Helms, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2820.

  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 2, line 3, strike ``1999'' and insert ``2000''.
       On page 5, beginning on line 7, strike ``No. 12938'' and 
     all that follows through the period and insert ``No. 
     12938.''.
       On page 5, beginning on line 9, strike ``The United 
     States'' and all that follows through ``shall terminate'' and 
     insert ``Prohibition on United States Government sales to 
     that foreign person of any item on the United States 
     Munitions List as in effect on August 8, 1995, and 
     termination of''.
       On page 5, beginning on line 16, strike ``The President 
     shall deny licenses and suspend'' and insert ``Denial of 
     licenses and suspension of''.
       On page 8 between lines 23 and 24, insert the following:
       (b) Opportunity to Provide Information.--Congress urges the 
     President--
       (1) in every appropriate case, to contact in a timely 
     fashion each foreign person identified in each report 
     submitted pursuant to section 2(a), or the government with 
     primary jurisdiction over such person, in order to afford 
     such person, or governments, the opportunity to provide 
     explanatory, exculpatory, or other additional information 
     with respect to the transfer that caused such person to be 
     identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a); 
     and
       (2) to exercise the authority in subsection (a) in all 
     cases where information obtained from a foreign person 
     identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a), or 
     from the government with primary jurisdiction over such 
     person, establishes that the exercise of such authority is 
     warranted.
       On page 8, line 24, strike ``(b)'' and insert ``(c)''.
       On page 9, line 11, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       On page 9, beginning on line 12, strike ``Russian Space 
     Agency'' and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       On page 10, beginning on line 11, strike ``through the 
     implementation of concrete steps''.
       On page 10, beginning on line 16, strike ``, including 
     through the imposition of meaningful penalties on persons who 
     make such transfers''.
       On page 10, line 19, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       On page 10, line 21, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       On page 11, line 25, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       On page 12, line 2, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       On page 13, line 6, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       On page 13, line 8, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       On page 13, line 10, insert after ``Service Module'' the 
     following: ``, and for the purchase (at a total cost not to 
     exceed $14,000,000) of the pressure dome for the Interim 
     Control Module and the Androgynous Peripheral Docking Adapter 
     and related hardware for the United States propulsion 
     module,''.
       On page 13, line 15, insert ``credible'' before 
     ``information''.
       On page 17, beginning on line 15, strike ``russian space 
     agency'' and insert ``russian aviation and space agency''.
       On page 17, beginning on line 17, strike ``Russian Space 
     Agency'' and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       On page 18, beginning on line 1, strike ``Russian Space 
     Agency'' and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or 
     Russian Space Agency''.
       On page 18, line 6, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space 
     Agency''.
       On page 18, line 10, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
       On page 18, beginning on line 13, strike ``Russian Space 
     Agency'' and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or 
     Russian Space Agency''.
       On page 18, line 15, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space 
     Agency''.
       On page 18, line 16, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and 
     insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space 
     Agency''.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to 
and the motion to reconsider is laid on the table.
  The amendment (No. 2820) was agreed to.
  Mr. LOTT. As a reminder to all Members, passage of this bill either 
by rollcall vote or voice vote is to occur in the 4 p.m. timeframe. We 
are trying to accommodate Senators who have a number of other meetings 
they need to attend, but it will be either at 4 or 4:30 at the very 
latest. Members will be notified, via hotline, as soon as the exact 
time has been determined.
  Mr. President, I rise in strong support of this very important 
legislation, H.R. 1883, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999.
  Let me say at the beginning, this legislation has always had strong 
bipartisan support. It passed overwhelmingly in the House of 
Representatives last year by a vote of 419-0, and it has always had 
strong support in the Senate from Senators Lieberman, Feinstein, and 
Helms--a very broad, bipartisan group.
  I also have to acknowledge the cooperation of Senator Levin, who has 
been working with me on the managers' amendment. I think it is 
important, we now go forward with this legislation.

[[Page S659]]

  I am pleased I have been joined in this effort by Senator Lieberman, 
who he is on the floor to participate in the discussion of this 
legislation. Senator Lieberman is a long-time expert in 
nonproliferation and Middle East matters, and he certainly deserves a 
lot of the credit for making this legislation possible.
  The purpose of the bill is to express once again our deep concern 
regarding the transfer to Iran of dangerous technology, principally 
from Russia, China, and North Korea, as well as from other foreign 
entities, and to recommend additional steps to halt this deadly trade.
  Again, let me go into a little history. This legislation passed the 
House and the Senate in 1998. The President vetoed it, but, at the 
request of the administration, efforts were ongoing to work with 
Russia. That veto was not overridden. We did not vote on it. But the 
hope that progress would be made has not paid off; we have not achieved 
the results we hoped for. You can say it was because they had changes 
in the leadership positions in Russia. They are trying to make 
progress, but the fact is, they are not making progress and this 
dangerous transfer of the technology that could lead to proliferation 
of nuclear weapons continues.
  This bill requires the President to report to Congress when credible 
information exists of a transfer of dangerous technology to Iran. The 
President must also inform Congress whether he has imposed certain 
penalties on foreign persons as a result of such transfers. If such 
penalties are not imposed, the President must report the reasons why he 
decided against taking this step.
  The bill will also create new incentives for the Russian aviation and 
space agency to cooperate with the United States in efforts to stem the 
proliferation of weapons technology to Iran by precluding certain 
payments to that agency if entities under its jurisdiction and control 
engage in such transfers.
  Think about that. The United States is assisting the Russian aviation 
and space agency at a time when entities under its jurisdiction may, as 
a matter of fact, be involved in transferring this dangerous technology 
to Iran. It is absurd, and the American people would rightly be 
horrified to find that is the case.
  As I noted, this bill passed the House last September by a unanimous 
vote, and that vote occurred despite an explicit veto threat by the 
President. The overwhelming bipartisan vote in the House and the strong 
bipartisan support the bill enjoys in the Senate underscores the 
seriousness with which the Congress views Iran's continued quest for 
long-range missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction.
  I can think of few international developments that would be as 
damaging to U.S. national security and to stability and security in the 
Middle East as the acquisition by Iran of long-range, nuclear-tipped 
missiles.
  We know already Iran has been the most notorious state sponsor of 
terrorism, including attacks on Americans, and we know Iran remains a 
steadfast opponent of peace between Israel and her neighbors, and Iran 
supports those whose violence is aimed at undermining prospects for a 
genuine lasting peace.
  Some of our colleagues might observe that they had elections in Iran 
last week, and I believe those elections continue now. It appears 
reformers have been making some gains. That may be the situation in 
Iran, and the relations with Iran will change as a result of that. Let 
me assure my colleagues that the danger is still there. Those who are 
in charge of this nuclear proliferation in Iran have a very strong grip 
on what is being done, and there is very little likelihood they are 
going to let go of it anytime soon, in spite of what appears to be 
encouraging election returns. In fact, one can argue that to continue 
to send a strong signal against Iran's acquisition of weapons of mass 
destruction actually bolsters the reformers in their efforts to change 
the approach of Iran, both internally and externally.
  While we are pleased to see what appears to be encouraging results--
and I think the Senate should express itself on that, and I will 
suggest to the Democratic leadership we perhaps have a resolution 
acknowledging what has happened there and are hopeful about what that 
may mean--I do not think by any stretch of the imagination that should 
lead us to think everything is going to change immediately and we 
should not go forward with this very important legislation.
  If my colleagues think about it, it is quite scary: Iran's leaders, 
now and in the future, will be in possession of nuclear-tipped ICBMs 
capable of reaching Washington or Los Angeles or New York. America's 
security and that of our friends and allies in the region will be 
unalterably affected by such a horrific development.
  Yet that day of reckoning is coming and much sooner than we prefer, 
unless something is done to stop the transfer of this technology and 
other forms of assistance to Iran by Russia, in particular, but also by 
China and North Korea.
  My colleagues will recall we have been working on this for 3 or 4 
years. We have tried mightily to be of help to the administration in 
trying to put pressure on Russia in particular, but that strategy has 
failed to slow the flow of this dangerous technology.
  Let me point out what CIA Director George Tenet said recently in a 
report to Congress on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
over the previous 6-month period. In that report, Director Tenet wrote:

       Entities in Russia and China continued to supply a 
     considerable amount and a wide variety of ballistic missile-
     related goods and technology to Iran.

  The report also stated:

       Iran's earlier success in gaining technology and materials 
     from Russian companies accelerated Iranian [missile] 
     development.

  Director Tenet also noted:

       Russian entities continued to interact with Iranian 
     research centers on various [nuclear] activities. These 
     projects will help Iran augment its nuclear technology 
     infrastructure, which in turn would be useful in supporting 
     nuclear weapons research and development.

  The report also highlighted China's development in their programs. 
For example, the report stated:

       Firms in China provided missile-related items, raw 
     materials, and/or assistance to . . . Iran.

  I had occasion to meet personally with Director Tenet recently 
because I wanted to hear what information he had that he could provide 
to me and other Senators who wished to have a private briefing about 
what is going on in this area, and also to discuss the recent U.S. 
counterterrorism activities.
  Director Tenet reaffirmed that the flow of dangerous technology to 
Iran from Russia and China is, in fact, continuing and on a significant 
scale. It has not dropped. If anything, it has become worse. I urge 
those Senators who have not had a chance to review this classified 
record to go up to room S-407 to get this briefing. It is a sobering 
reminder that despite the end of the cold war, serious threats to U.S. 
security and our critical allies around the world remain.
  I commend Director Tenet and the entire U.S. intelligence community 
for their heroic efforts to uncover the truth about these dangerous 
transfers. What makes the intelligence community's successes so much 
more astounding is that they come in spite of significant denial and 
deception by Russia, China, and others.
  Director Tenet's report underscores the administration's current 
strategy for dealing with this growing problem. I know they worked at 
it. I discussed this with National Security Adviser Sandy Berger. They 
have tried. They acknowledged it has been difficult. They have had to 
deal with changing people and the laws in Russia, of while their 
intentions, as they provide them to us verbally, appear to be in the 
right direction, the results are just not there.
  The administration had hoped that by engaging Russia, China, and 
North Korea in a dialog, they could persuade those nations to cease and 
desist from their provocative behavior. The administration, I 
understand, did get the Russian Government to take some steps, such as 
adoption of export control law and regulations, but despite this fact, 
not a single Russian has been successfully prosecuted for transferring 
weapons of mass destruction or missile technology to Iran. Not one. I 
repeat, the intelligence we get is it is probably growing worse. So 
action against an individual, action against companies or academicians 
and professors, if there is anything in that nature going on, we do not 
see any results.

[[Page S660]]

  Thus, it appears the Russian Government either supports this 
clandestine transfer of dangerous technology to Iran or is unwilling to 
take strong necessary steps to halt it.
  The same can be said for the People's Republic of China and the 
Democratic People's Republic of North Korea; therefore, I join with 
many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle in believing that it 
is time to send a strong signal to the administration but, more 
importantly, to Russia, China, and North Korea, and to other countries 
that may be contemplating the transfer of this dangerous technology to 
Iran, or to Iraq, for that matter.
  The message is simple: The Congress and the American people are not 
content with the status quo. We are not content with the dialog that 
produces even more promises on the one hand and scant or no real 
reduction in the flow of technology on the other. Some might say this 
bill is not strong enough, and I would be hard pressed to disagree with 
that. I would prefer it to be even stronger. After all, the bill 
provides the President with the authority to impose sanctions, but it 
does not require them. We may want to look at doing that if we do not 
see some changes. If we do not see some actions by the administration, 
if we do not see some actions being taken to impose sanctions, then we 
may want to go that next step.
  I believe bolder action is going to be needed, that this will not be 
enough. It is a signal that is worth providing at this time. Because of 
its strong bipartisan support and because I believe it will become law, 
I am willing to go forward with it in this fashion at this time.
  The bill before us now reflects a continuing commitment in both 
parties to take a tough stand in the fight against nuclear 
proliferation.
  With this in mind, I urge the President not to veto this bipartisan 
bill but instead to sign it into law as soon as it lands on his desk.
  Again, I thank Senator Lieberman, Senator Helms, and the many other 
Senators who are involved in the process of crafting this important 
legislation. I strongly urge a ``yes'' vote on H.R. 1883, the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act of 2000.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. REID addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Before the leader leaves the floor, I say it is important 
that we, on matters relating to foreign policy, do as much as we can on 
a bipartisan basis. I think moving this legislation along speaks well 
of that. I am confident that the legislation will be signed.
  I also extend my congratulations to the Senator from Connecticut, who 
has worked on this for a long time, well more than a year. It is 
because of him, working with the full committee, that we have been able 
to move this measure along.
  I also say to the leader, I think when the votes are counted in Iran, 
we should consider a resolution congratulating the people of Iran for 
what appears to be the moderate tone of the election results. I think 
that is very important. That is a positive sign, as it is a positive 
sign today that there appears to be developing in Russia a stable 
government.
  I extend my appreciation to the leader for the manner in which this 
measure is moving along. On an issue such as this, we should not have 
acrimonious debate. We have been able to avoid that with the work that 
has been done behind the scenes. That is very important.
  Mr. LOTT. If the Senator will yield, I think it is important the 
Senate take note of the fact that for the first time in 20 years 
reformers may have been making some gains and that maybe internally and 
the way they deal with the rest of the world things may change in Iran. 
We hope that is the case.
  I ask that you join me in talking to Senator Daschle to see if we can 
craft some legislation that would express the resolution's views on 
this. Hopefully, we can also take that up, if not today, maybe later 
this week.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to support this legislation. I 
particularly wish to thank the majority leader for his steadfast and 
very strong support for this important piece of legislation. The 
majority leader has recognized the serious threat that the 
proliferation of ballistic missile capacity and weapons of mass 
destruction to rogue nations, such as Iran, represents to our forces in 
the Middle East, to our allies in the Middle East, and in the not-too-
distant future--maybe real soon--to our allies in Europe, and, heaven 
protect us, to the United States of America, to our homeland.
  We have talked a lot in this Chamber, and outside, about national 
missile defense. We crossed a bridge on this issue last year, I think, 
with the bipartisan legislation sponsored initially by the majority 
leader's colleague from Mississippi, Senator Cochran.
  But if we are now involved in an effort to develop a national missile 
defense, does it not make sense to use whatever authority we have to 
deter, to retard, and, if possible, to prevent a rogue nation, such as 
Iran, from developing the capacity to strike us and our allies?
  This is to me the other side of the American effort to protect us and 
our people and our allies from what, in the years ahead, I am afraid 
will be the single most serious threat to our security, which is, the 
proliferation of ballistic missile capacity and weapons of mass 
destruction.
  The majority leader has been the leader on the bill we are 
considering today, and I have been privileged to work with him on it. I 
appreciate the broad bipartisan support we have on this measure. As the 
majority leader said, this legislation could have been stronger. It 
started out stronger when we introduced the initial legislation, but in 
the process of trying to get something done, we modified it.
  It still makes an important statement to the world about the 
steadfast commitment of the Congress of the United States to do 
everything we can to diminish the threat of weapons of mass destruction 
carried by ballistic missiles. It sends a message to our friends in 
Russia about the intensity of our concern about their part in helping 
Iran develop weapons of mass destruction. I believe it sends a message 
to the Administration of the United States about the broad bipartisan 
support in Congress for tougher actions against any nation, including 
Russia--with whom we have a developing relationship--if they are 
supporting Iran in the development of this destructive capacity.
  A reporter stopped me earlier today on the way to the Chamber and 
asked: Aren't you worried about the effect that passage of the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act will have on the Government of Russia or in the 
Presidential elections coming in Russia? My answer, directly, is no. 
But, obviously, we are all concerned and hopeful that the forces of 
reform will take hold in Russia and bring stability and progress to 
that country. But our first concern has to be not what happens in 
Russia, but what we can do to protect the security of the American 
people in this country and our forces abroad from the threat of weapons 
of mass destruction carried by ballistic missiles. If the Russian 
Government will be true to its own statements about working against 
proliferation, then there will be no problem for Russia as a result of 
the passage of this legislation.
  My colleagues have talked about changes in Iran. The developments are 
most remarkable in Iran. There is a whole new generation of Iranians 
and, if I am not mistaken, more than half of it was not of age when the 
extreme Islamic revolution, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, occurred in the 
late 1970s. It is a generation that appears to want reform, better 
lives for themselves, freedom, better relations with the West, and 
better relations with the United States of America.

  Remarkably, in the midst of the very authoritarian government that 
came into power in the late 1970s and has been there since, the 
Iranians have continued to have elections.
  Here is the power of the people at work again. Last Friday, 
apparently, more than four out of five eligible voters came out to vote 
in Iran. I say, parenthetically, what an embarrassment it should be to 
us to recall that in 1998, the last time we had a congressional 
election--our own, if you will, parliamentary election--36 percent of 
the

[[Page S661]]

eligible voters came out to vote; only one-third, as compared to more 
than four-fifths in Iran. They are apparently expressing very broad 
support for the forces of reform.
  Does that diminish the concern we have about what Iran is doing? Not 
immediately, unfortunately. Because the power is still exercised by a 
small group of leaders at the top. Not by the reform-oriented, moderate 
President Khatami, but by the religious leaders at the top who still 
exercise and control the agencies of foreign policy, defense policy, 
and intelligence policy, who still have the power to override and veto 
any of the acts, even of this new reform Parliament.
  The focus of our concern about Iran is that it has been our most 
implacable foe in the recent past and that it has been the single most 
intransigent supporter of terrorism against this Nation and our allies, 
a reality that remains unchanged.
  The thought that weapons of mass destruction, carried by ballistic 
missiles, would be in the possession of this nation, effectively still 
controlled by this small group of enemies of the United States, should 
fill us with the most profound fear and anxiety.
  It is from that fear and anxiety that this bill emerges. It is not 
the first time we have expressed our concerns about these developments 
in Iran. In previous enactments we have given the Administration the 
tools to try to address this problem, specifically in the Arms Export 
Control Act and in the Iran-Iraq Sanctions Act. But we were not 
satisfied with those measures and the way they were being used, so we 
passed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act in 1997, a measure 
similar to this legislation we are considering today.

  Unfortunately, the President chose to veto that legislation. That is 
why H.R. 1883 was introduced and why it passed the House 
overwhelmingly, 419-0, with every Member of both parties who voted 
supporting it.
  Since 1997, our concern about the problem has not diminished. It is 
widely and reliably reported--this is why we are back with this 
legislation--that entities and people in Russia continue to provide 
both technology and assistance to Iran to build these dangerous 
weapons. Iran has made worrying progress on its missile program, as the 
majority leader indicated and as the intelligence reports, classified 
as they are, which are available to our colleagues, clearly state.
  I cite also an unclassified source. According to the Congressional 
Research Service, with help from Russians and others, notably North 
Koreans and Chinese, Iran has produced a Shahab 3 ballistic missile 
with a range of 800 miles and tested it; on July 22, 1998, to be exact. 
Although the first test was apparently unsuccessful, the Congressional 
Research Service reports that the Shahab 3 is now thought to be 
operational and in production. There also have been credible reports 
that Iran is in the process of developing yet another, more advanced 
missile, the Shahab 4, which would have a range of up to 2,000 miles, 
more than double the range of the Shahab 3. We have some basis for 
believing the Iranians are now working on intercontinental ballistic 
missiles.
  If combined with weapons of mass destruction, these existing Iranian 
missiles can threaten American forces and our allies and friends in the 
Middle East and, soon after that, as indicated, our forces and allies 
throughout Europe and, of course, eventually, the American homeland 
itself. This is a frightening prospect, given Iran's large chemical 
weapons program and aggressive attempt to acquire a nuclear weapons 
capability. The American Government has made it clear that Iran is 
attempting--in this case largely with China's help--to reach self-
sufficiency in the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons, 
though Iran continues to deny that charge. Concerns have also been 
expressed by authorities in our country that Iran is seeking to become 
a nuclear arms state by attempting to buy material for such weapons or 
by using nonmilitary nuclear assistance to build up its knowledge about 
nuclear weapons.
  These programs in Iran can profoundly change the balance of power in 
the region and strike a very serious blow to our efforts to contain 
Iran until it becomes a responsible member of the community of nations, 
until the forces of change which are blowing so hopefully through Iran, 
even as we speak today, reach fruition and a change of policy.
  I am sure most everyone in this Chamber will look forward to a day 
when sanctions of this kind will not be necessary because a new 
government, representing what seems to be the clear will of the Iranian 
people, would be in power in Tehran; a government with which the United 
States of America and our allies could have constructive and peaceful 
relations. But until that time, the kinds of weapons capabilities that 
are being developed allow Iran to threaten, for instance, friendly Arab 
States, making it harder for them to cooperate with the United States. 
These weapons capabilities would raise the risks to U.S. military 
forces in the region and could threaten the free flow of oil out of 
this critical region which could, of course, create crises in the 
United States, in Europe, Asia, and in any other place in the world 
that depends on fuel from the Middle East to power their economies.
  It is self-evident and axiomatic that we have to do whatever we can 
to try to deter this dangerous capability, to delay it, to retard it as 
best we can, given the Iranian Government that now exists. Part of that 
is making clear, as I believe this legislation does, to our friends in 
Russia in no uncertain terms that we are serious about this. The time 
for hit and miss, slower, bob-and-weave progress toward shutting off 
Russian assistance to Iran for the development of these dangerous 
programs is over.

  In addition to other sanctions, we have focused in this bill on 
holding up extraordinary, as we call it, American funding for the 
international space station to the Russian space agency, unless Russia 
takes sufficient action to halt any part it is playing in proliferation 
to Iran. This is our attempt to demonstrate the seriousness of our 
concern about this matter, even to the extent of stopping the funding 
of a program that is not only important to us--that is, space 
cooperation--but important to the Russians.
  While we cannot expect to prevent all technology transfers to rogue 
states, we do have the ability to check the flow of some of it by 
adopting the kinds of sanctions in this legislation that are aimed at 
persons engaged in such activity. We are able and therefore must act to 
take measures against those governments that condone such activity, 
whether or not they are organizing and abetting the transfer, or merely 
looking the other way when their citizens engage in these activities.
  Senator Lott quoted CIA Director George Tenet. Director Tenet has 
made quite clear that despite the noticeable shifts within Iran, it 
remains ``the most active state sponsor of terrorism.'' Iran's support 
for dangerous terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, through training, money, and weapons, has 
just not ended. There are people in our country, people whom I respect, 
who continue to sustain the belief, based on evidence they have 
gathered, that Iran was involved in the 1996 attack on American service 
personnel at Khobar in Saudi Arabia, though no definitive conclusion 
has been reached on that matter.
  We have been engaged in a dialog across a wide spectrum with our 
friends and allies in trying to address the issue of proliferation to 
Iran. The prospect of a nuclear-capable, militarily powerful Iran armed 
with ballistic missiles is clearly a threat to our national interests 
and to those of our allies; therefore, we must act to stop it. The 
sanctions we are proposing will further stop the diffusion of this 
technology and lead to a more stable Middle East.
  I echo the words of the majority leader: The passage of this measure 
may actually encourage the forces of reform in Iran which are now so 
boldly and inspiringly expressing themselves. It certainly does seem 
that those forces of reform want to have better relations with the 
West, with the United States. Part of what we are saying to them is, 
this matters to us. You must stop your support of terrorism. Stop your 
development of these weapons of mass destruction, and we can develop a 
much better relationship.

[[Page S662]]

  The bill itself is simple and direct. It requires the President to 
submit reports to Congress on foreign entities where there is credible 
information that these entities have transferred certain goods, 
services, or technologies to Iran. That part of the bill would apply to 
any entities anywhere in the world, not just the Russians. It 
authorizes the President to impose measures against these entities, but 
does not mandate him to do so. It allows him to consider exculpatory 
material, material that argues against the guilt of the entities.
  And with an amendment that will be adopted, submitted by the Senator 
from Michigan, Mr. Levin, those entities will be given an opportunity 
to respond to those allegations before any sanctions are considered.
  Finally, the bill prohibits these extraordinary American payments to 
the Russian space agency until certain conditions enumerated in the 
bill are met. The purpose is to say to the Russians specifically that 
we keep seeing compelling evidence that entities in Russia are 
supporting the development of these dangerous programs within Iran.
  As much as we want to continue to work with Russia on joint efforts 
in space, we will not do so if they are contributing to this grave 
threat to our security.
  Finally, I thank Senator Lott, Senator Biden, Senator Helms, and 
others on both sides who have worked together to bring this bill to the 
floor, where I have reason to believe it will achieve strong support. I 
was pleased to hear representatives of the Administration indicate to 
some of us a short while ago that, though they may not specifically 
support the bill, they would not recommend that, in its current form, 
the President veto it. I think we are on the way to making a unified 
statement, which is a constructive one, and which takes a small but 
significant step toward protecting us, our children, and grandchildren 
from the threat of weapons of mass destruction carried by ballistic 
missiles.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). The Senator from Delaware is 
recognized.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, before the Senator from Connecticut leaves 
the floor, I wish to thank him and acknowledge all the work he has done 
over the past year or more on this issue. He has, in a sense, exercised 
some forbearance in the past when he thought it might have been more 
appropriate to make a stronger move, but because of circumstances 
within Russia and our bilateral relations and the hope--not 
expectation--that there may be a way to get this done, he has 
cooperated. I think everybody should understand the reason this issue 
has stayed so much on the forefront is because of his vigilance and his 
effort. I thank him for that. I thank him as well, along with other 
colleagues, for entertaining some of the changes that Senator Levin 
proposed. I think this is a much better bill. I agree with him; I think 
enough time has passed to demonstrate that this may be the only course 
left open, and hopefully it will work.
  In a strange sense, the Senator and I have had occasion separately 
and individually, as the Presiding Officer has, to meet with members of 
the Russian Duma, members of the Russian Government, and members of the 
leadership of the various Arab states. I find it counterintuitive that 
they don't understand, quite frankly, that what is happening in Iran 
and their quest for this missile technology is literally a greater 
threat to them than it is to us. It is no greater threat to anyone than 
Israel; nonetheless, it is an incredibly significant threat to our 
friends in Europe, as well as our Arab friends. What is going on in 
North Korea is a threat to China and Russia in the long term, not only 
Japan and South Korea. What is going on in Iraq is a greater threat to 
our French friends--who seem to support Iraq against their own 
interests--than it is to us.
  I am wondering when reason will take hold. I am a little bit 
dismayed, and more than a little bit miffed, by the ability of our 
friends, as well as those who are not viewed as our close friends, to 
dismiss reality. What do they think? If Russia is worried about the 
radicalization of the Moslem populations within the former Soviet 
Union, the Trans-Caucasus, and other places, why in the devil do they 
not understand that what is going on in Iraq, as well as in Iran--if it 
does not take a drastic change in course--is inimical to their 
interests? Ironically, the second largest former Communist state--the 
former Soviet Union--seems to be the ultimate capitalist in this 
regard; but they can't add very well. This is, I think, more about 
money than anything else. Hopefully, as I will lay out in my 
statement--and I don't want to delay the Senator any longer--they will 
see the virtues of looking to the West and not to Iran and Iraq for the 
source of their economic survival. At any rate, I thank the Senator 
very much for his leadership.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from 
Delaware for his kind words and the spirit of cooperation in which we 
have worked on this and on so many other matters over the years. I 
could not agree with him more on what he said. There is an irony here. 
It is as if folks in places such as Russia are still doing what we 
sometimes criticize people in our country for doing--going by a cold-
war mentality. But it is a cold-war mentality heavily not only affected 
by communism, but what the Senator has said, capitalism. So they are 
selling for short-term gains that, before very long, will endanger them 
more than us. This is our attempt to say: We are in this together. We 
are threatened by what you are doing, but watch out, friends, you are 
going to be threatened soon yourselves.

  I thank the Senator for his characteristically straight talk--
although he is not on the Straight Talk Express. He is a straight 
talker in the Senate Chamber. I thank him for his support.
  Mr. BIDEN. I wish the driver of that express a lot of luck.
  Maybe what Mr. Putin, who is the Acting President and likely soon to 
be elected President, it appears--maybe we should send my mom over to 
see him. My mom had an expression, from the time we were kids, when you 
would do something against your own interest out of anger, or out of 
pique, or misunderstanding. My mother would say, ``Don't bite your nose 
off to spite your face.'' Well, we have a whole lot of Russians seeming 
to bite their noses off to spite their faces. I find it absolutely 
astounding what they appear to continue to do.
  The bill before us is called the Iran Nonproliferation Act. That is 
the context in which we should talk about this, and I think we should 
understand this. The purpose of this bill is not to punish, but rather 
to restrain. The goal that we pursue is not to invoke sanctions, but 
rather to make this a safer world for all of us, including the 
Russians. The means to that end is to make this a world with fewer 
weapons of mass destruction and with fewer delivery systems able to 
deliver weapons of mass destruction, notably long-range ballistic 
missiles.
  Long-range ballistic missiles are a curious invention. They are 
awesome, frankly, but they don't amount to much as a military weapon 
unless they are armed with a powerful warhead. Now, the sort of long-
range missile that Third World countries might build --and that the 
countries I have mentioned are attempting to build, or have built--
those missiles cannot carry big enough warheads to do much damage with 
a conventional high explosive, a plain old bomb; they are too heavy. 
The missile is not big enough, powerful enough, does not have enough 
throw weight to carry conventional weapons. So the irony is that a 
country which develops or buys long-range ballistic missiles is all too 
likely, therefore, to seek weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear 
warheads that are lighter and have much more--no pun intended --bang 
for the buck than a conventional weapon, or even potentially a lighter 
payload, with chemical weapons or biological weapons on top of these 
missiles. The irony is that as they develop a long-range ballistic 
missile capacity, they are led inextricably--if they are going to be of 
any ``value'' militarily--they move toward weapons of mass destruction 
with which to arm the missiles.
  North Korea has been trying to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has built 
chemical and biological weapons and is seeking a nuclear capability. 
They were close to building a nuclear weapon a decade ago. Similarly, 
Iran has a

[[Page S663]]

covert nuclear weapons program. Even the Government of Russia admits 
that. Iran has also developed and used chemical weapons. Now, again, 
that is chemical weapons that, based on the missile technology they may 
have acquired, even if they have a range of 2,000 miles, as my friend 
from Connecticut indicated, doesn't get them to Washington, DC. It 
doesn't get them to any U.S. territory. But it does get them to a lot 
of areas of the world where our friends--in this case, the Russians--
can be affected.

  We have to stop this as best we can. The world must move toward fewer 
weapons of mass destruction, not more of them. We have to reduce the 
number of long-range ballistic missiles in the world, not increase 
them. Unfortunately, some foreign persons--and I say ``persons'' 
because that is the legal word in this legislation for officials or 
entities; by ``entities'' we mean the Russian agency comparable to our 
space agency, NASA, or the agency in Russia comparable to our Defense 
Department, or institutes, or companies. In Russia, institutes or 
companies cannot be separated very clearly from the Government.
  Unfortunately, some of these foreign ``persons''--in Russia, China, 
and North Korea--are deaf to the world's call for nonproliferation and 
apparently tone deaf to their own interests. The countries or entities 
are so desperate for cash or so angry at the West that they will risk 
Armageddon by helping Iran build long-range ballistic missiles or even 
nuclear weapons.
  As ironic as this sounds, this legislation is designed in part to 
save them from their own destructive impulses. The United States has 
imposed sanctions at times on entities from all three of these supplier 
countries. Again, by the ``supplier'' countries I mean North Korea, 
China, and Russia. The United States has imposed sanctions on entities 
from these countries and is continuing negotiations with all of these 
countries to secure an end to their assistance to Iran. While we may 
hope for success in the months or years to come, however, there has 
been little success so far.
  Today the Senate will vote to make the President list the offending 
``persons;'' to increase his powers to impose sanctions against them; 
and to limit United States support for Russian work on the 
international space station if any entities under the Russian Aviation 
and Space Agency continue to assist Iran, which we have reason to 
believe they have.
  It is important to understand that H.R. 1883, which we will shortly 
pass, is not an anti-Russian bill. Rather, it is simply and 
overwhelmingly a nonproliferation bill. Both I and the Senate sponsors 
of this bill would like nothing better than to have this bill result in 
no sanctions whatever against Russia.
  While we try to crack down on entities that assist Iran's long-range 
ballistic missile programs, we also support nonproliferation of 
assistance to Russia. We continue to help Russia reduce its unneeded 
strategic weapons through the Nunn-Lugar program, protect its sensitive 
nuclear materials, help it find new careers for excess weapon 
scientists, and improve its export control laws. Those are the laws 
that are on the books, and should be enforced, which would prevent any 
agency or company within Russia from transferring usable information to 
aid and abet Iran in their long-range missile programs.
  We are helping Russia in other ways, as well, so this should not be 
taken in isolation. This is part of a continuum of efforts on our part 
to deal with the interests of our country as well as Russia. The United 
States Government, with the support of many in this body, also 
continues to work with Russia on many other vital issues. We seek 
continued strategic arms reductions, through the so-called START 
process. We support the sharing of missile warning data. We are working 
to preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the ABM Treaty, with an 
amendment that allows for--again, in Russia's interests--a limited 
ballistic missile defense. Again, we pointed out that North Korea and 
Iran present a greater danger to them than they do to the United 
States.
  The United States and other Western countries also offer the 
investment on which Russia's economic development depends. United 
States companies even buy ballistic missile engines from Russia's top 
design bureaus. Our American companies are purchasing directly from 
Russian design entities. We are buying engines that they are producing, 
from which they are making substantial money. Iran cannot begin to 
match the power of the United States to sustain and transform Russian 
industry. In other words, they will make a heck of a lot more money 
doing the right thing, dealing with the United States and with the 
Western Europeans and Japan, than they will ever make from selling 
technology to Iran. I urge Russian leaders to think about that.

  I wonder, with all the chaos that is in place in Russia, whether 
anybody at the top has ever really focused on this. In pure 
unadulterated dollars and cents, what is in Russia's economic interest 
is to sell to the West rather than to sell to Iran. If the choice is 
starkly made, which we are about to do, I hope they will focus more 
logically on their alternatives.
  This bill and the Senate are not anti-Russian, but we are manifestly 
anti-proliferation. We will not tolerate vicious and venal persons 
plunging the world into a new cold war, let alone a hot one in which 
weapons of mass destruction would be a freely traded currency of death. 
If Russia or China or North Korea should choose the path of 
proliferation--and they have to some degree already done that--we will 
show that there are better paths to power and prestige than 
proliferating ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction to 
Third World countries with unstable regimes. There is still time to 
stamp out proliferation and to put the world on a more peaceful path, 
but we must not and we will not collaborate in sowing the seeds of 
global destruction through proliferation.
  It is unfortunate that the Senate action occurs only weeks before 
next month's Presidential elections in Russia. The need to pass this 
legislation is not our fault, that is Russia's fault. Some in that 
country between now and those elections may try to use our action to 
stir up a nationalistic reaction for their own political purposes in 
the upcoming Russian election. That would be both unwise and ill 
founded. It is also unfortunate that the House authors of this bill 
insisted upon triggering Presidential reporting and possible sanctions 
based upon a very low standard of evidence. In practice, however, no 
President will impose sanctions unless he is convinced that wrongdoing 
has occurred, notwithstanding the fact that the House standard of 
evidence is too low a threshold.
  Finally, I regret that this bill does not permit the President to 
authorize extraordinary payments for work on the international space 
station, if those payments should be needed, to protect sensitive 
intelligence information. Neither does it permit payments to a 
sanctioned entity if such payments are needed to prevent significant 
dangers to the crew of the space station. I do not think either of 
those are wise restrictions, and I hope these concerns can be addressed 
in conference between the House and Senate.
  The important fact is, however, that the Senate action today is a 
measure not of anti-Russian sentiment, nor of any impulse to bully. 
Rather, it reflects the depth of our concern and also our frustration 
over the increasing risk that Russian and other entities will 
recklessly open Pandora's box, against their own interest as well as 
ours.
  I earnestly hope that in the coming weeks, our President and the 
newly elected President of Russia can put us back on the track of 
peaceful cooperation to make this a safer and more prosperous world. 
That is a real prospect for both countries, if Russia would only accept 
that its profit and its destiny lies in the West, not in the East.
  Perhaps passage of this bill will help to bring about such a 
reevaluation. If so, then prospects for the new century on which we 
have just embarked would truly be improved. If not, it puts us on a 
perilous slope to more proliferation and colder, not warmer, relations.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today in support of H.R. 1883, the 
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999.
  As chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I am in a 
privileged position to have access to the volumes of intelligence 
information gathered at great expense and

[[Page S664]]

even risk of life by our intelligence community.
  Sadly, this intelligence leads me to the conclusion that our efforts 
thus far to stem proliferation have failed. As the Director of Central 
Intelligence told me in an open Hearing before the Senate Intelligence 
Committee just this month:

       Mr. Chairman, on proliferation, the picture that I drew 
     last year has become even more stark and worrisome. Transfers 
     of enabling technologies to countries of proliferation 
     concern have not abated.

  Particularly in the case of Iran, the intelligence indicates that the 
proliferation of missile technologies as well as the technologies and 
expertise to enable their development of chemical, biological, and 
nuclear weapons, continues unabated.
  Our nonproliferation efforts haven't failed because we haven't tried 
other things. They have failed because the tools we have used thus far 
have not been up to the task.
  The task is indeed formidable.
  Iran desperately wants these weapons. We wish they didn't. We wish 
the problem would go away on its own. But the evidence indicates that 
it won't. In the unclassified version of a report submitted to me on 
January 21st pursuant to a mandate in the Intelligence Authorization 
Act of 1997--a report available to all Members--the Director of Central 
Intelligence stated:

       Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to 
     acquire WMD [weapons of mass destruction] . . . from abroad. 
     In doing so, Tehran is attempting to develop an indigenous 
     capability to produce various types of weapons--nuclear, 
     chemical, and biological--and their delivery systems.

  With regard to missile proliferation, in his testimony to me this 
month, the DCI reported that:

       Most analysts believe that Iran, following the North Korean 
     pattern, could test an ICBM capable of delivering a light 
     payload to the United States in the next few years.

  And, he added, Iran could become not just a recipient, but a 
proliferator:

       While Russia, China, and North Korea continue to be the 
     main suppliers of ballistic missiles and related technology, 
     long-standing recipients--such as Iran--might become 
     suppliers in their own right as they develop domestic 
     production capabilities.

  Iran is not just seeking missiles, but also biological, chemical, and 
nuclear weapons. Iran is seeking dual-use technologies to further the 
biological warfare program it began during the Iran-Iraq war. Iran also 
wants to maintain a prohibited chemical weapons capability. According 
to the January DCI report I just mentioned, Iran, despite its 
commitment to give up chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, ``has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons, 
including blister, blood, and choking agents and the bombs and 
artillery shells for delivering them.'' They have continued to ``seek 
production technology, expertise, and chemicals that could be used as 
precursor agents in its chemical warfare program from entities in 
Russia and China.'' Finally, Iran wants a nuclear weapons capability. 
According to the DCI: ``Iran sought nuclear-related equipment, material 
and technical expertise from a variety of sources, especially in 
Russia, during the first half of 1999.''
  Importantly, Iran is seeking an indigenous capability. Their pursuit 
of WMD and delivery systems has lead to a maturing indigenous 
capability. This means that the window in which we can stop significant 
proliferation to Iran is closing rapidly. This means that the time to 
intervene is now.
  Some have suggested that the recent elections in Iran should lead us 
to pause our consideration of this bill. I disagree. First, to the 
degree that the newly elected Iranian legislators seek to constrain 
efforts to develop and deploy weapons of mass destruction, I believe 
that this legislation will strengthen such an effort. It demonstrates 
the seriousness with which the United States Congress views 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Second, existing evidence 
indicates that we cannot count on the elections to bring an end to 
Iran's national policy of developing weapons of mass destruction and 
their means of delivery. It is important to underscore that former 
President Rafsanjani, considered a moderate in Iranian political 
circles, was the very leader who initiated Iran's pursuit of those 
weapons. Indeed it was Rafsanjani who said that ``Chemical and 
biological weapons are poor man's atomic bombs . . .'' After he became 
Iran's President, he is quoted as saying: ``We should fully equip 
ourselves in the defensive and offensive use of chemical, 
bacteriological and radiological weapons.'' We cannot expect that Iran 
will therefore give up its pursuit of these weapons on their own. This 
bill will provide additional incentive for them to do so, and we will 
watch carefully for evidence of such a decision, but at this point, 
absent strong policy on our part, we must conclude that the policy of 
acquiring these weapons and their means of delivery will continue.
  The task of stemming proliferation to Iran is made more difficult 
because individuals and the nations from which they proliferate have 
their own strong motives for aiding Iran. For some individuals, the 
motive is money. But why can't we simply rely on the governments in 
which they operate to stop them? In some cases, governments are too 
week to intervene. In others, the government looks the other way or 
even promotes proliferation to Iran because their leaders welcome the 
challenge an Iran with missiles and weapons of mass destruction poses 
to the United States.
  We need the tools to offset the benefits of aiding Iran. We must 
ensure that there are financial and other costs associated with 
supplying the assistance Iran still needs in its drive for weapons of 
mass destruction and missiles.
  H.R. 1883 gives the United States tools to attack proliferation on 
the supply side.
  The first tool is the light of exposure to scrutiny. H.R. 1883 
requires the President to submit annual reports identifying every 
person that, on or after January 1, 1999, transfers to Iran goods, 
services or technology on existing control lists or items with the 
potential to make a material contribution to Iran's development of 
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or ballistic or cruise missile 
systems. As a result, the Congress, the American people, and the 
community of nations will know who is supporting Iran's efforts to 
threaten peace and stability. We will shine a light on those lining 
their bank accounts by selling the tools of hideous death and 
unimaginable destruction to Iran. The threat of public exposure should 
serve as a significant deterrent to those who contemplate proliferation 
to Iran.
  The second tool offered by H.R. 1883 is the authorization for the 
President to deny perpetrators of proliferation access to some U.S. 
trade. I highlight the word ``authorization.'' The sanctions provided 
by H.R. 1883 are not mandatory and exceptions are granted.
  These tools, properly employed, will help stem the tide of 
proliferation to Iran. Are there costs? Yes. Some U.S. businesses may 
be called upon by the President to refrain from commerce with 
individuals that are shown to be materially aiding Iran's weapons of 
mass destruction and missile programs. But such a potential cost seems 
reasonable to me in light of the potentially far greater cost if we 
fail to act--the lives of American men, women, and children.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 1883 in a 
bipartisan way, as our House colleagues did when they voted to pass 
H.R. 1883 by a vote of 419-zero.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, there are few in this body who have 
worked harder on this issue than my friend from Connecticut, and it has 
been a real pleasure to work with him on this legislation and on this 
issue.
  The Iran Nonproliferation Act is an important piece of legislation 
which seeks to halt the flow of ballistic missile technology and other 
weapons of mass destruction from Russia to Iran. I strongly support 
Senate passage of this legislation.
  Indeed, even as much of the U.S. focus in the past year--and rightly 
so, in my mind--has been on the peace process and Israel's relations 
with Syria and the Palestinians, there may be no greater long term 
threat to Israel's security and Middle East peace than an Iran actively 
seeking ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.
  That is why I believe that preventing the transfer of illegal nuclear 
and missile technology from Russia to Iran must be at the top of the 
U.S. policy agenda.
  As my colleagues are aware, there have been numerous reports over the

[[Page S665]]

past several years of Russian missile technology reaching Iran, 
sometimes with a semi-official wink from government authorities in 
Moscow, sometimes by rogue operators.
  Either way, the Russian government must put a stop to these 
transfers.
  As much as we want good relations with Russia, cooperation in this 
area is crucial. In some ways, I believe it is a litmus test of what 
sort of player Russia wants to be in the post-Cold War international 
system.
  Although Russia has denied that any illegal transfers have taken 
place, it has taken some tangible steps in response to American 
concerns--such as the cancellation of a 1997 contract between a Russian 
missile factory (NPO Trud) and Iran in which rocket engine components 
were to have been shipped under the guise of gas pipeline compressors.
  Unfortunately, despite such progress as cooperation with the NPO Trud 
contract, since issuing an Executive Order in 1998, the United States 
has been forced to sanction ten Russian entities for continuing to 
transfer technology for the development of advanced ballistic missiles 
and weapons of mass destruction, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
reports that Russian entities continue to provide Iran with assistance. 
Indeed, there are reportedly over 10,000 Russians in Iran helping Iran 
with these programs.
  For its part, and despite some positive signs of moderation in Iran's 
politics--the recent elections notwithstanding--Iran has not yet 
moderated any of its policies with regard to the support of 
international terrorism or the pursuit of advanced ballistic missiles 
and weapons of mass destruction.
  Iran has flight-tested the Shihab-3, a missile that can hit Israel 
and U.S. forces in the Middle East, and is continuing to work on other 
advanced missile designs, including those capable of delivering nuclear 
warheads.
  Because of Russia's mixed record--and Iran's outright dangerous 
record--I believe that although we should try to build on Russia's 
record of cooperation, we must also be prepared to take tough action 
when the situation warrants. In other words, we must be prepared to 
work with Russia on this issue and offer them a carrot, but, if our 
interests and those of our friends and allies are threatened, we must 
also be prepared to use a stick.
  To that end, last year I offered an amendment on the Department of 
Defense authorization bill, passed by the Senate, which stated that it 
is the sense of Congress that the U.S. should increase the quota on 
commercial space launch services provided by Russia if the Russian 
government demonstrates a sustained commitment to prevent the transfer 
from Russia to Iran, or other countries, of nuclear and missile 
technology.
  I continue to believe that pending Russian cooperation this quota can 
be raised to 20 and, if Russia continues to cooperate, incrementally 
raised again in the coming years. Each launch provides Russia with 
approximately $100 million in hard currency. A $100 million carrot is a 
good incentive to cooperate.
  The bill we consider before us today recognizes that in addition to 
such carrots, we must also be prepared to take tough action when 
necessary. The Iran Nonproliferation Act has two parts.
  First, it requires the President to report credible information about 
any foreign entity providing dangerous technologies to Iran and 
authorize the President to sanction these entities in accordance with 
the President's own Executive Order.
  Second, it requires that the President must certify that the Russian 
government opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to 
Iran and is taking steps to oppose such proliferation before the 
Russian Space Agency is provided with any additional U.S. taxpayer 
money beyond what has contracted for the International Space Station. 
These are funds which the U.S. is providing to Russia so that Russia 
can meet its own obligations to the International Space Station. If 
Russia and the Russian Space Agency cooperates with the U.S. on 
proliferation, then cooperation between Russia and Iran on the 
proliferation of advanced ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction must stop. If Russia and the Russian Space Agency 
cooperates with the U.S. on proliferation, then I believe we can work 
in partnership with them to increase commercial space launch and to 
provide funding for the International Space Station.
  But there are few things more dangerous or destabilizing to U.S. 
interests and peace and security in the Middle East than a nuclear 
armed Iran which continues to support international terrorism. And if 
Russia does not recognize this and is not willing to work with the 
United States to build a more stable and more secure Middle East, then 
we must not shy away from taking the tough action necessary to get 
results.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, for the past three years the Clinton 
administration has fought tooth-and-nail against the legislation now 
before the Senate. The White House repeatedly claimed, in its attempted 
defense, that the Lott-Lieberman initiative would undermine U.S. 
nonproliferation efforts, repeatedly asserting that they had Russia's 
behavior in check, and that progress was being made.
  Well, Mr. President, we now confront an Iran that has been armed to 
the gills with technology for ballistic missiles and nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons. According to the National Intelligence Officer 
for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, (who testified before the Foreign 
Relations Committee this past September), Iran is in a position to 
test, within the latter half of this decade, an ICBM that ``could 
deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload to many parts of the United 
States . . . using Russian technology and assistance.''
  Moreover, according to the Director of Central Intelligence, Iran 
``probably has achieved `emergency operational capability' '' with its 
medium range Shahab-3 missile. In other words, under President 
Clinton's watch, Iran has acquired from Russia and China the ability to 
strike Israel and Turkey with ballistic missiles carrying chemical or 
biological warheads. And the mullahs are working overtime to develop 
the Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 in order to menace U.S. citizens at home.
  In conclude now, in the absence of fierce opposition to this bill 
from the White House this time around, that reality has finally sunk in 
at the National Security Council. The Clinton administration's 
nonproliferation policy has been an abject failure. Bill Clinton and Al 
Gore will leave office having subordinated nonproliferation concerns to 
business interests, the wishes to foreign campaign donors, and their 
``touchy-feely'' personal politicking in Russia, China and elsewhere.
  The result has been an all-out fire-sale of deadly technologies by 
Russia, China, and others. Delegations from Iran, Syria, Iraq, North 
Korea, Libya, Sudan, Egypt, India, and Pakistan are virtually tripping 
over one another on their way in and out of various Russian and Chinese 
firms.
  The Clinton-Gore Administration will leave office:
  1. having allowed Russia and China to sell dangerous commodities 
around the globe with no fear of sanctions or consequences;
  2. having presided over the development of a North Korean ICBM 
capable of dropping biological weapons on U.S. soil (according to the 
intelligence community, a Taepo Dong-2 ICBM could be tested any day 
now);
  3. having presided over the arming of Iran, Syria, and others with 
nuclear, chemical, and biological missiles;
  4. having squandered its inheritance regarding Iraq by interfering 
with, and ultimately abandoning, UNSCOM;
  5. having prompted India and Pakistan into an all-out nuclear arms 
race by trying to ``strong-arm'' the two countries into the Test Ban 
Treaty (which merely prompted the nations to test);
  6. having lost all hope of getting the START II Treaty ratified, 
which would have banned MIRVed ICBMs in Russia;
  7. having imperiled the IAEA by tying the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty to the poorly-conceived, poorly-drafted CTBT, which the Senate 
rightly rejected;
  8. having destroyed the Missile Technology Control Regime by allowing 
Russia (a missile proliferator) to come in as a member; and
  9. having wasted half a decade of precious time in deploying a 
national missile defense to protect the United States from the 
consequences of their failed nonproliferation policy.

[[Page S666]]

  We must all remember that the Clinton-Gore administration voted the 
DoD authorization bill in 1995 because it required deployment of a 
national missile defense by 2001, with additional protection by 2003. 
Because of the President's reckless disregard for the nation's 
security, the U.S. will not ``break ground'' on a missile defense site 
in Alaska until this summer, at the earliest.
  At the same time, this administration taught Russia and China how to 
evade U.S. sanctions laws while simultaneously putting the U.S. 
sanctions determination process into a deep freeze. Not a single MTCR 
sanction has been imposed for Russia's arming of Iran or China's 
assistance to Pakistan. The enormity of this blatant disregard for the 
law is stunning, Mr. President.
  What is worse, by promoting U.S. commercial interests at the expense 
of national security, the Clinton-Gore administration has become part 
of the problem.
  China's nuclear proliferation has been swept under the rug by Mr. 
Clinton in order to clear the way for the nuclear lobby to sell 
reactors to the PRC. We must recall that, in 1998, President Clinton 
made a legally binding certification which no other President could, in 
good faith, bring himself to make. But the Clinton-Gore administration 
was happy to oblige industry and the Communist Chinese.
  In 1996 the Clinton administration pulled controls on commercial 
satellites because millionaire campaign donors wanted it. Unsupervised, 
unscrupulous U.S. companies engaged in the transfer of very sensitive 
ballistic missile information to the PRC, including information 
relating to the MIRVing of ICBMs. The Congress tried to shore up this 
fiasco by recontrolling satellites, but the Commerce Department is at 
it again, having recently declared--despite the law--that it wants 
reduced controls on extremely sensitive items such as radiation 
hardened chips and kick motors.
  From 1993 until 1999, willful disregard for security at the White 
House and the Department of Energy permitted continued acquisition of 
the nation's most sensitive nuclear warhead designs by China. This was 
exacerbated by the foolhardy declassification of thousands of documents 
by Hazel O'Leary, which undoubtedly has contributed to nuclear weapons 
capabilities around the globe. Even now, the Clinton-Gore 
administration is contemplating sharing nuclear weapons secrets with 
Russia in an effort to bribe them into submission on the ABM Treaty.
  Lately, the Department of Defense--once the bulwark against the 
foolhardy weakening of export controls--has been working ``hand-in-
glove'' with the defense industry and the Gore campaign. The Pentagon 
is now looking for ways to undermine the Arms Export Control Act. 
Again, this is happening because industry lobbying groups want these 
changes. There is an effort underway to avoid congressional 
notification of arms sales and to create license-free zones. The 
result, if unchecked, will be unfettered and unregulated trade in 
weaponry, which cannot be seen as a positive development under any 
circumstance.
  Finally, the administration has decided to support passively an 
Export Administration Act which would effectively undermine all 
existing U.S. export controls and which would undercut what is left of 
the nonproliferation policy which this administration inherited eight 
years ago. Enormous sums of money are being spent all over Washington 
by various industry groups because they know how loose export controls 
will be under this bill.
  Ronald Reagan's nonproliferation policy is in shambles, Mr. 
President. At best, this administration has been inept in managing such 
important issues. At worst, the administration has co-opted and 
corrupted nonproliferation policy on the basis of fund-raising schemes 
being run out of the Oval Office. The damage to U.S. nonproliferation 
policy is so severe and far-reaching, and the global results to date 
have been so catastrophic, that the next administration is going to 
spend the first four years just picking up the pieces.
  Mr. President, history will do worse than recording this 
administration as having fiddled while Rome burned. It will record 
these people as having set many of the fires themselves.
  I support the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Its reporting requirements 
will shed light on the fact that numerous Russian entities have sold 
their souls to the Mullahs in Tehran by offering that bunch of 
terrorists everything they want for their ballistic and cruise missile 
programs, including nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare 
technology. It will also prove that this administration has 
accomplished nothing in the past several years of ``talking.''
  That said, however much it might help, this bill will not solve the 
problem. It is much too late to prevent Iran from capitalizing upon the 
capabilities it has acquired.
  While it is not too late to defend ourselves, or to assist Israel, 
Turkey, and others in defending themselves, it will fall to the next 
administration to reconstruct a comprehensive nonproliferation policy 
and reverse the fearful effects of the past eight years.
  Thank you, Mr. President; I yield the floor.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems continues to be one 
of the most significant threats to America's national security. States 
like North Korea and Iran are actively pursuing ambitious programs and 
the technology needed to threaten the United States. Unclassified 
reports from our intelligence agencies indicate that these efforts have 
intensified.
  Iranian ballistic missile progress is largely the result of 
substantial assistance from North Korea, China, and especially, Russia. 
There is no doubt that foreign technology and assistance are essential 
to Iran's ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs. 
The U.S. intelligence community's most recent unclassified Semiannual 
Report to Congress on Proliferation states, ``Iran remains one of the 
most active countries seeking to acquire WMD [weapons of mass 
destruction] and ACW [advanced conventional weapons] technology from 
abroad.''
  The type of foreign assistance that is the subject of this 
legislation serves to increase the sophistication and rate of 
development of Iran's ballistic missiles. We must do more than we are 
doing now to impede its progress and, at the same time, prepare 
defenses against the use of such weapons.
  The rapid development of the Shahab-3 demonstrates how foreign 
assistance accelerated Iran's ballistic missile programs. The Shahab-3 
is based on the North Korean Nodong ballistic missile. But instead of 
simply purchasing the missile as Pakistan did, Iran chose to modify the 
design of the missile with Russian and Chinese assistance and produce 
the missile on its own. In February 1997, George Tenet, then Acting 
Director of the CIA, testified that with North Korean assistance, Iran 
could develop the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, ``in less 
than ten years.'' Less than a year later, in January 1998, Director 
Tenet testified, ``Iran's success in gaining technology and material 
from Russian companies, combined with recent indigenous Iranian 
advances, means that [Iran] could have a medium-range ballistic missile 
much sooner than I assessed last year.'' Six months later, in July 
1998, Iran flight-tested the Shahab-3. An unclassified Intelligence 
Community report released in January of this year assessed that Iran 
has achieved an ``emergency operational capability'' with the Shahab-3.
  Proliferation to Iran continues. According to the U.S. intelligence 
community's most recent unclassified Semiannual Report 
on Proliferation, summarizing proliferation that occurred in the first 
half of 1999,

       Russian entities during the first six months of 1999 have 
     provided substantial missile-related technology, training, 
     and expertise to Iran that almost certainly will continue to 
     accelerate Iranian efforts to build new indigenous ballistic 
     missiles.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       During the reporting period, firms in China provided 
     missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to 
     several countries of proliferation concern--such as Iran.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       Throughout the first half of 1999, North Korea continued to 
     export ballistic missiles-related equipment and missile 
     components, materials and technical expertise to countries in 
     the Middle East . . .

  This report to Congress also states, ``. . . economic conditions in 
Russia continued to deteriorate, putting more pressure on Russian 
entities to circumvent export controls. Despite some

[[Page S667]]

examples of restraint, Russian businesses continue to be major 
suppliers of WMD equipment, materials, and technology to Iran.''
  Because Russian government officials continue to show an 
unwillingness or inability to stop this dangerous assistance to Iran, 
the legislation we are considering should be passed to authorize and 
direct more effective sanctions.
  North Korea's continuing relationship with Iran is also of great 
concern. Iran has already received sufficient technology from North 
Korea to build a copycat three-stage Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile on 
its own. Moreover, senior Intelligence Community officials have 
testified that they expect North Korea to continue to sell ballistic 
missiles to Iran. Therefore, we must expect Iran to acquire the 
technology for the longer-range Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missile when 
North Korea begins its export. It is too optimistic, given the North 
Korea-Iran ballistic missile relationship, to expect Iran's 
capabilities to lag North Korea's for very long.
  There are several significant consequences of the continued 
proliferation of ballistic missile technology to Iran. I'll mention 
two.
  First, this assistance will allow Iran to develop more advanced 
ballistic missiles faster, cheaper, and easier than it otherwise would 
have on its own. Iran's defense minister has announced that it is 
working on the more advanced Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 missiles, and the 
Iranians even claim that they are going to launch a satellite into 
orbit by the second half of 2001. According to press reports, Iran's 
Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 ballistic missiles will use Russian engine 
technology, leading to an Iranian ICBM based in large part on Russian 
technology. Diminishing this proliferation is essential to slowing 
Iran's long-range ballistic missile program.
  Second, Iran is bound to become a supplier of ballistic missile 
technology and expertise as its own program proceeds. CIA Director 
Tenet recently made this point, testifying that, ``Iran's existence as 
a secondary supplier of this technology to other countries is the trend 
that worries me the most.'' We are already seeing indications that Iran 
is no longer merely a recipient of ballistic missile technology. 
According to unclassified intelligence community reports, Iran is 
assisting Libya's ballistic missile programs. Press reports also 
indicate Iran is helping Syria and others develop or acquire ballistic 
missiles.
  The legislation before the Senate will improve our efforts to 
restrain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic 
missile technology to Iran. I urge its approval.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I had a number of concerns with this bill, 
as it was approved by the House. I am pleased that we have been able to 
reach agreement on an amendment that addresses many of these concerns. 
The managers' amendment would make it clear that the application of 
sanctions under section 3 of the bill is discretionary, not mandatory. 
It would also urge the executive branch to provide notice to persons 
who may be subject to sanctions under this provision, giving them an 
opportunity to provide explanatory or exculpatory information before 
such sanctions are provided.
  I had planned on offering several amendments to this bill when it 
came to the floor, but because of the adoption of this amendment, I 
shall not do so. I would also like to clarify a few points with the 
chief Senate sponsors of the bill.
  First, the bill requires reporting of foreign persons when there is 
``credible information'' indicating that the person transferred 
specified goods, services, or technologies to Iran. I understand that 
it is the intent of the sponsors that the President judge the 
credibility of information on the basis of all information available to 
him, including both information that supports and information that 
undermines the conclusion that a covered transfer may have taken 
places. In other words, ``credible information'' is information that 
would lead a reasonable person to conlcude--after consideration of all 
the available evidence--that there is a substantial possibility that a 
covered transfer took place. Is that correct?
  Mr. LOTT. I agree. That understanding is consistent with the intent 
of the House, which defined ``credible information'' as such in its 
report.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I agree.
  Mr. LEVIN. The second point that I would like to address is the use 
of the word ``timely'' in the managers' amendment. It is my 
understanding that the intent is that, whenever appropriate, the 
President provide notice to foreign persons, or to the government with 
primarily jurisdiction over such persons, in a manner that provides 
them a reasonable opportunity to provide explanatory or exculpatory 
information before sanctions are imposed. Do the lead sponsors agree 
with this view?
  Mr. LOTT. I agree.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I agree.
  Mr. LEVIN. Finally, I would like to address section 6 of the bill, 
which requires a determination by the President that, among other 
things, the Government of Russia has demonstrated a sustained 
commitment to seek out and prevent the transfer to Iran of goods, 
services and technology that ``could'' make a material contribution to 
the development of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or of 
ballistic or cruise missile systems. It is my understanding that the 
use of the word ``could'' in this provision is not intended to go 
beyond other nonproliferation requirements or require the President to 
consider remote or absurdly hypothetical circumstances. Is that 
correct?
  Mr. LOTT. That is correct. The use of the term ``could'' is meant to 
convey an expectation that commodities should be controlled and 
monitored because of their potential for contributing to nuclear, 
chemical, or biological warfare programs, or to ballistic or cruise 
missile development. That is to say, this section covers commodities 
which should be controlled because of their physical or technological 
properties. This standard is consistent with current United States 
export control practice and with various statutory nonproliferation 
reporting requirements.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I agree.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act. For the past few years, I have been concerned 
about Iran's efforts to acquire the technology for ballistic missiles 
and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons from Russia and China.
  When reports began to surface in 1997 about Russian missile 
assistance to Iran, I met twice with Russia's Ambassador to the U.S. 
and the administration's special envoy on this issue to express my 
concern about this dangerous trade and to urge the Russian government 
and the Clinton Administration to take steps to stop it.
  I also gathered together a group of 99 Members of the House and 
Senate, who wrote to the President to urge him to invoke sanctions to 
halt this trade. The President refused.
  Along with a bipartisan group of House and Senate Members, I went to 
the White House to meet with Vice President Gore to urge the 
administration to take concrete actions to end Russian transfers to 
Iran. Again the administration refused, citing the need to let 
diplomacy work.
  That summer, I successfully offered an amendment that was adopted by 
unanimous consent to the fiscal year 1998 Foreign Operations 
Appropriations bill barring U.S. aid to Russia if missile assistance to 
Iran continued. In conference, the amendment was changed to give the 
President the ability to waive this prohibition on aid to Russia, which 
he subsequently did.
  In November 1997, the Senate unanimously passed a concurrent 
resolution that I sponsored, expressing the sense of the Congress that 
the President should sanction the Russian organizations involved in 
selling missile technology to Iran. The House also passed this 
resolution overwhelmingly by a vote of 414 to 8. Again the President 
refused to impose sanctions.
  The Congress tried again to spur the administration to action 6 
months later when we passed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions 
Act mandating sanctions on any organization involved in assisting 
Iran's missile or weapons of mass destruction programs. This bill 
passed the Senate by a vote of 90 to 4. Yet, when it reached the 
President's desk, he vetoed it.
  Instead of voting to override this veto, the Congress acceded to the 
President's request for more time to

[[Page S668]]

let diplomacy work. The verdict is in on that decision. Transfers of 
nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile technology to Iran 
persist demonstrating the Congress erred in deciding not to override 
the veto. While the administration has imposed so-called administrative 
sanctions against a handful of Russian entities, it cooperated with the 
Russian government to identify the target organizations such that the 
sanctions would have no meaningful effect, completely undermining the 
value of the action.
  While I will not go into the same detail here, let me simply say the 
administration has a similar record on Chinese proliferation to Iran, 
where it has failed to enforce U.S. laws calling for sanctions, again 
noting the need to let diplomacy work.
  Since the administration would not take steps to halt proliferation 
to Iran, I offered an amendment to a supplemental appropriations bill 
that the President signed into law in May 1998. The amendment 
appropriated $179 million to accelerate the development of U.S. theater 
missile defenses, including $45 million for Israel to begin purchasing 
equipment for a third battery of its Arrow missile defense system in 
order to counter the increased Iranian missile threat.
  As these examples show, the Clinton Administration is simply not 
willing to take the tough actions necessary to prevent proliferation. 
As a result, intelligence assessments indicate the problem is growing 
worse all the time. In an unclassified report to Congress last month, 
CIA Director George Tenet stated;

       Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to 
     acquire weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional 
     weapons technology from abroad. . . . For the first half of 
     1999, entities in Russia and China continued to supply a 
     considerable amount and a wide variety of ballistic missile-
     related goods and technology to Iran. . . . Iran already is 
     producing Scud short-range ballistic missiles and has built 
     and publicly displayed prototypes for the [1,300 kilometer-
     range] Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, which had its 
     initial flight test in July 1998 and probably achieved 
     ``emergency operational capability''--i.e., Tehran could 
     deploy a limited number of the Shahab-3 prototype missiles in 
     an operational mode during a perceived crisis situation. In 
     addition, Iran's Defense Minister last year publicly 
     acknowledged the development of the [2,000 kilometer range] 
     Shahab-4 . . . [and] publicly mentioned plans for a ``Shahab-
     5.''

  In the report, Director Tenet went on to note that Iran continues to 
seek biological warfare technology from Russia and Europe and despite 
being a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention has ``already has 
manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons . . . and the bombs and 
artillery shells for delivering them.'' He also said that ``Tehran 
continues to seek production technology, expertise, and chemicals that 
could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare program from 
entities in Russia and China.''
  Finally, the report indicated that despite promising never to acquire 
nuclear weapons, when it ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT), Iran has a nuclear weapons program, stating:

       Iran is attempting to establish a complete nuclear fuel 
     cycle for its civilian energy program. In that guise, it 
     seeks to obtain whole facilities . . . that in fact could be 
     used in any number of ways in support of efforts to produce 
     fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon. Despite 
     international efforts to curtail the flow of critical 
     technologies and equipment, Tehran continues to seek fissile 
     material and technology for weapons development and has set 
     up an elaborate system of military and civilian organization 
     to support its effort.

  In fact, according to the Washington Post, the CIA recently concluded 
that it could no longer rule out the possibility that Iran is already 
capable of producing a nuclear weapon. This is terribly troubling in 
light of the progress Iran has made in its missile program. Earlier 
this month, Director Tenet testified to the Intelligence Committee 
that:

       Most [intelligence] analysts believe that Iran, following 
     the North Korean pattern, could test an ICBM capable of 
     delivering a light payload to the United States in the next 
     few years. . . . As alarming as the long-range missile threat 
     is, it should not overshadow the immediacy and seriousness of 
     the threat that U.S. forces, interests, and allies already 
     face overseas from short and medium range missiles. The 
     proliferation of medium-range ballistic missiles [to nations 
     like Iran] is significantly altering strategic balances in 
     the Middle East and Asia.

  Finally, Director Tenet outlined a new type of proliferation threat 
from Iran in his testimony, warning that:

       . . . long-standing recipients--such as Iran--might become 
     suppliers in their own right as they develop domestic 
     production capabilities. . . . Iran in the next few years may 
     be able to supply not only complete Scuds, but also Shahab-3s 
     and related technology, and perhaps more advanced 
     technologies if Tehran continues to receive assistance from 
     Russia, China, and North Korea.

  It is clear that meaningful measures, and not simply another round of 
feckless diplomacy or a flawed international treaty such as the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT, is needed to combat this growing 
threat. Last Fall, the Administration accused the Congress of 
undermining U.S. nonproliferation efforts in rejecting the CTBT. But 
that treaty was unverifiable, would have undermined America's nuclear 
deterrent, and would have done nothing meaningful to combat 
proliferation.
  As I mentioned earlier, Iran along with 191 other nations has 
ratified the NPT, and thereby promised never to acquire nuclear 
weapons. It is violating this treaty. It is also violating the Chemical 
Weapons Convention and is acquiring missile technology. All of these 
actions should trigger U.S. sanctions, but the Clinton Administration 
has refused to take action.
  If arms control treaties like the NPT and other nonproliferation 
efforts are to be useful, they must be enforced. I urge the 
administration to finally get serious about this matter and for my 
colleagues to vote for the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Iran's possession 
of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and the missiles used to 
deliver them poses a clear and present danger to the United States and 
our forces and friends in the region. It is long past time that we 
address this threat.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________