[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 16 (Tuesday, February 22, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S658-S668]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1999--RESUMED
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, pursuant to the unanimous consent agreement,
I call up amendment No. 2820, which is already at the desk. This is the
so-called managers' amendment. I understand the amendment will be
agreed to and the motion to reconsider will be laid on the table.
Amendment No. 2820
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Lott], for himself, Mr.
Daschle, Mr. Levin, and Mr. Helms, proposes an amendment
numbered 2820.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 2, line 3, strike ``1999'' and insert ``2000''.
On page 5, beginning on line 7, strike ``No. 12938'' and
all that follows through the period and insert ``No.
12938.''.
On page 5, beginning on line 9, strike ``The United
States'' and all that follows through ``shall terminate'' and
insert ``Prohibition on United States Government sales to
that foreign person of any item on the United States
Munitions List as in effect on August 8, 1995, and
termination of''.
On page 5, beginning on line 16, strike ``The President
shall deny licenses and suspend'' and insert ``Denial of
licenses and suspension of''.
On page 8 between lines 23 and 24, insert the following:
(b) Opportunity to Provide Information.--Congress urges the
President--
(1) in every appropriate case, to contact in a timely
fashion each foreign person identified in each report
submitted pursuant to section 2(a), or the government with
primary jurisdiction over such person, in order to afford
such person, or governments, the opportunity to provide
explanatory, exculpatory, or other additional information
with respect to the transfer that caused such person to be
identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a);
and
(2) to exercise the authority in subsection (a) in all
cases where information obtained from a foreign person
identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a), or
from the government with primary jurisdiction over such
person, establishes that the exercise of such authority is
warranted.
On page 8, line 24, strike ``(b)'' and insert ``(c)''.
On page 9, line 11, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
On page 9, beginning on line 12, strike ``Russian Space
Agency'' and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
On page 10, beginning on line 11, strike ``through the
implementation of concrete steps''.
On page 10, beginning on line 16, strike ``, including
through the imposition of meaningful penalties on persons who
make such transfers''.
On page 10, line 19, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
On page 10, line 21, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
On page 11, line 25, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
On page 12, line 2, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
On page 13, line 6, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
On page 13, line 8, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
On page 13, line 10, insert after ``Service Module'' the
following: ``, and for the purchase (at a total cost not to
exceed $14,000,000) of the pressure dome for the Interim
Control Module and the Androgynous Peripheral Docking Adapter
and related hardware for the United States propulsion
module,''.
On page 13, line 15, insert ``credible'' before
``information''.
On page 17, beginning on line 15, strike ``russian space
agency'' and insert ``russian aviation and space agency''.
On page 17, beginning on line 17, strike ``Russian Space
Agency'' and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
On page 18, beginning on line 1, strike ``Russian Space
Agency'' and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or
Russian Space Agency''.
On page 18, line 6, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space
Agency''.
On page 18, line 10, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency''.
On page 18, beginning on line 13, strike ``Russian Space
Agency'' and insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or
Russian Space Agency''.
On page 18, line 15, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space
Agency''.
On page 18, line 16, strike ``Russian Space Agency'' and
insert ``Russian Aviation and Space Agency or Russian Space
Agency''.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to
and the motion to reconsider is laid on the table.
The amendment (No. 2820) was agreed to.
Mr. LOTT. As a reminder to all Members, passage of this bill either
by rollcall vote or voice vote is to occur in the 4 p.m. timeframe. We
are trying to accommodate Senators who have a number of other meetings
they need to attend, but it will be either at 4 or 4:30 at the very
latest. Members will be notified, via hotline, as soon as the exact
time has been determined.
Mr. President, I rise in strong support of this very important
legislation, H.R. 1883, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999.
Let me say at the beginning, this legislation has always had strong
bipartisan support. It passed overwhelmingly in the House of
Representatives last year by a vote of 419-0, and it has always had
strong support in the Senate from Senators Lieberman, Feinstein, and
Helms--a very broad, bipartisan group.
I also have to acknowledge the cooperation of Senator Levin, who has
been working with me on the managers' amendment. I think it is
important, we now go forward with this legislation.
[[Page S659]]
I am pleased I have been joined in this effort by Senator Lieberman,
who he is on the floor to participate in the discussion of this
legislation. Senator Lieberman is a long-time expert in
nonproliferation and Middle East matters, and he certainly deserves a
lot of the credit for making this legislation possible.
The purpose of the bill is to express once again our deep concern
regarding the transfer to Iran of dangerous technology, principally
from Russia, China, and North Korea, as well as from other foreign
entities, and to recommend additional steps to halt this deadly trade.
Again, let me go into a little history. This legislation passed the
House and the Senate in 1998. The President vetoed it, but, at the
request of the administration, efforts were ongoing to work with
Russia. That veto was not overridden. We did not vote on it. But the
hope that progress would be made has not paid off; we have not achieved
the results we hoped for. You can say it was because they had changes
in the leadership positions in Russia. They are trying to make
progress, but the fact is, they are not making progress and this
dangerous transfer of the technology that could lead to proliferation
of nuclear weapons continues.
This bill requires the President to report to Congress when credible
information exists of a transfer of dangerous technology to Iran. The
President must also inform Congress whether he has imposed certain
penalties on foreign persons as a result of such transfers. If such
penalties are not imposed, the President must report the reasons why he
decided against taking this step.
The bill will also create new incentives for the Russian aviation and
space agency to cooperate with the United States in efforts to stem the
proliferation of weapons technology to Iran by precluding certain
payments to that agency if entities under its jurisdiction and control
engage in such transfers.
Think about that. The United States is assisting the Russian aviation
and space agency at a time when entities under its jurisdiction may, as
a matter of fact, be involved in transferring this dangerous technology
to Iran. It is absurd, and the American people would rightly be
horrified to find that is the case.
As I noted, this bill passed the House last September by a unanimous
vote, and that vote occurred despite an explicit veto threat by the
President. The overwhelming bipartisan vote in the House and the strong
bipartisan support the bill enjoys in the Senate underscores the
seriousness with which the Congress views Iran's continued quest for
long-range missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction.
I can think of few international developments that would be as
damaging to U.S. national security and to stability and security in the
Middle East as the acquisition by Iran of long-range, nuclear-tipped
missiles.
We know already Iran has been the most notorious state sponsor of
terrorism, including attacks on Americans, and we know Iran remains a
steadfast opponent of peace between Israel and her neighbors, and Iran
supports those whose violence is aimed at undermining prospects for a
genuine lasting peace.
Some of our colleagues might observe that they had elections in Iran
last week, and I believe those elections continue now. It appears
reformers have been making some gains. That may be the situation in
Iran, and the relations with Iran will change as a result of that. Let
me assure my colleagues that the danger is still there. Those who are
in charge of this nuclear proliferation in Iran have a very strong grip
on what is being done, and there is very little likelihood they are
going to let go of it anytime soon, in spite of what appears to be
encouraging election returns. In fact, one can argue that to continue
to send a strong signal against Iran's acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction actually bolsters the reformers in their efforts to change
the approach of Iran, both internally and externally.
While we are pleased to see what appears to be encouraging results--
and I think the Senate should express itself on that, and I will
suggest to the Democratic leadership we perhaps have a resolution
acknowledging what has happened there and are hopeful about what that
may mean--I do not think by any stretch of the imagination that should
lead us to think everything is going to change immediately and we
should not go forward with this very important legislation.
If my colleagues think about it, it is quite scary: Iran's leaders,
now and in the future, will be in possession of nuclear-tipped ICBMs
capable of reaching Washington or Los Angeles or New York. America's
security and that of our friends and allies in the region will be
unalterably affected by such a horrific development.
Yet that day of reckoning is coming and much sooner than we prefer,
unless something is done to stop the transfer of this technology and
other forms of assistance to Iran by Russia, in particular, but also by
China and North Korea.
My colleagues will recall we have been working on this for 3 or 4
years. We have tried mightily to be of help to the administration in
trying to put pressure on Russia in particular, but that strategy has
failed to slow the flow of this dangerous technology.
Let me point out what CIA Director George Tenet said recently in a
report to Congress on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
over the previous 6-month period. In that report, Director Tenet wrote:
Entities in Russia and China continued to supply a
considerable amount and a wide variety of ballistic missile-
related goods and technology to Iran.
The report also stated:
Iran's earlier success in gaining technology and materials
from Russian companies accelerated Iranian [missile]
development.
Director Tenet also noted:
Russian entities continued to interact with Iranian
research centers on various [nuclear] activities. These
projects will help Iran augment its nuclear technology
infrastructure, which in turn would be useful in supporting
nuclear weapons research and development.
The report also highlighted China's development in their programs.
For example, the report stated:
Firms in China provided missile-related items, raw
materials, and/or assistance to . . . Iran.
I had occasion to meet personally with Director Tenet recently
because I wanted to hear what information he had that he could provide
to me and other Senators who wished to have a private briefing about
what is going on in this area, and also to discuss the recent U.S.
counterterrorism activities.
Director Tenet reaffirmed that the flow of dangerous technology to
Iran from Russia and China is, in fact, continuing and on a significant
scale. It has not dropped. If anything, it has become worse. I urge
those Senators who have not had a chance to review this classified
record to go up to room S-407 to get this briefing. It is a sobering
reminder that despite the end of the cold war, serious threats to U.S.
security and our critical allies around the world remain.
I commend Director Tenet and the entire U.S. intelligence community
for their heroic efforts to uncover the truth about these dangerous
transfers. What makes the intelligence community's successes so much
more astounding is that they come in spite of significant denial and
deception by Russia, China, and others.
Director Tenet's report underscores the administration's current
strategy for dealing with this growing problem. I know they worked at
it. I discussed this with National Security Adviser Sandy Berger. They
have tried. They acknowledged it has been difficult. They have had to
deal with changing people and the laws in Russia, of while their
intentions, as they provide them to us verbally, appear to be in the
right direction, the results are just not there.
The administration had hoped that by engaging Russia, China, and
North Korea in a dialog, they could persuade those nations to cease and
desist from their provocative behavior. The administration, I
understand, did get the Russian Government to take some steps, such as
adoption of export control law and regulations, but despite this fact,
not a single Russian has been successfully prosecuted for transferring
weapons of mass destruction or missile technology to Iran. Not one. I
repeat, the intelligence we get is it is probably growing worse. So
action against an individual, action against companies or academicians
and professors, if there is anything in that nature going on, we do not
see any results.
[[Page S660]]
Thus, it appears the Russian Government either supports this
clandestine transfer of dangerous technology to Iran or is unwilling to
take strong necessary steps to halt it.
The same can be said for the People's Republic of China and the
Democratic People's Republic of North Korea; therefore, I join with
many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle in believing that it
is time to send a strong signal to the administration but, more
importantly, to Russia, China, and North Korea, and to other countries
that may be contemplating the transfer of this dangerous technology to
Iran, or to Iraq, for that matter.
The message is simple: The Congress and the American people are not
content with the status quo. We are not content with the dialog that
produces even more promises on the one hand and scant or no real
reduction in the flow of technology on the other. Some might say this
bill is not strong enough, and I would be hard pressed to disagree with
that. I would prefer it to be even stronger. After all, the bill
provides the President with the authority to impose sanctions, but it
does not require them. We may want to look at doing that if we do not
see some changes. If we do not see some actions by the administration,
if we do not see some actions being taken to impose sanctions, then we
may want to go that next step.
I believe bolder action is going to be needed, that this will not be
enough. It is a signal that is worth providing at this time. Because of
its strong bipartisan support and because I believe it will become law,
I am willing to go forward with it in this fashion at this time.
The bill before us now reflects a continuing commitment in both
parties to take a tough stand in the fight against nuclear
proliferation.
With this in mind, I urge the President not to veto this bipartisan
bill but instead to sign it into law as soon as it lands on his desk.
Again, I thank Senator Lieberman, Senator Helms, and the many other
Senators who are involved in the process of crafting this important
legislation. I strongly urge a ``yes'' vote on H.R. 1883, the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. REID addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. REID. Before the leader leaves the floor, I say it is important
that we, on matters relating to foreign policy, do as much as we can on
a bipartisan basis. I think moving this legislation along speaks well
of that. I am confident that the legislation will be signed.
I also extend my congratulations to the Senator from Connecticut, who
has worked on this for a long time, well more than a year. It is
because of him, working with the full committee, that we have been able
to move this measure along.
I also say to the leader, I think when the votes are counted in Iran,
we should consider a resolution congratulating the people of Iran for
what appears to be the moderate tone of the election results. I think
that is very important. That is a positive sign, as it is a positive
sign today that there appears to be developing in Russia a stable
government.
I extend my appreciation to the leader for the manner in which this
measure is moving along. On an issue such as this, we should not have
acrimonious debate. We have been able to avoid that with the work that
has been done behind the scenes. That is very important.
Mr. LOTT. If the Senator will yield, I think it is important the
Senate take note of the fact that for the first time in 20 years
reformers may have been making some gains and that maybe internally and
the way they deal with the rest of the world things may change in Iran.
We hope that is the case.
I ask that you join me in talking to Senator Daschle to see if we can
craft some legislation that would express the resolution's views on
this. Hopefully, we can also take that up, if not today, maybe later
this week.
I yield the floor.
Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to support this legislation. I
particularly wish to thank the majority leader for his steadfast and
very strong support for this important piece of legislation. The
majority leader has recognized the serious threat that the
proliferation of ballistic missile capacity and weapons of mass
destruction to rogue nations, such as Iran, represents to our forces in
the Middle East, to our allies in the Middle East, and in the not-too-
distant future--maybe real soon--to our allies in Europe, and, heaven
protect us, to the United States of America, to our homeland.
We have talked a lot in this Chamber, and outside, about national
missile defense. We crossed a bridge on this issue last year, I think,
with the bipartisan legislation sponsored initially by the majority
leader's colleague from Mississippi, Senator Cochran.
But if we are now involved in an effort to develop a national missile
defense, does it not make sense to use whatever authority we have to
deter, to retard, and, if possible, to prevent a rogue nation, such as
Iran, from developing the capacity to strike us and our allies?
This is to me the other side of the American effort to protect us and
our people and our allies from what, in the years ahead, I am afraid
will be the single most serious threat to our security, which is, the
proliferation of ballistic missile capacity and weapons of mass
destruction.
The majority leader has been the leader on the bill we are
considering today, and I have been privileged to work with him on it. I
appreciate the broad bipartisan support we have on this measure. As the
majority leader said, this legislation could have been stronger. It
started out stronger when we introduced the initial legislation, but in
the process of trying to get something done, we modified it.
It still makes an important statement to the world about the
steadfast commitment of the Congress of the United States to do
everything we can to diminish the threat of weapons of mass destruction
carried by ballistic missiles. It sends a message to our friends in
Russia about the intensity of our concern about their part in helping
Iran develop weapons of mass destruction. I believe it sends a message
to the Administration of the United States about the broad bipartisan
support in Congress for tougher actions against any nation, including
Russia--with whom we have a developing relationship--if they are
supporting Iran in the development of this destructive capacity.
A reporter stopped me earlier today on the way to the Chamber and
asked: Aren't you worried about the effect that passage of the Iran
Nonproliferation Act will have on the Government of Russia or in the
Presidential elections coming in Russia? My answer, directly, is no.
But, obviously, we are all concerned and hopeful that the forces of
reform will take hold in Russia and bring stability and progress to
that country. But our first concern has to be not what happens in
Russia, but what we can do to protect the security of the American
people in this country and our forces abroad from the threat of weapons
of mass destruction carried by ballistic missiles. If the Russian
Government will be true to its own statements about working against
proliferation, then there will be no problem for Russia as a result of
the passage of this legislation.
My colleagues have talked about changes in Iran. The developments are
most remarkable in Iran. There is a whole new generation of Iranians
and, if I am not mistaken, more than half of it was not of age when the
extreme Islamic revolution, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, occurred in the
late 1970s. It is a generation that appears to want reform, better
lives for themselves, freedom, better relations with the West, and
better relations with the United States of America.
Remarkably, in the midst of the very authoritarian government that
came into power in the late 1970s and has been there since, the
Iranians have continued to have elections.
Here is the power of the people at work again. Last Friday,
apparently, more than four out of five eligible voters came out to vote
in Iran. I say, parenthetically, what an embarrassment it should be to
us to recall that in 1998, the last time we had a congressional
election--our own, if you will, parliamentary election--36 percent of
the
[[Page S661]]
eligible voters came out to vote; only one-third, as compared to more
than four-fifths in Iran. They are apparently expressing very broad
support for the forces of reform.
Does that diminish the concern we have about what Iran is doing? Not
immediately, unfortunately. Because the power is still exercised by a
small group of leaders at the top. Not by the reform-oriented, moderate
President Khatami, but by the religious leaders at the top who still
exercise and control the agencies of foreign policy, defense policy,
and intelligence policy, who still have the power to override and veto
any of the acts, even of this new reform Parliament.
The focus of our concern about Iran is that it has been our most
implacable foe in the recent past and that it has been the single most
intransigent supporter of terrorism against this Nation and our allies,
a reality that remains unchanged.
The thought that weapons of mass destruction, carried by ballistic
missiles, would be in the possession of this nation, effectively still
controlled by this small group of enemies of the United States, should
fill us with the most profound fear and anxiety.
It is from that fear and anxiety that this bill emerges. It is not
the first time we have expressed our concerns about these developments
in Iran. In previous enactments we have given the Administration the
tools to try to address this problem, specifically in the Arms Export
Control Act and in the Iran-Iraq Sanctions Act. But we were not
satisfied with those measures and the way they were being used, so we
passed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act in 1997, a measure
similar to this legislation we are considering today.
Unfortunately, the President chose to veto that legislation. That is
why H.R. 1883 was introduced and why it passed the House
overwhelmingly, 419-0, with every Member of both parties who voted
supporting it.
Since 1997, our concern about the problem has not diminished. It is
widely and reliably reported--this is why we are back with this
legislation--that entities and people in Russia continue to provide
both technology and assistance to Iran to build these dangerous
weapons. Iran has made worrying progress on its missile program, as the
majority leader indicated and as the intelligence reports, classified
as they are, which are available to our colleagues, clearly state.
I cite also an unclassified source. According to the Congressional
Research Service, with help from Russians and others, notably North
Koreans and Chinese, Iran has produced a Shahab 3 ballistic missile
with a range of 800 miles and tested it; on July 22, 1998, to be exact.
Although the first test was apparently unsuccessful, the Congressional
Research Service reports that the Shahab 3 is now thought to be
operational and in production. There also have been credible reports
that Iran is in the process of developing yet another, more advanced
missile, the Shahab 4, which would have a range of up to 2,000 miles,
more than double the range of the Shahab 3. We have some basis for
believing the Iranians are now working on intercontinental ballistic
missiles.
If combined with weapons of mass destruction, these existing Iranian
missiles can threaten American forces and our allies and friends in the
Middle East and, soon after that, as indicated, our forces and allies
throughout Europe and, of course, eventually, the American homeland
itself. This is a frightening prospect, given Iran's large chemical
weapons program and aggressive attempt to acquire a nuclear weapons
capability. The American Government has made it clear that Iran is
attempting--in this case largely with China's help--to reach self-
sufficiency in the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons,
though Iran continues to deny that charge. Concerns have also been
expressed by authorities in our country that Iran is seeking to become
a nuclear arms state by attempting to buy material for such weapons or
by using nonmilitary nuclear assistance to build up its knowledge about
nuclear weapons.
These programs in Iran can profoundly change the balance of power in
the region and strike a very serious blow to our efforts to contain
Iran until it becomes a responsible member of the community of nations,
until the forces of change which are blowing so hopefully through Iran,
even as we speak today, reach fruition and a change of policy.
I am sure most everyone in this Chamber will look forward to a day
when sanctions of this kind will not be necessary because a new
government, representing what seems to be the clear will of the Iranian
people, would be in power in Tehran; a government with which the United
States of America and our allies could have constructive and peaceful
relations. But until that time, the kinds of weapons capabilities that
are being developed allow Iran to threaten, for instance, friendly Arab
States, making it harder for them to cooperate with the United States.
These weapons capabilities would raise the risks to U.S. military
forces in the region and could threaten the free flow of oil out of
this critical region which could, of course, create crises in the
United States, in Europe, Asia, and in any other place in the world
that depends on fuel from the Middle East to power their economies.
It is self-evident and axiomatic that we have to do whatever we can
to try to deter this dangerous capability, to delay it, to retard it as
best we can, given the Iranian Government that now exists. Part of that
is making clear, as I believe this legislation does, to our friends in
Russia in no uncertain terms that we are serious about this. The time
for hit and miss, slower, bob-and-weave progress toward shutting off
Russian assistance to Iran for the development of these dangerous
programs is over.
In addition to other sanctions, we have focused in this bill on
holding up extraordinary, as we call it, American funding for the
international space station to the Russian space agency, unless Russia
takes sufficient action to halt any part it is playing in proliferation
to Iran. This is our attempt to demonstrate the seriousness of our
concern about this matter, even to the extent of stopping the funding
of a program that is not only important to us--that is, space
cooperation--but important to the Russians.
While we cannot expect to prevent all technology transfers to rogue
states, we do have the ability to check the flow of some of it by
adopting the kinds of sanctions in this legislation that are aimed at
persons engaged in such activity. We are able and therefore must act to
take measures against those governments that condone such activity,
whether or not they are organizing and abetting the transfer, or merely
looking the other way when their citizens engage in these activities.
Senator Lott quoted CIA Director George Tenet. Director Tenet has
made quite clear that despite the noticeable shifts within Iran, it
remains ``the most active state sponsor of terrorism.'' Iran's support
for dangerous terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, through training, money, and weapons, has
just not ended. There are people in our country, people whom I respect,
who continue to sustain the belief, based on evidence they have
gathered, that Iran was involved in the 1996 attack on American service
personnel at Khobar in Saudi Arabia, though no definitive conclusion
has been reached on that matter.
We have been engaged in a dialog across a wide spectrum with our
friends and allies in trying to address the issue of proliferation to
Iran. The prospect of a nuclear-capable, militarily powerful Iran armed
with ballistic missiles is clearly a threat to our national interests
and to those of our allies; therefore, we must act to stop it. The
sanctions we are proposing will further stop the diffusion of this
technology and lead to a more stable Middle East.
I echo the words of the majority leader: The passage of this measure
may actually encourage the forces of reform in Iran which are now so
boldly and inspiringly expressing themselves. It certainly does seem
that those forces of reform want to have better relations with the
West, with the United States. Part of what we are saying to them is,
this matters to us. You must stop your support of terrorism. Stop your
development of these weapons of mass destruction, and we can develop a
much better relationship.
[[Page S662]]
The bill itself is simple and direct. It requires the President to
submit reports to Congress on foreign entities where there is credible
information that these entities have transferred certain goods,
services, or technologies to Iran. That part of the bill would apply to
any entities anywhere in the world, not just the Russians. It
authorizes the President to impose measures against these entities, but
does not mandate him to do so. It allows him to consider exculpatory
material, material that argues against the guilt of the entities.
And with an amendment that will be adopted, submitted by the Senator
from Michigan, Mr. Levin, those entities will be given an opportunity
to respond to those allegations before any sanctions are considered.
Finally, the bill prohibits these extraordinary American payments to
the Russian space agency until certain conditions enumerated in the
bill are met. The purpose is to say to the Russians specifically that
we keep seeing compelling evidence that entities in Russia are
supporting the development of these dangerous programs within Iran.
As much as we want to continue to work with Russia on joint efforts
in space, we will not do so if they are contributing to this grave
threat to our security.
Finally, I thank Senator Lott, Senator Biden, Senator Helms, and
others on both sides who have worked together to bring this bill to the
floor, where I have reason to believe it will achieve strong support. I
was pleased to hear representatives of the Administration indicate to
some of us a short while ago that, though they may not specifically
support the bill, they would not recommend that, in its current form,
the President veto it. I think we are on the way to making a unified
statement, which is a constructive one, and which takes a small but
significant step toward protecting us, our children, and grandchildren
from the threat of weapons of mass destruction carried by ballistic
missiles.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). The Senator from Delaware is
recognized.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, before the Senator from Connecticut leaves
the floor, I wish to thank him and acknowledge all the work he has done
over the past year or more on this issue. He has, in a sense, exercised
some forbearance in the past when he thought it might have been more
appropriate to make a stronger move, but because of circumstances
within Russia and our bilateral relations and the hope--not
expectation--that there may be a way to get this done, he has
cooperated. I think everybody should understand the reason this issue
has stayed so much on the forefront is because of his vigilance and his
effort. I thank him for that. I thank him as well, along with other
colleagues, for entertaining some of the changes that Senator Levin
proposed. I think this is a much better bill. I agree with him; I think
enough time has passed to demonstrate that this may be the only course
left open, and hopefully it will work.
In a strange sense, the Senator and I have had occasion separately
and individually, as the Presiding Officer has, to meet with members of
the Russian Duma, members of the Russian Government, and members of the
leadership of the various Arab states. I find it counterintuitive that
they don't understand, quite frankly, that what is happening in Iran
and their quest for this missile technology is literally a greater
threat to them than it is to us. It is no greater threat to anyone than
Israel; nonetheless, it is an incredibly significant threat to our
friends in Europe, as well as our Arab friends. What is going on in
North Korea is a threat to China and Russia in the long term, not only
Japan and South Korea. What is going on in Iraq is a greater threat to
our French friends--who seem to support Iraq against their own
interests--than it is to us.
I am wondering when reason will take hold. I am a little bit
dismayed, and more than a little bit miffed, by the ability of our
friends, as well as those who are not viewed as our close friends, to
dismiss reality. What do they think? If Russia is worried about the
radicalization of the Moslem populations within the former Soviet
Union, the Trans-Caucasus, and other places, why in the devil do they
not understand that what is going on in Iraq, as well as in Iran--if it
does not take a drastic change in course--is inimical to their
interests? Ironically, the second largest former Communist state--the
former Soviet Union--seems to be the ultimate capitalist in this
regard; but they can't add very well. This is, I think, more about
money than anything else. Hopefully, as I will lay out in my
statement--and I don't want to delay the Senator any longer--they will
see the virtues of looking to the West and not to Iran and Iraq for the
source of their economic survival. At any rate, I thank the Senator
very much for his leadership.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from
Delaware for his kind words and the spirit of cooperation in which we
have worked on this and on so many other matters over the years. I
could not agree with him more on what he said. There is an irony here.
It is as if folks in places such as Russia are still doing what we
sometimes criticize people in our country for doing--going by a cold-
war mentality. But it is a cold-war mentality heavily not only affected
by communism, but what the Senator has said, capitalism. So they are
selling for short-term gains that, before very long, will endanger them
more than us. This is our attempt to say: We are in this together. We
are threatened by what you are doing, but watch out, friends, you are
going to be threatened soon yourselves.
I thank the Senator for his characteristically straight talk--
although he is not on the Straight Talk Express. He is a straight
talker in the Senate Chamber. I thank him for his support.
Mr. BIDEN. I wish the driver of that express a lot of luck.
Maybe what Mr. Putin, who is the Acting President and likely soon to
be elected President, it appears--maybe we should send my mom over to
see him. My mom had an expression, from the time we were kids, when you
would do something against your own interest out of anger, or out of
pique, or misunderstanding. My mother would say, ``Don't bite your nose
off to spite your face.'' Well, we have a whole lot of Russians seeming
to bite their noses off to spite their faces. I find it absolutely
astounding what they appear to continue to do.
The bill before us is called the Iran Nonproliferation Act. That is
the context in which we should talk about this, and I think we should
understand this. The purpose of this bill is not to punish, but rather
to restrain. The goal that we pursue is not to invoke sanctions, but
rather to make this a safer world for all of us, including the
Russians. The means to that end is to make this a world with fewer
weapons of mass destruction and with fewer delivery systems able to
deliver weapons of mass destruction, notably long-range ballistic
missiles.
Long-range ballistic missiles are a curious invention. They are
awesome, frankly, but they don't amount to much as a military weapon
unless they are armed with a powerful warhead. Now, the sort of long-
range missile that Third World countries might build --and that the
countries I have mentioned are attempting to build, or have built--
those missiles cannot carry big enough warheads to do much damage with
a conventional high explosive, a plain old bomb; they are too heavy.
The missile is not big enough, powerful enough, does not have enough
throw weight to carry conventional weapons. So the irony is that a
country which develops or buys long-range ballistic missiles is all too
likely, therefore, to seek weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear
warheads that are lighter and have much more--no pun intended --bang
for the buck than a conventional weapon, or even potentially a lighter
payload, with chemical weapons or biological weapons on top of these
missiles. The irony is that as they develop a long-range ballistic
missile capacity, they are led inextricably--if they are going to be of
any ``value'' militarily--they move toward weapons of mass destruction
with which to arm the missiles.
North Korea has been trying to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has built
chemical and biological weapons and is seeking a nuclear capability.
They were close to building a nuclear weapon a decade ago. Similarly,
Iran has a
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covert nuclear weapons program. Even the Government of Russia admits
that. Iran has also developed and used chemical weapons. Now, again,
that is chemical weapons that, based on the missile technology they may
have acquired, even if they have a range of 2,000 miles, as my friend
from Connecticut indicated, doesn't get them to Washington, DC. It
doesn't get them to any U.S. territory. But it does get them to a lot
of areas of the world where our friends--in this case, the Russians--
can be affected.
We have to stop this as best we can. The world must move toward fewer
weapons of mass destruction, not more of them. We have to reduce the
number of long-range ballistic missiles in the world, not increase
them. Unfortunately, some foreign persons--and I say ``persons''
because that is the legal word in this legislation for officials or
entities; by ``entities'' we mean the Russian agency comparable to our
space agency, NASA, or the agency in Russia comparable to our Defense
Department, or institutes, or companies. In Russia, institutes or
companies cannot be separated very clearly from the Government.
Unfortunately, some of these foreign ``persons''--in Russia, China,
and North Korea--are deaf to the world's call for nonproliferation and
apparently tone deaf to their own interests. The countries or entities
are so desperate for cash or so angry at the West that they will risk
Armageddon by helping Iran build long-range ballistic missiles or even
nuclear weapons.
As ironic as this sounds, this legislation is designed in part to
save them from their own destructive impulses. The United States has
imposed sanctions at times on entities from all three of these supplier
countries. Again, by the ``supplier'' countries I mean North Korea,
China, and Russia. The United States has imposed sanctions on entities
from these countries and is continuing negotiations with all of these
countries to secure an end to their assistance to Iran. While we may
hope for success in the months or years to come, however, there has
been little success so far.
Today the Senate will vote to make the President list the offending
``persons;'' to increase his powers to impose sanctions against them;
and to limit United States support for Russian work on the
international space station if any entities under the Russian Aviation
and Space Agency continue to assist Iran, which we have reason to
believe they have.
It is important to understand that H.R. 1883, which we will shortly
pass, is not an anti-Russian bill. Rather, it is simply and
overwhelmingly a nonproliferation bill. Both I and the Senate sponsors
of this bill would like nothing better than to have this bill result in
no sanctions whatever against Russia.
While we try to crack down on entities that assist Iran's long-range
ballistic missile programs, we also support nonproliferation of
assistance to Russia. We continue to help Russia reduce its unneeded
strategic weapons through the Nunn-Lugar program, protect its sensitive
nuclear materials, help it find new careers for excess weapon
scientists, and improve its export control laws. Those are the laws
that are on the books, and should be enforced, which would prevent any
agency or company within Russia from transferring usable information to
aid and abet Iran in their long-range missile programs.
We are helping Russia in other ways, as well, so this should not be
taken in isolation. This is part of a continuum of efforts on our part
to deal with the interests of our country as well as Russia. The United
States Government, with the support of many in this body, also
continues to work with Russia on many other vital issues. We seek
continued strategic arms reductions, through the so-called START
process. We support the sharing of missile warning data. We are working
to preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the ABM Treaty, with an
amendment that allows for--again, in Russia's interests--a limited
ballistic missile defense. Again, we pointed out that North Korea and
Iran present a greater danger to them than they do to the United
States.
The United States and other Western countries also offer the
investment on which Russia's economic development depends. United
States companies even buy ballistic missile engines from Russia's top
design bureaus. Our American companies are purchasing directly from
Russian design entities. We are buying engines that they are producing,
from which they are making substantial money. Iran cannot begin to
match the power of the United States to sustain and transform Russian
industry. In other words, they will make a heck of a lot more money
doing the right thing, dealing with the United States and with the
Western Europeans and Japan, than they will ever make from selling
technology to Iran. I urge Russian leaders to think about that.
I wonder, with all the chaos that is in place in Russia, whether
anybody at the top has ever really focused on this. In pure
unadulterated dollars and cents, what is in Russia's economic interest
is to sell to the West rather than to sell to Iran. If the choice is
starkly made, which we are about to do, I hope they will focus more
logically on their alternatives.
This bill and the Senate are not anti-Russian, but we are manifestly
anti-proliferation. We will not tolerate vicious and venal persons
plunging the world into a new cold war, let alone a hot one in which
weapons of mass destruction would be a freely traded currency of death.
If Russia or China or North Korea should choose the path of
proliferation--and they have to some degree already done that--we will
show that there are better paths to power and prestige than
proliferating ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction to
Third World countries with unstable regimes. There is still time to
stamp out proliferation and to put the world on a more peaceful path,
but we must not and we will not collaborate in sowing the seeds of
global destruction through proliferation.
It is unfortunate that the Senate action occurs only weeks before
next month's Presidential elections in Russia. The need to pass this
legislation is not our fault, that is Russia's fault. Some in that
country between now and those elections may try to use our action to
stir up a nationalistic reaction for their own political purposes in
the upcoming Russian election. That would be both unwise and ill
founded. It is also unfortunate that the House authors of this bill
insisted upon triggering Presidential reporting and possible sanctions
based upon a very low standard of evidence. In practice, however, no
President will impose sanctions unless he is convinced that wrongdoing
has occurred, notwithstanding the fact that the House standard of
evidence is too low a threshold.
Finally, I regret that this bill does not permit the President to
authorize extraordinary payments for work on the international space
station, if those payments should be needed, to protect sensitive
intelligence information. Neither does it permit payments to a
sanctioned entity if such payments are needed to prevent significant
dangers to the crew of the space station. I do not think either of
those are wise restrictions, and I hope these concerns can be addressed
in conference between the House and Senate.
The important fact is, however, that the Senate action today is a
measure not of anti-Russian sentiment, nor of any impulse to bully.
Rather, it reflects the depth of our concern and also our frustration
over the increasing risk that Russian and other entities will
recklessly open Pandora's box, against their own interest as well as
ours.
I earnestly hope that in the coming weeks, our President and the
newly elected President of Russia can put us back on the track of
peaceful cooperation to make this a safer and more prosperous world.
That is a real prospect for both countries, if Russia would only accept
that its profit and its destiny lies in the West, not in the East.
Perhaps passage of this bill will help to bring about such a
reevaluation. If so, then prospects for the new century on which we
have just embarked would truly be improved. If not, it puts us on a
perilous slope to more proliferation and colder, not warmer, relations.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today in support of H.R. 1883, the
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999.
As chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I am in a
privileged position to have access to the volumes of intelligence
information gathered at great expense and
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even risk of life by our intelligence community.
Sadly, this intelligence leads me to the conclusion that our efforts
thus far to stem proliferation have failed. As the Director of Central
Intelligence told me in an open Hearing before the Senate Intelligence
Committee just this month:
Mr. Chairman, on proliferation, the picture that I drew
last year has become even more stark and worrisome. Transfers
of enabling technologies to countries of proliferation
concern have not abated.
Particularly in the case of Iran, the intelligence indicates that the
proliferation of missile technologies as well as the technologies and
expertise to enable their development of chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons, continues unabated.
Our nonproliferation efforts haven't failed because we haven't tried
other things. They have failed because the tools we have used thus far
have not been up to the task.
The task is indeed formidable.
Iran desperately wants these weapons. We wish they didn't. We wish
the problem would go away on its own. But the evidence indicates that
it won't. In the unclassified version of a report submitted to me on
January 21st pursuant to a mandate in the Intelligence Authorization
Act of 1997--a report available to all Members--the Director of Central
Intelligence stated:
Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to
acquire WMD [weapons of mass destruction] . . . from abroad.
In doing so, Tehran is attempting to develop an indigenous
capability to produce various types of weapons--nuclear,
chemical, and biological--and their delivery systems.
With regard to missile proliferation, in his testimony to me this
month, the DCI reported that:
Most analysts believe that Iran, following the North Korean
pattern, could test an ICBM capable of delivering a light
payload to the United States in the next few years.
And, he added, Iran could become not just a recipient, but a
proliferator:
While Russia, China, and North Korea continue to be the
main suppliers of ballistic missiles and related technology,
long-standing recipients--such as Iran--might become
suppliers in their own right as they develop domestic
production capabilities.
Iran is not just seeking missiles, but also biological, chemical, and
nuclear weapons. Iran is seeking dual-use technologies to further the
biological warfare program it began during the Iran-Iraq war. Iran also
wants to maintain a prohibited chemical weapons capability. According
to the January DCI report I just mentioned, Iran, despite its
commitment to give up chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons
Convention, ``has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons,
including blister, blood, and choking agents and the bombs and
artillery shells for delivering them.'' They have continued to ``seek
production technology, expertise, and chemicals that could be used as
precursor agents in its chemical warfare program from entities in
Russia and China.'' Finally, Iran wants a nuclear weapons capability.
According to the DCI: ``Iran sought nuclear-related equipment, material
and technical expertise from a variety of sources, especially in
Russia, during the first half of 1999.''
Importantly, Iran is seeking an indigenous capability. Their pursuit
of WMD and delivery systems has lead to a maturing indigenous
capability. This means that the window in which we can stop significant
proliferation to Iran is closing rapidly. This means that the time to
intervene is now.
Some have suggested that the recent elections in Iran should lead us
to pause our consideration of this bill. I disagree. First, to the
degree that the newly elected Iranian legislators seek to constrain
efforts to develop and deploy weapons of mass destruction, I believe
that this legislation will strengthen such an effort. It demonstrates
the seriousness with which the United States Congress views
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Second, existing evidence
indicates that we cannot count on the elections to bring an end to
Iran's national policy of developing weapons of mass destruction and
their means of delivery. It is important to underscore that former
President Rafsanjani, considered a moderate in Iranian political
circles, was the very leader who initiated Iran's pursuit of those
weapons. Indeed it was Rafsanjani who said that ``Chemical and
biological weapons are poor man's atomic bombs . . .'' After he became
Iran's President, he is quoted as saying: ``We should fully equip
ourselves in the defensive and offensive use of chemical,
bacteriological and radiological weapons.'' We cannot expect that Iran
will therefore give up its pursuit of these weapons on their own. This
bill will provide additional incentive for them to do so, and we will
watch carefully for evidence of such a decision, but at this point,
absent strong policy on our part, we must conclude that the policy of
acquiring these weapons and their means of delivery will continue.
The task of stemming proliferation to Iran is made more difficult
because individuals and the nations from which they proliferate have
their own strong motives for aiding Iran. For some individuals, the
motive is money. But why can't we simply rely on the governments in
which they operate to stop them? In some cases, governments are too
week to intervene. In others, the government looks the other way or
even promotes proliferation to Iran because their leaders welcome the
challenge an Iran with missiles and weapons of mass destruction poses
to the United States.
We need the tools to offset the benefits of aiding Iran. We must
ensure that there are financial and other costs associated with
supplying the assistance Iran still needs in its drive for weapons of
mass destruction and missiles.
H.R. 1883 gives the United States tools to attack proliferation on
the supply side.
The first tool is the light of exposure to scrutiny. H.R. 1883
requires the President to submit annual reports identifying every
person that, on or after January 1, 1999, transfers to Iran goods,
services or technology on existing control lists or items with the
potential to make a material contribution to Iran's development of
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or ballistic or cruise missile
systems. As a result, the Congress, the American people, and the
community of nations will know who is supporting Iran's efforts to
threaten peace and stability. We will shine a light on those lining
their bank accounts by selling the tools of hideous death and
unimaginable destruction to Iran. The threat of public exposure should
serve as a significant deterrent to those who contemplate proliferation
to Iran.
The second tool offered by H.R. 1883 is the authorization for the
President to deny perpetrators of proliferation access to some U.S.
trade. I highlight the word ``authorization.'' The sanctions provided
by H.R. 1883 are not mandatory and exceptions are granted.
These tools, properly employed, will help stem the tide of
proliferation to Iran. Are there costs? Yes. Some U.S. businesses may
be called upon by the President to refrain from commerce with
individuals that are shown to be materially aiding Iran's weapons of
mass destruction and missile programs. But such a potential cost seems
reasonable to me in light of the potentially far greater cost if we
fail to act--the lives of American men, women, and children.
I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 1883 in a
bipartisan way, as our House colleagues did when they voted to pass
H.R. 1883 by a vote of 419-zero.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, there are few in this body who have
worked harder on this issue than my friend from Connecticut, and it has
been a real pleasure to work with him on this legislation and on this
issue.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act is an important piece of legislation
which seeks to halt the flow of ballistic missile technology and other
weapons of mass destruction from Russia to Iran. I strongly support
Senate passage of this legislation.
Indeed, even as much of the U.S. focus in the past year--and rightly
so, in my mind--has been on the peace process and Israel's relations
with Syria and the Palestinians, there may be no greater long term
threat to Israel's security and Middle East peace than an Iran actively
seeking ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.
That is why I believe that preventing the transfer of illegal nuclear
and missile technology from Russia to Iran must be at the top of the
U.S. policy agenda.
As my colleagues are aware, there have been numerous reports over the
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past several years of Russian missile technology reaching Iran,
sometimes with a semi-official wink from government authorities in
Moscow, sometimes by rogue operators.
Either way, the Russian government must put a stop to these
transfers.
As much as we want good relations with Russia, cooperation in this
area is crucial. In some ways, I believe it is a litmus test of what
sort of player Russia wants to be in the post-Cold War international
system.
Although Russia has denied that any illegal transfers have taken
place, it has taken some tangible steps in response to American
concerns--such as the cancellation of a 1997 contract between a Russian
missile factory (NPO Trud) and Iran in which rocket engine components
were to have been shipped under the guise of gas pipeline compressors.
Unfortunately, despite such progress as cooperation with the NPO Trud
contract, since issuing an Executive Order in 1998, the United States
has been forced to sanction ten Russian entities for continuing to
transfer technology for the development of advanced ballistic missiles
and weapons of mass destruction, and the Central Intelligence Agency
reports that Russian entities continue to provide Iran with assistance.
Indeed, there are reportedly over 10,000 Russians in Iran helping Iran
with these programs.
For its part, and despite some positive signs of moderation in Iran's
politics--the recent elections notwithstanding--Iran has not yet
moderated any of its policies with regard to the support of
international terrorism or the pursuit of advanced ballistic missiles
and weapons of mass destruction.
Iran has flight-tested the Shihab-3, a missile that can hit Israel
and U.S. forces in the Middle East, and is continuing to work on other
advanced missile designs, including those capable of delivering nuclear
warheads.
Because of Russia's mixed record--and Iran's outright dangerous
record--I believe that although we should try to build on Russia's
record of cooperation, we must also be prepared to take tough action
when the situation warrants. In other words, we must be prepared to
work with Russia on this issue and offer them a carrot, but, if our
interests and those of our friends and allies are threatened, we must
also be prepared to use a stick.
To that end, last year I offered an amendment on the Department of
Defense authorization bill, passed by the Senate, which stated that it
is the sense of Congress that the U.S. should increase the quota on
commercial space launch services provided by Russia if the Russian
government demonstrates a sustained commitment to prevent the transfer
from Russia to Iran, or other countries, of nuclear and missile
technology.
I continue to believe that pending Russian cooperation this quota can
be raised to 20 and, if Russia continues to cooperate, incrementally
raised again in the coming years. Each launch provides Russia with
approximately $100 million in hard currency. A $100 million carrot is a
good incentive to cooperate.
The bill we consider before us today recognizes that in addition to
such carrots, we must also be prepared to take tough action when
necessary. The Iran Nonproliferation Act has two parts.
First, it requires the President to report credible information about
any foreign entity providing dangerous technologies to Iran and
authorize the President to sanction these entities in accordance with
the President's own Executive Order.
Second, it requires that the President must certify that the Russian
government opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to
Iran and is taking steps to oppose such proliferation before the
Russian Space Agency is provided with any additional U.S. taxpayer
money beyond what has contracted for the International Space Station.
These are funds which the U.S. is providing to Russia so that Russia
can meet its own obligations to the International Space Station. If
Russia and the Russian Space Agency cooperates with the U.S. on
proliferation, then cooperation between Russia and Iran on the
proliferation of advanced ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction must stop. If Russia and the Russian Space Agency
cooperates with the U.S. on proliferation, then I believe we can work
in partnership with them to increase commercial space launch and to
provide funding for the International Space Station.
But there are few things more dangerous or destabilizing to U.S.
interests and peace and security in the Middle East than a nuclear
armed Iran which continues to support international terrorism. And if
Russia does not recognize this and is not willing to work with the
United States to build a more stable and more secure Middle East, then
we must not shy away from taking the tough action necessary to get
results.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, for the past three years the Clinton
administration has fought tooth-and-nail against the legislation now
before the Senate. The White House repeatedly claimed, in its attempted
defense, that the Lott-Lieberman initiative would undermine U.S.
nonproliferation efforts, repeatedly asserting that they had Russia's
behavior in check, and that progress was being made.
Well, Mr. President, we now confront an Iran that has been armed to
the gills with technology for ballistic missiles and nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons. According to the National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, (who testified before the Foreign
Relations Committee this past September), Iran is in a position to
test, within the latter half of this decade, an ICBM that ``could
deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload to many parts of the United
States . . . using Russian technology and assistance.''
Moreover, according to the Director of Central Intelligence, Iran
``probably has achieved `emergency operational capability' '' with its
medium range Shahab-3 missile. In other words, under President
Clinton's watch, Iran has acquired from Russia and China the ability to
strike Israel and Turkey with ballistic missiles carrying chemical or
biological warheads. And the mullahs are working overtime to develop
the Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 in order to menace U.S. citizens at home.
In conclude now, in the absence of fierce opposition to this bill
from the White House this time around, that reality has finally sunk in
at the National Security Council. The Clinton administration's
nonproliferation policy has been an abject failure. Bill Clinton and Al
Gore will leave office having subordinated nonproliferation concerns to
business interests, the wishes to foreign campaign donors, and their
``touchy-feely'' personal politicking in Russia, China and elsewhere.
The result has been an all-out fire-sale of deadly technologies by
Russia, China, and others. Delegations from Iran, Syria, Iraq, North
Korea, Libya, Sudan, Egypt, India, and Pakistan are virtually tripping
over one another on their way in and out of various Russian and Chinese
firms.
The Clinton-Gore Administration will leave office:
1. having allowed Russia and China to sell dangerous commodities
around the globe with no fear of sanctions or consequences;
2. having presided over the development of a North Korean ICBM
capable of dropping biological weapons on U.S. soil (according to the
intelligence community, a Taepo Dong-2 ICBM could be tested any day
now);
3. having presided over the arming of Iran, Syria, and others with
nuclear, chemical, and biological missiles;
4. having squandered its inheritance regarding Iraq by interfering
with, and ultimately abandoning, UNSCOM;
5. having prompted India and Pakistan into an all-out nuclear arms
race by trying to ``strong-arm'' the two countries into the Test Ban
Treaty (which merely prompted the nations to test);
6. having lost all hope of getting the START II Treaty ratified,
which would have banned MIRVed ICBMs in Russia;
7. having imperiled the IAEA by tying the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty to the poorly-conceived, poorly-drafted CTBT, which the Senate
rightly rejected;
8. having destroyed the Missile Technology Control Regime by allowing
Russia (a missile proliferator) to come in as a member; and
9. having wasted half a decade of precious time in deploying a
national missile defense to protect the United States from the
consequences of their failed nonproliferation policy.
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We must all remember that the Clinton-Gore administration voted the
DoD authorization bill in 1995 because it required deployment of a
national missile defense by 2001, with additional protection by 2003.
Because of the President's reckless disregard for the nation's
security, the U.S. will not ``break ground'' on a missile defense site
in Alaska until this summer, at the earliest.
At the same time, this administration taught Russia and China how to
evade U.S. sanctions laws while simultaneously putting the U.S.
sanctions determination process into a deep freeze. Not a single MTCR
sanction has been imposed for Russia's arming of Iran or China's
assistance to Pakistan. The enormity of this blatant disregard for the
law is stunning, Mr. President.
What is worse, by promoting U.S. commercial interests at the expense
of national security, the Clinton-Gore administration has become part
of the problem.
China's nuclear proliferation has been swept under the rug by Mr.
Clinton in order to clear the way for the nuclear lobby to sell
reactors to the PRC. We must recall that, in 1998, President Clinton
made a legally binding certification which no other President could, in
good faith, bring himself to make. But the Clinton-Gore administration
was happy to oblige industry and the Communist Chinese.
In 1996 the Clinton administration pulled controls on commercial
satellites because millionaire campaign donors wanted it. Unsupervised,
unscrupulous U.S. companies engaged in the transfer of very sensitive
ballistic missile information to the PRC, including information
relating to the MIRVing of ICBMs. The Congress tried to shore up this
fiasco by recontrolling satellites, but the Commerce Department is at
it again, having recently declared--despite the law--that it wants
reduced controls on extremely sensitive items such as radiation
hardened chips and kick motors.
From 1993 until 1999, willful disregard for security at the White
House and the Department of Energy permitted continued acquisition of
the nation's most sensitive nuclear warhead designs by China. This was
exacerbated by the foolhardy declassification of thousands of documents
by Hazel O'Leary, which undoubtedly has contributed to nuclear weapons
capabilities around the globe. Even now, the Clinton-Gore
administration is contemplating sharing nuclear weapons secrets with
Russia in an effort to bribe them into submission on the ABM Treaty.
Lately, the Department of Defense--once the bulwark against the
foolhardy weakening of export controls--has been working ``hand-in-
glove'' with the defense industry and the Gore campaign. The Pentagon
is now looking for ways to undermine the Arms Export Control Act.
Again, this is happening because industry lobbying groups want these
changes. There is an effort underway to avoid congressional
notification of arms sales and to create license-free zones. The
result, if unchecked, will be unfettered and unregulated trade in
weaponry, which cannot be seen as a positive development under any
circumstance.
Finally, the administration has decided to support passively an
Export Administration Act which would effectively undermine all
existing U.S. export controls and which would undercut what is left of
the nonproliferation policy which this administration inherited eight
years ago. Enormous sums of money are being spent all over Washington
by various industry groups because they know how loose export controls
will be under this bill.
Ronald Reagan's nonproliferation policy is in shambles, Mr.
President. At best, this administration has been inept in managing such
important issues. At worst, the administration has co-opted and
corrupted nonproliferation policy on the basis of fund-raising schemes
being run out of the Oval Office. The damage to U.S. nonproliferation
policy is so severe and far-reaching, and the global results to date
have been so catastrophic, that the next administration is going to
spend the first four years just picking up the pieces.
Mr. President, history will do worse than recording this
administration as having fiddled while Rome burned. It will record
these people as having set many of the fires themselves.
I support the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Its reporting requirements
will shed light on the fact that numerous Russian entities have sold
their souls to the Mullahs in Tehran by offering that bunch of
terrorists everything they want for their ballistic and cruise missile
programs, including nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare
technology. It will also prove that this administration has
accomplished nothing in the past several years of ``talking.''
That said, however much it might help, this bill will not solve the
problem. It is much too late to prevent Iran from capitalizing upon the
capabilities it has acquired.
While it is not too late to defend ourselves, or to assist Israel,
Turkey, and others in defending themselves, it will fall to the next
administration to reconstruct a comprehensive nonproliferation policy
and reverse the fearful effects of the past eight years.
Thank you, Mr. President; I yield the floor.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems continues to be one
of the most significant threats to America's national security. States
like North Korea and Iran are actively pursuing ambitious programs and
the technology needed to threaten the United States. Unclassified
reports from our intelligence agencies indicate that these efforts have
intensified.
Iranian ballistic missile progress is largely the result of
substantial assistance from North Korea, China, and especially, Russia.
There is no doubt that foreign technology and assistance are essential
to Iran's ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs.
The U.S. intelligence community's most recent unclassified Semiannual
Report to Congress on Proliferation states, ``Iran remains one of the
most active countries seeking to acquire WMD [weapons of mass
destruction] and ACW [advanced conventional weapons] technology from
abroad.''
The type of foreign assistance that is the subject of this
legislation serves to increase the sophistication and rate of
development of Iran's ballistic missiles. We must do more than we are
doing now to impede its progress and, at the same time, prepare
defenses against the use of such weapons.
The rapid development of the Shahab-3 demonstrates how foreign
assistance accelerated Iran's ballistic missile programs. The Shahab-3
is based on the North Korean Nodong ballistic missile. But instead of
simply purchasing the missile as Pakistan did, Iran chose to modify the
design of the missile with Russian and Chinese assistance and produce
the missile on its own. In February 1997, George Tenet, then Acting
Director of the CIA, testified that with North Korean assistance, Iran
could develop the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, ``in less
than ten years.'' Less than a year later, in January 1998, Director
Tenet testified, ``Iran's success in gaining technology and material
from Russian companies, combined with recent indigenous Iranian
advances, means that [Iran] could have a medium-range ballistic missile
much sooner than I assessed last year.'' Six months later, in July
1998, Iran flight-tested the Shahab-3. An unclassified Intelligence
Community report released in January of this year assessed that Iran
has achieved an ``emergency operational capability'' with the Shahab-3.
Proliferation to Iran continues. According to the U.S. intelligence
community's most recent unclassified Semiannual Report
on Proliferation, summarizing proliferation that occurred in the first
half of 1999,
Russian entities during the first six months of 1999 have
provided substantial missile-related technology, training,
and expertise to Iran that almost certainly will continue to
accelerate Iranian efforts to build new indigenous ballistic
missiles.
* * * * *
During the reporting period, firms in China provided
missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to
several countries of proliferation concern--such as Iran.
* * * * *
Throughout the first half of 1999, North Korea continued to
export ballistic missiles-related equipment and missile
components, materials and technical expertise to countries in
the Middle East . . .
This report to Congress also states, ``. . . economic conditions in
Russia continued to deteriorate, putting more pressure on Russian
entities to circumvent export controls. Despite some
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examples of restraint, Russian businesses continue to be major
suppliers of WMD equipment, materials, and technology to Iran.''
Because Russian government officials continue to show an
unwillingness or inability to stop this dangerous assistance to Iran,
the legislation we are considering should be passed to authorize and
direct more effective sanctions.
North Korea's continuing relationship with Iran is also of great
concern. Iran has already received sufficient technology from North
Korea to build a copycat three-stage Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile on
its own. Moreover, senior Intelligence Community officials have
testified that they expect North Korea to continue to sell ballistic
missiles to Iran. Therefore, we must expect Iran to acquire the
technology for the longer-range Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missile when
North Korea begins its export. It is too optimistic, given the North
Korea-Iran ballistic missile relationship, to expect Iran's
capabilities to lag North Korea's for very long.
There are several significant consequences of the continued
proliferation of ballistic missile technology to Iran. I'll mention
two.
First, this assistance will allow Iran to develop more advanced
ballistic missiles faster, cheaper, and easier than it otherwise would
have on its own. Iran's defense minister has announced that it is
working on the more advanced Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 missiles, and the
Iranians even claim that they are going to launch a satellite into
orbit by the second half of 2001. According to press reports, Iran's
Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 ballistic missiles will use Russian engine
technology, leading to an Iranian ICBM based in large part on Russian
technology. Diminishing this proliferation is essential to slowing
Iran's long-range ballistic missile program.
Second, Iran is bound to become a supplier of ballistic missile
technology and expertise as its own program proceeds. CIA Director
Tenet recently made this point, testifying that, ``Iran's existence as
a secondary supplier of this technology to other countries is the trend
that worries me the most.'' We are already seeing indications that Iran
is no longer merely a recipient of ballistic missile technology.
According to unclassified intelligence community reports, Iran is
assisting Libya's ballistic missile programs. Press reports also
indicate Iran is helping Syria and others develop or acquire ballistic
missiles.
The legislation before the Senate will improve our efforts to
restrain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missile technology to Iran. I urge its approval.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I had a number of concerns with this bill,
as it was approved by the House. I am pleased that we have been able to
reach agreement on an amendment that addresses many of these concerns.
The managers' amendment would make it clear that the application of
sanctions under section 3 of the bill is discretionary, not mandatory.
It would also urge the executive branch to provide notice to persons
who may be subject to sanctions under this provision, giving them an
opportunity to provide explanatory or exculpatory information before
such sanctions are provided.
I had planned on offering several amendments to this bill when it
came to the floor, but because of the adoption of this amendment, I
shall not do so. I would also like to clarify a few points with the
chief Senate sponsors of the bill.
First, the bill requires reporting of foreign persons when there is
``credible information'' indicating that the person transferred
specified goods, services, or technologies to Iran. I understand that
it is the intent of the sponsors that the President judge the
credibility of information on the basis of all information available to
him, including both information that supports and information that
undermines the conclusion that a covered transfer may have taken
places. In other words, ``credible information'' is information that
would lead a reasonable person to conlcude--after consideration of all
the available evidence--that there is a substantial possibility that a
covered transfer took place. Is that correct?
Mr. LOTT. I agree. That understanding is consistent with the intent
of the House, which defined ``credible information'' as such in its
report.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I agree.
Mr. LEVIN. The second point that I would like to address is the use
of the word ``timely'' in the managers' amendment. It is my
understanding that the intent is that, whenever appropriate, the
President provide notice to foreign persons, or to the government with
primarily jurisdiction over such persons, in a manner that provides
them a reasonable opportunity to provide explanatory or exculpatory
information before sanctions are imposed. Do the lead sponsors agree
with this view?
Mr. LOTT. I agree.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I agree.
Mr. LEVIN. Finally, I would like to address section 6 of the bill,
which requires a determination by the President that, among other
things, the Government of Russia has demonstrated a sustained
commitment to seek out and prevent the transfer to Iran of goods,
services and technology that ``could'' make a material contribution to
the development of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or of
ballistic or cruise missile systems. It is my understanding that the
use of the word ``could'' in this provision is not intended to go
beyond other nonproliferation requirements or require the President to
consider remote or absurdly hypothetical circumstances. Is that
correct?
Mr. LOTT. That is correct. The use of the term ``could'' is meant to
convey an expectation that commodities should be controlled and
monitored because of their potential for contributing to nuclear,
chemical, or biological warfare programs, or to ballistic or cruise
missile development. That is to say, this section covers commodities
which should be controlled because of their physical or technological
properties. This standard is consistent with current United States
export control practice and with various statutory nonproliferation
reporting requirements.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I agree.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Iran
Nonproliferation Act. For the past few years, I have been concerned
about Iran's efforts to acquire the technology for ballistic missiles
and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons from Russia and China.
When reports began to surface in 1997 about Russian missile
assistance to Iran, I met twice with Russia's Ambassador to the U.S.
and the administration's special envoy on this issue to express my
concern about this dangerous trade and to urge the Russian government
and the Clinton Administration to take steps to stop it.
I also gathered together a group of 99 Members of the House and
Senate, who wrote to the President to urge him to invoke sanctions to
halt this trade. The President refused.
Along with a bipartisan group of House and Senate Members, I went to
the White House to meet with Vice President Gore to urge the
administration to take concrete actions to end Russian transfers to
Iran. Again the administration refused, citing the need to let
diplomacy work.
That summer, I successfully offered an amendment that was adopted by
unanimous consent to the fiscal year 1998 Foreign Operations
Appropriations bill barring U.S. aid to Russia if missile assistance to
Iran continued. In conference, the amendment was changed to give the
President the ability to waive this prohibition on aid to Russia, which
he subsequently did.
In November 1997, the Senate unanimously passed a concurrent
resolution that I sponsored, expressing the sense of the Congress that
the President should sanction the Russian organizations involved in
selling missile technology to Iran. The House also passed this
resolution overwhelmingly by a vote of 414 to 8. Again the President
refused to impose sanctions.
The Congress tried again to spur the administration to action 6
months later when we passed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions
Act mandating sanctions on any organization involved in assisting
Iran's missile or weapons of mass destruction programs. This bill
passed the Senate by a vote of 90 to 4. Yet, when it reached the
President's desk, he vetoed it.
Instead of voting to override this veto, the Congress acceded to the
President's request for more time to
[[Page S668]]
let diplomacy work. The verdict is in on that decision. Transfers of
nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile technology to Iran
persist demonstrating the Congress erred in deciding not to override
the veto. While the administration has imposed so-called administrative
sanctions against a handful of Russian entities, it cooperated with the
Russian government to identify the target organizations such that the
sanctions would have no meaningful effect, completely undermining the
value of the action.
While I will not go into the same detail here, let me simply say the
administration has a similar record on Chinese proliferation to Iran,
where it has failed to enforce U.S. laws calling for sanctions, again
noting the need to let diplomacy work.
Since the administration would not take steps to halt proliferation
to Iran, I offered an amendment to a supplemental appropriations bill
that the President signed into law in May 1998. The amendment
appropriated $179 million to accelerate the development of U.S. theater
missile defenses, including $45 million for Israel to begin purchasing
equipment for a third battery of its Arrow missile defense system in
order to counter the increased Iranian missile threat.
As these examples show, the Clinton Administration is simply not
willing to take the tough actions necessary to prevent proliferation.
As a result, intelligence assessments indicate the problem is growing
worse all the time. In an unclassified report to Congress last month,
CIA Director George Tenet stated;
Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to
acquire weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional
weapons technology from abroad. . . . For the first half of
1999, entities in Russia and China continued to supply a
considerable amount and a wide variety of ballistic missile-
related goods and technology to Iran. . . . Iran already is
producing Scud short-range ballistic missiles and has built
and publicly displayed prototypes for the [1,300 kilometer-
range] Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, which had its
initial flight test in July 1998 and probably achieved
``emergency operational capability''--i.e., Tehran could
deploy a limited number of the Shahab-3 prototype missiles in
an operational mode during a perceived crisis situation. In
addition, Iran's Defense Minister last year publicly
acknowledged the development of the [2,000 kilometer range]
Shahab-4 . . . [and] publicly mentioned plans for a ``Shahab-
5.''
In the report, Director Tenet went on to note that Iran continues to
seek biological warfare technology from Russia and Europe and despite
being a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention has ``already has
manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons . . . and the bombs and
artillery shells for delivering them.'' He also said that ``Tehran
continues to seek production technology, expertise, and chemicals that
could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare program from
entities in Russia and China.''
Finally, the report indicated that despite promising never to acquire
nuclear weapons, when it ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), Iran has a nuclear weapons program, stating:
Iran is attempting to establish a complete nuclear fuel
cycle for its civilian energy program. In that guise, it
seeks to obtain whole facilities . . . that in fact could be
used in any number of ways in support of efforts to produce
fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon. Despite
international efforts to curtail the flow of critical
technologies and equipment, Tehran continues to seek fissile
material and technology for weapons development and has set
up an elaborate system of military and civilian organization
to support its effort.
In fact, according to the Washington Post, the CIA recently concluded
that it could no longer rule out the possibility that Iran is already
capable of producing a nuclear weapon. This is terribly troubling in
light of the progress Iran has made in its missile program. Earlier
this month, Director Tenet testified to the Intelligence Committee
that:
Most [intelligence] analysts believe that Iran, following
the North Korean pattern, could test an ICBM capable of
delivering a light payload to the United States in the next
few years. . . . As alarming as the long-range missile threat
is, it should not overshadow the immediacy and seriousness of
the threat that U.S. forces, interests, and allies already
face overseas from short and medium range missiles. The
proliferation of medium-range ballistic missiles [to nations
like Iran] is significantly altering strategic balances in
the Middle East and Asia.
Finally, Director Tenet outlined a new type of proliferation threat
from Iran in his testimony, warning that:
. . . long-standing recipients--such as Iran--might become
suppliers in their own right as they develop domestic
production capabilities. . . . Iran in the next few years may
be able to supply not only complete Scuds, but also Shahab-3s
and related technology, and perhaps more advanced
technologies if Tehran continues to receive assistance from
Russia, China, and North Korea.
It is clear that meaningful measures, and not simply another round of
feckless diplomacy or a flawed international treaty such as the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT, is needed to combat this growing
threat. Last Fall, the Administration accused the Congress of
undermining U.S. nonproliferation efforts in rejecting the CTBT. But
that treaty was unverifiable, would have undermined America's nuclear
deterrent, and would have done nothing meaningful to combat
proliferation.
As I mentioned earlier, Iran along with 191 other nations has
ratified the NPT, and thereby promised never to acquire nuclear
weapons. It is violating this treaty. It is also violating the Chemical
Weapons Convention and is acquiring missile technology. All of these
actions should trigger U.S. sanctions, but the Clinton Administration
has refused to take action.
If arms control treaties like the NPT and other nonproliferation
efforts are to be useful, they must be enforced. I urge the
administration to finally get serious about this matter and for my
colleagues to vote for the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Iran's possession
of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and the missiles used to
deliver them poses a clear and present danger to the United States and
our forces and friends in the region. It is long past time that we
address this threat.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in
morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________