Congressional Record, Volume 146 Issue 10 (Tuesday, February 8, 2000)

[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 10 (Tuesday, February 8, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S469-S477]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1999--Continued

CLOTURE MOTION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Chair lays
before the Senate the pending cloture motion, which the clerk will
state.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Cloture Motion

We the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the provisions of
rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby move to bring
to a close debate on the pending amendment to S. 1287, the Nuclear
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1999:
Trent Lott, Frank H. Murkowski, Slade Gorton, Don
Nickles, Tim Hutchinson, Conrad Burns, Michael Crapo,
Phil Gramm, Thad Cochran, Richard Shelby, Larry E.
Craig, Jim Bunning, Judd Gregg, Charles Grassley, Wayne
Allard, and Bob Smith of New Hampshire.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the quorum call has been
waived.
The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on
substitute amendment No. 2808 to S. 1287, a bill to provide for the
storage of spent nuclear fuel pending completion of the nuclear

[[Page S470]]

waste repository, and for other purposes, shall be brought to a close?
The yeas and nays are required under the rule.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) is
necessarily absent.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr.
Kennedy) and the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. Kerrey) are necessarily
absent.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from
Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy) would vote ``aye.''
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 94, nays 3, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 7 Leg.]

YEAS--94

Abraham
Akaka
Allard
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Breaux
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee, L.
Cleland
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McConnell
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Nickles
Reed
Robb
Roberts
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Torricelli
Voinovich
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden

NAYS--3

Boxer
Bryan
Reid

NOT VOTING--3

Kennedy
Kerrey
McCain
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 94, the nays are 3.
Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn having voted in the
affirmative, the motion is agreed to.
The Senator from Alaska.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I believe the Senator from Arkansas is
going to request unanimous consent there be a few minutes in morning
business so he can introduce a bill. I will be happy to accommodate him
if there is no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for
up to 10 minutes as in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. I thank the Chair.
(The remarks of Mr. Hutchinson pertaining to the introduction of S.
2039 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced
Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). The Senator from Alaska.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, it is my intention to continue the
debate on the manager's amendment to S. 1287, the Nuclear Policy Act
Amendments of 1999. It is appropriate to highlight a couple more charts
before I explain what this manager's substitute does.
I will reiterate the purpose of addressing the responsibility we have
as the Senate to resolve what we are going to do to dispose of this
high-level waste in conformance with the contractual commitment that
the Department of Energy and the Federal Government entered into to
take the waste beginning in January of 1998.
As I indicated earlier today, the Federal Government is derelict in
not meeting its fiduciary responsibility. It is appropriate to point
out that the ratepayers in this country have paid $15 billion to the
Federal Government to take that waste beginning in 1998. Damages for
nonperformance to the contractual commitment by the power industry in
this country against the Federal Government suggests the liability is
somewhere between $40 billion and $80 billion. The longer this body
delays in addressing its responsibility of disposal of this waste, the
greater the obligation to the American taxpayer, which currently is
estimated to be about $1,400 per family.
As a consequence, we have the responsibility, in a bipartisan manner,
to come together and resolve the obligation we were elected to address,
and that is to meet contractual commitments, honor the sanctity of the
contract, and resolve the waste problem and not allow the nuclear
industry to, basically, choke on its own waste.
There are a couple of charts with which I want to proceed. First of
all, I want to identify, again, the locations of the waste for those
who may have missed it earlier. Around this country, there are
approximately 80 sites. One can see the sites on the map: the
commercial reactors, the shut down reactors with spent fuel onsite; and
they will not be removed unless we proceed with this legislation to
address one site at Yucca Mountain in Nevada for a permanent
repository. It also includes the commercial spent nuclear fuel storage,
the non-DOE research reactor, the naval reactors, and the DOE-owned
spent nuclear fuel. My point is simply to show we have 80 sites in 40
States. It is an obligation we have to universally address this with
appropriate resolve.
The next chart shows radiation exposure. This is very important and
very germane to the debate because we are all concerned about the
manner in which the radiation exposure will be addressed and by what
agency.
I am not here to promulgate who has the best science, but I think it
is fair to say this issue deserves the very best science.
Traditionally, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission addresses licensing,
examination, and conformance of nuclear plants. They are pretty good at
it. They probably have more Ph.D.s than any other agency dealing with
nuclear radiation.
However, the National Academy of Sciences also has a great deal of
expertise, and we are suggesting that their scientific contribution be
part of a determination on setting a radiation level that will conform
to, as well as achieve, our objective, and that is to put the waste in
a permanent repository at Yucca Mountain.
There is a lot of concern about radiation. I think it has to be put
in some perspective that is understandable.
For those working in this Capitol, they get 80 millirems of exposure
each year.
If one is living in a brick house, they get 70 millirems per year.
The exposure from cosmic radiation to residents in Denver is 53
millirems.
The average annual radiation exposure from the ground is 26
millirems.
Diagnostic x-rays are 20 millirems.
Dental x-rays are 14 millirems.
If one flies from New York to Los Angeles, they get 6 millirems.
Exposure for half an hour from a transport container on a truck 6
feet away--let's assume they are moving this in a prescribed cask,
transporting it by rail or by highway with an escort--the exposure is 5
millirems.
These are accurate measurements. The EPA's proposed radiation
exposure level is 4 millirems, and that is a ground water standard.
I am not going to argue the merits of EPA other than to say that
their exposure level, from the standpoint of its relationship with
these other exposure levels, seems a little out of line. We will let it
go at that because I want to move on. I want to make the point, as we
look at radiation exposure levels, it is important to keep in
perspective what we are exposed to already.
Let's look at transportation because that is going to be debated
extensively. We have been transporting used fuel from 1964 through
1997, as this chart shows. These are the routes used for 2,913
shipments. Obviously, they have been going through all the States. They
have been going by railroad through Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, a
portion of Nebraska, I believe Missouri, and a couple of other States,
as indicated in red. We are and have been moving these shipments. The
significance of this is that the public health has never been exposed
to radiation from spent fuel cargo. We have never had an exposure. That
does not mean it cannot happen; it means we have taken practical
safeguards to ensure the exposure is at a minimum.

I learned a long time ago in my State of Alaska when we had the Exxon
Valdez accident that these accidents can occur. That ship went aground
in a 10.5-mile-wide channel simply because

[[Page S471]]

of the incompetence of those on the bridge. You can have accidents, and
you can prevent them.
We have a pretty good record here. Between 1971 and 1989, the
Department of Transportation tells us there have been seven minor
accidents that have occurred involving nuclear waste, but no
radioactivity was released at any of the accident sites simply because
of the containment of the vehicles that enclose the waste. Those, of
course, are the canisters which are built to withstand exposure. Some
time ago when we were talking about moving nuclear waste by aircraft,
there was the assurance that we have the technology to build a canister
that would survive a free-fall from an aircraft at 30,000 feet.
As evidence of the thousands of safe used-fuel shipments since 1964,
this is the type of cask that is used, and the waste is stored in that.
These are required to survive a 30-foot drop onto a flat, unyielding
surface, a drop of 40 inches on a steel plate, being engulfed in a
1,475-degree fire for 30 minutes, submersion under 3 feet of water for
8 hours, and on and on. We have taken safeguards to construct these
casks in such a way as to ensure there is a minimum of risk associated
with transportation.
I have been to Great Britain, Sweden, and I have seen in France the
manner in which they move high-level waste. They move it by ship, by
rail, by road, and they take safeguards to ensure that it is properly
contained.
We have transportation safety concerns. We have provisions in this
bill to deal with them. It involves the Department of Energy developing
comprehensive shipping and transportation plans under the same
guidelines as we currently move the WIPP. That is the waste isolation
project in New Mexico. These are the same guidelines we are going to be
using to move this waste.
We have been moving waste to New Mexico. That is basically low-level
waste. I have been there and been in the salt caverns and observed the
process down there. There is great care taken to ensure there is no
exposure that cannot be rectified through adequate engineering
technology.
The used fuel is going to have to travel as designated by the States,
they having a determination of what the most appropriate route is.
Clearly, the material has to move; otherwise, you cannot get it out of
the States--280 sites and 40 States--and you cannot move it to one area
that we have predesignated, which is Yucca Mountain in Nevada.
Then we are going to have training which would meet Department of
Transportation standards so that we have people who are adequately
trained to move this waste and cover whatever emergency response
readiness is necessary before the shipments begin.
So what we have done--perhaps we can do more and perhaps we should
and I certainly am open to that--is taken every precaution to try to
ensure the exposure is taken out of the process.
Let me show you a couple other charts that I think are relevant. For
those of you who missed it, this is the location out in the Nevada Test
Site that has been chosen to be the permanent repository. This site has
been already pretty well bombarded as a consequence of over 50 years
and 800 nuclear weapons tests. If you buy the theory that you kind of
desecrated one area so maybe that is the best area for a permanent
repository, this site should certainly fit.
Let me show you one other chart that shows another aspect. As I have
indicated earlier, about 20 percent of our energy comes from nuclear
power. You see on the chart, shown in red, nuclear power accounts for
18 percent of our energy use in the country. In any event, this chart
shows the mix: Coal is 53 percent; nuclear is 18 to 20 percent; natural
gas is 14 percent; hydroelectric is 10 percent; other is 2.7 percent;
oil is 2 percent; wind is .08 percent; and solar is .02 percent.
It is obvious we are going to be dependent on these sources for some
time. If we do not address the nuclear waste issue, we are going to
pick up 20 percent of our power generation some other way. I think
those who are critical of the effort to address our responsibility are
a bit irresponsible in not suggesting where we are going to pick up
this differential.
On this next chart we look at air quality. If we look at our concern
over global warming, if we look at our concern over Kyoto, we have to
recognize that there is significant avoidance of emissions by the
contribution of nuclear power. You can see shown on this chart the
regions that were subject to caps from 1990 to 1995 and the emissions
avoided by having nuclear generation and where these States would be
without it.
It is a pretty tough set of facts. The reality is, a good portion of
the Northeast corridor would no longer meet its mandate for emission
reductions if, indeed, we had to sacrifice the nuclear power industry.
Approximately 80 of the 103 currently operating nuclear energy plants
are located in or adjacent to areas that are unable to meet the Clean
Air Act standards for ozone. Any use of emitting generation in these
areas in place of the existing nuclear capacity moves the region
further away from attainment of these standards. So I encourage my
colleagues from these States to recognize that the nuclear power
industry makes a significant contribution, and without it you are going
to be looking to some other unidentifiable means to offset the loss of
power from the nuclear industry.

Let me turn to the substitute that is before us and briefly reflect
on where we have been. We have passed bills in this body by a broad
bipartisan margin. The last time the vote was 65 to 34--pretty close to
overcoming a veto but not quite.
I think these bills mark a historic pattern of trying to meet the
objectives of the administration through compromise, through changes,
and through accommodations. Those bills were a complete substitute for
the existing Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 that gave authority to
build an interim storage facility for nuclear waste, a temporary above-
ground storage pad adjacent to the Yucca Mountain site. It contained
extensive provisions on licensing for Yucca Mountain and the interim
storage facility, including NEPA radiation protection standards and
transportation safety. But the administration was not satisfied. They
saw fit to veto the legislation because it opposed the interim storage
before the viability assessment was made about the permanent
repository.
We still think we were doing the responsible thing by trying to
address the difficulty of those plants that were about out of license
time and would either have to shut down or seek additional relief under
State licensing by allowing them to move their waste and store it at
Yucca Mountain until such time as a permanent repository was completed.
Obviously, there was a fear from Nevada that if that were adopted,
the waste would end up in Nevada. Of course, today we are faced with
the concerns of various Governors that if we adopt the take-title
issue, and title is indeed taken, the waste will go into canisters and
be stored onsite in those States, the Government would have title and
the waste would still be in the States, that it would not move.
The point is that we are either committed as a body to resolve this
problem and get on with addressing the transportation of that waste to
a permanent repository, or we are going to be faced with the reality
that we will simply put it off for another day, put it off for another
administration. If we do that, I think we are acting irresponsibly.
What we have attempted to do in this bill is a different approach in
the manager's amendment. It is not a complete substitute for the old
act. It is a minimalist approach. It does not contain an interim
storage provision. So we responded to the administration. We responded
to the minority. We left that out. We said: It doesn't move until it is
licensed.
We propose to do two major things. We propose to give the Department
of Energy the tools it needs to meet its commitment to move the spent
fuel by opening a permanent repository at Yucca Mountain. Secondly, we
think it provides fair treatment by permitting utilities to enter into
voluntary settlements with those who have fulfilled their end of the
bargain by paying over some $15 billion which the ratepayers have paid
over the contract.
What has the Department of Energy done? It left them holding the
bag because the Department of Energy and the administration have not
seen fit to lift the terms of the contractual agreement to take the
waste. So the manager's amendment to S. 1287 clarifies

[[Page S472]]

the existing unconstitutional White House veto for raising the fee and
states that Congress can vote to raise the existing 1 million per
kilowatt fee, if necessary, to pay the expenses of the program. It
allows plaintiffs in the lawsuits and the DOE to reach voluntary
settlements of the Department of Energy's liability for failing to take
the waste in 1998.

I still have to refer to the example the Federal Government sets when
it doesn't honor the sanctity of a contractual commitment. They simply
ignore it. They simply ignore the liability of the taxpayer, which, as
I have indicated, is something in the area of $40 billion to $80
billion in damages. We, as elected representatives, have an obligation
to address and correct that. That is what we are attempting to do in
this legislation.
Further, it permits the EPA to continue with its rulemaking--and it
is the appropriate agency--on radiation standards as long as we have
the best science. Where is the best science? As I have indicated, it is
in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in consultation with the National
Academy of Sciences. That is the best science we have in this country.
If that isn't good enough to set a radiation standard, I don't know
what is.
Obviously, that standard will protect the public health and safety
and the environment, but it has to be attainable. If the EPA has a
policy of nonattainment that we come up with ultimately, we will waste
a lot of time and money, and it will cost the taxpayers a lot of
dollars. It will allow fuel to be accepted when the NRC authorizes
construction of the permanent repository in the year 2007. Further, it
allows the Department of Energy to begin moving fuel as soon as
possible after Yucca Mountain is licensed.
Transportation provisions are based on those used for the waste
isolation plan, as I have indicated. Furthermore, we have moved that
fuel in the United States around the world. So S. 1287 builds on
existing safe systems by adding money for education, emergency
response, local communities, transportation personnel, and provisions
for allowing the State to determine the routes and rules for population
areas. Who is better qualified than the States? Also, there is advance
notification for local government.
As I have indicated, we have attempted to compromise, and we continue
to try to meet the concerns of the administration and the minority. But
in order to do that, we have to agree on our objective, and that is to
meet our obligation to address, once and for all, some finality to the
nuclear waste storage dilemma. We have eliminated the source of the
administration's opposition to our previous bills on interim storage.
EPA, secondly, may proceed with its rulemaking. All they have to do--
all we want them to do--is be reasonable in the sense of using sound
science and participating in peer review with both NRC and the National
Academy of Sciences. And in this existing proposal, we have allowed the
utilities to enter into a voluntary settlement with the DOE. This was
the idea of Secretary Richardson.
The manager's amendment to S. 1287 gives us an opportunity, I think,
for a triumph of substance over process, safety of people over
politics. As I have indicated, the Senate has twice passed this
legislation by large, bipartisan margins.

Where does the administration stand on this? Well, I have a letter
from the administration called ``statement of policy.'' I think it
should be ``statement of administrative mixed policy.'' It states that
the administration has reviewed the February 4 manager's amendment and
they find it unacceptable. Although the amendment appears to allow the
EPA to exercise its existing authority, they still believe it would
allow another entity to block EPA's authority. I don't know whether
they have read the bill or not, but that isn't what the bill says.
Consequently, one can only assume the administration is opposed to it
because it always has been, regardless of what we have attempted to
compromise. Furthermore, I think it is appropriate to recognize that.
Again, the administration seems to be working to create a problem
that really we can address. The rationale is, I assume, only that they
could object to the legislation. That really isn't an adequate excuse.
I encourage my friends who have the same responsibility as I do to
recognize that the administration has an obligation to come forward and
say how we can meet this obligation collectively, the Congress and the
administration.
The administration, as I indicated, basically objects to a provision
that requires EPA to consult with scientists before adopting a
standard. What is wrong with the best science? The administration talks
about good science and making decisions based on sound science. In
fact, the administration's position on science is that it is good. But
I wonder if it is good only when it supports a predetermined policy
decision.
That is kind of where I think we are. I think that is unreasonable. I
think that is irresponsible. I think it deserves a greater explanation
than the one offered. The only reason for the administration to object
to having EPA consult with scientists at the National Academy of
Sciences, or with the participation of the NRC, is that they know it is
possible to adopt a reasonable standard but they simply don't want to
do it. I have a hard time with that because I think that in itself is
somewhat irresponsible.
I have some other examples that concern me. I will not take the time
now, but maybe I will later. The EPA is an extraordinary agency. They
carry a big responsibility, but one questions the balance they use. I
am going to cite a couple of instances with which I have had personal
experience, and I invite my colleagues to share those. As we question
the legitimate authority of the EPA, which is statute--that is in law--
EPA does have authority for final rulemaking; we just want them to use
the best science available.
In my hometown of Fairbanks, it snows. With snow, you have one of two
options: You either leave it there or you move it. Several years ago,
they had a heavy snowfall where the city and school buses park. This
was a paved lot. They moved the snow off the lot. The buses cooperated
and they put it on the back lot, which was determined by EPA to be a
wetlands. Well, the EPA notified the city of a violation of the
wetlands permit. Now, there was snow that came naturally on that other
lot where they pushed the snow. It makes no sense. The snow was frozen
water. How can wetlands be damaged by more snow? I don't know.
We had a problem in Anchorage, AK. This was a storm water treatment:
when it rains, the rain goes off the highway into the gutters. In the
particular community of Anchorage, it was charged into Cook Inlet; this
is water off the streets. Cook Inlet has some of the highest tides in
the world, next to the Bay of Fundy, nearly 30 feet, almost twice a
day.
However, EPA Clean Water Act regulations interpreted that the city
was in violation because it had to remove 30 percent of the organic
matter from the untreated water. The problem was it was rain water.
There was no organic matter to remove. Yet they were still in
violation. But the water was too clean to begin with. The city appealed
to the EPA. The EPA denied the appeal and told the city they were
subject to a fine. One of the city council members suggested they go
down to the fish plant and add some fish guts to the drain water so
there would be some organic matter to remove and thus meet the national
discharge standard. This got notoriety all over the country. It made no
sense to pay to contaminate pure rain water and then pay to remove the
contamination. We were finally able to convince them as a consequence
of public opinion and public notoriety of the impracticality of EPA.
In this instance, I have one more little item that I will share with
you. In 1993, the EPA proposed to take pepper spray bear repellent off
the market until its safety could be certified. The spray was at that
time the only effective nonlethal repellent that Alaskans could use to
protect themselves against bears. I say nonlethal. You can take a gun
or you can take some pepper spray. While the EPA reconsidered the
decision and allowed the pepper spray repellent to remain while it
permitted a speeded up regulatory review, the preliminary decision to
recall the spray was idiotic, to say the least. Alaskans or anyone who
wants to can put cayenne pepper in their chili. They could

[[Page S473]]

legally throw the pepper at a charging bear, if they wanted to. It was
insane to say that could not be placed within the spray can; namely,
the chili spray.
What was really insane was that EPA initially argued they couldn't
speed up registration of the pepper spray until it was field tested and
on, do you know what? Wild bears--a difficult and rather dangerous
thing to do. It was especially odd that the bear undoubtedly would much
rather be sprayed by the pepper spray than the alternative 30.06
bullet.
I have recycling asthma inhalant examples, vehicle gasoline rules,
ozone standards, background contamination on MTBE, battery enterprise
examples, mining examples, and recycling center examples.
I am not going to bore my colleagues with that other than to say what
we want is the best science. We want EPA to take advantage of that
science and then come down with their rulemaking. But very
particularly, we don't want EPA to set an attainment standard that is
unattainable for the nuclear waste to be disposed of.
I know my friends want to be heard from, and there will be amendments
forthcoming. But I want to conclude with a reference on what we can do.
Again, I point out that it is the obligation of the Government--that
includes those of us in the Congress and the administration--to solve
this problem. This bill is the congressional solution, and the
administration has an obligation as well.
We voted out this legislation in the last two Congresses by
bipartisan votes--65 to 34 in the Senate, and in the House of
Representatives 307 to 120--again, not enough to override a veto.
This year, we introduced the interim storage legislation, S. 608. The
legislation had votes to be favorably reported. I proposed that the
committee consider a new approach to accommodate the Secretary and the
administration. We hoped to find a solution to the nuclear waste
dilemma to gain full consensus and avoid procedural problems of the
past. Senate bill 1287 was approved in the committee by a bipartisan
vote of 14-6.

Here are the five essential points that I believe have to be
addressed if we are going to have anything meaningful when we are
through.
We need congressional approval before there is any increase in the
nuclear waste figure. We simply cannot give the executive branch carte
blanche. It has to have congressional approval; second, authorize
settlement of lawsuits for DOE's failure to perform; third, the
radiation protection standards, as I stated, for the repository to be
set by the agencies that have the expertise--the NRC, National Academy
of Sciences working with the EPA.
I compromised on this point in my manager's amendment. The EPA may
now go ahead with its standard-setting regulations provided that they
take advantage of the best science available, and that the NRC in
consultation with the National Academy of Sciences and the EPA agree
that the standard is attainable.
Some suggest that the EPA cannot have the last word. That is not the
intent. If we have to rephrase it, we will do it. The intent is
authority by statute to belong to the EPA, but clearly the best science
should include input from the National Academy of Sciences and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The fourth prerequisite: Operation of a repository fuel acceptance
facility key to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission authorization for the
permanent repository in the year 2007, and a transportation system
based on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant model, which is WIPP.
Those are the five principles that we outlined. Those are the
principles that we worked on with the minority to try to achieve a
consensus.
I think the bill reflects significant concession by the supporters of
the past legislation. I believe this new approach still gives the DOE
the tools it needs. I still don't know why the administration seems so
possessed, policy-wise, to oppose it. But that is what we have before
us.
I conclude this portion of my statement by again identifying where I
think we are in the differences we have. That, again, is the radiation
standard.
As you heard me state time and time again, I think the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission is the appropriate determiner of that standard.
But the manager's amendment now contains new language that would permit
the EPA to go ahead as long as the National Academy and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission are consulted. Obviously, that interest is a
science that will protect health, safety, and welfare. As to the
objective, it is most important that we have an objective of achieving
the radiation standard that is attainable.
This is a reasonable approach. It provides the best science after
peer review. Yet it does allow EPA to ultimately complete the rule
after we have had the input of the best minds on the subject and have
consulted with one another.
If the EPA and the NRC cannot agree, then the EPA is not permitted,
obviously, to adopt any rule until after June 1, 2001. But after June
1, 2001, the EPA may go ahead and adopt a rule pursuant to existing
authority under section 801 of the Energy Policy Act.
Part of the problem with the EPA standard that was detailed in the
proposed rules that came out last August was that it applied
unrealistic standards to ground water. They proposed 4 millirems for
ground water. This is a standard that comes from the Safe Drinking
Water Act, which I support.
This chart shows the levels of radiation. For those working in the
Capitol, we get 80 millirems; anyone living in a brick house, 70
millirems; annual exposure from cosmic radiation, 53 millirems; annual
average radiation from the ground, 26 millirems; x ray, 20 millirems;
dental x ray, 14 millirems; round-trip flight from New York to Los
Angeles, 6 millirems; exposure from a transport container carrying high
level waste 6 feet away, 5 millirems. But the EPA proposal is 4
millirems for the drinking water standard.
This chart shows the proposed site: 800 nuclear weapon tests over 50
years. They are going to come down and propose a 5 millirem level;
remember, 4 millirems is the level for drinking water.
Is that really in the interests of proceeding with this legislation
or is it to set an unattainable standard? No one will drink the ground
water that comes from this site. I hope not.
The Safe Drinking Water Act should not be applied to ground water.
However, if the water becomes tap water, the act should apply; but not
while the water is in the ground. The EPA wants to take extremely low
standards that were designed to apply to drinking water out of a tap
and apply to water in the ground, whether people drink it or not.
Let me be very clear. This dispute has nothing to do with a level of
protection for the people in Nevada. Whether or not the drinking water
standard is applied to ground water has nothing to do with how much
additional radiation, if any, Nevadans would be exposed to from the
facility. The EPA applied similar regulations to the WIPP Transuranic
Nuclear Waste Disposal Facility in New Mexico. The drinking water
standard was not an issue when WIPP was licensed by EPA because WIPP is
a salt mine. Obviously, there is no potable water around it. Maybe EPA
thinks all nuclear waste should be disposed of in a salt cavity, but I
am not sure everybody in the country or in this body would agree.
The National Academy of Sciences did not recommend that the Safe
Drinking Water Act be applied to ground water. Instead, they addressed
``requirements necessary to limit risks to individuals'' as required by
law. In fact, the National Academy specifically said they don't make
such a recommendation.
Finally, the National Academy concluded that the decision regarding
the acceptable level of risk for Yucca Mountain is a policy decision.
What does that mean? That means a decision for Congress, not the
scientists. In our legislation, we propose the best scientists come up
with a recommendation to EPA and EPA be part of that process. I think
it is appropriate that Congress make a decision regarding the level of
risk.
Finally, the ultimate myth. I think everyone would agree, this
administration says it cares about clean air and preventing climate
change. Here is where our electricity comes from: 53 percent comes from
coal; 18 to 20 percent is nuclear; 14 percent is natural

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gas; 10 percent is hydroelectricity; the remaining few percent is oil,
wind, and solar.
DOE's Energy Information Administration says the Kyoto treaty would
require a 30-percent reduction of CO2 emissions from the predicted 2010
level.

How do we do this without nuclear power? We cannot get there from
here. There are no nuclear emission-free sources that can economically
take its place. For the moment, forget about the Kyoto treaty and think
of the present.
This chart shows the emissions avoided from increased nuclear
generation. This is a reduction in SO2 from nuclear power generation.
From 1990 to 1995, 37 percent of the sulfur dioxide reductions required
by the Clean Air Act came from increased generation from existing
nuclear powerplants. That is where it came from. These were sulfide
reductions.
Is that not ironic? They gave credit for the reductions to the
nuclear plants. They don't have any emissions. That is where they get
the reductions. Clever. Even with nuclear power, it is difficult and
expensive to meet the new regs; without nuclear power it is impossible.
As this body addresses the broad obligation of reality, we have to
focus in on the difficulty we have. That is, that the nuclear industry
is choking on its own waste. We have the responsibility to come up with
a solution.
This chart shows an overlay of nuclear plants in noncontainment
areas. In fact, almost all nuclear plants are located in or near areas
that have significant air quality problems. What happens when the
nonemitting sources are replaced with emitting sources--the only
realistic alternatives?
EPA can pass all the regulations in the world, but if the President
and Vice President really did care about clean air, they would get
behind this bill. This contributes more to clean air than any possible
thing we could do in the area of increasing dependence on hydrocarbons.
The administration has a policy: Delay and more delay, for the
American people who care for their safety, their environment, and their
pocketbook. Let's look at the pocketbook. The litigation goes on. The
$15 billion has been paid by the ratepayers. The liability associated
with nonperformance to the contractual commitment, $40 to $80 billion,
or $1,400 per family.
Is the President concerned about clean air, about climate change or
is this some kind of a cynical diplomatic/political exercise? I don't
know. Previously, the administration said it objected to siting a
temporary storage facility before 1998 when the viability assessment
for Yucca Mountain would be completed. At that time, I said anyone who
believes that the availability of the viability assessment will make
passing legislation easier is out of touch with reality. I take no
pleasure in the fact that I was right. The reality is no one wants
nuclear waste stored in their State. I am sensitive to that. I
understand the position of my Nevada friends. However, we have it in 40
States. Do we want to leave it there or put it in one area that has
been determined to carry a repository for our high level waste?
At the committee hearing on S. 1287 in February, all four members of
the Nevada delegation stated that no level of scientific proof would
lessen their objection to this project. Let me repeat that: All four
members of the Nevada delegation stated that no level of scientific
proof would lessen their opposition to this project. I understand that
and I accept that. It doesn't make any difference what level of
scientific proof is available, they are going to oppose it. A further
reality is that this administration apparently will not support a
solution to this problem as long as the Nevada delegation opposes it. I
can understand that.
Let's call the shots as they really are. The ultimate reality is that
the Federal Government had an obligation to start taking the waste in
1998 and it violated the sanctity of the contract. We have reached a
crossroad. The job of fixing this program is ours. Time for fixing the
program is now. Much progress has been made at Yucca. Much money has
been spent at Yucca. We can build on this progress.
The bill contains the tools that the Department of Energy needs to
make the permanent repository work. Every day we wait to move the fuel,
the liability of the American taxpayer increases. We can choose whether
the Nation needs 80 various storage sites in 40 States or just one: the
arid, remote, Nevada Test Site where we exploded scores of nuclear
bombs during the cold war. Is that not the most safe and most remote
location for nuclear waste storage? Over 800 nuclear tests were
conducted at this site.

Mr. President, the time clearly is now. I note my colleagues from
Nevada are on the floor seeking recognition. I have taken a good deal
of time and look forward to their statement. I am happy to respond, I
might add, to any questions they may pose. Obviously, we are going to
be on this for some time.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, as is so often the case when it comes to
debating the various legislative proposals related to nuclear waste
that have been advanced since I have been a Member of the Senate, the
issues generate more heat than light. With all due respect to the
distinguished chairman of the Senate Energy Committee, much of what he
had to say was utterly irrelevant to the situation we confront today.
The chairman would have us believe that unless this legislation is
enacted, nothing will occur with respect to going forward and siting a
high-level nuclear waste repository.
Let me be clear. The process that was used to select that site is one
to which I am strongly opposed. But in reality, if this legislation
never leaves this Chamber--and it is my view it will never become law--
the process by which Yucca Mountain is to be studied--or the scientific
term, ``characterized''--goes forward. The time line that has been laid
out is that sometime next year there will be a site recommendation;
sometime in the year 2002 there will be an application for license;
sometime thereafter there will be a construction authorization; and
ultimately licensure will be approved if, indeed, all of the scientific
questions that have been raised are satisfactorily resolved.
That is a process that began its course back in 1983. We continually
revert to the history of this process to illuminate those who have not
followed it and lived with it as long as I and my fellow Nevadans have,
to try to explain the context in which this debate is occurring.
In 1983, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was signed into law by
President Reagan. It contemplated--and I must say I think the
scientific approach was reasonable--that we would search the Nation;
that we would look for various kinds of geological formations in which
high-level nuclear waste might be buried; that we would balance the
burden, in terms of the storage of the nuclear waste, with some sense
of regional equity. Three sites would be studied, or characterized,
those three sites would be presented to the President of the United
States, and the President would make that decision.
I was a newly elected Governor in 1983, and I believe the broad
outline of that process, the approach, was reasonable; that is to say,
a national search would be conducted, and among the geological
formations that were uppermost to be considered were granite formations
in the northeastern part of the country, salt dome formations in the
Southeast, and in our part of the country the so-called welded tuff.
That was a piece of legislation that, by and large, sought to deal
with this issue. I think, to use the chairman's terminology, that was a
responsible approach. That was an inquiry that, although we in Nevada
were apprehensive about it because welded tuff was being considered,
nevertheless represented science, it represented a fair approach, and
it represented some regional balance and equity.
May I say, from that point on, what has occurred with respect to the
siting process should be referred to as an antiscience approach. It is
blasphemy to discuss any kind of scientific orthodoxy in terms of what
has occurred. Let me remind my colleagues what occurred that in no
sense of the word could be justified as in the interest of science.
Early on, some of my colleagues expressed concern they did not want
it to go to the northeastern part of the country. I fully understand
that. That had nothing to do with science, everything to do with
politics. I have been in

[[Page S475]]

the business a while. I understand that. And what occurred? The
Department of Energy, in its own internal documentation, unilaterally
decided we ought not to look at the Northeast.

Was that science? Was that responsible? I think any person who had an
associate of arts degree in some area of science would conclude by no
standard could that be considered a scientific approach. It was
politics.
In the 1984 Presidential election, the issue came up as to those salt
dome formations in the Southeast. What was said at that time? The
President said: Look, not to worry, not to worry; we will not site it
in a place where the salt dome formations are.
Does that have anything to do with science? Not even to look at it?
To, in effect, blind ourselves and say we ought not to look at the salt
dome formation? We ought not to look at granite? Of course not. And no
sensible person and no scientist worthy of being called a scientist
would ever assert for a moment that that had anything to do with
science. Was it responsible? Of course not. Was it political? Yes,
indeed.
Then 1987 comes along, and a bill which shall live forever in the
infamy of congressional actions in our own State--the so-called ``Screw
Nevada'' bill. Let's call it what it is. Remember, I indicated the
original legislation contemplated there would be three sites that would
be studied or characterized? What occurred in 1987?
In 1987, a decision was made to look only at one site, Yucca
Mountain--exclude any other consideration in any other region of the
country. Was that science? Was that responsible? You do not have to
have a political science degree from Oxford to recognize that is
politics--politics, not science. So when I hear this great paean to
science and responsibility, I am compelled to revisit the history of
this process which has been corrupted and perverted in every stage in
the process where science ought to have prevailed. In every instance,
it has been politics that prevailed.
So if I speak with some energy and if I speak with some anger, it is
because we have been victimized, not by a scientific process but by a
political process in which Nevada has been victimized, and I strongly
object to that as a Nevadan, as a citizen. I hope my colleagues will
reflect in a broader sense that what has occurred to us could occur to
them in another context.
Having said that, the reality in which we deal today is that Yucca
Mountain is being considered. This process we have talked about, these
milestones, continues forward. So all this talk about nuclear waste
piling up and responsibility, we have to do something--hopefully, we
will do the responsible thing; hopefully, we will do the scientifically
prudent thing. But in no sense is this legislation necessary for this
process. I do not like its origin, in terms of the ``Screw Nevada''
bill, but it is going forward. That is, currently, as we are debating
on the floor of the Senate, the steady process goes forward. The final
environmental impact study is being finalized--not yet final.
Sometime late next year, we are going to have a site recommendation
and sometime in the year 2002, or thereafter, an application for a
license.
I say to my friends, no decision has been made at this point that, in
fact, Yucca Mountain is suitable. That decision is yet to be made.
Hopefully, it will be made not in the political way in which other
decisions have been made, but it will be made in a scientific way.
The first thing I want to disabuse my colleagues of and those
listening is that somehow there is a compelling necessity to have this
piece of legislation enacted, that if it is not enacted, somehow this
process I have described to you will stop. That simply is not true.
From a Nevada perspective, I am not happy with that process, but it is
going forward and will continue to go forward.
Let me, as a sidebar, try to address the red herring that is raised
every time that somehow there is going to be some insurmountable
problem in providing onsite storage. That simply is not the case. Those
utilities that need to provide additional onsite storage can do so in a
manner which is consistent with what the scientific community
acknowledges, with a dry cask storage system, will be available.
In terms of dealing with the equities, about the ratepayers who have
paid a lot of money, yes, they have paid a lot of money. That is not
the fault of people in my own State. That is part of a process which
has been very difficult, and I must say, rather ineptly handled by the
Department of Energy over a number of years.
It is true, as the chairman pointed out, that 1998 was promised as
the date in which a permanent repository or a waste dump would be
opened. We have passed 1998. It is now 2000. That permanent repository,
the dump at Yucca Mountain, will not, as I indicated in these
guidelines, be available if ever--if ever--for some years to come.
Early on, as a new Member in the Senate, I recognized there was an
equity argument, that to the extent ratepayers would have to pay for
additional storage as a result of the permanent waste dump not being
opened in the year 1998, there ought to be some kind of relief and
compensation. I introduced legislation that said, in effect, to the
extent that such delays occur, if they do, and if, indeed, as a result
of those delays additional storage is required, the dry cask storage
system is required, that whatever those expenses are ought to be
deducted from the amount of money the ratepayers are required to pay
into the nuclear waste fund. It strikes me as being fair.
That is where we begin to scratch the surface and find out that what
is really involved in that kind of discussion is not fairness or
equity, but the nuclear energy industry, through the Nuclear Energy
Institute, has a very different agenda because, incredibly, they oppose
that legislation.
Let me repeat that. For those who are listening who are ratepayers in
States that have nuclear utilities, I was prepared and remain prepared
today and agree with those parts of the bill that provide such
compensation to any ratepayer who has been subjected to additional
expense as a result of the permanent waste dump not being available
ought to be compensated in some way, and the compensation should be
reducing the amount of money the ratepayers are required to pay into
the nuclear waste fund by an amount equal to the expense they have
incurred.
That is equity. That is fairness. Let me repeat, that is not what the
nuclear industry is all about. They have no interest in that.

We have heard a good bit about responsibility and science. What we
want is the best science, we are told. I do not believe that is what
they want at all. Let me try to frame the issue and let me use the
chairman's own words.
The chairman has said--and I appreciate his candor; we disagree very
strongly about this, but I want to make it clear to him and others that
this is not a matter of personal acrimony; it is a major policy
difference. This is what the chairman said in the last go-round we were
about to have. This is an article that appeared in the Las Vegas Sun,
December 6, 1999:

What we want is to make sure that the measuring is under a
regulation that allows waste to go to Yucca.

``What we want is to make sure that the measuring is under a
regulation that allows waste to go to Yucca.''
Not one word is expressed about public health and public safety, and
that is precisely what they want. As my colleagues know, I will not be
a Member of this august body this time next year, but I predict that if
the nuclear utilities feel they need more legislation, they will be
attempting to reduce the standards further.
S. 1287, which is the vehicle we are debating, as it came out of
committee had these kinds of standards. Let's talk about that because
that is pretty important for our consideration.
S. 1287 provided that 30 millirems per year would be the authorized
dosage each individual can receive. For most of us who are not
scientists--and I acknowledge that I am not--I do not know that I would
recognize a millirem if I ran into one. Suffice it to say that
millirems are the way in which we measure radioactivity, radioactive
exposure. We all know that.
Many of us who are getting a bit long in the tooth--and I exempt the
distinguished occupant of the Chair from that categorization--can
remember in our youth when we would go to the shoe store and there
would be a little fluoroscope there. Your mom would be there, and that
fluoroscope would flash

[[Page S476]]

on and your bones in your feet would be exposed. The shoe salesman
would say: I think those are the right size for Richard because he can
move his toes freely.
As a kid, I revelled in it because I could see my feet--exposure,
radioactivity. Do we do this today? The distinguished occupant of the
Chair and I not only are parents but grandparents and are proud of that
fact and are interested in their health and safety. That was abandoned
a generation ago. Why? Because there are risks involved.
In less than a decade after Roentgen developed the x ray, there had
been a fatality. That process indicates that radiation poses some very
real risks to human health and safety. The experience in my own
lifetime has been that, by and large, those standards are tight. We do
not have fluoroscopes for fitting shoes on youngsters or adults, there
is a constant effort to reduce the amount of exposure, and x rays we
get when we go to the dentist are much less invasive than they were a
generation ago. Why? Because the cumulative impact of all of that has a
profound impact on health and safety.
We are not talking about some theoretical concern that might happen.
That is the experience of more than a century, and although not
completely applicable to this piece of legislation, we now know that
workers who were a part of the nuclear industrial development that made
it possible for us to produce the atomic weapons upon which our
security has been predicated for more than half a century, the
Department of Energy now acknowledges they were exposed to radiation
and their health has been potentially impacted. They have acknowledged
that for the first time decades later.
We are talking about something that can have a profound, even a
potentially deadly impact. Yet our friends in the Nuclear Energy
Institute and their allies shoehorn the standard so that it fits Yucca
Mountain, irrespective of what good scientists say about health and
safety.
Does that make me angry? You bet it does. Any parent, any
grandparent, any responsible citizen should be absolutely appalled at
the notion that this is being politicized, and it is. I will have more
to say about that.
In 1983, the year the legislation was signed into law by President
Reagan, the Environmental Protection Agency was established as the
individual Federal agency to set the standard. Nobody challenged that.
In my first 6 years in the Senate, we had a decision with respect to
the WIPP facility, a nuclear repository dealing with transuranic waste
located in the State of New Mexico.
The Environmental Protection Agency set the standard. What was the
standard they set? It was 15 millirems. Was there an objection from the
nuclear industry? No. Was there a contention that somehow this was an
outrageous and unreasonable standard? Was it suggested somehow this was
wild science? No. It was set at 15 millirems.
At about that time, however, the nuclear energy crowd's interest in
locating a high-level waste dump in our State began to be a little
fretful. Could Yucca Mountain, which was developing a number of
problems--a question of seismic activity, a question of volcanic
activity, a question in terms of water table or thermoloads that were
greater than expected, an earthquake which visited the site and created
some damage--all of this began.
So in the energy bill of 1992--never debated on the floor of the
Senate or the House--that was going forward, all of a sudden a
provision was inserted into the bill that sought in some way to maybe
bracket or to limit the EPA in setting the standard. In effect, what
was requested was that the National Academy of Sciences ought to take a
look and see if whatever the Environmental Protection Agency came up
with, to use a metaphor from the street, was in the ballpark: Are they
being reasonable?
That was the first assault upon the EPA and its standard-setting
capability advocated by the proponents of the high-level nuclear waste
dump at Yucca Mountain. This was not something the Senators from Nevada
and those of us who have been concerned about health and safety
advocated. This was what the nuclear utilities argued for.
Let's go over the verdict. What was the cycle? The National Academy
of Sciences did, in fact, take a look at the EPA standard that was
proposed for us at Yucca Mountain. The EPA standard: 15 millirems, the
same as WIPP. Pretty reasonable.
The National Academy of Sciences, in looking at that standard, said:
We think the standard with respect to the milliremic exposure rate per
person per year is somewhere between 2 and 20. We think that is the
range.
So those are the brackets you see there on the chart: 2 and 20.
Frankly, the EPA came right down in the middle. For those of us in
Nevada, we would much prefer that they would be at 2 or 5 or 10
millirems. But it was set at 15. It was consistent with what had been
done in WIPP.
Let's talk about the agenda. What does the nuclear utility crowd
want? They don't want the 15-millirem standard. That is science. What
they want to do is to game the system--to, in effect, shoehorn in any
kind of a standard that makes it possible for them to dump nuclear
waste in Nevada.
Their most recent iteration of this is S. 1287, the underlying
vehicle, although the substitute amendment we are debating does have
some changes. I want to make that clear for the record.
What did they propose? Thirty millirems--twice as much. A moment ago,
I stated it is my belief that next year, the year thereafter, we get to
2002, and all of a sudden they will say: Look, we can't build that site
with a 30-millirem standard. They would be rushing onto the floor of
the Senate, as they have year after year, to say: Look, we need a
standard that allows an exposure rate of 60 millirems, or 90 millirems,
or 100 millirems--whatever it takes.

That is the underlying basis for this statement right here. This
reflects the policy: What we want is to make sure that the measuring is
under a regulation that allows waste to go to Yucca. There is not one
reference to health, to safety, or to science. The shorthand view is:
Look, whatever it takes to get it there, devil be whatever the
standards will be, that is what we want.
That is the risk we have. That is not responsible. I exhort my
colleagues to be responsible. That is not scientific. I urge my
colleagues to be scientific. That is not scientific.
Why should there be a different standard set for WIPP than there is
for Yucca? Why? Why is that necessary? No objection was raised to the
WIPP standard. Why shouldn't it be the same? Logically, the EPA reached
the scientific conclusion that it should be the same.
The National Academy of Sciences--and there is nobody in Nevada who
was part of that review process--said: Look, that is within the
recommended range; that is fair. But fairness and science and
responsibility is not what this bill is all about. Any fair-minded
person would look at this and understand that it has a political
overtone.
In the last few days, the process has been extremely frustrating. On
Friday, we received two different versions of the substitute. By 4:45
on Friday afternoon, we had received the version that has been offered
today.
Based upon that version, here is what we know: The EPA strenuously
objects to the language as it relates to standards that are in the
draft before us today. The Council of Environmental Quality strongly
objects to that standard as set forth in the substitute. And the
President of the United States has indicated he will veto such
legislation if, indeed, the bill in that form reaches his desk.
This Statement of Administration Policy is dated February 8, 2000:

The Administration has reviewed a February 4, 2000,
manager's amendment to S. 1287--

That is the substitute we are talking about now--

and understands that this amendment will be brought to the
Senate floor.

Indeed, it has and is what we are debating.

Unfortunately, this amendment undermines EPA's existing
statutory authority to set standards to protect public health
and the environment from radioactive releases; therefore, it
is unacceptable to the Administration. Although the amendment
appears to allow EPA to exercise its existing authority to
set appropriate radiation release standards for the Yucca
Mountain repository, it will allow another entity to block
EPA's authority until June 1, 2001.

[[Page S477]]

This may not be readily apparent to everyone, but the thrust of this
new language would be to strip the EPA of the authority to promulgate,
in final form, this 15-millirem standard and kick it over until next
year. Why? Why would they do that? Is that science? Is there some
scientific reason for that? No.
This rule has been in the gestation process since the early 1980s.
It has been out for public comment, which is certainly appropriate--
those who criticize it or support it make recommended changes to it;
all of that has occurred. That is part of the process. That is not only
good science but it is responsible public policy. Is it responsible to
suggest that? No.
What is involved? Well, as we all know--and I must say it has begun
far too early for most of us, even those of us who have had a lifelong
fascination with politics--this is about Presidential election
politics. We are going to have a new President next year. President
Clinton is constitutionally precluded from succeeding himself. We all
know that we are going to have a new President. So this is a political,
cynical effort to deprive EPA of the authority to do its job in
accordance with science and in a responsible fashion, and to inject
what into the process? Politics. That began in 1983 with the Northeast
being taken out of the dialog, and in 1984 with the salt dome
formations in the Southeast being taken out in 1987--if we look at the
one-site and put-all-the-nuclear-eggs-in-one-basket approach.
Again--it should come as no surprise to those who have followed the
process--we have politics as usual. Kick this into next year, to a new
President who may take a less protective view of health and public
safety and responsibility and take a different approach. That is what
we are being asked to do.
This draft is replete with politics. Let me mention one of these
provisions to give you an idea. This draft has no more to do with
science or public responsibility; this is a political instrument; this
is a political deal. Let's be honest about it. What do we have here? We
have a little sentence that talks about transportation. Let me say that
the concerns about transportation, shipping 77,000 metric tons of high-
level nuclear waste on the interstate highway systems in America, on
the rail transportation corridors of America, that will go through 43
States, 51 million Americans live within a mile or less. So lest those
of you who may be observing this debate are thinking this only affects
the good people of Nevada, let me assure you that your backyard can be
affected, as well as your church and schools that may lie within that
mile or less of the Interstate Highway System or rail.
In looking at what those routes might be, one would think we ought to
try to take the safest, most direct route. But no, no, we have politics
in this. We are told we should avoid highways with downgrades of more
than 7 percent. I know why that was put in there. He is a very good
friend of mine, but the able Senator from Colorado, who voted with us
last year in opposing this ill-conceived attempt--this is an attempt to
acquire his support. I do not criticize him for it. He is trying to
protect his State. I offer no criticism. But that is the cynicism that
is involved. No science. No public responsibility. This is politics.
Now, look, I happen to love politics. It has been a lifetime of mine.
I am proud of my involvement. I have had experience at the local level
and the State level, and I am proud to have been a Member of this
august body. This is my twelfth year. So I do not shirk from or blanch
at the thought that we are talking about political issues and public
policy. That is why I came to the Senate. This is why I have devoted my
career in public service to policy formation. But this is not public
policy; this is public cynicism. That is what this is all about. We
ought to reject this.

So I guess I will simply return to the premise I began with, which
is, is this piece of legislation necessary? The answer is no. If this
legislation fails to be enacted into law, does it in any way impede the
process occurring at Yucca Mountain? The answer is no. Parenthetically,
I wish it did. But it does not impede it. That process goes forward.
Does it do anything with respect to these guidelines in the sense of
when the decisions are going to be made in the year 2001 and site
recommendations? Does it deal with that guideline or the site
application for licensure process? No. That all goes forward. That is
in the law now and that is part of the planning process. It is not
necessary. It is totally unnecessary.
What we are talking about is a very artful attempt to circumvent the
process in which good science and good public policy ought to be used
in making these decisions. That will not be allowed to happen in this
piece of legislation in this form.
This is a moving target. I am talking about the substitute before us
today. I alluded a bit ago to the frustration I have. This piece of
legislation affects my State more than any other State, although--let
me be clear--43 States will be affected by the transportation
corridors. Yet we have largely been in the dark in terms of what kind
of a substitute amendment we might face.
Friday afternoon, we received the version that we are debating today.
We are prepared to debate it. We are prepared to accept the President's
veto, the support of all the environmental community, support of the
EPA and Council on Environmental Quality, and all those charged with
that responsibility. We are prepared.
As we speak, a new substitute is being worked up. Whether or not
there will be agreement, we don't know. Perhaps some of these comments,
in the context of the new substitute, may have to be modified. But that
is a sense of frustration I share with colleagues. Imagine, if you
will, something that was particular to your own State, and the
negotiations affecting your State excluded you from the process. And
you kind of waited with bated breath each morning. You have a proposal;
can we see it? What is it going to be? That, Mr. President, is where we
in Nevada have been.
I am deeply offended by that process. I was not sent to Washington by
the people whom I represent to sit on the sidelines and be that potted
plant somewhere in the back part of the Senate Chamber. I want to know
what is going to happen because I know from bitter experience that good
science and good public policy have absolutely nothing to do with the
way this process has been implemented since its earlier auspicious
beginning in January of 1983.
So I recognize in these kinds of debates, I am sad to say, that
unlike the days when the giants of the Senate took the floor and we saw
each other and debated back and forth, that is not the way the process
works. I understand that, in numbers, we are no match for the phalanx
of lobbyists from the nuclear utilities. We do not have their financial
resources; I acknowledge that. All we have is our honor, our integrity,
and what is good science and public responsibility.
I hope that argument will prevail because it ought to be the way we
in this Chamber make the decision. It ought to be the process by which
every piece of legislation is dealt with on the floor of the Senate and
in its various standing committees. We are here debating the
substitute. We will wait and see what other pieces of legislation there
might be. But I implore my colleagues to look at this carefully and
understand what is coming about. This is not necessary. It is not
science. It is simply not responsible public policy.
I urge you to oppose this legislation.
I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, first of all, I have been coming to the
floor every day because of a commitment I made. I will just take a
couple of minutes on this.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are in a postcloture situation.
Mr. WELLSTONE. I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to speak in
morning business for 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair.

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