[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 9 (Monday, February 7, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S367-S369]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     THE NAVY SUPER HORNET PROGRAM

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I have been a long-time critic of the 
Navy's F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet program. For years, I have come to the 
floor to highlight this program's shortcomings, and I have offered 
bills to kill the program and amendments to try to achieve greater 
scrutiny over the program. Sometimes my colleagues have agreed with me, 
and more often than not, they have not on this particular issue. I 
understand that, in all probability, the Super Hornet program will get 
its final green light this spring, and it will go into full-rate 
production.
  However, I will continue to fight for responsible defense spending 
and continue to try to enlighten my colleagues about this inferior, 
unnecessary, and expensive program.
  With that in mind, I have asked Secretary Cohen to delay his 
production decision until he reviews a GAO audit of the Super Hornet 
program's Operational Evaluation.
  I will read an opinion-editorial by Lieutenant Colonel Jay Stout, a 
highly-regarded, active duty Marine fighter pilot of the F/A-18C, and 
combat veteran. The Virginian-Pilot published his opinions this past 
December.
  Rear Admiral J.B. Nathman, the Navy's director of air warfare, wrote 
the requisite, tired response, with a little personal invective thrown 
in.
  A subsequent piece by James Stevenson, a well-known aviation writer, 
rebuts each of Admiral Nathman's arguments. I will read Stevenson's 
letter, as well.
  I will read the article by Mr. Stout, and I ask unanimous consent 
that two other articles, plus a December 13, 1999, article from 
Business Week be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. FEINGOLD. The first article is Mr. Stout's piece from the 
Virginian-Pilot entitled, ``The Navy's Super Fighter Is A Super 
Failure.''
  The article reads as follows:

       I am a fighter pilot. I love fighter aircraft. But even 
     though my service--I am a Marine--doesn't have a dog in the 
     fight, it is difficult to watch the grotesquerie that is the 
     procurement of the Navy's new strike-fighter, the F/A-18 E/F 
     Super Hornet.
       Billed as the Navy's strike-fighter of the future, the F/A-
     18 E/F is instead an expensive failure--a travesty of 
     subterfuge and poor leadership. Intended to overcome any 
     potential adversaries during the next 20 years, the aircraft 
     is instead outperformed by a number of already operational 
     aircraft--including the fighter it is scheduled to replace, 
     the original F/A-18 Hornet.
       The Super Hornet concept was spawned in 1992, in part, as a 
     replacement for the 30 year-old A-6 Intruder medium bomber. 
     Though it had provided yeoman service since the early 1960s, 
     the A-6 was aging and on its way to retirement by the end of 
     the Gulf War in 1991. The Navy earlier tried to develop a 
     replacement during the 1980s--the A-12--but bungled the 
     project so badly that the whole mess was scrapped in 1991. 
     The A-12 fiasco cost the taxpayers $5 billion and cost the 
     Navy what little reputation it had as a service that could 
     wisely spend taxpayer dollars.
       Nevertheless, the requirement for an A-6 replacement 
     remains. Without an aircraft with a longer range and greater 
     payload than the current F/A-18, the Navy lost much of its 
     offensive punch. Consequently it turned to the original F/A-
     18--a combat-proven performer, but a short-ranged light 
     bomber when compared to the A-6. Still stinging from the A-12 
     debacle, the Navy tried to ``put one over'' on Congress by 
     passing off a completely redesigned aircraft--the Super 
     Hornet--as simply a modification of the original Hornet.
       The obfuscation worked. Many in Congress were fooled into 
     believing that the new aircraft was just what the Navy told 
     them it was--a modified Hornet. In fact, the new airplane is 
     much larger--built that way to carry more fuel and bombs--is 
     much different aerodynamically, has new engines and engine 
     intakes and a completely reworked internal structure. In 
     short, the Super Hornet and the original Hornet are two 
     completely different aircraft despite their similar 
     appearance.
       Though the deception worked, the new aircraft--the Super 
     Hornet--does not. Because it was never prototyped--at the 
     Navy's insistence--its faults were not evident until 
     production aircraft rolled out of the factory. Among the 
     problems the aircraft experienced was the publicized 
     phenomenon of ``wing drop''--a spurious, uncommanded roll, 
     which occurred in the heart of the aircraft's performance 
     envelope. After a great deal of negative press, the Super 
     Hornet team devised a ``band-aid'' fix that mitigated the 
     problem at the expense of performance tradeoffs in other 
     regimes of flight. Regardless, the redesigned wing is a 
     mish-mash of aerodynamic compromises which does nothing 
     well. And the Super Hornet's wing drop problem is minor 
     compared to other shortfalls. First, the aircraft is 
     slow--slower than most fighters fielded since the early 
     1960s. In that one of the most oft-uttered maxims of the 
     fighter pilot fraternity is that ``Speed is Life,'' this 
     deficiency is alarming.
       But the Super Hornet's wheezing performance against the 
     speed clock isn't its only flaw. If speed is indeed life, 
     then maneuverability is the reason that life is worth living 
     for the fighter pilot. In a dog fight, superior 
     maneuverability allows a pilot to bring his weapons to bear 
     against the enemy. With its heavy, aerodynamically 
     compromised airframe, and inadequate engines, the Super 
     Hornet won't win many dogfights. Indeed, it can be 
     outmaneuvered by nearly every front-line fighter fielded 
     today.
       ``But the Super Hornet isn't just a fighter,'' its 
     proponents will counter. ``It is a bomber as well.'' True, 
     the new aircraft carries more bombs than the current F/A-18--
     but not dramatically more, or dramatically further. The 
     engineering can be studied, but the laws of physics don't 
     change for anyone--certainly not the Navy. From the 
     beginning, the aircraft was incapable of doing what the Navy 
     wanted. And they knew it.
       The Navy doesn't appear to be worried about the performance 
     shortfalls of the Super Hornet. The aircraft is supposed to 
     be so full of technological wizardry that the enemy will be 
     overwhelmed by its superior weapons. That is the same 
     argument that was used prior to the Vietnam War. This logic 
     fell flat when our large, expensive fighters--the most 
     sophisticated in the world--started falling to peasants 
     flying simple aircraft designed during the Korean conflict.
       Further drawing into question the Navy's position that 
     flight performance is secondary to the technological 
     sophistication of the aircraft, are the Air Forces' 
     specifications for its new--albeit expensive--fighter, the F-
     22. The Air Force has ensured that the F-22 has top-notch 
     flight performance, as well as a weapons suite second to 
     none. It truly has no rivals in the foreseeable future.
       The Super Hornet's shortcomings have been borne out 
     anecdotally. There are numerous stories, but one episode sums 
     it up nicely. Said one crew member who flew a standard Hornet 
     alongside new Super Hornets: ``We outran them, we out-flew 
     them, and we ran them out of gas. I was embarrassed for those 
     pilots.'' These shortcomings are tacitly acknowledged around 
     the fleet where the aircraft is referred to as the ``Super-
     Slow Hornet.''
       What about the rank-and-file Navy fliers? What are they 
     told when they question the Super Hornet's shortcomings? The 
     standard reply is, ``Climb aboard, sit down, and shut up. 
     This is our fighter, and you're going to make it work.'' Can 
     there be any wondering at the widespread disgust with the 
     Navy's

[[Page S368]]

     leadership and the hemorrhaging exodus of its fliers?
       Unfortunately, much of the damage has been done. Billions 
     of dollars have been spent on the Super Hornet that could 
     have been spent on maintaining or upgrading the Navy's 
     current fleet of aircraft. Instead, unacceptable numbers of 
     aircraft are sidelined for want of money to buy spare parts. 
     Paradoxically, much of what the Navy wanted in the Super 
     Hornet could have been obtained, at a fraction of the cost, 
     by upgrading the current aircraft--what the Navy said it was 
     going to do at the beginning of this mess.
       Our military's aircraft acquisition program cannot afford 
     all the proposed acquisitions. Some hard decisions will have 
     to be made. The Super Hornet decision, at a savings of 
     billions of dollars, should be an easy one.

  Again, what I have just been reading for several minutes is an op-ed 
from Lt. Col. Jay Stout, somebody who actually knows this airplane 
well.
  Now I would like to read a brief letter that rebuts Admiral Nathman's 
letter, which was in response to Lt. Col. Jay Stout's piece.
  In his response to Lt. Col. Jay Stout's Dec. 15 op-ed criticism of 
the F-18E Super Hornet, Rear Adm. John Nathman accused Stout (letter, 
Dec. 23) of ``unfounded assertions.''
  What this letter then says is:

       Nathman claimed that the F-18E has completed ``the most 
     rigorous and scrutinized process of procurement, acquisition 
     and evaluation in recent Department of Defense and naval 
     history.'' On the contrary, the F-18E was initially rejected 
     by the Navy and only rushed into the budget at the last 
     minute when the A-12 was canceled.
       In the fall of 1990, the Navy re-examined its requirements 
     for a deep strike aircraft. It dismissed the F-18E as 
     unacceptable in both range and stealth. As to stealth, it 
     concluded that ordnance hanging under the F-18E would provide 
     too good a target on radar.
       When then Defense Secretary Richard Cheney canceled the A-
     12, the Navy pushed the F-18E onto center stage, ignoring 
     regulations that required a new design number for ``major 
     design changes within the same mission category.'' Instead, 
     the Navy gave the new aircraft a new series letter, to make 
     this new aircraft appear as a mere modification. The Navy did 
     this to avoid approximately 25 specific oversight steps.
       In so doing, the Navy insured that the F-18E would avoid, 
     from its inception, the ``scrutinized process of procurement, 
     acquisition and evaluation,'' about which Nathman wrote.
       The Navy's attempt to minimize oversight extended to the 
     Congress. The Navy flight test director, in October 1996 and 
     March 1997, issued two F-18E deficiency reports. In spite of 
     these reports, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote four 
     months later to the chairman of the Senate National Security 
     Committee as follows:
       The F/A-18 E/F has flawlessly progressed through every 
     required milestone to include operational requirements, 
     mission needs, cost and threat analysis, and engine 
     development . . . Testing results have clearly exceeded all 
     specific performance parameters.
       Rear Adm. Nathman states that the F-18E has 40 percent more 
     range. Such a statement is misleading. In 1993, the Navy 
     admitted that under the same conditions and weapons loads, 
     the promised range of the F-18E was between 15 and 19 percent 
     less than the original F-18A specification.
       It remains for Nathman to provide evidence that the F-18E's 
     performance is now greater than its 1993 promise.
       Finally, Nathman complained that Stout wrote his article 
     ``without checking some readily available factual 
     information.'' From what we have seen, even those charged 
     with oversight--our congressmen--cannot obtain ``readily 
     available factual information.'' Stout got his information 
     from sources that are more reliable than the CNO's 
     communication with Congress.
       If Stout had continued his investigation, he would have 
     learned that far from pushing ``current technology to its 
     limit,'' the Navy will give future naval aviation--for twice 
     the program unit cost--an airplane that, below 20,000 feet 
     with pylons on, cannot fly supersonic. There is some question 
     as to whether this fact is included within the ``readily 
     available'' information of which Nathman spoke.

  Madam President, that is the response of James Stevenson to the 
Navy's letter questioning Lt. Col. Jay Stout's comments. I offer these 
as evidence that we are about to embark on an F/A-18E and F airplane 
that, frankly, after having been looked at for several years, at best 
is not better than the current plane, and probably is worse, and is 
enormously more expensive than continuing with the FA-18C and D plane.

                               Exhibit 1

               [From the Virginian-Pilot, Dec. 23, 1999]

        Look at the Facts: The Navy's New Hornet Is Super Indeed

                     (By Rear Admiral J.B. Nathman)

       It is healthy to bring opposing views forward in open and 
     honest discussion. Unfortunately, this was not the case in a 
     Dec. 15 op-ed column on the F-18E/F Super Hornet. (``The 
     Navy's super fighter is a super failure''). This article was 
     apparently written without checking some readily available 
     factual information.
       As the one responsible for establishing naval aviation 
     requirements, I can set the record straight with regard to 
     the performance and warfighting capabilities of the Super 
     Hornet. I would also like to speak for the thousands of 
     individuals, both military and civilian, whose efforts were 
     involved in bringing the Super Hornet's warfighting 
     capability to our Naval Air Force.
       The F-18E/F Super Hornet has just completed the most 
     rigorous and scrutinized process of procurement, acquisition 
     and evaluation in recent Department of Defense and naval 
     history. Going into the final evaluation process, the Super 
     Hornet met or exceeded every established performance 
     milestone. The Super Hornet was designed from Day One to be a 
     decisive strike-fighter, equipped to handle the threats and 
     win in today's environment and for the foreseeable future.
       Achieving this goal required years of planning and pushed 
     current technology to its limits to obtain the most combat 
     ``bang for the buck'' for the US Navy and American taxpayer. 
     As compared to the current model F-18, proven enhancements 
     include:
       40 percent increase in mission combat radius.
       50 percent increase in combat on-station time.
       Three times the carrier recovery payload--safer carrier 
     operations for our pilots.
       Improved survivability, lethality and greater penetration 
     into the enemy's battle space.
       Growth potential for future combat enhancements and mission 
     requirements.
       In today's environment, the calculus of combat 
     effectiveness is much more than just speed. With its superb 
     combat maneuverability, radar and weapons systems, impressive 
     suite of electronic countermeasures, ability to withstand 
     greater combat damage and increased fuel capacity, the Super 
     Hornet is not only more survivable but three to five times 
     more combat effective than any other naval aircraft in the 
     inventory.
       The author's unfounded assertions with regard to 
     performance are simply not borne out by the facts and do not 
     reflect the performance of the combat-ready Super Hornet.
       Naval Aviation has made tough but sound choices with the 
     Super Hornet program. Some trade-offs are inevitable and 
     appropriate, particularly in an austere defense budget 
     climate, but this aircraft answers the Navy's needs.
       The F/A-18E/F is an outstanding investment for the American 
     taxpayer and will serve as a model for future Navy programs 
     and procurement. The Super Hornet is being delivered on time, 
     on budget and is at the heart of naval aviation's ability to 
     fight and win in the 21st Century.
       In the final analysis, hard fact--not innuendo, anecdote or 
     rumor--will establish the operational supremacy of this 
     aircraft. By every measure, Boeing and the Navy's new Hornet 
     are indeed super. The aircraft is in great shape as it 
     completes final evaluation.
       Because the Virginian-Pilot is read by thousands of men and 
     women in the naval aviation community, both active-duty and 
     retired, I felt it was my responsibility to respond to a 
     column riddled with inaccuracies.

                  [From Business Week, Dec. 13, 1999]

   The (Not So) Super Hornet--Why the Navy Is Spending Billions on a 
   Fighter Jet With Flaws That Costs Twice as Much as Its Predecessor

                            (By Stan Crock)

       Pentagon analyst Frnaklin C. Spinney remembers the 
     conversation with crystal clarity. Over dinner with a Marine 
     flier in late 1991, talk turned to Navy plans for a new 
     version of the F-18 Hornet. Earlier in the year, the Pentagon 
     had killed the new A-12 bomber. Other Navy planes were 
     decades old. And the service thought existing F/A-18s 
     couldn't fly long-range missions. To fill carrier decks, the 
     Navy decided to rely on an upgrade of the F-18 used by the 
     fabled Blue Angels. ``We've got to have this even if it 
     doesn't work,'' the pilot confided.
       How prophetic. On Nov. 16, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet 
     finished operational-evaluation flights, the last step before 
     full production, set for this spring. And Congress in 
     September approved a five-year, $9 billion authorization for 
     the fighter-attack aircraft, which will cost $47 billion 
     through 2010. But by many accounts, the $53 million-a-copy 
     plane is only slightly better than its predecessor, the F/A-
     18C/D (table, page 136), which costs half as much. And the E/
     F's flying performance ``is almost unambiguously a step 
     backward,'' says Spinney.
       As a debate rages on Capitol Hill over thee Pentagon's 
     ambitious plans to buy three new aircraft for an astounding 
     $340 billion over the next three decades, Boeing Co.'s Super 
     Hornet has managed to fly under the radar with political, if 
     not technological, stealth. The saga of how it has done so 
     shows just how hard it will be to kill off any of the three: 
     the Super Hornet, the Air Force's F-22 Raptor, and the Joint 
     Strike Fighter. The ingredients of the F/A-18E/F's tale 
     include a Navy anxious not to cede missions to the Air Force, 
     an ailing defense contractor, and lawmakers looking to 
     preserve defense jobs.
       The Pentagon and Boeing staunchly defend the program. The 
     E/F won a Pentagon award in 1996 for excellence in 
     engineering and development. And supporters note it's on 
     schedule and under budget. Says Patrick J. Finneran, Boeing's 
     F-18 czar: ``This thing gets gold stars.''
       The General Accounting Office, Congress' watchdog agency, 
     begs to differ. It noted in

[[Page S369]]

     a June, 1999, report that as full production neared, the 
     plane had 84 deficiencies, including radar that couldn't tell 
     the direction of oncoming threats. It recommended--in vain--
     that Congress reject a multiyear commitment to the program. 
     Critics say one reason for the Super Hornet's woes is that 
     the Navy dubbed the E/F a modification of its C/D 
     predecessor. That was true even though the E/F has a 
     different wing, fuselage, and engine, and is 25% heavier. 
     About 85% of the wing and airframe components are different 
     from those of the F/A-18C/D, according to an analysis by the 
     Cato Institute, a conservative think tank. All of this led 
     some experts to say it's a new aircraft.
       Reeling. But a new plane would have been harder to sell to 
     Congress and wouldn't have been exempt from some lengthy 
     procurement requirements. Most important, St. Louis-based 
     McDonnell Douglas Corp., the F-18's builder, would not have 
     been guaranteed the work. At the time, McDonnell Douglas, 
     which Boeing acquired in 1997, was reeling from cost overruns 
     on other programs and the A-12's termination.
       The shorter procurement process for a modification meant 
     McDonnell Douglas didn't have to build a prototype to help 
     iron our kinks. The risks from this approach became apparent 
     in March, 1996, during the Super Hornet's seventh test 
     flight. The plane suddenly started to roll as it approached 
     supersonic speed. A blue-ribbon panel said in a Jan. 14, 
     1998, report that the wing-drop phenomenon ``could put flight 
     safety at risk.'' And the flaw would make it tough for pilots 
     to track enemy aircraft.
       The Navy downplays the issue, saying wing drops had cropped 
     up--and been solved--in previous programs. But fixing the 
     problem proved difficult. One solution--a new wing covering--
     caused yet another problem: vibrations so severe that pilots 
     had trouble reading the display.
       Another shrewd Navy ploy was to lower the bar for 
     performance standards. When the Navy brass debated whether 
     the E/F should be required to turn, climb, accelerate, and 
     maneuver better than the C/D version, Vice Admiral Dennis V. 
     McGinn, then the head of naval air warfare, rejected all but 
     acceleration. A good thing, too, because the E/F doesn't 
     perform so well in the other areas. In a Jan. 19, 1999, memo, 
     Phillip E. Coyle, a top Defense Dept. weapon systems 
     evaluator, says such Russian fighters as the Su-27 and Mig-9 
     ``can accelerate faster and out-turn all variants of the F/A-
     18 in most operating regimes.'' The memo says while that's 
     the price for more payload and range, the Navy plans to use 
     air-combat tactics that won't require the capabilities of the 
     earlier F/A-18 models.
       Despite efforts to compensate for shortcomings, a July, 
     1997, report by an advisory board of Pentagon and contractor 
     representatives warned that evaluators may find the plane 
     ``not operationally effective'' even if it meets all 
     requirements. One solution proposed: ``aggressive 
     indoctrination of operational community to help them match 
     expectation to reality of F/A-18E/F.'' Translation: Lower 
     pilots' expectations.
       Early on, one of the Super Hornet's key selling points was 
     a project that the plane would fly 40% farther than its 
     predecessor. But the longer-range figure assumed that 80% of 
     the fleet would be one-seater planes. One-seaters carry more 
     fuel than two-seaters and thus can fly farther. But now the 
     Navy wants just 55% of the fleet to be one-seaters. While 
     this lets it replace the ancient F-15 Tomcat--a two-seater--
     it undercuts the longer-range promises. In actual 
     performance, the one-seater shows a range of 444 nautical 
     miles, only 20% above the older F/A-18C's 369-mile range, the 
     GAO says.
       The Navy also says the E/F will have 17 cubic feet more 
     room for high-tech gear than the C/D. But the GAO found only 
     5.46 cubic feet were usable--and that nearly every upgrade 
     could be installed on the C/D. And the Navy claims that the 
     Super Hornet performs a crucial function better than the C/D: 
     Returning to a carrier with unusual munitions. But critics 
     say it would be cheaper to dump the bombs in the ocean than 
     to pay $30 million extra for the E/F.
       Boeing's Finneran disputes the GAO's findings. He says 
     recent tests show the planes have exceeded range goals, and 
     he rejects the notion that the C/D has the space to be 
     upgraded. Still, looking at the broad picture, former 
     National Security Adviser Brent Scowcraft would kill the 
     program because the E/F ``has the least modernization'' of 
     the three new planes under development.
       The Super Hornet has plenty of support on Capitol Hill, 
     though. When a House National Security subcommittee 
     threatened funding for the program in 1996, House Minority 
     Leader Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri called every Democrat 
     on the full committee. Representative Jim Talent (R-Mo.) 
     collard his GOP brethren. The funding cuts were restored. 
     Even GOP Presidential hopeful Senator John McCain, who often 
     attacks Pentagon waste, backs the program.
       The upshot? The Navy will get its plane, regardless of how 
     it works. But Marine pilots won't fly it. They're waiting for 
     the stealthy Joint Strike Fighter, slated for production 
     around 2008. ``If we were going to spend dollars, we wanted 
     to spend them on something that was a leap in technology,'' 
     says recently retired General Charles C. Krulak, a former 
     Marine commandant who opted not to buy the Super Hornet. 
     Indeed, Marine pilots' fears now are quite different from 
     those Spinney heard in 1991. ``If the Joint Strike Fighter 
     dies,'' frets one airman, ``we're stuck with the Super 
     Hornet.''


                            words of warning

       Official Evaluation--The Operational Test and Evaluation 
     Force ``may find the F/A-18E/F not operationally effective/
     suitable even though all specification requirements are 
     satisfied'' Translation--This plane may have plenty of 
     problems even if it meets our specs.
       Official Evaluation--How to mitigate the problem: 
     ``aggressive indoctrination of operational community to help 
     them match expectation to reality of F/A-18E/F.'' 
     Translation--We oversold this plane and now need to lower 
     pilots expectations.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________