[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 9 (Monday, February 7, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S367-S369]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THE NAVY SUPER HORNET PROGRAM
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I have been a long-time critic of the
Navy's F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet program. For years, I have come to the
floor to highlight this program's shortcomings, and I have offered
bills to kill the program and amendments to try to achieve greater
scrutiny over the program. Sometimes my colleagues have agreed with me,
and more often than not, they have not on this particular issue. I
understand that, in all probability, the Super Hornet program will get
its final green light this spring, and it will go into full-rate
production.
However, I will continue to fight for responsible defense spending
and continue to try to enlighten my colleagues about this inferior,
unnecessary, and expensive program.
With that in mind, I have asked Secretary Cohen to delay his
production decision until he reviews a GAO audit of the Super Hornet
program's Operational Evaluation.
I will read an opinion-editorial by Lieutenant Colonel Jay Stout, a
highly-regarded, active duty Marine fighter pilot of the F/A-18C, and
combat veteran. The Virginian-Pilot published his opinions this past
December.
Rear Admiral J.B. Nathman, the Navy's director of air warfare, wrote
the requisite, tired response, with a little personal invective thrown
in.
A subsequent piece by James Stevenson, a well-known aviation writer,
rebuts each of Admiral Nathman's arguments. I will read Stevenson's
letter, as well.
I will read the article by Mr. Stout, and I ask unanimous consent
that two other articles, plus a December 13, 1999, article from
Business Week be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibit 1.)
Mr. FEINGOLD. The first article is Mr. Stout's piece from the
Virginian-Pilot entitled, ``The Navy's Super Fighter Is A Super
Failure.''
The article reads as follows:
I am a fighter pilot. I love fighter aircraft. But even
though my service--I am a Marine--doesn't have a dog in the
fight, it is difficult to watch the grotesquerie that is the
procurement of the Navy's new strike-fighter, the F/A-18 E/F
Super Hornet.
Billed as the Navy's strike-fighter of the future, the F/A-
18 E/F is instead an expensive failure--a travesty of
subterfuge and poor leadership. Intended to overcome any
potential adversaries during the next 20 years, the aircraft
is instead outperformed by a number of already operational
aircraft--including the fighter it is scheduled to replace,
the original F/A-18 Hornet.
The Super Hornet concept was spawned in 1992, in part, as a
replacement for the 30 year-old A-6 Intruder medium bomber.
Though it had provided yeoman service since the early 1960s,
the A-6 was aging and on its way to retirement by the end of
the Gulf War in 1991. The Navy earlier tried to develop a
replacement during the 1980s--the A-12--but bungled the
project so badly that the whole mess was scrapped in 1991.
The A-12 fiasco cost the taxpayers $5 billion and cost the
Navy what little reputation it had as a service that could
wisely spend taxpayer dollars.
Nevertheless, the requirement for an A-6 replacement
remains. Without an aircraft with a longer range and greater
payload than the current F/A-18, the Navy lost much of its
offensive punch. Consequently it turned to the original F/A-
18--a combat-proven performer, but a short-ranged light
bomber when compared to the A-6. Still stinging from the A-12
debacle, the Navy tried to ``put one over'' on Congress by
passing off a completely redesigned aircraft--the Super
Hornet--as simply a modification of the original Hornet.
The obfuscation worked. Many in Congress were fooled into
believing that the new aircraft was just what the Navy told
them it was--a modified Hornet. In fact, the new airplane is
much larger--built that way to carry more fuel and bombs--is
much different aerodynamically, has new engines and engine
intakes and a completely reworked internal structure. In
short, the Super Hornet and the original Hornet are two
completely different aircraft despite their similar
appearance.
Though the deception worked, the new aircraft--the Super
Hornet--does not. Because it was never prototyped--at the
Navy's insistence--its faults were not evident until
production aircraft rolled out of the factory. Among the
problems the aircraft experienced was the publicized
phenomenon of ``wing drop''--a spurious, uncommanded roll,
which occurred in the heart of the aircraft's performance
envelope. After a great deal of negative press, the Super
Hornet team devised a ``band-aid'' fix that mitigated the
problem at the expense of performance tradeoffs in other
regimes of flight. Regardless, the redesigned wing is a
mish-mash of aerodynamic compromises which does nothing
well. And the Super Hornet's wing drop problem is minor
compared to other shortfalls. First, the aircraft is
slow--slower than most fighters fielded since the early
1960s. In that one of the most oft-uttered maxims of the
fighter pilot fraternity is that ``Speed is Life,'' this
deficiency is alarming.
But the Super Hornet's wheezing performance against the
speed clock isn't its only flaw. If speed is indeed life,
then maneuverability is the reason that life is worth living
for the fighter pilot. In a dog fight, superior
maneuverability allows a pilot to bring his weapons to bear
against the enemy. With its heavy, aerodynamically
compromised airframe, and inadequate engines, the Super
Hornet won't win many dogfights. Indeed, it can be
outmaneuvered by nearly every front-line fighter fielded
today.
``But the Super Hornet isn't just a fighter,'' its
proponents will counter. ``It is a bomber as well.'' True,
the new aircraft carries more bombs than the current F/A-18--
but not dramatically more, or dramatically further. The
engineering can be studied, but the laws of physics don't
change for anyone--certainly not the Navy. From the
beginning, the aircraft was incapable of doing what the Navy
wanted. And they knew it.
The Navy doesn't appear to be worried about the performance
shortfalls of the Super Hornet. The aircraft is supposed to
be so full of technological wizardry that the enemy will be
overwhelmed by its superior weapons. That is the same
argument that was used prior to the Vietnam War. This logic
fell flat when our large, expensive fighters--the most
sophisticated in the world--started falling to peasants
flying simple aircraft designed during the Korean conflict.
Further drawing into question the Navy's position that
flight performance is secondary to the technological
sophistication of the aircraft, are the Air Forces'
specifications for its new--albeit expensive--fighter, the F-
22. The Air Force has ensured that the F-22 has top-notch
flight performance, as well as a weapons suite second to
none. It truly has no rivals in the foreseeable future.
The Super Hornet's shortcomings have been borne out
anecdotally. There are numerous stories, but one episode sums
it up nicely. Said one crew member who flew a standard Hornet
alongside new Super Hornets: ``We outran them, we out-flew
them, and we ran them out of gas. I was embarrassed for those
pilots.'' These shortcomings are tacitly acknowledged around
the fleet where the aircraft is referred to as the ``Super-
Slow Hornet.''
What about the rank-and-file Navy fliers? What are they
told when they question the Super Hornet's shortcomings? The
standard reply is, ``Climb aboard, sit down, and shut up.
This is our fighter, and you're going to make it work.'' Can
there be any wondering at the widespread disgust with the
Navy's
[[Page S368]]
leadership and the hemorrhaging exodus of its fliers?
Unfortunately, much of the damage has been done. Billions
of dollars have been spent on the Super Hornet that could
have been spent on maintaining or upgrading the Navy's
current fleet of aircraft. Instead, unacceptable numbers of
aircraft are sidelined for want of money to buy spare parts.
Paradoxically, much of what the Navy wanted in the Super
Hornet could have been obtained, at a fraction of the cost,
by upgrading the current aircraft--what the Navy said it was
going to do at the beginning of this mess.
Our military's aircraft acquisition program cannot afford
all the proposed acquisitions. Some hard decisions will have
to be made. The Super Hornet decision, at a savings of
billions of dollars, should be an easy one.
Again, what I have just been reading for several minutes is an op-ed
from Lt. Col. Jay Stout, somebody who actually knows this airplane
well.
Now I would like to read a brief letter that rebuts Admiral Nathman's
letter, which was in response to Lt. Col. Jay Stout's piece.
In his response to Lt. Col. Jay Stout's Dec. 15 op-ed criticism of
the F-18E Super Hornet, Rear Adm. John Nathman accused Stout (letter,
Dec. 23) of ``unfounded assertions.''
What this letter then says is:
Nathman claimed that the F-18E has completed ``the most
rigorous and scrutinized process of procurement, acquisition
and evaluation in recent Department of Defense and naval
history.'' On the contrary, the F-18E was initially rejected
by the Navy and only rushed into the budget at the last
minute when the A-12 was canceled.
In the fall of 1990, the Navy re-examined its requirements
for a deep strike aircraft. It dismissed the F-18E as
unacceptable in both range and stealth. As to stealth, it
concluded that ordnance hanging under the F-18E would provide
too good a target on radar.
When then Defense Secretary Richard Cheney canceled the A-
12, the Navy pushed the F-18E onto center stage, ignoring
regulations that required a new design number for ``major
design changes within the same mission category.'' Instead,
the Navy gave the new aircraft a new series letter, to make
this new aircraft appear as a mere modification. The Navy did
this to avoid approximately 25 specific oversight steps.
In so doing, the Navy insured that the F-18E would avoid,
from its inception, the ``scrutinized process of procurement,
acquisition and evaluation,'' about which Nathman wrote.
The Navy's attempt to minimize oversight extended to the
Congress. The Navy flight test director, in October 1996 and
March 1997, issued two F-18E deficiency reports. In spite of
these reports, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote four
months later to the chairman of the Senate National Security
Committee as follows:
The F/A-18 E/F has flawlessly progressed through every
required milestone to include operational requirements,
mission needs, cost and threat analysis, and engine
development . . . Testing results have clearly exceeded all
specific performance parameters.
Rear Adm. Nathman states that the F-18E has 40 percent more
range. Such a statement is misleading. In 1993, the Navy
admitted that under the same conditions and weapons loads,
the promised range of the F-18E was between 15 and 19 percent
less than the original F-18A specification.
It remains for Nathman to provide evidence that the F-18E's
performance is now greater than its 1993 promise.
Finally, Nathman complained that Stout wrote his article
``without checking some readily available factual
information.'' From what we have seen, even those charged
with oversight--our congressmen--cannot obtain ``readily
available factual information.'' Stout got his information
from sources that are more reliable than the CNO's
communication with Congress.
If Stout had continued his investigation, he would have
learned that far from pushing ``current technology to its
limit,'' the Navy will give future naval aviation--for twice
the program unit cost--an airplane that, below 20,000 feet
with pylons on, cannot fly supersonic. There is some question
as to whether this fact is included within the ``readily
available'' information of which Nathman spoke.
Madam President, that is the response of James Stevenson to the
Navy's letter questioning Lt. Col. Jay Stout's comments. I offer these
as evidence that we are about to embark on an F/A-18E and F airplane
that, frankly, after having been looked at for several years, at best
is not better than the current plane, and probably is worse, and is
enormously more expensive than continuing with the FA-18C and D plane.
Exhibit 1
[From the Virginian-Pilot, Dec. 23, 1999]
Look at the Facts: The Navy's New Hornet Is Super Indeed
(By Rear Admiral J.B. Nathman)
It is healthy to bring opposing views forward in open and
honest discussion. Unfortunately, this was not the case in a
Dec. 15 op-ed column on the F-18E/F Super Hornet. (``The
Navy's super fighter is a super failure''). This article was
apparently written without checking some readily available
factual information.
As the one responsible for establishing naval aviation
requirements, I can set the record straight with regard to
the performance and warfighting capabilities of the Super
Hornet. I would also like to speak for the thousands of
individuals, both military and civilian, whose efforts were
involved in bringing the Super Hornet's warfighting
capability to our Naval Air Force.
The F-18E/F Super Hornet has just completed the most
rigorous and scrutinized process of procurement, acquisition
and evaluation in recent Department of Defense and naval
history. Going into the final evaluation process, the Super
Hornet met or exceeded every established performance
milestone. The Super Hornet was designed from Day One to be a
decisive strike-fighter, equipped to handle the threats and
win in today's environment and for the foreseeable future.
Achieving this goal required years of planning and pushed
current technology to its limits to obtain the most combat
``bang for the buck'' for the US Navy and American taxpayer.
As compared to the current model F-18, proven enhancements
include:
40 percent increase in mission combat radius.
50 percent increase in combat on-station time.
Three times the carrier recovery payload--safer carrier
operations for our pilots.
Improved survivability, lethality and greater penetration
into the enemy's battle space.
Growth potential for future combat enhancements and mission
requirements.
In today's environment, the calculus of combat
effectiveness is much more than just speed. With its superb
combat maneuverability, radar and weapons systems, impressive
suite of electronic countermeasures, ability to withstand
greater combat damage and increased fuel capacity, the Super
Hornet is not only more survivable but three to five times
more combat effective than any other naval aircraft in the
inventory.
The author's unfounded assertions with regard to
performance are simply not borne out by the facts and do not
reflect the performance of the combat-ready Super Hornet.
Naval Aviation has made tough but sound choices with the
Super Hornet program. Some trade-offs are inevitable and
appropriate, particularly in an austere defense budget
climate, but this aircraft answers the Navy's needs.
The F/A-18E/F is an outstanding investment for the American
taxpayer and will serve as a model for future Navy programs
and procurement. The Super Hornet is being delivered on time,
on budget and is at the heart of naval aviation's ability to
fight and win in the 21st Century.
In the final analysis, hard fact--not innuendo, anecdote or
rumor--will establish the operational supremacy of this
aircraft. By every measure, Boeing and the Navy's new Hornet
are indeed super. The aircraft is in great shape as it
completes final evaluation.
Because the Virginian-Pilot is read by thousands of men and
women in the naval aviation community, both active-duty and
retired, I felt it was my responsibility to respond to a
column riddled with inaccuracies.
[From Business Week, Dec. 13, 1999]
The (Not So) Super Hornet--Why the Navy Is Spending Billions on a
Fighter Jet With Flaws That Costs Twice as Much as Its Predecessor
(By Stan Crock)
Pentagon analyst Frnaklin C. Spinney remembers the
conversation with crystal clarity. Over dinner with a Marine
flier in late 1991, talk turned to Navy plans for a new
version of the F-18 Hornet. Earlier in the year, the Pentagon
had killed the new A-12 bomber. Other Navy planes were
decades old. And the service thought existing F/A-18s
couldn't fly long-range missions. To fill carrier decks, the
Navy decided to rely on an upgrade of the F-18 used by the
fabled Blue Angels. ``We've got to have this even if it
doesn't work,'' the pilot confided.
How prophetic. On Nov. 16, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
finished operational-evaluation flights, the last step before
full production, set for this spring. And Congress in
September approved a five-year, $9 billion authorization for
the fighter-attack aircraft, which will cost $47 billion
through 2010. But by many accounts, the $53 million-a-copy
plane is only slightly better than its predecessor, the F/A-
18C/D (table, page 136), which costs half as much. And the E/
F's flying performance ``is almost unambiguously a step
backward,'' says Spinney.
As a debate rages on Capitol Hill over thee Pentagon's
ambitious plans to buy three new aircraft for an astounding
$340 billion over the next three decades, Boeing Co.'s Super
Hornet has managed to fly under the radar with political, if
not technological, stealth. The saga of how it has done so
shows just how hard it will be to kill off any of the three:
the Super Hornet, the Air Force's F-22 Raptor, and the Joint
Strike Fighter. The ingredients of the F/A-18E/F's tale
include a Navy anxious not to cede missions to the Air Force,
an ailing defense contractor, and lawmakers looking to
preserve defense jobs.
The Pentagon and Boeing staunchly defend the program. The
E/F won a Pentagon award in 1996 for excellence in
engineering and development. And supporters note it's on
schedule and under budget. Says Patrick J. Finneran, Boeing's
F-18 czar: ``This thing gets gold stars.''
The General Accounting Office, Congress' watchdog agency,
begs to differ. It noted in
[[Page S369]]
a June, 1999, report that as full production neared, the
plane had 84 deficiencies, including radar that couldn't tell
the direction of oncoming threats. It recommended--in vain--
that Congress reject a multiyear commitment to the program.
Critics say one reason for the Super Hornet's woes is that
the Navy dubbed the E/F a modification of its C/D
predecessor. That was true even though the E/F has a
different wing, fuselage, and engine, and is 25% heavier.
About 85% of the wing and airframe components are different
from those of the F/A-18C/D, according to an analysis by the
Cato Institute, a conservative think tank. All of this led
some experts to say it's a new aircraft.
Reeling. But a new plane would have been harder to sell to
Congress and wouldn't have been exempt from some lengthy
procurement requirements. Most important, St. Louis-based
McDonnell Douglas Corp., the F-18's builder, would not have
been guaranteed the work. At the time, McDonnell Douglas,
which Boeing acquired in 1997, was reeling from cost overruns
on other programs and the A-12's termination.
The shorter procurement process for a modification meant
McDonnell Douglas didn't have to build a prototype to help
iron our kinks. The risks from this approach became apparent
in March, 1996, during the Super Hornet's seventh test
flight. The plane suddenly started to roll as it approached
supersonic speed. A blue-ribbon panel said in a Jan. 14,
1998, report that the wing-drop phenomenon ``could put flight
safety at risk.'' And the flaw would make it tough for pilots
to track enemy aircraft.
The Navy downplays the issue, saying wing drops had cropped
up--and been solved--in previous programs. But fixing the
problem proved difficult. One solution--a new wing covering--
caused yet another problem: vibrations so severe that pilots
had trouble reading the display.
Another shrewd Navy ploy was to lower the bar for
performance standards. When the Navy brass debated whether
the E/F should be required to turn, climb, accelerate, and
maneuver better than the C/D version, Vice Admiral Dennis V.
McGinn, then the head of naval air warfare, rejected all but
acceleration. A good thing, too, because the E/F doesn't
perform so well in the other areas. In a Jan. 19, 1999, memo,
Phillip E. Coyle, a top Defense Dept. weapon systems
evaluator, says such Russian fighters as the Su-27 and Mig-9
``can accelerate faster and out-turn all variants of the F/A-
18 in most operating regimes.'' The memo says while that's
the price for more payload and range, the Navy plans to use
air-combat tactics that won't require the capabilities of the
earlier F/A-18 models.
Despite efforts to compensate for shortcomings, a July,
1997, report by an advisory board of Pentagon and contractor
representatives warned that evaluators may find the plane
``not operationally effective'' even if it meets all
requirements. One solution proposed: ``aggressive
indoctrination of operational community to help them match
expectation to reality of F/A-18E/F.'' Translation: Lower
pilots' expectations.
Early on, one of the Super Hornet's key selling points was
a project that the plane would fly 40% farther than its
predecessor. But the longer-range figure assumed that 80% of
the fleet would be one-seater planes. One-seaters carry more
fuel than two-seaters and thus can fly farther. But now the
Navy wants just 55% of the fleet to be one-seaters. While
this lets it replace the ancient F-15 Tomcat--a two-seater--
it undercuts the longer-range promises. In actual
performance, the one-seater shows a range of 444 nautical
miles, only 20% above the older F/A-18C's 369-mile range, the
GAO says.
The Navy also says the E/F will have 17 cubic feet more
room for high-tech gear than the C/D. But the GAO found only
5.46 cubic feet were usable--and that nearly every upgrade
could be installed on the C/D. And the Navy claims that the
Super Hornet performs a crucial function better than the C/D:
Returning to a carrier with unusual munitions. But critics
say it would be cheaper to dump the bombs in the ocean than
to pay $30 million extra for the E/F.
Boeing's Finneran disputes the GAO's findings. He says
recent tests show the planes have exceeded range goals, and
he rejects the notion that the C/D has the space to be
upgraded. Still, looking at the broad picture, former
National Security Adviser Brent Scowcraft would kill the
program because the E/F ``has the least modernization'' of
the three new planes under development.
The Super Hornet has plenty of support on Capitol Hill,
though. When a House National Security subcommittee
threatened funding for the program in 1996, House Minority
Leader Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri called every Democrat
on the full committee. Representative Jim Talent (R-Mo.)
collard his GOP brethren. The funding cuts were restored.
Even GOP Presidential hopeful Senator John McCain, who often
attacks Pentagon waste, backs the program.
The upshot? The Navy will get its plane, regardless of how
it works. But Marine pilots won't fly it. They're waiting for
the stealthy Joint Strike Fighter, slated for production
around 2008. ``If we were going to spend dollars, we wanted
to spend them on something that was a leap in technology,''
says recently retired General Charles C. Krulak, a former
Marine commandant who opted not to buy the Super Hornet.
Indeed, Marine pilots' fears now are quite different from
those Spinney heard in 1991. ``If the Joint Strike Fighter
dies,'' frets one airman, ``we're stuck with the Super
Hornet.''
words of warning
Official Evaluation--The Operational Test and Evaluation
Force ``may find the F/A-18E/F not operationally effective/
suitable even though all specification requirements are
satisfied'' Translation--This plane may have plenty of
problems even if it meets our specs.
Official Evaluation--How to mitigate the problem:
``aggressive indoctrination of operational community to help
them match expectation to reality of F/A-18E/F.''
Translation--We oversold this plane and now need to lower
pilots expectations.
Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________