[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 1 (Monday, January 24, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Page S5]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM TESTING

  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, last week the Department of Defense 
conducted its most recent flight test of our National Missile Defense 
system. A great deal has been said and written about this test in the 
last few days--much of it erroneous--and I think it is important that 
we draw the correct conclusions about what this test does and does not 
mean.
  The test conducted last week was one of a series of 18 scheduled 
flight tests of the National Missile Defense system, and only the 
second to actually attempt to intercept a strategic ballistic missile 
by colliding with it in space. The first test this past October was 
primarily a test of the vehicle that actually hits the target missile. 
Last week's test was significantly more complicated and involved 
additional, newly developed elements of the National Missile Defense 
system, such as the ground-based radar and the Battle Management 
Command, Control and Communications system. In fact, a senior Defense 
Department official told reporters before the test that the battle 
management system is: ``the most difficult and sophisticated part of 
this entire program.''
  The latest test began with the launch of an intercontinental 
ballistic missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. After 
its rocket engine burned out, the target missile deployed both a mock 
warhead and a balloon decoy intended to try to fool the interceptor 
missile. The missile was tracked by satellites and by the National 
Missile Defense system's ground-based radar at Kwajalein Atoll in the 
South Pacific, and the interceptor missile was launched to meet the 
target. It sighted the target missile and then closed on it.
  While the interceptor did not hit the target warhead, it appeared 
that all of the systems tested functioned properly until the final six 
seconds of these, when the infrared sensors on the interceptor vehicle 
did not operate correctly--as they had in the October test.
  While the failure to hit the target is disappointing, it is hardly 
justification for all the negative comments I have heard about last 
week's test. It's important to remember that a test program involves 
the testing of weapon systems to see if they perform as they were 
designed. The purpose of this test program is to uncover problems and 
correct them. If it were possible to take a design straight from the 
drawing board to the field, we wouldn't need testing programs. We test 
because we expect to find problems and try to solve them.
  What's remarkable about the National Missile Defense testing is not 
that the intercept vehicle missed on the second test but that it 
succeeded on the first one. Many newly introduced elements had to work 
right on this most recent test even to achieve a near miss, and the 
really significant news on this test is that all of the new elements 
which added complexity to the challenge seemed to have performed very 
well; the only thing that apparently didn't work properly was the one 
element which was already proven to work in the October flight.
  Some of the critics of missile defense have said this test was a 
major setback for the program. It was not. In fact, it demonstrated 
significant progress in the development of a workable and reliable 
National Missile Defense capability.
  The October flight was primarily a test of the intercept vehicle and 
its ability to identify a target in space, discriminate between the 
warhead and a decoy, and collide with the warhead. It did exactly what 
it was designed to do, but critics of the program claimed that had the 
decoy not attracted the intercept vehicle's attention, it never would 
have detected the warhead. They argued that the system can not work 
when there are decoys, and only did work because there was a decoy.
  As ridiculous as that sounds, it has been echoed by those who have 
long opposed missile defense in any form. An editorial in the New York 
Times claimed that the October success was ``lucky'' and occurred 
``almost by accident.'' Now wait a minute and think about this. When 
two objects--each about the size of a chair, launched 4300 miles apart 
and traveling at a combined speed of 15,000 miles an hour--collide in 
the vastness of space 140 miles above the Earth's surface, that's not 
an accident. That's a demonstration of some very capable technology and 
engineering.
  Clearly, for some, no amount of evidence will be convincing. But 
repeating something that's wrong doesn't make it right.
  Predictably, some are urging the National Missile Defense program be 
slowed down or even shelved in the wake of last week's test. For some 
critics, delay or cancellation is always the right course of action 
when it comes to missile defense. Others suggest abandoning this 
program for another approach using different basing modes, but that 
will only delay the National Missile Defense deployment we need now. 
Still others believe the administration's assessment of technological 
readiness should be delayed in order to remove the decision from 
presidential politics. This, too, would be a mistake.
  We have a National Missile Defense program because we have a growing 
vulnerability to the threat of ballistic missile attack. That threat 
will not wait for us to conduct a test program with perfect results, 
something that has never happened with any weapon system. Delay in 
deploying a defense against these missiles only serves the interests of 
our adversaries.
  This threat is growing. We must all remember that this program is not 
just an academic exercise. The Senate passed the National Missile 
Defense Act last spring; in September the Intelligence Community 
released a new National Intelligence Estimate of the ballistic missile 
threat which, according to its unclassified summary, judges that some 
rogue states may have ICBMs much sooner than previously thought, and 
that those missiles will be more sophisticated than previously 
estimated. In just the past few weeks, British authorities intercepted 
components bound for Libya for missiles with three times the range of 
Tripoli's current arsenal. According to news reports from last week, 
the Director of Central Intelligence cannot rule out that Iran may 
already be able to build a nuclear weapon. And this past weekend, North 
Korea said it was reconsidering its declaration to refrain from any 
more long-range missile tests, though of course a moratorium on flight 
testing, however long, does not mean that North Korea isn't making 
progress on its missile development programs.
  While the threat continues to intensify, we've already had too much 
delay in deploying a missile defense system. In fact, we are behind 
today precisely because those who counsel delay have long had their 
way, not because of any inherent problems with the technology. What's 
required now is that we stay the course we set for ourselves when we 
passed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. That act makes it the 
policy of the United States to deploy a National Missile Defense system 
as soon as technologically possible. With the successful test in 
October and last week's test incorporating additional elements of the 
National Missile Defense system, the talented men and women of our 
armed forces and industry have demonstrated that this system is 
technologically possible. The test program is in its early stages and 
much can and will be done to refine the system between now and the 
start of missile production. But there is no question that this 
technology is not just within our reach but is actually in our grasp 
now.
  I congratulate the Defense Department for the extraordinary technical 
accomplishments it has achieved so far, and urge it to continue to work 
to improve this important program.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.

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