[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 1 (Monday, January 24, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S44-S45]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 SUPREME COURT CAMPAIGN FINANCE RULING

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, this morning the Supreme Court issued 
the most significant ruling in the area of campaign finance and 
election law since the 1976 landmark decision in Buckley v. Valeo. I am 
happy to report the Court reaffirmed the core holding

[[Page S45]]

of Buckley: The public's elected representatives have the 
constitutional power to limit contributions to political campaigns in 
order to protect the integrity of the political process from corruption 
or the appearance of corruption.
  It is most fitting that this ruling came down this morning as the 
Senate prepares to return from its long recess. As you know, Mr. 
President, one of the most important unfinished pieces of business on 
our agenda is campaign finance reform and the McCain-Feingold bill. The 
House passed a reform bill last year by a wide bipartisan margin, and 
now today's Court decision leaves no doubt that a soft money ban, which 
is the core provision of that bill and of our bill in the Senate, is 
constitutional. Today's decision has dispatched one of the most 
persistent and most erroneous arguments against reform. The Court did 
it by a decisive vote of 6-3. We, as a legislative body, must step up 
and do what is right, what is constitutional, and what is demanded by 
the public and pass a ban on soft money.
  I will take a minute to discuss this important Supreme Court decision 
and its implications for our work in this body. The case is Nixon v. 
Shrink Missouri Government PAC. It was an appeal of the decision of the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that struck down contribution limits 
enacted by the Missouri Legislature to cover State elections. Those 
limits were modeled on the Federal limit--$1,000 per candidate per 
election in a statewide election, somewhat lower for candidates for the 
State legislature. The State statute includes an inflation adjustment 
so that the limit for statewide races had become $1,075 per election by 
the time this challenge was filed.
  The Missouri limits were upheld by the district court, but they were 
struck down by the court of appeals. The court of appeals held that the 
State had not provided adequate evidence of actual or apparent 
corruption stemming from large contributions to justify the 
restrictions. It also suggested that the limits were too low and 
therefore unconstitutional because inflation has eroded the value of a 
$1,000 contribution since 1974, when the Congress chose that limit for 
Federal elections.
  Today the Supreme Court squarely and decisively rejected the court of 
appeals analysis. It did so by a 6-3 vote. I might note that it did so 
by a 4-3 vote of Justices appointed by Republican Presidents. The Court 
held that there was more than adequate evidence of actual or apparent 
corruption on which the State legislature could base its judgment that 
contributions should be limited. The Court noted that the Buckley 
decision itself provides that evidence. It said:

       Buckley demonstrates that the dangers of large, corporate 
     contributions and the suspicion that large contributions are 
     corrupt are neither novel nor implausible. The opinion noted 
     that the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 
     election demonstrate that the problem of corruption is not an 
     illusory one.

  In essence, the Court today rejected the notion that legislatures 
must amass conclusive evidence of actual corruption in order to justify 
contribution limits and that each State or Federal legislature must 
reinvent the wheel each time it passes a new limit. The Court 
concluded:

       [T]here is little reason to doubt that sometimes large 
     contributions will work actual corruption of our political 
     system, and no reason to question the existence of a 
     corresponding suspicion among voters.

  The Court thus found, as advocates for reform have argued for years, 
that it is reasonable for Congress to conclude that large contributions 
are corrupting our system. The question has been asked not too long ago 
in this Chamber, where is the corruption? Today Justice Souter has 
provided the answer: It is in the big money.
  The Court also rejected the argument that because the passage of time 
has eroded the value of a $1,000 contribution, somehow that limit is 
now unconstitutionally low, even though it was acceptable in 1974. We 
have heard this argument time and again on the floor of the Senate. It 
has been rejected by the Supreme Court. The Court specifically held 
that Buckley did not establish a constitutional minimum. Instead, the 
relevant question in Buckley was ``whether the contribution limitation 
was so radical in effect as to render political association 
ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of 
notice, and render contributions pointless.''
  The Court concluded:

       Such being the test, the issue in later cases cannot be 
     truncated to a narrow question about the power of the dollar 
     but must go to the power to mount a campaign with all the 
     dollars likely to be forthcoming. As Judge Gibson, the 
     dissenting judge in the court of appeals, put it, ``the 
     dictates of the first amendment are not mere functions of the 
     Consumer Price Index.''

  I have quoted the decision at some length because I think it is 
crucial that my colleagues hear and understand the very clear and very 
direct statements of the Supreme Court on questions that were not only 
at issue in this case but that we have been debating in this body over 
the past few years. No longer can my colleagues come to this floor and 
say they would love to support a ban on soft money but it would violate 
the first amendment for Congress to outlaw unlimited corporate and 
labor contributions to political parties. This favorite figleaf 
clutched by opponents of reform was snatched away today by the Supreme 
Court. That emperor now has no clothes.

  Just as 126 legal scholars said over 2 years ago when they wrote to 
us, today's decision confirms that Congress may constitutionally outlaw 
soft money in this country. Justice Breyer's concurrence today, joined 
by Justice Ginsburg, says that explicitly. He writes:

       Buckley's holding seems to leave the political branches 
     broad authority to enact laws regulating contributions that 
     take the form of soft money.

  We have more than adequate evidence of at least the appearance of 
corruption in these unlimited contributions. Furthermore, if Congress 
can limit individual contributions and ban corporate and labor 
contributions in connection with Federal elections, surely it can 
eliminate the soft money loophole through which corporations, unions, 
and wealthy individuals evade those limits. The constitutionality of 
the McCain-Feingold bill to ban soft money is simply no longer an open 
question. The support of the American people for taking such a step is 
not in doubt either.
  What is in doubt is the courage and will of the Senate to do what has 
to be done. Now that we are back in session, and with the encouragement 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, we must act. The reason we 
must act was made very clear by the Supreme Court today. The survival 
of our democracy depends on our citizens having confidence that their 
elected officials will vote in accordance with the public interest 
rather than the interest of their contributors. The appearance of 
corruption inherent in unlimited contributions calls that confidence 
into grave question. As the Court said in its opinion today:

       Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the 
     cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could 
     jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in 
     democratic governance. Democracy works only if people have 
     faith in those who govern. That faith is bound to be 
     shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in 
     activities which arouse suspicions of ``malfeasance and 
     corruption.''

  I urge all of my colleagues to read and digest the opinion of the 
Court in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC. The Court has done 
its duty and spoken in a clear voice. Now we must do ours.
  I yield the floor.

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