[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 165 (Friday, November 19, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S15069-S15071]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, due to the illness of a family member, I was 
unable to participate in much of the debate on the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty. I voted in favor of ratification of the treaty, and, now 
that there is ample time, I want to express my views on the treaty and 
the debate prior to the Senate's vote against ratification.
  In my view, that vote was a sad day for the United States Senate, for 
our nation and for the world. During the debate, my colleague, Senator 
Cleland spoke eloquently of the pride he felt as a young man sitting in 
this chamber 36 years ago when the Senate voted to ratify the first 
nuclear test ban treaty which prohibited atmospheric nuclear tests. I 
doubt that many people can express a similar sense of pride over the

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outcome of the Senate's consideration of the Test Ban Treaty earlier 
this fall.
  My disappointment rests, firstly, with the manner in which this 
treaty was considered. It can only be characterized as hurried, a 
legislative rush to judgement. For instance, Senator Byrd, one of the 
most senior members of this chamber and a former majority leader, rose 
to speak prior to a procedural vote. He dared to ask for fifteen 
minutes to speak during this chamber's headlong rush to vote against a 
treaty that would ban nuclear explosions throughout the world. The 
majority was well aware that there were not 67 votes for this treaty, 
and they knew what the final outcome would be. Sadly, though, the 
majority found it necessary to brush aside the most senior member on 
this side of the aisle. That is not the way we should conduct business 
in the Senate.
  Unfortunately, that episode characterized the entire debate on this 
treaty. There was a hastiness and a needless sense of urgency about 
arriving at that ratification vote that we rarely see in this body. The 
sudden scheduling of the vote, prior to a single hearing, brought one 
week of frenzied focus that some members characterized as ample 
consideration. I think that it fell far short. All hearings on this 
treaty were crammed into one week, and most of the floor debate time 
was allocated on a Friday, prior to a three day weekend and after the 
week's final vote.
  The brief debate and vote on this treaty were closely watched within 
this country and around the world. As evidence of that, most, if not 
all, Senators received a high volume of constituent calls, and no 
Senator is unaware that foreign leaders made rare appeals to this body.
  The process followed with this treaty bore little resemblance to the 
process the Senate normally follows when it receives a treaty. The 
normal process includes careful consideration of a treaty's merits, an 
airing of the arguments from those who have objections, the addition of 
any safeguards that may be necessary, and, finally, a vote on 
ratification. In this case, that process was ignored and, some would 
argue, even maligned.
  The Senate could have easily avoided a ratification vote, and, given 
the haste of its actions and the profound importance of the subject at 
hand, should have done so. Moreover, some members on the other side of 
the aisle clearly stated that they needed more time to examine this 
treaty, study its implications, and propose any appropriate amendments 
or side agreements. In fact, a majority of this body appeared to want 
more time to do so. That view is eminently reasonable considering how 
quickly this treaty was considered. Instead, all Senators were forced 
to make a fast decision and put their position on record. It is hard to 
avoid the conclusion that the defeat of this treaty was an end in 
itself, rather than a byproduct of considered action. Now, by this 
vote, the United States Senate has allowed friend and foe to conclude 
that we want more nuclear testing and we need more nuclear explosions. 
We ignored Senator Levin's injunction to, at the very least, ``do no 
harm.'' Instead, we have at a minimum muddied this nation's 
position with respect to containing the threat of nuclear warfare. All 
we had to do to avoid this outcome was to delay the vote. There were 
those on the other side of the aisle who endorsed doing just that. 
Regrettably, they were overruled by their colleagues who are 
overzealous opponents of this Administration.

  I support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and, as the President 
stated, I expect that the treaty will be ratified--if not this year, 
then some year. Nuclear test explosions are becoming anachronisms; the 
tide of history is quickly sweeping away the last vestiges of their 
legitimacy. Prior to the vote, I had decided to support the President's 
request to put off the vote on ratification. It had become clear to the 
President and me and most other members of this chamber that, despite 
our strong support of this treaty, the Senate was not yet ready to 
support ratification. It was with regret that I arrived at that 
conclusion, because no one enjoys putting off a vote that will benefit 
the people of this nation, and, in this case, the people of the world. 
This treaty has been signed by over 150 nations. It is supported by 
nearly every member of the United Nations. Clearly it merited several 
days or even weeks of hearings in which experts on both sides of this 
issue would have a chance to present testimony and answer questions. 
More than that, though, it deserved to be ratified. Our nation is the 
world's greatest force for peace and freedom. It is not worthy of that 
stature for us to be outside the community of civilized nations that 
have committed themselves to an end to nuclear testing.
  We have missed an opportunity to lead these nations, and to provide 
an example to countries like India and Pakistan, both of whom are on 
the verge of signing this treaty. Instead, we have, I fear, energized 
forces in those countries and others around the world that favor 
further testing or revoking pledges not to test.
  This treaty will make the world more safe for our children and our 
children's children. We have a responsibility, despite the vote, to 
those future generations to do our part to stop nuclear detonations. If 
we fail in our responsibility, we will dash the hopes of generations 
yet to come. They may wonder why, when the world finally seemed ready 
to halt nuclear testing, the United States refused to go along.
  Throughout the Cold War, nuclear tests may have been necessary to 
modernize this nation's nuclear weapons capability. But at the height 
of tensions with the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower said that the 
failure to achieve a nuclear test ban ``would have to be classed as the 
greatest disappointment of any administration, of any decade, of any 
time and of any party.''
  In 1992, President Bush, a former CIA Director and Ambassador to the 
United Nations, unilaterally halted nuclear weapons tests in the United 
States. President Clinton subsequently continued the moratorium. This 
treaty would halt nuclear weapons tests in other nations, as well. It 
would force other nations to do what this nation has already done and 
has been doing for these past several years.
  Since the first test in 1945, the United States has conducted 1030 
nuclear explosions--more than all other nations combined. As a result, 
we have far more test data and a far more deadly nuclear arsenal than 
any other nation. This treaty would effectively preserve this nation's 
position as the pre-eminent nuclear weapons power.
  It would limit the ability of nuclear-capable nations from developing 
more sophisticated and more deadly nuclear weapons. It does not outlaw 
improvements and advancements to weapons, but without the ability to 
test the new weapons, nations would be hesitant to deploy them.
  For those nations that do not yet possess a nuclear arsenal, this 
treaty will hinder their ability to develop such an arsenal. Those 
nations will be barred from conducting and studying a single nuclear 
explosion. Perhaps they could develop, at some time in the future, a 
crude nuclear arsenal, but they would face daunting uncertainties 
without having witnessed a single explosion.
  This treaty enhances our national security. It has the support of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and several former military leaders including 
Gen. Colin Powell. Besides solidifying this nation's vast lead in 
nuclear technology and nuclear weaponry, it would assist us in 
monitoring nuclear explosions throughout the world. Regardless of 
whether this treaty goes into force, this nation must determine whether 
other nations are conducting nuclear explosions. This treaty mandates a 
global network of sensors and allows for on-site inspections, so it 
would greatly assist this nation in meeting its monitoring 
responsibilities.
  Questions have been raised about whether we can maintain the 
reliability of our nuclear arsenal absent more nuclear tests. Many 
nuclear experts, however, assert that we can maintain a reliable 
deterrent, as we have since 1992, without the nuclear explosions. 
Furthermore, this nation plans to allocate $45 billion over the next 
ten years to ensure the reliability of our stockpile. What other nation 
has greater resources to dedicate to its stockpile? What other nation 
is better able, given its experience, to ensure the reliability of 
nuclear weapons?
  Our allies, Britain and France, have conducted far fewer nuclear 
explosions than we have, yet they have ratified

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this treaty. Over half of the nuclear-capable nations in the world have 
ratified this treaty. We have the least to lose and the most to gain if 
this treaty goes into force. This nation must do its part and help rid 
the world of these terrible nuclear explosions. I urge my colleagues to 
support a reexamination of these issues and a reconsideration of the 
Senate's regrettable course of action.

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