[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 158 (Wednesday, November 10, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S14541-S14547]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mrs. FEINSTEIN:
  S. 1902. A bill to require disclosure under the Freedom of 
Information Act regarding certain persons and records of the Japanese 
Imperial Army in a manner that does not impair any investigation or 
prosecution conducted by the Department of Justice or certain 
intelligence matters, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the 
Judiciary.


             Japanese Imperial Army Disclosure Act of 1999

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Japanese 
Imperial Army Disclosure Act of 1999.
  This legislation will require the disclosure under the Freedom of 
Information Act classified records and documents in the possession of 
the U.S. Government regarding chemical and biological experiments 
carried out by Japan during the course of the Second World War.
  Let me preface my statement by making clear that none of the remarks 
that I will make in discussing this legislation should be considered 
anti-Japanese. I was proud to serve as the President of the Japan 
Society of Northern California, and I have done everything I can to 
foster, promote, and develop positive relations between Japan, the 
United States, China, and other states of the region. The legislation I 
introduce today is eagerly sought by a large number of Californians who 
believe that there is an effort to keep information about possible 
atrocities and experiments with poisonous gas and germ warfare from the 
pubic record.
  One of my most important goals in the Senate is to see the 
development of a Pacific Rim community that is peaceful and stable. I 
have worked towards this end for over twenty years. I introduce this 
legislation to try to heal wounds that still remain, particularly in 
California's Chinese-American community.

  This legislation is needed because although the Second World War 
ended over fifty years ago--and with it Japan's chemical and biological 
weapons experimentation programs--many of the records and documents 
regarding Japan's wartime activities remain classified and hidden in 
U.S. Government archives and repositories. Even worse, according to 
some scholars, some of these records are now being inadvertently 
destroyed.
  For the many U.S. Army veteran's who were subject to these 
experiments in POW camps, as well as the many Chinese and other Asian 
civilians who were subjected to these experiments, the time has long 
since passed for the full truth to come out.
  According to information which was revealed at the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East, starting in 1931, when the so-
called ``Mukden incident'' provided Japan the pretext for the 
occupation of Manchuria, the Japanese Imperial Army conducted numerous 
biological and chemical warfare tests on Chinese civilians, Allied 
POWs, and possibly Japanese civilians as well.
  Perhaps the most notorious of these experiments were carried out 
under General Ishii Shiro, a Japanese Army surgeon, who, by the late 
1930's had built a large installation in China with germ breeding 
facilities, testing

[[Page S14542]]

grounds, prisons to hold the human test subjects, facilities to make 
germ weapons, and a crematorium for the final disposal of the human 
test victims. General Ishii's main factory operated under the code name 
Unit 731.
  Based on the evidence revealed at the War Crimes trials, as well as 
subsequent work by numerous scholars, there is little doubt that Japan 
conducted these chemical and biological warfare experiments, and that 
the Japanese Imperial Army attempted to use chemical and biological 
weapons during the course of the war, included reports of use of plague 
on the cities of Ningbo and Changde.
  And, as a 1980 article by John Powell in the Bulletin of Concerned 
Asia Scholars found,

       Once the fact had been established that Ishii had used 
     Chinese and others as laboratory tests subjects, it seemed a 
     fair assumption that he also might have used American 
     prisoners, possibly British, and perhaps even Japanese.

  Some of the records of these activities were revealed during the 
Tokyo War Crimes trials, and others have since come to light under 
Freedom of Information Act requests, but many other documents, which 
were transferred to the U.S. military during the occupation of Japan, 
have remained hidden for the past fifty years.
  And it is precisely for this reason that this legislation is needed: 
The world is entitled to a full and compel record of what did 
transpire.
  Sheldon Harris, Professor of History Emeritus at California State 
university Northridge wrote to me on October 7 of this year that:

       In my capacity as an academic Historian, I can testify to 
     the difficulty researchers have in unearthing documents and 
     personal testimony concerning these war crimes * * *. Here in 
     the United States, despite the Freedom of Information Act, 
     some archives remain closed to investigators * * *. Moreover, 
     ``sensitive documents--as defined by archivists and FOIA 
     officers--are at the moment being destroyed.

  Professor Sheldon's letter goes on to discuss three examples of the 
destruction of documents relating to chemical and biological warfare 
experiments that he is aware of: At Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah, at 
Fort Detrick in Maryland, and at the Pentagon.
  This legislation establishes, within 60 days after the enactment of 
the act, the Japanese Imperial Army Records Interagency Working Group, 
including representation by the Department of State and the Archivist 
of the United States, to locate, identify, and recommend for 
declassification all Japanese Imperial Army records of the United 
States.
  This Interagency Work Group, which will remain in existence for three 
years, is to locate, identify, inventory, recommend for classification, 
and make available to the public all classified Imperial Army records 
of the United States. It is to do so in coordination with other 
agencies, and to submit a report to Congress describing its activities.
  It is my belief that the establishment of such an Interagency Working 
Group is the best way to make sure that the documents which need to be 
declassified will be declassified, and that this process will occur in 
an orderly and expeditious manner.
  This legislation also includes exceptions which would allow the 
Interagency Working Group to deny release of records on the basis of: 
1. Records which may unfairly invade an individual's privacy; 2. 
Records which adversely affect the national security or intelligence 
capabilities of the United States; 3. Records which might ``seriously 
or demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a 
foreign government''; and, 4. Records which might contribute to the 
development of chemical or biological capabilities.
  My purpose in introducing this legislation is to help those who were 
victimized by these experiments and, with the adage ``the truth shall 
set you free'' in mind, help build a more peaceful Asian-Pacific 
community for the twenty-first century.
  First, the declassification and release of this material will help 
the victims of chemical and biological warfare experimentation carried 
out by the Japanese Army during the Second World War, as well as their 
families and descendants, gain information about what occurred to them 
fifty years ago. If old wounds are to heal, there must be a full 
accounting of what happened.
  Second, and perhaps just as importantly, this legislation is intended 
to create an environment of honest dialogue and discussion in the Asia-
Pacific region, so that the countries and people of the region can move 
beyond the problems that have plagued us for the past century, and work 
together to build a peaceful and prosperous Asian-Pacific community in 
the next century.
  If the countries of Asia are to build a peaceful community it is 
necessary that we deal fully, fairly, and honestly with the past. It is 
only by doing so that we can avoid repeating the mistakes of the past 
and build a more just world for the future.
  Indeed, as Rabbi Abraham Cooper has remarked, ``Since the end of 
World War II, professed neutral nations like Sweden and Switzerland 
have had the courage to take a painful look back at their World War II 
record; can Japan be allowed to do anything less?''
  I hope that my colleagues will join me in support of this 
legislation.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the October 7 letter by 
Professor Harris and an article outlining some of the scholarly 
research on this issue: ``Japan's Biological Weapons: 1930-1945,'' by 
Robert Gromer, John Powell, and Burt Roling be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                            Granada Hills, CA,

                                                  October 7, 1999.
     Hon. Senator Dianne Feinstein,
     Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Feinstein: Several Asian American activists 
     organizations in California, and organizations representing 
     former Prisoners of War and Internees of the Japanese 
     Imperial Army, have indicated to me that you are proposing to 
     introduce legislation into the United States Senate that 
     calls for full disclosure by the United States Government of 
     records it possesses concerning war crimes committed by 
     members of the Japanese Imperial Army. I endorse such 
     legislation enthusiastically.
       My support for the full disclosure of American held records 
     relating to the Japanese Imperial Army's wartime crimes 
     against humanity is both personal and professional. I am 
     aware of the terrible suffering members of the Imperial 
     Japanese Army imposed upon innocent Asians, prisoners of war 
     of various nationalists and civilian internees of Allied 
     nations. These inhumane acts were condoned, if not ordered, 
     by the highest authorities in both the civilian and military 
     branches of the Japanese government. As a consequence, 
     millions of persons were killed, maimed, tortured, or 
     experienced acts of violence that included human experiments 
     relating to biological and chemical warfare research. Many of 
     these actions meet the definition of ``war crimes'' under 
     both the Potsdam Declaration and the various Nuremberg War 
     Crimes trials held in the post-war period.
       I am the author of ``Factories of Death, Japanese 
     Biological Warfare, 1932-45, and the American Cover-up'' 
     (Routlege: London and New York; hard cover edition 1994; 
     paperback printings, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999). I discovered in 
     the course of my research for this book, and scholarly 
     articles that I published on the subject of Japanese 
     biological and chemical warfare preparations, that members of 
     the Japanese Imperial Army Medical Corps committed heinous 
     war crimes. These included involuntary laboratory tests of 
     various pathogens on humans--Chinese, Korean, other Asian 
     nationalities, and Allied prisoners of war, including 
     Americans. Barbarous acts encompassed live vivisections, 
     amputations of body parts (frequently without the use of 
     anesthesia), frost bite exposure to temperatures of 40-50 
     degrees Fahrenheit below zero, injection of horse blood and 
     other animal blood into humans, as well as other horrific 
     experiments. When a test was completed, the human 
     experimented was ``sacrificed'', the euphemism used by 
     Japanese scientists as a substitute term for ``killed.''
       In my capacity as an academic Historian, I can testify to 
     the difficulty researchers have in unearthing documents and 
     personal testimony concerning these war crimes. I, and other 
     researchers, have been denied access to military archives in 
     Japan. These archives cover activities by the Imperial 
     Japanese Army that occurred more than 50 years ago. The 
     documents in question cannot conceivably contain information 
     that would be considered of importance to ``National 
     Security'' today. The various governments in Japan for the 
     past half century have kept these archives firmly closed. The 
     fear is that the information contained in the archives will 
     embarrass previous governments.
       Here in the United States, despite the Freedom of 
     Information Act, some archives remain closed to 
     investigators. At best, the archivists in charge, or the 
     Freedom of Information Officer at the archive in question, 
     select what documents they will allow to become public. This 
     is an unconscionable act of arrogance and a betrayal of the 
     trust they have been given by the Congress and the

[[Page S14543]]

     President of the United States. Moreover, ``sensitive'' 
     documents--as defined by archivists and FOIA officers--are at 
     the moment being destroyed. Thus, historians and concerned 
     citizens are being denied factual evidence that can shed some 
     light on the terrible atrocities committed by Japanese 
     militarists in the past.
       Three examples of this wanton destruction should be 
     sufficiently illustrative of the dangers that exist, and 
     should reinforce the obvious necessity for prompt passage of 
     legislation you propose to introduce into the Congress:
       1. In 1991, the Librarian at Dugway Proving Grounds, 
     Dugway, Utah, denied me access to the archives at the 
     facility. It was only through the intervention of then U.S. 
     Representative Wayne Owens, Dem., Utah, that I was given 
     permission to visit the facility. I was not shown all the 
     holdings relating to Japanese medical experiments, but the 
     little I was permitted to examine revealed a great deal of 
     information about medical war crimes. Sometimes after my 
     visit, a person with intimate knowledge of Dugway's 
     operations, informed me that ``sensitive'' documents were 
     destroyed there as a direct result of my research in their 
     library.
       2. I conducted much of my American research at Fort Detrick 
     in Frederick, Md. The Public Information Officer there was 
     extremely helpful to me. Two weeks ago I telephoned Detrick, 
     was informed that the PIO had retired last May. I spoke with 
     the new PIO, who told me that Detrick no longer would discuss 
     past research activities, but would disclose information only 
     on current projects. Later that day I telephoned the retired 
     PIO at his home. He informed me that upon retiring he was 
     told to ``get rid of that stuff'', meaning incriminating 
     documents relating to Japanese medical war crimes. Detrick no 
     longer is a viable research center for historians.
       3. Within the past 2 weeks, I was informed that the 
     Pentagon, for ``space reasons'', decided to rid itself of all 
     biological warfare documents in its holdings prior to 1949. 
     The date is important, because all war crimes trials against 
     accused Japanese war criminals were terminated by 1949. Thus, 
     current Pentagon materials could not implicate alleged 
     Japanese war criminals. Fortunately, a private research 
     facility in Washington volunteered to retrieve the documents 
     in question. This research facility now holds the documents, 
     is currently cataloguing them (estimated completion time, at 
     least twelve months), and is guarding the documents under 
     ``tight security.''
       Your proposed legislation must be acted upon promptly. Many 
     of the victims of Japanese war crimes are elderly. Some of 
     the victims pass away daily. Their suffering should receive 
     recognition and some compensation. Moreover, History is being 
     cheated. As documents disappear, the story of war crimes 
     committed in the War In The Pacific becomes increasingly 
     difficult to describe. The end result will be a distorted 
     picture of reality. As an Historian, I cannot accept this 
     inevitability without vigorous protest.
       Please excuse the length of this letter. However, I do hope 
     that some of the arguments I made in comments above will be 
     of some assistance to you as you press for passage of the 
     proposed legislation. I will be happy to be of any additional 
     assistance to you, should you wish to call upon me for 
     further information or documentation.
           Sincerely yours,

                                            Sheldon H. Harris,

                                    Professor of History emeritus,
     California State University, Northridge.
                                  ____


        [From the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Oct., 1981]

   Japan's Biological Weapons: 1930-1945--A Hidden Chapter in History

         (By Robert Gomer, John W. Powell and Bert V.A. Roling)

       When this story first reached the Bulletin, our reaction 
     was horrified disbelief. I think all of us hoped that it was 
     not true. Unfortunately, subsequent research shows that it is 
     all too true. In order to verify the facts set forth here we 
     enlisted the help of a number of distinguished scientists and 
     historians, who are hereby thanked. It seems unnecessary to 
     mention them by name; suffice it that the allegations set 
     forth in this article seem to be true and there is a 
     substantial file of documents in the Bulletin offices to back 
     them up.
       What other comment need one really make? Any reader with a 
     sense of justice and decency will be nauseated, not only by 
     these atrocities, but equally so by the reaction of the U.S. 
     Departments of War and State.
       The psychological climate engendered by war is horrible. 
     The Japanese tortured and killed helpless prisoners in search 
     of ``a cheap and effective weapon.'' The Americans and 
     British invented firestorms and the U.S. dropped two nuclear 
     bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In such a climate it may 
     have seemed reasonable not to bring the Japanese responsible 
     for the biological ``experiments'' to justice, but it was and 
     remains monstrous.
       By acquiring ``at a fraction of the original cost'' the 
     ``invaluable'' results of the Japanese experiments, have we 
     not put ourselves on the same level as the Japanese 
     experimenters? Some politicians and generals like to speak of 
     the harsh realities of the world in order to act both 
     bestially and stupidly. The world clearly does contain harsh 
     realities but somehow there is a sort of potential divine 
     justice basic decency generally would have been the 
     smartest course in the long run. Unfortunately there are 
     few instances where it was actually taken.
       The spirit and psychological climate which made possible 
     the horrors described in this article are not dead; in fact, 
     they seem to be flourishing in the world. The torture 
     chambers are busy in Latin America and elsewhere, and the 
     United States provides economic and military aid to the 
     torturers. The earth-and-people destroying was waged by the 
     United States not long ago in Vietnam, the apparently similar 
     war being waged by the Soviets in Afghanistan, the horrors of 
     the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, and the contemplation with 
     some equanimity of ``limited'' nuclear war by strategists 
     here and in the Soviet Union display the spirit of General 
     Ishii. If we are to survive as human beings, or more 
     accurately, if we are to become fully human, that spirit must 
     have no place among men.--Robert Gomer (professor of 
     chemistry at the University of Chicago, and member of the 
     Board of Directors of the Bulletin.)
       Long-secret documents, secured under the U.S. Freedom of 
     Information Act, reveal details of one of the more gruesome 
     chapters of the Pacific War; Japan's use of biological 
     warfare against China and the Soviet Union. For years the 
     Japanese and American governments succeeded in suppressing 
     this story.
       Japan's desire to hide its attempts at ``public health in 
     reverse'' is understandable. The American government's 
     participation in the cover-up, it is now disclosed, stemmed 
     from Washington's desire to secure exclusive possession of 
     Japan's expertise in using germs as lethal weapons. The 
     United States granted immunity from war crimes prosecution to 
     the Japanese participants, and they in turn handed over their 
     laboratory records to U.S. representatives from Camp Detrick 
     (now Fort Detrick).
       The record shows that by the late 1930s Japan's biological 
     warfare (BW) program was ready for testing. It was used with 
     moderate success against Chinese troops and civilians and 
     with unknown results against the Russians. By 1945 Japan had 
     a huge stockpile of germs, vectors and delivery equipment 
     unmatched by any other nation.
       Japan had gained this undisputed lead primarily because its 
     scientists used humans as guinea pigs. It is estimated that 
     at least 3,000 people were killed at the main biological 
     warfare experimental station, code named Unit 731 and located 
     a few miles from Harbin. They either succumbed during the 
     experiments or were executed when they had become physical 
     wrecks and were no longer fit for further germ tests [1, pp. 
     19-21]. There is no estimate of total casualties but it is 
     known that at least two other Japanese biological warfare 
     installations--Unit 100 near Changchun and the Tama 
     Detachment in Nanjing--engaged in similar human 
     experimentation.
       (End Notes at end of articles)
       This much of the story has been available for some years. 
     What has not been known until very recently is that among the 
     human guinea pigs were an undetermined number of American 
     soldiers, captured during the early part of the war and 
     confined in prisoner-of-war camps in Manchuria. Official U.S. 
     reports reveal that Washington was aware of these facts when 
     the decision was made to forego prosecution of the Japanese 
     participants. These declassified ``top secret'' documents 
     disclose the details and raise disturbing questions about the 
     role of numerous highly placed American officials at the 
     time.
       The first public indications that American prisoners of war 
     were among the human victims appeared in the published 
     summary of the Khabarovsk trial. A witness stated that a 
     researcher was sent to the camps where U.S. prisoners were 
     held to ``study the immunity of Anglo-Saxons to infectious 
     diseases'' [1, p. 268]. The summary noted: ``As early as 
     1943, Minata, a researcher belonging to Detachment 731, was 
     sent to prisoner of war camps to test the properties of the 
     blood and immunity to contagious diseases of American 
     soldiers'' [1, p. 415].
       On June 7, 1947, Colonel Alva C. Carpenter, chief of 
     General Douglas MacArthur's legal staff, in a top secret 
     cable to Washington, expressed doubt about the reliability of 
     early reports of Japanese biological warfare, including an 
     allegation by the Japanese Communist Party that experiments 
     had been performed ``on captured Americans in Mukden and that 
     simultaneously research on similar lines was conducted in 
     Tokyo and Kyoto.'' On June 27, Carpenter again cabled 
     Washington, stating that further information strengthened the 
     charges and ``warrants conclusion'' that the Ishii group had 
     violated the ``rules of land warfare.'' He warned that the 
     Soviets might bring up evidence of Japanese use of biological 
     warfare against China and ``other evidence on this subject 
     which may have resulted from their independent investigation 
     in Manchuria and in Japan.'' He added that ``this expression 
     of opinion'' was not a recommendation that Ishii's group be 
     charged with war crimes.
       Cecil F. Hubbert, a member of the State, War, Navy 
     Coordinating Committee, in a July 15, 1947 memo, recommended 
     that the story be covered up but warned that it might leak 
     out if the Russian prosecutor brought the subject up during 
     the Tokyo war crimes trials and added that the Soviets might 
     have found out that ``American prisoners of war were used for 
     experimental purposes of a bw nature and that they lost their 
     lives as a result of these experiments.''

[[Page S14544]]

       In his book, The Pacific War Professor Ienaga Saburo added 
     a few new details about Unit 731 and described fatal 
     vivisection experiments at Kyushu Imperial University on 
     downed American fliers [2, pp. 188-90].
       The biological warfare project began shortly after the 
     Manchurian Incident in 1931, when Japan occupied China's 
     Northeast provinces and when a Japanese Army surgeon, Ishii 
     Shiro, persuaded his superiors that microbes could become an 
     inexpensive weapon potentially capable of producing enormous 
     casualties [1, pp. 105-107; 3]. Ishii, who finally rose to 
     the rank of lieutenant-general, built a large, self-contained 
     installation with sophisticated germ- and insect-breeding 
     facilities, a prison for the human experimentees, testing 
     grounds, an arsenal for makin germ bombs, an airfield, its 
     own special planes and a crematorium for the human victims.
       When Soviet tanks crossed the Siberian-Manchurian border at 
     midnight on August 8, 1945, Japan was less than a week away 
     from unconditional surrender. In those few days of grace the 
     Japanese destroyed their biological warfare installations in 
     China, killed the remaining human experimentees (``It took 30 
     hours to lay them in ashes [4]'') and ship out most of their 
     personnel and some of the more valuable equipment to South 
     Korea [1, pp. 43, 125, 130-31]. Reports that some equipment 
     was slipped into Japan are confirmed by American documents 
     which reveal that slides, laboratory records and case 
     histories of experiments over many years were successfully 
     transported to Japan [4].
       A ``top secret'' cable from Tokyo to Washington on May 6, 
     1947, described some of the information being secured:
       ``Statements obtained from Japanese here confirm statements 
     of ussr prisoners. . . Experiments on humans were . . . 
     described by three Japanese and confirmed tacitly by Ishii; 
     field trials against Chinese took place . . . scope of 
     program indicated by report . . . that 400 kilograms [880 
     lbs.] of dried anthrax organisms destroyed in August 1945. . 
     . . Reluctant statements by Ishii indicate he had superiors 
     (possibly general staff) who . . . authorized the program. 
     Ishii states that if guaranteed immunity from ``war crimes'' 
     in documentary form for himself, superiors and subordinates, 
     he can describe program in detail. Ishii claims to have 
     extensive theoretical high-level knowledge including 
     strategic and tactical use of BW on defense and offense, 
     backed by some research on best agents to employ by 
     geographical areas of Far East, and the use of BW in cold 
     climates'' [5, 6].
       A top secret Tokyo headquarters ``memorandum for the 
     record'' (also dated May 6), gave more details: ``USSR 
     interest in Japanese BW personnel arises from interrogations 
     of two captured Japanese formerly associated with BW. Copies 
     of these interrogations were given to U.S. Preliminary 
     investigation[s] confirm authenticity of USSR interrogations 
     and indicate Japanese activity in:
       a. Human experiments
       b. Field trials against Chinese
       c. Large scale program
       d. Research on BW by crop destruction
       e. Possible that Japanese General Staff knew and authorized 
     program
       f. Thought and research devoted to strategic and tactical 
     use of BW.
       Data . . . on above topics are of great intelligence value 
     to U.S. Dr. Fell, War Department representative, states that 
     this new evidence was not known by U.S. [6].
       Certain low echelon Japanese are now working to assemble 
     most of the necessary technical data. . . . Information to 
     the present have [sic] been obtained by persuasion, 
     exploitation of Japanese fear of USSR and Japanese desire to 
     cooperate with U.S. Additional information . . . probably can 
     be obtained by informing Japanese involved that information 
     will be kept in intelligence channels and not employed for 
     `war crimes' evidence.
       Documentary immunity from ``war crimes'' given to higher 
     echelon personnel involved will result in exploiting twenty 
     years experience of the director, former General Ishii, who 
     can assure complete cooperation of his former subordinates, 
     indicate the connection of the Japanese General Staff and 
     provide the tactical and strategic information'' [7].
       A report on December 12, 1947, by Dr. Edwin V. Hill, chief, 
     Basic Sciences, Camp Detrick, Maryland, described some of the 
     technical data secured from the Japanese during an official 
     visit to Tokyo by Hill and Dr. Joseph Victor [8]. 
     Acknowledging the ``wholehearted cooperation of Brig. Gen. 
     Charles A. Willoughby,'' MacArthur's intelligence chief, Hill 
     wrote that the objectives were to obtain additional material 
     clarifying reports already submitted by the Japanese, ``to 
     examine human pathological material which had been 
     transferred to Japan from BW installations,'' and ``to obtain 
     protocols necessary for understanding the significance of the 
     pathological material.''
       Hill and Victor interviewed a number of Japanese experts 
     who were already assembling biological warfare archival 
     material and writing reports for the United States. They 
     checked the results of experiments with various specific 
     human, animal and plant diseases, and investigated Ishii's 
     system for spreading disease via aerosol from planes. Dr. Ota 
     Kiyoshi described his anthrax experiments, including the 
     number of people infected and the number who died Ishii 
     reported on his experiments with botulism and brucellosis. 
     Drs. Hayakawa Kiyoshi and Yamanouchi Yujiro gave Hill and 
     Victor the results of other brucellosis tests, including the 
     number of human casualties.
       Hill pointed out that the material was a financial bargain, 
     was obtainable nowhere else, and concluded with a plea on 
     behalf of Ishii and his colleagues:
       ``Specific protocols were obtained from individual 
     investigators. Their descriptions of experiments are detailed 
     in separate reports. These protocols . . . indicate the 
     extent of experimentation with infectious diseases in human 
     and plant species.
       Evidence gathered . . . has greatly supplemented and 
     amplified previous aspects of this field. It represents data 
     which have been obtained by Japanese scientists at the 
     expenditure of many millions of dollars and years of work. 
     Information has accrued with respect to human susceptibility 
     to those diseases as indicated by specific infectious doses 
     of bacteria. Such information could not be obtained in our 
     own laboratories because of scruples attached to human 
     experimentation. These data were secured with a total outlay 
     of Y [yen] 250,000 to date, a mere pittance by comparison 
     with the actual cost of the studies.
       Furthermore, the pathological material which has been 
     collected constitutes the only material evidence of the 
     nature of these experiments. It is hoped that individuals who 
     voluntarily contributed this information will be spared 
     embarrassment because of it and that every effort will be 
     taken to prevent this information from falling into other 
     hands.''
       A memo by Dr. Edward Wetter and Mr. H.I. Stubblefield, 
     dated July 1, 1947, for restricted circulation to military 
     and State Department officials also described the nature and 
     quantity of material which Ishii was beginning to supply, and 
     noted some of the political issues involved [9]. They 
     reported that Ishii and his colleagues were cooperating 
     fully, were preparing voluminous reports, and had agreed to 
     supply photographs of ``selected examples of 8,000 slides 
     of tissues from autopsies of humans and animals subjected 
     to BW experiments.'' Human experiments, they pointed out, 
     were better than animal experiments:
       ``This Japanese information is the only known source of 
     data from scientifically controlled experiments showing the 
     direct effect of BW agents on man. In the past it has been 
     necessary to evaluate the effects of BW agents on man from 
     data obtained through animal experimentation. Such evaluation 
     is inconclusive and far less complete than results obtained 
     from certain types of human experimentation.''
       Wetter and Stubblefield also stated that the Soviet Union 
     was believed to be in possession of ``only a small portion of 
     this technical information'' and that since ``any `war 
     crimes' trial would completely reveal such data to all 
     nations, it is felt that such publicity must be avoided in 
     the interests of defense and national security of the U.S.'' 
     They emphasized that the knowledge gained by the Japanese 
     from their human experiments ``will be of great value to the 
     U.S. BW research program'' and added: ``The value to U.S. of 
     Japanese BW data is of such importance to national security 
     as to far outweigh the value accruing from war crimes 
     prosecution.''
       A July 15 response to the Wetter-Stubblefield memo by Cecil 
     F. Hubbert, a member of the State, War, Navy Coordinating 
     Committee, agreed with its recommendations but warned of 
     potential complications because ``experiments on human beings 
     . . . have been condemned as war crimes by the International 
     Military Tribunal'' in Germany and that the United States 
     ``is at present prosecuting leading German scientists and 
     medical doctors at Nuremberg for offenses which included 
     experiments on human beings which resulted in the suffering 
     and death of most of those experimented upon'' [10].
       Hubbert raised the possibility that the whole thing might 
     leak out if the Soviets were to bring it up in cross-
     examining major Japanese war criminals at the Tokyo trial and 
     cautioned:
       ``It should be kept in mind that there is a remote 
     possibility that independent investigation conducted by the 
     Soviets in the Mukden area may have disclosed evidence that 
     American prisoners-of-war were used for experimental purposes 
     of a BW nature and that they lost their lives as a result of 
     these experiments.''
       Despite these risks, Hubbert concurred with the Wetter-
     Stubblefield recommendation that the issue be kept secret and 
     that the Japanese biological warfare personnel be given 
     immunity in return for their cooperation. He suggested some 
     changes for the final position paper, including the following 
     casuistry: ``The data on hand . . . does not appear 
     sufficient at this time to constitute a basis for sustaining 
     a war crimes charge against Ishii and/or his associates.''
       Hubbert returned to the subject in a memorandum written 
     jointly with E.F. Lyons, Jr., a member of the Plans and 
     Policy Section of the War Crimes Branch. This top secret 
     document stated, in part:
       ``The Japanese BW group is the only known source of data 
     from scientifically controlled experiments showing direct 
     effects of BW agents on humans. In addition, considerable 
     valuable data can be obtained from this group regarding BW 
     experiments on animals and food crops. . . .
       Because of the vital importance of the Japanese BW 
     information . . . the Working Group, State-War-Navy 
     Coordinating Sub-

[[Page S14545]]

     committee for the Far East, are in agreement that the 
     Japanese BW group should be informed that this Government 
     would retain in intelligence channels all information given 
     by the group on the subject of BW. This decision was made 
     with full consideration of and in spite of the following:
       (a) That its practical effect is that this Government will 
     not prosecute any members of the Japanese BW group for War 
     Crimes of a BW nature.
       (b) That the Soviets may be independent investigation 
     disclose evidence tending to establish or connect Japanese BW 
     activities with a war crime, which evidence the Soviets may 
     attempt to introduce at the International Military Trial now 
     pending at Tokyo.
       (c) That there is a remote possibility that the evidence 
     which may be disclosed by the Soviets would include evidence 
     that American prisoners of war were used for experimental 
     purposes by the Japanese BW group'' [11].
       In the intervening years the evidence that captured 
     American soldiers were among the human guinea pigs used by 
     Ishii in his lethal germ experiments remained ``closely 
     held'' in the top echelons of the U.S. government. A 
     ``confidential'' March 13, 1956, Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation internal memorandum, addressed to the 
     ``Director, FBI (105-12804)'' from ``SAC, WFO (105-1532)'' 
     stated in part:
       ``Mr. James J. Kelleher, Jr., Office of Special Operations, 
     DOD [Department of Defense], has volunteered further comments 
     to the effect that American Military Forces after occupying 
     Japan, determined that the Japanese actually did experiment 
     with ``BW'' agents in Manchuria during 1943-44 using American 
     prisoners as test victims. . . . Kelleher added that . . . 
     information of the type in question is closely controlled and 
     regarded as highly sensitive.''
       It is perhaps not surprising that it has taken so long for 
     the full story to be revealed. Over the years fragments have 
     occasionally leaked out, but each time were met with 
     denials, initially by the Japanese and later by the United 
     States. During the Korean War when China accused the 
     United States of employing updated versions of Japan's 
     earlier biological warfare tactics, not only were the 
     charges denied, but it was also claimed that there was no 
     proof of the earlier Japanese actions.
       At the time of the Khabarovsk trial, the United States was 
     pressing the Soviet Union to return thousands of Japanese 
     prisoners held in Siberian labor camps since the end of World 
     War II. When news of the trial reached Tokyo, it was 
     dismissed as ``propaganda.'' William J. Sebald, MacArthur's 
     diplomatic chief, was quoted in a United Press story in the 
     Nippon Times on December 29, 1949, as saying the story of the 
     trial might just be fiction and that it obviously was a 
     ``smoke screen'' to obscure the fact that the Soviets had 
     refused to account for the missing Japanese prisoners.
       It is possible that some of Ishii's attacks went 
     undetected, either because they were failures or because the 
     resulting outbreaks of disease were attributed to natural 
     causes by the Chinese. However, some were recognized. 
     Official archives of the People's Republic of China list 11 
     cities as subjected to biological warfare attacks, while the 
     number of victims of artificially disseminated plague alone 
     is placed at approximately 700 between 1940 and 1944 [12, p. 
     11].
       A few of the Chinese allegations received international 
     press coverage at the time. The Chinese Nationalists claimed 
     that on October 27, 1940, plague was dropped on Ningbo, a 
     city near Shanghai. The incident was not investigated in a 
     scientific way, but the observed facts aroused suspicion. 
     Something was seen to come out of a Japanese plane. Later, 
     there was a heavy infestation of fleas and 99 people came 
     down with bubonic plague, with all but one dying. Yet the 
     rats in the city did not have plague, and traditionally, 
     outbreaks of plague in the human population follow an 
     epizootic in the rat population.
       In the next few years a number of other Japanese biological 
     warfare attacks were alleged by the Chinese. Generally, they 
     were based on similar cause and effect observations. One 
     incident, however, was investigated with more care.
       On the morning of November 4, 1941, a Japanese plane 
     circled low over Changde, a city in Hunan Province. Instead 
     of the usual cargo of bombs, the plane dropped grains of 
     wheat and rice, pieces of paper and cotton wadding, which 
     fell in two streets in the city's East Gate District. 
     During the next three weeks six people living on the two 
     streets died, all with symptoms suggesting plague. Dr. 
     Chen Wen-kwei, a former League of Nations plague expert in 
     India, arrived with a medical team just as the last victim 
     died. He performed the autopsy, found symptoms of plague 
     which were confirmed by culture and animal tests. Again, 
     there was no plague outbreak in the rat population [12, 
     pp. 195-204].
       On March 31, 1942, the Nationalist government stated that a 
     follow-up investigation by Dr. Robert K.S. Lim, Director of 
     the Chinese Red Cross, and Dr. R. Politzer, internationally 
     known epidemiologist and former member of the League of 
     Nations Anti-Epidemic Commission, who was then on a wartime 
     assignment to the Chinese government, had confirmed Chen's 
     findings.
       Western reaction to the Chinese charges was mixed. Harrison 
     Forman of the New York Times, and Dr. Thomas Parran, Jr., the 
     U.S. Surgeon-General, thought the Chinese had made a case. 
     But U.S. Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss was uncertain in an 
     April 11, 1942, cable to the State Department, while Dr. 
     Theodor Rosebury, the well-known American bacteriologist, 
     felt that failure to produce plague bacilli from cultures of 
     the material dropped at Changde weakened the Chinese claim 
     [13, pp. 109-10]. Chen's full report, in which he suggested 
     that it was fleas that were infected rather than the other 
     material, was not made readily available by the Nationalist 
     government.
       Later disclosures of Japanese techniques would support 
     Chen's reasoning: Fleas, after being fed on plague-infected 
     rats, were swaddled in cotton and wrapped in paper, while 
     grain was included in the mix in the hope that it would 
     attract rats so that the fleas would find a new host to 
     infect and thus start a ``natural'' epidemic.
       At the December 1949 Soviet trial at Khabarovsk evidence 
     was produced supporting the Nationalist Chinese biological 
     warfare charges [14]. Witnesses testified that films had been 
     made of some tests, including the 1940 attack on Ningbo. 
     Japanese witnesses and defendants confirmed other biological 
     warfare attacks, such as the 1941 Changde incident. Military 
     orders, railroad waybills for shipment of biological warfare 
     supplies, gendarmerie instructions for sending prisoners to 
     the laboratories, and other incriminating Japanese documents 
     were introduced in evidence [1, pp. 19-20, 23-24].
       Describing the operation of Unit 731, the main biological 
     warfare installation, located outside Harbin, the transcript 
     summary stated: ``Experts have calculated . . . that it was 
     capable of breeding, in the course of one production cycle, 
     lasting only a few days, no less than 30,000,000 billion 
     microbes. . . . That explains why . . . bacteria quantities 
     [are given] in kilograms, thus referring to the weight of 
     the thick, creamy bacteria mass skimmed directly from the 
     surface of the culture medium [1, pp. 13-14].
       Total bacteria production capacity at this one unit was 
     eight tons per month [1, pp. 266-67].
       Euphemistically called a ``water purification unit,'' 
     General Ishii's organization also worked on medical projects 
     not directly related to biological warfare. In the Asian 
     countries it overran, the Japanese Army conscripted local 
     young women to entertain the troops. The medical difficulties 
     resulting from this practice became acute. In an effort to 
     solve the problem, Chinese women confined in the detachment's 
     prison ``were infected with syphillis with the object of 
     investigating preventive means against this disease. [1, p. 
     357].
       Another experiment disclosed at the Khabarovsk trial was 
     the ``freezing project.'' During extremely cold winter 
     weather prisoners were led outdoors:
       ``Their arms were bared and made to freeze with the help of 
     an artificial current of air. This was done until their 
     frozen arms, when struck with a short stick, emitted a sound 
     resembling that which a board gives out when it is struck'' 
     [1, pp. 289, 21-22, 357-58].
       Once back inside, various procedures for thawing were 
     tried. One account of Unit 731's prison, adjacent to the 
     laboratories, described men and women with rotting hands from 
     which the bones protruded--victims of the freezing tests. A 
     documentary film was made of one of the experiments.
       Simulated field tests were carried out at Unit 731's Anta 
     Station Proving Ground. Witnesses described experiments in 
     which various infecting agents were used. Nishi Toshihide, 
     Chief of the Training Division, testified:
       ``In January 1945 . . . I saw experiments in inducing gas 
     gangrene, conducted under the direction of the Chief of the 
     2nd Division, Col. Ikari, and researcher Futaki. Ten 
     prisoners . . . were tied facing stakes, five to ten metres 
     apart. . . . The prisoners' heads were covered with metal 
     helmets, and their bodies with screens . . . only the naked 
     buttocks being exposed. At about 100 metres away a 
     fragmentation bomb was exploded by electricity. . . . All ten 
     men were wounded . . . and sent back to the prison. . . . I 
     later asked Ikari and research Futaki what the results had 
     been. They told me that all ten men had . . . died of gas 
     gangrene.'' [1, pp. 289-90].
       Among the many wartime recollections published by Japanese 
     exservicemen are a few by former members of Unit 731 [15]. 
     Akiyama Hiroshi told his story in two magazine articles and 
     Kimura Bumpei, a former captain, has published his memoirs 
     [16]. Sakaki Ryohei, a former major, has described how 
     plague was spread by air-dropping rats and voles and has 
     given details of the flea ``nurseries'' developed by Ishii 
     for rapid production of millions of fleas [17].
       A more dramatic confirmation of Ishii's work was an hour-
     long Japanese television documentary produced by Yoshinaga 
     Haruko and shown by the Tokyo Broadcasting System. A 
     Washington Post dispatch on November 19, 1976, reported:
       ``In the little-publicized television documentary on the 
     germ warfare unit, Yoshinaga laid bare secrets closely held 
     in Japan during and since the war. . . . [She] traveled 
     throughout Japan to trace down 20 former members of the 
     wartime unit. . . . Four of the men finally agreed to help, 
     and the reporter found their testimony dovetailed with 
     reports of war crime trials held in the Soviet Union.''
       Some of those interviewed by Yoshinaga claimed that they 
     had told their stories to American authorities. Eguchi said 
     that he ``was the second to be ordered to G.H.Q. [General 
     Headquarters]'' and ``they took a

[[Page S14546]]

     record'' of his testimony. Takahashi, an ex-surgeon and Army 
     major, stated: ``I went to the G.H.Q. twice in 1947. 
     Investigators made me write reports on the condition that 
     they will protect me from the Soviets.'' Kumamoto, an ex-
     flight engineer, said that after the war General Ishii went 
     to America and ``took his research data and begged for 
     remission for us all'' [4].
       Declassified position papers indicate a difference of 
     opinion on how to deal with the question of immunity. The War 
     Department favored acceding to Ishii's demands for immunity 
     in documentary form. The State Department, however, cautioned 
     against putting anything in writing which might later cause 
     embarrassment, arguing that if the Japanese were told the 
     information would be kept in classified intelligence channels 
     that would be sufficient protection. In any event, a 
     satisfactory arrangement apparently was worked out as none of 
     the biological warfare personnel was subsequently charged 
     with war crimes and the United States obtained full details 
     of Japan's program.
       The Japanese experts who, Dr. Hill hoped, would ``be spared 
     embarrassment,'' not only used their human guinea pigs in 
     experiments to determine lethal dosages but on occasion--in 
     their pursuit of exact scientific information--made certain 
     that the experimentees did not survive. A group would be 
     brought down with a disease and, as the infection developed, 
     individuals would be selected out of the group and killed. 
     Autopsies were then performed, so that the progress of the 
     disease could be ascertained at various time-frames.
       General Kitano Masaji and Dr. Kasahara Shiro revealed this 
     practice in a report prepared for U.S. officials describing 
     their work on hemorrhagic fever:
       ``Subsequent cases were produced either by blood or blood-
     free extracts of liver, spleen or kidney derived from 
     individuals sacrificed at various times during the course of 
     the disease. Morphine was employed for this purpose'' [18].
       Kitano and Dr. Kasahara Yukio described the ``sacrificing'' 
     of a human experimentee when he apparently was recovering 
     from an attack of tick encephalitis:
       ``Mouse brain suspension . . . was injected . . . and 
     produced symptoms after an incubation period of 7 days. 
     Highest temperature was 39.8 deg. C. This subject was 
     sacrificed when fever was subsiding, about the 12th day.''
       Clearly, U.S. biological warfare experts learned a lot from 
     their Japanese counterparts. While we do not yet know exactly 
     how much this information advanced the American program, we 
     have the Fort Detrick doctors' testimony that it was 
     ``invaluable.'' And it is known that some of the biological 
     weapons developed later were at least similar to ones that 
     had been part of the Japanese project. Infecting feathers 
     with spore diseases was one of Ishii's achievements and 
     feather bombs later became a weapon in America's biological 
     warfare arsenal [19].
       Dr. Leroy D. Fothergill, long-time scientific advisor to 
     the U.S. Army's Biological Laboratories at Fort Detrick, once 
     speculated upon some of the possible spin-off effects of a 
     biological warfare attack:
       ``Everything that breathes in the exposed area has an 
     opportunity to be exposed to the agent. This will involve 
     vast numbers of mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and 
     insects. . . . Surveys have indicated surprising numbers of 
     wild life inhabiting each square mile of countryside. It is 
     possible that many species would be exposed to an agent for 
     the first time in their evolutionary history . . . Would it 
     create the basis for possible genetic evolution of 
     microorganisms in new directions with changes in virulence of 
     some species? Would it establish public health and 
     environmental problems that are unique and beyond our present 
     experience?'' [20].
       Perhaps President Richard Nixon had some of these things in 
     mind when, on November 25, 1969, he renounced the use of 
     biological warfare, declaring:
       ``Biological weapons have massive unpredictable and 
     potentially uncontrollable consequences. They may produce 
     global epidemics and impair the health of future generations. 
     I have therefore decided that the U.S. shall renounce the use 
     of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other 
     methods of biological warfare'' [21].
       Some research on defensive aspects was permitted by the 
     ban. The line between defense and offense is admittedly a 
     thin one. Nearly a year after the Nixon renunciation of 
     biological warfare, Seymour Hersh wrote that the programs the 
     Army wanted to continue ``under defensive research included a 
     significant effort to develop and produce virulent strains of 
     new biological agents, then develop defenses against them. 
     `This sounds very much like what we were doing before,' one 
     official noted caustically'' [22].
       There is a difference of opinion among observers as to 
     whether the United States and other major powers have indeed 
     given up on biological warfare. Some believe the issue is a 
     matter of the past. However, its history has been so replete 
     with deception that one cannot be sure. One thing seems 
     certain: The story did not end with Japan's use of biological 
     war fare against China; there are additional chapters to be 
     written.
       Available documents do not reveal whether anyone knows the 
     names of any of the thousands of Chinese Mongolians, 
     Russians, ``half-breeds'' and Americans whose lives were 
     prematurely ended by massive doses of plague, typhus, 
     dysenteries, gas gangrene, typhoid, hemorrhagic fever, 
     cholera, anthax, tularemia, smallpox, tsutsugamushi and 
     glanders; or by such grotesqueries as being pumped full of 
     horse blood; having their livers destroyed by prolonged 
     exposure to X-rays or being subjected to vivisection.
       It is known, however, that because of the ``national 
     security'' interests of the United States, General Ishii and 
     many of the top members of Unit 731 lived out their full 
     lives, suffering only the natural afflictions of old age. A 
     few, General Kitano among them, enjoyed exceptional good 
     health and at the time of writing were living in quiet 
     retirement.
         General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied 
           Powers,
                                                       Mar 27, 47.

                      Brief for the Chief of Staff

       1. This has to do with Russian requests for transfer of the 
     former Japanese expert in Bacteriological Warfare.
       2. The United States has primary interest, has already 
     interrogated this man and his information is held by the U.S. 
     Chemical Corps classified as TOP SECRET.
       3. The Russian has made several attempts to get at this 
     man. We have stalled. He now hopes to make his point by 
     suddenly claiming the Japanese expert as a war criminal.
       4. Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that this not be done but 
     concur in a SCAP controlled interrogation requiring expert 
     assistance not available in FEC.
       5. This memorandum recommends:
       a. Radio to WD for two experts.
       b. Letter to USSR refusing to turn over Japanese expert.
       c. Check Note to International Prosecution Section 
     initiating action on the JCS approved interrogations.
                                  ____

                                                   War Department,


                                    Classified Message Center,

                        CFE Tokyo Japan (Carpenter Legal Section).
       Reurad WAR 80671, 22nd June 47, held another conference 
     with Tavenner of IPS who reports following.
       One on 27th October 1940 Japanese planes scattered 
     quantities of wheat grain over Ningpo. Epidemic of bubonic 
     plague broke out 29th October 40. Karazawai affidavit in para 
     3 below confirms this as Ishii Detachment experiment. 97 
     plague fatalities.
       2. Strong circumstantial evidence exists of use of bacteria 
     warfare at Chuhsien, Kinghwa and Changteh. At Chuhsien 
     Japanese planes scattered rice and wheat grains mixed with 
     fleas on 4th October 1940. Bubonic plague appeared in same 
     area on 12th November. Plague never occurred in Chuhsien 
     before occurrence. Fleas were not properly examined to 
     determine whether plague infected. At Kinghwa, located 
     between Ningpo and Chupuien, 3 Japanese planes dropped a 
     large quantity of small granules on 28th November 1940. 
     Microscopic examination revealed presence of numerous gram-
     negative bacilli possessing * * *.

                           *   *   *   *   *


                             A Judge's View

                         (By Bert V.A. Roling)

       As one of the judges in the International Military Tribunal 
     for the Far East, it is a bitter experience for me to be 
     informed now that centrally ordered Japanese war criminality 
     of the most disgusting kind was kept secret from the Court by 
     the U.S. government. This Japanese war criminality consisted, 
     in part, of using human beings, prisoners of war, Chinese as 
     well as American, as ``guinea pigs'' in an endeavor to test 
     the impact of specific biological warfare weapons. Research 
     on and production of these weapons was not forbidden at that 
     time. The Protocol of Geneva, 1925, forbade their use only in 
     battle. But to use human beings for biological experiments, 
     causing the death of at least 3,000 prisoners of war, was 
     among the gravest war crimes.
       The first information about these Japanese atrocities 
     became known through the trial at Khabarovsk, December 25 to 
     30, 1949. I remember reading about it [1], and not believing 
     its contents. I could not imagine that these things had 
     happened, without the Court in Tokyo being informed. 
     According to the book about the trial all the facts were 
     transmitted to the chief prosecutor, Joseph B. Keenan. But 
     some of the information was incorrect. The book mentions that 
     the Military Tribunal was informed of the wicked experiements 
     done by the Tama division in Nanking, and that it requested 
     the American prosecution to submit more detailed proof [1, p. 
     443]. Such Court procedures would not have been in conformity 
     with Anglo-Saxon practice. It is more likely that the 
     information was given to the chief prosecutor.
       A further feature of the Khabarovsk book is the strange 
     character of the confessions made by the accused. Some are 
     quoted as saying that they acted upon the special secret 
     orders of the Japanese emperor [1, pp. 10, 519]. This was 
     bound to cause doubts about its credibility. The emperor does 
     not give orders to perform specific military acts. Everything 
     that is ordered by the government and its officials is ``in 
     the name of the emperor.'' But his role is remarkable in that 
     he may not make decisions; he has only to confirm decisions 
     of the government. The ``imperial will is decisive, but 
     it derives wholly from the government and the small circle 
     around the throne. Titus stresses the

[[Page S14547]]

     ``ratification function'' of the reached consensus [2, p. 
     321]. It is clear that this imperial confirmation gives a 
     decision an exceptional authority: the command of the 
     emperor is obeyed. In fact, however, the emperor has a 
     kind of loud-speaker function. He is heard, and obeyed, 
     but he speaks only on the recommendation of the 
     government.
       Very seldom does the emperor act in a personal manner. One 
     such occasion was his criticism of the behavior of the 
     Japanese army in Manchuria (the so-called Manchurian 
     Incident). Another related to his role in connection with the 
     capitulation at the end of World War II. Despite the atomic 
     bombs and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, the 
     cabinet was divided and could not come to a decision because 
     the military members refused to surrender. Their motivation: 
     the existence of the imperial system was not sufficiently 
     guaranteed. In a very exceptional move, the emperor was 
     brought in to make the decision. He took the risk, and 
     decided for immediate capitulation.
       Thus the emphasis on the personal secret involvement of the 
     emperor in the Khabarovsk trial account make it appear 
     untrustworthy. The whole setup could be perceived as a source 
     of arguments in favor of indicting the emperor. I remember at 
     that time, writing to show the danger of national postwar 
     judgments which could easily be misused for political 
     purposes, and giving the Khabarovsk trial as an example. I 
     must state now that the Japanese misbehavior as described in 
     the judgment, has been confirmed by the recently disclosed 
     American documents.
       Immunity from prosecution was granted in exchange for 
     Japanese scientific findings concerning biological weapons, 
     based on disgusting criminal research on human beings. We 
     learn from these documents that it was considered a bargain: 
     almost for nothing, information was obtained that had cost 
     millions of dollars and thousands of human lives. The 
     American authorities were worrying only about the prospect of 
     the human outcry in the United States, which surely would 
     have taken place if the American people had been informed 
     about this ``deal.''
       The security that surrounds the military makes it possible 
     for military behavior to deviate considerably from the 
     prevailing public standard, but it is a danger to society 
     when such deviation takes place. It leads gradually to 
     contempt for the military, as witness the public attitude in 
     connection with military behavior in the Vietnam war. The 
     kind of military behavior that occurred in connection with 
     the Japanese biological weapon atrocities can only contribute 
     further to this attitude.
       Respect for what the Nuremberg judgment called ``the 
     honorable profession of arms'' is needed. Military power is 
     still indispensable in our present world to provide for peace 
     and security, so it is desirable for it to be held in high 
     esteem. Power which is despised may become dangerous. 
     Moreover, only if the military is regarded with respect, will 
     it attract the personnel it should have.
       The same is true of diplomatic service, which needs 
     national and international respect. This respect will 
     disappear if the service indulges in subversive activities, 
     as the U.S. diplomatic mission did in Iran. That diplomatic 
     misbehavior in Iran led to developments--the hostage crisis--
     which were disastrous for the whole world.
       The documents which have come to light inform us also of 
     the use of biological weapons in the war against the Chinese 
     people. The criminal warfare was not mentioned in the Tokyo 
     indictment, and not discussed before the Military Tribunal. 
     It was kept secret from the world. The immunity granted to 
     the Japanese war criminals covered not only deadly research 
     on living persons, but also the use of biological weapons 
     against the Chinese. And all this so that the United States 
     could obtain exclusive access to the information, gained at 
     the cost of thousands of human lives.
       Knowledge about what kind of bargain was being struck in 
     the biological weapons area may strengthen the perception of 
     the repulsiveness of war. It may also show the danger of 
     moral depravity, in peacetime, within the circles that have 
     the instruments of military power in their hands.


                               end notes

       1. Materials on the Trial of Former Servicemen of the 
     Japanese Army Charged with Manufacturing and Employing 
     Bacteriological Weapons (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing 
     House, 1950), pp. 19-21. This volume is a summary of the 
     transcript of the Soviet trial in Khabarovsk, Siberia, Dec. 
     20-25, 1949, of 12 captured Japanese Army personnel charged 
     with participation in the biological warfare program. For a 
     later reference to the program see Outline History of Science 
     and Technology in Japan, (``Nihon Kagaku Gijutsu-shi 
     Taikei''), Vol. 25 (Medicine 2, 1967), pp. 309-10. This 
     account states that the biological warfare program was 
     organized in 1933 and that ``for special research on 
     bacteria, members of the epidemic-prevention section shall be 
     sent to Manchuria.'' It also stated that little was known 
     about the program after the war since all records were said 
     to have been destroyed and that the only evidence was that 
     produced at the Khabarovsk trial. It did add, however, that 
     there were reports that General Ishii had avoided prosecution 
     by turning over his materials to U.S. authorities. I have not 
     seen this volume and am indebted to John Dower, of the 
     University of Wisconsin, who supplied the citation.
       2. Ienaga Saburo, The Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 
     1978).
       3. Although most U.S. documents and the Soviet trial 
     summary give Ishii credit for originating the biological 
     warfare program, it is possible that he was only the chosen 
     instrument. There are references indicating interest in the 
     program at higher levels. The ``staff officer'' of Ishii's 
     Operations Division was Lieutenant Colonel Miyata, who in 
     real life was Prince Takeda [1, p. 40]. Ishii's friend at 
     court was Gen. Nagata Tetsuzan, long Japan's top military man 
     [1, pp. 106, 295], while the orders establishing the two 
     original units were reputedly issued by the Emperor [1, pp. 
     10, 104, 413].
       4. ``A Bruise--Terror of the 731 Corps,'' Tokyo 
     Broadcasting System television documentary, produced by 
     Yoshinaga Haruko, shown Nov. 2, 1976. It has also been 
     screened in Europe but not in the United States. However, the 
     Washington Post (Nov. 19, 1976) carried a lengthy news story 
     describing the film. In an interview with Post reporter John 
     Saar, Yoshinaga said five former members of the biological 
     warfare unit told her they were promised complete protection 
     in return for cooperation with U.S. authorities. ``All the 
     important documents were given to the United States,'' she 
     said.
       5. This ``top secret'' cable [C-52423] also reveals that 
     the first of the biological warfare experts to be sent from 
     Washington to Japan had already arrived, referring to ``Dr. 
     Norbert H. Fell's letters via air courier to General Alden C. 
     Waitt,'' who was then chief of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps.
       6. Cable from Washington to Tokyo on April 2, 1947, stating 
     that Fell would leave for Japan on April 5. A cable from 
     Tokyo to the War Department on June 30, 1947, warns that an 
     ``aggressive prosecution will adversely affect U.S. 
     interests'' and urges that Fell (presumably now returned to 
     Washington) be shown recent cables because he is an expert 
     and can appreciate the value of the Japanese bw material.
       7. Top secret Memorandum for the Record (May 6, 1947) 
     indicated it was in response to ``War Department Radio W-
     94446 & swncc 351/1 and was signed ``rpm 26-6166''.
       8. ``Summary Report on B.W. Investigations.'' Dated Dec. 
     12, 1947, and addressed to General Alden C. Waitt.
       9. Dated july 1, 1947, and titled, ``Interrogation of 
     Certain Japanese by Russian Prosecutor,'' this memo also 
     lists some of the material already obtained, including a ``60 
     page report'' covering experiments on humans and notes that 
     other data confirms, supplements and complements U.S. 
     research and ``may suggest new fields for future research.'' 
     Record Group No. 153, National Archives.
       10. This July 15, 1947, memo is addressed to Commander J.B. 
     Cresap and signed ``Cecil F. Hubbert, member working party 
     (SWNCC 351/2/D).''
       11. Undated and titled ``SFE 182/2,'' it was part of 
     National Archives Record Group No. 153.
       12. ``Report of the International Scientific Commission for 
     the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare 
     in Korea and China,'' Peking, 1952.
       13. Theodor Rosebury, Peace or Pestilence (New York: 
     McGraw-Hill, 1949).
       14. In order to ascertain the Nationalist position on this 
     issue after the passage of some 40 years, I checked with 
     Taipei and am grateful to Lieutenant General Teng Shu-wei, of 
     the Nationalist Defense Ministry's Medical Bureau, who 
     searched the Taiwan archives. His report is in substantial 
     agreement with the records of the People's Republic in 
     Beijing, although less complete.
       15. Bungei Shunju, Aug. 1955; Jimbutsu Ohrai (July 10, 
     1956).
       16. ``Terrible Modern Strategic War'' by Kimura Bumpei. I 
     have not seen this book and am relying upon a brief 
     description of it contained in a March 31, 1959, letter from 
     Tokyo attorney Morikawa Kinju to A.L. Wirin, chief counsel of 
     the American Civil Liberties Union in Los Angeles.
       17. Sunday Mainichi, No. 1628 (Jan. 27, 1952).
       18. ``Songo-Epidemic Hemorrhagic Fever,'' report dated Nov. 
     13, 1947, based on interview with General Kitano Masaji and 
     Dr. Kasahara Shiro.
       19. ``Feathers as Carriers of Biological Warfare Agents,'' 
     Biological Department, Chemical Corps So and C Divisions 
     (Dec. 15, 1950).
       20. Leroy D. Fothergill, M.D., ``Biological Warfare: Nature 
     & Consequences,'' Texas State Journal of Medicine (Jan. 
     1964).
       21. New York Times (Nov. 26, 1969).
       22. Washington Post (Sept. 20, 1970).
       This article is based, in part, on an article by the author 
     in Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (P.O. Box W, 
     Charlemont, MA 01339), 12:4, pp. 2-15.
                                 ______