[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 158 (Wednesday, November 10, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S14533-S14571]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. CAMPBELL:
  S. 1899. A bill to redesignate the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency as the ``Federal Fire and Emergency Management Agency,'' and to 
amend the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act to 1974 to authorize 
the Director of the Federal Fire and Emergency Management Agency to 
make grants to local fire departments for the purpose of protecting the 
public and firefighting personnel against fire and fire-related 
hazards; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.


    The Firefighter Investment and Response Enhancement Act of 1999

  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation which 
would better equip our nation's firefighters to fight the ever-
increasing threat of property destruction and potential loss of life.
  The ``Firefighter Investment and Response Enhancement (FIRE) Act of 
1999'' would authorize the newly-named Federal Fire and Emergency 
Management Agency to make available matching grants on a competitive 
basis to fire departments for the purpose of protecting the public and 
firefighting personnel against fire and fire-related hazards. This bill 
is a companion to H.R. 1168, which was introduced by my colleague in 
the House of Representatives, Congressman Pascrell.
  Mr. President, each year approximately 100 of our nation's 
firefighters pay the ultimate sacrifice to preserve the safety of our 
communities. Increased demands on firefighting personnel have made it 
difficult for local governments to prepare for necessary fire safety 
precautions. The fire loss in the United States is serious, and the 
fire death rate is one of the highest per capita in the industrialized 
world. Fire kills more than 4,000 people and injures more than 25,000 
people each year. Today, 11 people will die due to fire. Two of these 
people are likely to be children under the age of 5. Another 68 people 
will be injured due to fire. Financially, the impact of America's 
estimated 2.2 million fires annually is over $9 billion in direct 
property losses. Those numbers are staggering, and many of these losses 
could have been prevented.
  The bill I introduce today would make grants available to train 
firefighter personnel in firefighting, emergency response, arson 
prevention and detection, and the handling of hazardous substances or 
pollutants or contaminants associated with the illegal manufacture of 
amphetamine or methamphetamine.
  This bill also creates partnerships by allowing for the effective use 
of the capabilities of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, the Department of Commerce, and the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission for research and development aimed at advancing the health 
and safety of firefighters; information technologies for fire 
management; technologies for fire prevention and protection; 
firefighting technologies; and burn care and rehabilitation.
  In addition, this legislation would ensure that grants would be made 
to a wide variety of fire departments, including applicants from paid, 
volunteer, and combination fire departments, large and small, which are 
situated in urban, suburban and rural communities.
  Mr. President, despite the risks, 1.2 million men and women 
firefighters willingly put their lives on the line responding to over 
17 million calls, annually. Our greatest challenge is to put limited 
resources to work where they will make the most difference in saving 
lives and reducing losses.
  I am pleased that the bill I introduce today has been endorsed by the 
Colorado State Fire Chief's Association.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this important bill. I 
ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1899

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Firefighter Investment and 
     Response Enhancement (FIRE) Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds that--
       (1) increased demands on firefighting personnel have made 
     it difficult for local governments to adequately fund 
     necessary fire safety precautions;
       (2) the Federal Government has an obligation to protect the 
     health and safety of the firefighting personnel of the United 
     States and to help ensure that the personnel have the 
     financial resources to protect the public;
       (3) the United States has serious fire losses, including a 
     fire death rate that is one of the highest per capita in the 
     industrialized world;
       (4) in the United States, fire kills more than 4,000 people 
     and injures more than 25,000 people each year;
       (5) in any single day in the United States, on the 
     average--
       (A) 11 people will die because of fire;
       (B) 2 of those people are likely to be children under the 
     age of 5;
       (C) 68 people will be injured because of fire; and
       (D) over $9,000,000,000 in property losses will occur from 
     fire; and
       (6) those statistics demonstrate a critical need for 
     Federal investment in support of firefighting personnel.

     SEC. 3. REDESIGNATION OF FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY.

       (a) In General.--The Federal Emergency Management Agency is 
     redesignated as the ``Federal Fire and Emergency Management 
     Agency''.
       (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 
     document, paper, or other record of the United States to the 
     Federal Emergency Management Agency shall be deemed to be a 
     reference to the Federal Fire and Emergency Management 
     Agency.
       (c) Conforming Amendments to Federal Fire Prevention and 
     Control Act of 1974.--Sections 4(4), 17, and 31(a)(5)(B) of 
     the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974 (15 
     U.S.C. 2203(4), 2216, and 2227(a)(5)(B)) are amended by 
     striking ``Federal Emergency Management Agency'' each place 
     it appears and inserting ``Federal Fire and Emergency 
     Management Agency''.

     SEC. 4. FIREFIGHTER INVESTMENT AND RESPONSE ENHANCEMENT.

       The Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974 (15 
     U.S.C. 2201 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

     ``SEC. 33. FIREFIGHTER INVESTMENT AND RESPONSE ENHANCEMENT.

       ``(a) Definition of Firefighting Personnel.--In this 
     section, the term `firefighting personnel' means individuals, 
     including volunteers, who are firefighters, officers of fire 
     departments, or emergency medical service personnel of fire 
     departments.
       ``(b) Grant Program.--
       ``(1) Authority.--In accordance with this section, the 
     Director may make grants on a competitive basis to fire 
     departments for the purpose of protecting the health and 
     safety of the public and firefighting personnel against fire 
     and fire-related hazards.

[[Page S14534]]

       ``(2) Establishment of office for administration of 
     grants.--Before making grants under paragraph (1), the 
     Director shall establish an office in the Federal Fire and 
     Emergency Management Agency that shall have the duties of 
     establishing specific criteria for the selection of grant 
     recipients, and administering the grants, under this section.
       ``(3) Use of grant funds.--The Director may make a grant 
     under paragraph (1) only if the applicant for the grant 
     agrees to use grant funds--
       ``(A)(i) to train firefighting personnel in firefighting, 
     emergency response, arson prevention and detection, or the 
     handling of hazardous materials, which shall include, at a 
     minimum, the removal of any hazardous substance or pollutant 
     or contaminant associated with the illegal manufacture of 
     amphetamine or methamphetamine; or
       ``(ii) to train firefighter personnel to provide any of the 
     training described in clause (i);
       ``(B) to make effective use of the capabilities of the 
     National Institute of Standards and Technology, the 
     Department of Commerce, the Consumer Product Safety 
     Commission, and other public and private sector entities, for 
     research and development aimed at advancing--
       ``(i) the health and safety of firefighters;
       ``(ii) information technologies for fire management;
       ``(iii) technologies for fire prevention and protection;
       ``(iv) firefighting technologies; and
       ``(v) burn care and rehabilitation;
       ``(C) to fund the creation of rapid intervention teams to 
     protect firefighting personnel at the scenes of fires and 
     other emergencies;
       ``(D) to certify fire inspectors;
       ``(E) to establish wellness and fitness programs for 
     firefighting personnel to ensure that the firefighting 
     personnel can carry out their duties;
       ``(F) to fund emergency medical services provided by fire 
     departments;
       ``(G) to acquire additional firefighting vehicles, 
     including fire trucks;
       ``(H) to acquire additional firefighting equipment, 
     including equipment for communications and monitoring;
       ``(I) to acquire personal protective equipment required for 
     firefighting personnel by the Occupational Safety and Health 
     Administration, and other personal protective equipment for 
     firefighting personnel;
       ``(J) to modify fire stations, fire training facilities, 
     and other facilities to protect the health and safety of 
     firefighting personnel;
       ``(K) to enforce fire codes;
       ``(L) to fund fire prevention programs; or
       ``(M) to educate the public about arson prevention and 
     detection.
       ``(4) Application.--The Director may make a grant under 
     paragraph (1) only if the fire department seeking the grant 
     submits to the Director an application in such form and 
     containing such information as the Director may require.
       ``(5) Matching requirement.--The Director may make a grant 
     under paragraph (1) only if the applicant for the grant 
     agrees to match with an equal amount of non-Federal funds 10 
     percent of the funds received under paragraph (1) for any 
     fiscal year.
       ``(6) Maintenance of expenditures--The Director may make a 
     grant under paragraph (1) only if the applicant for the grant 
     agrees to maintain in the fiscal year for which the grant 
     will be received the applicant's aggregate expenditures for 
     the uses described in paragraph (3) at or above the average 
     level of such expenditures in the 2 fiscal years preceding 
     the fiscal year for which the grant will be received.
       ``(7) Report to the director.--The Director may make a 
     grant under paragraph (1) only if the applicant for the grant 
     agrees to submit to the Director a report, including a 
     description of how grant funds were used, with respect to 
     each fiscal year for which a grant was received.
       ``(8) Variety of grant recipients.--The Director shall 
     ensure that grants under paragraph (1) for a fiscal year are 
     made to a variety of fire departments, including, to the 
     extent that there are eligible applicants--
       ``(A) paid, volunteer, and combination fire departments;
       ``(B) fire departments located in communities of varying 
     sizes; and
       ``(C) fire departments located in urban, suburban, and 
     rural communities.
       ``(9) Limitation on expenditures for firefighting 
     vehicles.--The Director shall ensure that not more than 25 
     percent of the assistance made available under paragraph (1) 
     for a fiscal year is used for the use described in paragraph 
     (3)(G).
       ``(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       ``(1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated 
     to the Director such sums as are necessary to carry out this 
     section.
       ``(2) Limitation on administrative costs.--Of the amounts 
     made available under paragraph (1) for a fiscal year, the 
     Director may use not more than 10 percent for the 
     administrative costs of carrying out this section.''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. LAUTENBERG (for himself, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Moynihan, Mr. 
        Cleland, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Biden, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Kohl, Mr. 
        Specter, Mr. Robb, Mr. Leahy, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Sarbanes, Mr. 
        Torricelli, Mr. L. Chafee, Mr. Graham, Mr. Kennedy, Ms. 
        Mikulski, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Schumer, Mr. Levin, and Mrs. 
        Hutchison):
  S. 1900. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a 
credit to holders of qualified bonds issued by Amtrak, and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on Finance.


                     high-speed rail investment act

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, overcrowding on our highways and in 
our skies is almost at the crisis point. We're spending billions of 
dollars each year in wasted gas and wasted time because there are fewer 
and fewer ways to get somewhere quickly and comfortably.
  We're not going to solve that problem by simply building new roads or 
airports. People don't want airports in their backyards, and there just 
isn't enough space in many parts of the country for new roads. Besides, 
new airports and new roads cost billions. And they become obsolete 
almost as quickly as we build them.
  Instead of wasting money on ineffective short-term solutions, we 
should be investing in a transportation plan that promises lasting 
benefits far into the next century.
  High-speed rail is the future of transportation in this country. 
Train travel is comfortable, reliable, and it's getting faster all the 
time. The rail lines are already there. All we need to do is bring them 
up to 21st-century standards.
  The legislation I'm introducing today would make a serious investment 
in the future of high-speed rail. And an investment in high-speed rail 
is an investment in less crowded highways and airports, cleaner air, 
and a new level of productivity for millions of Americans whose jobs 
and lifestyles depend on efficient transportation.
  Mr. President, I'm willing to bet that every Member of this Senate 
has at least one recent memory of a plane flight that went horribly 
wrong. Missed connections. Hours spent inside an overheated plane stuck 
on the tarmac. Lost baggage. I know I've had plenty of experiences like 
that.
  And even when everything goes according to plan, air travel is 
uncomfortable at best. You almost have to know yoga just to cram 
yourself into one of those tiny seats.
  Commuting by car isn't any better. Parts of Interstate 95 regularly 
turn into parking lots during week-day rush hours. And all this 
congestion can lead to truly life-threatening situations. Traffic 
accidents. Higher pollution levels. Explosions of road rage that 
actually lead people to pull guns on each other on the highway.
  Land and financial resources are scarce and we need to make better 
use of what we already have. Our rail lines are there, ready to help 
solve the overcrowding problems that are making our other 
transportation options less and less appealing. But for the most part, 
U.S. transportation policy has ignored the potential of high-speed rail 
and our rail system has fallen far below the standards set in nearly 
every other developed nation on the planet.
  My legislation seeks to change that by authorizing Amtrak to sell $10 
billion in high-speed rail bonds over ten years to develop high-speed 
corridors across the nation. This leveraging of private sector 
investment will allow Amtrak to complete the Northeast Corridor high-
speed project and provide the funding needed to bring faster, better 
service to federally designated high-speed corridors in other regions.
  These corridors cover states in the Northeast, the Southeast, the 
Midwest, the Gulf Coast, and the Pacific Coast. Our aim is to take what 
we've learned in the Northeast and provide it to the rest of the 
nation.
  The Federal Government would subsidize these bonds by providing tax 
credits to bondholders in lieu of interest payments. And state matching 
funds would help to secure repayment of the bond principal.
  Mr. President, the money we don't spend on high-speed rail today we 
will have to spend tomorrow--on things like highway construction and 
pollution controls.
  Investing in high speed rail is not only good transportation policy, 
it is good land use policy. Constructing an airport or highway outside 
of city limits promotes sprawl, robs cities of valuable revenue, and 
increases the pressure for even more road construction.

[[Page S14535]]

Rail travel, on the other hand, is downtown-to-downtown, not suburb-to-
suburb. Rail transportation encourages efficient, ``smart growth'' land 
use patterns, preserves downtown economies, protects open space, and 
improves air quality.
  Furthermore, passenger rail stations serve as focal points for 
commercial development, promoting downtown redevelopment and generating 
increased retail business and tax revenue. Making efficient and cost-
effective use of existing infrastructures is an increasingly important 
goal and one which this legislation will help achieve.
  Mr. President, high-speed rail is already proving itself. In 1999, 
Amtrak's Metroliner train between Washington and New York set its third 
consecutive ridership record with over two million passengers, and 
Amtrak reported the highest total revenues in the corporation's 28-year 
history. The reason is simple--people are becoming less and less 
satisfied with traveling by plane. And more and more frustrated with 
gridlock on our highways.
  You can see why. The summer of 1999 was the most delay-plagued season 
in history for airlines. And these delays are expensive. In 1998, air 
traffic control delays cost the airlines and passengers a combined $4.5 
billion.
  Unfortunately, this problem is only going to get worse. The number of 
people flying is increasing significantly. In 1998 there were 643 
million airplane boardings in the U.S., up 25 percent from just five 
years ago. The Federal Aviation Administration estimates that boardings 
will increase to 917 million by 2008. Our current aviation system can't 
handle this demand. We need a quality passenger rail system to relieve 
some of this pressure.
  Passenger rail can make a difference, particularly between cities 
located on high-speed corridors. I went back and looked at the list of 
the 31 airports expected to experience more than 20,000 passenger hours 
of flight delays in 2007. The vast majority of these airports--more 
than three out of four--are located on a high-speed rail corridor. If 
the funding envisioned in this legislation were made available to 
develop these corridors, we could take much of the burden of short 
flights off our aviation system. That would allow airlines to 
concentrate their limited slots and resources on longer-distance 
flights.
  Traffic congestion costs commuters even more--an estimated $74 
billion a year in lost productivity and wasted fuel. These commuters, 
even the ones who continue to drive, will be well served by an 
investment in high-speed rail corridors. Amtrak takes 18,000 cars a day 
off the roads between Philadelphia and New York. Without Amtrak, these 
congested roads would be in far worse shape. Commuters in other parts 
of the country should be able to benefit from high-quality, fast rail 
service that takes cars off the road and helps to improve the 
performance of our overall transportation system.
  This bill does not just benefit those who ride trains. Everyone who 
drives a car on congested highways or suffers from delays while using 
our overburdened aviation system will benefit from the rail investment 
called for in this legislation. I can tell you, as a former businessman 
who helped run a very profitable company, that high-speed rail is a 
smart investment. And it's an investment that deserves support from 
Congress.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. KOHL (for himself and Mr. Torricelli):
  S. 1901. A bill to establish the Privacy Protection Study Commission 
to evaluate the efficacy of the Freedom of Information Act and the 
Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, to determine 
whether new laws are necessary, and to provide advice and 
recommendations; to the Committee on the Judiciary.


          the privacy protection study commission act of 1999

  Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Privacy 
Protection Study Commission Act of 1999 with my colleague Senator 
Torricelli. This legislation addresses privacy protection by creating 
an expert Commission charged with the duty to explore privacy concerns. 
We cannot underestimate the importance of this issue. Privacy matters, 
and it will continue to matter more and more in this information age of 
high speed data, Internet transactions, and lightning-quick 
technological advances.
  There exists a massive wealth of information in today's world, which 
is increasingly stored electronically. In fact, experts estimate that 
the average American is ``profiled'' in up to 150 commercial electronic 
databases. That means that there is a great deal of data--in some 
cases, very detailed and personal--out there and easily accessible 
courtesy of the Internet revolution. With the click of a button it is 
possible to examine all sorts of personal information, be it an 
address, a criminal record, a credit history, a shopping performance, 
or even a medical file.
  Generally, the uses of this data are benign, even beneficial. 
Occasionally, however, personal information is obtained 
surreptitiously, and even peddled to third parties for profit or other 
uses. This is especially troubling when, in many cases, people do not 
even know that their own personal information is being ``shopped.''
  Two schools of thought exist on how we should address these privacy 
concerns. There are some who insist that we must do something and do it 
quickly. Others urge us to rely entirely on ``self-regulation''--
according to them most companies will act reasonably and, if not, 
consumers will demand privacy protection as a condition for their 
continued business.
  Both approaches have some merit, but also some problems. For example, 
even though horror stories abound about violations of privacy, Congress 
should not act by anecdote or on the basis of a few bad actors. Indeed, 
enacting ``knee-jerk,'' ``quick-fix'' legislation could very well do 
more harm than good. By the same token, however, self-regulation alone 
is unlikely to be the silver bullet that solves all privacy concerns. 
By itself, we have no assurance that it will bring the actors in line 
with adequate privacy protection standards.
  Because it is better to do it right--in terms of addressing the 
myriad of complicated privacy concerns--than to do it fast, perhaps 
what is needed is a cooling off period. Such a ``breather'' will ensure 
that our action is based on a comprehensive understanding of the 
issues, rather than a ``mishmash'' of political pressures and clever 
soundbites.
  For those reasons, and recognizing that there are no quick and easy 
answers, I suggest that we step back to consider the issue of privacy 
more thoughtfully. Let's admit that neither laws nor self-regulation 
alone may be the solution. Let's also concede that no one is going to 
divine the right approach overnight. But given the time and resources, 
a ``Privacy Protection Study Commission'' composed of experts drawn 
from the fields of law, civil rights and liberties, privacy matters, 
business, or information technology, may offer insights on how to 
address and ensure balanced privacy protection into the next 
millennium.
  The bill I am introducing today would do just that. The Commission 
would be comprised of nine bright minds equally chosen by the Senate, 
the House, and the Administration. As drafted, the Commission will be 
granted the latitude to explore and fully examine the current 
complexities of privacy protection. After 18 months, the Commission 
will be required to report back to Congress with its findings and 
proposals. If legislation is necessary, the Commission will be in the 
best position to recommend a balanced course of action. And if 
lawmaking is not warranted, the Commission's recognition of that fact 
will help persuade a skeptical Congress and public.
  This is not a brand new idea. Twenty-five years ago, Congress created 
a Privacy Protection Commission to study privacy concerns as they 
related to government uses of personal information. That Commission's 
findings were seminal. A quarter of a century later, because so much 
has changed, it is time to re-examine this issue on a much broader 
scale. The uses of personal information that concerned the Commission 
25 years ago have exploded today, especially in this era of e-commerce, 
super databases, and mega-mergers. People are genuinely worried--
perhaps they shouldn't be--but their concerns are real.
  For example, a Wall Street Journal survey revealed that Americans 
today are more concerned about invasions of their personal privacy than 
they are

[[Page S14536]]

about world war. Another poll cited in the Economist noted that 80 
percent are worried about what happens to information collected about 
them. William Afire summed it up best in a recent New York Times essay: 
``We are dealing here with a political sleeper issue. People are 
getting wise to being secretly examined and manipulated and it rubs 
them the wrong way.''
  One final note: given that privacy is not an easy issue and that it 
appears in so many other contexts, I invite all interested parties to 
help us improve our legislation to create a Commission. We need to 
forge a middle ground consensus with our approach, and the door is open 
to all who share this goal.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the previously cited 
material be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record as follows:

                   [From the Economist--May 1, 1999]

                           The End of Privacy

       Remember, they are always watching you. Use cash when you 
     can. Do not give your phone number, social-security number or 
     address, unless you absolutely have to. Do not fill in 
     questionnaires or respond to telemarketers. Demand that 
     credit and datamarketing firms produce all information they 
     have on you, correct errors and remove you from marketing 
     lists. Check your medical records often. If you suspect a 
     government agency has a file on you, demand to see it. Block 
     caller ID on your phone, and keep your number unlisted. Never 
     use electronic tollbooths on roads. Never leave your mobile 
     phone on--your movements can be traced. Do not use store 
     credit or discount cards. If you must use the Internet, 
     encrypt your e-mail, reject all ``cookies'' and never give 
     your real name when registering at websites. Better still, 
     use somebody else's computer. At work, assume that calls, 
     voice mail, e-mail and computer use are all monitored.
       This sounds like a paranoid ravings of the Unabomber. In 
     fact, it is advice being offered by the more zealous of 
     today's privacy campaigners. In an increasingly wired world, 
     people are continually creating information about themselves 
     that is recorded and often sold or pooled with information 
     from other sources. The goal of privacy advocates is not 
     extreme. Anyone who took these precautions would merely be 
     seeking a level of privacy available to all 20 years ago. And 
     yet such behaviour now would seem obsessive and paranoid 
     indeed.
       That is a clue to how fast things have changed. To try to 
     restore the privacy that was universal in the 1970s is to 
     chase a chimera. Computer technology is developing so rapidly 
     that it is hard to predict how it will be applied. But some 
     trends are unmistakable. The volume of data recorded about 
     people will continue to expand dramatically (see pages 21-
     23). Disputes about privacy will become more bitter. Attempts 
     to restrain the surveillance society through new laws will 
     intensify. Consumers will pay more for services that offer a 
     privacy pledge. And the market for privacy-protection 
     technology will grow.
     Always observed
       Yet there is a bold prediction: all these efforts to hold 
     back the rising tide of electronic intrusion into privacy 
     will fail. They may offer a brief respite for those 
     determined, whatever the trouble or cost, to protect 
     themselves. But 20 years hence most people will find that the 
     privacy they take for granted today will be just as elusive 
     as the privacy of the 1970s now seems. Some will shrug and 
     say: ``Who cares? I have nothing to hide.'' But many others 
     will be disturbed by the idea that most of their behaviour 
     leaves a permanent and easily traceable record. People will 
     have to start assuming that they simply have no privacy. This 
     will constitute one of the greatest social changes of modern 
     times.
       Privacy is doomed for the same reason that it has been 
     eroded so fast over the past two decades. Presented with the 
     prospect of its loss, many might prefer to eschew even the 
     huge benefits that the new information economy promises. But 
     they will not, in practice, be offered that choice. Instead, 
     each benefit--safer streets, cheaper communications, more 
     entertainment, better government services, more convenient 
     shopping, a wider selection of products--will seem worth the 
     surrender of a bit more personal information. Privacy is a 
     residual value, hard to define or protect in the abstract. 
     The cumulative effect of these bargains--each attractive on 
     their own--will be the end of privacy.
       For a similar reason, attempts to protect privacy through 
     new laws will fail--as they have done in the past. The 
     European Union's data protection directive, the most sweeping 
     recent attempt, gives individuals unprecedented control over 
     information about themselves. This could provide remedies 
     against the most egregious intrusions. But it is doubtful 
     whether the law can be applied in practice, if too many 
     people try to use it. Already the Europeans are hinting that 
     they will not enforce the strict terms of the directive 
     against America, which has less stringent protections.
       Policing the proliferating number of databases and the 
     thriving trade in information would not only be costly in 
     itself, it would also impose huge burdens on the economy. 
     Moreover, such laws are based on a novel concept: that 
     individuals have a property right in information about 
     themselves. Broadly enforced, such a property right would be 
     antithetical to an open society. It would pose a threat not 
     only to commerce, but also to a free press and to much 
     political activity, to say nothing of everyday conversation.
       It is more likely that laws will be used not to obstruct 
     the recording and collection of information, but to catch 
     those who use it to do harm. Fortunately, the same technology 
     that is destroying privacy also makes it easier to trap 
     stalkers, detect fraud, prosecute criminals and hold the 
     government to account. The result could be less privacy, 
     certainly--but also more security for the law-abiding.
       Whatever new legal remedies emerge, opting out of 
     information-gathering is bound to become ever harder and less 
     attractive. If most urban streets are monitored by 
     intelligent video cameras that can identify criminals, who 
     will want to live on a street without one? If most people 
     carry their entire medical history on a plastic card that the 
     emergency services come to rely on, a refusal to carry the 
     card could be life-threatening. To get a foretaste of what is 
     to come, try hiring a car or booking a room at a top hotel 
     without a credit card.


                                leaders

       In a way, the future may be like the past, when few except 
     the rich enjoyed much privacy. To earlier generations, 
     escaping the claustrophobic all-knowingness of a village for 
     the relative anonymity of the city was one of the more 
     liberating aspects of modern life. But the era of urban 
     anonymity already looks like a mere historical interlude. 
     There is, however one difference between past and future. In 
     the village, everybody knew everybody else's business. In the 
     future, nobody will know for certain who knows what about 
     them. That will be uncomfortable. But the best advice may be: 
     get used to it.


                        the surveillance society

       New information technology offers huge benefits--higher 
     productivity, better crime prevention, improved medical care, 
     dazzling entertainment, more convenience. But it comes at a 
     price: less and less privacy
       ``The right to be left alone.'' For many this phrase, made 
     famous by Louis Brandeis, an American Supreme Court justice, 
     captures the essence of a notoriously slippery, but crucial 
     concept. Drawing the boundaries of privacy has always been 
     tricky. Most people have long accepted the need to provide 
     some information about themselves in order to vote, work, 
     shop, pursue a business, socialise or even borrow a library 
     book. But exercising control over who knows what about you 
     has also come to be seen as an essential feature of a 
     civilised society.
       Totalitarian excesses have made ``Big Brother'' one of the 
     20th century's most frightening bogeyman. Some right of 
     privacy, however qualified, has been a major difference 
     between democracies and dictatorships. An explicit right to 
     privacy is now enshrined in scores of national constitutions 
     as well as in international human-rights treaties. Without 
     the ``right to be left alone,'' to shut out on occasion the 
     prying eyes and importunities of both government and society, 
     other political and civil liberties seem fragile. Today most 
     people in rich societies assume that, provided they obey the 
     law, they have a right to enjoy privacy whenever it suits 
     them.
       They are wrong. Despite a raft of laws, treaties and 
     constitutional provisions, privacy has been eroded for 
     decades. This trend is now likely to accelerate sharply. The 
     cause is the same as that which alarmed Brandeis when he 
     first popularized his phrase in an article in 1890; 
     technological change. In his day it was the spread of 
     photography and cheap printing that posed the most immediate 
     threat to privacy. In our day it is the computer. The 
     quantity of information that is now available to governments 
     and companies about individuals would have horrified 
     Brandeis. But the power to gather and disseminate data 
     electronically is growing so fast that it raises an even more 
     unsettling question: in 20 years' time, will there be any 
     privacy left to protect?
       Most privacy debates concern media intrusion, which is also 
     what bothered Brandeis. And yet the greatest threat to 
     privacy today comes not from the media, whose antics affect 
     few people, but from the mundane business of recording and 
     collecting an ever-expanding number of everyday transactions. 
     Most people know that information is collected about them, 
     but are not certain how much. Many are puzzled or annoyed by 
     unsolicited junk mail coming through their letter boxes. And 
     yet junk mail is just the visible tip of an information 
     iceberg. The volume of personal data in both commercial and 
     government databases has grown by leaps and bounds in recent 
     years along with advances in computer technology. The United 
     States, perhaps the most computerized society in the world, 
     is leading the way, but other countries are not far behind.
       Advances in computing are having a twin effect. They are 
     not only making it possible to collect information that once 
     went largely unrecorded, but are also making it relatively 
     easy to store, analyze and retrieve this information in ways 
     which, until quite recently, were impossible.
       Just consider the amount of information already being 
     collected as a matter of routine--any spending that involves 
     a credit or

[[Page S14537]]

     bank debit card, most financial transactions, telephone 
     calls, all dealings with national or local government. 
     Supermarkets record every item being bought by customers who 
     use discount cards. Mobile-phone companies are busy 
     installing equipment that allows them to track the location 
     of anyone who has a phone switched on. Electronic toll-booths 
     and traffic-monitoring systems can record the movement of 
     individual vehicles. Pioneered in Britain, closed-circuit tv 
     cameras now scan increasingly large swathes of urban 
     landscapes in other countries too. The trade in consumer 
     information has hugely expanded in the past ten years. One 
     single company, Acxiom Corporation in Conway, Arkansas, has a 
     database combining public and consumer information that 
     covers 95% of American households. Is there anyone left on 
     the planet who does not know that their use of the Internet 
     is being recorded by somebody, somewhere?
       Firms are as interested in their employees as in their 
     customers. A 1997 survey by the American Management 
     Association of 900 large companies found that nearly two-
     thirds admitted to some form of electronic surveillance of 
     their own workers. Powerful new software makes it easy for 
     bosses to monitor and record not only all telephone 
     conversations, but every keystroke and e-mail message as 
     well.
       Information is power, so its hardly surprising that 
     governments are as keen as companies to use data-processing 
     technology. They do this for many entirely legitimate 
     reasons--tracking benefit claimants, delivering better health 
     care, fighting crime, pursuing terrorists. But it inevitable 
     means more government surveillance.
       A controversial law passed in 1994 to aid law enforcement 
     requires telecoms firms operating in America to install 
     equipment that allows the government to intercept and monitor 
     all telephone and data communications, although disputes 
     between the firms and the FBI have delayed its 
     implementation. Intelligence agencies from America, Britain, 
     Canada, Australia and New Zealand jointly monitor all 
     international satellite-telecommunications traffic via a 
     system called ``Echelon'' that can pick specific words or 
     phrases from hundreds of thousands of messages.
       America, Britain, Canada and Australia are also compiling 
     national DNA databases of convicted criminals. Many other 
     countries are considering following suit. The idea of DNA 
     databases that cover entire populations is still highly 
     controversial, but those databases would be such a powerful 
     tool for fighting crime and disease that pressure for their 
     creation seems inevitable. Iceland's parliament has agreed a 
     plan to sell the DNA database of its population to a medical-
     research firm, a move bitterly opposed by some on privacy 
     grounds.
     To each a number
       The general public may be only vaguely aware of the 
     mushrooming growth of information-gathering, but when they 
     are offered a glimpse, most people do not like what they see. 
     A survey by America's Federal Trade Commission found that 80% 
     of Americans are worried about what happens to information 
     collected about them. Skirmishes between privacy advocates 
     and those collecting information are occurring with 
     increasing frequency.
       This year both intel and Microsoft have run into a storm of 
     criticism when it was revealed that their products--the chips 
     and software at the heart of most personal computers--
     transmitted unique identification numbers whenever a 
     personal-computer user logged on to the Internet. Both 
     companies hastily offered software to allow users to turn the 
     identifying numbers off, but their critics maintain that any 
     software fix can be breached. In fact, a growing number of 
     electronic devices and software packages contain identifying 
     numbers to help them interact with each other.
       In February an outcry greeted news that image Data, a small 
     New Hampshire firm, had received finance and technical 
     assistance from the American Secret Service to build a 
     national database of photographs used on drivers' licenses. 
     As a first step, the company had already bought the 
     photographs of more than 22m drivers from state governments 
     in South Carolina, Florida and Colorado. Image Data insists 
     that the database, which would allow retailers or police 
     across the country instantly to match a name and photograph, 
     is primarily designed to fight cheque and credit-card fraud. 
     But in response to more than 14,000 e-mail complaints, all 
     three state moved quickly to cancel the sale.
       It is always hard to predict the impact of new technology, 
     but there are several developments already on the horizon 
     which, if the recent past is anything to go by, are bound to 
     be used for monitoring of one sort or another. The 
     paraphernalia of snooping, whether legal or not, is becoming 
     both frighteningly sophisticated and easily affordable. 
     Already, tiny microphones are capable of recording whispered 
     conversations from across the street. Conversations can even 
     be monitored from the normally imperceptible vibrations of 
     window glass. Some technologists think that the tiny 
     battlefield reconnaissance drones being developed by the 
     American armed forces will be easy to commercialize. Small 
     video cameras the size of a large wasp may some day be able 
     to fly into a room, attach themselves to a wall or ceiling 
     and record everything that goes on there.
       Overt monitoring is likely to grow as well. Intelligent 
     software systems are already able to scan and identify 
     individuals from video images. Combined with the plummeting 
     price and size of cameras, such software should eventually 
     make video surveillance possible almost anywhere, at any 
     time. Street criminals might then be observed and traced with 
     ease.
       The burgeoning field of ``biometrics'' will make possible 
     cheap and fool-proof systems that can identify people from 
     their voices, eyeballs, thumbprints or any other measurable 
     part of their anatomy. That could mean doing away with 
     today's cumbersome array of security passes, tickets and even 
     credit cards. Alternatively, pocket-sized ``smart' cards 
     might soon be able to store all of a person's medical or 
     credit history, among other things, together with physical 
     data needed to verify his or her identity.
       In a few years' time utilities might be able to monitor the 
     performance of home appliances, sending repairmen or 
     replacements even before they break down. Local supermarkets 
     could check the contents of customers' refrigerators, 
     compiling a shopping list as they run out of supplies of 
     butter, cheese or milk. Or office workers might check up on 
     the children at home from their desktop computers.
       But all of these benefits, from better medical care and 
     crime prevention to the more banal delights of the 
     ``intelligent'' home, come with one obvious drawback--an 
     ever-widening trail of electronic data. Because the cost of 
     storing and analysing the data is also plummeting, almost any 
     action will leave a near-permanent record. However 
     ingeniously information-processing technology is used, what 
     seems certain is that threats to traditional notions of 
     privacy will proliferate.
       This prospect provokes a range of responses, none of them 
     entirely adequate. More laws. Brandeis's article was a plea 
     for a right to sue for damages against intrusions of privacy. 
     It spawned a burst of privacy statutes in America and 
     elsewhere. And yet privacy lawsuits hardly ever succeed, 
     except in France, and even there they are rare. Courts find 
     it almost impossible to pin down a precise enough legal 
     definition of privacy.
       America's consumer-credit laws, passed in the 1970s, give 
     individuals the right to example their credit records and to 
     demand corrections. The European Union has recently gone a 
     lot further. The EU Data Protection directive, which came 
     into force last October, aims to give people control over 
     their data, requiring ``unambiguous'' consent before a 
     company or agency can process it, and barring the use of the 
     data for any purpose other than that for which it was 
     originally collected. Each EU country, is pledged to appoint 
     a privacy commissioner to act on behalf of citizens whose 
     rights have been violated. The directive also bars the export 
     of data to countries that do not have comparably stringent 
     protections.
       Most EU countries have yet to pass the domestic laws needs 
     to implement the directive, so it is difficult to say how it 
     will work in practice. But the Americans view it as 
     Draconian, and a trade row has blown up about the EU's 
     threat to stop data exports to the United States. A 
     compromise may be reached that enables American firms to 
     follow voluntary guidelines; but that merely could create 
     a big loophole. If, on the other hand, the EU insist on 
     barring data exports, not only might a trade war be 
     started but also the development of electronic commerce in 
     Europe could come screeching to a complete halt, 
     inflicting a huge cost on the EU's economy.
       In any case, it is far from clear what effect the new law 
     will have even in Europe. More products or services may have 
     to be offered with the kind of legalistic bumf that is now 
     attached to computer software. But, as with software, most 
     consumers are likely to sign without reading it. The new law 
     may give individuals a valuable tool to fight against some of 
     the worst abuses, rather on the pattern of consumer-credit 
     laws. But, also as with those laws--and indeed, with 
     government freedom of information laws in general--
     individuals will have to be determined and persistent to 
     exercise their rights. Corporate and government officials can 
     often find ways to delay or evade individual requests for 
     information. Policing the rising tide of data collection and 
     trading is probably beyond the capability of any government 
     without a crackdown so massive that it could stop the new 
     information economy in its tracks.
       Market solutions. The Americans generally prefer to rely on 
     self-regulation and market pressures. Yet so far, self-
     regulation has failed abysmally. A Federal Trade Commission 
     survey of 1,400 American Internet sites last year found that 
     only 2% had posted a privacy policy in line with that 
     advocated by the commission, although more have probably done 
     so since, not least in response to increased concern over 
     privacy. Studies of members of America's Direct Marketing 
     Association by independence researchers have found that more 
     than half did not abide even by the association's modest 
     guidelines.
       If consumers were to become more alarmed about privacy, 
     however, market solutions could offer some protection. The 
     Internet, the frontline of the privacy battle-field, has 
     already spawned anonymous remailers, firms that forward e-
     mail stripped of any identifying information. One website 
     (www.anonymizer.com) offers anonymous Internet browsing. 
     Electronic digital cash, for use or off the Internet, may 
     eventually provide some anonymity but, like today's physical 
     cash, it will probably be used only for smaller purchases.

[[Page S14538]]

     Enter the infomediary
       John Hagel and Marc Singer of McKinsey, a management 
     consulting firm, believe that from such services will emerge 
     ``informediaries'', firms that become brokers of information 
     between consumers and other companies, giving consumers 
     privacy protection and also earning them some revenue for the 
     information they are willing to release about themselves. If 
     consumers were willing to pay for such brokerage, 
     infomediaries might succeed on the Internet. Such firms would 
     have the strongest possible stake in maintaining their 
     reputation for privacy protection. But it is hard to imagine 
     them thriving unless consumers are willing to funnel every 
     transaction they make through a single infomediary. Even if 
     this is possible--which is unclear--many consumers may not 
     want to rely so much on a single firm. Most, for example, 
     already have more than one credit card.
       In the meantime, many companies already declare that they 
     will not sell information they collect about customers. But 
     many others find it possible profitable not to make--to--or 
     keep--this pledge. Consumers who want privacy must be ever 
     vigilant, which is more than most can manage. Even those 
     companies which advertise that they will not sell information 
     do not promise not to buy it. They almost certainly know more 
     about their customers than their customers realize. And in 
     any case, market solutions, including informediaries, are 
     unlikely to be able to deal with growing government databases 
     or increased surveillance in public areas.
       Technology. The Internet has spawned a fierce war between 
     fans of encryption and governments, especially America's, 
     which argue that they must have access to the keys to 
     software codes used on the web in the interests of the law 
     enforcement. This quarrel has been rumbling on for years. But 
     given the easy availability of increasingly complex codes, 
     governments may just have to accept defeat, which would 
     provide more privacy not just for innocent web users, but for 
     criminals as well. Yet even encryption will only serve to 
     restore to Internet users the level of privacy that most 
     people have assumed they now enjoy in traditional (i.e., 
     paper) mail.
       Away from the web, the technological race between snoopers 
     and anti-snoopers will also undoubtedly continue. But 
     technology can only ever be a partial answer. Privacy will be 
     reduced not only by government or private snooping, but by 
     the constant recording of all sorts of information that 
     individuals must provide to receive products or benefits--
     which is as true on as off the Internet.
       Transparency. Despairing of efforts to protect privacy in 
     the face of the approaching technological deluge, David Brin, 
     an American physicist and science-fiction writer, proposes a 
     radical alternative--its complete abolition. In his book 
     ``The Transparent Society'' (Addision-Wesley, $25) he argues 
     that in future the rich and powerful--and most ominously of 
     all, governments--will derive the greatest benefit from 
     privacy protection, rather than ordinary people. Instead, 
     says Mr. Brin, a clear, simple rule should be adopted: 
     everyone should have access to all information. Every citizen 
     should be able to tap into any database, corporate or 
     governmental, containing personal information. Images from 
     the video-surveillance cameras on city streets should be 
     accessible to everyone, not just the police.
       The idea sounds disconcerting, he admits. But he argues 
     that privacy is doomed in any case. Transparency would enable 
     people to know who knows what about them, and for the ruled 
     to keep any eye on their rulers. Video cameras would record 
     not only criminals, but also abusive policemen. Corporate 
     chiefs would know that information about themselves is as 
     freely available as it is about their customers or workers. 
     Simple deterrence would then encourage restraint in 
     information gathering--and maybe even more courtesy.
       Yet Mr. Brin does not explain what would happen to 
     transparency violators or whether there would be any limits. 
     What about national-security data or trade secrets? Police or 
     medical files? Criminals might find these of great interest. 
     What is more, transparency would be just as difficult to 
     enforce legally as privacy protection is now. Indeed, the 
     very idea of making privacy into a crime seems outlandish.
       There is unlikely to be a single answer to the dilemma 
     posed by the conflict between privacy and the growing power 
     of information technology. But unless society collectively 
     turns away from the benefits that technology can offer--
     surely the most unlikely outcome of all--privacy debates are 
     likely to become very more intense. In the brave new world of 
     the information age, the right to be left alone is certain to 
     come under siege as never before.
                                  ____


                           Nosy Parker Lives

                      [William Safire, Washington]

       A state sells its driver's license records to a stalker; he 
     selects his victim--a Hollywood starlet--from the photos and 
     murders her.
       A telephone company sells a list of calls; an extortionist 
     analyzes the pattern of calls and blackmails the owner of the 
     phone.
       A hospital transfers patient records to an insurance 
     affiliate, which turns down a policy renewal.
       A bank sells a financial disclosure statement to a 
     borrower's employer, who fires the employee for profligacy.
       An Internet browser sells the records of a nettie's 
     searches to a lawyer's private investigator, who uses 
     ``cookie''-generated evidence against the nettie in a 
     lawsuit.
       Such invasions of privacy are no longer far-out 
     possibilities. The first listed above, the murder of Rebecca 
     Schaeffer, led to the Driver's Privacy Protection Act. That 
     Federal law enables motorists to ``opt out''--to direct that 
     information about them not be sold for commercial purposes.
       But even that opt out puts the burden of protection on the 
     potential victim, and most people are too busy or lazy to 
     initiate self-protection. Far more effective would be what 
     privacy advocates call opt in--requiring the state or 
     business to request permission of individual customers before 
     selling their names to practioners of ``target marketing.''
       In practical terms, the difference between opt in and opt 
     out is the difference between a door locked with a bolt and a 
     door left ajar. But in a divided appeals court--under the 
     strained rubric of commercial free speech--the intrusive 
     telecommunications giant US West won. Its private customers 
     and the public are the losers.
       Corporate mergers and technologies of E-commerce and 
     electronic surveillance are pulverizing the walls of personal 
     privacy. Belatedly, Americans are awakening to their new 
     nakedness as targets of marketers.
       Your bank account, you health record, your genetic code, 
     your personal and shopping habits and sexual interests are 
     your own business. That information has a value. If anybody 
     wants to pay for an intimate look inside your life, let them 
     make you an offer and you'll think about it. That's opt in. 
     You may decide to trade the desired information about 
     yourself for services like an E-mail box or stock quotes or 
     other inducement. But require them to ask you first.
       We are dealing here with a political sleeper issue. People 
     are getting wise to being secretly examined and manipulated 
     and it rubs them the wrong way.
       Politicians sense that a strange dissonance is agitating 
     their constituents. But most are leery of the issue because 
     it cuts across ideologies and party lines--not just encrypted 
     communication versus national security, but personal liberty 
     versus the free market.
       That's why there has been such Sturm und Drang around the 
     Financial Services Act of 1999. Most pols think it is bogged 
     down only because of a turf war between the Treasury and the 
     Fed over who regulates the new bank-broker-insurance mergers. 
     It goes deeper.
       The House passed a bill 343 to 86 to make ``pretext 
     calling'' by snoops pretending to be the customer a Federal 
     crime, plus an ``opt out'' that puts the burden on bank 
     customers to tell their banks not to disclose account 
     information to marketers. The bank lobby went along with 
     this.
       The Senate passed a version without privacy protection 
     because Banking Chairman Phil Gramm said so. But in Senate-
     House conference, Republican Richard Shelby of Alabama (who 
     already toughened drivers' protection at the behest of 
     Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum and the A.C.L.U.) is pressing 
     for the House version. `` `Opt out' is weak,'' Shelby tells 
     me, ``but it's a start.''
       The groundswelling resentment is in search of a public 
     champion. The start will gain momentum when some Presidential 
     candidate seizes the sleeper issue of the too-targeted 
     consumer. Laws need not always be the answer: to avert 
     regulation, smart businesses will complete to assure 
     customers' right to decide.
       The libertarian principle is plain: excepting legitimate 
     needs of law enforcement and public interest, control of 
     information about an individual must rest with the person 
     himself. When the required permission is asked, he or she can 
     sell it or trade it--or tell the bank, the search engine and 
     the Motor Vehicle Bureau to keep their mouths shut.
                                  ____


                        Privately Held Concerns

                  [Oct. 22, 1999--Wall Street Journal]

       Congress has been paddling 20 years to get a financial-
     service overhaul bill, and now the canoe threatens to run 
     aground on one of those imaginary concerns that only sounds 
     good in press release--``consumer privacy.'' In the column 
     alongside, Paul Gigot describes the hardball politics behind 
     the financial reform bill's other sticking point--the 
     Community Reinvestment Act. Our subject here is Senator 
     Richard Shelby's strange idea of what, precisely, should 
     constitute ``consumer privacy'' in the new world. ``It's our 
     responsibility to identify what is out of bounds,' '' 
     declared the identity confused Republican as he surfaced this 
     phantom last spring.
       Privacy concerns are a proper discussion point for the 
     information age, but financial reform would actually end to 
     alleviate some of them. If a single company were allowed to 
     sell insurance, portfolio advice and checking accounts, there 
     would be less incentive to peddle information to third 
     parties. Legislative reform and mergers in the financial 
     industry were all supposed to be aimed at the same goal, 
     using information efficiently within a single company to 
     serve customers. Yet to Mr. Shelby, this is a predatorial 
     act.
       He's demanding language that would mean a Citigroup banker, 
     say, couldn't tell a Citigroup insurance agent that Mr. Jones 
     is a hot insurance prospect--unless Mr. Jones gives his 
     permission in writing first. Mr. Shelby threatens to withhold 
     his crucial

[[Page S14539]]

     vote unless this deal-breaker is written into the law.
       To inflict this inconvenience on Mr. Jones is weird enough: 
     He has already volunteered to have a relationship with 
     Citigroup. But even weirder is the urge to cripple a law 
     whose whole purpose is to modernize an industry structure 
     that forces consumers today to chase six different companies 
     around to get a full mix of financial services. In essence, 
     financial products all do the same thing: shift income in 
     time. You want to go to college now based on your future 
     earnings, so you take out a loan. You want to retire in 20 
     years based on your present earnings, so you get an IRA. And 
     if a single cry goes up from modern man, it's ``Simplify my 
     life.''
       A vote last Friday seemed, to put Mr. Shelby's peeve to 
     rest. Under the current language, consumers would have an 
     ``opt out'' if they don't want their information shared. But 
     Mr. Shelby won't let go, and joining his chorus are Ralph 
     Nader on the left, Phyllis Schlafly on the right and various 
     gnats buzzing around the interest-group honeypot.
       He claims to be responding to constituent complaints about 
     telemarketing, not to mention a poll showing that 90% of 
     consumers respond favorably to the word ``privacy.'' Well, 
     duh. Consumers don't want their information made available 
     indiscriminately to strangers. But putting up barriers to 
     free exchange inside a company that a customer already has 
     chosen to do business with is a farfetched application of a 
     sensible idea.
       Mr. Shelby was a key supporter of language that would push 
     banks to set up their insurance and securities operations as 
     affiliates under a holding company. Now he wants to stop 
     these affiliates from talking to each other. Maybe he's just 
     confused, but it sounds more like a favor to Alabama bankers 
     and insurance agents who want to make life a lot harder for 
     their New York competitors trying to open up local markets.
                                  ____


        Growing Compatibility Issue: Computers and User Privacy

            [By John Markoff, New York Times, March 3, 1999]

       San Francisco, March 2--The Intel Corporation recently 
     blinked in a confrontation with privacy advocates protesting 
     the company's plans to ship its newest generation of 
     microprocessors with an embedded serial number that could be 
     used to identify a computer--and by extension its user.
       But those on each side of the dispute acknowledge that it 
     was only an initial skirmish in a wider struggle. From 
     computers to cellular phones to digital video players, 
     everyday devices and software programs increasingly embed 
     telltale identifying numbers that let them interact.
       Whether such digital fingerprints constitute an imminent 
     privacy threat or are simply part of the foundation of 
     advanced computer systems and networks is the subject of a 
     growing debate between the computer industry and privacy 
     groups. At its heart is a fundamental disagreement over the 
     role of electronic anonymity in a democratic society.
       Privacy groups argue fiercely that the merger of computers 
     and the Internet has brought the specter of a new 
     surveillance society in which it will be difficult to find 
     any device that cannot be traced to the user when it is used. 
     But a growing alliance of computer industry executives, 
     engineers, law enforcement officials and scholars contend 
     that absolute anonymity is not only increasingly difficult to 
     obtain technically, but is also a potential threat to 
     democratic order because of the possibility of electronic 
     crime and terrorism.
       ``You already have zero privacy--get over it,'' Scott 
     McNealy, chairman and chief executive of Sun Microsystems, 
     said at a recent news conference held to introduce the 
     company's newest software, known as Jini, intended to 
     interconnect virtually all types of electronic devices from 
     computer to cameras. Privacy advocates contend that software 
     like Jini, which assigns an identification number to each 
     device each time it connects to a network, could be misused 
     as networks envelop almost everyone in society in a dense web 
     of devices that see, hear, and monitor behavior and location.
       ``Once information becomes available for one purpose there 
     is always pressure from other organizations to use it for 
     their purposes,'' said, Lauren Weinstein, editor of Privacy 
     Forum, an on-line journal.
       This week, a programmer in Massachusetts found that 
     identifying numbers can easily be found in word processing 
     and spreadsheet files created with Microsoft's popular Word 
     and Excel programs and in the Windows 95 and 98 operating 
     systems.
       Moreover, unlike the Intel serial number, which the 
     computer user can conceal, the numbers used by the Microsoft 
     programs--found in millions of personal computers--cannot be 
     controlled by the user.
       The programmer, Richard M. Smith, president of Phar Lap 
     Software, a developer of computer programming tools in 
     Cambridge, Mass., noticed that the Windows operating system 
     contains a unique registration number stored on each personal 
     computer in a small data base known as the Windows registry.
       His curiosity aroused, Mr. Smith investigated further and 
     found that the number that uniquely identifies his computer 
     to the network used in most office computing systems, known 
     as the Ethernet, was routinely copied to, each Microsoft Word 
     or Excel document he created.
       The number is used to create a longer number, known as a 
     globally unique identifier. It is there, he said, to enable 
     computer users to create sophisticated documents comprising 
     work processing, spreadsheet, presentation and data base 
     information.
       Each of those components in a document needs a separate 
     identity, and computer designers have found the Ethernet 
     number a convenient and widely available identifier, he said. 
     But such universal identifiers are of particular concern to 
     privacy advocated because they could be used to compile 
     information on individuals from many data bases.
       ``The infrastructure relies a lot on serial numbers,'' Mr. 
     Smith said. ``We've let the genie out of the bottle.''
       Jeff Ressler, a Microsoft product manager, said that if a 
     computer did not have an Ethernet adapter then another 
     identifying number was generated that was likely to be 
     unique. ``We need a big number, which is a unique 
     identifier,'' he said. ``If we didn't have, it would be 
     impossible to make our software programs work together across 
     networks.''
       Indeed, an increasing range of technologies have provisions 
     for identifying their users for either technical reasons 
     (such as connecting to a network) or commercial ones (such as 
     determining which ads to show to Web surfers). But engineers 
     and network designers argue that identify information is a 
     vital aspect of modern security design because it is 
     necessary to authenticate an individual in a network, thereby 
     preventing fraud or intrusion.
       Last month at the introduction of Intel's powerful Pentium 
     III chip, Intel executives showed more than a dozen data 
     security uses for the serial number contained electronically 
     in each of the chips, ranging from limiting access to 
     protecting documents or software against piracy.
       Intel, the largest chip maker, had recently backed down 
     somewhat after it was challenged by privacy advocates over 
     the identity feature, agreeing that at least some processors 
     for the consumer market would be made in a way that requires 
     the user to activate the feature.
       Far from scaling back its vision, however, Intel said it 
     was planning an even wider range of features in its chips to 
     help companies protect copyrighted materials. It also pointed 
     to software applications that would use the embedded number 
     to identify participants in electronic chat rooms on the 
     Internet and thereby, for example, protect children from 
     Internet stalkers.
       But in achieving those goals, it would also create a 
     universal identifier, which could be used by software 
     applications to track computer users wherever they surfed on 
     the World Wide Web. And that, despite the chip maker's 
     assertions that it is working to enhance security and 
     privacy, has led some privacy advocates to taunt Intel and 
     accused it of a ``Big Brother Inside'' strategy.
       They contend that by uniquely identifying each computer it 
     will make it possible for marketers or Government and law 
     enforcement officials to track the activities of anyone 
     connected to a computer network more closely. They also say 
     that such a permanent identifier could be used in a similar 
     fashion to the data, known as ``cookies,'' that are placed on 
     a computer's hard drive by Web site to track the comings and 
     goings of Internet users.


                    putting privacy on the defensive

       Intel's decision to forge ahead with identity features in 
     its chip technology may signal a turning point in the battle 
     over privacy in the electronic age. Until now, privacy 
     concerns have generally put industry's executives on the 
     defensive. Now questions are being raised about whether there 
     should be limits to privacy in an Inernet era.
       ``Judge Brandeis's definition of privacy was `the right to 
     be left alone,' not the right to operate in absolute 
     secrecy,'' said Paul Saffo, a researcher at the Institute for 
     the Future in Menlo Park, Calif.
       Some Silicon Valley engineers and executives say that the 
     Intel critics are being naive and have failed to understand 
     that all devices connected to computer networks require 
     identification features simply to function correctly.
       Moreover, they note that identifying numbers have for more 
     than two decades been a requirement for any computer 
     connected to an Ethernet network. (Although still found most 
     widely in office settings, Ethernet connections are 
     increasingly being used for high-speed Internet Service in 
     the home via digital telephone lines and cable modems.)
       All of Apple Computer's popular iMac machines come with an 
     Ethernet connection that has a unique permanent number 
     installed in the factory. The number is used to identify the 
     computer to the local network.
       While the Ethernet number is not broadcast over the 
     Internet at large, it could easily be discovered by a 
     software application like a Web browser and transmitted to a 
     remote Web site tracking the identities of its users, a 
     number of computer engineers said.
       Moreover, they say that other kinds of networks require 
     identify numbers to protect against fraud. Each cellular 
     telephone currently has two numbers: the telephone number, 
     which can easily be changed, and an electronic serial number, 
     which is permanently put in place at the factory to protect 
     against theft or fraud.
       The serial number is accessible to the cellular telephone 
     network, and as cellular telephones add Internet browsing and 
     E-mail capabilities, it will potentially have the same

[[Page S14540]]

     identity capability as the Intel processor serial number.
       Other examples include DIVX DVD disks, which come with a 
     serial number that permits tracking the use of each movie by 
     a centralized network-recording system managed by the 
     companies that sell the disks.


                fearing the misuse of all those numbers

       Industry executives say that as the line between 
     communications and computing becomes increasingly blurred, 
     every electronic device will require some kind of 
     identification to attach to the network
       Making those numbers available to networks that need to 
     pass information or to find a mobile user while at the same 
     time denying the information to those who wish to gather 
     information into vast data bases may be an impossible task.
       Privacy advocates argue that even if isolated numbers look 
     harmless, they are actually harbingers of a trend toward ever 
     more invasive surveillance networks.
       ``Whatever we can do to actually minimize the collection of 
     personal data is good,' said March Rotenberg, director of the 
     Electronic Privacy Information Center, one of three groups 
     trying to organize a boycott of Intel's chips.
       The groups are concerned that the Government will require 
     ever more invasive hardware modifications to keep track of 
     individuals. Already they point to the 1994 Communications 
     Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, which requires that 
     telephone companies modify their network switches to make it 
     easier for Government wiretappers.
       Also, the Federal Communications Commission is developing 
     regulations that will require every cellular telephone to be 
     able to report its precise location for ``911'' emergency 
     calls. Privacy groups are worried that this feature will be 
     used as a tracking technology by law enforcement officials.
       ``The ultimate danger is that the Government will mandate 
     that each chip have special logic added'' to track identifies 
     in cyberspace, said Vernor Vinge, a computer scientist at San 
     Diego State University. ``We're on a slide in that 
     direction.''
       Mr. Vinge is the author of ``True Names'' (Tor Books, 
     1984), a widely cited science fiction novel in the early 
     1980's, that forecast a world in which anonymity in computer 
     networks is illegal.
       Intel executives insist that their chip is being 
     misconstrued by privacy groups.
       ``We're going to start building security architecture into 
     our chips, and this is the first step,'' said Pat Gelsinger, 
     Intel vice president and general manager of desktop products. 
     ``The discouraging part of this is our objective is to 
     accomplish privacy.
       That quandry--that it is almost impossible to 
     compartmentalize information for one purpose so that it 
     cannot be misused--lies at the heart of the argument. 
     Moreover providing security while at the same time offering 
     anonymity has long been a technical and a political 
     challenge.
       ``We need to find ways to distinguish between security and 
     identity,'' said James X. Dempsey, a privacy expert at the 
     Center for Democracy and Technology, a Washington lobbying 
     organization.
       So far the prospects are not encouraging. One technical 
     solution developed by a cryptographer, David Chaum, made it 
     possible for individuals to make electronic cash payments 
     anonymously in a network.
       In the system Mr. Chaum designed, a user employs a 
     different number with each organization, thereby insuring 
     that there is no universal tracking capability.
       But while Mr. Chaum's solution has been widely considered 
     ingenious, it has failed in the marketplace. Last year, his 
     company, Digicash Inc. based in Palo Alto, Calif., filed for 
     bankruptcy protection.
       ``Privacy never seems to sell,'' said Bruce Schneier, a 
     cryptographer and a computer industry consultant. ``Those who 
     are interested in privacy don't want to pay for it.''
                                  ____


                         Privacy Isn't Dead Yet

                          [By Amitai Etzioni]

       It seems self-evident that information about your shoe size 
     does not need to be as well guarded as information about 
     tests ordered by your doctor. But with the Federal and state 
     governments' piecemeal approach to privacy protection, if we 
     release information about one facet of our lives, we 
     inadvertently expose much about the others.
       During Senate hearings in 1987 about Robert Bork's fitness 
     to serve as a Supreme Court justice, a reporter found out 
     which videotapes Mr. Bork rented. The response was the 
     enactment of the Video Privacy Protection Act. Another law 
     prohibits the Social Security Administration (but hardly 
     anybody else) from releasing our Social Security numbers. 
     Still other laws limit what states can do with information 
     that we provide to motor vehicle departments.
       Congress is now seeking to add some more panels to this 
     crazy quilt of narrowly drawn privacy laws. The House 
     recently endorsed a bill to prohibit banks and securities and 
     insurance companies owned by the same parent corporation from 
     sharing personal medical information. And Congress is 
     grappling with laws to prevent some information about our 
     mutual-fund holdings from being sold and bought as freely as 
     hot dogs.
       But with superpowerful computers and vast databases in the 
     private sector, personal information can't be segmented in 
     this manner. For example, in 1996, a man in Los Angeles got 
     himself a store card, which gave him discounts and allowed 
     the store to trace what he purchased. After injuring his knee 
     in the store, he sued for damages. He was then told that if 
     he proceeded with his suit the store would use the fact that 
     he bought a lot of liquor to show that he must have fallen 
     because he was a drunkard.
       Some health insurers try to ``cherry pick'' their clients, 
     seeking to cover only those who are least likely to have 
     genetic problems or contract costly diseases like AIDS. Some 
     laws prohibit insurers from asking people directly about 
     their sexual orientation. But companies sometimes refuse to 
     insure those whose vocation (designer?), place of residence 
     (Greenwich Village?) and marital status (single at 40-plus?) 
     suggest that they might pose high risks.
       Especially comprehensive privacy invaders are ``cookies''--
     surveillance files that many marketers implant in the 
     personal computers of people who visit their Web sites to 
     allow the marketers to track users' preferences and 
     transactions. Cookies, we are assured, merely inform 
     marketers about our wishes so that advertising can be better 
     directed, sparing us from a flood of junk mail.
       Actually, by tracing the steps we take once we gain a new 
     piece of information, cookies reveal not only what we buy (a 
     thong from Victoria's Secret? Antidepressants?) but also how 
     we think. Nineteen eighty-four is here courtesy of Intel, 
     Microsoft and quite a few other corporations.
       All this has led Scott McNealy, the chairman and chief 
     executive of Sun Microsystems, to state, ``You already have 
     zero privacy--get over it.'' This pronouncement of the death 
     of privacy is premature, but we will be able to keep it alive 
     only if we introduce general, all-encompassing protections 
     over segmented ones.
       Some cyberspace anonymity can be provided by new 
     technologies like anti-cookie programs and encryption 
     software that allow us to encrypt all of our data. Corporate 
     self-regulation can also help. I.B.M., for example, said last 
     week that it would pull its advertising from Web sites that 
     don't have clear privacy policies. Other companies like 
     Disney and Kellogg have voluntarily agreed not to collect 
     information about children 12 or younger without the consent 
     of their parents. And some new Government regulation of 
     Internet commerce may soon be required, if only because the 
     European Union is insisting that any personal information 
     about the citizens of its member countries cannot be used 
     without the citizen's consent.
       Especially sensitive information should get extra 
     protection. But such selective security can work only if all 
     the other information about a person is not freely accessible 
     elsewhere.
                                  ____


                  A Middle Ground in the Privacy War?

                   [By John Schwartz--March 29, 1999]

       Jim Hightower, the former agriculture commissioner of 
     Texas, is fond of saying that ``there's nothing in the middle 
     of the road but yellow stripes and dead armadillos.''
       It's punchy, and has become a rallying cry of sorts for 
     activists on all sides. But is it right? Amitai Etzioni, a 
     professor at George Washington University, thinks not. He 
     thinks he has found a workable middle ground between the 
     combatants in one of the fiercest fights in our high-tech 
     society: the right of privacy.
       Etzioni has carved out a place for himself over the decades 
     as a leader in the ``communitarian'' movement. 
     Communitarianism works toward a civil society that transcends 
     both government regulation and commercial intrusion--a 
     society where the golden rule is as important as the rule of 
     law, and the notion that ``he who has the gold makes the 
     rules'' does not apply.
       What does all that have to do with privacy? Etzioni has 
     written a new book, ``The Limits of Privacy,'' that applies 
     communitarian principles to this thorny issue.
       For the most part, the debate over privacy is carried out 
     from two sides separated by a huge ideological gap--a gap so 
     vast that they seem to feel a need to shout just to get their 
     voices to carry across it. So Etzioni comes in with a theme 
     not often heard, that middle of the road that Hightower hates 
     so much.
       What he wants to do is to forge a new privacy doctrine that 
     protects the individual from snooping corporations and 
     irresponsible government, but cedes individual privacy rights 
     when public health and safety are at stake--``a balance 
     between rights and the common good,'' he writes.
       In the book, Etzioni tours a number of major privacy 
     issues, passing judgment as he goes along. Pro-privacy 
     decisions that prohibited mandatory testing infants for HIV, 
     for example, take the concept too far and put children at 
     risk, he says. Privacy advocates' campaigns against the 
     government's attempts to wiretap and unscramble encrypted 
     messages, he says, are misguided in the face of the evil that 
     walks the planet.
       The prospect of some kind of national ID system, which many 
     privacy advocates view as anathema, he finds useful for 
     catching criminals, reducing fraud and ending the crime of 
     identity theft. The broad distribution of our medical records 
     for commercial gain, however, takes too much away from us for 
     little benefit to society.
       I called Etzioni to ask about his book. He said civil 
     libertarians talk about the threat of government intrusion 
     into our lives, and government talks about the threat of 
     criminals, but that the more he got into his research, the 
     more it seemed that the two

[[Page S14541]]

     sides were missing ``the number one enemy--it's a small group 
     of corporations that have more information about us than the 
     East German police ever had about the Germans.''
       He's horrified, for example, by recent news that both 
     Microsoft Corp. and Intel Corp. have included identifier 
     codes in their products that could be used to track people's 
     online habits: ``They not only track what we are doing,'' he 
     says. ``They track what we think.''
       His rethinking of privacy leads him to reject the notions 
     that led to a constitutional right of privacy, best expressed 
     in the landmark 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut.
       In that case, Justice William O. Douglas found a right of 
     privacy in the ``penumbra,'' or shadow border, of rights 
     granted by other constitutional amendments--such as freedom 
     of speech, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, 
     freedom from having troops billeted in our homes.
       Etzioni scoffs at this ``stretched interpretation of a 
     curious amalgam of sundry pieces of various constitutional 
     rights,'' and says we need only look to the simpler balancing 
     act we've developed in Fourth Amendment cases governing 
     search and seizure, which give us privacy protection by 
     requiring proper warrants before government can tape a phone 
     or search a home.
       ``We cannot say that we will not allow the FBI under any 
     conditions, because of a cyberpunk dream of a world without 
     government, to read any message.'' He finds such a view ``so 
     ideological, so extreme, that somebody has to talk for a 
     sense of balance.''
       I was surprised to see, in the acknowledgements in his 
     book, warm thanks to Marc Rotenberg, who heads the Electronic 
     Privacy Information Center. Rotenberg is about as staunch a 
     privacy advocate as I know, and I can't imagine him finding 
     much common ground with Etzioni--but Etzioni told me that 
     ``Marc is among all the people in this area the most 
     reasonable. One can talk to him.''
       So I called Rotenberg, too. He said he deeply respects 
     Etzioni, but can't find much in the book to agree with. For 
     all the talk of balance, he say, ``we have invariably found 
     that when the rights of the individual are balanced against 
     the claims of the community, that the individual loses out.''
       We're in the midst of a ``privacy crisis'' in which ``we 
     have been unable to come up with solutions to the privacy 
     challenges that new business practices and new technologies 
     are creating,'' Rotenberg told me.
       The way to reach answers, he suggested, is not to seek 
     middle ground but to draw the lines more clearly, the way 
     judges do in deciding cases. When a criminal defendant 
     challenges a policeman's pat-down search in court, Rotenberg 
     explained, ``the guy with the small plastic bag of cocaine 
     either gets to walk or he doesn't. . . . Making those lines 
     fuzzier doesn't really take you any closer to finding 
     answers.''
       As you can see, this is one argument that isn't settled. 
     But I'm glad that Etzioni has joined the conversation--both 
     for the trademark civility he brings to it, and for the 
     dialogue he will spark.

  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Privacy 
Protection Study Commission Act of 1999 with my colleague, Senator 
Kohl. This legislation creates a Commission to comprehensively examine 
privacy concerns. This Commission will provide Congress with 
information to facilitate our decision making regarding how to best 
address individual privacy protections.
  The rise in the use of information technology--particularly the 
Internet, has led to concerns regarding the security of personal 
information. As many as 40 million people around the world have the 
ability to access the Internet. The use of computers for personal and 
business transactions has resulted in the availability of vast amounts 
of financial, medical and other information in the public domain. 
Information about online users is also collected by Web sites through 
technology which tracks an individual's every interaction with the 
Internet.
  Despite the ease of availability of personal information, the United 
States is one of the few countries in the world that does not have 
comprehensive legal protection for personal information. This is in 
part due to differences in opinion regarding the best way to address 
the problem. While some argue that the Internet's size and constantly 
changing technology demands government and industry self-regulation, 
others advocate for strong legislative and regulatory protections. And, 
still others note that such protections, although necessary, could lead 
to unconstitutional consequences if drafted without a comprehensive 
understanding of the issue. As a result, congressional efforts to 
address privacy concerns have been patchwork in nature.
  This is why Senator Kohl and I are proposing the creation of a 
Commission with the purpose of thoughtfully considering the range of 
issues involved in the privacy debate and the implications of self-
regulation, legislation, and federal regulation. The Commission will be 
comprised of experts in the fields of law, civil rights, business, and 
government. After 18 months, the Commission will deliver a report to 
Congress recommending the necessary legislative protections are needed. 
The Commission will have the authority to gather the necessary 
information to reach conclusions that are balanced and fair.
  Americans are genuinely concerned about individual privacy. The 
Privacy Commission proposed by Senator Kohl and myself will enable 
Congress and the public to evaluate the extent to which we should be 
concerned and the proper way to address those concerns. The privacy 
debate is multifaceted and I encourage my colleagues to join Senator 
Kohl and myself in our efforts to gain a better understanding of it. 
Senator Kohl and I look forward to working with all those interested in 
furthering this debate and giving Americans a greater sense of 
confidence in the security of their personal information.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mrs. FEINSTEIN:
  S. 1902. A bill to require disclosure under the Freedom of 
Information Act regarding certain persons and records of the Japanese 
Imperial Army in a manner that does not impair any investigation or 
prosecution conducted by the Department of Justice or certain 
intelligence matters, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the 
Judiciary.


             Japanese Imperial Army Disclosure Act of 1999

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Japanese 
Imperial Army Disclosure Act of 1999.
  This legislation will require the disclosure under the Freedom of 
Information Act classified records and documents in the possession of 
the U.S. Government regarding chemical and biological experiments 
carried out by Japan during the course of the Second World War.
  Let me preface my statement by making clear that none of the remarks 
that I will make in discussing this legislation should be considered 
anti-Japanese. I was proud to serve as the President of the Japan 
Society of Northern California, and I have done everything I can to 
foster, promote, and develop positive relations between Japan, the 
United States, China, and other states of the region. The legislation I 
introduce today is eagerly sought by a large number of Californians who 
believe that there is an effort to keep information about possible 
atrocities and experiments with poisonous gas and germ warfare from the 
pubic record.
  One of my most important goals in the Senate is to see the 
development of a Pacific Rim community that is peaceful and stable. I 
have worked towards this end for over twenty years. I introduce this 
legislation to try to heal wounds that still remain, particularly in 
California's Chinese-American community.

  This legislation is needed because although the Second World War 
ended over fifty years ago--and with it Japan's chemical and biological 
weapons experimentation programs--many of the records and documents 
regarding Japan's wartime activities remain classified and hidden in 
U.S. Government archives and repositories. Even worse, according to 
some scholars, some of these records are now being inadvertently 
destroyed.
  For the many U.S. Army veteran's who were subject to these 
experiments in POW camps, as well as the many Chinese and other Asian 
civilians who were subjected to these experiments, the time has long 
since passed for the full truth to come out.
  According to information which was revealed at the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East, starting in 1931, when the so-
called ``Mukden incident'' provided Japan the pretext for the 
occupation of Manchuria, the Japanese Imperial Army conducted numerous 
biological and chemical warfare tests on Chinese civilians, Allied 
POWs, and possibly Japanese civilians as well.
  Perhaps the most notorious of these experiments were carried out 
under General Ishii Shiro, a Japanese Army surgeon, who, by the late 
1930's had built a large installation in China with germ breeding 
facilities, testing

[[Page S14542]]

grounds, prisons to hold the human test subjects, facilities to make 
germ weapons, and a crematorium for the final disposal of the human 
test victims. General Ishii's main factory operated under the code name 
Unit 731.
  Based on the evidence revealed at the War Crimes trials, as well as 
subsequent work by numerous scholars, there is little doubt that Japan 
conducted these chemical and biological warfare experiments, and that 
the Japanese Imperial Army attempted to use chemical and biological 
weapons during the course of the war, included reports of use of plague 
on the cities of Ningbo and Changde.
  And, as a 1980 article by John Powell in the Bulletin of Concerned 
Asia Scholars found,

       Once the fact had been established that Ishii had used 
     Chinese and others as laboratory tests subjects, it seemed a 
     fair assumption that he also might have used American 
     prisoners, possibly British, and perhaps even Japanese.

  Some of the records of these activities were revealed during the 
Tokyo War Crimes trials, and others have since come to light under 
Freedom of Information Act requests, but many other documents, which 
were transferred to the U.S. military during the occupation of Japan, 
have remained hidden for the past fifty years.
  And it is precisely for this reason that this legislation is needed: 
The world is entitled to a full and compel record of what did 
transpire.
  Sheldon Harris, Professor of History Emeritus at California State 
university Northridge wrote to me on October 7 of this year that:

       In my capacity as an academic Historian, I can testify to 
     the difficulty researchers have in unearthing documents and 
     personal testimony concerning these war crimes * * *. Here in 
     the United States, despite the Freedom of Information Act, 
     some archives remain closed to investigators * * *. Moreover, 
     ``sensitive documents--as defined by archivists and FOIA 
     officers--are at the moment being destroyed.

  Professor Sheldon's letter goes on to discuss three examples of the 
destruction of documents relating to chemical and biological warfare 
experiments that he is aware of: At Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah, at 
Fort Detrick in Maryland, and at the Pentagon.
  This legislation establishes, within 60 days after the enactment of 
the act, the Japanese Imperial Army Records Interagency Working Group, 
including representation by the Department of State and the Archivist 
of the United States, to locate, identify, and recommend for 
declassification all Japanese Imperial Army records of the United 
States.
  This Interagency Work Group, which will remain in existence for three 
years, is to locate, identify, inventory, recommend for classification, 
and make available to the public all classified Imperial Army records 
of the United States. It is to do so in coordination with other 
agencies, and to submit a report to Congress describing its activities.
  It is my belief that the establishment of such an Interagency Working 
Group is the best way to make sure that the documents which need to be 
declassified will be declassified, and that this process will occur in 
an orderly and expeditious manner.
  This legislation also includes exceptions which would allow the 
Interagency Working Group to deny release of records on the basis of: 
1. Records which may unfairly invade an individual's privacy; 2. 
Records which adversely affect the national security or intelligence 
capabilities of the United States; 3. Records which might ``seriously 
or demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a 
foreign government''; and, 4. Records which might contribute to the 
development of chemical or biological capabilities.
  My purpose in introducing this legislation is to help those who were 
victimized by these experiments and, with the adage ``the truth shall 
set you free'' in mind, help build a more peaceful Asian-Pacific 
community for the twenty-first century.
  First, the declassification and release of this material will help 
the victims of chemical and biological warfare experimentation carried 
out by the Japanese Army during the Second World War, as well as their 
families and descendants, gain information about what occurred to them 
fifty years ago. If old wounds are to heal, there must be a full 
accounting of what happened.
  Second, and perhaps just as importantly, this legislation is intended 
to create an environment of honest dialogue and discussion in the Asia-
Pacific region, so that the countries and people of the region can move 
beyond the problems that have plagued us for the past century, and work 
together to build a peaceful and prosperous Asian-Pacific community in 
the next century.
  If the countries of Asia are to build a peaceful community it is 
necessary that we deal fully, fairly, and honestly with the past. It is 
only by doing so that we can avoid repeating the mistakes of the past 
and build a more just world for the future.
  Indeed, as Rabbi Abraham Cooper has remarked, ``Since the end of 
World War II, professed neutral nations like Sweden and Switzerland 
have had the courage to take a painful look back at their World War II 
record; can Japan be allowed to do anything less?''
  I hope that my colleagues will join me in support of this 
legislation.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the October 7 letter by 
Professor Harris and an article outlining some of the scholarly 
research on this issue: ``Japan's Biological Weapons: 1930-1945,'' by 
Robert Gromer, John Powell, and Burt Roling be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                            Granada Hills, CA,

                                                  October 7, 1999.
     Hon. Senator Dianne Feinstein,
     Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Feinstein: Several Asian American activists 
     organizations in California, and organizations representing 
     former Prisoners of War and Internees of the Japanese 
     Imperial Army, have indicated to me that you are proposing to 
     introduce legislation into the United States Senate that 
     calls for full disclosure by the United States Government of 
     records it possesses concerning war crimes committed by 
     members of the Japanese Imperial Army. I endorse such 
     legislation enthusiastically.
       My support for the full disclosure of American held records 
     relating to the Japanese Imperial Army's wartime crimes 
     against humanity is both personal and professional. I am 
     aware of the terrible suffering members of the Imperial 
     Japanese Army imposed upon innocent Asians, prisoners of war 
     of various nationalists and civilian internees of Allied 
     nations. These inhumane acts were condoned, if not ordered, 
     by the highest authorities in both the civilian and military 
     branches of the Japanese government. As a consequence, 
     millions of persons were killed, maimed, tortured, or 
     experienced acts of violence that included human experiments 
     relating to biological and chemical warfare research. Many of 
     these actions meet the definition of ``war crimes'' under 
     both the Potsdam Declaration and the various Nuremberg War 
     Crimes trials held in the post-war period.
       I am the author of ``Factories of Death, Japanese 
     Biological Warfare, 1932-45, and the American Cover-up'' 
     (Routlege: London and New York; hard cover edition 1994; 
     paperback printings, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999). I discovered in 
     the course of my research for this book, and scholarly 
     articles that I published on the subject of Japanese 
     biological and chemical warfare preparations, that members of 
     the Japanese Imperial Army Medical Corps committed heinous 
     war crimes. These included involuntary laboratory tests of 
     various pathogens on humans--Chinese, Korean, other Asian 
     nationalities, and Allied prisoners of war, including 
     Americans. Barbarous acts encompassed live vivisections, 
     amputations of body parts (frequently without the use of 
     anesthesia), frost bite exposure to temperatures of 40-50 
     degrees Fahrenheit below zero, injection of horse blood and 
     other animal blood into humans, as well as other horrific 
     experiments. When a test was completed, the human 
     experimented was ``sacrificed'', the euphemism used by 
     Japanese scientists as a substitute term for ``killed.''
       In my capacity as an academic Historian, I can testify to 
     the difficulty researchers have in unearthing documents and 
     personal testimony concerning these war crimes. I, and other 
     researchers, have been denied access to military archives in 
     Japan. These archives cover activities by the Imperial 
     Japanese Army that occurred more than 50 years ago. The 
     documents in question cannot conceivably contain information 
     that would be considered of importance to ``National 
     Security'' today. The various governments in Japan for the 
     past half century have kept these archives firmly closed. The 
     fear is that the information contained in the archives will 
     embarrass previous governments.
       Here in the United States, despite the Freedom of 
     Information Act, some archives remain closed to 
     investigators. At best, the archivists in charge, or the 
     Freedom of Information Officer at the archive in question, 
     select what documents they will allow to become public. This 
     is an unconscionable act of arrogance and a betrayal of the 
     trust they have been given by the Congress and the

[[Page S14543]]

     President of the United States. Moreover, ``sensitive'' 
     documents--as defined by archivists and FOIA officers--are at 
     the moment being destroyed. Thus, historians and concerned 
     citizens are being denied factual evidence that can shed some 
     light on the terrible atrocities committed by Japanese 
     militarists in the past.
       Three examples of this wanton destruction should be 
     sufficiently illustrative of the dangers that exist, and 
     should reinforce the obvious necessity for prompt passage of 
     legislation you propose to introduce into the Congress:
       1. In 1991, the Librarian at Dugway Proving Grounds, 
     Dugway, Utah, denied me access to the archives at the 
     facility. It was only through the intervention of then U.S. 
     Representative Wayne Owens, Dem., Utah, that I was given 
     permission to visit the facility. I was not shown all the 
     holdings relating to Japanese medical experiments, but the 
     little I was permitted to examine revealed a great deal of 
     information about medical war crimes. Sometimes after my 
     visit, a person with intimate knowledge of Dugway's 
     operations, informed me that ``sensitive'' documents were 
     destroyed there as a direct result of my research in their 
     library.
       2. I conducted much of my American research at Fort Detrick 
     in Frederick, Md. The Public Information Officer there was 
     extremely helpful to me. Two weeks ago I telephoned Detrick, 
     was informed that the PIO had retired last May. I spoke with 
     the new PIO, who told me that Detrick no longer would discuss 
     past research activities, but would disclose information only 
     on current projects. Later that day I telephoned the retired 
     PIO at his home. He informed me that upon retiring he was 
     told to ``get rid of that stuff'', meaning incriminating 
     documents relating to Japanese medical war crimes. Detrick no 
     longer is a viable research center for historians.
       3. Within the past 2 weeks, I was informed that the 
     Pentagon, for ``space reasons'', decided to rid itself of all 
     biological warfare documents in its holdings prior to 1949. 
     The date is important, because all war crimes trials against 
     accused Japanese war criminals were terminated by 1949. Thus, 
     current Pentagon materials could not implicate alleged 
     Japanese war criminals. Fortunately, a private research 
     facility in Washington volunteered to retrieve the documents 
     in question. This research facility now holds the documents, 
     is currently cataloguing them (estimated completion time, at 
     least twelve months), and is guarding the documents under 
     ``tight security.''
       Your proposed legislation must be acted upon promptly. Many 
     of the victims of Japanese war crimes are elderly. Some of 
     the victims pass away daily. Their suffering should receive 
     recognition and some compensation. Moreover, History is being 
     cheated. As documents disappear, the story of war crimes 
     committed in the War In The Pacific becomes increasingly 
     difficult to describe. The end result will be a distorted 
     picture of reality. As an Historian, I cannot accept this 
     inevitability without vigorous protest.
       Please excuse the length of this letter. However, I do hope 
     that some of the arguments I made in comments above will be 
     of some assistance to you as you press for passage of the 
     proposed legislation. I will be happy to be of any additional 
     assistance to you, should you wish to call upon me for 
     further information or documentation.
           Sincerely yours,

                                            Sheldon H. Harris,

                                    Professor of History emeritus,
     California State University, Northridge.
                                  ____


        [From the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Oct., 1981]

   Japan's Biological Weapons: 1930-1945--A Hidden Chapter in History

         (By Robert Gomer, John W. Powell and Bert V.A. Roling)

       When this story first reached the Bulletin, our reaction 
     was horrified disbelief. I think all of us hoped that it was 
     not true. Unfortunately, subsequent research shows that it is 
     all too true. In order to verify the facts set forth here we 
     enlisted the help of a number of distinguished scientists and 
     historians, who are hereby thanked. It seems unnecessary to 
     mention them by name; suffice it that the allegations set 
     forth in this article seem to be true and there is a 
     substantial file of documents in the Bulletin offices to back 
     them up.
       What other comment need one really make? Any reader with a 
     sense of justice and decency will be nauseated, not only by 
     these atrocities, but equally so by the reaction of the U.S. 
     Departments of War and State.
       The psychological climate engendered by war is horrible. 
     The Japanese tortured and killed helpless prisoners in search 
     of ``a cheap and effective weapon.'' The Americans and 
     British invented firestorms and the U.S. dropped two nuclear 
     bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In such a climate it may 
     have seemed reasonable not to bring the Japanese responsible 
     for the biological ``experiments'' to justice, but it was and 
     remains monstrous.
       By acquiring ``at a fraction of the original cost'' the 
     ``invaluable'' results of the Japanese experiments, have we 
     not put ourselves on the same level as the Japanese 
     experimenters? Some politicians and generals like to speak of 
     the harsh realities of the world in order to act both 
     bestially and stupidly. The world clearly does contain harsh 
     realities but somehow there is a sort of potential divine 
     justice basic decency generally would have been the 
     smartest course in the long run. Unfortunately there are 
     few instances where it was actually taken.
       The spirit and psychological climate which made possible 
     the horrors described in this article are not dead; in fact, 
     they seem to be flourishing in the world. The torture 
     chambers are busy in Latin America and elsewhere, and the 
     United States provides economic and military aid to the 
     torturers. The earth-and-people destroying was waged by the 
     United States not long ago in Vietnam, the apparently similar 
     war being waged by the Soviets in Afghanistan, the horrors of 
     the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, and the contemplation with 
     some equanimity of ``limited'' nuclear war by strategists 
     here and in the Soviet Union display the spirit of General 
     Ishii. If we are to survive as human beings, or more 
     accurately, if we are to become fully human, that spirit must 
     have no place among men.--Robert Gomer (professor of 
     chemistry at the University of Chicago, and member of the 
     Board of Directors of the Bulletin.)
       Long-secret documents, secured under the U.S. Freedom of 
     Information Act, reveal details of one of the more gruesome 
     chapters of the Pacific War; Japan's use of biological 
     warfare against China and the Soviet Union. For years the 
     Japanese and American governments succeeded in suppressing 
     this story.
       Japan's desire to hide its attempts at ``public health in 
     reverse'' is understandable. The American government's 
     participation in the cover-up, it is now disclosed, stemmed 
     from Washington's desire to secure exclusive possession of 
     Japan's expertise in using germs as lethal weapons. The 
     United States granted immunity from war crimes prosecution to 
     the Japanese participants, and they in turn handed over their 
     laboratory records to U.S. representatives from Camp Detrick 
     (now Fort Detrick).
       The record shows that by the late 1930s Japan's biological 
     warfare (BW) program was ready for testing. It was used with 
     moderate success against Chinese troops and civilians and 
     with unknown results against the Russians. By 1945 Japan had 
     a huge stockpile of germs, vectors and delivery equipment 
     unmatched by any other nation.
       Japan had gained this undisputed lead primarily because its 
     scientists used humans as guinea pigs. It is estimated that 
     at least 3,000 people were killed at the main biological 
     warfare experimental station, code named Unit 731 and located 
     a few miles from Harbin. They either succumbed during the 
     experiments or were executed when they had become physical 
     wrecks and were no longer fit for further germ tests [1, pp. 
     19-21]. There is no estimate of total casualties but it is 
     known that at least two other Japanese biological warfare 
     installations--Unit 100 near Changchun and the Tama 
     Detachment in Nanjing--engaged in similar human 
     experimentation.
       (End Notes at end of articles)
       This much of the story has been available for some years. 
     What has not been known until very recently is that among the 
     human guinea pigs were an undetermined number of American 
     soldiers, captured during the early part of the war and 
     confined in prisoner-of-war camps in Manchuria. Official U.S. 
     reports reveal that Washington was aware of these facts when 
     the decision was made to forego prosecution of the Japanese 
     participants. These declassified ``top secret'' documents 
     disclose the details and raise disturbing questions about the 
     role of numerous highly placed American officials at the 
     time.
       The first public indications that American prisoners of war 
     were among the human victims appeared in the published 
     summary of the Khabarovsk trial. A witness stated that a 
     researcher was sent to the camps where U.S. prisoners were 
     held to ``study the immunity of Anglo-Saxons to infectious 
     diseases'' [1, p. 268]. The summary noted: ``As early as 
     1943, Minata, a researcher belonging to Detachment 731, was 
     sent to prisoner of war camps to test the properties of the 
     blood and immunity to contagious diseases of American 
     soldiers'' [1, p. 415].
       On June 7, 1947, Colonel Alva C. Carpenter, chief of 
     General Douglas MacArthur's legal staff, in a top secret 
     cable to Washington, expressed doubt about the reliability of 
     early reports of Japanese biological warfare, including an 
     allegation by the Japanese Communist Party that experiments 
     had been performed ``on captured Americans in Mukden and that 
     simultaneously research on similar lines was conducted in 
     Tokyo and Kyoto.'' On June 27, Carpenter again cabled 
     Washington, stating that further information strengthened the 
     charges and ``warrants conclusion'' that the Ishii group had 
     violated the ``rules of land warfare.'' He warned that the 
     Soviets might bring up evidence of Japanese use of biological 
     warfare against China and ``other evidence on this subject 
     which may have resulted from their independent investigation 
     in Manchuria and in Japan.'' He added that ``this expression 
     of opinion'' was not a recommendation that Ishii's group be 
     charged with war crimes.
       Cecil F. Hubbert, a member of the State, War, Navy 
     Coordinating Committee, in a July 15, 1947 memo, recommended 
     that the story be covered up but warned that it might leak 
     out if the Russian prosecutor brought the subject up during 
     the Tokyo war crimes trials and added that the Soviets might 
     have found out that ``American prisoners of war were used for 
     experimental purposes of a bw nature and that they lost their 
     lives as a result of these experiments.''

[[Page S14544]]

       In his book, The Pacific War Professor Ienaga Saburo added 
     a few new details about Unit 731 and described fatal 
     vivisection experiments at Kyushu Imperial University on 
     downed American fliers [2, pp. 188-90].
       The biological warfare project began shortly after the 
     Manchurian Incident in 1931, when Japan occupied China's 
     Northeast provinces and when a Japanese Army surgeon, Ishii 
     Shiro, persuaded his superiors that microbes could become an 
     inexpensive weapon potentially capable of producing enormous 
     casualties [1, pp. 105-107; 3]. Ishii, who finally rose to 
     the rank of lieutenant-general, built a large, self-contained 
     installation with sophisticated germ- and insect-breeding 
     facilities, a prison for the human experimentees, testing 
     grounds, an arsenal for makin germ bombs, an airfield, its 
     own special planes and a crematorium for the human victims.
       When Soviet tanks crossed the Siberian-Manchurian border at 
     midnight on August 8, 1945, Japan was less than a week away 
     from unconditional surrender. In those few days of grace the 
     Japanese destroyed their biological warfare installations in 
     China, killed the remaining human experimentees (``It took 30 
     hours to lay them in ashes [4]'') and ship out most of their 
     personnel and some of the more valuable equipment to South 
     Korea [1, pp. 43, 125, 130-31]. Reports that some equipment 
     was slipped into Japan are confirmed by American documents 
     which reveal that slides, laboratory records and case 
     histories of experiments over many years were successfully 
     transported to Japan [4].
       A ``top secret'' cable from Tokyo to Washington on May 6, 
     1947, described some of the information being secured:
       ``Statements obtained from Japanese here confirm statements 
     of ussr prisoners. . . Experiments on humans were . . . 
     described by three Japanese and confirmed tacitly by Ishii; 
     field trials against Chinese took place . . . scope of 
     program indicated by report . . . that 400 kilograms [880 
     lbs.] of dried anthrax organisms destroyed in August 1945. . 
     . . Reluctant statements by Ishii indicate he had superiors 
     (possibly general staff) who . . . authorized the program. 
     Ishii states that if guaranteed immunity from ``war crimes'' 
     in documentary form for himself, superiors and subordinates, 
     he can describe program in detail. Ishii claims to have 
     extensive theoretical high-level knowledge including 
     strategic and tactical use of BW on defense and offense, 
     backed by some research on best agents to employ by 
     geographical areas of Far East, and the use of BW in cold 
     climates'' [5, 6].
       A top secret Tokyo headquarters ``memorandum for the 
     record'' (also dated May 6), gave more details: ``USSR 
     interest in Japanese BW personnel arises from interrogations 
     of two captured Japanese formerly associated with BW. Copies 
     of these interrogations were given to U.S. Preliminary 
     investigation[s] confirm authenticity of USSR interrogations 
     and indicate Japanese activity in:
       a. Human experiments
       b. Field trials against Chinese
       c. Large scale program
       d. Research on BW by crop destruction
       e. Possible that Japanese General Staff knew and authorized 
     program
       f. Thought and research devoted to strategic and tactical 
     use of BW.
       Data . . . on above topics are of great intelligence value 
     to U.S. Dr. Fell, War Department representative, states that 
     this new evidence was not known by U.S. [6].
       Certain low echelon Japanese are now working to assemble 
     most of the necessary technical data. . . . Information to 
     the present have [sic] been obtained by persuasion, 
     exploitation of Japanese fear of USSR and Japanese desire to 
     cooperate with U.S. Additional information . . . probably can 
     be obtained by informing Japanese involved that information 
     will be kept in intelligence channels and not employed for 
     `war crimes' evidence.
       Documentary immunity from ``war crimes'' given to higher 
     echelon personnel involved will result in exploiting twenty 
     years experience of the director, former General Ishii, who 
     can assure complete cooperation of his former subordinates, 
     indicate the connection of the Japanese General Staff and 
     provide the tactical and strategic information'' [7].
       A report on December 12, 1947, by Dr. Edwin V. Hill, chief, 
     Basic Sciences, Camp Detrick, Maryland, described some of the 
     technical data secured from the Japanese during an official 
     visit to Tokyo by Hill and Dr. Joseph Victor [8]. 
     Acknowledging the ``wholehearted cooperation of Brig. Gen. 
     Charles A. Willoughby,'' MacArthur's intelligence chief, Hill 
     wrote that the objectives were to obtain additional material 
     clarifying reports already submitted by the Japanese, ``to 
     examine human pathological material which had been 
     transferred to Japan from BW installations,'' and ``to obtain 
     protocols necessary for understanding the significance of the 
     pathological material.''
       Hill and Victor interviewed a number of Japanese experts 
     who were already assembling biological warfare archival 
     material and writing reports for the United States. They 
     checked the results of experiments with various specific 
     human, animal and plant diseases, and investigated Ishii's 
     system for spreading disease via aerosol from planes. Dr. Ota 
     Kiyoshi described his anthrax experiments, including the 
     number of people infected and the number who died Ishii 
     reported on his experiments with botulism and brucellosis. 
     Drs. Hayakawa Kiyoshi and Yamanouchi Yujiro gave Hill and 
     Victor the results of other brucellosis tests, including the 
     number of human casualties.
       Hill pointed out that the material was a financial bargain, 
     was obtainable nowhere else, and concluded with a plea on 
     behalf of Ishii and his colleagues:
       ``Specific protocols were obtained from individual 
     investigators. Their descriptions of experiments are detailed 
     in separate reports. These protocols . . . indicate the 
     extent of experimentation with infectious diseases in human 
     and plant species.
       Evidence gathered . . . has greatly supplemented and 
     amplified previous aspects of this field. It represents data 
     which have been obtained by Japanese scientists at the 
     expenditure of many millions of dollars and years of work. 
     Information has accrued with respect to human susceptibility 
     to those diseases as indicated by specific infectious doses 
     of bacteria. Such information could not be obtained in our 
     own laboratories because of scruples attached to human 
     experimentation. These data were secured with a total outlay 
     of Y [yen] 250,000 to date, a mere pittance by comparison 
     with the actual cost of the studies.
       Furthermore, the pathological material which has been 
     collected constitutes the only material evidence of the 
     nature of these experiments. It is hoped that individuals who 
     voluntarily contributed this information will be spared 
     embarrassment because of it and that every effort will be 
     taken to prevent this information from falling into other 
     hands.''
       A memo by Dr. Edward Wetter and Mr. H.I. Stubblefield, 
     dated July 1, 1947, for restricted circulation to military 
     and State Department officials also described the nature and 
     quantity of material which Ishii was beginning to supply, and 
     noted some of the political issues involved [9]. They 
     reported that Ishii and his colleagues were cooperating 
     fully, were preparing voluminous reports, and had agreed to 
     supply photographs of ``selected examples of 8,000 slides 
     of tissues from autopsies of humans and animals subjected 
     to BW experiments.'' Human experiments, they pointed out, 
     were better than animal experiments:
       ``This Japanese information is the only known source of 
     data from scientifically controlled experiments showing the 
     direct effect of BW agents on man. In the past it has been 
     necessary to evaluate the effects of BW agents on man from 
     data obtained through animal experimentation. Such evaluation 
     is inconclusive and far less complete than results obtained 
     from certain types of human experimentation.''
       Wetter and Stubblefield also stated that the Soviet Union 
     was believed to be in possession of ``only a small portion of 
     this technical information'' and that since ``any `war 
     crimes' trial would completely reveal such data to all 
     nations, it is felt that such publicity must be avoided in 
     the interests of defense and national security of the U.S.'' 
     They emphasized that the knowledge gained by the Japanese 
     from their human experiments ``will be of great value to the 
     U.S. BW research program'' and added: ``The value to U.S. of 
     Japanese BW data is of such importance to national security 
     as to far outweigh the value accruing from war crimes 
     prosecution.''
       A July 15 response to the Wetter-Stubblefield memo by Cecil 
     F. Hubbert, a member of the State, War, Navy Coordinating 
     Committee, agreed with its recommendations but warned of 
     potential complications because ``experiments on human beings 
     . . . have been condemned as war crimes by the International 
     Military Tribunal'' in Germany and that the United States 
     ``is at present prosecuting leading German scientists and 
     medical doctors at Nuremberg for offenses which included 
     experiments on human beings which resulted in the suffering 
     and death of most of those experimented upon'' [10].
       Hubbert raised the possibility that the whole thing might 
     leak out if the Soviets were to bring it up in cross-
     examining major Japanese war criminals at the Tokyo trial and 
     cautioned:
       ``It should be kept in mind that there is a remote 
     possibility that independent investigation conducted by the 
     Soviets in the Mukden area may have disclosed evidence that 
     American prisoners-of-war were used for experimental purposes 
     of a BW nature and that they lost their lives as a result of 
     these experiments.''
       Despite these risks, Hubbert concurred with the Wetter-
     Stubblefield recommendation that the issue be kept secret and 
     that the Japanese biological warfare personnel be given 
     immunity in return for their cooperation. He suggested some 
     changes for the final position paper, including the following 
     casuistry: ``The data on hand . . . does not appear 
     sufficient at this time to constitute a basis for sustaining 
     a war crimes charge against Ishii and/or his associates.''
       Hubbert returned to the subject in a memorandum written 
     jointly with E.F. Lyons, Jr., a member of the Plans and 
     Policy Section of the War Crimes Branch. This top secret 
     document stated, in part:
       ``The Japanese BW group is the only known source of data 
     from scientifically controlled experiments showing direct 
     effects of BW agents on humans. In addition, considerable 
     valuable data can be obtained from this group regarding BW 
     experiments on animals and food crops. . . .
       Because of the vital importance of the Japanese BW 
     information . . . the Working Group, State-War-Navy 
     Coordinating Sub-

[[Page S14545]]

     committee for the Far East, are in agreement that the 
     Japanese BW group should be informed that this Government 
     would retain in intelligence channels all information given 
     by the group on the subject of BW. This decision was made 
     with full consideration of and in spite of the following:
       (a) That its practical effect is that this Government will 
     not prosecute any members of the Japanese BW group for War 
     Crimes of a BW nature.
       (b) That the Soviets may be independent investigation 
     disclose evidence tending to establish or connect Japanese BW 
     activities with a war crime, which evidence the Soviets may 
     attempt to introduce at the International Military Trial now 
     pending at Tokyo.
       (c) That there is a remote possibility that the evidence 
     which may be disclosed by the Soviets would include evidence 
     that American prisoners of war were used for experimental 
     purposes by the Japanese BW group'' [11].
       In the intervening years the evidence that captured 
     American soldiers were among the human guinea pigs used by 
     Ishii in his lethal germ experiments remained ``closely 
     held'' in the top echelons of the U.S. government. A 
     ``confidential'' March 13, 1956, Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation internal memorandum, addressed to the 
     ``Director, FBI (105-12804)'' from ``SAC, WFO (105-1532)'' 
     stated in part:
       ``Mr. James J. Kelleher, Jr., Office of Special Operations, 
     DOD [Department of Defense], has volunteered further comments 
     to the effect that American Military Forces after occupying 
     Japan, determined that the Japanese actually did experiment 
     with ``BW'' agents in Manchuria during 1943-44 using American 
     prisoners as test victims. . . . Kelleher added that . . . 
     information of the type in question is closely controlled and 
     regarded as highly sensitive.''
       It is perhaps not surprising that it has taken so long for 
     the full story to be revealed. Over the years fragments have 
     occasionally leaked out, but each time were met with 
     denials, initially by the Japanese and later by the United 
     States. During the Korean War when China accused the 
     United States of employing updated versions of Japan's 
     earlier biological warfare tactics, not only were the 
     charges denied, but it was also claimed that there was no 
     proof of the earlier Japanese actions.
       At the time of the Khabarovsk trial, the United States was 
     pressing the Soviet Union to return thousands of Japanese 
     prisoners held in Siberian labor camps since the end of World 
     War II. When news of the trial reached Tokyo, it was 
     dismissed as ``propaganda.'' William J. Sebald, MacArthur's 
     diplomatic chief, was quoted in a United Press story in the 
     Nippon Times on December 29, 1949, as saying the story of the 
     trial might just be fiction and that it obviously was a 
     ``smoke screen'' to obscure the fact that the Soviets had 
     refused to account for the missing Japanese prisoners.
       It is possible that some of Ishii's attacks went 
     undetected, either because they were failures or because the 
     resulting outbreaks of disease were attributed to natural 
     causes by the Chinese. However, some were recognized. 
     Official archives of the People's Republic of China list 11 
     cities as subjected to biological warfare attacks, while the 
     number of victims of artificially disseminated plague alone 
     is placed at approximately 700 between 1940 and 1944 [12, p. 
     11].
       A few of the Chinese allegations received international 
     press coverage at the time. The Chinese Nationalists claimed 
     that on October 27, 1940, plague was dropped on Ningbo, a 
     city near Shanghai. The incident was not investigated in a 
     scientific way, but the observed facts aroused suspicion. 
     Something was seen to come out of a Japanese plane. Later, 
     there was a heavy infestation of fleas and 99 people came 
     down with bubonic plague, with all but one dying. Yet the 
     rats in the city did not have plague, and traditionally, 
     outbreaks of plague in the human population follow an 
     epizootic in the rat population.
       In the next few years a number of other Japanese biological 
     warfare attacks were alleged by the Chinese. Generally, they 
     were based on similar cause and effect observations. One 
     incident, however, was investigated with more care.
       On the morning of November 4, 1941, a Japanese plane 
     circled low over Changde, a city in Hunan Province. Instead 
     of the usual cargo of bombs, the plane dropped grains of 
     wheat and rice, pieces of paper and cotton wadding, which 
     fell in two streets in the city's East Gate District. 
     During the next three weeks six people living on the two 
     streets died, all with symptoms suggesting plague. Dr. 
     Chen Wen-kwei, a former League of Nations plague expert in 
     India, arrived with a medical team just as the last victim 
     died. He performed the autopsy, found symptoms of plague 
     which were confirmed by culture and animal tests. Again, 
     there was no plague outbreak in the rat population [12, 
     pp. 195-204].
       On March 31, 1942, the Nationalist government stated that a 
     follow-up investigation by Dr. Robert K.S. Lim, Director of 
     the Chinese Red Cross, and Dr. R. Politzer, internationally 
     known epidemiologist and former member of the League of 
     Nations Anti-Epidemic Commission, who was then on a wartime 
     assignment to the Chinese government, had confirmed Chen's 
     findings.
       Western reaction to the Chinese charges was mixed. Harrison 
     Forman of the New York Times, and Dr. Thomas Parran, Jr., the 
     U.S. Surgeon-General, thought the Chinese had made a case. 
     But U.S. Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss was uncertain in an 
     April 11, 1942, cable to the State Department, while Dr. 
     Theodor Rosebury, the well-known American bacteriologist, 
     felt that failure to produce plague bacilli from cultures of 
     the material dropped at Changde weakened the Chinese claim 
     [13, pp. 109-10]. Chen's full report, in which he suggested 
     that it was fleas that were infected rather than the other 
     material, was not made readily available by the Nationalist 
     government.
       Later disclosures of Japanese techniques would support 
     Chen's reasoning: Fleas, after being fed on plague-infected 
     rats, were swaddled in cotton and wrapped in paper, while 
     grain was included in the mix in the hope that it would 
     attract rats so that the fleas would find a new host to 
     infect and thus start a ``natural'' epidemic.
       At the December 1949 Soviet trial at Khabarovsk evidence 
     was produced supporting the Nationalist Chinese biological 
     warfare charges [14]. Witnesses testified that films had been 
     made of some tests, including the 1940 attack on Ningbo. 
     Japanese witnesses and defendants confirmed other biological 
     warfare attacks, such as the 1941 Changde incident. Military 
     orders, railroad waybills for shipment of biological warfare 
     supplies, gendarmerie instructions for sending prisoners to 
     the laboratories, and other incriminating Japanese documents 
     were introduced in evidence [1, pp. 19-20, 23-24].
       Describing the operation of Unit 731, the main biological 
     warfare installation, located outside Harbin, the transcript 
     summary stated: ``Experts have calculated . . . that it was 
     capable of breeding, in the course of one production cycle, 
     lasting only a few days, no less than 30,000,000 billion 
     microbes. . . . That explains why . . . bacteria quantities 
     [are given] in kilograms, thus referring to the weight of 
     the thick, creamy bacteria mass skimmed directly from the 
     surface of the culture medium [1, pp. 13-14].
       Total bacteria production capacity at this one unit was 
     eight tons per month [1, pp. 266-67].
       Euphemistically called a ``water purification unit,'' 
     General Ishii's organization also worked on medical projects 
     not directly related to biological warfare. In the Asian 
     countries it overran, the Japanese Army conscripted local 
     young women to entertain the troops. The medical difficulties 
     resulting from this practice became acute. In an effort to 
     solve the problem, Chinese women confined in the detachment's 
     prison ``were infected with syphillis with the object of 
     investigating preventive means against this disease. [1, p. 
     357].
       Another experiment disclosed at the Khabarovsk trial was 
     the ``freezing project.'' During extremely cold winter 
     weather prisoners were led outdoors:
       ``Their arms were bared and made to freeze with the help of 
     an artificial current of air. This was done until their 
     frozen arms, when struck with a short stick, emitted a sound 
     resembling that which a board gives out when it is struck'' 
     [1, pp. 289, 21-22, 357-58].
       Once back inside, various procedures for thawing were 
     tried. One account of Unit 731's prison, adjacent to the 
     laboratories, described men and women with rotting hands from 
     which the bones protruded--victims of the freezing tests. A 
     documentary film was made of one of the experiments.
       Simulated field tests were carried out at Unit 731's Anta 
     Station Proving Ground. Witnesses described experiments in 
     which various infecting agents were used. Nishi Toshihide, 
     Chief of the Training Division, testified:
       ``In January 1945 . . . I saw experiments in inducing gas 
     gangrene, conducted under the direction of the Chief of the 
     2nd Division, Col. Ikari, and researcher Futaki. Ten 
     prisoners . . . were tied facing stakes, five to ten metres 
     apart. . . . The prisoners' heads were covered with metal 
     helmets, and their bodies with screens . . . only the naked 
     buttocks being exposed. At about 100 metres away a 
     fragmentation bomb was exploded by electricity. . . . All ten 
     men were wounded . . . and sent back to the prison. . . . I 
     later asked Ikari and research Futaki what the results had 
     been. They told me that all ten men had . . . died of gas 
     gangrene.'' [1, pp. 289-90].
       Among the many wartime recollections published by Japanese 
     exservicemen are a few by former members of Unit 731 [15]. 
     Akiyama Hiroshi told his story in two magazine articles and 
     Kimura Bumpei, a former captain, has published his memoirs 
     [16]. Sakaki Ryohei, a former major, has described how 
     plague was spread by air-dropping rats and voles and has 
     given details of the flea ``nurseries'' developed by Ishii 
     for rapid production of millions of fleas [17].
       A more dramatic confirmation of Ishii's work was an hour-
     long Japanese television documentary produced by Yoshinaga 
     Haruko and shown by the Tokyo Broadcasting System. A 
     Washington Post dispatch on November 19, 1976, reported:
       ``In the little-publicized television documentary on the 
     germ warfare unit, Yoshinaga laid bare secrets closely held 
     in Japan during and since the war. . . . [She] traveled 
     throughout Japan to trace down 20 former members of the 
     wartime unit. . . . Four of the men finally agreed to help, 
     and the reporter found their testimony dovetailed with 
     reports of war crime trials held in the Soviet Union.''
       Some of those interviewed by Yoshinaga claimed that they 
     had told their stories to American authorities. Eguchi said 
     that he ``was the second to be ordered to G.H.Q. [General 
     Headquarters]'' and ``they took a

[[Page S14546]]

     record'' of his testimony. Takahashi, an ex-surgeon and Army 
     major, stated: ``I went to the G.H.Q. twice in 1947. 
     Investigators made me write reports on the condition that 
     they will protect me from the Soviets.'' Kumamoto, an ex-
     flight engineer, said that after the war General Ishii went 
     to America and ``took his research data and begged for 
     remission for us all'' [4].
       Declassified position papers indicate a difference of 
     opinion on how to deal with the question of immunity. The War 
     Department favored acceding to Ishii's demands for immunity 
     in documentary form. The State Department, however, cautioned 
     against putting anything in writing which might later cause 
     embarrassment, arguing that if the Japanese were told the 
     information would be kept in classified intelligence channels 
     that would be sufficient protection. In any event, a 
     satisfactory arrangement apparently was worked out as none of 
     the biological warfare personnel was subsequently charged 
     with war crimes and the United States obtained full details 
     of Japan's program.
       The Japanese experts who, Dr. Hill hoped, would ``be spared 
     embarrassment,'' not only used their human guinea pigs in 
     experiments to determine lethal dosages but on occasion--in 
     their pursuit of exact scientific information--made certain 
     that the experimentees did not survive. A group would be 
     brought down with a disease and, as the infection developed, 
     individuals would be selected out of the group and killed. 
     Autopsies were then performed, so that the progress of the 
     disease could be ascertained at various time-frames.
       General Kitano Masaji and Dr. Kasahara Shiro revealed this 
     practice in a report prepared for U.S. officials describing 
     their work on hemorrhagic fever:
       ``Subsequent cases were produced either by blood or blood-
     free extracts of liver, spleen or kidney derived from 
     individuals sacrificed at various times during the course of 
     the disease. Morphine was employed for this purpose'' [18].
       Kitano and Dr. Kasahara Yukio described the ``sacrificing'' 
     of a human experimentee when he apparently was recovering 
     from an attack of tick encephalitis:
       ``Mouse brain suspension . . . was injected . . . and 
     produced symptoms after an incubation period of 7 days. 
     Highest temperature was 39.8 deg. C. This subject was 
     sacrificed when fever was subsiding, about the 12th day.''
       Clearly, U.S. biological warfare experts learned a lot from 
     their Japanese counterparts. While we do not yet know exactly 
     how much this information advanced the American program, we 
     have the Fort Detrick doctors' testimony that it was 
     ``invaluable.'' And it is known that some of the biological 
     weapons developed later were at least similar to ones that 
     had been part of the Japanese project. Infecting feathers 
     with spore diseases was one of Ishii's achievements and 
     feather bombs later became a weapon in America's biological 
     warfare arsenal [19].
       Dr. Leroy D. Fothergill, long-time scientific advisor to 
     the U.S. Army's Biological Laboratories at Fort Detrick, once 
     speculated upon some of the possible spin-off effects of a 
     biological warfare attack:
       ``Everything that breathes in the exposed area has an 
     opportunity to be exposed to the agent. This will involve 
     vast numbers of mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and 
     insects. . . . Surveys have indicated surprising numbers of 
     wild life inhabiting each square mile of countryside. It is 
     possible that many species would be exposed to an agent for 
     the first time in their evolutionary history . . . Would it 
     create the basis for possible genetic evolution of 
     microorganisms in new directions with changes in virulence of 
     some species? Would it establish public health and 
     environmental problems that are unique and beyond our present 
     experience?'' [20].
       Perhaps President Richard Nixon had some of these things in 
     mind when, on November 25, 1969, he renounced the use of 
     biological warfare, declaring:
       ``Biological weapons have massive unpredictable and 
     potentially uncontrollable consequences. They may produce 
     global epidemics and impair the health of future generations. 
     I have therefore decided that the U.S. shall renounce the use 
     of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other 
     methods of biological warfare'' [21].
       Some research on defensive aspects was permitted by the 
     ban. The line between defense and offense is admittedly a 
     thin one. Nearly a year after the Nixon renunciation of 
     biological warfare, Seymour Hersh wrote that the programs the 
     Army wanted to continue ``under defensive research included a 
     significant effort to develop and produce virulent strains of 
     new biological agents, then develop defenses against them. 
     `This sounds very much like what we were doing before,' one 
     official noted caustically'' [22].
       There is a difference of opinion among observers as to 
     whether the United States and other major powers have indeed 
     given up on biological warfare. Some believe the issue is a 
     matter of the past. However, its history has been so replete 
     with deception that one cannot be sure. One thing seems 
     certain: The story did not end with Japan's use of biological 
     war fare against China; there are additional chapters to be 
     written.
       Available documents do not reveal whether anyone knows the 
     names of any of the thousands of Chinese Mongolians, 
     Russians, ``half-breeds'' and Americans whose lives were 
     prematurely ended by massive doses of plague, typhus, 
     dysenteries, gas gangrene, typhoid, hemorrhagic fever, 
     cholera, anthax, tularemia, smallpox, tsutsugamushi and 
     glanders; or by such grotesqueries as being pumped full of 
     horse blood; having their livers destroyed by prolonged 
     exposure to X-rays or being subjected to vivisection.
       It is known, however, that because of the ``national 
     security'' interests of the United States, General Ishii and 
     many of the top members of Unit 731 lived out their full 
     lives, suffering only the natural afflictions of old age. A 
     few, General Kitano among them, enjoyed exceptional good 
     health and at the time of writing were living in quiet 
     retirement.
         General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied 
           Powers,
                                                       Mar 27, 47.

                      Brief for the Chief of Staff

       1. This has to do with Russian requests for transfer of the 
     former Japanese expert in Bacteriological Warfare.
       2. The United States has primary interest, has already 
     interrogated this man and his information is held by the U.S. 
     Chemical Corps classified as TOP SECRET.
       3. The Russian has made several attempts to get at this 
     man. We have stalled. He now hopes to make his point by 
     suddenly claiming the Japanese expert as a war criminal.
       4. Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that this not be done but 
     concur in a SCAP controlled interrogation requiring expert 
     assistance not available in FEC.
       5. This memorandum recommends:
       a. Radio to WD for two experts.
       b. Letter to USSR refusing to turn over Japanese expert.
       c. Check Note to International Prosecution Section 
     initiating action on the JCS approved interrogations.
                                  ____

                                                   War Department,


                                    Classified Message Center,

                        CFE Tokyo Japan (Carpenter Legal Section).
       Reurad WAR 80671, 22nd June 47, held another conference 
     with Tavenner of IPS who reports following.
       One on 27th October 1940 Japanese planes scattered 
     quantities of wheat grain over Ningpo. Epidemic of bubonic 
     plague broke out 29th October 40. Karazawai affidavit in para 
     3 below confirms this as Ishii Detachment experiment. 97 
     plague fatalities.
       2. Strong circumstantial evidence exists of use of bacteria 
     warfare at Chuhsien, Kinghwa and Changteh. At Chuhsien 
     Japanese planes scattered rice and wheat grains mixed with 
     fleas on 4th October 1940. Bubonic plague appeared in same 
     area on 12th November. Plague never occurred in Chuhsien 
     before occurrence. Fleas were not properly examined to 
     determine whether plague infected. At Kinghwa, located 
     between Ningpo and Chupuien, 3 Japanese planes dropped a 
     large quantity of small granules on 28th November 1940. 
     Microscopic examination revealed presence of numerous gram-
     negative bacilli possessing * * *.

                           *   *   *   *   *


                             A Judge's View

                         (By Bert V.A. Roling)

       As one of the judges in the International Military Tribunal 
     for the Far East, it is a bitter experience for me to be 
     informed now that centrally ordered Japanese war criminality 
     of the most disgusting kind was kept secret from the Court by 
     the U.S. government. This Japanese war criminality consisted, 
     in part, of using human beings, prisoners of war, Chinese as 
     well as American, as ``guinea pigs'' in an endeavor to test 
     the impact of specific biological warfare weapons. Research 
     on and production of these weapons was not forbidden at that 
     time. The Protocol of Geneva, 1925, forbade their use only in 
     battle. But to use human beings for biological experiments, 
     causing the death of at least 3,000 prisoners of war, was 
     among the gravest war crimes.
       The first information about these Japanese atrocities 
     became known through the trial at Khabarovsk, December 25 to 
     30, 1949. I remember reading about it [1], and not believing 
     its contents. I could not imagine that these things had 
     happened, without the Court in Tokyo being informed. 
     According to the book about the trial all the facts were 
     transmitted to the chief prosecutor, Joseph B. Keenan. But 
     some of the information was incorrect. The book mentions that 
     the Military Tribunal was informed of the wicked experiements 
     done by the Tama division in Nanking, and that it requested 
     the American prosecution to submit more detailed proof [1, p. 
     443]. Such Court procedures would not have been in conformity 
     with Anglo-Saxon practice. It is more likely that the 
     information was given to the chief prosecutor.
       A further feature of the Khabarovsk book is the strange 
     character of the confessions made by the accused. Some are 
     quoted as saying that they acted upon the special secret 
     orders of the Japanese emperor [1, pp. 10, 519]. This was 
     bound to cause doubts about its credibility. The emperor does 
     not give orders to perform specific military acts. Everything 
     that is ordered by the government and its officials is ``in 
     the name of the emperor.'' But his role is remarkable in that 
     he may not make decisions; he has only to confirm decisions 
     of the government. The ``imperial will is decisive, but 
     it derives wholly from the government and the small circle 
     around the throne. Titus stresses the

[[Page S14547]]

     ``ratification function'' of the reached consensus [2, p. 
     321]. It is clear that this imperial confirmation gives a 
     decision an exceptional authority: the command of the 
     emperor is obeyed. In fact, however, the emperor has a 
     kind of loud-speaker function. He is heard, and obeyed, 
     but he speaks only on the recommendation of the 
     government.
       Very seldom does the emperor act in a personal manner. One 
     such occasion was his criticism of the behavior of the 
     Japanese army in Manchuria (the so-called Manchurian 
     Incident). Another related to his role in connection with the 
     capitulation at the end of World War II. Despite the atomic 
     bombs and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, the 
     cabinet was divided and could not come to a decision because 
     the military members refused to surrender. Their motivation: 
     the existence of the imperial system was not sufficiently 
     guaranteed. In a very exceptional move, the emperor was 
     brought in to make the decision. He took the risk, and 
     decided for immediate capitulation.
       Thus the emphasis on the personal secret involvement of the 
     emperor in the Khabarovsk trial account make it appear 
     untrustworthy. The whole setup could be perceived as a source 
     of arguments in favor of indicting the emperor. I remember at 
     that time, writing to show the danger of national postwar 
     judgments which could easily be misused for political 
     purposes, and giving the Khabarovsk trial as an example. I 
     must state now that the Japanese misbehavior as described in 
     the judgment, has been confirmed by the recently disclosed 
     American documents.
       Immunity from prosecution was granted in exchange for 
     Japanese scientific findings concerning biological weapons, 
     based on disgusting criminal research on human beings. We 
     learn from these documents that it was considered a bargain: 
     almost for nothing, information was obtained that had cost 
     millions of dollars and thousands of human lives. The 
     American authorities were worrying only about the prospect of 
     the human outcry in the United States, which surely would 
     have taken place if the American people had been informed 
     about this ``deal.''
       The security that surrounds the military makes it possible 
     for military behavior to deviate considerably from the 
     prevailing public standard, but it is a danger to society 
     when such deviation takes place. It leads gradually to 
     contempt for the military, as witness the public attitude in 
     connection with military behavior in the Vietnam war. The 
     kind of military behavior that occurred in connection with 
     the Japanese biological weapon atrocities can only contribute 
     further to this attitude.
       Respect for what the Nuremberg judgment called ``the 
     honorable profession of arms'' is needed. Military power is 
     still indispensable in our present world to provide for peace 
     and security, so it is desirable for it to be held in high 
     esteem. Power which is despised may become dangerous. 
     Moreover, only if the military is regarded with respect, will 
     it attract the personnel it should have.
       The same is true of diplomatic service, which needs 
     national and international respect. This respect will 
     disappear if the service indulges in subversive activities, 
     as the U.S. diplomatic mission did in Iran. That diplomatic 
     misbehavior in Iran led to developments--the hostage crisis--
     which were disastrous for the whole world.
       The documents which have come to light inform us also of 
     the use of biological weapons in the war against the Chinese 
     people. The criminal warfare was not mentioned in the Tokyo 
     indictment, and not discussed before the Military Tribunal. 
     It was kept secret from the world. The immunity granted to 
     the Japanese war criminals covered not only deadly research 
     on living persons, but also the use of biological weapons 
     against the Chinese. And all this so that the United States 
     could obtain exclusive access to the information, gained at 
     the cost of thousands of human lives.
       Knowledge about what kind of bargain was being struck in 
     the biological weapons area may strengthen the perception of 
     the repulsiveness of war. It may also show the danger of 
     moral depravity, in peacetime, within the circles that have 
     the instruments of military power in their hands.


                               end notes

       1. Materials on the Trial of Former Servicemen of the 
     Japanese Army Charged with Manufacturing and Employing 
     Bacteriological Weapons (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing 
     House, 1950), pp. 19-21. This volume is a summary of the 
     transcript of the Soviet trial in Khabarovsk, Siberia, Dec. 
     20-25, 1949, of 12 captured Japanese Army personnel charged 
     with participation in the biological warfare program. For a 
     later reference to the program see Outline History of Science 
     and Technology in Japan, (``Nihon Kagaku Gijutsu-shi 
     Taikei''), Vol. 25 (Medicine 2, 1967), pp. 309-10. This 
     account states that the biological warfare program was 
     organized in 1933 and that ``for special research on 
     bacteria, members of the epidemic-prevention section shall be 
     sent to Manchuria.'' It also stated that little was known 
     about the program after the war since all records were said 
     to have been destroyed and that the only evidence was that 
     produced at the Khabarovsk trial. It did add, however, that 
     there were reports that General Ishii had avoided prosecution 
     by turning over his materials to U.S. authorities. I have not 
     seen this volume and am indebted to John Dower, of the 
     University of Wisconsin, who supplied the citation.
       2. Ienaga Saburo, The Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 
     1978).
       3. Although most U.S. documents and the Soviet trial 
     summary give Ishii credit for originating the biological 
     warfare program, it is possible that he was only the chosen 
     instrument. There are references indicating interest in the 
     program at higher levels. The ``staff officer'' of Ishii's 
     Operations Division was Lieutenant Colonel Miyata, who in 
     real life was Prince Takeda [1, p. 40]. Ishii's friend at 
     court was Gen. Nagata Tetsuzan, long Japan's top military man 
     [1, pp. 106, 295], while the orders establishing the two 
     original units were reputedly issued by the Emperor [1, pp. 
     10, 104, 413].
       4. ``A Bruise--Terror of the 731 Corps,'' Tokyo 
     Broadcasting System television documentary, produced by 
     Yoshinaga Haruko, shown Nov. 2, 1976. It has also been 
     screened in Europe but not in the United States. However, the 
     Washington Post (Nov. 19, 1976) carried a lengthy news story 
     describing the film. In an interview with Post reporter John 
     Saar, Yoshinaga said five former members of the biological 
     warfare unit told her they were promised complete protection 
     in return for cooperation with U.S. authorities. ``All the 
     important documents were given to the United States,'' she 
     said.
       5. This ``top secret'' cable [C-52423] also reveals that 
     the first of the biological warfare experts to be sent from 
     Washington to Japan had already arrived, referring to ``Dr. 
     Norbert H. Fell's letters via air courier to General Alden C. 
     Waitt,'' who was then chief of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps.
       6. Cable from Washington to Tokyo on April 2, 1947, stating 
     that Fell would leave for Japan on April 5. A cable from 
     Tokyo to the War Department on June 30, 1947, warns that an 
     ``aggressive prosecution will adversely affect U.S. 
     interests'' and urges that Fell (presumably now returned to 
     Washington) be shown recent cables because he is an expert 
     and can appreciate the value of the Japanese bw material.
       7. Top secret Memorandum for the Record (May 6, 1947) 
     indicated it was in response to ``War Department Radio W-
     94446 & swncc 351/1 and was signed ``rpm 26-6166''.
       8. ``Summary Report on B.W. Investigations.'' Dated Dec. 
     12, 1947, and addressed to General Alden C. Waitt.
       9. Dated july 1, 1947, and titled, ``Interrogation of 
     Certain Japanese by Russian Prosecutor,'' this memo also 
     lists some of the material already obtained, including a ``60 
     page report'' covering experiments on humans and notes that 
     other data confirms, supplements and complements U.S. 
     research and ``may suggest new fields for future research.'' 
     Record Group No. 153, National Archives.
       10. This July 15, 1947, memo is addressed to Commander J.B. 
     Cresap and signed ``Cecil F. Hubbert, member working party 
     (SWNCC 351/2/D).''
       11. Undated and titled ``SFE 182/2,'' it was part of 
     National Archives Record Group No. 153.
       12. ``Report of the International Scientific Commission for 
     the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare 
     in Korea and China,'' Peking, 1952.
       13. Theodor Rosebury, Peace or Pestilence (New York: 
     McGraw-Hill, 1949).
       14. In order to ascertain the Nationalist position on this 
     issue after the passage of some 40 years, I checked with 
     Taipei and am grateful to Lieutenant General Teng Shu-wei, of 
     the Nationalist Defense Ministry's Medical Bureau, who 
     searched the Taiwan archives. His report is in substantial 
     agreement with the records of the People's Republic in 
     Beijing, although less complete.
       15. Bungei Shunju, Aug. 1955; Jimbutsu Ohrai (July 10, 
     1956).
       16. ``Terrible Modern Strategic War'' by Kimura Bumpei. I 
     have not seen this book and am relying upon a brief 
     description of it contained in a March 31, 1959, letter from 
     Tokyo attorney Morikawa Kinju to A.L. Wirin, chief counsel of 
     the American Civil Liberties Union in Los Angeles.
       17. Sunday Mainichi, No. 1628 (Jan. 27, 1952).
       18. ``Songo-Epidemic Hemorrhagic Fever,'' report dated Nov. 
     13, 1947, based on interview with General Kitano Masaji and 
     Dr. Kasahara Shiro.
       19. ``Feathers as Carriers of Biological Warfare Agents,'' 
     Biological Department, Chemical Corps So and C Divisions 
     (Dec. 15, 1950).
       20. Leroy D. Fothergill, M.D., ``Biological Warfare: Nature 
     & Consequences,'' Texas State Journal of Medicine (Jan. 
     1964).
       21. New York Times (Nov. 26, 1969).
       22. Washington Post (Sept. 20, 1970).
       This article is based, in part, on an article by the author 
     in Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (P.O. Box W, 
     Charlemont, MA 01339), 12:4, pp. 2-15.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. SHELBY (for himself and Mr. Bryan):
  S. 1903. A bill to amend the privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.


               consumer's right to financial privacy act

  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to offer the ``Consumer's 
Right to Financial Privacy Act'' for myself and Senator Bryan. This 
bill would address the significant deficiencies in the Financial 
Services Modernization Act passed by this very body last week.

  Our bill would provide that consumers have (1) notice of the 
categories

[[Page S14548]]

of nonpublic personal information that institutions collect, as well as 
the practices and policies of that institution with respect to 
disclosing nonpublic information; (2) access to the nonpublic personal 
information collected and shared; (3) affirmative consent, that is that 
the financial institution must receive the affirmative consent of the 
consumer, also referred to as an opt-in, in order to share such 
information with third parties and affiliates. Lastly, my provision 
would require that this federal law not preempt stronger state privacy 
laws. This bill is drafted largely after the amendment Senator Bryan 
and I offered in the Conference on Financial Services Modernization, 
but failed to get adopted due to the Conference's rush to pass a 
financial modernization bill, no matter what the cost.
  I know some think that opt-in is extreme, but I have to tell you that 
is what the American people want. Over the past year I have learned a 
great deal about the activities of institutions sharing sensitive 
personal information. Many may not be aware, but it had become a common 
practice for state department of motor vehicles to sell the drivers 
license information, including name, height, weight, social security 
number, vehicle identification number, motor vehicle record and more. 
Some states even sold the digital photo image of each driver's license.
  I was not aware of this practice going on. When I learned about it 
and studied it a little closer, I found several groups who were 
outraged by this practice. One such group was Eagle Forum. Another such 
group was the ACLU. Still another group was the Free Congress 
Foundation. Before I knew it, there was an ad hoc coalition of groups 
not only supporting the issue of driver's license privacy, but 
demanding it.
  Thanks to the hard work of these groups, I was able to include an 
opt-in provision for people applying for drivers licenses at their 
state department of motor vehicles. That provision sailed through the 
Senate and then the House. That bill was signed into law by President 
Clinton. Despite significant lobbying by the direct marketing industry, 
not one member of the House or Senate took to the floor and said, ``I 
believe we should not allow consumers to choose whether or not their 
drivers license information, including their picture, should be sold or 
traded away like an old suit.'' No, no one objected to the opt-in. As a 
result, I believe very strongly that Congress has already set the bar 
on this issue. Opt-in is not just reasonable, it is the right thing to 
do.

  Meanwhile, the ad hoc coalition, which is continuing to grow and 
includes every ideology from conservative to liberal, has signed on to 
four basic principles with regard to financial privacy. The principles 
include notice, access and consent, but also a requirement that weak 
federal laws not preempt stronger state laws. Our amendment 
incorporates those four basic principles.
  Now my basic question is this, why would anyone oppose this bill? 
Only if you believe the financial services industry cannot make money 
by doing business above the table and on the level for everyone to see 
in the ``sunshine'' if you will. If you believe that financial 
institutions make money only by deceiving their customers or leaving 
those customers in the dark, then maybe you should oppose this bill. I 
do not subscribe to such a belief.
  Industry will tell you that if they are required to include an opt-
in, consumers will not, and therefore business will shut down. What 
does that tell you that consumers won't choose to opt-in? It means 
people don't want their information shared. If that is such a problem, 
it seems to me the business would spend more time educating the 
consumer as to the benefits of information sharing. That is where the 
burden to convince the consumer to buy the product should be--on the 
business.
  During the financial modernization debate, the financial industry, 
along with Citigroup communicated to Congress that they would not be 
able to operate or function appropriately with an opt-in requirement. I 
find that very difficult to comprehend, seeing as Citibank signed an 
agreement with their German affiliates in 1995 affording German 
citizens the opportunity to tell Citibank ``no,'' they did not want 
their personal data shared with third parties. I have a copy of the 
contract to prove it.
  Entitled, Agreement on ``Interterritorial Data Protection'' one can 
see this is an agreement on the sharing of customer information between 
Citibank (South Dakota), referred in the document as CNA, and its 
German affiliates. On page two paragraph 4, entitled, Use of 
Subcontractors, Transmission of Data to Third Parties, number 2 reads:

       For marketing purposes, the transfer of personal data to 
     third parties provided by the Card Service Companies (that is 
     Citicorp of Germany and Citicorp Card Operations of Germany) 
     is prohibited, except in those cases where such personal data 
     is transferred to affiliated companies engaged in banking 
     business in order to market financial services; the transfer 
     of such data beyond the aforementioned scope to third 
     parties, shall require the Card Service Companies' express 
     approval. Such approval is limited to the scope of the Card 
     Customers' consent as obtained on the application form.

  That ladies and gentlemen, is an opt-in to operate in Germany, by 
none other than Citigroup, the number one proponent of financial 
modernization. Now if they can offer financial privacy to individuals 
in Germany, why on God's green earth can't they agree to an opt-in here 
in America? Do Germans have special rights over Americans? I should 
hope not.
  Mr. President, simply put, this bill is what Americans want. This 
bill is workable as proven in the Citicorp agreement. The truth is that 
the American people do not understand the intricacies of banking law or 
securities regulation. They probably do not know or care much about 
affiliates or operating subsidiaries. What I do know, is that if you 
walked outside and polled people from New York City to Los Angeles, CA, 
and everywhere in between, they would not only understand financial 
privacy, 90 percent of them would demand financial privacy and the 
ability to tell an institution ``no.''
  Mr. President, in passing the financial modernization bill, Congress 
gave mammoth financial services companies significant expanded powers 
and unprecedented ability to collect, share, buy and sell a consumers 
nonpublic personal financial information. During the debate, many 
members promised they would address privacy, but only in a separate 
bill at a later time. Well, Mr. President, the time is now and the bill 
is the ``Consumer's Right to Financial Privacy Act.''
  The financial industry may have won the battle by keeping stronger 
financial privacy provisions out of the financial modernization bill. 
But I assure you they have not won the war. They cannot win the war on 
financial privacy because the American people just won't allow it.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the agreement on 
``International Data Protection'' be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             Agreement on Interterritorial Data Protection


                             by and between

     1. Citicorp Kartenservice GmbH, Wilhelm-Leuschner-Str. 32, 
           60329 Frankfurt/M, Germany (CKS)
     2. Citicorp Card Operations GmbH, Bentheimer Strae 
           118, 48529 Nordhorn, Germany (CCO)

       (CKS and CCO hereinafter collectively referred to as: Card 
     Service Companies)

     3. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., Attn.: Office of the 
           President, 701 E. 60th Street North, Sioux Falls, South 
           Dakota 57117 (CNA)
     4. Citibank Privatkunden AG, Kasernenstrae 10, 40213 
           Dusseldorf, Germany (CIP)


                                recital

       1. CIP has unrestricted authority to engage in banking 
     transactions. As a license of VISA International, CIP issues 
     the Citibank Visa Card''. Additionally, since July 1st, 1995, 
     CIP has been cooperating with the Deutsche Bahn AG in issuing 
     the ``DB/Citibank BahnCard'' with a cash-free payment 
     function--hereinafter referred to as ``DB/Citibank-
     BahnCard''--on the basis of a Co-Branding Agreement concluded 
     between Deutsche Bahn AG and CIP on November 18th, 1994. 
     After the conclusion of the Agreement, the co-branding 
     business was extended to include the issuance of the DB/
     Citibank BahnCard without a cash-free payment function, known 
     as BahnCard ``pure''.
       2. CIP transferred to CKS the operations of the Citibank 
     Visa credit card business, including accounting and 
     electronic data processing, on the basis of the terms of a 
     Service Agreement (non-gratuitous contract for services) 
     dated March 24, 1998, supplemented as of June 1, 1989 and 
     November 30, 1989. Details are contained in the ``CKS Service

[[Page S14549]]

     Agreement'', according to which CKS performs for CIP all 
     services pertaining to the Citibank Visa card business. 
     Concurrent with the application for a Citibank Visa Card, the 
     Citibank Visa Card customers agree to the transfer of their 
     personal data to CKS and to those companies entrusted by CKS 
     with such data processing.
       3. In the Co-Branding Agreement with the Deutsche Bahn AG 
     dated November 18, 1994, CIP assumed responsibility for the 
     issuance of the DB/Citibank BahnCard as well as for the 
     entire management and operations associated with this 
     business.
       4. On the basis of a Service Agreement dated April 1, 1995, 
     CIP transferred the entire operations of the DB/Citibank-
     BahnCard business, including data processing and accounting, 
     to the Card Service Companies. Details are contained in the 
     ``BahnCard Service Agreement''. Concurrent with the 
     application for issuing a DB/Citibank BahnCard, the BahnCard 
     customers agree to the transfer of their personal data to CCO 
     and to those companies entrusted by CCO with such data 
     processing.
       5. Due to reasons of efficiency, service and 
     centralization, the Card Service Companies have entrusted CNA 
     with the processing of the Citibank Visa card business and of 
     the DB/Citibank BahnCard business as of July 1, 1995. In 
     light of such considerations, the Card Service Companies--as 
     principals--and CNA--as contractors--concluded the ``CNA 
     Service Agreement'', to which CIP expressly consented.
       6. The performance of the CNA Service Agreement requires 
     the Card Service Companies to transfer the personal data of 
     the Citibank Visa card customers and the DB/Citibank BahnCard 
     customers--hereinafter collectively referred to as ``Card 
     Customers''--to CNA and further requires CNA to process and 
     use these data.
       In order to protect the Card Customers' rights with respect 
     to both the data protection law, as well as the banking 
     secrecy, and in order to comply with the banking supervisory 
     and data protection requirements.
       The contractual parties agree and covenant as follows:


                        Sec. 1  Basic Principles

       The parties hereto undertake to safeguard the Card 
     Customers' right to protection against unauthorized capture, 
     storage and use of their personal data and their right to 
     informational self-determination. The scope of such 
     protection shall be governed by the standards as laid down in 
     the German Federal Data Protection Law 
     (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, abbreviated to ``BDSG''). The 
     parties hereto additionally agree to comply with the banking 
     secrecy regulations.


           Sec. 2  instructions of the card service companies

       1. CNA shall process the data provided by the Card Service 
     Companies solely in accordance with the Card Service 
     Companies' instructions and rules, and the provisions 
     contained in this Agreement. CNA undertakes to process and 
     use the data only for the purpose for which the data have 
     been provided by the Card Service Companies to CNA, said 
     purposes including those as described in the CNA Service 
     Agreement. The use of such data for purposes other than 
     described above requires the Card Service Companies' express 
     written consent.
       2. At any time, the Card Service Companies may make 
     inquiries to CNA about the personal data transferred by the 
     Card Service Companies and stored at CNA, and the Card 
     Service Companies may require CNA to perform corrections, 
     deletions or blockings of such personal data transferred by 
     the Card Service Companies to CNA.


        Sec. 3  inspection rights of the Card Service Companies

       At regular intervals, an (joint) agent appointed by the 
     Card Service Companies shall verify whether CNA complies with 
     the terms and conditions of this Agreement, and in particular 
     with the data protection law as well as the banking secrecy 
     regulations. CNA shall grant the Card Service Companies' 
     agent supervised unimpeded access to the extent necessary to 
     accomplish the inspection and review of all data processing 
     facilities, data files and other documentation needed for 
     processing and utilizing the personal data transferred by the 
     Card Service Companies in a fashion which is consistent with 
     the CNA Operational Policies. CNA shall provide the agent 
     with all such information as deemed necessary to perform this 
     inspection function.


  Sec. 4  use of subcontractors, transmission of data to third parties

       1. CNA may not appoint non-affiliated third parties, in 
     particular subcontractors, to perform and fulfill CNA's 
     commitments and obligations under this Agreement.
       2. For marketing purposes, the transfer of personal data to 
     third parties provided by the Card Service Companies is 
     prohibited, except in those cases where such personal data is 
     transferred to affiliated companies engaged in the banking 
     business in order to market financial services; the transfer 
     of such data beyond the aforementioned scope to third parties 
     shall require the Card Service Companies' express approval. 
     Such approval is limited to the scope of the Card Customers' 
     consent as obtained on the application form. The personal 
     data of customers having obtained a BahnCard ``pure'' may 
     only be used or transferred for BahnCard marketing purposes.
       CNA and the Card Service Companies undertake to institute 
     and maintain the following data protection measures:
     1. Access control of persons
       CNA shall implement suitable measures in order to prevent 
     unauthorized persons from gaining access to the data 
     processing equipment where the data transferred by the Card 
     Service Companies are processed.
       This shall be accomplished by:
       a. Establishing security areas;
       b. Protection and restriction of access paths;
       c. Securing the decentralized data processing equipment and 
     personal computers;
       d. Establishing access authorizations for employees and 
     third parties, including the respective documentation;
       e. Identification of the persons having access authority;
       f. Regulations on key-codes;
       g. Restriction on keys;
       h. Code card passes;
       i. Visitors books;
       j. Time recording equipment;
       k. Security alarm system or other appropriate security 
     measures.
     2. Data media control
       CNA undertake to implement suitable measures to prevent the 
     unauthorized reading, copying, alteration or removal of the 
     data media used by CNA and containing personal data of the 
     Card Customers.
       This shall be accomplished by:
       a. Designating the areas in which data media may/must be 
     located;
       b. Designating the persons in such areas who are authorized 
     to remove data media;
       c. Controlling the removal of data media;
       d. Securing the areas in which data media are located;
       e. Release of data media to only authorized persons;
       f. Control of files, controlled and documented destruction 
     of data media;
       g. Policies controlling the production of back-up copies.
     3. Data memory control
       CNA undertakes to implement suitable measures to prevent 
     unauthorized input into the data memory and the unauthorized 
     reading, alteration or deletion of the stored data on Card 
     Customers.
       This shall be accomplished by:
       a. An authorization policy for the input of data into 
     memory, as well as for the reading, alteration and deletion 
     of stored data;
       b. Authentication of the authorized personnel;
       c. Protective measures for the data input into memory, as 
     well as for the reading, alteration and deletion of stored 
     data,
       d. Utilization of user codes (passwords);
       e. Use of encryption for critical security files.
       f. Specific access rules for procedures, control cards, 
     process control methods, program cataloging authorization;
       g. Guidelines for data file organization;
       h. Keeping records of data file use;
       i. Separation of production and test environment for 
     libraries and data files
       j. Providing that entries to data processing facilities 
     (the rooms housing the computer hardware and related 
     equipment) are capable of being locked,
       k. Automatic log-off of user ID's that have not been used 
     for a substantial period of time.
     4. User control
       CNA shall implement suitable measures to prevent its data 
     processing systems from being used by unauthorized persons by 
     means of data transmission equipment.
       This shall be accomplished by:
       a. Identification of the terminal and/or the terminal user 
     to the DP system;
       b. Automatic turn-off of the user ID when several erroneous 
     passwords are entered, log file of events, (monitoring of 
     break-in-attempts);
       c. Issuing and safeguarding of identification codes;
       d. Dedication of individual terminals and/or terminal 
     users, identification characteristics exclusive to specific 
     functions;
       e. Evaluation of records.
     5 Personnel control
       Upon request, CNA shall provide the Card Service Companies 
     with a list of the CNA employees entrusted with processing 
     the personal data transferred by the Card Service Companies, 
     together with a description of their access rights.
     6. Access control to data
       CNA commits that the persons entitled to use CNA's data 
     processing system are only able to access the data within the 
     scope and to the extent covered by the irrespective access 
     permission (authorization).
       This shall be accomplished by:
       a. Allocation of individual terminals and/or terminal user, 
     and identification characteristics exclusive to specific 
     functions;
       b. Functional and/or time-restricted use of terminals and/
     or terminal users, and identification characteristics;
       c. Persons with function authorization codes (direct 
     access, batch processing) access to work areas;
       d. Electronic verification of authorization;
       e. Evaluation of records.
     7. Transmission control
       CNA shall be obligated to enable the verification and 
     tracing of the locations/destinations to which the Card 
     Customers' data are transferred by utilization of CNA's data 
     communication equipment/devices.
       This shall be accomplished by:
       a. Documentation of the retrieval and transmission 
     programs;

[[Page S14550]]

       b. Documentation of the remote locations/destinations to 
     which a transmission paths (logical paths).
     8. Input control
       CNA shall provide for the retrospective ability to review 
     and determine the time and the point of the Card Customers' 
     data entry into CNA's data processing system.
       This shall be accomplished by:
       a. Proof established within CNA's organization of the input 
     authorization;
       b. Electronic recording of entries.
     9. Instructional control
       The Card Customers' data transferred by the Card Service 
     Companies to CNA may only be processed in accordance with 
     instructions of the Card Service Companies.
       This shall be accomplished by:
       a. Binding policies and procedures for CNA employees, 
     subject to the Card Service Companies' prior approval of such 
     procedures and policies,
       b. Upon request, access will be granted to those Card 
     Service Companies' employees and agents who are responsible 
     for monitoring CNA's compliance with this Agreement (c.f. 
     Sec. 3 hereof.)
     10. Transport control
       CNA and the Card Service Companies shall implement suitable 
     measures to prevent the Card Customers' personal data from 
     being read, copied, altered or deleted by unauthorized 
     parties during the transmission thereof or during the 
     transport of the data media.
       This shall be accomplished by:
       a. Encryption of the data for on-line transmission, or 
     transport by means of data carriers, (tapes and cartridges);
       b. Monitoring of the completeness and correctness of the 
     transfer of data (end-to-end check).
     II. Organization control
       CNA shall maintain its internal organization in a matter 
     that meets the requirements of this Agreement.
       This shall be accomplished by:
       a. Internal CNA policies and procedures, guidelines, work 
     instructions, process descriptions, and regulations for 
     programming, testing, and release, insofar as they relate to 
     data transferred by Card Service Companies;
       b. Formulation of a data security concept whose content has 
     been reconciled with the Card Service Companies;
       c. Industry standard system and program examination;
       d. Formulation of an emergency plan (back-up contingency 
     plan).


                   Sec. 6  Data Protection Supervisor

       1. CNA undertakes to appoint a Data Protection Supervisor 
     and to notify the Card Service Companies of the appointee(s). 
     CNA shall only select an employee with adequate expertise and 
     reliability necessary to perform such a duty, and provide the 
     Card Service Companies with appropriate evidence thereof.
       2. The Data Protection Supervisor shall be directly 
     subordinate/accountable to CNA's General Management. He shall 
     not be bound by instructions which obstruct or hinder the 
     performance of his duty in the field of data protection. He 
     shall cooperate with the Card Service Companies' agent--as 
     indicated in Sec. 3 hereof--in monitoring the performance of 
     this Agreement and adhering to the data protection 
     requirements in conjunction with the data in question. In the 
     event that CNA chooses to change the person who serves as a 
     Data Protection Supervisor, CNA shall give timely notice to 
     the Card Service Companies of such change. The Data 
     Protection Supervisor shall be bound by confidentiality 
     obligations.
       3. The Data Protection Supervisor shall be available as the 
     on-site contact for the Card Service Companies.


                   Sec. 7  Confidentiality Obligation

       CNA shall impose a confidentiality obligation on those 
     employees entrusted with processing the personal data 
     transferred by the Card Service Companies. CNA shall 
     furthermore obligate its employees to adhere to the banking 
     and data secrecy regulations and document such employees' 
     obligation in writing. Upon request, CNA shall provide the 
     Card Service Companies with satisfactory evidence of 
     compliance with this provision.


                  Sec. 8  Rights of Concerned Persons

       1. At any time, Card Customers whose data are transferred 
     by CIP to the Card Service Companies, and thereafter further 
     transferred by the Card Service Companies to CNA, shall be 
     entitled to make inquiries to CNA (who are required to 
     respond) as to: the stored personal data, including the 
     origin and the recipient of the data; the purpose of storage; 
     and the persons and locations/destinations to which such data 
     are transferred on a regular basis.
       The requested information shall generally be provided in 
     writing.
       2. The Card Service Companies shall honour the concerned 
     person's request to correct his personal data at any time, 
     provided that the stored data are incorrect. The same shall 
     apply to data stored at CNA.
       3. The concerned person may claim from the responsible Card 
     Service Companies the deletion or blocking of any data stored 
     at the Card Service Companies or CNA, in the event that: such 
     storage is prohibited by law; the data in question relate to 
     information about health criminal actions, violations of the 
     public order, or religious or political opinions, and its 
     truth/correctness cannot be proved by the Card Service 
     Companies; and such data are processed to serve Card Service 
     Companies' own purposes, and such data are no longer 
     necessary to serve the purpose of the data storage under the 
     agreement with the respective Card Customers.
       Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties hereto submit to 
     the provisions of Sec. 35 of the German Federal Data 
     Protection Law (BDSG), and agree to be familiar with such 
     provisions.
       4. The concerned person may demand that the responsible 
     Card Service Companies block his or her personal data, if he 
     or she contests the correct nature thereof and if it is not 
     possible to determine whether such data is correct or 
     incorrect. This shall also apply to such data stored by CNA.
       5. If CIP. the Card Service Companies or CNA should violate 
     the data protection or banking secrecy regulations, the 
     person concerned shall be entitled to claim damages caused 
     and incurred thereby as provided in the German Federal Data 
     Protection Law (BDSG). CIP's and the Card Service Companies' 
     liability shall moreover extend to those claims arising from 
     breach of this Agreement and asserted against CNA and/or its 
     employees in performance of this Agreement.
       6. CNA acknowledges the obligation assumed by CIP and the 
     Card Service Companies towards the concerned person, and 
     undertakes to comply with all Card Service Companies' 
     instructions concerning such person. The concerned person may 
     also directly assert claims against CNA and file an action at 
     CNA's applicable place of jurisdiction.


              Sec. 9  Notification to the Concerned Person

       The Card Service Companies undertake to appropriately 
     notify the concerned Card Customers of the transfer of their 
     data to CNA.


                  Sec. 10  Data Protection Supervision

       1. According to the German Federal Data Protection Law 
     (BDSG), the Card Service Companies and CIP are subject to 
     public control exercised by the respective responsible 
     supervisory authorities.
       2. Upon request of CIP or either of the Card Service 
     Companies, CNA shall provide the respective supervisory 
     authorities with the desired information and grant them the 
     opportunity of auditing to the same extent as they would be 
     entitled to conduct audits at the Card Service Companies and 
     CIP; this includes the entitlement to inspections at CNA's 
     premises by the supervisory authorities or their nominated 
     agents, unless barred by binding instructions of the 
     appropriate U.S. authorities.


                      Sec. 11  Banking Supervision

       1. Any vouchers, commercial books of accounting, and work 
     instructions needed for the comprehension of such documents, 
     as well as other organizational documents shall physically 
     remain at the Card Service Companies, unless electronically 
     archived by scanning devices in a legally permissible 
     fashion.
       2. The Card Service Companies and CNA undertake to adhere 
     to the principles of proper accounting practice applicable in 
     Germany for computer-aided processes and the auditing 
     thereof, in particular FAMA 1/1987.
       3. The Card Service Companies undertake to submit a data 
     processing concept and a data security concept to the German 
     Federal Authority for the Supervision of Banks 
     (Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen) prior to commencing 
     transfer of data to CNA.
       4. The remote processing of the data shall be subject to 
     the internal audit department of CIP and the Card Service 
     Companies. CNA agrees to cooperate with the internal auditors 
     of CIP and the Card Service Companies, who shall have the 
     right to inspect the files of CNA's internal auditors, 
     insofar as they relate to the data files transferred by the 
     Card Service Companies to CNA. The internal auditors of the 
     Card Service Companies and of CIP shall conduct audits of CNA 
     as required by due diligence.
       5. In a joint declaration to the Federal Banking 
     Supervisory Authority; CIP, the Card Service Companies and 
     CNA shall undertake to allow the inclusion of CNA in audits 
     in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 44 of the Banking 
     Law (Kreditwesengesetz abbreviated to KWG) at any time and 
     not to impede or obstruct such audits, provided that legal 
     requirements and/or instructions of U.S. authorities bind CNA 
     to the contrary.
       6. CNA shall request the US banking supervisory 
     authorities' confirmation in writing to the effect that no 
     objections will be raised against the intended remote data 
     processing concept. In the event that CNA cannot procure such 
     written confirmation upon the Card Service Companies' 
     request, the Card Service Companies and CIP may withdraw from 
     this Agreement and the underlying CNA Service Agreement.
       7. CIP, the Card Service Companies and CNA undertake to 
     abide by the requirements for interterritorial remote data 
     processing in bank accounting as set forth in the letter of 
     the Federal Authority for the Supervision of Banks dated 
     October 16, 1992. This letter is appended as a Schedule 
     hereto and forms an integral part of this Agreement.


                     Sec. 12  Indemnification Claim

       1. CNA shall indemnify the Card Service Companies within 
     the scope of their internal and contractual relationship from 
     any claims of damages asserted by the Card Customers, and 
     resulting from CNA's incompliance with the terms and 
     conditions of this Agreement.
       2. The Card Service Companies shall indemnify CNA within 
     the scope of their internal and contractual relationship from 
     any claims of damages asserted by the Card Customer, and 
     resulting from one or both of the

[[Page S14551]]

     Card Service Companies' incompliance with the terms and 
     conditions of this Agreement.


                     Sec. 13  Term of the Agreement

       1. This Agreement is effective as of July 1st, 1995, until 
     terminated. It may be terminated by any party hereto at the 
     end of each calendar year upon 12 months notice prior to the 
     expiration date, subject to each party's right of termination 
     of the Agreement for material, unremedied breach hereof. The 
     termination of this Agreement by any one of the parties shall 
     result in the termination of the entire Agreement with 
     respect to the other parties.
       2. CNA commits to return and delete all personal data 
     stored at the time of termination hereof in accordance with 
     the Card Service Companies' instructions.


                        Sec. 14  Confidentiality

       The parties hereto commit to treat strictly confidential 
     any trade, business and operating secrets or other sensitive 
     information of the other parties involved. This obligation 
     shall survive termination of this Agreement.


    Sec. 15  Data protection Agreement with Deutsche Bahn AG (DB AG)

       1. The Deutsche Bahn AG captures personal data at its 
     counters and appears as a joint issuer of the DB/Citibank 
     BahnCard. The parties hereto agree that the Deutsche Bahn AG 
     therefore bears responsibility for such data.
       2. The Deutsche Bahn AG and CIP concluded a Data Protection 
     Agreement as of February 13, 1996, defining the scope of data 
     protection obligations and commitments between the parties. 
     The parties hereto are familiar with said Data Protection 
     Agreement and acknowledge the obligations arising for CIP 
     thereunder.
       3. The parties hereto authorize CIP to provide DB AG with 
     written notification of this Agreement on Interterritorial 
     Data Protection.


                      Sec. 16  General Provisions

       1. This Agreement sets forth the entire understanding 
     between the parties hereto in conjunction with the subject 
     matter as laid down herein and none of the parties hereto has 
     entered into this Agreement in reliance upon any 
     representation, warranty or undertaking of any other party 
     which is not contained in this Agreement or incorporated by 
     reference herein. Any subsequent amendments to this Agreement 
     shall be in writing duly signed by authorized representatives 
     of the parties hereto.
       2. If one or more provisions of this Agreement becomes 
     invalid, or the Agreement is proven to be incomplete, the 
     validity and legality of the remaining provisions hereof 
     shall not be affected or impaired thereby. The parties hereto 
     agree to substitute the invalid part of this Agreement by 
     such a legally valid provision which constitutes the closest 
     representation of the parties' intention and the economical 
     purpose of the invalid term, and the parties hereto further 
     agree to be bound by such a valid term. An incompleteness of 
     this Agreement shall be bridged in a similar fashion.
       3. The Parties hereto submit to the jurisdiction and venue 
     of the courts of Frankfurt/M.
       4. This Agreement shall be governed by, interpreted and 
     construed in accordance with German law.

       What are the main features of the International Agreement?

       1. The parties on both sides of the Atlantic agree to apply 
     German Data Protectional Law to their handling of 
     cardholders' data (Sec. 1).
       2. Customer data may only be processed in the United States 
     for the purpose of producing the cards (Sec. 2).
       3. Citibank in the United States and in Europe is not 
     allowed to transfer personal data to third parties for 
     marketing purposes except in two cases:
       (a) Data of applicants for a RailwayCard with payment 
     function may be transferred to other Citibank companies in 
     order to market financial services; (b) Data of applicants 
     for a pure RailwayCard may only be used or transferred for 
     BahnCard marketing purposes, i.e., to try to convince the 
     cardholder that he should upgrade his RailwayCard to have a 
     ``better BahnCard'' with credit card function (Sec. 4 II).
       4. The technical requirements on data security according to 
     German law are spelt out in detail in Sec. 5.
       5. The American Citibank subsidiary has to appoint data 
     protection supervisors again following the German legal 
     requirements (Sec. 6).
       6. The German card customers have all individual rights 
     against the American Citibank subsidiary which they have 
     under German law. They can ask for inspection, claim 
     deletion, correction or blocking of their data and they can 
     bring an action for compensation under the strict liability 
     rules of German law either against German Railway, the German 
     Citibank subsidiary or directly against the American Citibank 
     subsidiary (Sec. 8).
       7. The Citibank subsidiaries in the United States accept 
     on-site audits by the German data protection supervisory 
     authority, i.e., the Berlin Data Protection Commissioner, or 
     his nominated agents, e.g. an American consulting or auditing 
     firm acting on his behalf (Sec. 10 II).
       This very important provision contains a restriction in 
     case US authorities instruct Citibank in their country not to 
     allow foreign auditors in. However, this restriction is not 
     very likely to become practical. On the contrary, US 
     authorities have already declared by way of a diplomatic note 
     sent to the German side that they will accept these audits. 
     This follows an agreement between German and United States 
     banking supervisory authorities on auditing the trans-border 
     processing of accounting data (cf. Sec. 11). Indeed this 
     previous agreement very much facilitated the acceptance of 
     German data protection audits by Citibank in the United 
     States. As far as data security concepts are concerned the 
     Federal Banking Supervisory Authority and the Berlin Data 
     Protection Commissioner will be working hand in glove.
       8. Finally--and this is not reproduced in the version of 
     the Agreement which you have received--German Railway has 
     been linked to this agreement between Citibank subsidiaries 
     in a specific provision.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. THOMAS (for himself and Mr. Enzi):
  S. 1904. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide 
for an election for special tax treatment of certain S corporation 
conversions; to the Committee on Finance.


election for special tax treatment of certain s corporation conversions

 Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, today I join Senator Enzi in 
introducing legislation that will give small businesses more 
flexibility in how they choose to operate.

  One of the most important decisions for the founder of a business is 
``choice of entity,'' whether to operate the business through a 
corporation, partnership, limited liability company or other form of 
business. This choice is plainly important for reaching business goals, 
and may be critical to the survival of the business. For the family 
business, the choice also is inseparable from the owner's preferences 
as to how the owner wants to relate to family co-owners. Choice of 
entity is therefore potentially one of the most important decisions for 
an owner.
  The law concerning choice of entity has changed enormously in the 
last decade, particularly with the widespread adoption of laws 
authorizing the limited liability company (LLC). As a result, business 
owners have more flexibility in this area than ever before. Even so, 
older family businesses operated as S corporations may be ``locked'' 
into the corporate form, simply because of the tax cost of changing to 
another form. These businesses are thus unable to take advantages of 
the recent advancements in choice of entity.
  In order to help these older businesses remain competitive with their 
younger rivals, the bill Senator Enzi and I introduce today will allow 
a one-time election for an S corporation to change to another form of 
business without incurring the normal tax cost of doing so.
  Thousands of corporations have elected subchapter S status since 
President Eisenhower signed into law the Technical Amendments Act of 
1958, which added subchapter S to the code. The legislative history 
makes clear that the purpose of subchapter S was to offer simplified 
tax rules for the small and family-owned business operating in the 
corporate form.
  Until the rise of the LLC in the mid 1990's, the S corporation 
remained, for all practical purposes, the sole means for a small or 
family business to obtain the benefits of limited liability without the 
complex corporate tax. For many years, a change to another form of 
business was relatively easy. But by the time an alternative to the S 
corporation became widely available, this avenue had been foreclosed by 
changes to the tax code. Thus thousands of S corporations are saddled 
with the cumbersome and inflexible rules of the corporate form.
  The Internal Revenue Code itself reflects a policy of respecting 
economic reality over form in the conduct of a trade or business. For 
example, Section 1031, which existed even in 1939, allows 
nonrecognition of gain or loss in the exchange of property used in a 
trade or business, or for investment, on the theory that the taxpayer 
has not cashed out his investment. Code Sections 351 and 721 allow 
nonrecognition on the contribution of property to a corporation or a 
partnership, on the rationale that the taxpayer is only changing the 
form of his investment.
  The S election itself was a giant stride in removing tax 
considerations in choice of entity. More recently, the Internal Revenue 
Service has done much to remove tax considerations from the choice of 
business form through the check the box regulations.

[[Page S14552]]

The Service should be commended for taking this step.
  The next step in the process is allowing those S corporations that 
can more efficiently function as an LLC the one-time chance to make the 
conversion, without tax cost being the controlling factor. Until these 
conversions can be accomplished, the task of reducing the role of taxes 
in choosing a business form will remain unfinished.
  I look forward to working with Senator Roth and the other members of 
the Senate Finance Committee so we may take action on this measure as 
soon as possible.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. SANTORUM (for himself, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Torricelli, Mr. 
        Lieberman, Mr. Schumer, and Mr. Lautenberg):
  S. 1905. A bill to establish a program to provide for a reduction in 
the incidence and prevalence of Lyme disease; to the Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.


                  the lyme disease initiative of 1999

 Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, it is with great enthusiasm that 
I rise today to join my friend and colleague, the senior Senator from 
Connecticut, Christopher Dodd, in introducing the Lyme Disease 
Initiative of 1999. This legislation is aimed at waging a comprehensive 
fight against Lyme disease--America's most common tick-borne illness.
  I know that Mr. Dodd shares my sentiments in believing that this 
legislation could not be more timely or necessary. Lyme remains the 2nd 
fastest growing infectious disease in this country after AIDS. The 
number of annually reported cases of Lyme disease in the United States 
has increased about 25-fold since national surveillance began in 1982, 
and an average of approximately 12,500 cases annually were reported by 
states to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) from 
1993-1997.
  Every summer, tens of thousands of Americans enjoying or working in 
the outdoors are bitten by ticks. While most will experience no medical 
problems, others are not so lucky--including the 16,801 Americans who 
contracted Lyme disease last year.
  According to some estimates, Lyme disease costs our nation $1 billion 
to $2 billion in medical costs annually. The number of confirmed cases 
of Lyme disease in 1998 increased 31.2 percent from the previous year--
and that is only the tip of the iceberg. Many experts believe the 
official statistics understate the true number of Lyme disease cases by 
as much as ten or twelve-fold, because Lyme disease can be so difficult 
to diagnose.
  And Lyme is a disease that does not discriminate. Persons of all ages 
and both genders are equally susceptible, although among the highest 
attack rates are in children aged 0-14 years.
  The Lyme Disease Initiative is a five year, $125 million blueprint 
for attacking the disease on all fronts. In addition to authorizing the 
necessary resources to wage this war, this legislation outlines a 
public health management plan to make the most of our efforts on all 
fronts to combat Lyme disease:
  The Lyme Disease Initiative makes the development of better detection 
tests for Lyme disease the highest research priority;
  The Lyme Disease Initiative sets goals for public health agencies, 
including a 33 percent reduction in Lyme disease within five years of 
enactment in the ten states with the highest rates;
  The Lyme Disease Initiative fosters better coordination between the 
scattered Lyme disease programs within the federal government through a 
five year, joint-agency plan of action;
  The Lyme Disease Initiative helps protect workers and visitors at 
federally-owned lands in endemic areas through a system of periodic, 
standardized, and publicly accessible Lyme disease risk assessments;
  The Lyme Disease Initiative requires a review of current Lyme disease 
prevention and surveillance efforts to search for areas of improvement;
  The Lyme Disease Initiative fosters additional research into other 
related tick-borne illnesses so that the problem of co-infection can be 
addressed;
  The Lyme Disease Initiative initiates a plan to boost public and 
physician understanding about Lyme disease;
  The Lyme Disease Initiative creates a Lyme Disease Task Force to 
provide Americans with the opportunity to hold our public health 
officials accountable as they accomplish these tasks.
  This legislation is the product of countless meetings that Senator 
Dodd and I have had with patients and families struggling to cope with 
this debilitating disease. Although Lyme disease can be treated 
successfully in the early stages with antibiotics, sadly, the lack of 
physician knowledge about Lyme disease and the inadequacies of existing 
laboratory detection tests compound the physical suffering, which can 
include damage to the nervous system, skin, and joints and other 
significant health complications where patients go undetected, and 
hence untreated. Patients relate heart breaking stories about visiting 
multiple doctors without getting an accurate diagnosis, undergoing 
unnecessary tests while getting progressively weaker and sicker --and 
racking massive medical bills in the process.
  Although Lyme disease poses many challenges, they are challenges the 
medical research community is well equipped to meet. This legislation 
will enhance efforts to discover new information on and establish 
treatment protocols for Lyme disease. Thanks to the scientific research 
being conducted here in the United States and around the world, new and 
promising research is already accumulating at a rapid pace. We have a 
unique opportunity to help re-build the shattered lives of Lyme victims 
and their families, and I look forward to working with Senator Dodd, my 
colleagues, and the administration to accomplish this worthy public 
health goal.
 Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today to join Senator Santorum 
in introducing The Lyme Disease Initiative of 1999, companion 
legislation to a bill introduced by Representative Christopher Smith of 
New Jersey. The objective of this bill is simple--to put us on the path 
toward eradicating Lyme disease--a disease that is still unfamiliar to 
some Americans, but one that those of us from Connecticut and the 
Northeast know all too well.
  Last Congress I was pleased to introduce similar legislation, The 
Lyme Disease Initiative of 1998, and to see a critical component of 
that legislation enacted into law. Through an amendment that I offered 
to the FY 1999 Department of Defense (DoD) appropriations bill, an 
additional $3 million was directed toward the DoD's Lyme disease 
research efforts. This was an important step in the fight to increase 
our understanding of this condition, but clearly much more remains to 
be done.
  Almost every resident of my state has witnessed firsthand the 
devastating impact that this disease can have on its victims. As most 
of my constituents know, Lyme disease is a ``home-grown'' illness--it 
first achieved prominence in the 1980s in the state of Connecticut and 
got its name from the town of Lyme, CT. And today, Connecticut 
residents have the dubious distinction of being 10 times more likely to 
contract Lyme disease than the rest of the nation.
  To begin to address this crisis, this legislation would establish a 
five-year, $125 million blueprint for attacking the disease on all 
fronts by bolstering funding for better detection, prevention, 
surveillance, and public and physician education. Additionally, this 
legislation would require the primary federal agencies involved in Lyme 
disease research and education to substantially improve the 
coordination of their efforts, in an effort to minimize duplication and 
to enhance federal leadership.
  In my opinion, money to fund Lyme disease research and public 
education is money well spent. Studies indicate that long-term 
treatment of infected individuals often exceeds $100,000 per person--a 
phenomenal cost to society. Health problems experienced by those 
infected can include facial paralysis, joint swelling, loss of 
coordination, irregular heart-beat, liver malfunction, depression, and 
memory loss. Because Lyme disease mimics other conditions, patients 
often must visit multiple doctors before a proper diagnosis is made. 
This results in prolonged pain and suffering, unnecessary tests, costly 
and futile treatments, and devastating emotional consequences for 
victims and their families.
  Tragically, the number of Lyme disease cases reported to the CDC has 
sky-

[[Page S14553]]

rocketed--from 500 in 1982 to 17,000 in 1998. In the last year alone, 
the number of infected individuals rose 25%. And these cases represent 
only the tip of the iceberg. Several new reports have found that the 
actual incidence of the disease may be ten times greater than current 
figures suggest.
  While continuing to fight for additional funding for research into 
this disease, it is also critical that we ensure that current and 
future federal resources for Lyme disease are used wisely and in the 
best interest of the individuals and families affected by this 
condition. To that end, I intend to ask the General Accounting Office 
to review current federal funding priorities for Lyme disease.
  I truly look forward to the day when Lyme disease no longer plagues 
our nation and view The Lyme Disease Initiative of 1999 as a critical 
step toward that goal. I urge my colleagues to support this 
legislation.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. BINGAMAN (for himself, Mr. Allard, and Mr. Craig):
  S. 1906. A bill to amend Public Law 104-307 to extend the expiration 
date of the authority to sell certain aircraft for use in wildfire 
suppression, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed 
Services.


     wildfire suppression aircraft transfer act of 1996 extension 
                              legislation

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, Airplanes, known as airtankers, play a 
critical role in fighting wildfires. They are used in the initial 
attack of wildfires in support of firefighters on the ground and, on 
large wildfires, to aid in the protection of lives and structures from 
rapidly advancing fires.
  Today, Senators Allard, Craig and I are introducing legislation that 
will help ensure that Federal firefighters continue to have access to 
airtanker services. This technical amendment will extend the expiration 
date of the Wildfire Suppression Aircraft Transfer Act of 1996 from 
September 30, 2000 to September 30, 2005. The regulations under the act 
are still being finalized, so no aircraft have yet been transferred. 
Extending the 1996 act is critical to help facilitate the sale of 
former military aircraft to contractors who provide firefighting 
services to the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior. The 
existing fleet of available airtankers is aging rapidly, and fleet 
modernization is critical to the continued success of the firefighting 
program.
  This bill will extend legislative authority to transfer or sell 
excess turbine-powered military aircraft suitable for conversion to 
airtankers. If we fail to pass this extension, airtanker operators will 
not have access to the planes they need to update the aging airtanker 
fleet. The Wildfire Suppression Aircraft Transfer Act of 1996 required 
that the aircraft be used only for firefighting activities.
  I urge my colleagues to support our efforts to ensure that Federal 
firefighters have the resources they need to protect the public and 
their property from the threat of wildfires.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1900

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.

       Section 2 of the Wildlife Suppression Aircraft Transfer Act 
     of 1996 (Public Law No. 104-307) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1) by striking ``September 30, 2000'' 
     and inserting ``September 30, 2005'';
       (2) in subsection (d)(2)(C), by striking ``and'' at the 
     end;
       (3) in subsection (d)(2)(D), by striking the period at the 
     end and inserting ``; and'';
       (4) in subsection (d)(2), by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(E) be in effect until September 30, 2005''; and
       (5) in subsection (f), by striking ``March 31, 2000'' and 
     inserting ``March 31, 2005''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. DODD (for himself and Mr. Kennedy) (by request):
  S. 1907. A bill to prohibit employment discrimination against parents 
and those with parental responsibilities, and for other purposes; to 
the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.


           ending discrimination against parents act of 1999

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce ``the Ending 
Discrimination Against Parents Act of 1999,'' on behalf of President 
Clinton, to prohibit employment discrimination against private and 
public employees because they are parents. I am pleased to be joined by 
Senator Kennedy in this effort.

  Mr. President, today more than ever parents work. One may argue 
whether it is right or wrong--but the facts are clear. In 1998, 38 
percent of all U.S. workers had children under the age of 18. Nearly 
one in five working parents is a single parent; moreover, a fifth of 
these are single fathers. Labor force participation has also increased 
in two parent families, with both parents often holding down jobs.
  Clearly, this has revolutionized our culture. Child care is a 
constant personal as well as public policy issue. Grocery stores and 
other retailers are open later--many catalogues offer round the clock 
service via the telephone or Internet. Take out meals and delivered 
pizza, which in the past were often reserved as a special weekend 
treat, are now commonplace on week nights. Cellular telephone companies 
even offer special family plans with unlimited calling among family 
members, for those families entirely on the go.
  Workplaces too have changed. Women and men work side by side in 
nearly every occupation. Many employers attract workers with on-site 
day care, flexible work arrangements and generous family leave. Take 
Your Daughter to work day has introduced millions of girls and boys to 
the world of work.
  But not all change has come easy. Many parents have made agonizing 
choices about work and family. Some have chosen to scale back their 
careers, move to less demanding jobs, pursue part-time work, or take a 
few years off. Others have continued in their careers without 
interruption relying on committed child care or the support of a 
partner. Each working parent has come to their own decision about how 
to move forward in their jobs and in their role as parents. And most 
employers are supportive of these decisions. They recognize that good 
employees are good employees regardless of their status as parents.
  Mr. President, this legislation is not about these employers. 
Frankly, it is not even about encouraging, much less requiring, work 
place accommodations of parents and their family obligations--as much 
as I support those efforts. It is, instead, about those hopefully rare 
cases where employers discriminate in their employment practices 
against parents. It is about eliminating bias not about guaranteeing 
accommodation.
  Specifically, the proposed statute would include parental status as a 
protected class with respect to employment discrimination. Parental 
status would cover parents of children under 18 years of age and 
children who remain under parental supervision because of a mental or 
physical disability, as well as those seeking legal custody of children 
and those who stand ``in loco parentis.'' The legislation would bar 
discrimination against parents in all aspects of employment, including 
recruitment, referral, hiring, promotions, discharge, training and 
other terms and conditions of employment.
  For example, this legislation would make illegal policies against 
hiring single parents. Employers would be prohibited from taking a 
mother or a father off a career-advancing path out of a belief that 
parents uniformly cannot meet the requirements of these jobs. Neither 
could employers hire less qualified non-parents over parents because of 
unfounded concerns about parents. Basic discrimination against parents 
would be barred.
  I want to be very clear, Mr. President, this legislation does not 
release working parents from any job performance requirements. 
Employers are free to make decisions based on an employee's job 
performance or ability to meet job requirements or qualifications--no 
matter what that employee's parental status is. Thus, an employer may 
discipline an employee who is late because of childcare issues. 
Similarly, an employer may reject an applicant for a job that requires 
extensive travel if that applicant is unwilling to travel because of 
his or her parental responsibilities. What the bill would prohibit

[[Page S14554]]

is rejection of an applicant who is willing to travel based simply on 
the assumption that he or she, as a parent, will be unable to fulfill 
that commitment.
  Mr. President, this is unfortunately not a new problem for parents. 
Several states, including Alaska, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
and South Dakota, and the District of Columbia have enacted laws that 
prohibit discrimination based on parental or familial status. There 
have also been several federal cases filed under gender discrimination 
statutes that have found discrimination based on parental status. In 
one case, an employer transferred a new mother recently back to work 
from maternity leave into a lower paying job, not based on her request 
or her performance, but because the employer simply felt it better 
suited a new mother. Beyond anecdotes and a few court cases, it is 
difficult to gauge the extent of this problem--rare or common--given 
the extremely limited avenues of redress open to parents currently.
  But no matter how rare--if it happens just once it is wrong. And 
working parents deserve better. This legislation makes sure they get 
it. I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this legislation.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1907

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Ending Discrimination 
     Against Parents Act of 1999.''

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       (a) In 1998, thirty-eight percent of all United States 
     workers had children under 18.
       (b) The vast majority of Americans with children under 18 
     are employed.
       (c) Federal law protects working parents from employment 
     discrimination in a number of important areas. For instance, 
     title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
     discrimination against workers on the basis of sex; the 
     Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 prohibits 
     discrimination against workers on the basis of disability; 
     and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 prohibits 
     discrimination against workers on the basis of pregnancy. 
     Also, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 provides 
     covered workers with job protection when they take time off 
     for certain family responsibilities.
       (d) However, no existing Federal statute protects all 
     workers from employment discrimination on the basis of their 
     status as parents.
       (e) Such discrimination against parents occurs where, for 
     example, employers refuse to hire or promote both men and 
     women who are parents based on unwarranted stereotypes or 
     overbroad assumptions about their level of commitment to the 
     work force.
       (f) Such discrimination has occurred in the workplace and 
     has been largely unremedied.
       (g) Such discrimination occurs in both the private and the 
     public sectors.
       (h) Such discrimination--
       (1) reduces the income earned by families who rely on the 
     wages of working parents to make ends meet;
       (2) prevents the best use of available labor resources;
       (3) has been spread and perpetuated, through commerce and 
     the channels and instrumentalities of commerce, among the 
     workers of several States;
       (4) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in 
     commerce;
       (5) constitutes an unfair method of competition in 
     commerce; and
       (6) leads to labor disputes burdening an obstructing 
     commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce.
       (i) Elimination of such discrimination would have positive 
     effects, including--
       (1) solving problems in the economy created by unfair 
     discrimination against parents;
       (2) promoting stable families by enabling working parents 
     to work free from discrimination against parents; and
       (3) remedying the effects of past discrimination against 
     parents.

     SEC. 3. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of this Act are--
       (a) to prohibit employers, employment agencies, and labor 
     organizations from discriminating against parents and persons 
     with parental responsibilities based on the assumption that 
     they cannot satisfy the requirements of a particular 
     position; and
       (b) to provide meaningful and effective remedies for 
     employment discrimination against parents and persons with 
     parental responsibilities.

     SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (a) ``Commission'' means the Equal Employment Opportunity 
     Commission.
       (b) ``Complaining party'' means the Commission, the 
     Attorney General, or any other person who may bring an action 
     or proceeding under this Act.
       (c) ``Covered entity'' means an employer, employment 
     agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management 
     committee.
       (d) ``Demonstrates'' means meet the burden of production 
     and persuasion.
       (e)(1) The term ``employee'' means:
       (i) an individual to whom section 701(f) of the Civil 
     Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(f)) applies;
       (ii) an individual to whom section 717(a) of the Civil 
     Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a)) applies;
       (iii) an individual to whom section 302(a)(1) of the 
     Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 (2 U.S.C. 1202(a)(1)) 
     applies;
       (iv) a covered employee as defined in section 101(3) of the 
     Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1301(3)); 
     and
       (v) a covered employee as defined in section 411(c)(1) of 
     title 3, United States Code.
       (2) The term ``employee'' includes applicants for 
     employment and former employees.
       (f)(1) The term ``employer'' means:
       (i) a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce (as 
     defined in section 701(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 
     U.S.C. 2000e(h))) who has fifteen or more employees (as 
     defined in section 701(f) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e(f))) 
     for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks 
     in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of 
     such a person;
       (ii) an entity to which section 717(a) of the Civil Rights 
     Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a)) applies;
       (iii) an employing authority to which section 302(a)(1) of 
     the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 (2 U.S.C. 
     1202(a)(1)) applies;
       (iv) an employing office, as defined in section 101(9) of 
     the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 
     1301(9)); and
       (v) an employing office as defined in section 411(c)(2) of 
     title 3, United States Code.
       (2) The term ``employer'' does not include a bona fide 
     private membership club (other than a labor organization) 
     that is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of title 
     26, United States Code.
       (g) ``Employment agency'' has the meaning given that term 
     in section 701(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
     2000e(c)).
       (h) ``Incapable of self-care'' means that the individual 
     needs active assistance or supervision to provide daily self-
     care in three or more of the ``activities of daily living'' 
     or ``instrumental activities of daily living.'' Activities of 
     daily living include adaptive activities such as caring 
     appropriately for one's grooming and hygiene, bathing, 
     dressing, and eating. Instrumental activities of daily living 
     include cooking, cleaning, shopping, taking public 
     transportation, paying bills, maintaining a residence, using 
     telephones and directories, using a post office, and similar 
     activities.
       (i) ``Labor organization'' has the meaning given that term 
     in sections 701(d) and (e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
     (42 U.S.C. 2000e(d), (e)).
       (j) ``Office of Compliance'' has the meaning given that 
     term in the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (2 
     U.S.C. 1301 et seq.).
       (k) ``Parent'' means a person who, with regard to an 
     individual who is under the age of 18, or who is 18 or older 
     but is incapable of self-care because of a physical or mental 
     disability--
       (l) has the status of--
       (i) a biological parent;
       (ii) an adoptive parent;
       (iii) a foster parent;
       (iv) a stepparent; or
       (v) a custodian of a legal ward;
       (2) is actively seeking legal custody or adoption; or
       (3) stands in loco parentis to such an individual.
       (l) ``Person'' has the meaning given that term in section 
     701(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(a)).
       (m) ``Physical or mental disability'' means a physical or 
     mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
     the major life activities of an individual.
       (n) ``State'' has the meaning given that term in section 
     701(i) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(i)).

     SEC. 5. DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED.

       (a) Employer Practices.--It shall be an unlawful employment 
     practice for an employer--
       (1) to fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any 
     individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
     individual with regard to the compensation, terms, 
     conditions, or privileges of employment of the individual, 
     because such individual is a parent; or
       (2) to limit, segregate, or classify employees in any way 
     that would deprive, or
       (2) to limit, segregate, or classify employees in any way 
     that would deprive, or tend to deprive, any individual of 
     employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the 
     status of the individual as an employee, because such 
     individual is a parent.
       (b) Employment Agency Practices.--It shall be an unlawful 
     employment practice for an employment agency to fail or 
     refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate 
     against, any individual because such individual is a parent 
     or to classify or refer for employment any individual because 
     such individual is a parent.
       (c) Labor Organization Practices.--It shall be an unlawful 
     employment practice for a labor organization--
       (1) to exclude or expel from its membership, or otherwise 
     to discriminate against, any individual because such 
     individual is a parent;

[[Page S14555]]

       (2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or 
     applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse 
     to refer for employment any individual, in any way that would 
     deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
     opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities 
     or otherwise adversely affect the status of the individual as 
     an employee, because such individual is a parent; or
       (3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to 
     discriminate against an individual in violation of this Act.
       (d) Training Programs.--It shall be an unlawful employment 
     practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint 
     labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or 
     other training or retraining, including on-the-job training 
     programs, to discriminate against any individual because such 
     individual is a parent in admission to, or employment in, any 
     program established to provide apprenticeship or other 
     training.

     SEC. 6. RETALIATION AND COERCION PROHIBITED.

       (a) Retaliation.--A covered entity shall not discriminate 
     against an employee because the employee has opposed any act 
     or practice prohibited by this Act or because the employee 
     made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
     manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
     Act.
       (b) Interference, Coercion, or Intimidation.--A covered 
     entity shall not coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere 
     with any employee in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on 
     account of the employee's having exercised or enjoyed, or on 
     account of the employee's having aided or encouraged any 
     other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right 
     granted or protected by this Act.

     SEC. 7. OTHER PROHIBITIONS.

       (a) Collection of Statistics.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act, the Commission shall not collect 
     statistics from covered entities on their employment of 
     parents, or compel the collection of such statistics by 
     covered entities, unless such statistics are to be used in 
     investigation, litigation, or resolution of a claim of 
     discrimination under this Act.
       (b) Quotas.--A covered entity shall not adopt or implement 
     a quota with respect to its employment of parents.

     SEC. 8. MIXED MOTIVE DISCRIMINATION.

       (a) An unlawful employment practice is established under 
     this Act when the complaining party demonstrates that--
       (1) an individual's status as a parent; or
       (2) retaliation, coercion, or threats against, intimidation 
     of, or interference with an individual as described in 
     section 6 of this Act

     was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even 
     though other factors also motivated the practice.
       (b) When an individual proves a violation under this 
     section, and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent 
     would have taken the same action in the absence of the 
     prohibited motivating factor, a court or any other entity 
     authorized in section 11(a) of this Act to award relief--
       (1) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except 
     as provided in clause (2) below), and attorney's fees and 
     costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the 
     pursuit of a claim under this section; and
       (2) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any 
     admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment.

     SEC. 9. DISPARATE IMPACT.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the fact 
     that an employment practice has a disparate impact on 
     parents, as the term ``disparate impact'' is used in section 
     703(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
     2(k)), shall not establish a violation of this Act.

     SEC. 10. DEFENSES WHERE ACTIONS TAKEN IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

       (a) It shall not be unlawful under this Act for a covered 
     entity to take any action otherwise prohibited under this Act 
     with respect to an employee in a workplace in a foreign 
     country if compliance with this Act would cause such entity 
     to violate the law of the foreign country in which such 
     workplace is located.
       (b) (1) If a covered entity controls a corporation whose 
     place of incorporation is a foreign country, any practice 
     prohibited by this Act engaged in by such corporation shall 
     be presumed to be engaged in by such covered entity.
       (2) This Act shall not apply with respect to the foreign 
     operations of a corporation that is a foreign person not 
     controlled by an American covered entity.
       (3) For purposes of this subsection, the determination of 
     whether a covered entity controls a corporation shall be 
     based on the factors set forth in section 702(c)(3) of the 
     Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-1(c)(3)).
       (c) This Act shall not apply to a covered entity with 
     respect to the employment of aliens outside any State.

     SEC. 11. ENFORCEMENT AND REMEDIES.

       (a) Incorporation of Powers, Remedies, and Procedures in 
     Other Civil Rights Statutes.--With respect to the 
     administration and enforcement of this Act in the case of a 
     claim alleged by an individual for a violation of this Act, 
     the following statutory provisions are hereby incorporated, 
     and shall, along with the provisions in subsection 11(b), 
     establish the powers, remedies, procedures, and jurisdiction 
     that this Act provides to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
     Commission, the Attorney General, the Librarian of 
     Congress, the Office of Compliance and its Board of 
     Directors, the Merit Systems Protection Board, the 
     President, the courts of the United States, and/or any 
     other person alleging a violation of any provision of this 
     Act--
       (1) for individuals who are covered under title VII of the 
     Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2000e et 
     seq.), sections 705, 706, 707, 709, 710, 711, and 717 of that 
     Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9, 
     2000e-10, and 2000e-16), and sections 7121, 7701, 7702, and 
     7703 of title 5, United States Code, as applicable;
       (2) for individuals who are covered under section 302(a) of 
     the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 (2 U.S.C. 
     1202(a)), sections 302(b)(1) and 304(b)-(e) of that Act (2 
     U.S.C. 1202(b)(1), 1220(b)-(e));
       (3) for individuals who are covered under section 101(3) of 
     the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 
     1301(3)), sections 201(b)(1), 225, and 401-416 of that Act (2 
     U.S.C. 1311(b)(1), 1361, 1401-1416); and
       (4) for individuals who are covered under section 411(c)(1) 
     of title 3, United States Code, sections 411(b)(1), 435, and 
     451-456 of that title:
       (b) Additional Remedies.--
       (1) Notwithstanding any express or implied limitation on 
     the remedies incorporated by reference in subsection 11(a), 
     and except as provided in subsection (b)(2) of this section, 
     section 8, or section 12 of this Act, any covered entity that 
     violates this Act shall be liable for such compensatory 
     damages as may be appropriate and for punitive damages if the 
     covered entity engaged in a discriminatory practice or 
     practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the 
     federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.
       (2) Notwithstanding subsection 11(b)(1),
       (i) absent its consent to a monetary remedy, a State may be 
     liable for monetary relief only in an action brought by the 
     Attorney General in a court of the United States; and
       (ii) a State shall not be liable for punitive damages.
       (3) Notwithstanding any express or implied limitation on 
     the remedies incorporated by reference in subsection 11(a) or 
     included in subsection 11(b)(2) above,
       (i) an individual may bring an action in a district court 
     of the United States for declaratory or injunctive relief 
     against any appropriate State official for a violation of 
     this Act; and
       (ii) the Attorney General may bring an action in a district 
     court of the United States for declaratory or injunctive 
     relief against any appropriate State official or State for a 
     violation of this Act.

     SEC. 12. FEDERAL IMMUNITY.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, in an 
     action or administrative proceeding against the United States 
     for a violation of this Act, remedies (including remedies at 
     law and in equity, and interest) are available for a 
     violation to the same extent as the remedies are available 
     against a private entity, except that punitive damages are 
     not available.

     SEC. 13. POSTING NOTICES.

       A covered entity shall post notices for individuals to whom 
     this Act applies that describe the applicable provisions of 
     this Act in the manner prescribed by, and subject to the 
     penalty provided under, section 711 of the Civil Rights Act 
     of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-10).

     SEC. 14. REGULATIONS.

       (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsections 14(b), 
     (c), (d), and (e) below, the Commission shall have authority 
     to issue regulations to carry out this Act.
       (b) Librarian of Congress.--The Librarian of Congress shall 
     have authority to issue regulations to carry out this Act 
     with respect to employees of the Library of Congress.
       (c) Board.--The Board of the Office of Compliance shall 
     have authority to issue regulations to carry out this Act, in 
     accordance with sections 303 and 304 of the Congressional 
     Accountability Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1383, 1384), with 
     respect to covered employees as defined in section 101(3) of 
     such Act (2 U.S.C. 1301(3)).
       (d) President.--The President shall have authority to issue 
     regulations to carry out this Act with respect to covered 
     employees as defined in section 411(c)(1) of title 3, United 
     States Code.
       (e) Commission and Merit Systems Protection Board.--The 
     Commission and the Merit Systems Protection Board shall each 
     have authority to issue regulations to carry out this Act 
     with respect to individuals covered by sections 7121, 7701, 
     7702, and 7703 of title 5, United States Code.

     SEC. 15. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS.

       Nothing in this Act shall affect the interpretation or 
     application of, and this Act shall not invalidate or limit 
     the rights, remedies, or procedures available to an 
     individual claiming discrimination prohibited under, any 
     other Federal law or any law of a State or political 
     subdivision of a State.

     SEC. 16. SEVERABILITY.

       If any provision of this Act, or the application of such 
     provision to any person or circumstances, is held to be 
     invalid, the remainder of this Act and the application of 
     such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not 
     be affected.

     SEC. 17. APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
     necessary to carry out this Act.

     SEC. 18. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       This Act shall take effect 180 days after enactment and 
     shall not apply to conduct occurring before the effective 
     date.

[[Page S14556]]

                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. DODD:
  S. 1908. A bill to protect students from commercial exploitation; to 
the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.


                     Student Privacy Protection Act

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today to offer legislation, ``the 
Student Privacy Protection Act,'' to provide parents and their children 
with modest, but appropriate, privacy protection from questionable 
marketing research in the schools.
  There are few images as enduring as those we experienced as school-
children: the teachers and chalkboards, the principal's office, 
children at play during recess, school libraries, and desks organized 
around a room. All define a school in our memories and continue to 
define schools today. Clearly, there have been changes and many of 
those for the good. Computers have become more common and are now in a 
majority of classrooms. Students with disabilities are routinely 
included in regular classes rather than segregated in separate 
classrooms or schools.
  However, some changes in my view have not been for the best. More and 
more schools and their classrooms are becoming commercialized. Schools, 
teachers and their students are daily barraged with commercial messages 
aimed at influencing the buying habits of children and their parents. A 
1997 study from Texas A&M, estimated that children, aged 4-12 years, 
spent more than $24 billion themselves and influenced their parents to 
spend $187 billion. Marketing to children and youth is particularly 
powerful however, because students are not just current consumers, they 
will be consumers for decades to come. And just as we hope that what 
students learn in schools stays with them, marketers know their 
messages stick--be it drinking Coke or Pepsi, or wearing Nikes or 
Reeboks, these habits continue into adulthood.
  There is no question that advertising is everywhere in our society 
from billboards to bathroom stalls. But what is amazing is how 
prevalent it has become in our schools. Companies no longer just 
finance the local school's scoreboard or sponsor a little league team, 
major national companies advertise in school hallways, in classrooms, 
on the fields and, even, in curriculum which they have developed 
specifically to get their messages into classrooms. One major spaghetti 
sauce firm has encouraged science teachers to have their student test 
different sauces for thickness as part of their science classes. Film 
makers and television studios promote new releases with special 
curriculum tied to their movies or shows. In one school, a student was 
suspended for wearing a Pepsi T-shirt on the school's Coke Day. In 
another, credit card applications were sent home with elementary school 
students for their parents and the school collected a fee for every 
family that signed up.
  Mr. President, this is not to say that companies cannot and should 
not be active partners in our schools. Indeed, business leaders have 
been some of the strongest advocates for school improvement. Many 
corporations partner with schools to contribute to the educational 
mission of the schools, be it through mentoring programs or through 
donations of technology. Other businesses have become well-known for 
their scholarship support of promising students. And one cannot imagine 
a successful, relevant vocational education program without the 
participation of business.
  Each of these activities meets the central test of contributing to 
student learning. Unfortunately, too much commercial activity in our 
schools does not. These issues are not black and white. Channel One 
which is in many, many of our nation's secondary schools offers high 
quality programming on the news of the day and issues of importance. 
They provide televisions, VCR's, and satellite dishes along with other 
significant educational programming. But Channel One is a business; in 
exchange for all that is good comes advertising.
  Teachers, principals and parents are on the front lines of this 
issue; each day making decisions on what goes in and what stays out of 
classrooms. In my view, too often these decisions are made in the face 
of very limited resources. I believe most educators recognize the 
potential down-sides of exposing children to commercial messages--but 
too often they have no choice. They are faced with two poor choices: 
provide computers, current events or other activities with corporate 
advertising or not at all.
  The legislation I offer today does not second guess these hard 
decisions. This bill, which is a companion to legislation introduced in 
the other body by Congressman George Miller, would prohibit schools 
from letting students participate in various forms of market research 
without their parents' written permission. This bill would also provide 
for a study of the extent and effect of commercialism in our schools.
  This is, I believe, a modest proposal that deals with one of the most 
disturbing commercial trends in our schools. Existing school privacy 
laws protect official records and educational research. Current law 
leaves a loophole for companies to go into classroom and get 
information directly from children--information about family income, 
buying habits, preferences, etc. --without the consent of their 
parents. Marketers and advertisers use this information to target and 
better hone their message to reach youngsters and their families.
  This is not some scenario from a science fiction novel. Elementary 
school students in New Jersey filled out a 27-page booklet called ``My 
All About Me Journal'' as part of a marketing survey for a cable 
television channel. A technology firm provides schools with free 
computers and Internet access, but monitors students' web activity by 
age, gender and ZIP code. Children in a Massachusetts school did a 
cereal taste test and answered an opinion poll. This legislation does 
not presume that these activities are bad or unrelated to learning--it 
simply requires parents give their permission before their children 
participate.
  Mr. President, public education is not a new topic for discussion 
here on the Senate floor. But we rarely think about the actual words we 
use--``Public education''--and what they mean. These are schools that 
belong to us, to the public as a whole: schools that serve all 
children, schools that are the central element in their communities, 
and that are financed by all of us through our taxes--local, state and 
federal. This bill helps ensure that they remain true to their name.
  I ask unanimous consent that a copy of this legislation be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1908

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Student Privacy Protection 
     Act''.

     SEC. 2. PRIVACY FOR STUDENTS.

       Part E of title XIV of the Elementary and Secondary 
     Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 8891 et seq.) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 14515. PRIVACY FOR STUDENTS.

       ``(a) In General.--None of the funds authorized under this 
     Act may be used by an applicable program to allow a third 
     party to monitor, receive, gather, or obtain information 
     intended for commercial purposes from any student under 18 
     years of age without prior, written, informed consent of the 
     parent of the student.
       ``(b) Intention of Third Party.--Before a school, local 
     educational agency, or State, as the case may be, enters into 
     a contract with a third party, the school, agency, or State 
     shall inquire whether the third party intends to gather, 
     collect, or store information on students, the nature of the 
     information to be gathered, how the information will be used, 
     whether the information will be sold, distributed, or 
     transferred to other parties and the amount of class time, if 
     any, that will be consumed by such activity.
       ``(c) Consent Form.--The consent form referred to in 
     subsection (a) shall indicate the dollar amount and nature of 
     the contract between a school, local educational agency, or 
     State, as the case may be, and a third party, including the 
     nature of the information to be gathered, how the information 
     will be used, if the information will be sold, distributed, 
     or transferred to other parties, and the amount of class 
     time, if any, that will be consumed by such activity.''.

     SEC. 3. GAO STUDY.

       (a) In General.--The Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall conduct a study in accordance with subsection 
     (b) regarding the prevalence and effect of commercialism in 
     elementary and secondary education.
       (b) Contents.--The study shall--
       (1) document the nature, extent, demographics, and trends 
     of commercialism (commercial advertising, sponsorships of 
     programs and activities, exclusive agreements, incentive 
     programs, appropriation of space,

[[Page S14557]]

     sponsored educational materials, electronic marketing, market 
     research, and privatization of management) in elementary and 
     secondary schools receiving funds under the Elementary and 
     Secondary Education Act of 1965;
       (2) consider the range of benefits and costs, educational, 
     public health, financial and social, of such commercial 
     arrangements in classrooms; and
       (3) consider how commercial arrangements in schools affect 
     student privacy, particularly in regards to new technologies 
     such as the Internet, including the type of information that 
     is collected on students, how it is used, and the manner in 
     which schools inform parents before information is collected.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. TORRICELLI:
  S. 1909. A bill to provide for the preparation of a Governmental 
report detailing injustices suffered by Italian Americans during World 
War II, and a formal acknowledgment of such injustices by the 
President; to the Committee on the Judiciary.


       wartime violation of italian american civil liberties act

  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a bill that 
is important not only to every American of Italian descent, but to any 
American citizen who values our Constitutional freedoms. This 
legislation draws attention to the plight of Italian Americans during 
World War II. Their story has received little attention until now, and 
I am pleased to be able to heighten public awareness about the 
injustices they suffered.
  Hours after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested 250 Italian Americans and 
shipped them to internment camps in Montana and Ellis Island. These men 
had done nothing wrong. Their only crime was their Italian heritage and 
the suspicion that they could be dangerous during war time. By 1942, 
all Italian immigrants, approximately 600,000 people, were labeled 
``enemy aliens'' and given photo IDs which they had to carry at all 
times. They could travel no further than five miles from their homes 
and were required to turn in all cameras, flashlights and weapons.
  These violations did not discriminate against class or social status. 
In San Francisco, Joe DiMaggio's parents were forbidden to go further 
than five miles from their home without a permit. Even Enrico Fermi, a 
leading Italian physicist who was instrumental in America's development 
of the atomic bomb, could not travel freely along the East Coast. Yet, 
while these activities persisted in the United States, Italian 
Americans comprised the largest ethnic group in the Armed Forces. 
During the war, Italian Americans fought valiantly to defend the 
freedoms that their loved ones were being denied at home.
  These are the stories we know about and the facts which have come to 
light. Yet more than fifty years after the end of World War II, the 
American people still do not know the details of the Italian American 
internment, and the American government has yet to acknowledge that 
these events ever took place. Through this legislation, the 
Administration will be required to report on the extent to which civil 
liberties were violated. The Justice Department would conduct a 
comprehensive review of the Italian American internment, and report its 
findings, including the name of every person taken into custody, 
interned, or arrested. The specific injustices they suffered in camps 
and jail cells would also be detailed in the report. Moreover, federal 
agencies, from the Department of Education to the National Endowment 
for the Humanities, would be encouraged to support projects like ``Una 
Storia Segreta'' that draw attention to this episode of American 
history.
  The United States has rightfully admitted its error in interning 
Japanese Americans. However, Americans of Italian descent suffered 
equal hardships and this same recognition has been denied to them. I 
look forward to working with my colleagues to secure passage of this 
legislation so that the United States government will begin to release 
the facts about this era. Only then can Italian Americans begin to come 
to terms with the treatment they received during World War II.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1909

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Wartime Violation of Italian 
     American Civil Liberties Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The freedom of more than 600,000 Italian-born 
     immigrants in the United States and their families was 
     restricted during World War II by Government measures that 
     branded them ``enemy aliens'' and included carrying 
     identification cards, travel restrictions, and seizure of 
     personal property.
       (2) During World War II more than 10,000 Italian Americans 
     living on the West Coast were forced to leave their homes and 
     prohibited from entering coastal zones. More than 50,000 were 
     subjected to curfews.
       (3) During World War II thousands of Italian American 
     immigrants were arrested, and hundreds were interned in 
     military camps.
       (4) Hundreds of thousands of Italian Americans performed 
     exemplary service and thousands sacrificed their lives in 
     defense of the United States.
       (5) At the time, Italians were the largest foreign-born 
     group in the United States, and today are the fifth largest 
     immigrant group in the United States, numbering approximately 
     15,000,000.
       (6) The impact of the wartime experience was devastating to 
     Italian American communities in the United States, and its 
     effects are still being felt.
       (7) A deliberate policy kept these measures from the public 
     during the war. Even 50 years later much information is still 
     classified, the full story remains unknown to the public, and 
     it has never been acknowledged in any official capacity by 
     the United States Government.

     SEC. 3. REPORT.

       The Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall 
     conduct a comprehensive review of the treatment by the United 
     States Government of Italian Americans during World War II, 
     and not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this 
     Act shall submit to the Congress a report that documents the 
     findings of such review. The report shall cover the period 
     between September 1, 1939, and December 31, 1945, and shall 
     include the following:
       (1) The names of all Italian Americans who were taken into 
     custody in the initial roundup following the attack on Pearl 
     Harbor, and prior to the United States declaration of war 
     against Italy.
       (2) The names of all Italian Americans who were taken into 
     custody.
       (3) The names of all Italian Americans who were interned 
     and the location where they were interned.
       (4) The names of all Italian Americans who were ordered to 
     move out of designated areas under the United States Army's 
     ``Individual Exclusion Program''.
       (5) The names of all Italian Americans who were arrested 
     for curfew, contraband, or other violations under the 
     authority of Executive Order 9066.
       (6) Documentation of Federal Bureau of Investigation raids 
     on the homes of Italian Americans.
       (7) A list of ports from which Italian American fishermen 
     were restricted.
       (8) The names of Italian American fishermen who were 
     prevented from fishing in prohibited zones and therefore 
     unable to pursue their livelihoods.
       (9) The names of Italian Americans whose boats were 
     confiscated.
       (10) The names of Italian American railroad workers who 
     were prevented from working in prohibited zones.
       (11) A list of all civil liberties infringements suffered 
     by Italian Americans during World War II, as a result of 
     Executive Order 9066, including internment, hearings without 
     benefit of counsel, illegal searches and seizures, travel 
     restrictions, enemy alien registration requirements, 
     employment restrictions, confiscation of property, and forced 
     evacuation from homes.
       (12) An explanation of why some Italian Americans were 
     subjected to civil liberties infringements, as a result of 
     Executive Order 9066, while other Italian Americans were not.
       (13) A review of the wartime restrictions on Italian 
     Americans to determine how civil liberties can be better 
     protected during national emergencies.

     SEC. 4. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of the Congress that--
       (1) the story of the treatment of Italian Americans during 
     World War II needs to be told in order to acknowledge that 
     these events happened, to remember those whose lives were 
     unjustly disrupted and whose freedoms were violated, to help 
     repair the damage to the Italian American community, and to 
     discourage the occurrence of similar injustices and 
     violations of civil liberties in the future;
       (2) Federal agencies, including the Department of Education 
     and the National Endowment for the Humanities, should support 
     projects such as--
       (A) conferences, seminars, and lectures to heighten 
     awareness of this unfortunate chapter in our Nation's 
     history;
       (B) the refurbishment of and payment of all expenses 
     associated with the traveling exhibit ``Una Storia Segreta'', 
     exhibited at

[[Page S14558]]

     major cultural and educational institutions throughout the 
     United States; and
       (C) documentaries to allow this issue to be presented to 
     the American public to raise its awareness;
       (3) an independent, volunteer advisory committee should be 
     established comprised of representatives of Italian American 
     organizations, historians, and other interested individuals 
     to assist in the compilation, research, and dissemination of 
     information concerning the treatment of Italian Americans; 
     and
       (4) after completion of the report required by this Act, 
     financial support should be provided for the education of the 
     American public through the production of a documentary film 
     suited for public broadcast.

     SEC. 5. FORMAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

       The United States Government formally acknowledges that 
     these events during World War II represented a fundamental 
     injustice against Italian Americans.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. MOYNIHAN (for himself and Mr. Schumer):
  S. 1910. A bill to amend the Act establishing Women's Rights National 
Historical Park to permit the Secretary of the Interior to acquire 
title in fee simple to the Hunt House located in Waterloo, New York; to 
the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.


             hunt house purchase authorization legislation

   Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I rise to introduce a bill that 
would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to purchase the Hunt 
House in Seneca Falls, New York. This summer the owners of the Hunt 
House put it on the market for $135,000. Of four historic buildings in 
Seneca Falls that should be part of the Women's Rights National 
Historical Park, the Hunt House is the only one that is not. It was the 
site of the gathering of five women (the founding mothers, you might 
say) who decided to hold the Nation's first women's rights convention. 
That convention took place in Seneca Falls in July, 1848. The Women's 
Rights Park is a monument to the idea they espoused that summer, that 
women should have equal rights with men; one of the most influential 
ideas of the last 150 years.
  Adding the Hunt House to the Park would complete it. The problem is 
that the Department was not given the authorization to purchase the 
Hunt House in the bill I offered 20 years ago so that speculation would 
not drive up the price of the house when it eventually went on the 
market. That worked. But now the lack of an authorization should not 
keep us from being able to acquire the house at all. This bill simply 
removes the restriction against a fee simple purchase by the Park 
Service. I hope my colleagues will offer their support, and I ask that 
the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
  The bill follows:

                                S. 1910

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. ACQUISITION OF HUNT HOUSE.

       (a) In General.--Section 1601(d) of Public Law 97-607 (94 
     Stat. 3547; 16 U.S.C. 410ll(d)) is amended--
       (1) in the first sentence--
       (A) by inserting a period after ``park''; and
       (B) by striking the remainder of the sentence; and
       (2) by striking the last sentence.
       (b) Technical Corrections.--Section 1601(c)(8) of Public 
     Law 97-607 (94 Stat. 3547; 16 U.S.C. 410ll(c)(8)) is amended 
     by striking ``Williams'' and inserting ``Main''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. BREAUX (for himself, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Hollings, Mr. Shelby, 
        Mr. Kerry, Mr. Sessions, and Ms. Landrieu):
  S. 1911. A bill to conserve Atlantic highly migratory species of 
fish, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation.


                 ATLANTIC HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES ACT

 Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I rise today to send to the desk a 
bill that is called the Atlantic Highly Migratory Species Act of 1999. 
The legislation cosponsored by Senators Snowe, Hollings, Shelby, Kerry, 
Sessions and Landrieu results from a far reaching conservation 
agreement among four key recreational and commercial fishing 
organizations. These organizations include the Billfish Foundation, the 
Coastal Conservation Association, the American Sportfishing Association 
and the Blue Water Fishermen's Association.
  The legislation will prohibit pelagic long line fishing for 
designated months each year in U.S. waters determined to be swordfish 
nursery and billfish bycatch areas based on extensive analyses of the 
best available science. Based upon the effectiveness of this type of 
management strategy in other U.S. fisheries, I am optimistic about the 
benefits that can come from the legislation.
  Mr. President, the legislation has three major components that I 
would like to briefly outline.
  First, the bill would prohibit pelagic longline fishing for certain 
months each year in U.S. waters where swordfish and billfish are caught 
with other fish. Essentially, more than 160,000 square nautical miles 
in the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico would become a conservation 
area to rebuild populations of swordfish, sailfish, tuna, marlin and 
sharks.
  Recognizing the economic impact on commercial fishermen, the 
legislation provides a fair and equitable program for longline vessel 
owners who are adversely impacted by the fishing prohibition. Funding 
of the permit buyback program would come through a partnership of the 
recreational and commercial fishing industries and federal funds.
  The bill also directs the National Marine Fisheries Service to 
conduct a comprehensive research program in cooperation with the U.S. 
longline fleet to identify and test a variety of longline gear 
configurations to determine which are the most effective at reducing 
billfish bycatch in the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico.
  I believe that a true solution to the bycatch issue will require 
international cooperation. Ironically, next week the U.S. Commissioners 
to the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(ICCAT) will be meeting in Brazil to consider many challenging issues, 
including a rebuilding plan for the north Atlantic stock of swordfish.
  Under the bill we introduce today, we are taking a bold first step to 
address the problems in our own coastal waters. I am confident that 
this first step will serve as an example to the international community 
on focusing much needed attention to this important issue.
 Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise today to join my 
colleague, Senator Breaux, in introducing the Atlantic Highly Migratory 
Species Conservation Act of 1999. I am pleased to co-sponsor this 
legislative effort to promote conservation and bycatch reduction of 
small swordfish, billfish, and other highly migratory species.
  The Atlantic Highly Migratory Species Conservation Act would create 
time-area closures for pelagic longline fishing along 160,000 miles of 
the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico coasts. These closures include the 
three major spawning areas where a significant portion of juvenile 
swordfish and billfish bycatch mortality occurs. I am particularly 
pleased to see that these closures encompass the coastal waters of my 
home state of South Carolina and particularly a highly productive 
swordfish spawning and nursery ground, the Charleston Bump. In 
conjunction with the closures, the bill would reduce fishing capacity 
by retiring approximately 68 longline vessels from the commercial 
fishery through a fair and equitable program funded by the federal 
government and the recreational and commercial fishing industries. In 
addition, the Act would establish a research program, in conjunction 
with the National Marine Fisheries Service, to study longline gear and 
potential gear improvements. All too frequently we are forced to make 
fisheries management decisions with too little information; these 
research provisions will provide data crucial for management of highly 
migratory species.
  The current proposal results from arduous work and negotiation among 
commercial and recreational fishing groups including the Coastal 
Conservation Association, the American Sportsfishing Association, the 
Billfish Foundation, and the Blue Water Fisherman's Association. I 
commend these groups for their cooperation in developing this truly 
constructive conservation plan based on extensive analyses of the best 
available science. I also approve of their effort to make this bill 
consistent with the principles governing capacity reduction established 
in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.
  The introduction of the Atlantic Highly Migratory Species 
Conservation Act of 1999 couldn't come at a better time. Many of the 
highly migratory

[[Page S14559]]

species, including North Atlantic swordfish, are currently overfished. 
The National Marine Fisheries Service reports that billfish and some 
shark and tuna species are at all-time lows in abundance as a result of 
longline fishing bycatch and widespread disregard for international 
rules by commercial fishermen of other nations. The international 
management body for highly migratory species, the International 
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), recently 
expressed concern about the high catches and discards of small 
swordfish and emphasized that future gains in yield could accrue if 
fishing mortality on small fish could be reduced. Further, ICCAT 
encouraged member nations to consider alternative methods such as time/
area closures to aid rebuilding of highly migratory stocks. I commend 
Senator Breaux for attempting to establish such areas domestically, and 
hope that we can serve as a model for other nations.
  While this legislation can result in important conservation 
achievements, we must also employ other means to protect and rebuild 
our highly migratory species such as swordfish. Next week, ICCAT will 
convene in Rio de Janero, Brazil to determine new international 
management measures for Atlantic swordfish. The United States must 
supplement Senator Breaux's proposal by securing an agreement at ICCAT 
that will reduce catches by all member nations sufficient to allow the 
North Atlantic swordfish population to recover within ten years or 
less--a goal that scientists tell us can only be achieved if we count 
discarded dead swordfish against the catch quotas. In addition, I am 
certain that Senator Breaux's effort to reduce bycatch and establish 
time-area closures will serve as a powerful example to the 
international community of a responsible method for sustaining and 
restoring highly migratory species.
  I applaud my colleague and the other architects of this ambitious 
conservation effort and look forward to working with Senator Breaux and 
other cosponsors to ensure that this legislation is part of an 
effective national plan that ensures recovery of the North Atlantic 
swordfish stock within 10 years in a manner consistent with the goals 
of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
 Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I rise today to co-sponsor a bill 
introduced by Mr. Breaux, that is called the Atlantic Highly Migratory 
Species Act of 1999.
  This legislation closes large areas to longline gear, including the 
important spawning areas where juvenile bycatch of swordfish and other 
billfish species are the highest. This legislation will also provide a 
fair and equitable program for longline vessel owners who are adversely 
impacted by the fishing prohibition. Funding of the permit buyback 
program would come through a partnership of the recreational and 
commercial fishing industries and federal funds. Lastly, this 
legislation directs the National Marine Fisheries Service to conduct a 
comprehensive research program in cooperation with the U.S. longline 
fleet to identify and test a variety of longline gear configurations to 
determine which are the most effective at reducing billfish bycatch in 
the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico.
  We are introducing this legislation at an important time. It will 
serve as an example to show the international community at next week's 
negotiations in Brazil, at the International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), that the U.S. embraces use of 
time-area closures to help swordfish recover.
  I believe that this legislation will serve as one prong, of a two-
prong U.S. strategy in international negotiations on swordfish quotas 
that ensures the total mortality of swordfish, including discards, is 
limited to levels that will allow the stock to recover in 10 years.
  I look forward to working with Mr. Breaux and other cosponsors of the 
bill to ensure that this legislation is both consistent with the 
principles of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and part of an effective 
national plan to ensure recovery of the North Atlantic swordfish stock 
within 10 years.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. FRIST (for himself, Mr. McCain, and Mr. Bingaman):
  S. 1912. A bill to facilitate the growth of electronic commerce and 
enable the electronic commerce market to continue its current growth 
rate and realize its full potential, to signal strong support of the 
electronic commerce market by promoting its use within Federal 
government agencies and small and medium-sized businesses, and for 
other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation.


            the electronic commerce technology promotion act

 Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the 
Electronic Commerce Technology Promotion Act. I am very pleased to be 
joined by Senators McCain and Bingaman.
  Electronic commerce has fundamentally changed the way we do business, 
promising increased efficiency and improved quality at lower cost. It 
has been widely embraced by industry, both in the United States and 
abroad. This is evident in the growth of the electronic commerce 
market, which though almost non-existent just a few years ago, is 
expected to top a staggering $1 trillion by 2003, according to market 
research reports.
  The basis for the growth of electronic commerce is the potential that 
electronic transactions can be completed seamlessly and simultaneously, 
regardless of geographical boundaries. Inherent in this is the ability 
of different systems to communicate and exchange data, commonly 
referred to as ``system interoperability''. The continued growth of 
global electronic commerce depends on a fundamental set of technical 
standards that enable essential technologies to interoperate, and on a 
policy and legal framework that supports the development that the 
market demands in a timely manner.
  The United States is leading this global revolution. Our industries 
are at the forefront in every sector, continually evolving their 
businesses and developing new technologies to adapt to changing market 
needs. Continued growth of the overall electronic commerce market is 
vital to our economy as well as the global market.
  For the electronic commerce market to sustain its current phenomenal 
growth rate, companies must be allowed to be agile and flexible in 
responding to market needs, their activities unfettered by cumbersome 
and static regulations. The federal government must allow the private 
sector to continue to take the lead in developing this dynamic global 
market, and refrain from undue regulatory measures wherever possible.
  At the same time, the federal government must unambiguously signal 
its strong desire to promote and facilitate the growth of the 
electronic commerce market by adopting and deploying relevant 
electronic commerce technologies within the federal agencies, as well 
as widely promoting their use by small and medium-sized enterprises.
  Usage of these technologies in the federal agencies enables us to 
share in the benefits of the electronic commerce revolution and 
participate more effectively as an active contributor in the private 
sector efforts to develop the frameworks and specifications necessary 
for systems and components to interoperate. This has the added 
advantage of allowing the government to intercede in a timely manner, 
either in failure conditions or to remove barriers erected by foreign 
governments. Furthermore, we would be strengthening our global 
leadership position, while at the same time establishing a model for 
other governments and enabling the growth of the global electronic 
commerce market.
  Small and medium-sized businesses have traditionally been the fastest 
growing segment of our economy, contributing more than 50 percent of 
the private sector output in the United States. Electronic commerce has 
the potential to enable these enterprises to enter the market with 
lower entry costs, yet extend their reach to a much larger market. The 
federal government has an inherent interest in helping them to maintain 
their global competitiveness.
  It is in response to these needs that I introduce today the 
Electronic Commerce Technology Promotion Act. The legislation 
establishes a Center of Excellence for Electronic Commerce at the 
National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) that will act 
as a centralized resource of information for federal agencies and small 
and medium-sized businesses in electronic commerce technologies and 
issues. My

[[Page S14560]]

intention is not to create yet another program at NIST which will 
require substantial appropriations, but to create an office that 
focuses solely on electronic commerce by building upon existing 
expertise and resources. We have proposed that the Center be organized 
as a matrix organization that will coordinate existing as well as 
future activities at the Institute on electronic commerce.
  The Center will also coordinate its activities with the Department of 
Commerce's Manufacturing Extension Program (MEP) and the Small Business 
Administration to provide assistance to small and medium-sized 
enterprises on issues related to the deployment and use of electronic 
commerce technologies, including developing training modules and 
software toolkits. In working jointly, the Center can build upon the 
existing MEP infrastructure to reach out to these businesses. It is 
important to note that my intention is not to enlarge or modify the 
charter of the MEP program.
  Mr. President, I believe that the growth of the electronic commerce 
market is vital to our economic growth. It is our responsibility to 
facilitate this growth as well as do our best to enable the market to 
sustain its current phenomenal growth rate. Therefore, I urge my 
colleagues to support timely passage of this legislation so that we can 
give our unambiguous support for the development of electronic commerce 
as a market-driven phenomenon, and signal our strong desire to promote 
and facilitate the growth of the electronic commerce market.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I am very pleased to join Senators Frist 
and McCain today in introducing the ``Electronic Commerce Technology 
Promotion Act.'' This bill, which sets up a center of Excellence in 
Electronic Commerce at the National Institutes of Standards and 
Technology, or NIST, is a solid step towards adapting an important 
federal agency to the digital economy we see blooming around us.
  NIST was established in 1901 as the National Bureau of Standards 
during a time of tremendous industrial development, when technology 
became a key driver of our economic growth. Making those technologies 
literally fit together reliably through standards became crucial, and 
Congress realized that one key to sustaining our industrial growth and 
the quality of our products would be a federal laboratory devoted to 
developing standards. The Bureau of Standards is a classic example of 
how the federal government can support technical progress that 
undergirds economic growth and enables the competitive marketplace to 
work.
  Around ten years ago, Congress modified the Bureau's charter in 
response to the problems of the 1980's, increasing its focus on 
competitiveness, adding efforts like the highly regarded Manufacturing 
Extension Program (MEP), and changing the name to NIST. Turning to the 
challenges of today's growing digital economy, this bill makes NIST a 
focal point in the federal government for promoting electronic commerce 
throughout our economy by establishing a Center of Excellence in 
Electronic Commerce there. While the challenges of making things fit 
together in a digital economy are different--and now go under the un-
melodic term ``interoperability''--they are just as crucial as they 
were in the industrial economy of 1901. And, NIST remains an excellent 
place to lead the work.
  I'm particularly pleased that this bill includes the fundamental idea 
behind my bill S. 1494, the Electronic Commerce Extension Establishment 
Act of 1999. That is, NIST ought to lead an electronic commerce 
extension program or service to provide small businesses with low cost, 
impartial technical advice on how to enter and succeed in e-commerce. 
This service will help ensure that small businesses in every part of 
the nation fully participate in the unfolding e-commerce revolution 
through a well-proven policy tool--a service analogous to the 
Department of Agriculture's Cooperative Extension Service and NIST's 
own MEP. I believe such a service would help both small businesses and 
our entire economy as the productivity enhancements from e-commerce are 
spread more rapidly, and I recently asked Secretary Daley for a report 
on how such a service should work. So, I thank Senator Frist for 
including my basic policy idea in his bill and look forward to working 
with him to flesh it out, particularly in light of the report we should 
get from the Commerce Department.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to join Senators Frist, McCain, 
and myself in supporting this bill, as one step the Congress can take 
to make sure an important federal agency, NIST, continues its strong 
tradition of helping our economy--our growing digital economy--to be 
the most competitive in the world.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. LOTT (for Mr. McCain (for himself and Mr. Kyl)):
  S. 1913. A bill to amend the Act entitled ``An act relating to the 
water rights of the Ak-Chin Indian Community'' to clarify certain 
provisions concerning the leasing of such water rights, and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on Indian Affairs.


       The Ak-Chin Water Rights Settlement Act Amendments of 1999

 Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise on behalf of myself and my 
colleague, Senator Kyl, to offer legislation that will make an 
important clarification to the Ak-Chin Water Rights Settlement Act of 
1984. Similar legislation has been introduced in the House by 
Representative Shadegg.
  Let me explain why this legislation is necessary.
  In 1992, Congress amended the Ak-Chin Water Rights Settlement Act to 
allow the Ak-Chin Indian Community to enter into leases of the 
Community's water for a term not to exceed 100 years. On December 15, 
1994, the Ak-Chin Indian Community entered into an agreement with the 
Del Webb Corporation to allow the company the option to lease up to 
10,000 acre-feet of water for a period of 100 years from the date the 
option was exercised. Del Webb exercised the option on December 6, 
1996, with a principal objective of providing a water supply for its 
development of a master-planned community in the Phoenix area.
  However, since 1995, the State of Arizona, through its Department of 
Water Resources, has required certificates of assured water supply for 
100 years for developments within the Phoenix Active Management Area. 
The 100-year assured water supply requirement is one of the key tenets 
of Arizona's water resource management. A certificate cannot be 
obtained unless a developer demonstrates that sufficient groundwater, 
surface water or adequate quality effluent will be continuously 
available to satisfy the proposed use of the development for at least 
100 years.
  Unfortunately, the lease as signed in 1996 has now matured for three 
years without the actual application to the Arizona Department of Water 
Resources for a certificate of assured water supply. The Arizona 
Department of Water Resources advised the company that it interprets 
its regulations to require Del Webb to demonstrate that water leased 
under the agreement with the Community will be available for a period 
of 100 years from the date each certificate issued. Under ADWR's 
interpretation, if Del Webb applies for a certificate of assured water 
supply on December 6, 1999, it must show that water will be available 
under the lease agreement until December 6, 2099. However, because Del 
Webb exercised its option in 1996, the lease agreement between Del Webb 
and the Community will expire on December 6, 2096, and will not meet 
the State's test of continuing legal and physical availability of water 
supply. Moreover, the Community does not have statutory authority to 
grant leases with terms in excess of 100 years.
  To resolve this unanticipated conflict, the affected parties have 
agreed that what is required is a simple modification to the Ak-Chin 
Water Rights Settlement Act of 1984 to allow the extension of leasing 
authority to include options to lease and renew or extend existing 
leases. This change will allow the Ak-Chin Indian Community to extend 
or renew the existing lease to Del Webb for a cumulative term that 
would expire more than 100 years from today.
  Mr. President, this legislation will make a technical change to the 
Ak-Chin Water Rights Settlement Act in order for the Ak-Chin/Del Webb 
agreement to be in compliance with State law. All parties and interests 
directly impacted by this lease agreement are

[[Page S14561]]

supportive of this amendment. Therefore, it is our hope that we can 
move this legislation quickly.
  I ask to include a complete text of the legislation in the Record.
  The bill follows:

                                S. 1913

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY.

       The Constitutional authority for this Act rests in article 
     I, section 8, authorizing Congress to ``regulate Commerce 
     with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
     the Indian tribes''.

     SEC. 2. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO AK-CHIN WATER USE ACT OF 
                   1984.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Ak-
     Chin Water Use Amendments Act of 1999''.
       (b) Authorization of Use of Water.--Section 2(j) of the Act 
     of October 19, 1984 (Public Law 98-530; 98 Stat. 2698) is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(j)(1) The Ak-Chin Indian Community (hereafter in this 
     subsection referred to as the `Community') shall have the 
     right to devote the permanent water supply provided for by 
     this Act to any use, including agricultural, municipal, 
     industrial, commercial, mining, recreational, or other 
     beneficial use, in the areas initially designated as the 
     Pinal, Phoenix, and Tucson Active Management Areas pursuant 
     to the Arizona Groundwater Management Act of 1980, laws 1980, 
     fourth special session, chapter 1. The Community is 
     authorized to lease or enter into options to lease, to renew 
     options to lease, to extend the initial terms of leases for 
     the same or a lesser term as the initial term of the lease, 
     to renew leases for the same or a lesser term as the initial 
     term of the lease, to exchange or temporarily dispose of 
     water to which it is entitled for the beneficial use in the 
     areas initially designated as the Pinal, Phoenix, and Tucson 
     Active Management Areas pursuant to the Arizona Groundwater 
     Management Act of 1980, laws 1980, fourth special session, 
     chapter 1.
       ``(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the initial term of 
     any lease entered into under this subsection shall not exceed 
     100 years and the Community may not permanently alienate any 
     water right. In the event the Community leases, enters into 
     an option to lease, renews an option to lease, extends a 
     lease, renews a lease, or exchanges or temporarily disposes 
     of water, such action shall only be valid pursuant to a 
     contract that has been accepted and ratified by a resolution 
     of the Ak-Chin Indian Community Council and approved and 
     executed by the Secretary.''.
       (c) Approval of Lease and Amendment of Lease.--The option 
     and lease agreement among the Ak-Chin Indian Community, the 
     United States, and Del Webb Corporation, dated as of December 
     14, 1996, and the Amendment Number One thereto among the Ak-
     Chin Indian Community, the United States, and Del Webb 
     Corporation, dated as of January 7, 1999, are hereby ratified 
     and approved. The Secretary of the Interior is hereby 
     authorized and directed to execute Amendment Number One, and 
     the restated agreement as provided for in Amendment Number 
     One, not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. MACK (for himself and Mrs. Hutchison):
  S. 1914. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide 
for the creation of disaster protection funds by property and casualty 
insurance companies for the payment of policyholders' claims arising 
from future catastrophic events; to the Committee on Finance.


                  policyholder disaster protection act

 Mr. MACK. Mr. President, I rise today to address a problem 
that ought to be a concern to all of us: natural disasters and the 
exposure of the private insurance industry to catastrophic risks. In my 
state of Florida, we have a particular concern about hurricane risk, 
but many areas of the country are exposed to the risks of other major 
catastrophes--whether they be volcanoes, earthquakes or tornadoes. 
Increasingly, I am concerned about the state of the private insurance 
industry and its ability to withstand a major catastrophe--a 
catastrophe of Hurricane Andrew size ($15 billion in insured losses) or 
greater.
  Today, I am introducing legislation to help address this problem and 
strengthen disaster protection for homeowners and businesses while 
protecting the interests of the taxpayer. I am pleased my friend from 
Texas, Senator Hutchison, has joined me in this effort. I believe our 
approach is an innovative, private-sector solution to the problem of 
catastrophic risk and I encourage my colleagues to review this proposal 
carefully.
  Consumers of property and casualty insurance must be able to rely on 
their insurers for protection against the risk of catastrophic loss. 
However, protection for policyholders in today's system is weak; a 
major future catastrophe could leave consumers without protection and--
if past experience is any indication--the government would intervene to 
ensure the people in the disaster areas receive timely compensation. It 
is important to note that current law actually poses a disincentive for 
insurers to set aside special reserves for catastrophic events. Any 
money set aside to cover potential risk is considered taxable income. 
To fix this flaw in America's insurance system, we need to provide 
incentives for insurers to set aside a portion of their policy premiums 
in secure reserve funds that will be available to meet policyholder 
needs in the event of future catastrophes. Our bill does just that.
  The typical property and casualty insurance company in the United 
States is exposed to multiple forms of catastrophic risk. This risk can 
take the form of major disasters that occur only once in a decade or 
once in several decades (e.g., severe earthquakes, major hurricanes). 
These can also be in the form of localized natural disasters (e.g., 
tornadoes, wildfires, floods, winter storms) that cause unusually large 
policyholder losses in a region and imperil the ability of smaller 
insurance companies to help their policyholders in the area.
  The nation's exposure to these large natural disasters is staggering. 
While millions of families and small businesses rely on insurance 
payments to recover from natural disasters, it is important to remember 
that--under our current insurance tax and regulatory systems--many 
private insurers may not be able to pay all claims arising from a major 
disaster. Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge Earthquake opened our 
eyes to the country's massive exposure to catastrophic losses. Insured 
losses in my state from Hurricane Andrew exceeded $15 billion. But if 
this storm had passed over Miami, rather than Homestead just 40 miles 
south, insured losses could have reached $50 billion, leaving the 
Florida economy crippled and more than a third of all insurers in that 
market insolvent.
  There is always the potential for a major disaster in any given year 
in the United States. Estimates of insured losses from highly probable 
events range from about $75 billion in California and Florida to $100 
billion or more in areas of the Midwest. The Gulf, Intermountain West, 
and Atlantic states all face exposures of approximately $20 billion or 
more.
  Unfortunately, our current system of tax laws and accounting rules 
work against consumers and taxpayers because they discourage private 
market preparation for future major disasters. Present tax laws do not 
permit portions of consumers' insurance policy payments to be set aside 
and tax deferred in order to provide for the risk of truly catastrophic 
loss events. Ironically, our tax system allows insurers to set aside 
funds on a tax-deductible basis to address disasters that have already 
happened but it gives them no incentive to prepare for those major 
disasters that have not yet happened.
  Policyholder premiums needed to fund policyholders' catastrophic 
losses in future years are subject to current tax if not used in a 
particular year. This diminishes the power of insurers to protect 
policyholders against future losses. This structure is inadequate for 
assuring that property-casualty policies will protect consumers from 
future major catastrophic losses.
  The tax law should be revised in order to make accommodation for 
disaster protection reserves and bring about a more practical, and 
sensible, system for insurance companies and consumers.
  Under the Policyholder Disaster Protection Act, insurers could set 
aside portions of policyholder payments in a tax-deferred disaster 
protection fund. Amounts from this fund used to pay for losses from a 
major disaster would be subject to taxation. This concept is similar to 
programs presently in place in many other developed countries.
  I believe this legislation would result in greater stability for 
insurers providing catastrophic coverage and fewer insolvencies after a 
major disaster. A recent study by a major U.S. accounting firm 
determined that approximately $21 billion in pre-funded reserves would 
be accumulated within the first ten years of the program.

[[Page S14562]]

Also, the tax incentive in the bill will encourage insurers to serve 
disaster-prone areas in a responsible manner by setting aside funds to 
pay for major losses.
  The treatment of the fund by insurers would be closely regulated. 
Following is a general description of the provisions of the bill:
  Insurers would be able to set aside special tax-deferred reserves to 
cover potential catastrophic events.
  The maximum amount any insurer could set aside in a given year would 
be determined by reference to each insurance company's exposure to the 
risk of catastrophic loss events.
  Deductible contributions to disaster protection funds would be 
voluntary, but would be irrevocable once made (except to the extent of 
``drawdowns'' for actual catastrophic loss events, or drawdowns 
otherwise required by state insurance regulators). No company could use 
these funds to shelter income from taxation.
  The maximum allowable reserve for any given company will increase or 
decrease as they enter or exit lines of business that pose catastrophic 
risk.
  Insurers would only be allowed to drawdown the disaster reserves if 
the loss event in question is declared an emergency or disaster by 
certain recognized bodies or government officials (for example, a 
disaster declared by the President under the Stafford Act) and that 
losses in a year exceed the specified high level. The amounts 
distributed from the fund are added to company's taxable income for the 
year in which the drawdown occurred.
  Insurance companies would pay taxes on income generated when funds in 
the disaster reserve are invested. This income would be distributed out 
of the fund to the insurance company and taxed to the company on a 
current basis.
  The maximum reserve (or ``cap'') would be phased in at the rate of 
five percent per year over 20 years. Industry estimates indicate 
private reserves of $40 billion would be built up over this time.
  Various concepts to address the problem of catastrophic losses have 
been proposed over the years. I look forward to working with all of my 
colleagues to craft a comprehensive solution to both the short-term and 
long-term problems presented by the risk of catastrophic disasters. In 
my view, the private-sector focus of this bill, which puts a 
strengthened private insurance market for consumers in the forefront of 
disaster protection, is an approach designed to ensure disaster relief 
is efficient and cost-effective for taxpayers. While the federal 
government may still need to provide last-resort safety net for 
disaster victims, it is important to do what we can to ensure private 
insurance is available, affordable and secure for those citizens in 
those areas of the country at risk to a catastrophic disaster. This 
bill will help to bring precisely that availability, affordability and 
security to insurance policyholders throughout the country, and I 
believe it is worthy of support and consideration.
  The bill we're introducing today mirrors a bill introduced by 
Congressman Foley and Matsui in the House of Representatives. It is 
also supported by taxpayer, homeowner, consumer, business and emergency 
service organizations, as well as local and state policy makers and 
insurance organizations. I believe it is a sensible approach and I hope 
my colleagues will join me in this effort.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. JEFFORDS (for himself, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Murkowski, Mr. 
        Schumer, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Burns, and Mr. Reid):
  S. 1915. A bill to enhance the services provided by the Environmental 
Protection Agency to small communities that are attempting to comply 
with national, State, and local environmental regulations; to the 
Committee on Environment and Public Works.


                 small committee assistance act of 1999

  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, for years small communities across the 
United States have labored to meet environmental regulations written 
for major cities. They have struggled unduly with complicated 
regulations designed for Chicago or Los Angeles. Today I am introducing 
legislation designed to end this problem: the Small Community 
Assistance Act of 1999.
  We who live in small towns such as my home town of Shrewsbury, 
Vermont are proud of our community and our environment. We want to 
comply with reasonable health and environmental standards in order to 
leave a healthy legacy for our children. But we do not have the staff 
or financial capacity of larger communities to respond to far-reaching 
regulations. We are concerned about standards written without 
consideration for the special circumstances small towns in America 
face. While we recognize the importance of environmental regulations in 
safeguarding our air and water, we need the ability to respond 
intelligently to local priorities and needs. We want to comply with 
environmental regulations, but we need some flexibility in order to 
comply in a reasonable manner. We do not want preferential treatment, 
we want treatment that recognizes our unique size and fiscal situation.
  In 1991, I authored the Small Town Environmental Planning Act. This 
act passed overwhelmingly in the House and Senate and was signed into 
law by President Bush in 1992. This act mandated that the Environmental 
Protection Agency give more assistance to small towns. It created a 
task force comprised of representatives from small communities across 
the nation. These small town representatives developed a list of ways 
in which the EPA can better help small towns enjoy and maintain a 
healthy environment.
  It is now time to take their advice. The Small Community Assistance 
Act of 1999 will give much needed assistance to small towns and 
communities in Vermont and across the nation. This bill will give small 
communities more input into the regulatory review process, clearer and 
simpler environmental guidelines, and more assistance in meeting 
environmental obligations.
  This legislation acts on the recommendations of people from small 
communities throughout the United Stats. Small community members 
provided the impetus for this bill, helped write the bill itself, and 
provided numerous helpful comments. To these small community members I 
offer my sincere appreciation. I would especially like to thank the 
members of EPA's Small Community Advisory Subcommittee for all of their 
help, and I thank the committee for its unanimous endorsement of this 
bill.
  I would like to thank the original cosponsors of this bill, Senators 
Crapo, Murkowski, Schumer, Harkin, Bryan, Burns, and Reid. Their 
leadership on this bill underscores their dedication to helping people 
in our small towns. I urge every one of my colleagues to cosponsor this 
bill. Together, we can improve the quality of life and further 
environmental protections in our small communities nationwide.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I am pleased to join today with a 
geographically and politically diverse group of Senators to introduce 
the Small Community Assistance Act of 1999. I commend Senator Jeffords 
for investing his time and energy in developing this important 
legislation. This Small Community Assistance Act will help ensure that 
small towns all across America are included in a combined local, state, 
and national effort to protect the environment.
  This bill would help increase communications and cooperation between 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and smaller communities. By 
establishing a Small Town Ombudsman Office in each of EPA's regions, 
this bill will ensure that communities with less than 7500 residents 
have improved access to the technical expertise and information that 
are necessary for small towns to cost effectively protect the quality 
of their air and water and their citizens' health.
  By incorporating the perspectives of a Small Community Advisory 
Committee early in the development of EPA's environmental policies, 
this bill will improve the working relationship between small towns and 
EPA and ultimately strengthen environmental protection.
  The Small Community Advisory Committee will build on the valuable 
work already done by EPA's Small Community Task Force, which includes 
representatives of towns, governmental agencies, and public interest 
groups from across the country. Cherie Aiazzi of Carlin, a town of 
about 2800 people in northern Nevada, contributed

[[Page S14563]]

her time, insight and creativity to this task force and I know that 
perspectives of rural towns across the country are better understood as 
a result of her efforts.
  By coincidence of history and geography Nevada is a state with more 
small towns than big cities. In our efforts to enhance the quality of 
life for all Nevadans, it is crucial that small communities play an 
important role in the development and achievement of our environmental 
goals. The Small Community Assistance Act of 1999 provides an valuable 
opportunity for small towns to contribute to and benefit from this 
important effort.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. FEINGOLD:
  S. 1917. A bill to abolish the death penalty under Federal law; to 
the Committee on the Judiciary.


            THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY ABOLITION ACT OF 1999

 Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the 
Federal Death Penalty Abolition Act of 1999. This bill will abolish the 
death penalty at the federal level. It will put an immediate halt to 
executions and forbid the imposition of the death penalty as a sentence 
for violations of federal law.
  Since the beginning of this year, this Chamber has echoed with debate 
on violence in America. We've heard about violence in our schools and 
neighborhoods. Some say it's because of the availability of guns to 
minors. Some say Hollywood has contributed to a culture of violence. 
Others argue that the roots of the problem are far deeper and more 
complex. Whatever the causes, a culture of violence has certainly 
infected our nation. As schoolhouse killings have shown, our children 
now can be reached by that culture of violence. And they aren't just 
casual observers; some of them are active participants and many have 
been victims.
  But, Mr. President, I'm not so sure that we in government don't 
contribute to this casual attitude we sometimes see toward killing and 
death. With each new death penalty statute enacted and each execution 
carried out, our executive, judicial and legislative branches, at both 
the state and federal level, add to a culture of violence and killing. 
With each person executed, we're teaching our children that the way to 
settle scores is through violence, even to the point of taking a human 
life.
  At the same time, the public debate on the death penalty, which was 
an intense national debate not very long ago, is muted. As the online 
magazine Slate recently noted, with crime rates down and incomes up, 
``unspeakable crimes are no longer spoken of, murder is what happens to 
your portfolio on a bad day, `family values' are debated through the 
Internal Revenue code, and the `death penalty' is [often used as a term 
for] a tax issue.'' What has happened to our nation's sense of striving 
to do what we know to be the right thing? Those who favor the death 
penalty should be pressed to explain why fallible human beings should 
presume to use the power of the state to extinguish the life of a 
fellow human being on our collective behalf. Those who oppose the death 
penalty should demand that explanation adamantly, and at every turn. 
But only a zealous few try.
  Our nation is a great nation. We have the strongest democracy in the 
world. We have expended blood and treasure to protect so many 
fundamental human rights at home and abroad and not always for only our 
own interests. But we can do better. Mr. President, we should do 
better. And we should use this moment to do better as we step not only 
into a new century but also a new millennium, the first such landmark 
since the depths of the Middle Ages.
  Courtesy of the Internet and CNN International, the world observes, 
perplexed and sometimes horrified, the violence in our nation. When the 
Littleton tragedy erupted, newspapers all over the world marveled at 
how readily available guns are to American children. And across the 
globe, with every American who is executed, the entire world watches 
and asks how can the Americans, the champions of human rights, 
compromise their own professed beliefs in this way.
  Religious groups and leaders express their revulsion at the continued 
practice of capital punishment. Pope John Paul II frequently appeals to 
American governors when a death row inmate is about to die. I am 
pleased that in a recent case, involving an inmate on death row in 
Missouri, the Missouri governor heeded the good advice of the pontiff 
and commuted the killer's sentence to life without parole. That case 
generated a lot of press--but only as a political issue, rather than a 
moral question or a human rights challenge.
  But the Pope is not standing alone against the death penalty. He is 
joined by the chorus of voices of various people of faith who abhor the 
death penalty. Religious groups from the National Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, the United Methodist Church, the Presbyterian Church, 
the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the Mennonites, the Central 
Conference of American Rabbis, and so many more people of faith have 
proclaimed their opposition to capital punishment. And, I might add, 
even conservative Pat Robertson protested the execution in 1998 of 
Karla Faye Tucker, a born-again Christian on Texas death row. Mr. 
President, I would like to see the commutation of sentences to life 
without parole for all death row inmates--whether they are Christians, 
Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, or some other faith, or no faith at all.
  The United States' casual imposition of capital punishment is 
abhorrent not only to many people of faith. Our use of the death 
penalty also stands in stark contrast to the majority of nations that 
have abolished the death penalty in law or practice. Even Russia and 
South Africa--nations that for years were symbols of egregious 
violations of basic human rights and liberties--have seen the error of 
the use of the death penalty. The United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights has called for a worldwide moratorium on the use of the death 
penalty. And soon, Italy and other European nations are expected to 
introduce a resolution in the UN General Assembly calling for a 
worldwide moratorium.
  The European Union denies membership in their alliance to those 
nations that use the death penalty. In fact, the European Union 
recently warned Turkey that if it executes the Kurdish leader, Abdullah 
Ocalan, Turkey would jeopardize its membership application. Just this 
past December, the European Union actually passed a resolution calling 
for the immediate and unconditional global abolition of the death 
penalty, and it specifically called on all states within the United 
States to abolish the death penalty. This is significant because it 
reflects the unanimous view of the nations with which the United States 
enjoys its closest relationships--nations that so often follow our 
lead.
  Mr. President, what is even more troubling in the international 
context is that the United States is now one of only six countries that 
imposes the death penalty for crimes committed by children. I'll repeat 
that because it is remarkable. We are one of only six nations on this 
earth that puts to death people who were under 18 years of age when 
they committed their crimes. The others are Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria, 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen. These are countries that are often criticized 
for human rights abuses. And let's look at the numbers. Since 1990, the 
United States has executed ten child offenders. That's more than any 
one of these five other countries and equal to all five countries 
combined. Even China --the country that many members of Congress, 
including myself, have criticized for its human rights violations--
apparently has the decency not to execute its children. This is 
embarrassing. Is this the kind of company we want to keep? Is this the 
kind of world leader we want to be? But these are the facts for this 
past decade, 1990 to the present.
  Now, let's look at the last two years. In the last two years, the 
United States has been the only nation in the world to put to death 
people who were minors when they committed their crimes. We have 
executed four child offenders during the last two years. Today, over 70 
child offenders remain on death row. No one, Mr. President, no one can 
reasonably argue that based on this data, executing child offenders is 
a normal or acceptable practice in the world community. And I 
don't think we should be proud of the fact that the United States is 
the world leader in the execution of child offenders.

  Is the death penalty a deterrent for our children's conduct, as well 
as that

[[Page S14564]]

of adult Americans? For those who believe capital punishment is a 
deterrent, they are sadly, sadly mistaken. The federal government and 
most states in the U.S. have a death penalty, while our European 
counterparts do not. Following the logic of death penalty supporters 
who believe it's a deterrent, you would think that our European allies, 
who don't use the death penalty, would have a higher murder rate than 
the United States. Yet, they don't and it's not even close. In fact, 
the murder rate in the U.S. is six times higher than the murder rate in 
Britain, seven times higher than in France, five times higher than in 
Australia, and five times higher than in Sweden.
  But we don't even need to look across the Atlantic to see that 
capital punishment has no deterrent effect on crime. Let's compare 
Wisconsin and Texas. I'm proud of the fact that my great state, 
Wisconsin, was the first state in this nation to abolish the death 
penalty completely, when it did so in 1853. Wisconsin has been death 
penalty-free for nearly 150 years. In contrast, Texas is the most 
prodigious user of the death penalty, having executed 192 people since 
1976. Let's look at the murder rate in Wisconsin and Texas. During the 
period 1995 to 1998, Texas has had a murder rate that is nearly double 
the murder rate in Wisconsin. This data alone calls into question the 
argument that the death penalty is a deterrent to murder.
  In fact, according to a 1995 Hart Research poll, the majority of our 
nation's police chiefs do not believe the death penalty is a 
particularly effective law enforcement tool. When asked to rank the 
various factors in reducing crime, police chiefs ranked the death 
penalty last. Rather, the police chiefs --the people who deal with 
hardened criminals day in and day out --cite reducing drug abuse as the 
primary factor in reducing crime, along with a better economy and jobs, 
simplifying court rules, longer prison sentences, more police officers, 
and reducing guns. It looks like most police chiefs recognize what our 
European allies and a few states like Wisconsin have known all along: 
the death penalty is not an effective deterrent.
  Mr. President, let me be clear. I believe murderers and other violent 
offenders should be severely punished. I'm not seeking to open the 
prison doors and let murderers come rushing out into our communities. I 
don't want to free them. The question is: should the death penalty be a 
means of punishment in our society? One of the most frequent refrains 
from death penalty supporters is the claim that the majority of 
Americans support the death penalty. It's repeated so often, everybody 
assumes it's true. Mr. President, the facts do not support this claim. 
Survey after survey, from around the country, shows that when offered 
sentencing alternatives, more Americans prefer life without parole plus 
restitution for the victim's family over the death penalty. For 
example, a 1993 national poll found that when offered alternatives to 
the death penalty, 44% of Americans supported the alternative of life 
without parole plus restitution over the death penalty. Only 41% 
preferred the death penalty and 15% were unsure. This is remarkable. 
Sure, if you ask Americans the simple, isolated question of whether 
they support the death penalty, a majority of Americans will agree. But 
if you ask them whether they support the death penalty or a realistic, 
practical alternative sentence like life without parole plus 
restitution, support for the death penalty falls dramatically to below 
50%. More Americans support the alternative sentence than Americans who 
support the death penalty.
  The fact that our society relies on killing as punishment is 
disturbing enough. Even more disturbing, however, is the fact that the 
States' and federal use of the death penalty is often not consistent 
with principles of due process, fairness and justice. These principles 
are the foundation of our criminal justice system and, in a broader 
sense, the stability of our nation. It is clearer than ever before that 
we have put innocent people on death row. In addition, those States 
that have the death penalty are more likely to put people to death for 
killing white victims than for killing black victims.
  Mr. President, are we certain that innocent persons are not being 
executed? Obviously not. Are we certain that racial bias is not 
infecting the criminal justice system and the administration of the 
death penalty? I doubt it.
  It simply cannot be disputed that we are sending innocent people to 
death. Since the modern death penalty was reinstated in the 1970s, we 
have released 79 men and women from death row. Why? Because they were 
innocent. Seventy-nine men and women sitting on death row, awaiting a 
firing squad, lethal injection or electrocution, but later found 
innocent. That's one death row inmate found innocent for every seven 
executed. One in seven! That's a pretty poor performance for American 
justice. A wrong conviction means that the real killer may have gotten 
away. The real killer may still be on the loose and a threat to 
society. What an injustice that the victims' loved ones cannot rest 
because the killer is still not caught. What an injustice that an 
innocent man or woman has to spend even one day in jail. What a 
staggering injustice that innocent people are sentenced to death for 
crimes they did not commit. What a disgrace when we carry out those 
sentences, actually taking the lives of innocent people in the name of 
justice.
  I call my colleagues' attention to the recent example of an Illinois 
death row inmate, Ronald Jones, who had been sentenced to death for the 
rape and murder of a Chicago woman. After a lengthy interrogation in 
which Mr. Jones was beaten by police, he signed a confession. As a 
class assignment, a group of Northwestern University journalism 
students researched the case of Ronald Jones. What did they learn? They 
learned that Mr. Jones was clearly innocent and not for some technical 
reason--he just didn't do it. As a result of the students' efforts, Mr. 
Jones was later exonerated based on DNA evidence. Mr. President, our 
criminal justice system sent an innocent man to death row. Mr. Jones 
was tried and convicted in a justice system that is sometimes far from 
just and that sometimes just gets it wrong. And Mr. Jones is not alone. 
In Illinois alone, three death row inmates so far this year have been 
proven innocent. Since 1987, Illinois has freed 12 inmates from death 
row because they were later found innocent.
  Innocent, Mr. President, and they were sitting on death row. 
Innocent, and yet they were about to be killed. Why? Because our 
criminal justice system is sometimes far from fair and far from just. 
We can all agree that it is profoundly wrong to convict and condemn 
innocent people to death. But sadly, that's what's happening. With the 
greater accuracy and sophistication of DNA testing available today 
compared to even a couple of years ago, states like Illinois are 
finding that people sitting on death row did not commit the crimes to 
which earlier, less accurate DNA tests appeared to link them. This DNA 
technology should be further reviewed and compared to other tests. We 
should consider the role of DNA tests in all those committed to death 
row.
  Some argue that the discovery of the innocence of a death row inmate 
proves that the system works. This is absurd. How can you say the 
criminal justice system works when a group of students--not lawyers or 
investigators but students with no special powers, who were very much 
outside the system--discover that a man about to be executed was in 
fact innocent? That's what happened in Illinois to Ronald Jones. The 
system doesn't work. It has failed us.
  A primary reason why justice has been less than just is a series of 
Supreme Court decisions that seem to fail to grasp the significance and 
responsibility of their task when a human life is at stake. The Supreme 
Court has been narrowly focused on procedural technicalities, ignoring 
the fact that the death penalty is a unique punishment that cannot be 
undone to correct mistakes. One disturbing decision was issued by the 
Supreme Court just a few months ago. In Jones v. United States, which 
involved an inmate on death row in Texas and the interpretation of the 
1994 Federal Death Penalty Act, the judge refused to tell the jury that 
if they deadlocked on the sentence, the law required the judge to 
impose a sentence of life without possibility of parole. As a result, 
some jurors were under the grave misunderstanding that lack of 
unanimity would mean the judge could give a sentence where the

[[Page S14565]]

defendant might one day go free. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the 
lower court's imposition of the death penalty. And one more person will 
lose a life, when a simple correction of a misunderstanding could have 
resulted in a severe yet morally correct sentence of life without 
parole.
  As legal scholar Ronald Dworkin recently observed, ``[t]he Supreme 
Court has become impatient, and super due process has turned into due 
process-lite. Its impatience is understandable, but is also 
unacceptable.'' Mr. President, America's impatience with the protracted 
appeals of death row inmates is understandable. But this impatience is 
unacceptable. The rush to judgment is unacceptable. And the rush to 
execute men, women and children who might well be innocent is 
horrifying.
  The discovery of the innocence of death row inmates and misguided 
Supreme Court decisions disallowing potentially dispositive exculpatory 
evidence, however, aren't the only reasons we need to abolish the death 
penalty. Another reason we need to abolish the death penalty is the 
continuing racism in our criminal justice system. Our nation is facing 
a crucial test. A test of moral and political will. We have come a long 
way through this nation's history, and especially in this century, to 
dismantle state-sponsored and societal racism. Brown v. Board of 
Education, ensuring the right to equal educational opportunities for 
whites and blacks, was decided only 45 years ago. Unfortunately, 
however, we are still living with vestiges of institutional racism. In 
some cases, racism can be found at every stage of a capital trial--in 
the selection of jurors, during the presentation of evidence, when the 
prosecutor contrasts the race of the victim and defendant to appeal to 
the prejudice of the jury, and sometimes during jury deliberations.
  After the 1976 Supreme Court Gregg decision upholding the use of the 
death penalty, the death penalty was first enacted as a sentence at the 
federal level with passage of the Drug Kingpin Statute in 1988. Since 
that time, numerous additional federal crimes have become death 
penalty-eligible, bringing the total to about 60 statutes today. At the 
federal level, 21 people have been sentenced to death. Another eight 
men sit on the military's death row. Of those 21 defendants on the 
federal government's death row, 14 are black and only 5 are white. One 
defendant is Hispanic and another Asian. That means 16 of the 21 people 
on federal death row are minorities. That's just over 75%. And the 
numbers are worse on the military's death row. Seven of the eight, or 
87.5%, on military death row are minorities.
  Some of my colleagues may remember the debates of the late 1980's and 
early 1990's, when Congress considered the Racial Justice Act and other 
attempts to eradicate racism in the use of capital punishment. A noted 
study evaluating the role of race in death penalty cases was frequently 
discussed. This was the study by David Baldus, a professor at the 
University of Iowa College of Law. The Baldus study found that 
defendants who kill white victims are more than four times more likely 
to be sent to death row than defendants who kill black victims. An 
argument against the Baldus study was made by some opponents of the 
Racial Justice Act. They argued that we just needed to ``level up'' the 
playing field. In other words, send all the defendants who killed black 
victims to death row, too. They argued that legislative remedies were 
not needed, just tell prosecutors and judges to go after perpetrators 
of black homicide as strongly as against perpetrators of white 
homicide.
  In theory, this may sound reasonable but one thing is clear: no 
matter how hard we try, we cannot overcome the inevitable fallibility 
of being human. That fallibility means that we will not be able to 
apply the death penalty in a fair and just manner. We will always run 
the risk that we will condemn innocent people to death. Mr. President, 
let's restore some certainty, fairness, and justice to our criminal 
justice system. Let's have the courage to recognize our human 
fallibilities. Let's put a halt to capital punishment.
  The American Bar Association agrees. In 1997, the American Bar 
Association called for a moratorium on the death penalty because it 
found that the application of the death penalty raises fairness and due 
process concerns. Several states are finally beginning to recognize the 
great injustice when the ultimate punishment is carried out in a biased 
and unfair way. Moratoriums have been considered by the legislatures of 
at least ten states over the last several months. The legislatures of 
Illinois and Nebraska have made the most progress. They actually passed 
moratorium measures earlier this year.
  I am glad to see that some states are finally taking steps to correct 
the practice of legalized killing that was again unleashed by the 
Supreme Court's Gregg decision in 1976. The first post-Gregg execution 
took place in 1977 in Utah, when Gary Gilmore did not challenge and 
instead aggressively sought his execution by a firing squad. The first 
post-Gregg involuntary execution took place on May 25, 1979. I vividly 
remember that day. I had just finished my last law school exam that 
morning. Later that day, I recall turning on the television and 
watching the news report that Florida had just executed John 
Spenkelink. I was overcome with a sickening feeling. Here I was, fresh 
out of law school and firm in my belief that our legal system was 
advancing through the latter quarter of the twentieth century. Instead, 
to my great dismay, I was witnessing a throwback to the electric chair, 
the gallows, and the routine executions of our nation's earlier 
history.
  Mr. President, I haven't forgotten that experience or what I thought 
and felt on that day. At the end of 1999, at the end of a remarkable 
century and millennium of progress, I cannot help but believe that our 
progress has been tarnished with our nation's not only continuing, but 
increasing use of the death penalty. As of today, the United States has 
executed 584 people since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 
1976. In those 23 years, there has been a sharp rise in the number of 
executions. This year the United States has already set a record for 
the most executions in our country in one year, 84--the latest 
execution being that of Thomas Lee Royal, Jr., who was executed by 
lethal injection just last night by the state of Virginia. And the year 
isn't even over yet. We are on track to hit close to 100 executions 
this year. This is astounding and it is embarrassing. We are a nation 
that prides itself on the fundamental principles of justice, liberty, 
equality and due process. We are a nation that scrutinizes the human 
rights records of other nations. We are one of the first nations to 
speak out against torture and killings by foreign governments. It is 
time for us to look in the mirror.
  Two former Supreme Court justices did just that. Justice Harry 
Blackmun penned the following eloquent dissent in 1994:
       From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the 
     machinery of death. For more than 20 years I have 
     endeavored--indeed, I have struggled--along with a majority 
     of this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules 
     that would lend more than the mere appearance of fairness to 
     the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle 
     the Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has 
     been achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel 
     morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that 
     the death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually 
     self-evident to me now that no combination of procedural 
     rules or substantive regulations ever can save the death 
     penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies. The 
     basic question--does the system accurately and consistently 
     determine which defendants ``deserve'' to die?--cannot be 
     answered in the affirmative. . . . The problem is that the 
     inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a 
     system that we know must wrongly kill some defendants, a 
     system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and 
     reliable sentences of death required by the Constitution.

  Justice Lewis Powell also had a similar change of mind. Justice 
Powell dissented from the Furman decision in 1972, which struck down 
the death penalty as a form of cruel and unusual punishment. He also 
wrote the decision in McCleskey v. Kemp in 1987, which denied a 
challenge to the death penalty on the grounds that it was applied in a 
discriminatory manner against African Americans. In 1991, however, 
Justice Powell told his biographer that he had decided that capital 
punishment should be abolished.
  After sitting on our nation's highest court for over 20 years, 
Justices Blackmun and Powell came to understand the randomness and 
unfairness of the death penalty. Mr. President, it is time for our 
nation to follow the lead of these two distinguished jurists and

[[Page S14566]]

re-visit its support for this form of punishment.
  At the end of 1999, as we enter a new millennium, our society is 
still far from fully just. The continued use of the death penalty 
demeans us. The death penalty is at odds with our best traditions. It 
is wrong and it is immoral. The adage ``two wrongs do not make a 
right,'' could not be more appropriate here. Our nation has long ago 
done away with other barbaric punishments like whipping and cutting off 
the ears of suspected criminals. Just as our nation did away with these 
punishments as contrary to our humanity and ideals, it is time to 
abolish the death penalty as we enter the next century. And it's not 
just a matter of morality. Mr. President, the continued viability of 
our justice system as a truly just system requires that we do so. And 
in the world's eyes, the ability of our nation to say truthfully that 
we are the leader and defender of freedom, liberty and equality demands 
that we do so.
  I ask my colleagues to join me in taking the first step in abolishing 
the death penalty in our great nation. Today, I introduce a bill that 
abolishes the death penalty at the federal level. I call on all states 
that have the death penalty to also cease this practice. Let us step 
away from the culture of violence and restore fairness and integrity to 
our criminal justice system. I close with this reminder to my 
colleagues. Where would our nation be if members of Congress were 
followers, not leaders, of public opinion? We, of course, would still 
be living with slavery, segregation and without a woman's right to 
vote. Like abolishing slavery and segregation and establishing a 
woman's right to vote, abolishing the death penalty will not be an easy 
task. It will take patience, persistence and courage. As we head into 
the next millennium, let us leave this archaic practice behind.
  Mr. President, I ask that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  The bill follows:

                                S. 1917

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Death Penalty 
     Abolition Act of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. REPEAL OF FEDERAL LAWS PROVIDING FOR THE DEATH 
                   PENALTY.

       (a) Homicide-Related Offenses.--
       (1) Murder related to the smuggling of aliens.--Section 
     274(a)(1)(B)(iv) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(B)(iv)) is amended by striking ``punished 
     by death or''.
       (2) Destruction of aircraft, motor vehicles, or related 
     facilities resulting in death.--Section 34 of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking ``to the death 
     penalty or''.
       (3) Murder committed during a drug-related drive-by 
     shooting.--Section 36(b)(2)(A) of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by striking ``death or''
       (4) Murder committed at an airport serving international 
     civil aviation.--Section 37(a) of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended, in the matter following paragraph (2), by 
     striking ``punished by death or''.
       (5) Civil rights offenses resulting in death.--Chapter 13 
     of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) in section 241, by striking ``, or may be sentenced to 
     death'';
       (B) in section 242, by striking ``, or may be sentenced to 
     death'';
       (C) in section 245(b), by striking ``, or may be sentenced 
     to death''; and
       (D) in section 247(d)(1), by striking ``, or may be 
     sentenced to death''.
       (6) Murder of a member of congress, an important executive 
     official, or a supreme court justice.--Section 351 of title 
     18, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``death or''; and
       (B) in subsection (d)(2), by striking ``death or''.
       (7) Death resulting from offenses involving transportation 
     of explosives, destruction of government property, or 
     destruction of property related to foreign or interstate 
     commerce.--Section 844 of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (A) in subsection (d), by striking ``or to the death 
     penalty'';
       (B) in subsection (f)(3), by striking ``subject to the 
     death penalty, or'';
       (C) in subsection (i), by striking ``or to the death 
     penalty''; and
       (D) in subsection (n), by striking ``(other than the 
     penalty of death)''.
       (8) Murder committed by use of a firearm during commission 
     of a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime.--Section 
     924(j)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking ``by death or''.
       (9) Genocide.--Section 1091(b)(1) of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking ``death or''.
       (10) First degree murder.--Section 1111(b) of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking ``by death or''.
       (11) Murder by a federal prisoner.--Section 1118 of title 
     18, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``by death or''; and
       (B) in subsection (b), in the third undesignated 
     paragraph--
       (i) by inserting ``or'' before ``an indeterminate''; and
       (ii) by striking ``, or an unexecuted sentence of death''.
       (12) Murder of a state or local law enforcement official or 
     other person aiding in a federal investigation; murder of a 
     state correctional officer.--Section 1121 of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``by sentence of death 
     or''; and
       (B) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``or death''.
       (13) Murder during a kidnaping.--Section 1201(a) of title 
     18, United States Code, is amended by striking ``death or''.
       (14) Murder during a hostage-taking.--Section 1203(a) of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ``death 
     or''.
       (15) Murder with the intent of preventing testimony by a 
     witness, victim, or informant.--Section 1512(a)(2)(A) of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ``the 
     death penalty or''.
       (16) Mailing of injurious articles with intent to kill or 
     resulting in death.--Section 1716(i) of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking ``to the death penalty 
     or''.
       (17) Assassination or kidnaping resulting in the death of 
     the president or vice president.--Section 1751 of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (A) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``death or''; and
       (B) in subsection (d)(2), by striking ``death or''.
       (18) Murder for hire.--Section 1958(a) of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking ``death or''.
       (19) Murder involved in a racketeering offense.--Section 
     1959(a)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking ``death or''.
       (20) Willful wrecking of a train resulting in death.--
     Section 1992(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
     by striking ``to the death penalty or''.
       (21) Bank robbery-related murder or kidnaping.--Section 
     2113(e) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking ``death or''.
       (22) Murder related to a carjacking.--Section 2119(3) of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ``, or 
     sentenced to death''.
       (23) Murder related to aggravated child sexual abuse.--
     Section 2241(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
     by striking ``unless the death penalty is imposed,''.
       (24) Murder related to sexual abuse.--Section 2245 of title 
     18, United States Code, is amended by striking ``punished by 
     death or''.
       (25) Murder related to sexual exploitation of children.--
     Section 2251(d) of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
     by striking ``punished by death or''.
       (26) Murder committed during an offense against maritime 
     navigation.--Section 2280(a)(1) of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by striking ``punished by death or''.
       (27) Murder committed during an offense against a maritime 
     fixed platform.--Section 2281(a)(1) of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking ``punished by death or''.
       (28) Terrorist murder of a united states national in 
     another country.--Section 2332(a)(1) of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking ``death or''.
       (29) Murder by the use of a weapon of mass destruction.--
     Section 2332a of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``punished by death 
     or''; and
       (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``by death, or''.
       (30) Murder by act of terrorism transcending national 
     boundaries.--Section 2332b(c)(1) of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by striking ``by death, or''.
       (31) Murder involving torture.--Section 2340A(a) of title 
     18, United States Code, is amended by striking ``punished by 
     death or''.
       (32) Murder related to a continuing criminal enterprise or 
     related murder of a federal, state, or local law enforcement 
     officer.--Section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 
     U.S.C. 848) is amended--
       (A) in each of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection 
     (e)(1), by striking ``, or may be sentenced to death'';
       (B) by striking subsections (g) and (h) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(g) [Reserved.]
       ``(h) [Reserved.]'';
       (C) in subsection (j), by striking `` and as to 
     appropriateness in that case of imposing a sentence of 
     death'';
       (D) in subsection (k), by striking ``, other than death,'' 
     and all that follows before the period at the end and 
     inserting ``authorized by law''; and
       (E) by striking subsections (l) and (m) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(l) [Reserved.]
       ``(m) [Reserved.]''.
       (33) Death resulting from aircraft hijacking.--Section 
     46502 of title 49, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``put to death or''; 
     and
       (B) in subsection (b)(1)(B), by striking ``put to death 
     or''.

[[Page S14567]]

       (b) Non-Homicide Related Offenses.--
       (1) Espionage.--Section 794(a) of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by striking ``punished by death or'' and all 
     that follows before the period and inserting ``imprisoned for 
     any term of years or for life''.
       (2) Treason.--Section 2381 of title 18, United States Code, 
     is amended by striking ``suffer death, or''.
       (c) Repeal of Criminal Procedures Relating To Imposition of 
     Death Sentence.--
       (1) In general.--Chapter 228 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is repealed.
       (2) Technical and conforming amendment.--The table of 
     chapters for part II of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking the item relating to chapter 228.

     SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON IMPOSITION OF DEATH SENTENCE.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, no person may be sentenced to death or put to death on 
     or after the date of enactment of this Act for any violation 
     of Federal law .
       (b) Persons Sentenced Before Date of Enactment.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person 
     sentenced to death before the date of enactment of this Act 
     for any violation of Federal law shall serve a sentence of 
     life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mrs. BOXER:
  S. 1918. A bill to waive the 24-month waiting period for disabled 
individuals to qualify for Medicare benefits in the case of individuals 
suffering from terminal illness with not more than 2 years to live; to 
the Committee on Finance.


           medicare for individuals with terminal illness act

  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation to 
correct a weakness in the Medicare law for those who develop a terminal 
illness.
  Under current law, individuals under age 65 who are unable to work 
because of a disability can qualify for Medicare after a two-year 
waiting period. That is, two years after developing a disability, 
individuals can start to receive Medicare benefits to help pay for 
their health care.
  There are reasons for this two-year waiting period, and this 
legislation would not change that. What I am concerned about, Mr. 
President, is the fact that thousands of individuals develop a 
disability that is terminal within two years.
  I am talking about people with cancer, people with AIDS, people with 
Lou Gehrig's Disease, to name to just a few examples. In some cases, 
when these individuals are diagnosed and can no longer work, they have 
less than two years to live. That means they will die before the end of 
the waiting period, before they become eligible for Medicare, before 
they qualify to receive health care benefits. That is not right and not 
fair.
  The Medicare for Individuals with Terminal Illness Act would change 
this. My bill would say that for people whose doctors expect them to 
live less than two years because of their disability or illness, there 
will be no waiting period. They would qualify for Medicare immediately 
and could get the health care they need.
  Mr. President, to date, 10 individuals and 44 organizations--groups 
involved with AIDS, cerebral palsy, Alzheimer's Disease, hospice care, 
and diabetes, among others--have endorsed this legislation.
  Mr. President, I encourage my colleagues to look at this list of 
supporters, look at the bill, and join me in correcting a problem that 
is denying health care benefits to thousands of Americans.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill and 
a list of endorsements be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 1918

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Medicare for Individuals 
     With Terminal Illnesses Act of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. ELIMINATION OF MEDICARE WAITING PERIOD FOR 
                   INDIVIDUALS WITH A TERMINAL ILLNESS.

       (a) In General.--Section 226 of the Social Security Act (42 
     U.S.C. 426) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(j)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (f), each individual 
     with a terminal illness (as defined in paragraph (2)) who 
     would be described in subsection (b) but for the requirement 
     that the individual has been entitled to the specified 
     benefits for 24 months shall be entitled to hospital 
     insurance benefits under part A of title XVIII for each month 
     beginning with the latest of--
       ``(A) the first month after the expiration of the 24-month 
     period,
       ``(B) in the case of a qualified railroad retirement 
     beneficiary (as defined in subsection (d)), the first month 
     of the individual's entitlement or status as such a 
     beneficiary, or
       ``(C) the date of enactment of the Medicare for Individuals 
     With Terminal Illnesses Act of 1999.
       ``(2) As used in this subsection, the term `terminal 
     illness' means a medically determinable physical impairment 
     which is expected to result in the death of such individual 
     within the next 24 months.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Amendments to the railroad retirement act of1974.--
     Section 7(d)(2) of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 (45 
     U.S.C. 231f(d)(2)) is amended--
       (A) in clause (i), by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (B) in clause (ii), by striking the comma at the end and 
     inserting ``; or''; and
       (C) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:
       ``(iii)(I) has not attained age 65;
       ``(II) has a terminal illness (as defined in section 
     226(j)(2) of the Social Security Act); and
       ``(III) is entitled to an annuity under section 2 of this 
     Act, or under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 and section 
     2 of this Act, or could have been includable in the 
     computation of an annuity under section 3(f)(3) of this Act, 
     and could currently be entitled to monthly insurance benefits 
     under section 223 of the Social Security Act or under section 
     202 of that Act on the basis of disability if service as an 
     employee after December 31, 1936, had been included in the 
     term `employment' as defined in that Act and if an 
     application for disability benefits had been filed,''.
       (2) Amendments to the social security act.--
       (A) Description of program.--Section 1811 of the Social 
     Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395c) is amended by striking ``and 
     (3)'' and inserting ``(3) individuals under age 65 who have a 
     terminal illness (as defined in section 226(j)(2)) and who 
     are eligible for benefits under title II of this Act (or 
     would have been so entitled to such benefits if certain 
     government employment were covered under such title) or under 
     the railroad retirement system on the basis of a disability, 
     and (4)''.
       (B) Hospital insurance benefits for disabled individuals 
     who have exhausted their entitlement.--Section 1818A of the 
     Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395i-2a) is amended--
       (i) in subsection (a)(2)(A), by striking ``section 226(b)'' 
     and inserting ``subsection (b) or (j) of section 226'';
       (ii) in subsection (a)(2)(C), by striking ``section 
     226(b)'' and inserting ``subsection (b) or (j) of section 
     226'';
       (iii) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``section 226(b)'' 
     and inserting ``subsection (b) or (j) of section 226''; and
       (iv) in subsection (d)(1)(B)(ii), by striking ``section 
     226(b)'' and inserting ``subsection (b) or (j) of section 
     226''.
       (C) Enrollment periods.--Section 1837 of the Social 
     Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395p) is amended--
       (i) in subsection (g)(1), by inserting ``but does not 
     satisfy the requirements of section 226(j)'' after ``section 
     226(b)''; and
       (ii) in subsection (i)(4)(A), by striking ``section 
     226(b)'' and inserting ``subsection (b) or (j) of section 
     226''.
       (D) Exclusions from coverage and medicare as secondary 
     payer.--Section 1862(b)(1)(B)(i) of the Social Security Act 
     (42 U.S.C. 1395y(b)(1)(B)(i)) is amended by striking 
     ``section 226(b)'' and inserting ``subsection (b) or (j) of 
     section 226''.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this Act shall 
     apply with respect to any application for hospital insurance 
     benefits submitted to the Secretary of Health and Human 
     Services on or after the date of enactment of this Act.

     Medicare for Individuals With Terminal Illnesses Act--List of 
                              Endorsements


                           Organizations (44)

       AIDS Legal Referral Panel--San Francisco, Altamed Health 
     Services--Los Angeles, Alzheimer's Aid Society--Sacramento, 
     American Diabetes Association, African American Chapter--Los 
     Angeles, American Lung Association of California--Sacramento, 
     Asian American Drug Abuse Program, Inc. (AADAP)--Los Angeles, 
     California Prevention and Education Project (CALPEP)--
     Oakland, California Hospice and Palliative Care Association 
     (CHAPCA)--Sacramento, California Coalition of United Cerebral 
     Palsy Associations--Sacramento, Camarillo Hospice--Camarillo, 
     Caring for Babies with AIDS--Los Angeles, City of Los 
     Angeles, Common Ground Community Center--Santa Monica, County 
     of Sacramento, Covenant House California--Hollywood, Dolores 
     Street Community Services--San Francisco, Families First--
     Davis, The Family Link--San Francisco, Feedback Foundation--
     Anaheim, Friends of Chelation Society--Palm Springs, 
     Homeowner Options for Massachusetts Elders--Boston, 
     Massachusetts, and Hospice Education Institute--Essex, 
     Connecticut.
       Hospice of Marin--Corte Madera, Lambda Letters Project--
     Carmichael, Legal Center for the Elderly and Disabled--
     Sacramento, Mental Health Association of Sacramento, Mission 
     Neighborhood Health Center--San Francisco, National 
     Organization for Rare Disorders--New Fairfield, Connecticut, 
     National Health Federation--Monrovia, California, Neptune 
     Society--San Francisco,

[[Page S14568]]

     New Village Project--Los Angeles, Ohlhoff Recovery Programs--
     San Francisco, Parkinson's Disease Association of the 
     Sacramento Valley, Retired Senior Volunteer Program--Santa 
     Barbara, Sacramento AIDS Foundation, San Francisco 
     Community Clinic Consortium, Serra Project--Los Angeles, 
     Shascade Community Services--Redding, Vital Options--
     Sherman Oaks, Westside Community Mental Health Center, 
     Inc.--San Francisco, Women and Children's Family Services, 
     Yolo Hospice--Davis, YMCA of Greater Sacramento, and YWCA 
     of Sacramento.


                            individuals (10)

       Barbara Kaufman--Member, SFBOS, Sue Bierman--Member, SFBOS, 
     Ricardo Hernandez--Public Administrator/Public Guardian, City 
     & County of SF, Steve Cohn--Member, Sacramento City Council, 
     Eve Meyer--Executive Director, San Francisco Suicide 
     Prevention, Mike McGowan--Member, Yolo County Board of 
     Supervisors, Rev. Gwyneth MacKenzie Murphy--Associate Pastor, 
     Grace Cathedral, Teresa Brown--Program Coordinator, HIV 
     Services Division, Alameda County Medical Ctr., Lois Wolk--
     Yolo County Supervisor, Sarah Bennett--Executive Director, Ad 
     Hoc Committee to Defend Health Care--Cambridge, MA.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. DODD (for himself and Mr. Leahy):
  S. 1919. A bill to permit travel to or from Cuba by United States 
citizens and lawful resident aliens of the United States; to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations.


               The Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2000

 Mr. DODD. Mr. President, today my colleague, Senator Leahy and 
I are introducing ``The Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2000.'' We 
believe the time has come to lift the very archaic, counterproductive, 
and ill-conceived ban on Americans traveling to Cuba. Not only does 
this ban hinder rather than help our effort to spread democracy, it 
unnecessarily abridges the rights of ordinary Americans. The United 
States was founded on the principles of liberty and freedom. Yet when 
it comes to Cuba, our Government abridges these rights with no greater 
rationale than political and rhetorical gain.
  Cuba lies just 90 miles from America's shore. Yet those 90 miles of 
water might as well be an entire ocean. We have made a land ripe for 
American influence forbidden territory. In doing so, we have enabled 
the Cuban regime to be a closed system with the Cuban people having 
little contact with their closest neighbors.
  Surely we do not ban travel to Cuba out of concern for the safety of 
Americans who might visit that island nation. Today Americans are free 
to travel to Iran, Sudan, Burma, Yugoslavia, North Korea--but not to 
Cuba. You can fly to North Korea; you can fly to Iran; you can travel 
freely. It seems to me if you can go to those countries, you ought not 
be denied the right to go to Cuba. If the Cubans want to stop Americans 
from visiting that country, that ought to be their business. But to say 
to an American citizen that you can travel to Iran, where they held 
American hostages for months on end, to North Korea, which has declared 
us to be an enemy of theirs completely, but that you cannot travel 90 
miles off our shore to Cuba, is a mistake.
  To this day, some Iranian politicians believe the United States to be 
``the Great Satan.'' We hear it all the time. Just two decades ago, 
Iran occupied our Embassy and took innocent American diplomats hostage. 
To this day, protesters in Tehran burn the American flag with the 
encouragement of some officials in that Government. Those few Americans 
who venture into such inhospitable surroundings often find themselves 
pelted by rocks and accosted by the public.
  Similarly, we do not ban travel to Sudan, a nation we attacked with 
cruise missiles last summer for its support of terrorism; to Burma, a 
nation with one of the most oppressive regimes in the world today; to 
North Korea, whose soldiers have peered at American servicemen through 
gun sights for decades; or Syria, which has one of the most egregious 
human rights records and is one of the foremost sponsors of terrorism.
  We believe that it is time to end the inconsistency with respect to 
U.S. travel restrictions to Cuba. We ban travel to Cuba, a nation which 
is neither at war with the United States nor a sponsor of international 
terrorist activities. Why do we ban travel? Ostensibly so that we can 
pressure Cuban authorities into making the transition to a democratic 
form of government.
  I fail to see how isolating the Cuban people from democratic values 
and ideals will foster the transition to democracy in that country. I 
fail to see how isolating the Cuban people from democratic values and 
from the influence of Americans when they go to that country to help 
bring about the change we all seek serves our own interests.
  The Cuban people are not currently permitted the freedom to travel 
enjoyed by many peoples around the world. However, because Fidel Castro 
does not permit Cubans to leave Cuba and come to this country is not 
justification for adopting a similar principle in this country 
that says Americans cannot travel freely. We have a Bill of Rights. We 
need to treasure and respect the fundamental rights that we embrace as 
American citizens. Travel is one of them. If other countries want to 
prohibit us from going there, then that is their business. But for us 
to say that citizens of Connecticut or Alabama cannot go where they 
like is not the kind of restraint we ought to put on people.

  If Americans can travel to North Korea, to the Sudan, to Iran, then I 
do not understand the justification for saying that they cannot travel 
to Cuba. I happen to believe that by allowing Americans to travel to 
Cuba, we can begin to change the political climate and bring about the 
changes we all seek in that country.
  Today, every single country in the Western Hemisphere is a democracy, 
with one exception: Cuba. American influence through person-to-person 
and cultural exchanges was a prime factor in this evolution from a 
hemisphere ruled predominantly by authoritarian or military regimes to 
one where democracy is the rule. Our current policy toward Cuba blocks 
these exchanges and prevents the United States from using our most 
potent weapon in our effort to combat totalitarian regimes, and that is 
our own people. They are the best ambassadors we have. Most 
totalitarian regimes bar Americans from coming into their countries for 
the very reasons I just mentioned. They are afraid the gospel of 
freedom will motivate their citizens to overthrow dictators, as they 
have done in dozens of nations over the last half century. Isn't it 
ironic that when it comes to Cuba we do the dictator's bidding for him 
in a sense? Cuba does not have to worry about America spreading 
democracy. Our own Government stops us from doing so.
  Let me review for my colleagues who may travel to Cuba under current 
Government regulations and under what circumstances. The following 
categories of people may travel to Cuba without applying to the 
Treasury Department for a specific license to travel. They are deemed 
to be authorized to travel under so-called general license: Government 
officials, regularly employed journalists, professional researchers who 
are ``full time professionals who travel to Cuba to conduct 
professional research in their professional areas'', Cuban Americans 
who have relatives in Cuba who are ill (but only once a year.)
  There are other categories of individuals who theoretically are 
eligible to travel to Cuba as well, but they must apply for a license 
from the Department of the Treasury and prove they fit a category in 
which travel to Cuba is permissible. What are these categories? The 
first is so called freelance journalists, provided they can prove they 
are journalists; they must also submit their itinerary for the proposed 
research. The second is Cuban Americans who are unfortunate enough to 
have more than one humanitarian emergency in a 12-month period and 
therefore cannot travel under a general license. The third is students 
and faculty from U.S. academic institutions that are accredited by an 
appropriate national or regional educational accrediting association 
who are participating in a ``structural education program.'' The fourth 
is members of U.S. religious organizations. The fifth is individuals 
participating in public performances, clinics, workshops, athletic and 
other competitions and exhibitions. If that isn't complicated enough--
just because you think you may fall into one of the above enumerated 
categories does not necessarily mean you will actually be licensed by 
the U.S. Government to travel to Cuba.

[[Page S14569]]

  Under current regulations, who decides whether a researcher's work is 
legitimate? Who decides whether a freelance journalist is really 
conducting journalistic activities? Who decides whether or not a 
professor or student is participating in a ``structured educational 
program''? Who decides whether a religious person is really going to 
conduct religious activities? Government bureaucrats are making those 
decisions about what I believe should be personal rights of American 
citizens.

  It is truly unsettling, to put it mildly, when you think about it, 
and probably unconstitutional at its core. It is a real intrusion on 
the fundamental rights of American citizens. It also says something 
about what we as a Government think about our own people. Do we really 
believe that a journalist, a Government official, a Senator, a 
Congressman, a baseball player, a ballerina, a college professor or 
minister is somehow superior to other citizens who do not fall into 
those categories; that only these categories of people are ``good 
examples'' for the Cuban people to observe in order to understand 
American values?
  I do not think so. I find such a notion insulting. There is no better 
way to communicate America's values and ideals than by unleashing 
average American men and women to demonstrate by daily living what our 
great country stands for and the contrasts between what we stand for 
and what exists in Cuba today.
  I do not believe there was ever a sensible rationale for restricting 
Americans' right to travel to Cuba. With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and an end to the cold war, I do not think any excuse remains 
today to ban this kind of travel. This argument that dollars and 
tourism will be used to prop up the regime is specious. The regime 
seems to have survived 38 years despite the Draconian U.S. embargo 
during that entire period. The notion that allowing Americans to spend 
a few dollars in Cuba is somehow going to give major aid and comfort to 
the Cuban regime is without basis, in my view.
  This spring, we got a taste of what people-to-people exchanges 
between the United States and Cuba might mean when the Baltimore 
Orioles and the Cuban National Team played a home-and-home series. The 
game brought players from two nations with the greatest love of 
baseball together for the first time in generations. It is time to 
bring the fans together. It is time to let Americans and Cubans meet in 
the baseball stands and on the streets of Havana.
  Political rhetoric is not sufficient reason to abridge the freedoms 
of American citizens. Nor is it sufficient reason to stand by a law 
which counteracts one of the basic premises of American foreign policy; 
namely, the spread of democracy. The time has come to allow Americans--
average Americans--to travel freely to Cuba. I urge my colleagues to 
support the legislation that Senator Leahy and I have introduced today. 
We will be working to ensure that the full Senate has an opportunity to 
debate and vote on this matter when the Senate convenes next year. I 
hope our colleagues will join with us at that time in restoring 
American citizens' rights to travel wherever they choose, including to 
the Island of Cuba.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. LEVIN (for himself and Mr. Specter):
  S. 1920. A bill to combat money laundering and protect the United 
States financial system by addressing the vulnerabilities of private 
banking to money laundering, and for other purposes; to the Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.


                 money laundering abatement act of 1999

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, today I am introducing, along with Senator 
Specter, the Money Laundering Abatement Act of 1999.
  The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, of which I am 
the ranking member, is currently holding hearings on problems specific 
to private banking, a rapidly-growing financial service in which banks 
provide one-on-one services tailored to the individual needs of wealthy 
individuals. The Subcommittee's investigation and hearings show that 
private bankers have operated in a culture which emphasizes secrecy, 
impeding account documentation for regulators and law enforcement 
entities. This culture makes private banking peculiarly susceptible to 
money laundering.
  The Money Laundering Abatement Act is intended to supplement and 
reinforce the current anti-money-laundering laws and bolster the 
efforts of regulators and law enforcement bodies in this nation and 
around the world and the efforts of others in Congress.
  The Subcommittee's year-long investigation and testimony by 
distinguished financial experts, regulators, and banking industry 
personnel, revealed that private bankers regularly create devices such 
as shell corporations established in offshore jurisdictions to hide the 
source of and movement of clients' funds. The motives may be benign or 
they may be questionable but one thing is certain: they make it harder 
for regulators and law enforcement personnel to track the ownership and 
flow of funds and avert or apprehend laundering of the proceeds of drug 
and weapons trafficking, tax evasion, corruption, and other 
malfeasance. To make matters worse, many activities which Americans 
find reprehensible and which can destabilize regimes and economies are 
not currently illegal under foreign laws. Therefore, as the current 
money laundering laws are written, transactions in funds derived from 
such activities do not constitute money laundering, but they ought to 
constitute money laundering punishable under United States laws.
  My bill would patch these holes, particularly as they apply to 
private banking activities, the volume of which experts predict will 
grow exponentially as more and more wealth is created and banks compete 
for this lucrative line of business. Accordingly, I am today 
introducing legislation that would significantly increase the 
transparency of our banking system and make it possible for law 
enforcement and civil process to pierce the veil of secrecy that for 
too long has made it possible for institutions and individuals 
operating in largely unregulated off-shore jurisdictions to gain 
unfettered access to the U.S. financial system for purposes of 
legitimizing the proceeds of illegal or unsavory activity.
  A great problem in detecting money laundering is that many private 
banking transactions are conducted through fictitious entities or under 
false names or numbered accounts in which the actual or beneficial 
owner is not identified. The bill requires a financial institution that 
opens or maintains a U.S. account for a foreign entity to identify and 
maintain a record in the U.S. of the identity of each direct or 
beneficial owner of the account. The bill would further help banks in 
verifying customers' identities by making it illegal to misrepresent 
the true ownership of an account to a bank. The bill also imposes a 
``48-hour rule'' under which, within 48 hours of a request by a federal 
banking agency, a financial institution would have to provide account 
information and documentation to the agency.

  Our investigation into private banking has shown that money 
launderers may launder their transactions by commingling the proceeds 
in so-called ``concentration accounts'' and aggregate the funds from 
multiple customers and transactions. The bill curtails the illicit use 
of these accounts by prohibiting institutions from using these accounts 
anonymously. The bill also prohibits U.S. financial institutions from 
opening or maintaining correspondent accounts with so-called ``brass 
plate'' banks--most often in off-shore locations--that are not licensed 
to provide services in their home countries and are not subject to 
comprehensive home country supervision on a consolidated basis, 
reducing the likelihood that U.S.-based institutions will receive funds 
that may derive from illicit sources.
  The bill would also eliminate significant gaps in current U.S. law by 
expanding the list of crimes committed on foreign soil that can serve 
as predicate offenses for money laundering prosecutions in the U.S., 
including corruption and the misappropriation of IMF funds. It would 
expand the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, by including transactions in 
which money is laundered through a foreign bank as a U.S. crime if the 
transaction has a ``nexus'' in the United States. The bill addresses 
the reality that governmental corruption weakens economies

[[Page S14570]]

and causes political instability and when U.S. banks profit from the 
fruits of such corruption they run counter to U.S. interests in ending 
such corruption.
  Another problem that we have encountered repeatedly in our 
investigation is that many private banks have written policies that 
repeatedly stress that the banker must know a customer's identity and 
source of funds. Yet in practice, many private bankers do not comply 
with their own bank's policies. To rectify this, the bill requires 
financial institutions to develop and apply due diligence standards for 
accounts for private banking customers to verify the customers' 
identity and source of wealth, both when opening such accounts and on 
an ongoing basis.
  Finally, the bill would authorize funding for FinCEN to develop an 
automated ``alert database.'' FinCEN, an arm of the Department of the 
Treasury, tracks Currency Transaction Reports and Suspicious Activity 
Reports, important tools in fighting money laundering. However, FinCEN 
officials have told me that they lack a database which will 
automatically alert them to patterns of suspicious activity that could 
indicate money laundering or other illicit activity. Such a database is 
imperative to enable FinCEN to adequately serve the law enforcement 
bodies that it supplies information to.
  This bill will close gaps in our anti-money-laundering laws and 
regulations. I ask unanimous consent that the bill and a summary of the 
bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 1920

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Money Laundering Abatement 
     Act of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Money laundering is a serious problem that enables 
     criminals to reap the rewards of their crimes by hiding the 
     criminal source of their profits.
       (2) When carried out by using banks, money laundering 
     erodes the integrity of our financial institutions.
       (3) United States financial institutions are a critical 
     link in our efforts to combat money laundering.
       (4) In addition to organized crime enterprises, corrupt 
     government officials around the world increasingly employ 
     sophisticated money laundering schemes to conceal wealth they 
     have plundered or extorted from their nations or received as 
     bribes, and these practices weaken the legitimacy of foreign 
     states, threaten the integrity of international financial 
     markets, and harm foreign populations.
       (5) Private banking is a growing activity among financial 
     institutions based in and operating in the United States.
       (6) The high profitability, competition, high level of 
     secrecy, and close relationships of trust developed between 
     private bankers and their clients make private banking 
     vulnerable to money laundering.
       (7) The use by United States bankers of financial centers 
     located outside of the United States that have weak financial 
     regulatory and reporting regimes and no transparency 
     facilitates global money laundering.
       (b) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to eliminate the 
     weaknesses in Federal law that allow money laundering to 
     flourish, particularly in private banking activities.

     SEC. 3. IDENTIFICATION OF ACTUAL OR BENEFICIAL OWNERS OF 
                   ACCOUNTS.

       (a) Transactions and Accounts With or on Behalf of Foreign 
     Entities.--Subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United 
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 5331. Requirements relating to transactions and 
       accounts with or on behalf of foreign entities

       ``(a) Definitions.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this subchapter, in this section the following definitions 
     shall apply:
       ``(1) Account.--The term `account'--
       ``(A) means a formal banking or business relationship 
     established to provide regular services, dealings, and other 
     financial transactions; and
       ``(B) includes a demand deposit, savings deposit, or other 
     asset account and a credit account or other extension of 
     credit.
       ``(2) Correspondent account.--The term `correspondent 
     account' means an account established to receive deposits 
     from and make payments on behalf of a correspondent bank.
       ``(3) Correspondent bank.--The term `correspondent bank' 
     means a depository institution that accepts deposits from 
     another financial institution and provides services on behalf 
     of such other financial institution.
       ``(4) Depository institution.--The term `depository 
     institution' has the same meaning as in section 19(b)(1)(A) 
     of the Federal Reserve Act.
       ``(5) Foreign banking institution.--The term `foreign 
     banking institution' means a foreign entity that engages in 
     the business of banking, and includes foreign commercial 
     banks, foreign merchant banks, and other foreign institutions 
     that engage in banking activities usual in connection with 
     the business of banking in the countries where they are 
     organized or operating.
       ``(6) Foreign entity.--The term `foreign entity' means an 
     entity that is not organized under the laws of the Federal 
     Government of the United States, any State of the United 
     States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of 
     Puerto Rico.
       ``(b) Prohibition on Opening or Maintaining Accounts 
     Belonging to or for the Benefit of Unidentified Owners.--A 
     depository institution or a branch of a foreign bank (as 
     defined in section 1 of the International Banking Act of 
     1978) may not open or maintain any account in the United 
     States for a foreign entity or a representative of a foreign 
     entity, unless--
       ``(1) for each such account, the institution completes and 
     maintains in the United States a form or record identifying, 
     by a verifiable name and account number, each person having a 
     direct or beneficial ownership interest in the account; or
       ``(2) some or all of the shares of the foreign entity are 
     publicly traded.
       ``(c) Prohibition on Opening or Maintaining Correspondent 
     Accounts or Correspondent Bank Relationship With Certain 
     Foreign Banks.--A depository institution, or branch of a 
     foreign bank, as defined in section 1 of the International 
     Banking Act of 1978, may not open or maintain a correspondent 
     account in the United States for or on behalf of a foreign 
     banking institution, or establish or maintain a correspondent 
     bank relationship with a foreign banking institution (other 
     than in the case of an affiliate of a branch of a foreign 
     bank), that--
       ``(1) is organized under the laws of a jurisdiction outside 
     of the United States; and
       ``(2) is not subject to comprehensive supervision or 
     regulation on a consolidated basis by the appropriate 
     authorities in such jurisdiction.
       ``(d) 48-Hour Rule.--Not later than 48 hours after 
     receiving a request by the appropriate Federal banking agency 
     (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
     Act) for information related to anti-money laundering 
     compliance by a financial institution or a customer of that 
     institution, a financial institution shall provide to the 
     requesting agency, or make available at a location specified 
     by the representative of the agency, information and account 
     documentation for any account opened, maintained, or managed 
     in the United States by the financial institution.''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of 
     sections for subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United 
     States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating 
     to section 5330 the following:

``5331. Requirements relating to transactions and accounts with or on 
              behalf of foreign entities.''.

       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply--
       (1) with respect to any account opened on or after the date 
     of enactment of this Act, as of such date; and
       (2) with respect to any account opened before the date of 
     enactment of this Act, as of the end of the 6-month period 
     beginning on such date.

     SEC. 4. PROPER MAINTENANCE OF CONCENTRATION ACCOUNTS AT 
                   FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

       Section 5318(h) of title 31, United States Code, is amended 
     by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3) Availability of certain account information.--The 
     Secretary shall prescribe regulations under this subsection 
     that govern maintenance of concentration accounts by 
     financial institutions, in order to ensure that such accounts 
     are not used to prevent association of the identity of an 
     individual customer with the movement of funds of which the 
     customer is the direct or beneficial owner, which regulations 
     shall, at a minimum--
       ``(A) prohibit financial institutions from allowing clients 
     to direct transactions that move their funds into, out of, or 
     through the concentration accounts of the financial 
     institution;
       ``(B) prohibit financial institutions and their employees 
     from informing customers of the existence of, or means of 
     identifying, the concentration accounts of the institution; 
     and
       ``(C) require each financial institution to establish 
     written procedures governing the documentation of all 
     transactions involving a concentration account, which 
     procedures shall ensure that, any time a transaction 
     involving a concentration account commingles funds belonging 
     to 1 or more customers, the identity of, and specific amount 
     belonging to, each customer is documented.''.

     SEC. 5. DUE DILIGENCE REQUIRED FOR PRIVATE BANKING.

       The Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1811 et seq.) 
     is amended by inserting after section 10 the following:

     ``SEC. 5A. DUE DILIGENCE.

       ``(a) Private Banking.--In fulfillment of its anti-money 
     laundering obligations under section 5318(h) of title 31, 
     United States Code, each depository institution that engages 
     in private banking shall establish due

[[Page S14571]]

     diligence procedures for opening and reviewing, on an ongoing 
     basis, accounts of private banking customers.
       ``(b) Minimum Standards.--The due diligence procedures 
     required by paragraph (1) shall, at a minimum, ensure that 
     the depository institution knows and verifies, through 
     probative documentation, the identity and financial 
     background of each private banking customer of the 
     institution and obtains sufficient information about the 
     source of funds of the customer to meet the anti-money 
     laundering obligations of the institution.
       ``(c) Compliance Review.--The appropriate Federal banking 
     agencies shall review compliance with the requirements of 
     this section as part of each examination of a depository 
     institution under this Act.
       ``(d) Regulations.--The Board of Governors of the Federal 
     Reserve System shall, after consultation with the other 
     appropriate Federal banking agencies, define the term 
     `private banking' by regulation for purposes of this 
     section.''.

     SEC. 6. SUPPLEMENTATION OF CRIMES CONSTITUTING MONEY 
                   LAUNDERING.

       Section 1956(c)(7)(B) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:
       ``(ii) any conduct constituting a crime of violence;''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(iv) fraud, or any scheme to defraud, committed against a 
     foreign government or foreign governmental entity under the 
     laws of that government or entity;
       ``(v) bribery of a foreign public official, or the 
     misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public funds by 
     or for the benefit of a foreign public official under the 
     laws of the country in which the subject conduct occurred or 
     in which the public official holds office;
       ``(vi) smuggling or export control violations involving 
     munitions listed in the United States Munitions List or 
     technologies with military applications, as defined in the 
     Commerce Control List of the Export Administration 
     Regulations;
       ``(vii) an offense with respect to which the United States 
     would be obligated by a multilateral treaty either to 
     extradite the alleged offender or to submit the case for 
     prosecution, if the offender were found within the territory 
     of the United States; or
       ``(viii) the misuse of funds of, or provided by, the 
     International Monetary Fund in contravention of the Articles 
     of Agreement of the Fund or the misuse of funds of, or 
     provided by, any other international financial institution 
     (as defined in section 1701(c)(2) of the International 
     Financial Institutions Act) in contravention of any 
     international treaty or other international agreement to 
     which the United States is a party, including any articles of 
     agreement of the members of such international financial 
     institution;''.

     SEC. 7. PROHIBITION ON FALSE STATEMENTS TO FINANCIAL 
                   INSTITUTIONS CONCERNING THE IDENTITY OF A 
                   CUSTOMER.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code 
     (relating to fraud and false statements), is amended by 
     inserting after section 1007 the following:

     ``Sec. 1008. False statements concerning the identity of 
       customers of financial institutions

       ``(a) In General.--Whoever knowingly in any manner--
       ``(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up, or attempts to 
     falsify, conceal, or cover up, the identity of any person in 
     connection with any transaction with a financial institution;
       ``(2) makes, or attempts to make, any materially false, 
     fraudulent, or fictitious statement or representation of the 
     identity of any person in connection with a transaction with 
     a financial institution;
       ``(3) makes or uses, or attempts to make or use, any false 
     writing or document knowing the same to contain any 
     materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
     entry concerning the identity of any person in connection 
     with a transaction with a financial institution; or
       ``(4) uses or presents, or attempts to use or present, in 
     connection with a transaction with a financial institution, 
     an identification document or means of identification the 
     possession of which is a violation of section 1028;

     shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 
     years, or both.
       ``(b) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Financial institution.--In addition to the meaning 
     given to the term `financial institution' by section 20, the 
     term `financial institution' also has the meaning given to 
     such term in section 5312(a)(2) of title 31.
       ``(2) Identification document and means of 
     identification.--The terms `identification document' and 
     `means of identification' have the meanings given to such 
     terms in section 1028(d).''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Title 18, united states code.--Section 1956(c)(7)(D) of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking ``1014 
     (relating to fraudulent loan'' and inserting ``section 1008 
     (relating to false statements concerning the identity of 
     customers of financial institutions), section 1014 (relating 
     to fraudulent loan''.
       (2) Table of sections.--The table of sections for chapter 
     47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to section 1007 the following:

``1008. False statements concerning the identity of customers of 
              financial institutions.''.

     SEC. 8. APPROPRIATION FOR FINCEN TO IMPLEMENT SAR/CTR ALERT 
                   DATABASE.

       There is authorized to be appropriated $1,000,000, to 
     remain available until expended, for the Financial Crimes 
     Enforcement Network of the Department of the Treasury to 
     implement an automated database that will alert law 
     enforcement officials if Currency Transaction Reports or 
     Suspicious Activity Reports disclose patterns that may 
     indicate illegal activity, including any instance in which 
     multiple Currency Transaction Reports or Suspicious Activity 
     Reports name the same individual within a prescribed period 
     of time.

     SEC. 9. LONG-ARM JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN MONEY LAUNDERERS.

       Section 1956(b) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively;
       (2) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)'';
       (3) by inserting ``, or section 1957'' after ``or (a)(3)''; 
     and
       (4) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) For purposes of adjudicating an action filed or 
     enforcing a penalty ordered under this section, the district 
     courts shall have jurisdiction over any foreign person, 
     including any financial institution authorized under the laws 
     of a foreign country, that commits an offense under 
     subsection (a) involving a financial transaction that occurs 
     in whole or in part in the United States, if service of 
     process upon such foreign person is made under the Federal 
     Rules of Civil Procedure or the laws of the country in which 
     the foreign person is found.
       ``(3) The court may issue a pretrial restraining order or 
     take any other action necessary to ensure that any bank 
     account or other property held by the defendant in the United 
     States is available to satisfy a judgment under this 
     section.''.

     SEC. 10. LAUNDERING MONEY THROUGH A FOREIGN BANK.

       Section 1956(c)(6) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(6) the term `financial institution' includes--
       ``(A) any financial institution described in section 
     5312(a)(2) of title 31, or the regulations promulgated 
     thereunder; and
       ``(B) any foreign bank, as defined in section 1(b)(7) of 
     the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3101(7)).''.

     SEC. 11. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act, this 
     Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect 90 
     days after the date of enactment of this Act.
                                  ____


         Summary of the Money Laundering Abatement Act of 1999

       A United States depository institution or a United States 
     branch of a foreign institution could not open or maintain an 
     account in the United States for a foreign entity unless the 
     owner of the account was identified on a form or record 
     maintained in the United States.
       A United States depository institution or branch of a 
     foreign institution in the United States could not maintain a 
     correspondent account for a foreign institution unless the 
     foreign institution was subject to comprehensive supervision 
     or regulation.
       Within 48 hours of receiving a request from a federal 
     banking agency, a financial institution would be required to 
     provide account information and documentation to the 
     requesting agency.
       The Secretary of the Treasury would be required to issue 
     regulations to ensure that customer funds flowing through a 
     concentration account (which comingles funds of an 
     institution's customers) were earmarked to each customer.
       The list of crimes that are predicates to money laundering 
     would be broadened to include, among other things, corruption 
     or fraud by or against a foreign government under that 
     government's laws or the laws of the country in which the 
     conduct occurred, and misappropriation of funds provided by 
     the IMF or similar organizations.
       Institutions that engage in private banking would be 
     required to implement due diligence procedures encompassing 
     verification of private banking customers' identities and 
     source of funds.
       It would be a federal crime to knowingly falsify or conceal 
     the identity of a financial institution customer.
       An appropriation would be authorized for FinCEN, which 
     tracks reports filed by financial institutions under the Bank 
     Secrecy Act, to establish an automated system of alerting 
     authorities when multiple reports are filed regarding the 
     same customer.
       United States courts would be given ``long-arm'' 
     jurisdiction over foreign persons and institutions that 
     commit money laundering offenses that occur in whole or part 
     in the United States.
       The definition of money laundering in current statutes 
     would be expanded to include laundering money through foreign 
     banks.

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