[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 157 (Tuesday, November 9, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Page S14425]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  SENATE RESOLUTION 226--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING 
         JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

  Mr. BAUCUS (for himself and Mr. Grassley) submitted the following 
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Finance:

                              S. Res. 226

       Whereas Japan is the world's second largest economy with 
     exports and imports together equal to one-fifth of its gross 
     domestic product;
       Whereas Japan is the second largest trading partner of the 
     United States and sends almost one-third of its exports to 
     the United States;
       Whereas prosperity and growth in Japan, one of the primary 
     beneficiaries of the liberal international trading system, is 
     dependent on the maintenance of open markets throughout the 
     world;
       Whereas prosperity in the Asian region and globally 
     requires open markets in Japan;
       Whereas Japan has a profound interest in ensuring that the 
     World Trade Organization continues to thrive and develop, and 
     that world markets are open on the basis of a rules-based 
     system that is widely supported by governments, businesses, 
     nongovernmental organizations, and average citizens 
     throughout the world;
       Whereas Japan's dependence on open markets requires Japan 
     to take a leadership role, rather than a defensive posture, 
     in the next round of multilateral trade negotiations;
       Whereas support for free trade in the United States and in 
     many other countries has become increasingly fragile;
       Whereas the world's major trading nations, including Japan, 
     have a special responsibility to take the measures necessary 
     to strengthen a consensus for free trade;
       Whereas Japan's importation of manufactured goods, as a 
     share of its gross domestic product, is considerably lower 
     than that of other industrialized nations and is one of the 
     lowest of all nations reporting data to the World Bank;
       Whereas Japan has one of the lowest levels of intra-
     industry trade in the industrialized world according to the 
     Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development;
       Whereas even in the case of rice where some progress was 
     made at the Uruguay Round, the Government of Japan agreed to 
     a tariff-rate quota, yet set the over quota tariff rate at a 
     level that is currently equivalent to approximately a 500 
     percent ad valorem duty, thus drastically reducing the 
     possible market impact of the concession;
       Whereas Japan is protecting its trade-distorting policies 
     in the areas of agriculture, forestry, and fishing and is 
     trying to shift the focus of the next round of multilateral 
     trade negotiations away from concessions and liberalization 
     of its trade-distorting policies in these areas;
       Whereas there is a concern that in the previous rounds of 
     multilateral trade negotiations, the Government of Japan has 
     been able to minimize the commitments it made;
       Whereas there is a concern that the Government of Japan may 
     be able to minimize the actual implementation of commitments 
     through formal government measures and informal government 
     guidance to counter the effects of those commitments on 
     liberalization;
       Whereas reducing Japanese tariffs and eliminating 
     traditional nontariff barriers appears to have less of an 
     effect than expected on improving market access in Japan in 
     many sectors because of the complex and opaque network of 
     systemic barriers that continue to exist in much of Japan's 
     economic system;
       Whereas despite the fact that Japan is a full participant 
     in the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement and appears to 
     be making concessions equal in value to the concessions made 
     by other parties, Japan has not opened the government 
     procurement market to the degree expected by the United 
     States and other trading partners;
       Whereas because of the impediments in the Japanese 
     government procurement market that were not addressed by the 
     GATT and the WTO, the United States has had to negotiate 
     bilateral government procurement agreements covering 
     computers, telecommunications equipment, medical products, 
     satellites, and supercomputers;
       Whereas the Government of Japan has called for reopening 
     the WTO Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the 
     GATT 1994 (the Antidumping Agreement), and supports similar 
     efforts by other nations, which would result in reducing the 
     effectiveness of United States trade law and the ability of 
     the United States to take action against the injurious and 
     unfair trade practice of dumping;
       Whereas the advanced tariff liberalization process would be 
     further along but for the opposition of Japan at the Asia-
     Pacific Economic Cooperation forum; and
       Whereas a focus on Japanese practices and commitments at 
     the next round of multilateral trade negotiations is more 
     important than ever because the trade laws of the United 
     States, such as section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, section 
     1377 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 
     and title VII of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
     1988, have been significantly weakened as a result of 
     agreements concluded during the Uruguay Round: Now, 
     therefore, be it
       Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the 
     appropriate officials in the executive branch--
       (1) should include, in the United States negotiating 
     objectives for the next round of multilateral negotiations, 
     specific expectations as to how the negotiations will result 
     in changes in the Japanese market;
       (2) should pay special attention to commitments required of 
     the Government of Japan in the next round of negotiations and 
     ensure that commercially meaningful Japanese concessions 
     equivalent to concessions made by other major trading nations 
     will lead to market change in Japan;
       (3) should cooperate closely with other major trading 
     nations to ensure that the next round of negotiations results 
     in genuine change in Japan's markets.
       (4) should consult closely with Congress throughout the 
     next round of negotiations about the specific impact of the 
     negotiations on Japan's markets, and should provide periodic 
     reports, with full input from the private sector, about 
     progress being made in addressing Japanese barriers within 
     the negotiations;
       (5) should devote the resources needed to analyze market 
     barriers in Japan and to analyze how these market barriers 
     can be addressed in the next round of negotiations; and
       (6) should work closely with United States manufacturers, 
     service providers, and nongovernmental organizations to 
     develop the priority areas for focusing United States efforts 
     with respect to Japan in the next round of negotiations and 
     to determine the progress being made in meeting those 
     priorities.

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