[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 154 (Thursday, November 4, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S13985-S13986]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




SENATE RESOLUTION 220--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING THE 
FEBRUARY 2000 DEPLOYMENT OF THE U.S.S. EISENHOWER BATTLE GROUP AND THE 
24TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT TO AN AREA OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES AND 
THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS THAT THE BATTLE GROUP AND EXPEDITIONARY UNIT 
HAVE RECEIVED THE ESSENTIAL TRAINING NEEDED TO CERTIFY THE WARFIGHTING 
PROFICIENCY OF THE FORCES COMPRISING THE BATTLE GROUP AND EXPEDITIONARY 
                                  UNIT

  Mr. INHOFE (for himself, Mr. Warner, Mr. Roberts, and Mr. Lott) 
submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee 
on Armed Services:

                              S. Res. 220

       Whereas the President, as Commander-in-Chief of all of the 
     Armed Forces of the United States, makes the final decision 
     to order a deployment of those forces into harm's way;
       Whereas the President, in making that decision, relies upon 
     the recommendations of the civilian and military leaders 
     tasked by law with the responsibility of training those 
     forces, including the Commander of the Second Fleet of the 
     Navy and the Commander of the Marine Forces in the Atlantic;
       Whereas the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility has 
     been since World War II, and continues to be, an essential 
     part of the training infrastructure that is necessary to 
     ensure that maritime forces deploying from the east coast of 
     the United States are prepared and ready to execute their 
     assigned missions;
       Whereas, according to the testimony of the Chairman of the 
     Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the 
     Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Island of Vieques is a 
     vital part of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility 
     and makes an essential contribution to the national security 
     of the United States by providing integrated live-fire 
     combined arms training opportunities to Navy and Marine Corps 
     forces deploying from the east coast of the United States;
       Whereas, according to testimony before the Committee on 
     Armed Services of the Senate and the report of the Special 
     Panel on Military Operations on Vieques, a suitable 
     alternative to Vieques cannot now be identified;
       Whereas, during the course of its hearings on September 22 
     and October 19, 1999, the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     Senate acknowledged and expressed its sympathy for the tragic 
     death and injuries that resulted from the training accident 
     that occurred at Vieques in April 1999;
       Whereas the Navy has failed to take those actions necessary 
     to develop sound relations with the people of Puerto Rico;
       Whereas the Navy should implement fully the terms of the 
     1983 Memorandum of Understanding between the Navy and the 
     Commonwealth of Puerto Rico regarding Vieques and work to 
     increase its efforts to improve the economic conditions for 
     and the safety of the people on Vieques;
       Whereas in February 2000, the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle 
     Group and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit are scheduled to 
     deploy to the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf where 
     the battle group and expeditionary unit will face the 
     possibility of combat, as experienced by predecessor 
     deploying units, during operations over Iraq and during other 
     unexpected contingencies;
       Whereas in a September 22, 1999, letter to the Committee on 
     Armed Services of the Senate, the President stated that the 
     rigorous, realistic training undergone by military forces 
     ``is essential for success in combat and for protecting our 
     national security'';
       Whereas in that letter the President also stated that he 
     would not permit Navy or Marine Corps forces to deploy 
     ``unless they are at a satisfactory level of combat 
     readiness'';
       Whereas Richard Danzig, the Secretary of the Navy, recently 
     testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     Senate that ``only by providing this preparation can we 
     fairly ask our service members to put their lives at risk'';
       Whereas according to the testimony of the Chairman of the 
     Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the 
     Commandant of the Marine Corps, Vieques provides integrated 
     live-fire training ``critical to our readiness'', and the 
     failure to provide for adequate live-fire training for our 
     naval forces before deployment will place those forces at 
     unacceptably high risk during deployment;

[[Page S13986]]

       Whereas Admiral Johnson, the Chief of Naval Operations, and 
     General Jones, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, recently 
     testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     Senate that without the ability to train on Vieques, the 
     U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the 24th Marine 
     Expeditionary Unit scheduled for deployment in February 2000 
     would not be ready for such deployment ``without greatly 
     increasing the risk to those men and women who we ask to go 
     in harm's way'';
       Whereas Vice Admiral Murphy, Commander of the Sixth Fleet 
     of the Navy, recently testified before the Committee on Armed 
     Services of the Senate that the loss of training on Vieques 
     would ``cost American lives'';
       Whereas the Navy is currently prevented as a consequence of 
     unrestrained civil disobedience from using the training 
     facilities on Vieques which are required to accomplish the 
     training necessary to achieve a satisfactory level of combat 
     readiness; and
       Whereas while the Department of Defense is trying to work 
     with the Government of Puerto Rico on a permanent solution to 
     resolve the current training crisis, the Department of the 
     Navy has an immediate requirement to gain access to these 
     facilities for 13 days in December to accomplish the critical 
     integrated training necessary to achieve a satisfactory level 
     of combat readiness for the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group 
     and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that--
       (1) the Secretary of the Navy should conduct the 13 days of 
     pre-deployment training which is required to be performed on 
     the Island of Vieques to ensure the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle 
     Group and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit are free of 
     serious deficiencies in major warfare areas, thereby reducing 
     the risk to those men and women who we ask to go in harm's 
     way; and
       (2) the President should not deploy the U.S.S. Eisenhower 
     Battle Group or the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit until--
       (A) the President, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval 
     Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, reviews 
     the certifications regarding the readiness of the battle 
     group and the expeditionary unit made by the Commander of the 
     Second Fleet of the Navy and the Commander of the Marine 
     Forces in the Atlantic, as the case may be; and
       (B) the President determines and so notifies Congress that 
     the battle group and the expeditionary unit are free of 
     serious deficiencies in major warfare areas.

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