[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 153 (Wednesday, November 3, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H11440-H11441]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA 
 CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY FOR SEPARATION OF ISOTOPES OF URANIUM BY LASER 
      EXCITATION--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

  The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message 
from the President of the United States; which was read and, together 
with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the 
Committee on International Relations:

To the Congress of the United States:
  I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to sections 123 b. 
and 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 
2153(b), (d)), the text of a proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between 
the United States of America and Australia Concerning Technology for 
the Separation of Isotopes of Uranium by Laser Excitation, with 
accompanying annexes and agreed minute. I am also pleased to transmit 
my written approval, authorization, and determination concerning the 
Agreement, and an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment 
Statement (NPAS) concerning the Agreement. (In accordance with section 
123 of the Act, as amended by title XII of the Foreign Affairs Reform 
and Restructuring Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-277), a classified annex 
to the NPAS, prepared by the Secretary of State in consultation with 
the Director of Central Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified 
information, will be submitted to the Congress separately.) The joint 
memorandum submitted to me by the Secretary of State and the Secretary 
of Energy, which includes a summary of the provisions of the Agreement 
and the views of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, is also enclosed.
  A U.S. company and an Australian company have entered into a contract 
jointly to develop and evaluate the commercial potential of a 
particular uranium enrichment process (known as the ``SILEX'' process) 
invented by the Australian company. If the commercial viability of the 
process is demonstrated, the U.S. company may adopt it to enrich 
uranium for sale to U.S. and foreign utilities for use as reactor fuel.
  Research on and development of the new enrichment process may require 
transfer from the United States to Australia of technology controlled 
by the United States as sensitive nuclear technology or Restricted 
Data. Australia exercises similar controls on the transfer of such 
technology outside Australia. There is currently in force an Agreement 
Between the United States of America and Australia Concerning Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy, signed at Canberra July 5, 1979 (the ``1979 
Agreement''). However, the 1979 Agreement does not permit transfers of 
sensitive nuclear technology and Restricted Data between the parties 
unless specifically provided for by an amendment or by a separate 
agreement.

  Accordingly, the United States and Australia have negotiated, as a 
complement to the 1979 Agreement, a specialized agreement for peaceful 
nuclear cooperation to provide the necessary legal basis for transfers 
of the relevant technology between the two countries for peaceful 
purposes.
  The proposed Agreement provides for cooperation between the parties 
and authorized persons within their respective jurisdictions in 
research on and development of the SILEX process (the particular 
process for the separation of isotopes of uranium by laser excitation). 
The Agreement permits the transfer for peaceful purposes from Australia 
to the United States and from the United States to Australia, subject 
to the nonproliferation conditions and controls set forth in the

[[Page H11441]]

Agreement of Restricted Data, sensitive nuclear technology, sensitive 
nuclear facilities, and major critical components of such facilities, 
to the extent that these relate to the SILEX technology.
  The nonproliferation conditions and controls required by the 
Agreement are the standard conditions and controls required by section 
123 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), for all new U.S. agreements for 
peaceful nuclear cooperation. These include safeguards, a guarantee of 
no explosive or military use, a guarantee of adequate physical 
protection, and rights to approve re-transfers, enrichment, 
reprocessing, other alterations in form or content, and storage. The 
Agreement contains additional detailed provisions for the protection of 
sensitive nuclear technology, Restricted Data, sensitive nuclear 
facilities, and major critical components of such facilities 
transferred pursuant to it.

  Material, facilities, and technology subject to the Agreement may not 
be used to produce highly enriched uranium without further agreement of 
the parties.
  The Agreement also provides that cooperation under it within the 
territory of Australia will be limited to research on and development 
of SILEX technology, and will not be for the purpose of constructing a 
uranium enrichment facility in Australia unless provided for by an 
amendment to the Agreement. The United States would treat any such 
amendment as a new agreement pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic 
Energy Act, including the requirement for congressional review.
  Australia is in the forefront of nations supporting international 
efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional 
countries. It is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has an agreement with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of full-scope 
safeguards to its nuclear program. It subscribes to the Nuclear 
Supplier Group (NSG) Guidelines, which set forth standards for the 
responsible export of nuclear commodities for peaceful use, and to the 
Zangger (NPT Exporters) Committee Guidelines, which oblige members to 
require the application of IAEA safeguards on nuclear exports to 
nonnuclear weapon states. In addition, Australia is a party to the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, whereby it 
has agreed to apply international standards of physical protection to 
the storage and transport of nuclear material under its jurisdiction or 
control.
  The proposed Agreement with Australia has been negotiated in 
accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and other 
applicable law. In my judgment, it meets all statutory requirements and 
will advance the nonproliferation, foreign policy, and commercial 
interests of the United States.
  A consideration in interagency deliberations on the Agreement was the 
potential consequences of the Agreement for U.S. military needs. If 
SILEX technology is successfully developed and becomes operational, 
then all material produced by and through this technology would be 
precluded from use in the U.S. nuclear weapons and naval nuclear 
propulsion programs. Furthermore, all other military uses of this 
material, such as tritium production and material testing, would also 
not be possible because of the assurances given to the Government of 
Australia. Yet, to ensure the enduring ability of the United States to 
meet its common defense and security needs, the United States must 
maintain its military nuclear capabilities. Recognizing this 
requirement and the restrictions being placed on the SILEX technology, 
the Department of Energy will monitor closely the development of SILEX 
but ensure that alternative uranium enrichment technologies are 
available to meet the requirements for national security.
  I have considered the views and recommendations of the interested 
agencies in reviewing the proposed Agreement and have determined that 
its performance will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable 
risk to, the common defense and security. Accordingly, I have approved 
the Agreement and authorized its execution and urge that the Congress 
give it favorable consideration.
  Because this Agreement meets all applicable requirements of the 
Atomic Energy Act, as amended, for agreements for peaceful nuclear 
cooperation, I am transmitting it to the Congress without exempting it 
from any requirement contained in section 123 a. of that Act. This 
transmission shall constitute a submittal for purposes of both sections 
123 b. and 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act. My Administration is 
prepared to begin immediately the consultations with the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and House International Relations Committee as 
provided in section 123 b. Upon completion of the 30-day continuous 
session period provided for in section 123 b., the 60-day continuous 
session period provided for in section 123 d. shall commence.
                                                  William J. Clinton.  
  The White House, November 3, 1999.

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