[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 152 (Tuesday, November 2, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H11318-H11321]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




              ANTITRUST TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS ACT OF 1999

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill 
(H.R. 1801) to make technical corrections to various antitrust laws and 
to references to such laws, as amended.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                               H.R. 1801

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Antitrust Technical 
     Corrections Act of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Act of March 3, 1913.--The Act of March 3, 1913 
     (chapter 114, 37 Stat. 731; 15 U.S.C. 30) is repealed.
       (b) Panama Canal Act.-- Section 11 of the Panama Canal Act 
     (37 Stat. 566; 15 U.S.C. 31) is amended by striking the 
     undesignated paragraph that begins ``No vessel permitted''.
       (c) Sherman Act.--Section 3 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 
     3) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(a)'' after ``Sec. 3.'', and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(b) Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
     monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
     persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce in 
     any Territory of the United States or of the District of 
     Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or 
     between any such Territory or Territories and any State or 
     States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, 
     or between the District of Columbia, and any State or States 
     or foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, 
     on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not 
     exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other 
     person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three 
     years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the 
     court.''.
       (d) Wilson Tariff Act.--
       (1) Technical amendment.--The Wilson Tariff Act (28 Stat. 
     570; 15 U.S.C. 8 et seq.) is amended--
       (A) by striking section 77, and
       (B) in section 78--
       (i) by striking ``76, and 77'' and inserting ``and 76'', 
     and
       (ii) by redesignating such section as section 77.
       (2) Conforming amendments to other laws.--
       (A) Clayton act.--Subsection (a) of the 1st section of the 
     Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)) is amended by striking 
     ``seventy-seven'' and inserting ``seventy-six''.
       (B) Federal trade commission act.--Section 4 of the Federal 
     Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 44) is amended by striking 
     ``77'' and inserting ``76''.
       (C) Packers and stockyards act, 1921.--Section 405(a) of 
     the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921 (7 U.S.C. 225(a)) is 
     amended by striking ``77'' and inserting ``76''.
       (D) Atomic energy act of 1954.--Section 105 of the Atomic 
     Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2135) is amended by striking 
     ``seventy-seven'' and inserting ``seventy-six''.
       (E) Deep seabed hard mineral resources act.--Section 
     103(d)(7) of the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (30 
     U.S.C. 1413(d)(7)) is amended by striking ``77'' and 
     inserting ``76''.

     SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Effective Date.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
     this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take 
     effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Application to cases.--(1) Section 2(a) shall apply to 
     cases pending on or after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (2) The amendments made by subsections (b), (c), and (d) of 
     section 2 shall apply only with respect to cases commenced on 
     or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) 
each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde).


                             General Leave

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
and to include extraneous material on H.R. 1801.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Shimkus). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from Illinois?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1801, the ``Antitrust 
Technical Corrections Act of 1999,'' which I have introduced with the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), the ranking member.
  H.R. 1801 makes four separate technical corrections to our antitrust 
laws. Three of these corrections repeal outdated provisions of the law, 
the requirement that depositions in antitrust cases brought by the 
Government be taken in public; the prohibition on violators of the 
antitrust laws passing through the Panama Canal; and a redundant and 
rarely used jurisdiction and venue provision.
  The last one clarifies a long existing ambiguity regarding the 
application of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to the District of Columbia 
and the territories.
  The committee has informally consulted the antitrust enforcement 
agencies, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the 
Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, and the agencies 
have indicated they do not object to any of these changes.
  In response to written questions following the committee's November 
5, 1997, oversight hearing on the antitrust enforcement agencies, the 
Department of Justice recommended two of the repeals and the 
clarification contained in this bill. The other repeal was recommended 
to the committee by House Legislative Counsel. In addition, the 
Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association supports the bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I include their comments for the Record at this point.

 Comments on the ``Antitrust Technical Corrections Act of 1999'' (H.R. 
 1801) by the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association

       The Antitrust Technical Corrections Act of 1999 (HR 1801) 
     would bring minor but useful revisions to several provisions 
     of the antitrust laws. The Section of Antitrust Law 
     (``Antitrust Section'') of the American Bar

[[Page H11319]]

     Association (``ABA'') believes that the amendments 
     contemplated in this bill would improve the administration 
     and enforcement of the laws. These views are presented on 
     behalf of the Antitrust Section and have not been approved by 
     the ABA House of Delegates or the ABA Board of Governors and, 
     thus, should not be construed as representing the position of 
     the ABA.


                        1. contents of h.r. 1801

       1. Repeal of the Publicity in Taking Evidence Act of 1913 
     regarding public depositions for use in suits in equity (15 
     U.S.C. Sec. 30).
       2. Repeal of the provision of the Panama Canal Act which 
     bars the use of Panama Canal to violators of antitrust laws 
     (15 U.S.C. Sec. 31).
       3. Addition to 15 U.S.C. Sec. 3 to include prohibitions for 
     restraints of trade in and among the Territories of the 
     United States and the District of Columbia.
       4. Technical amendments to the Wilson Tariff Act (28 Stat. 
     570).


         2. the antitrust section of the aba supports h.r. 1801

       1. Repeal of the Publicity in Taking Evidence Act of 1913 
     (15 U.S.C. 30).
       The publicity in Taking Evidence Act of 1913, 15 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 30, requires public depositions in any suit in equity by 
     the United States under the Sherman Act. In most actions 
     under the antitrust laws, judges have discretion to control 
     public access, and option that can be essential in high 
     profile proceedings. Uncontrolled access increases the 
     potential for discovery proceedings devolving into a circus 
     atmosphere. Unexpected or unmanageable crowds seeking to 
     attend a deposition can cause it to be moved, delayed, or 
     altered in a manner that disrupts the discovery phase of a 
     proceeding. The scheduling of such depositions is already 
     difficult, and the cases in which they occur may be on tight 
     deadlines. Section 30 is an anachronism that removes the 
     ability of a judge to control public access to depositions in 
     cases where such cases could be detrimental to the orderly 
     conduct of a case.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ See U.S. v. Microsoft, 165 F.3d 952, 953 (D.C. Cir. 
     1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       There is no reason why one type of action brought by the 
     U.S. should have a special rule for the taking of 
     depositions, especially when that rule is likely to be 
     invoked in situations that would cause disruption and delay. 
     There does not appear to be any compelling interest in 
     forcing depositions in equity cases to be open to any and all 
     audiences, since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures (see 
     Rules 43(a) and 77(b)) already insure that the public has 
     access to civil antitrust trials. The Antitrust Section 
     believes the issue of public access to depositions ought to 
     remain a matter for the presiding judge to determine. 
     Therefore, it supports the repeal of this antiquated law.
       2. Repeal of antitrust provisions of the Panama Canal Act 
     (15 U.S.C. Sec. 31)
       Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Sec. 31, the Panama Canal is closed 
     to violators of the antitrust laws. Specifically, no vessel 
     owned by any individual or company that is violating the 
     antitrust laws may pass through the canal. Setting aside the 
     ambiguity of the language of this law, any penalty it imposes 
     is in addition to the sanctions available under the Sherman 
     and Clayton Acts. Specifically, criminal violations of the 
     Sherman Act are felonies that are punishable by fines up to 
     $10,000,000 for corporations, or $350,000 for individuals, 
     and/or imprisonment for up to 3 years. Fines of much larger 
     amounts are authorized where profit or injury exceeds 
     $10,000,000.\2\ Moreover, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Sec. 6, 
     violators of section one of the Sherman Act are also subject 
     to asset forfeiture. Additionally, section four of the 
     Clayton Act provides treble damages for successful private 
     antitrust claims. Further, section 16 of the Clayton Act 
     allows for injunctive relief.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \2\ See U.S. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche LTV, Crim. No. 99-CR-184-R 
     (N.D. Tex May 20, 1999). Hoffman-La Roche agreed to pay 
     $500,000,000 in fines for involvement in a vitamin price-
     fixing conspiracy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The Antitrust Section believes it is through the sanctions 
     of the Sherman and Clayton Acts that the antitrust policy of 
     deterrence will be most effectively advanced. There has been 
     a great deal of debate in Congress, in the courts and in the 
     agencies over the proper combination of injunctions, fines, 
     forfeitures, and sentences to ensure competition and deter 
     potential violators. The Panama Canal Act's provision dealing 
     with antitrust penalties is at best unnecessary. At worst it 
     could encourage ill-considered interference with 
     international completion of the foreign relations of the 
     United States.\3\ Therefore, the Antitrust Section supports 
     the repeal of this provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \3\ Especially, in view of the fact that control over the 
     Canal reverts to Panama on January 1, 2000, the United States 
     code should not contain provisions such as these.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       3. Addition to 15 U.S.C. Sec. 3
       HR 1801 clarifies that the antitrust laws encompass the 
     District of Columbia and the territories of the United States 
     by adding to 15 U.S.C. Sec. 3 \4\ the following language as 
     section 3(B):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \4\ Currently, U.S.C Sec. 3 prohibits restraints for trade in 
     and among the District Columbia, United States Territories, 
     and other states. The penalties are the same as those set out 
     in section one of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, 
     or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to 
     monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
     Territories of the United States and the District of 
     Columbia, or between any of the several States and any 
     Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, 
     shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction 
     thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 
     if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by 
     imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said 
     punishment, in the discretion of the court.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \5\ Compare with section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 2): Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
     monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
     persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
     among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be 
     deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall 
     be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a 
     corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by 
     imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said 
     punishment, in the discretion of the court.

       Current section 3 (to become 3(a) under the amendment) 
     already covers trade between the District or any Territory 
     and the states or foreign countries. The failure of section 3 
     to address trade among the Territories and the District 
     simply invites arguments that such circumstances remain 
     outside the reach of the antitrust laws. No good reason has 
     been offered for the failure, and the Section is aware of 
     none. Further, current section 3 uses the terms of section 1 
     (generally applicable to conspiracies), but not section 2 
     (applicable to monopolization).\6\ Consequently, the new 
     language clarifies that conduct prohibited by section 2 is 
     covered in Washington, D.C. and United States territories. 
     The Antitrust Section supports this correction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \6\ Section 3 currently reads: Every contract, combination in 
     form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
     trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of 
     the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or 
     commerce between any such Territory and another, or between 
     any such Territory or Territories and any State or States or 
     the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between 
     the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign 
     nations, is declared illegal. Every person who shall make any 
     such contract or engage in any such combination or 
     conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on 
     conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
     $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, 
     $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or 
     both said punishments in the discretion of the court. 15 
     U.S.C.A. Sec. 3 (1890).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       However, it should be noted that as it stands section 2(c) 
     of the bill refers to the wrong section of the United States 
     Code. The correct section to be amended appears to be 15 
     U.S.C. Sec. 3 (not 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2 as noted in the bill). 
     The Antitrust Section suggests correcting this minor 
     discrepancy in the bill.
       4. Technical amendments to the Wilson Tariff Act (28 Stat. 
     570).
       Section 77 of the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894 gives antitrust 
     jurisdiction to any ``circuit court of the United States in 
     the district in which the defendant resides or is found.'' 
     \7\ This section was never codified in the United States 
     Code.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \7\ Wilson Tariff Act. ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (Aug. 27, 1894). 
     In its entirety, section 77 reads: That any person who shall 
     be injured in his business or property by any other person or 
     corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be 
     unlawful by this Act may sue therefor in any circuit court of 
     the United States in the district in which the defendant 
     resides or is found, without respect to the amount in 
     controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him 
     sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable 
     attorney's fee. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Section 77 is an antiquated piece of legislation that may 
     confuse those that come across it. It is an anomaly to the 
     traditional jurisdiction of federal district courts in 
     construing claims sounding in antitrust law. The 
     jurisdictional provisions of the United States Code vest 
     jurisdiction over cases arising under the antitrust laws in 
     the United States District Courts. A provision allocating 
     jurisdiction of similar cases in different courts can only 
     complicate proceedings and impede the effective 
     administration of antitrust law. By deleting this section, 
     Congress would preserve the general jurisdictional provisions 
     pertaining to the antitrust laws, and would prevent confusion 
     that this section of the Tariff Act may create. Therefore, 
     the Antitrust Section supports this technical amendment.


                             3. conclusion

       HR 1801 is a helpful piece of legislation that helps 
     clarify and update the antitrust laws. The Antitrust Section 
     of the ABA supports the changes contemplated in HR 1801.

  Mr. Speaker, I believe all these provisions are noncontroversial and 
they will help clean up some underbrush in the antitrust laws. I 
recommend that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, as 
amended by the managers' amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1801, the ``Antitrust Technical Corrections Act,'' 
makes four noncontroversial changes in our antitrust laws to repeal 
some outdated provisions of the law and to clarify that our antitrust 
laws apply to the District of Columbia and to the territories.
  The gentleman from Illinois (Chairman Hyde) and the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Conyers) have worked together on this bill and they have 
consulted with the Department of Justice

[[Page H11320]]

Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of 
Competition to ensure these technical changes improve the efficiency of 
our antitrust laws.
  The first change will permit depositions taken in Sherman Act equity 
cases brought by the Government, to be conducted in private, just as 
they are in all other types of cases.
  In the early days of the Sherman Act, the courts conducted such cases 
by deposition without any formal trial proceeding. Now that the trials 
are conducted in public, it is no longer necessary to hold the 
depositions in public.
  The problem with having public depositions became clear during the 
deposition of Bill Gates during the Microsoft antitrust case. The 
public deposition created a circus atmosphere, and the D.C. Circuit 
Court invited Congress to repeal this law. With this change, antitrust 
depositions will be treated like those in all other cases.
  The second change repeals a little-known and little-used provision 
that prohibits vessels from passing into the Panama Canal if the 
vessel's owner is violating the antitrust laws. With the return of the 
Canal to Panama at the end of 1999, it is appropriate to repeal this 
outdated provision.
  The third change clarifies that Sherman Act's prohibitions on 
restraint of trade and monopolization apply to conduct occurring in the 
District of Columbia and the various territories of the United States. 
We believe that it was always Congress' intent for the Sherman Act to 
apply in the District and the territories, and this amendment merely 
clarifies the scope of our antitrust laws. However, because this 
clarification could affect the standards of rights of litigants under 
pending cases, and to avoid changing the rules in the middle of 
litigation, this provision will only apply to cases filed on or after 
the enactment date of this act.
  Finally, this bill repeals a redundant jurisdiction and venue 
provision in Section 77 of the Wilson Tariff Act. Repealing Section 77 
will not diminish any jurisdiction of venue rights of litigants because 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides any potential plaintiff with 
broader rights of jurisdiction and venue than does Section 77.
  There is also a manager's amendment that clarifies some technical 
aspects of H.R. 1801. I recommend that the manager's amendment be 
adopted and that H.R. 1801 be approved, as amended. With these changes, 
our antitrust laws will be more clear, consistent, and efficient.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I have the honor of yielding 5 
minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Minge).
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentlewoman for 
yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin by stating that I fully support 
the legislation. I also appreciate the attention to the antitrust 
activities that has been given by the Committee on the Judiciary in the 
last month.
  The gentleman from Illinois (Chairman Hyde) scheduled hearings on 
concentration in the agricultural sector and problems of slotting fees 
in retailing. I had an opportunity to testify at that hearing. What I 
would like to do is to urge my colleagues to join me and several other 
Members of this body in focusing attention on what is happening in our 
economy.
  Here in the late 1990s, we have seen an increasing pace in 
consolidations and mergers in our economy. The level of concentration 
is growing dramatically. It is continuing a trend that has existed 
perhaps for several decades, and it is a trend that has some alarming 
implications. Namely, what type of a competitive marketplace do we as 
Americans need in order for our economy to continue to be innovative, 
to continue to be successful, and to continue to thrive and provide 
leadership in a global economy?
  Secondly, what type of concentration can we have in this economy and 
still have those that deal with the bottlenecks that are created by 
this concentration treated fairly?
  I would like to turn my attention to agriculture in particular. When 
we look at the ag sector of our economy and recognize that a handful of 
firms control meat packing, control movement of grain, control seed 
stock and other supplies that farmers use that are now entering into 
contracts with farmers to purchase seed, to grow crops based on that 
seed, and to deliver the crops for more specific uses based upon the 
genetic character of those seed, we recognize that farmers are 
increasingly becoming contractors in our economy and they are 
increasingly dependent upon those contracts for their survival.
  Each stage of the process is one that is carefully monitored by 
larger firms. And as they see the opportunity to capture profit in this 
process, the farmer's opportunity to survive in our economy is 
diminished.
  It is for this reason that I have joined with my colleague the 
gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. Pomeroy) and my colleague the 
gentlewoman from Wisconsin (Ms. Baldwin) to introduce legislation that 
would impose a moratorium on mergers and consolidations in the ag-tech 
sector and order an 18-month study of this with recommendations to 
Congress as to appropriate legislative response.
  I will also be dropping legislation within the next few days that 
will provide farmers in the hog sector with some degree of protection 
from the vertical integration that has such a devastating impact on 
their opportunity to continue to raise hogs independently.
  What we saw in the poultry sector of agriculture 20 years ago is now 
happening with hogs. It is estimated that 75 percent of the hogs in 
this country are marketed pursuant to contracts, not into an open 
market setting. As we lose the smaller farming operations and the 
opportunity for farmers to raise hogs, we are losing one of the profit 
centers that has existed in agriculture.
  The word has always been that hogs are the mortgage lifters on the 
farm. They are the dependable source of income and profit that enable 
farmers to pay off the mortgages. And without that opportunity, the 
diversification that is so important in agriculture is lost.
  So I would like to urge that my colleagues recognize the seriousness 
of the problem that we face in the ag sector and that we join together 
as an institution on a bipartisan basis on behalf of America's farmers 
to ensure that they continue to have the opportunity to earn a living 
and be an important part of the rural economy.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from 
Minnesota for bringing this instructive insight to this discussion.
  Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1801 which 
makes technical corrections in various antitrust laws and to the 
references of such laws. I thank Chairman Hyde and the Ranking 
Democrat, Mr. Conyers, for the work they did on this legislation to 
ensure the protection of American consumers. I would like to recognize 
that this legislation, which among other things, clarifies the 
application of the Sherman Act to the U.S. Territories, is supported by 
my fellow colleagues from the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, the 
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
  The challenges faced by U.S. Territories are multi-faceted. In many 
respects, our relationship with the United States stems from the 
benefits we provide based on our geography. This benefit which helped 
us become a part of the American family can also be a disadvantage for 
the development of our economies. Save for Puerto Rico and the District 
of Columbia, Guam is the next most populated territory with 150,000 
citizens. We are also coincidentally the furthest territory from the 
U.S. mainland.
  Our population and remoteness has proved challenging in the 
development of our economy. We have worked to develop a top-notch 
tourism industry and encourage entrepreneurship amongst our residents. 
Our focus to ensure a healthy tourism industry has resulted in the 
construction of world class hotels, such as the Hilton, the Nikko 
Hotel, and the Hyatt. Our success in fostering at least 1.3 million 
tourists a year has caught the attention of many well-known U.S. based 
companies, who have established themselves on Guam. Major retailers 
like K-mart and Costco, trendy restaurants like Hard Rock Cafe and 
Planet Hollywood, and numerous fast food restaurants have found a 
profitable and competitive home in Guam.
  Like many other communities in the U.S. with a similar population to 
Guam, there is a potential for sectors in an industry to monopolize the 
needs of a community. It's an extremely complex endeavor to prove, that 
a company is illegally monopolizing an industry,

[[Page H11321]]

but it's a topic that is inevitably posed to small communities. H.R. 
1801 clarifies that small communities, like the U.S. Territories, will 
not be the subject of monopolization and imposes hefty penalties for 
companies or individuals found engaged in such business activities. 
This is good legislation and good protection for consumers, small 
businesses and entrepreneurs.
  Again, I thank Chairman Hyde for introducing this legislation and 
encourage my colleagues to support this measure.
  Mr. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) that the House suspend the rules and 
pass the bill, H.R. 1801, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor 
thereof) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________