[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 149 (Thursday, October 28, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S13430-S13431]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  SENATE RESOLUTION 208--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING 
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND 
 THE EUROPEAN UNION, IN LIGHT OF THE ALLIANCE'S APRIL 1999 WASHINGTON 
        SUMMIT AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S JUNE 1999 COLOGNE SUMMIT

  Mr. ROTH (for himself, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Biden, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Hagel, Mr. 
Smith of Oregon, Mr. Lieberman, and Mr. Helms) submitted the following 
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

                              S. Res. 208

       Whereas NATO is the only military alliance with both real 
     defense capabilities and a transatlantic membership;
       Whereas NATO is the only institution that promotes a 
     uniquely transatlantic perspective and approach to issues 
     concerning the security of North America and Europe;
       Whereas NATO's military force structure, defense planning, 
     command structures, and force goals must be sufficient for 
     the collective self-defense of its members, capable of 
     projecting power when the security of a NATO member is 
     threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of 
     willing partners among NATO members to defend common values 
     and interests;
       Whereas these requirements dictate that European NATO 
     members possess national military capabilities to rapidly 
     deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for 
     extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United 
     States in high-intensity conflicts;
       Whereas NATO's military operations against the Federal 
     Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999 
     highlighted (1) the significant shortcomings of European 
     allies in command, control, communication, and intelligence 
     resources; combat aircraft; precision-guided munitions; 
     airlift; deployability; and logistics; and (2) the overall 
     imbalance between United States and European defense 
     capabilities;
       Whereas this imbalance in United States and European NATO 
     defense capabilities undercuts the Alliance's goal of 
     equitable transatlantic burden-sharing;
       Whereas NATO has undertaken great efforts to facilitate the 
     emergence of a stronger European pillar within NATO through 
     the European Security and Defense Identity, including the 
     identification of NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander as 
     the commander of operations led by the Western European Union 
     (WEU); the creation of a NATO Headquarters for WEU-led 
     operations; and the establishment of close linkages between 
     NATO and the WEU, including planning, exercises, and regular 
     consultations;
       Whereas in promulgating NATO's Defense Capabilities 
     Initiative Alliance members committed themselves to improving 
     their respective forces in five areas: (1) effective 
     engagement; (2) deployability and mobility; (3) 
     sustainability and logistics; (4) survivability; and (5) 
     command, control and communications.
       Whereas on June 3, 1999, the European Union, in the course 
     of its Cologne Summit, agreed to absorb the functions and 
     structures of the Western European Union, including its 
     command structures and military forces, and established 
     within it the post of High Representative for Common Foreign 
     and Security Policy; and
       Whereas the European Union's decisions at its June 3, 1999 
     Cologne Summit indicate a new determination of its member 
     states to develop a European Security and Defense Identity 
     with strengthened defense capabilities to address regional 
     conflicts and crisis management: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved,

     SECTION 1. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATO.

       (a) Sense of the Senate.--The Senate--
       (1) believes NATO should remain the primary institution 
     through which European and North American allies address 
     security issues of transatlantic concern;
       (2) believes all NATO members should commit to improving 
     their respective defense capabilities so that NATO can 
     project power decisively with equitable burden-sharing;
       (3) endorses NATO's decision to launch the Defense 
     Capabilities Initiative, which is intended to improve the 
     defense capabilities of the European Allies, particularly the 
     deployability, mobility, sustainability, and interoperability 
     of these European forces;
       (4) acknowledges the resolve of the European Union to have 
     the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take 
     decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a 
     whole is not engaged; and
       (5) calls upon the member states of NATO and the European 
     Union to promulgate together during their respective 
     meetings, ministerials, and summits in the course of 1999 
     principles that will strengthen the transatlantic 
     partnership, reinforce unity within NATO, and harmonize their 
     roles in transatlantic affairs.
       (b) Further Sense of the Senate.--It is further the sense 
     of the Senate that--
       (1) on matters of trans-Atlantic concern the European Union 
     should make clear that it would undertake an autonomous 
     mission through its European Security and Defense Identity 
     only after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been 
     offered the opportunity to undertake that mission but had 
     referred it to the European Union for action;
       (2) improved European military capabilities, not new 
     institutions outside of the Alliance, are the key to a 
     vibrant and more influential European Security and Defense 
     Identity within NATO;
       (3) failure of the European allies of the United States to 
     achieve the goals established through the Defense 
     Capabilities Initiative would weaken support for the Alliance 
     in the United States;
       (4) the President, the Secretary of State, and the 
     Secretary of Defense should fully use their offices to 
     encourage the NATO allies of the United States to commit the 
     resources necessary to upgrade their capabilities to rapidly 
     deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for 
     extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United 
     States in high-intensity conflicts, thus making them 
     effective partners of the United States in supporting mutual 
     interests;
       (5) the European Union must implement its Cologne Summit 
     decisions concerning its Common Foreign and Security Policy 
     in a manner that will ensure that non-WEU NATO allies, 
     including Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, 
     Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and the United States, will 
     not be discriminated against, but will be fully involved when 
     the European Union addresses issues affecting their security 
     interests;
       (6) the European Union's implementation of the Cologne 
     Summit decisions should not promote a strategic perspective 
     on transatlantic security issues that conflicts with that 
     promoted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
       (7) the European Union's implementation of its Cologne 
     Summit decisions should not promote unnecessary duplication 
     of the resources and capabilities provided by NATO; and
       (8) the European Union's implementation of its Cologne 
     Summit decisions should not promote a decline in the military 
     resources that European allies contribute to NATO, but should 
     instead promote the complete fulfillment of their respective 
     force commitments to the Alliance.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce, with Senator 
Roth, Senator Lugar and other colleagues, a resolution that attempts to 
clarify the relationship between the European Union's new European 
Security and Defense Identify, popularly known by its acronym ESDI, and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
  Mr. President, as my colleagues will remember, ESDI has been 
gathering momentum since last December's meeting in St. Malo, France 
between French President Chirac and British Prime Minister Blair. It is 
part of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy, which 
the EU sees as essential to its development as ``an ever closer 
union.''
  ESDI was discussed in the communique of the April 1999 NATO 
Washington Summit, and it was elaborated on in the communique of the 
June 1999 EU Cologne Summit.
  Let me say up front that I believe that ESDI--if it is developed in 
proper coordination with NATO--can serve the national interest of the 
United States by becoming a valuable vehicle for strengthening the 
European military contribution to NATO. Put another way, ESDI, if 
handled correctly, can at long last create more equitable burden-
sharing between our European NATO allies and the United States.
  NATO must and will remain the preeminent organization to defend the 
territory of the North Atlantic area against all external threats, as 
envisioned in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949 
and restated

[[Page S13431]]

on April 30, 1998 by the United States Senate in its Resolution of 
Ratification of the enlargement of the Alliance to include Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary.
  NATO may also, pursuant to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, on 
a case-by-case basis, engage in other missions when there is consensus 
among its members that there is a threat to the security and interests 
of NATO members. These missions have become known as non-Article 5 
missions and were also reaffirmed by the Senate in the April 30, 1998 
Resolution of Ratification of NATO enlargement.
  ESDI's field of action should be restricted to those non-Article 5 
missions in which NATO as an organization does not wish to involve 
itself. In practice, Mr. President, this would mean that at some future 
date if the need for military action arose in non-NATO Europe and the 
United States did not wish to become involved, the European Union could 
undertake the effort, utilizing, in part, NATO assets.
  Mr. President, I believe that such a situation with a rejuvenated 
European pillar of the alliance could free up forces of this country 
for possible action elsewhere.

  Let me emphasize, however, that in order for ESDI to accomplish both 
the goals of the European Union and of NATO, it must be clearly 
designed in a way that gives NATO the ``right of first refusal'' on 
non-Article 5 missions. To repeat--if NATO would not wish to become 
involved, then the European Union would have the option of leading the 
mission.
  In addition, Mr. President, we must be sure that ESDI does not 
duplicate resources or discriminate against non-EU European NATO 
members (Norway, Turkey, Iceland, Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary).
  Mr. President, in my opinion the biggest danger is that ESDI could be 
constructed as an alternative to NATO for non-Article 5 missions. If 
this would happen, it could lead to an estrangement of the United 
States from its European allies.
  Unfortunately, the June 1999 Cologne EU Summit communique subtly 
modified the language of the April 1999 Washington NATO Summit 
communique in the direction of ESDI as an autonomous EU military organ, 
using NATO assets, without giving NATO this necessary ``right of first 
refusal'' for non-Article 5 missions.
  The European Union is currently involved in internal negotiations on 
a further elaboration of ESDI at the December EU Summit in Helsinki. 
The Sense of the Senate resolution that we are introducing serves as a 
clear message to our friends in the European Union that while we 
recognize their aspirations for a European Security and Defense 
Identity, it must complement NATO, not be in competition with, or 
duplicative of it.
  With that in mind, our Resolution traces the development of ESDI, 
citing both the Washington NATO Summit and the Cologne EU Summit. It 
stresses that the Yugoslav air campaign demonstrated the military 
shortcomings of the European allies and the imbalance with the United 
States, both of which the allies have pledged to address through the 
NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative.
  The Resolution then expresses several items that are the Sense of the 
Senate.
  NATO should remain the primary institution for security issues of 
trans-Atlantic concern;
  All NATO members should commit to improving their defense 
capabilities so that the Alliance can project power decisively with 
equitable burden-sharing;
  The Defense Capabilities Initiative adopted at the Washington NATO 
Summit is specifically endorsed;
  The resolve of the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action 
where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged is acknowledged;
  The member states of NATO and the EU should promulgate principles 
that will strengthen the trans-Atlantic partnership and reinforce unity 
within NATO.

  Then, Mr. President, cutting directly to the heart of preventing 
ESDI's becoming an alternative to NATO for non-Article 5 missions, the 
Resolution offers the Further Sense of the Senate that ``on matters of 
trans-Atlantic concern the European Union should make clear that it 
would undertake an autonomous mission through its European Security and 
Defense Identity only after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had 
been offered the opportunity to undertake that mission but had referred 
it to the European Union for action.''
  Further, and directly relevant to the issue of more equitable burden-
sharing, the Resolution states the Sense of the Senate that ``failure 
of the European allies of the United States to achieve the goals 
established through the Defense Capabilities Initiative would weaken 
support for the Alliance in the United States.''
  Addressing the issue of non-discrimination by the EU against non-EU 
NATO members, the Resolution states the Sense of the Senate that ``the 
European Union must implement its Cologne Summit decisions concerning 
its Common Foreign and Security Policy in a manner that will ensure 
that non-WEU NATO allies, including Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and the United 
States, will not be discriminated against, but will be fully involved 
when the European Union addresses issues affecting their security 
interests.''
  Finally, the Resolution expresses the Sense of the Senate that the 
EU's implementation of its Cologne Summit decisions should not promote 
a strategic perspective on trans-Atlantic security issues that 
conflicts with that promoted by NATO and should not promote unnecessary 
duplication of the resources and capabilities provided by NATO.
  Mr. President, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the 
cornerstone of our engagement with Europe. The resolution we have 
introduced makes clear to our partners that we support the European 
Union's European Security and Defense Identity as long as it is 
developed in a manner to strengthen NATO, not weaken it.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

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