[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 144 (Thursday, October 21, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Page S13019]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. DeWINE (for himself and Mr. Kohl):
  S. 1764. A bill to make technical corrections to various antitrust 
laws and to references to such laws; to the Committee on the Judiciary.


      ANTITRUST TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1999

 Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise today to co-sponsor the 
Antitrust Technical Corrections and Improvements Act of 1999 with my 
colleague Mike DeWine. This act makes five miscellaneous technical 
corrections to the antitrust laws. Companion legislation to this bill 
has been introduced in the House by Representatives Hyde and Conyers.
  One of the technical corrections repeals an outdated provision which 
applies only to the Panama Canal, one clarifies a long existing 
ambiguity and expressly ensures that the Sherman Act applies to the 
District of Columbia and the territories, and another repeals a 
redundant jurisdictional provision. In addition, two other provisions 
correct typographical errors in two antitrust statutes--the inadvertent 
mislabeling of an amendment to the Clayton Act passed last year and 
another a punctuation error in the Year 2000 Information and Readiness 
Disclosure Act.
  The only difference between our bill and the House companion is that 
the House would repeal an outdated statute--the Taking Depositions in 
Public Act--which requires that pre-trial depositions in antitrust 
cases brought by the government be taken in public. This provision was 
enacted in 1913 at a time when antitrust cases were tried under 
completely different procedures from today and testimony was usually 
not taken in open court. In other words, back then antitrust trials 
were essentially conducted ``on paper.'' This statute was virtually 
ignored--and unused--until the past year. This provision was revived 
last year when, as part of its antitrust lawsuit against Microsoft, the 
government deposed Bill Gates.
  Now, of course, people need to be deposed if they possess evidence 
that may be integral to the resolution of the case. But today the 1913 
statute seems both unnecessary, counter-productive and, even, 
voyeuristic--that is, if you can have voyeurism in an antitrust 
context. Its need has vanished because testimony is now taken in open 
court in antitrust cases, as it is in any other. Indeed, requiring the 
depositions of prominent figures such as Bill Gates and Steve Case in 
controversial and widely publicized cases inevitably creates a media 
``feeding frenzy'' contrary to the sound administration of justice and 
a sober examination of complicated legal issues.
  So I would support the House provision but, at this point, my belief 
is that it is more important to move the underlying measure in a timely 
manner than to wait to develop a consensus on the deposition provision 
in the Senate. We'll work on that consensus here, or we'll work the 
differences out in conference.
  Mr. President, I ask that a summary of the bill be printed in the 
Record. I look forward to working with my colleagues to turn this bill 
into law.
  The summary of the bill follows:

Summary of the Antitrust Technical Corrections and Improvements Act of 
                                  1999

       1. Repeal of the Antitrust Provision of the Panama Canal 
     Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 31)--Section 11 of the Panama Canal Act 
     provides that no vessel owned by someone who is violating the 
     antitrust laws may pass through the Panama Canal. With the 
     return of the Canal to Panamanian sovereignty at the end of 
     1999, it is appropriate to repeal this outdated provision.
       2. Clarification that Section 2 of the Sherman Act Applies 
     to the District and the Territories (15 U.S.C. Sec. 3)--
     Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act are two of the central 
     provisions of the antitrust laws. Section 1 prohibits 
     combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, and 
     Section 2 prohibits monopolization. Section 3 of the Sherman 
     Act was intended to apply these provisions to the District of 
     Columbia and the various territories of the United States. 
     Unfortunately, however, section 3 is ambiguously drafted and 
     leaves it unclear whether Section 2 applies to the 
     District of Columbia and the territories. This bill 
     clarifies that both Section 1 and Section 2 apply to the 
     District and the Territories.
       3. Repeal of Redundant Antitrust Jurisdictional Provision 
     in Section 77 at the Wilson Tariff Act--In 1955, Congress 
     modernized the jurisdictional and venue provisions relating 
     to antitrust suits by amendment Section 4 of the Clayton Act 
     (15 U.S.C. Sec. 15). At that time, it repealed the redundant 
     jurisdiction provision in Section 7 of the Sherman Act, but 
     not the corresponding provision in Section 77 of the Wilson 
     Tariff Act. It appears that this was an oversight because 
     Section 77 was never codified and has rarely been used. 
     Repealing Section 77 will not change any substantive rights 
     because Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides any potential 
     plaintiff with the same rights. Rather it simply rides the 
     law of a confusing, redundant, and little used provision.
       4. Technical Amendment to the Curt Flood Act of 1998 
     (Public Law 105-297)--This provision corrects an inadvertent 
     technical error in the statutory codification of the Curt 
     Flood Act of 1998, the statute which provided that major 
     league baseball players are covered under the antitrust law. 
     The Curt Flood Act was codified to a section number of the 
     Clayton Act which was already in use. The amendment corrects 
     this error by redesignating the statute as section 28 of the 
     Clayton Act. This substantive change to the statute is 
     intended.
       5. Technical Amendment to the Year 2000 Information and 
     Readiness Disclosure Act--This provision corrects a 
     typographical error in the statute as enacted by the 
     inserting a missing period in section 5(a)(2). No substantive 
     change to the statute is intended.
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