[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 140 (Friday, October 15, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12691-S12693]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            CTBT COMMISSION

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on Wednesday evening, the Senate cast a 
historic vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  In the aftermath of this vote, I am reminded of the old saying, ``The 
past is prologue.''
  At some point we have to lift this issue from the cauldron of 
politics.
  Now, is it not time to build bridges and find common ground on the 
issue of a possible treaty covering nuclear testing? Let the issues be 
worked on, for a while, by people of the caliber, of the experience, of 
those who wrote to the Senate, who testified, and called or sent 
statements during the Senate's debate. Their wisdom can then be 
returned to our next President and the 107th Congress.
  That is why, today, I propose the creation of a bipartisan, blue 
ribbon commission of experts, representing differing viewpoints on the 
basic issues, to study this issue and make recommendations--including 
possible changes to the treaty. Colleagues, I ask for your ``advice and 
consent'' as I pursue this goal of a commission.
  During the course of the debate in the Senate, it was clear that a 
number of Members could have supported some

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type of a test ban treaty, but were troubled by several key provisions 
in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that was before us.
  Of a particular concern was the zero-yield threshold. Legitimate 
concerns were raised about our ability to monitor violations down to 
the zero-yield level, and with our need to conduct, at some point in 
the future, very low yield nuclear explosions to verify the safety of 
our stockpile, or to ensure the validity of the stockpile stewardship 
program. Perhaps it would have been better to agree to a Treaty which 
allowed very low yield testing--as all past presidents, beginning with 
President Eisenhower, have proposed.
  Another grave concern was the fact that this Treaty bans nuclear 
testing in perpetuity. When we are dealing with the safety and 
credibility of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, we should exercise the 
greatest degree of caution. Would it not have been better to have a 
treaty which required, specifically in its text, periodic reviews, at 
fixed intervals, as did the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT. At 
the time the Senate considered that Treaty, the NPT provided for 
automatic reviews every 5 years.
  The Stockpile Stewardship Program was another issue of concern. In my 
view, it is just not far enough along, as confirmed by qualified 
experts, for the United States to stake the future of its nuclear 
arsenal on this alternative to actual testing. More needs to be done on 
that issue. For example, there is currently underway a panel, pursuant 
to a provision in the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1999, to study and report on the reliability, safety 
and security of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Perhaps some of the fine 
work of this commission, which is comprised of experts such as former 
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and Dr. Johnny Foster, could be 
incorporated into the work of a test ban commission.
  These are but examples of a number of issues related to this Treaty 
where there are honest differences of opinion, and over which bridges 
must be built to reach common ground. These issues could benefit from 
examination now by a group outside of the political arena--a group of 
experts.
  Recent history is replete with examples of commissions, composed of a 
bipartisan group of experts, who have successfully advised the 
Congress, the President.
  For example, in 1994, when I was Vice Chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee and the CIA was under attack, I included legislation in the 
FY 1995 Intelligence Authorization Act establishing a commission to 
study the roles and capabilities of the Intelligence Community. The 
commission was formed by the President and the congressional 
leadership. It was chaired by former secretaries of defense Les Aspin 
and Harold Brown and former Senator Warren Rudman. They met the 
challenge; their advice was accepted.
  Let's join together; get it done.
  I ask unanimous consent that a number of items be printed in the 
Record at this point.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Excerpts From the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for 
                   Fiscal Year 1999 Conference Report

     SEC. 3159. PANEL TO ASSESS THE RELIABILITY, SAFETY, AND 
                   SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR 
                   STOCKPILE.

       (a) Requirement for Panel.--The Secretary of Defense, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall enter into a 
     contract with a federally funded research and development 
     center to establish a panel for the assessment of the 
     certification process for the reliability, safety, and 
     security of the United States nuclear stockpile.
       (b) Composition and Administration of Panel.--(1) The panel 
     shall consist of private citizens of the United States with 
     knowledge and expertise in the technical aspects of design, 
     manufacture, and maintenance of nuclear weapons.
       (2) The federally funded research and development center 
     shall be responsible for establishing appropriate procedures 
     for the panel, including selection of a panel chairman.
       (c) Duties of Panel.--Each year the panel shall review and 
     assess the following:
       (1) The annual certification process, including the 
     conclusions and recommendations resulting from the process, 
     for the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear 
     weapons stockpile of the United States, as carried out by the 
     directors of the national weapons laboratories.
       (2) The long-term adequacy of the process of certifying the 
     safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons 
     stockpile of the United States.
       (3) The adequacy of the criteria established by the 
     Secretary of Energy pursuant to section 3158 for achieving 
     the purposes for which those criteria are established.
       (d) Report.--Not later than October 1 of each year, 
     beginning with 1999, the panel shall submit to the Committee 
     on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National 
     Security of the House of Representatives a report setting 
     forth its findings and conclusions resulting from the review 
     and assessment carried out for the year covered by the 
     report. The report shall be submitted in classified and 
     unclassified form.
       (e) Cooperation of Other Agencies.--The panel may secure 
     directly from the Department of Energy, the Department of 
     Defense, or any of the national weapons laboratories or 
     plants or any other Federal department or agency information 
     that the panel considers necessary to carry out its duties.
       (2) For carrying out its duties, the panel, shall be 
     provided full and timely cooperation by the Secretary of 
     Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Commander of United 
     States Strategic Command, the Directors of the Los Alamos 
     National Laboratory, the Lawrence Livermore National 
     Laboratory, the Sandia National Laboratories, the Savannah 
     River Site, the Y-12 Plant, the Pantex Facility, and the 
     Kansas City Plant, and any other official of the United 
     States that the chairman of the panel determines as having 
     information described in paragraph (1).
       (3) The Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense 
     shall each designate at least one officer or employee of the 
     Department of Energy and the Department of Defense, 
     respectively, to serve as a liaison officer between the 
     department and the panel.
       (f) Funding.--The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 
     Energy shall each contribute 50 percent of the amount of 
     funds that are necessary for the panel to carry out its 
     duties. Funds available for the Department of Energy for 
     atomic energy defense activities shall be available for the 
     Department of Energy contribution.
       (g) Termination of Panel.--The panel shall terminate three 
     years after the date of the appointment of the member 
     designated as chairman of the panel.
       (h) Initial Implementation.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     enter into the contract required under subsection (a) not 
     later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act. The panel shall convene its first meeting not later than 
     30 days after the date as of which all members of the panel 
     have been appointed.

                           *   *   *   *   *

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  Excerpt From the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995

TITLE IX--COMMISSION ON THE ROLES AND CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES 
                         INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

     SEC. 901. ESTABLISHMENT.

       There is established a commission to be known as the 
     Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States 
     Intelligence Community (hereafter in this title referred to 
     as the ``Commission'').

     SEC. 902. COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATIONS.

       (a) Membership.--(1) The Commission shall be composed of 17 
     members, as follows:
       (A) Nine members shall be appointed by the President from 
     private life, no more than four of whom shall have previously 
     held senior leadership positions in the intelligence 
     community and no more than five of whom shall be members of 
     the same political party.
       (B) Two members shall be appointed by the majority leader 
     of the Senate, of whom one shall be a Member of the Senate 
     and one shall be from private life.
       (C) Two members shall be appointed by the minority leader 
     of the Senate, of whom one shall be a Member of the Senate 
     and one shall be from private life.
       (D) Two members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the 
     House of Representatives, of whom one shall be a Member of 
     the House and one shall be from private life.
       (E) Two members shall be appointed by the Minority Leader 
     of the House of Representatives, of whom one shall be a 
     Member of the House and one shall be from private life.
       (2) The members of the Commission appointed from private 
     life under paragraph (1) shall be persons of demonstrated 
     ability and accomplishment in government, business, law, 
     academe, journalism, or other profession, who have a 
     substantial background in national security matters.
       (b) Chairman and Vice Chairman.--The President shall 
     designate two of the members appointed from private life to 
     serve as Chairman and Vice Chairman, respectively, of the 
     Commission.

                           *   *   *   *   *


     SEC. 903. DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION.

       (a) In General.--It shall be the duty of the Commission--
       (1) to review the efficacy and appropriateness of the 
     activities of the United States intelligence community in the 
     post-cold war global environment; and
       (2) to prepare and transmit the reports described in 
     section 904.
       (b) Implementation.--In carrying out subsection (a), the 
     Commission shall specifically consider the following:
       (1) What should be the roles and missions of the 
     intelligence community in terms of providing support to the 
     defense and foreign policy establishments and how should 
     these relate to tactical intelligence activities.

[[Page S12693]]

       (2) Whether the roles and missions of the intelligence 
     community should extend beyond the traditional areas of 
     providing support to the defense and foreign policy 
     establishments, and, if so, what areas should be considered 
     legitimate for intelligence collection and analysis, and 
     whether such areas should include, for example, economic 
     issues, environmental issues, and health issues.
       (3) What functions, if any, should continue to be assigned 
     to the organizations of the intelligence community, including 
     the Central Intelligence Agency, and what capabilities should 
     these organizations retain for the future.
       (4) Whether the existing organization and management 
     framework of the organizations of the intelligence community, 
     including the Central Intelligence Agency, provide the 
     optimal structure for the accomplishment of their missions.
       (5) Whether existing principles and strategies governing 
     the acquisition and maintenance of intelligence collection 
     capabilities should be retained and what collection 
     capabilities should the Government retain to meet future 
     contingencies.
       (6) Whether intelligence analysis, as it is currently 
     structured and executed, adds sufficient value to information 
     otherwise available to the Government to justify its 
     continuation, and, if so, at what level of resources.
       (7) Whether the existing decentralized system of 
     intelligence analysis results in significant waste or 
     duplication, and if so, what can be done to correct these 
     deficiencies.
       (8) Whether the existing arrangements for allocating 
     available resources to accomplish the roles and missions 
     assigned to intelligence agencies are adequate.
       (9) Whether the existing framework for coordinating among 
     intelligence agencies with respect to intelligence collection 
     and analysis and other activities, including training and 
     operational activities, provides an optimal structure for 
     such coordination.
       (10) Whether current personnel policies and practices of 
     intelligence agencies provide an optimal work force to 
     satisfy the needs of intelligence consumers.
       (11) Whether resources for intelligence activities should 
     continue to be allocated as part of the defense budget or be 
     treated by the President and Congress as a separate budgetary 
     program.
       (12) Whether the existing levels of resources allocated for 
     intelligence collection or intelligence analysis, or to 
     provide a capability to conduct covert actions, are seriously 
     at variance with United States needs.
       (13) Whether there are areas of redundant or overlapping 
     activity or areas where there is evidence of serious waste, 
     duplication, or mismanagement.
       (14) To what extent, if any, should the budget for United 
     States intelligence activities be publicly disclosed.
       (15) To what extent, if any, should the United States 
     intelligence community collect information bearing upon 
     private commercial activity and the manner in which such 
     information should be controlled and disseminated.
       (16) Whether counterintelligence policies and practices are 
     adequate to ensure that employees of intelligence agencies 
     are sensitive to security problems, and whether intelligence 
     agencies themselves have adequate authority and capability to 
     address perceived security problems.
       (17) The manner in which the size, missions, capabilities, 
     and resources of the United States intelligence community 
     compare to those of other countries.
       (18) Whether existing collaborative arrangements between 
     the United States and other countries in the area of 
     intelligence cooperation should be maintained and whether 
     such arrangements should be expanded to provide for increased 
     burdensharing.
       (19) Whether existing arrangements for sharing intelligence 
     with multinational organizations in support of mutually 
     shared objectives are adequate.

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