[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 138 (Wednesday, October 13, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12465-S12467]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I will take a few minutes to share with 
the Senate something that has not been mentioned yet in this whole CTBT 
debate.
  First of all, let me respond to a couple of things that were said by 
the last speaker who spoke in favor of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty. I hate to be redundant, but I cannot let these things continue 
to go by. People will actually believe them when, in fact, they are not 
true.
  The statement was made by one of the Senators that the Directors of 
the labs--the three energy labs--were in favor of this treaty. I 
listened to this, and yet we had them before our committee which I 
chair. They were very emphatic about their feelings. I am going to read 
to make sure the record reflects this.
  Dr. Paul Robinson, one of the Directors, said:

       The Treaty bans any ``nuclear explosion,'' but 
     unfortunately, compliance with a zero-yield requirement is 
     unverifiable. The limitations of verifiability introduce the 
     possibility of inconsistent observance of the ban under the 
     threshold of detectability.

  The threshold of detectability is something that is there. What that 
means is, no matter what equipment we use, we are unable to detect 
certain tests that are underground under certain yields. This is a 
zero-yield test.
  We kept hearing from the same individual yesterday that they can get 
onsite inspections. Onsite inspections are not assured. Under this 
treaty, it is very specific. Going back to Paul Robinson, the Director 
of Sandia Lab:

       The decision to approve a request for an onsite inspection 
     must be made by an affirmative vote of at least 30 of the 
     51 members of the treaty organization's Executive Council.

  I know there is supposedly some informal agreement that we in the 
United States would be a member of that executive council. I do not see 
anything in this treaty that says we are. We are putting our fate in 
the hands of some 30 nations, and we do not know at this point who 
those 30 nations will be.
  I will quote further to get my point across, although the Senator was 
well meaning yesterday in making the comment this was endorsed by the 
Directors of the labs. I will quote Dr. Paul Robinson again. He was 
referring to himself and the Directors of the other two labs. I am 
talking about all three labs:

       I and others who are or have been responsible for the 
     safety and reliability of the U.S. stockpile of nuclear 
     weapons have testified to this obvious conclusion many times 
     in the past. To forego that validation through testing is, in 
     short, to live with uncertainty.

  He goes on to say:

       If the United States scrupulously restricts itself to zero 
     yield while other nations may conduct experiments up to the 
     threshold of international detectability--

  The one I just talked about--

     we will be at an intolerable disadvantage.

  We have to read that over and over because people are not getting 
that message.
  The second thing he said was, what is the rush? This morning, I heard 
the President in his press conference of yesterday talk about the rush. 
Here is the President who has been saying over and over that he demands 
this come before this Senate and be acted upon by November of this 
year. Here it is. That is next month. We are doing exactly what he 
wanted. Yet now he wants to withdraw this treaty because he does not 
believe he has the votes for the ratification. I agree. He does not 
have the votes. It would shock me if he had the votes.
  Yet we have had a chance for a very deliberative session. We have 
talked for hours and hours, some 22 hours of debate and committee 
activity on this subject. We are all very familiar with it.
  I also suggest that any Member of the Senate who stands up now and 
says we should not be doing this and how unconscionable that we are 
considering something of this magnitude right now, any one of those 
Senators saying that had the opportunity, as the Senator from Illinois 
would have had the opportunity, to object to bringing it up because it 
was done so by unanimous consent.
  The third thing they were talking about is how everyone is a strong 
supporter of this treaty. For the record, one more time, we have 6 
former Secretaries of Defense and several former Directors of Central 
Intelligence, as well as some 13 former commanding generals, all of 
whom are in the Record right now, and I do not need to put it in again, 
I have already put that in the Record; also, the statement by Bill 
Cohen. There is no one for whom I have greater respect than my former 
colleague on the Senate Armed Services Committee, the former Senator 
Bill Cohen, now Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen.
  But I had to remind him, during our committee meeting, that maybe now 
his attitude is different on some of these critical things because he 
is now working for the President. But what he said in September of 
1992--and I remember when he said it when he was leading the fight to 
stop this type of a treaty; in fact, it is the same provisions--he 
said:

       . . . [W]hat remains relevant is the fact that many of 
     these nuclear weapons which we intend to keep in our 
     stockpile for the indefinite future are dangerously unsafe. 
     Equally relevant is the fact that we can make these weapons 
     much safer if limited testing is allowed to be conducted. So, 
     when crafting our policy regarding nuclear testing, this 
     should be our principal objective: To make the weapons we 
     retain safe.
       . . . The amendment that was adopted last week . . .

  This is back in 1992, but this is the same language we are talking 
about today--

     does not meet this test . . . [because] it would not permit 
     the Department of Energy to conduct the necessary testing to 
     make our weapons safe.

  Here is the same Secretary of Defense, back when he was in the 
Senate, talking about the fact that our weapons are not safe. By the 
way, we had a chart that we showed of information that came from all 
three of the Energy labs which is in the Cloakroom right now, but we 
have used on the floor several times, showing specifically not one of 
the nine weapons in that arsenal meet the safety tests today. In other 
words, we have gone 7 years now without testing, and it has now taken 
its toll. We are having a problem. So anyway, that is very significant 
to remember those words of Secretary Cohen.
  I have been asked the question by a number of people as to why I am 
so adamant about objecting to the unanimous consent request--and I do 
not care who makes it--to take this from the calendar and put it back 
into the Foreign Relations Committee.
  I do so because there is something that has not even been discussed 
on

[[Page S12466]]

this floor yet; and that is, unless we kill it and actually reject this 
treaty by a formal action, the provisions of this treaty are going to 
remain somewhat in effect. In other words, we are going to have to 
comply with this treaty that has been signed--going back to a document 
of the Vienna Convention that was actually signed on May 23, 1969, but 
it did not become a part of the international law until January of 
1980.
  Article 18--and this is in effect today--says:

       Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty 
     prior to its entry into force.
       A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat 
     the object and purpose of a treaty when:
       (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments 
     constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance 
     or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not 
     to become a party to the treaty. . .

  What that means is, we have this flawed treaty, this treaty that 
allows our adversaries to conduct underground tests. Yet while we 
cannot do it, we have to comply with this treaty, if we merely send it 
back to committee.
  So I just want to make sure--I am going to read that again. This is 
from the Vienna Convention. This is something that we are a party to. 
It says--I will take out some of the other language--

       A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat 
     the object and purpose of a treaty when:
       (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments 
     constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance 
     or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not 
     to become a party to the treaty . . .
  What that means is, we have this flawed treaty, this treaty that 
allows our adversaries to conduct underground tests; yet while we 
cannot do it, we have to comply with this treaty, if we merely send it 
back to committee.
  So I just want to make sure--I am going to read that again. This is 
from the Vienna Convention. This is something that we are a party to. 
It says--I will take out some of the other language--

       A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat 
     the object and purpose of a treaty when:
       (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments 
     constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance 
     or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not 
     to become a party to the treaty . . .

  How do you make your intentions clear? Under the Vienna Convention 
language, not to be a party to this treaty you have to vote it down. 
You have to bring this up for ratification and reject it formally on 
the floor of this Senate. To do anything other than that is to leave it 
alive and to force us to comply with this flawed treaty, which is a 
great threat to our safety in this country.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I want to make a couple comments about the 
conference report on Agriculture appropriations. Before I do, I would 
like to make a comment or two about the presentation just offered by my 
friend from Oklahoma.
  The Senator from Oklahoma, as he always does, makes a strong 
presentation for something he believes very strongly in. I believe very 
strongly that he is wrong. I believe very strongly in the other side of 
the issue. Let me describe why just for a few moments.
  The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is a question presented to 
this country in this form: Will the United States of America assume the 
moral leadership that it must assume, in my judgment, to help stop the 
spread of nuclear weapons around the world? There are two nuclear 
weapons superpowers--the United States and Russia. Between us, we have 
roughly 30,000 nuclear weapons. Some other countries have them, and 
many other countries want them. There are many countries, there are 
rogue nations, and there are terrorist groups that want to have access 
to nuclear weapons.
  The question of what kind of a future we will have in this world 
depends, in large part, upon the direction this country takes in 
assuming its responsibility to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
  We already decided 7 years ago, as a country, we will no longer test 
nuclear weapons. We made that decision unilaterally. Over 40 years ago, 
President Eisenhower said: We must have a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-
Ban Treaty; we must do that. About 5 or 6 years ago, we began 
negotiating with other countries to develop such a treaty. Two years 
ago, President Clinton sent to the Senate a treaty that would provide a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban all around the world.
  For 2 years, that treaty languished here without 1 day of hearings 
before the primary committee that it was sent to, the Foreign Relations 
Committee. I know there is disagreement on that, but I tell you, 
Senator Biden, who is the ranking Democrat of that committee, says 
there was not 1 day of hearings devoted to that treaty.
  I understand some people want to kill it.
  Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield on that?
  Mr. DORGAN. I am happy to yield.
  Mr. INHOFE. I ask the Senator, if it should not have been brought up 
for the purpose he just articulated, why did this Senator not object to 
the unanimous consent request to have a vote on it?
  Mr. DORGAN. Let me say this about the unanimous consent request. If 
you take a look at all the arms control treaties that have been offered 
to the Senate--the ABM Treaty, the START I treaty, the START II treaty, 
on down the line--and take a look at how many days of comprehensive 
hearings they had, No. 1, in the committee of jurisdiction and, No. 2, 
how many days they were debated on the floor of the Senate, what the 
Senator will discover is this treaty, that has been treated lightly, it 
is a serious matter--treated lightly by the fact that the majority 
leader said, even without comprehensive hearings, we will bring this 
treaty to the floor of the Senate and kill it.
  It alone is the arms control treaty that has been treated in this 
manner. All other treaties were dealt with seriously with long, 
thoughtful, comprehensive hearings--day, after day, after day--and then 
a debate on the floor of the Senate--day after day--which involved the 
American people and public opinion; and then this country made 
decisions about those treaties.
  I know there are some who have never supported an arms control treaty 
under any condition. They have not.
  Mr. INHOFE. If the Senator will yield further?
  Mr. DORGAN. Let me finish my statement.
  They do not support arms control treaties. I respect that. I just 
think they are dead wrong. I have on my desk--I ask consent to show it 
again--a piece of a bomber. This is a piece of a Backfire bomber, a 
Russian bomber. Why is a Russian bomber in a circumstance where its 
wing was sawed off--not shot down, its wing sawed off? Because arms 
control agreements have reduced the number of delivery systems and 
nuclear weapons.
  This part was sawed off a Russian bomber wing as part of the 
reduction of the threat under our arms control treaties. These treaties 
work. We know they work. That is why, without shooting down a bomber, I 
have a piece of a Russian Backfire bomber wing, just to remind us that 
arms control treaties work.
  Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield further?
  Mr. DORGAN. Just for a moment.
  Mr. INHOFE. I think it is very significant because this subject has 
come up during 14 hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. We have over 130 pages of testimony on this. We have 
discussed it for hours and hours over the last 2 days. Again, any 
Senator could have objected to this and apparently believed it was not 
necessary.
  But I have to ask you this question. You talked about only two 
countries having these weapons.
  Mr. DORGAN. I did not say that. Let me reclaim my time. I did not 
talk about ``only two countries.''

[[Page S12467]]

  Mr. INHOFE. There was a time when that was true. During the cold war 
that was a valid argument. It is no longer true. Virtually every 
country has weapons of mass destruction. Now it is a matter of which 
countries have missiles that could deliver them, of which now we know 
of North Korea and Russia and China--and whoever else we don't know 
because they have been trading technology with countries like Iraq and 
Iran, and other countries.
  Mr. DORGAN. I did not say that the United States and Russia are the 
only countries that have nuclear weapons. I said we have 30,000 between 
the two countries. Other countries have nuclear weapons as well, and 
many other countries aspire to have nuclear weapons.
  The Senator from Oklahoma said something that is not the case. He 
said virtually every other country has weapons of mass destruction. 
That is not the case. The nuclear club, those countries that possess 
nuclear weapons, is still rather small, but the aspiration to get a 
hold of nuclear weapons is pretty large. A lot of countries--more than 
just countries, terrorist groups--want to lay their hands on nuclear 
weapons. What happens when they do? Then we will see significant 
threats to the rest of this world.
  It is in our interest as a country to do everything we can possibly 
do to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Do we want Bin Laden to have 
a nuclear weapon? Do we want Qadhafi to have a nuclear weapon? Do we 
want Saddam Hussein to acquire a nuclear weapon? I don't think so. Arms 
control agreements and the opportunities to prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons are critical.
  How do we best do that? Many of us believe one of the best ways to do 
that is to pass this treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.
  We are going to have this treaty back on the floor, I think, for 3 
hours today. I will make it a point to come and I will spend the entire 
3 hours with the Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. If the Senator will yield for a response.
  Mr. DORGAN. I have not yielded, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota has the floor.
  Mr. DORGAN. This treaty was brought to the floor for 14 hours of 
debate. Name another arms control treaty that came to the floor with 
only 14 hours of debate. The Senator asks: Why didn't someone object? 
The burden is on us. Because the majority leader treated a serious 
matter lightly, the burden is on someone else.
  The Senator from Oklahoma knows we objected the first time the 
Senator from Mississippi proposed it. He knows an objection was raised. 
The second time the Senator from Mississippi proposed it, he linked it 
to a time. If that is the only basis on which we had the opportunity to 
consider this treaty, so be it. But it is not treating a serious matter 
seriously, in my judgment. Name another treaty that has come to the 
floor of the Senate dealing with arms control, the arms control issues 
embodied in this treaty, trying to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons, that has had this little debate and comes to the floor, 
despite what my colleague says, without having had 1 day of 
comprehensive hearings devoted to this treaty in the committee to which 
it was assigned? Those are the facts.
  Mr. INHOFE. If the Senator will yield on that point.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I came to speak about the Agriculture 
appropriations bill. The only reason I made these comments is, the 
Senator from Oklahoma was, once again, making statements. He is good at 
it. He feels passionately about these things. But I think, with all due 
respect, he is wrong on this issue.
  This country has a responsibility to treat these issues seriously. 
This country has a responsibility to lead in the area of preventing the 
spread of nuclear weapons. We don't lead in that regard by turning down 
or rejecting this treaty. There was a coup in Pakistan yesterday; we 
are told. We don't know the dimensions or consequences of it. Pakistan 
is a nuclear power. Pakistan and India are two countries that don't 
like each other. They exploded nuclear weapons, literally under each 
other's chin, within the last year. Is that a serious concern to the 
rest of the world? It is.
  Mr. INHOFE. Absolutely, if the Senator will yield.
  Mr. DORGAN. Are we going to lead and try to stop nuclear testing? Are 
we going to lead in trying to stop the spread of nuclear weapons? I 
hope so. I cast my vote to ratify this treaty, believing it is the best 
hope we have as a country to weigh in and be a leader, to say we want 
to stop the spread of nuclear weapons around the rest of the country.
  Mr. President, I see my friend from Arizona has also joined us. I 
came to speak about this Agriculture bill. I know my colleague from 
Illinois is waiting to address these issues as well.
  Mr. KYL. I wonder if I might prevail on the courtesy of the Senator 
for 30 seconds.
  Mr. DORGAN. Thirty seconds.
  Mr. KYL. The Senator asked a question which I think deserves an 
answer: Name one other treaty that had less time or more time than 
this. Here are the treaties: The Chemical Weapons Convention had 18 
hours allotted for it.
  Mr. DORGAN. Is that less than 14?
  Mr. KYL. That includes amendments.
  Mr. DORGAN. How many comprehensive hearings did that treaty have?
  Mr. KYL. If I could complete my answer to the Senator, which is that 
this treaty, pursuant to a request by the minority, had 14 hours 
associated with it, plus 4 hours per amendment, if there were 
amendments offered. There was an amendment offered on the Democratic 
side. The Democratic side used 2 hours allotted to them for that. The 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty had 6 hours, compared to 14 for 
the CTBT. The START Treaty had 9\1/2\ hours, about 6 hours less. The 
START II Treaty had 6 hours, and the CFE Flank Agreement, 2 hours. So 
every one of these treaties ended up having less time than the CTBT 
allotted for debate on the floor.
  All of last week was consumed by hearings in the Intelligence 
Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Senate Armed 
Services Committee; I don't know how many hours total. Prior to that 
time, the Government Operations Committee had three separate hearings. 
That is the specific answer to the Senator's question.
  Mr. DORGAN. One thing I hate in politics is losing an argument I am 
not having. The Senator from Arizona cites the number of hours this 
treaty or that treaty was considered on the floor of the Senate. I will 
bring to the floor this afternoon the compendium of action by the 
Senate on the range of arms control treaties, START I, START II, ABM, 
so on. What I will show is that in the committee of jurisdiction, there 
were days and days and days of comprehensive hearings and the length of 
time those treaties were considered, in terms of number of days on the 
floor of the Senate, were extensive. It allows the American people to 
be involved in this discussion and this debate. This approach, which 
treats a very serious issue, in my judgment, too lightly, says, let us 
not hold comprehensive hearings. I remind the Senator that the request 
from the minority was of the majority leader to hold comprehensive 
hearings, allow consideration, and allow a vote on this treaty. That is 
not the course the majority leader chose.
  Having said all that, I am happy to come back this afternoon. I feel 
passionately about this issue. We should talk about all the things the 
Senator from Oklahoma is raising. We haven't tested for 7 years, and we 
think this country is weaker because of it. I don't know how some 
people can sleep at night. North Korea is going to attack the Aleutian 
Islands with some missile. Our nuclear stockpile is unsafe, one Senator 
said the other day. The bombs in storage are unsafe. We have been 
storing nuclear weapons for over 40 years in this country. All of a 
sudden they are unsafe, on the eve of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-
Ban Treaty.

                          ____________________