[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 137 (Tuesday, October 12, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Page S12427]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                          AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED

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               THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY

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                  DASCHLE EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2291

  Mr. BIDEN (for Mr. Daschle) proposed an amendment to the resolution 
to advise and consent to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
(Treaty Document 105-28); as follows:

       Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the 
     following:

     ``SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS.

       The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the 
     Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, opened for signature 
     and signed by the United States at New York on September 24, 
     1996, including the following annexes and associated 
     documents, all such documents being integral parts of and 
     collectively referred to in this resolution as the 
     ``Treaty,'' (contained in Senate Treaty document 105-28), 
     subject to the conditions in section 2:
       (1) Annex 1 to the Treaty entitled ``List of States 
     Pursuant to Article II, Paragraph 28''.
       (2) Annex 2 to the Treaty entitled ``List of States 
     Pursuant to Article XIV''.
       (3) Protocol to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.
       (4) Annex 1 to the Protocol.
       (5) Annex 2 to the Protocol.

     SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.

       The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of 
     the Treaty is subject to the following conditions, which 
     shall be binding upon the President:
       (1) Stockpile stewardship program.--The United States shall 
     conduct a science-based Stockpile Stewardship program to 
     ensure that a high level of confidence in the safety and 
     reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile is 
     maintained, including the conduct of a broad range of 
     effective and continuing experimental programs.
       (2) Nuclear laboratory facilities and programs.--The United 
     States shall maintain modern nuclear laboratory facilities 
     and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear 
     technology that are designed to attract, retain, and ensure 
     the continued application of human scientific resources to 
     those programs on which continued progress in nuclear 
     technology depends.
       (3) Maintenance of nuclear testing capability.--The United 
     States shall maintain the basic capability to resume nuclear 
     test activities prohibited by the Treaty in the event that 
     the United States ceases to be obligated to adhere to the 
     Treaty.
       (4) Continuation of a comprehensive research and 
     development program.--The United States shall continue its 
     comprehensive research and development program to improve its 
     capabilities and operations for monitoring the Treaty.
       (5) Intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities.--
     The United States shall continue its development of a broad 
     range of intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities 
     and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive 
     information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons 
     development programs, and related nuclear programs.
       (6) Withdrawal under the ``supreme interests'' clause.--
       (A) Safety and reliability of the u.s. nuclear deterrent; 
     policy.--The United States--
       (i) regards continued high confidence in the safety and 
     reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile as a matter 
     affecting the supreme interests of the United States; and
       (ii) will regard any events calling that confidence into 
     question as ``extraordinary events related to the subject 
     matter of the Treaty'' under Article IX(2) of the Treaty.
       (B) Certification by secretary of defense and secretary of 
     energy.--Not later than December 31 of each year, the 
     Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, after 
     receiving the advice of--
       (i) the Nuclear Weapons Council (comprised of 
     representatives of the Department of Defense, the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Energy),
       (ii) the Directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories of 
     the Department of Energy, and
       (iii) the Commander of the United States Strategic Command,

     shall certify to the President whether the United States 
     nuclear weapons stockpile and all critical elements thereof 
     are, to a high degree of confidence, safe and reliable. Such 
     certification shall be forwarded by the President to Congress 
     not later than 30 days after submission to the President.
       (C) Recommendation whether to resume nuclear testing.--If, 
     in any calendar year, the Secretary of Defense and the 
     Secretary of Energy cannot make the certification required by 
     subparagraph (B), then the Secretaries shall recommend to the 
     President whether, in their opinion (with the advice of the 
     Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of the nuclear weapons 
     laboratories of the Department of Energy, and the Commander 
     of the United States Strategic Command), nuclear testing is 
     necessary to assure, with a high degree of confidence, the 
     safety and reliability of the United States nuclear weapons 
     stockpile.
       (D) Written certification; minority views.--In making the 
     certification under subparagraph (B) and the recommendations 
     under subparagraph (C), the Secretaries shall state the 
     reasons for their conclusions, and the views of the Nuclear 
     Weapons Council, the Directors of the nuclear weapons 
     laboratories of the Department of Energy, and the Commander 
     of the United States Strategic Command, and shall provide any 
     minority views.
       (E) Withdrawal from the treaty.--If the President 
     determines that nuclear testing is necessary to assure, with 
     a high degree of confidence, the safety and reliability of 
     the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, the President 
     shall consult promptly with the Senate and withdraw from the 
     Treaty pursuant to Article IX(2) of the Treaty in order to 
     conduct whatever testing might be required.

     

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