[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 137 (Tuesday, October 12, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12395-S12405]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent 
that Cline Crosier on my staff be granted the privilege of the floor 
for the remainder of the debate on this issue.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Madam President, it was interesting to 
hear my colleague from Delaware. He is correct. I remember those signs, 
``One hydrogen bomb could ruin your day.'' I think the reason we are 
here today is a second hydrogen bomb that ruined their day. I think we 
need to make sure they understand we have the capability to respond in 
kind with weapons that will work. I think that is really the subject of 
the debate.
  It takes a very confident person to criticize Edward Teller a little 
bit.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, if the Senator will yield, not on his 
scientific assessments, on his political judgment.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Right.
  The Senator from Delaware also said that if you can't verify the 
reliability or certify the reliability, you can always get out of the 
treaty. That is true. But my concern is, will it be too late to catch 
up at that point? How much time will have elapsed?
  I wonder sometimes how the results of the cold war might have come 
out had we yielded to all of the arms control pressures and adopted 
every arms control agreement exactly as it was pushed upon us, not only 
in the Senate but also in the House over the years. I look at arms 
control agreements in the 1960s and 1970s and 1980s. In spite of the 
fact we had a full-scale Soviet expansion throughout the world and 
full-scale nuclear buildup and absolutely no verification for the most 
part and cheating year after year, time after time we still pushed hard 
for these arms control agreements.
  Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for 30 seconds for me to respond? 
We did pass the ABM Treaty, SALT I treaty, the START I treaty, the INF 
Treaty, the CFE Treaty, and we did it during the cold war.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. And the Soviets violated every one of 
them.
  Mr. BIDEN. They seem to work.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. They work if you want to accept the fact 
that they violated it. We got lucky. That is the bottom line. As to the 
violations that President Reagan said trust but verify, in this 
particular case, I am not prepared to trust the North Koreans or the 
Libyans or the Iranians or the Iraqis or the Red Chinese, No. 1; and, 
No. 2, we cannot verify anything they are doing. That has been 
testified to over and over and over again.
  I rise in very strong opposition to this Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty and, in doing so, know full well that we have one of the 
greatest communicators and spinners in American history in the White 
House. The idea will be that this will become a political debate in 
that how could anyone not be in favor of or how could anybody be 
opposed to a comprehensive test ban where we would ban the testing of 
nuclear weapons. That is the way it will be spun.
  The answer is very simple. Because if you can't verify what the other 
side is doing, then you are at a disadvantage because we have the 
superiority of the arsenal. So if we don't verify that they are not 
testing, and we don't keep our stockpile up to speed because of that, 
and we don't know it is reliable and they do, then we are gradually 
losing that advantage. That is the issue.
  In spite of all the spin we will hear over the next day or two after 
this treaty is voted on, that is the crux of the issue. Let us separate 
the spin. Let us take the politics out of this. Let us take the spin 
out of it and go right to the heart of it. We can't verify what they 
do, and if our stockpile is not reliable because we don't test, they 
gain on us.

  The other point is, some of these nations, such as North Korea, might 
decide to test it on us and think nothing of it. Does anybody feel 
confident that the Iranians or the Iraqis would feel they had to test a 
nuclear weapon before they tried it on us? I don't feel that confident. 
I certainly don't think many in America do either. This treaty is wrong 
for our nuclear weapons program. It is wrong for America. It is wrong 
for the international community. It cannot be verified. It does not 
help us in maintaining our own stockpile.
  Time after time the past several weeks, I have heard members of the 
administration try to spin this issue and claim that every President 
since Eisenhower has sought a comprehensive test ban. Basically, that 
is an attempt to hide the truth, to fool the American people into 
thinking this treaty would have had unanimous support from all of those 
Presidents. It wouldn't have had the unanimous support of those 
Presidents. To make those of us who oppose this treaty look as if we 
are standing out on the fringes is simply wrong. Yet that is the way it 
is reported. That is the way it is written. That is the way it will be 
spun tonight, tomorrow, and the next day by members of the 
administration as they

[[Page S12396]]

move out on to the talk shows--at taxpayers' expense, I might add--and 
criticize those of us in the Senate who in good conscience vote against 
this treaty.
  What they haven't told the American people about these Presidents is 
that not one single President--not Eisenhower, not Kennedy, Johnson, 
Nixon, Carter, no one, not Reagan--no one until Bill Clinton ever 
proposed a test ban of zero yield and unlimited duration--zero yield, 
unlimited duration.
  In the past few days, the spin machines have been working overtime 
telling the American people this issue is far too critical to national 
security for the Senate to make such a rash decision on its 
ratification. The administration now wants to pull the treaty, saying 
we haven't had enough time to study it. For up until a week or two ago, 
they were pushing us for a vote on it.
  My colleague from Delaware mentioned the coup in Pakistan, did that 
bother me. No, frankly. I don't think it has a heck of a lot to do with 
this decision. I don't like to see coups anywhere. They contribute to 
the instability in the world. But it has nothing to do, in my view, 
with the issue before us.
  I would like to remind my colleagues, this treaty was signed by 
President Bill Clinton in 1996 and transmitted to the Senate in 1997. 
Over 2 years, we have had this treaty before us. One of the problems I 
have in the Senate is that it doesn't matter how much time you spend on 
something or how long something is before this body; the only time we 
try to get really involved in it is when we are about to vote on 
something. Then those who haven't done their homework want to come out 
here and say we need more time.
  We have had plenty of time. I have had 5 years of hearings on this 
issue. I chaired them myself and have listened to people testify for 
the past 5 years on this issue. I remind my colleagues, just a few 
months ago the minority threatened to hold up every single piece of 
legislation that came to the Senate floor until we agreed to have a 
vote on the test ban treaty. Now they are criticizing us because we are 
having one. It was President Clinton and the minority who demanded the 
treaty be brought before the Senate; it was President Clinton and the 
minority who urged consideration; and it was President Clinton and the 
minority who scolded the majority for failing to act on this issue. 
That was 2, 3 weeks ago.

  So when things go sour on the President, he has a unique way--and a 
very good way, frankly--of twisting things around to his benefit. We 
found that out here on the floor in a very important impeachment vote a 
few months ago. The President has been demanding a vote on this treaty 
for 2 years. Now he has it. But now it is our fault because he is not 
going to get the vote he wants. The President said in remarks on the 
50th anniversary of the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 
August, 1999--not too many months ago--``I ask the Senate to vote for 
ratification as soon as possible.'' That was 2 months ago. He asked the 
Senate, ``to give its advice and consent to the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty this year.''
  The problem with the President is, he wants us to give consent, but 
he doesn't like our advice. That is the problem. The Constitution 
requires both advice and consent. This President needs to learn that 
the Senate is here to advise, and if you want the consent, then you 
need to advise and discuss. That is part of the process. It is part of 
the process in treaties, and it is part of the process in judicial 
nominations, and it is part of the process in other appointments in his 
administration. After 7 years, almost, he still hasn't learned that.
  In his State of the Union, in 1998, President Clinton said, ``Approve 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty this year.'' That was last year. The 
Vice President, Mr. Gore, said, ``The U.S. Congress should act now to 
ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.'' That now was July 23, 1998.
  Now, because the votes are going against him, he is now saying we 
need more time, don't vote now. It is just spin at its best, and he is 
good at it; there is no question about it. That was pure partisan 
politics because when the majority leader finally consented and offered 
to bring the treaty to the floor, it was objected to. Let's remind the 
American people of that. You can bet the President is not going to 
remind them of that. This treaty was objected to when the majority 
leader asked to bring it to the floor. Then he offered a second time to 
bring the treaty to the floor and this body agreed by unanimous consent 
to a debate and a vote.
  Let me say again: Unanimously, we agreed to a debate and a vote.
  The minority party had ample opportunity at that time to object on 
the grounds that we haven't had enough time to study the treaty. Why 
didn't they say so then? Because the answer is, that is not the issue. 
We have had plenty of time to study the treaty. ``We haven't had enough 
time to have hearings,'' they said. The minority leader objected. Once 
the President sensed he was going to lose the vote, the spin machine 
began and he tried to figure out a way not to vote on what the 
President urged us so desperately to schedule in the first place--to 
avoid the vote he asked us to have.
  I agreed with the President then that this treaty deserved 
consideration by the Senate. I wish we had more chance to advise, but 
he didn't choose that. So he asked for our consent. As it turns out, we 
are not going to give it to him. That is our constitutional right. It 
should not be spun and changed. It should be truthfully debated. We are 
all accountable. Some have said they don't want to vote on this treaty. 
I am not one of those people. We are here to be held accountable; we 
are here to vote. That is why we are here. If we disagree, we can vote 
against it. If we agree, we can vote for it.

  My objection to this treaty is not based on partisan politics; it is 
based on careful, thoughtful study of the treaty and its implications 
both here in the United States and around the world. I believe the 
world will be more unstable--contrary to the feelings of my colleague 
from Delaware--not a more stable place, and America's nuclear deterrent 
capability will become more unreliable than at any time in the history 
of America if this treaty were to be ratified.
  There are three points that would support that argument:
  One, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not verifiable.
  Two, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will not stop proliferation.
  Three--and perhaps most important--the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
puts our nuclear arsenal at risk.
  My job as chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee is to oversee that 
arsenal. I have been out to the labs, and I have had 5 or 6 years of 
hearings on these issues. Others will discuss the first two points in 
more depth than I will, and some have already. Let me focus on the 
third concern, which is that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not 
verifiable.
  Last week, we saw reports in the media that the CIA admitted they 
were unable to verify key tests that may even be taking place today. We 
can't base our national security on an ability --which arguably may not 
exist--to detect an adversary's covert activity, and that the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will not stop proliferation. We already 
have a treaty in place to do that, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This 
treaty has been violated repeatedly, over and over, year after year, by 
rogue nations that don't respect international law.
  Do you think, with this kind of treaty, that every nation is going to 
have this great respect for international law and they are going to 
allow us total access to their country to verify this? When are we ever 
going to learn? Some have mentioned how futile the treaty would be in 
asking rogue nations not to test the same nuclear weapons they promised 
not to develop in the first place under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
And it is false hope that our adversaries will abide by international 
law if we just promise to do this treaty.
  As I mentioned, the safety and reliability of the nuclear arsenal is 
my most serious concern. Rather than relying solely on the good 
intentions of other countries--and they may be good or they may not 
be--or on our ability to detect violations by other countries, my 
concern is ensuring that we remain capable of providing the safeguard 
and nuclear deterrent that won the cold war. That is what won the cold 
war--

[[Page S12397]]

the fact that other nations knew what would happen. They knew what 
would happen if they messed with us; we had the arsenal.
  The linchpin of this treaty, as I see it, is whether or not you 
believe the United States can maintain a safe, credible, and reliable 
nuclear arsenal, given a zero-yield ban in perpetuity. The Stockpile 
Stewardship Program is really at the heart of this matter. If you think 
that we can have a reliable nuclear arsenal, with a zero-yield ban, in 
perpetuity, you should be for this treaty. Even the Secretary of 
Defense, William Cohen, has illustrated this point. This was 2 days 
ago. I want this to be listened to carefully. During testimony before 
the Armed Services Committee.

       Senator Snowe. Would you support ratification of this 
     treaty without the Stockpile Stewardship Program?
       Secretary Cohen. No.
       Senator Snowe. No? So then, obviously, you are placing a 
     great deal of confidence in this program.
       Secretary Cohen. I oppose a unilateral moratorium, without 
     some method of testing for the safety and security and 
     reliability of our nuclear force. The question right now is, 
     does the Stockpile Stewardship Program give us that 
     assurance? If there is doubt about it, then, obviously, you 
     would say we cannot rely upon it and we should go back to 
     testing.

  Let me repeat that last line:

       If there is doubt about it, then, obviously, you would say 
     we cannot rely upon it and we should go back to testing.

  Well, that is a critical point. Which of us would knowingly ratify a 
treaty that was advertised to put the safety, reliability, and 
credibility of the United States nuclear deterrent stockpile at risk 
and place the lives of the American people at risk? None of us would do 
that. Certainly not us, not the Secretary, not anybody. But that is the 
linchpin. If you believe in the Stockpile Stewardship Program, a series 
of computer simulations and laser experiments--that is what the program 
is, that we don't need to test, and that we do these computer tests and 
laser experiments--if you think that can sufficiently guarantee the 
safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons program, without testing 
of any kind forever--forever--then you should vote for the treaty 
because that is what this is about. As the Senator from Delaware said, 
you can get out of the treaty, but if you don't like what is going on, 
then it is too late.
  If, however, you do not believe that the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program can sufficiently guarantee the safety and reliability of our 
nuclear weapons programs, then you should vote against the treaty.
  Well--as Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, I have 
oversight of all three of the Nation's nuclear laboratories--Los 
Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia. I have been to the labs, I have 
seen the computer simulations, I have talked with the physicists and 
programmers. Just last February Senator Landrieu and I traveled to 
Lawrence Livermore Lab for a field hearing and a very productive set of 
tours and briefings.
  Based on my experience--based on what I've seen, I don't have the 
confidence that the Stockpile Stewardship Program can sufficiently 
guarantee the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons arsenal--
forever--without any testing of any kind.
  But don't just take my word for it--after all I'm not a physicist--
I'm not a nuclear lab director. To settle the question about whether 
this Stockpile Stewardship Program can guarantee the safety and 
reliability of our nuclear weapons, we must turn to those lab 
directors, the men directly responsible for administering, executing, 
and overseeing the Stockpile Program.
  Those three gentlemen testified before the Armed Services Committee 
just last week, and I think it is absolutely critical to share that 
testimony with my colleagues as we debate this treaty.
  Dr. John Browne, Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, had this 
to say about the condition and reliability of the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program:

       Maintaining the safety and reliability of our nuclear 
     weapons without nuclear testing is an unprecedented technical 
     challenge.
       The Stockpile Stewardship Program is working successfully 
     toward this goal, but it is a work in progress.
       There are simply too many processes in a nuclear explosion 
     involving too much physics detail to perform a complete 
     calculation. At present, with the most powerful 
     supercomputers on Earth, we know that we are not doing 
     calculations with sufficient accuracy and with sufficient 
     detail to provide maximum confidence in the stockpile.
       We know that we do not adequately understand instabilities 
     that occur during the implosion process and we are concerned 
     about the aging of high explosives and plutonium that could 
     necessitate remanufacture of the stockpile.
       We do not know the details of how this complex, 
     artificially produced metal (plutonium) ages, including 
     whether pits fail gradually, giving us time to replace them 
     with newly manufactured ones, or whether they fail 
     catastrophically in a short time interval that would render 
     many of our weapons unreliable at once.
       It is important to note that even with a complete set of 
     tools we will not be able to confirm all aspects of weapons 
     safety and performance. Nuclear explosions produce pressures 
     and temperatures that cannot be duplicated in any current or 
     anticipated laboratory facility. Some processes simply cannot 
     be experimentally studied on a small scale because they 
     depend on the specific configuration of material at the time 
     of the explosion.
       On the basis of our experience in the last 4 years, we 
     continue to be optimistic that we can maintain our nuclear 
     weapons without testing. However, we have identified many 
     issues that increase risk and lower our level of confidence.

  Dr. Bruce Tarter, Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
testified:

       We have not been able to meet the deadlines of the 
     program as we thought we could.
       It (the stockpile stewardship program) hasn't been 
     perfect--the challenge lies in the longer term.
       The stockpile stewardship program is an excellent bet--but 
     it's not a sure thing.

  Dr. Paul Robinson, director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, which 
is responsible for the engineering of more than 90 percent of the 
component parts of all U.S. nuclear warheads, provided an even more 
ominous testimony.

       There is no question from a technical point of view, actual 
     testing of designs to confirm their performance is the 
     desired regimen for any high-technology device.
       For a device as highly consequential as a nuclear weapon, 
     testing of the complete system both when it is first 
     developed and periodically throughout its lifetime to ensure 
     that aging effects do not invalidate its performance, is also 
     the preferred methodology.
       I could not offer a proof, nor can anyone, that such an 
     alternative means of certifying the adequacy of the U.S. 
     stockpile will be successful. I believe then as I do now that 
     it may be possible to develop the stockpile stewardship 
     approach as a substitute for nuclear testing for keeping 
     previously tested nuclear weapon designs safe and reliable. 
     However, this undertaking is an enormous challenge which no 
     one should underestimate, and will carry a higher level of 
     risk than at any time in the past.
       The difficulty we face is that we cannot today guarantee 
     that stockpile stewardship will be ultimately successful; nor 
     can we guarantee that it will be possible to prove that it is 
     successful.
       Confidence in the reliability and safety of the U.S. 
     nuclear weapons stockpile will eventually decline without 
     nuclear testing.
       The stockpile stewardship program--though essential for 
     continual certification of the stockpile--does not provide a 
     guarantee of perpetual certifiability.
       I have always said actual testing is preferred method--to 
     do otherwise is acceptable risk.
       I cannot ensure the program will mature in time to ensure 
     safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile in 
     the future.
       I have always felt if you are betting your country--you 
     better be conservative.

  I find this testimony absolutely chilling. I am not willing to ``Bet 
my country'' on the stockpile stewardship program. America's lab 
directors who are directly responsible for the execution of the 
stockpile stewardship program testified before Congress that this 
program cannot guarantee the future security or stability or our 
nuclear weapons. I am not willing to accept any risk. I will not risk 
the lies of the American people on a program who's director--empowered 
by the President with the responsibility for running that program--are 
so very uncertain about its reliability.
  On the basis of the expert testimony of these three lab Directors 
alone, if any Senators had any doubt about how they would vote on this 
treaty--it should now be gone!
  And I cannot for the life of me understand why the President would 
ask the Senate to ratify a treaty that lives or dies based on the 
stockpile stewardship program--a program that our lab Directors are 
telling us they cannot guarantee!

  If we ratify this treaty, there is a very high probability we will 
have to start looking for a way out of it within 10-15 years--maybe 
even sooner. I don't

[[Page S12398]]

understand entering into a treaty you know full well you may have to 
pull out of almost as soon as it goes into effect.
  Now, supporters of the treaty will point out that if in fact the lab 
Directors, and the Secretary of Energy all agree in 10 years that the 
stockpile stewardship isn't working, the President, in consultation 
with Congress, can just pull us out of the treaty.
  Well, treaties tend to take on a life of their own, and I do not 
believe it would be that easy. Just look at the ABM Treaty of 1972. Our 
co-signer, the U.S.S.R. doesn't even exist anymore, and although there 
is overwhelming agreement between the defense and intelligence 
communities, and the American public, that our national interests are 
at stake, the President still opposes pulling out of the ABM Treaty!
  The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty of 1968 are two more examples. These treaties have both been 
violated. But have we pulled out of either one despite the legal right 
to do so--absolutely not!
  My friends and colleagues, it makes no sense to ratify a treaty that 
our own nuclear experts tell us we may have to negotiate a way out of 
within a decade.
  This treaty is dangerous and ill-advised. It places our nuclear 
stockpile, and hence our nuclear deterrent capability, at considerable 
risk. This treaty is bad for America, and it is bad for the 
international community, and I will vote against it.
  That is if I'm given the opportunity to vote against it. While Senate 
Democrats and the White House are back pedaling furiously, some in the 
Senate are anxious to rescue them from their miscalculation and deliver 
them from a major legislative defeat. It might be tempting to view this 
as a ``win-win'' situation for those who oppose the treaty. The 
reasoning goes like this: If we effectively kill this flawed treaty 
without a vote, we will have forced the White House to back down, and 
have won without letting the White House accuse us of killing the 
treaty. This is superficially appealing. But it is a strategy for, at 
best, a half-victory, and at worst, a partial defeat.
  Postponing a vote on the CTBT will allow the White House to claim 
victory in saving the treaty, and will allow the White House to 
continue to spin the American people by blaming opponents for not 
ratifying the treaty. There is no conservative victory in that.
  Every single Senator knows today how he or she will vote on this 
treaty. More debate and more hearings won't change that. It's time to 
put partisan politics aside and stand firm on our beliefs. The die is 
cast, and Republicans and Democrats alike have staked out their 
positions. It's time for Senators to stand by those positions and vote 
their conscience. Mr. President, I oppose postponing the vote on this 
treaty, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS. I feel obliged to observe that the United States has 
already flirted with an end to nuclear testing--from 1958 to 1961. It 
bears remembering that the nuclear moratorium ultimately was judged to 
constitute an unacceptable risk to the nation's security, and was 
terminated after just three years. On the day that President Kennedy 
ended the ban--March 2, 1962--he addressed the American people and 
said:

       We know enough about broken negotiations, secret 
     preparations, and the advantages gained from a long test 
     series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium. Some 
     urge us to try it again, keeping our preparations to test in 
     a constant state of readiness. But in actual practice, 
     particularly in a society of free choice, we cannot keep top 
     flight scientists concentrating on the preparation of an 
     experiment which may or may not take place on an uncertain 
     date in the future. Nor can large technical laboratories be 
     kept fully alert on a standby basis waiting for some other 
     nation to break an agreement. This is not merely difficult or 
     inconvenient--we have explored this alternative thoroughly 
     and found it impossible of execution.

  This statement is very interesting. It makes clear that the 
fundamental problems posed by a test ban remain unchanged over the past 
27 years. The United States certainly faces a Russian Federation that 
is engaging in ``secret preparations'' and likely is engaging in 
clandestine nuclear tests relating to the development of brand-new, 
low-yield nuclear weapons. The United States, on the other hand, cannot 
engage in such nuclear modernization while adhering to the CTBT.
  Likewise, the Senate is faced with the same verification problem that 
it encountered in 1962. As both of President Clinton's former 
intelligence chiefs have warned, low-yield testing is undetectable by 
seismic sensors. Nor does the United States have any reasonable chance 
of mobilizing the ludicrously high number of votes needed under the 
treaty to conduct an on-site inspection. In other words, the treaty is 
unverifiable and there is no chance that cheaters will ever be caught.
  This is not my opinion. This is a reality, given that 30 of 51 
countries on the treaty's governing board must approve any on-site 
inspection. Even the President's own senior arms controller--John 
Holum--complained in 1996 that ``treaty does not contain . . . our 
position that on-site inspections should proceed automatically unless 
two-thirds of the Executive Council vote ``no.'' Instead of an 
automatic green light for inspections, the U.S. got exactly the 
opposite of what it requested.
  But most importantly, in 1962 President Kennedy correctly noted that 
the inability to test has a pernicious and corrosive effect--not just 
upon the weapons themselves (which cannot be fully remanufactured under 
such circumstances)--but upon the nation's nuclear infrastructure. Our 
confidence in the nuclear stockpile is eroding even as we speak. Again, 
this is not my opinion. It is a fact which has been made over and over 
again by the nation's senior weapons experts.
  In 1995, the laboratory directors compiled the following two charts 
which depict two simple facts: (1) that even with a successful science-
based program, confidence will not be as high as it could be with 
nuclear testing; and (2) even if the stockpile stewardship program is 
completely successful by 2010, the United States will not be able to 
design new weapons, and will not be able to make certain types of 
nuclear safety assessments and stockpile replacements.
  Senators will notice that, on both charts, there is mention of ``HN'' 
(e.g. hydronuclear) and 500 ton tests. The laboratory directors, in a 
joint statement to the administration in 1995, said: ``A strong 
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program is necessary to underwrite 
confidence. A program of 500-ton experiments would significantly reduce 
the technical risks.''
  This judgment has not changed over the past several years. Both 
weapons laboratory directors stated in 1997 that nuclear testing would 
give the United States greater confidence in the stockpile.
  So as I listen to these claims that the United States is ``out of the 
testing business,'' I make two basic observations. First, we are only 
out of the testing business because President Clinton has taken us out. 
There is no legal barrier today to conducting stockpile experiments. 
The reason is purely political. Indeed, the White House is using 
circular logic. The United States is not testing because the White 
House supports the test ban treaty; but the White House is claiming 
that because we are not testing, we should support the treaty.
  Second, I remind all that the United States thought it was out of the 
testing business in 1958, only to discover how badly we had 
miscalculated. President Kennedy not only ended the 3-year moratorium, 
but embarked upon the most aggressive test series in the history of the 
weapons program. If Senators use history as their guide, they will 
realize that the CTBT is a serious threat to the national security of 
the United States.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my very grave 
concerns over the path down which we are heading. The United States 
Senate is on the verge of voting down a treaty the intent of which is 
consistent with U.S. national security objectives, but the letter and 
timing of which are fraught with serious implications for our security 
over the next decade.
  Mr. President, I will vote against ratifying the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty. This is not a vote I take lightly. I am not ideologically 
opposed to arms control, having voted to ratify the START Treaty and 
the Chemical Weapons Convention. But, my concerns about the flaws in 
this Treaty's drafting and in the administration's plan for

[[Page S12399]]

maintaining the viability of the stockpile leave me no other choice.
  On October 5, Henry Kissinger, John Deutch and Brent Scowcroft wrote 
to the majority and minority leaders stating their serious concerns 
with the Senate's voting on the treaty so far in advance of our being 
able to implement its provisions and relying solely on the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program. They noted that ``. . . few, if any, of the 
benefits envisaged by the treaty's advocates could be realized by 
Senate ratification now. At the same time, there could be real costs 
and risks to a broad range of national security interests--including 
our nonproliferation objectives--if [the] Senate acts prematurely.'' 
These are sage words that should not be taken lightly by either party 
in the debate on ratification.
  In the post-cold-war era, a strong consensus exists that 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our single greatest 
national security concern. Unfortunately, a ban on nuclear testing, 
especially when verification issues are so poorly addressed, as in this 
treaty, will not prevent other countries from developing nuclear 
weapons. A number of countries have made major strides in developing 
nuclear weapons without testing. South Africa and Pakistan both built 
nuclear stockpiles without testing; North Korea may very well have one 
or two crude nuclear weapons sufficient for its purposes; and Iraq was 
perilously close to becoming a nuclear state at the time it invaded 
Kuwait. Iran has an active nuclear weapons program, and Brazil and 
Argentina were far along in their programs before they agreed to 
terminate them. Testing is not necessary to have very good confidence 
that a first generation nuclear weapon will work, as the detonation 
over Hiroshima, utilizing a design that had never been tested, 
demonstrated more than half-a-century ago.
  Whenever an arms control agreement is debated, the issue of 
verification rightly assumes center stage. That is entirely 
appropriate, as the old adage that arms control works best when it is 
needed least continues to hold true. That the leaders of Great Britain, 
France, and Germany support ratification is less important than what is 
going on inside the heads of the leaders of Russia, China, India, 
Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. We don't need arms control 
agreements with our friends; we pursue arms control as a way of 
minimizing the threat from those countries that may not have our 
national interests at heart. Some of the countries with active nuclear 
weapons programs clearly fall into that category. On that count, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty falls dangerously short.
  In order to fully comprehend the complexity of the verification 
issue, it is important to understand the distinction between monitoring 
and verifying. Monitoring is a technical issue. It is the use of a 
variety of means of gather information--in other words, detecting that 
an event took place. Verification, however, is a political process.
  Even if we assume that compliance with the treaty can be monitored--
and I believe very strongly, based in part on the CIA's recent 
assessment, that that is not the case--we are left with the age-old 
question posed most succinctly some 40 years ago by Fred Ikle: After 
Detection--What? What are we to make of a verification regime that is 
far from prepared to handle the challenges it will confront. For 
example, we are potentially years from an agreement among signatories 
on what technologies will be employed for monitoring purposes. More 
importantly, the treaty requires 30 disparate countries to agree to a 
challenge on-site inspection when 19 allies couldn't agree on how to 
conduct air strikes against Yugoslavia?
  Furthermore, we are being asked to accept arguments on verification 
by an administration that swept under the rug one of the most egregious 
cases of proliferation this decade, the November 1992 Chinese transfer 
of M-11 missiles to Pakistan, and that continues to cling tenaciously 
to the ABM Treaty despite the scale of global change that has occurred 
over the last 10 years.
  In determining whether to support this treaty at this time, it is 
essential that we examine the continued importance of nuclear weapons 
to our national security. Last week's testimony by our nuclear weapons 
lab directors that the Stockpile Stewardship Program will not be a 
reliable alternative to nuclear testing for five to 10 years is a clear 
and unequivocal statement that ratification of this treaty is 
dangerously premature. General John Vessey noted in his letter to the 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee that the unique role of the 
United States in ensuring the ultimate security of our friends and 
allies, obviating their requirement for nuclear forces in the process, 
remains dependent upon our maintenance of a modern, safe and reliable 
nuclear deterrent. As General Vessey pointed out, ``the general 
knowledge that the United States would do whatever was necessary to 
maintain that condition certainly reduced the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons during the period and added immeasurably to the security 
cooperation with our friends and allies.'' This sentiment was also 
expressed by former Secretaries of Defense Schlesinger, Cheney, 
Carlucci, Weinberger, Rumsfeld, and Laird, when they emphasized the 
importance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and its deterrent value 
relative not just to nuclear threats, but to chemical and biological 
ones as well.

  The immensely important role that a viable nuclear deterrent 
continues to play in U.S. national security strategy requires the 
United States to be able to take measures relative to our nuclear 
stockpile that are currently precluded by the Test Ban Treaty. Our 
stockpile is older today than at any previous time and has far fewer 
types of warheads--a decrease from 30 to nine--than it did 15 years 
ago. A fault in one will require removing all of that category from the 
stockpile. The military typically grounds or removes from service all 
of a specific weapons system or other equipment when a serious problem 
is detected. Should they act differently with nuclear warheads? 
Obviously not.
  Finally, this treaty will actually prevent us from making our nuclear 
weapons safer. Without testing, we will not be able to make essential 
safety improvements to our aging stockpile--a stockpile that has 
already gone seven years without being properly and thoroughly tested.
  I hope the time does arrive when a comprehensive ban on nuclear 
testing will be consistent with our national security requirements. We 
are simply not yet there. I will consider supporting a treaty when 
alternative means of ensuring safety and reliability are proven, and 
when a credible verification regime is proposed. Until then, the risks 
inherent in the administration's program preclude my adopting a more 
favorable stance.
  These are the reasons that I must vote against ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at this time. The viability of our 
nuclear deterrent is too central to our national security to rush 
approval of a treaty that cannot be verified and that will facilitate 
the decline of that deterrent. Preferably, this vote would be delayed 
until a more appropriate time, but, barring that, I cannot support 
ratification right now.
  The operative phrase, though, is ``right now.'' The concept of a 
global ban on testing has considerable merit. Defeating the treaty 
would not only imperil our prospects of attaining that objective at 
some future point, it would in all likelihood send a green light to 
precisely those nations we least want to see test that it is now okay 
to do so. Such a development, I think we can all agree, is manifestly 
not in our national interest.
  In articulating his reasons for continuing to conduct nuclear tests, 
then-President Kennedy stated that, ``If our weapons are to be more 
secure, more flexible in their use and more selective in their impact--
if we are to be alert to new breakthroughs, to experiment with new 
designs--if we are to maintain our scientific momentum and leadership--
then our weapons progress must not be limited to theory or to the 
confines of laboratories and caves.'' This is not an obsolete 
sentiment. It rings as true today as when President Kennedy uttered 
those words 37 years ago.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, today the Senate debates an arms control 
treaty of idealistic intent, vague applicability, and undetermined 
effects. Given today's state of scientific, geopolitical and military 
affairs, I must vote against the resolution of ratification of

[[Page S12400]]

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a treaty that will lower confidence 
in our strategic deterrent while creating an international regime that 
does not guarantee an increase in this country's security.
  On balance--and these matters are often concluded on balance, as 
rarely are we faced with clear-cut options--it is my reasoned 
conclusion that the CTBT does not advance the security of this nation.
  Some people think that, by passing the CTBT, we will be preventing 
the horrors of nuclear war in the future. There is great emotional 
content to this argument.
  But in deliberations about a matter so grave, I had to apply a 
rational, logical analysis to the affairs of nations as I see them. 
And, on reflecting on half a century of the nuclear era, I can only 
conclude that it is the nuclear strategic deterrent of this country 
that is the single most important factor in explaining why this country 
has not been challenged in a major military confrontation on our 
territory. We emerged victorious from the cold war without ever 
engaging in a global ``hot'' war.
  Despite the security we have bought with our nuclear deterrent, the 
world we live in today is more dangerous than the cold war era. Today, 
we are faced with the emergence of new international threats. These 
include rogue states, such as Iraq, Sudan, and North Korea; 
independent, substate international terrorists, such as Osama bin 
Laden; and international criminal organizations that may facilitate 
funds and, perhaps, nuclear materials to flow between these actors. 
Some of these actors, of course, can and have developed the ``poor 
man's'' nukes, as they are called: biological and chemical weapons.
  It is to the credit of the serious proponents of this treaty that 
they have not argued that this treaty can effectively prevent these new 
actors on the global scene from developing primitive nuclear weapons--
which can be built without tests. The CTBT does not prevent them from 
stealing or buying tactical nuclear weapons that slip unsecured out of 
Russian arsenals. The CTBT cannot prevent or even detect low-yield 
testing by rogue states which have a record of acting like treaties 
aren't worth the paper they're written on. These are the threats we 
face today.
  In this new threat environment, the proponents of this treaty suggest 
that we abandon testing to determine the reliability of our weapons, to 
increase their safety, and to modernize our arsenal.
  Yet we have recent historical evidence that our nuclear deterrent is 
a key factor in dealing with at least some of these actors. Recall 
that, in the gulf war, Saddam Hussein did not use his chemical and 
biological weapons against the international coalition. This was not 
because Saddam Hussein was respecting international norms. It was 
solely because he knew the United States had a credible nuclear 
deterrent that we reserved the right to use.
  Proponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty argue that scientific 
tests at the sub-critical level can replace testing as the methodology 
to ensure the reliability and safety of our nuclear arsenal, which, we 
all know, has not been tested since 1992. The question of reliability 
of our deterrent is absolutely essential to this nation's security. And 
yet the proponents of our science-based alternative program to 
testing--known as the Stockpile Stewardship Program--all acknowledge 
that this critical replacement to testing is not in place today and 
will not be fully developed until sometime in the next decade.
  Even if the Stockpile Stewardship Program is fully operational in 
2005, as the most optimistic representations suggest, that will be more 
than 10 years since we have had our last tests. After a decade of no 
testing, the confidence in our weapons will have declined. Throughout 
this period, we will be relying on a scientific regime whose evolution 
and effectiveness we can only hope for.
  This is the concern of numerous national security experts, and their 
conclusions were not supportive of the CTBT. Addressing this central 
issue, six former Secretaries of defense (Schlesinger, Cheney, 
Carlucci, Weinberger, Rumsfeld, Laird) said:

       The Stockpile Stewardship Program, which will not be mature 
     for at least 10 years, will improve our scientific 
     understanding of nuclear weapons and would likely mitigate 
     the decline in our confidence in the safety and reliability 
     of our arsenal. We will never know whether we should trust 
     the Stockpile Stewardship if we cannot conduct tests to 
     calibrate the unproven new techniques.

  Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former National Security 
Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and former Director of Central Intelligence 
John Deutch said recently:

       But the fact is that the scientific case simply has not 
     been made that, over the long term, the United States can 
     ensure the nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing . . . 
     The Stockpile Stewardship Program is not sufficiently mature 
     to evaluate the extent to which it can be a suitable 
     alternative to testing.

  I hasten to point out that the experts who have spoken against the 
CTBT have served in Republican and Democratic Administrations. 
Secretary Kissinger served in the Nixon administration, for example, 
which negotiated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty banning tests above 150 
kilotons. This treaty was ratified during the Bush Administration. John 
Deutch, as we all know, was head of the CIA in the present 
Administration.
  I support the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and will continue to 
support it. There may be a day when my colleagues and I can be 
convinced that science-based technology can ensure the reliability and 
safety of our arsenal to a level that matches what we learn through 
testing. That would be a time to responsibly consider a Comprehensive 
Test Ban. And that time is not now.
  This central point on the reliability of our nuclear deterrent has 
not escaped the public's view of the current debate. Utahns have 
approached me on both sides of the argument.
  Yes, we have seen numerous polls that suggest that the public 
supports the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. When people are asked, ``do 
you support a global ban on nuclear testing?'' majorities respond 
affirmatively. However, when people are asked, as some more specific 
polls have done, ``Do you believe our nuclear arsenal has kept this 
country free from attack?'' the majority always answers overwhelmingly 
affirmatively. When asked whether we need to continue to rely on a 
nuclear deterrent, the answer is always overwhelmingly affirmative, as 
it is when the public is asked whether we need to maintain reliability 
in our nuclear deterrent. Once again, I find the public more 
sophisticated than they are often given credit for.
  When I speak with people about the limits of monitoring this global 
ban, and the numerous methods and technologies available to parties 
that wish to evade detection, confidence in the CTBT falls even lower. 
The fact is--and, once again, the proponents of the treaty concede 
this--that a zero-yield test ban treaty is unverifiable.
  Small but militarily significant tests--that is, 500-ton tests, 
significant to the development and improvement of nuclear weapons--will 
not always be detectable. Higher yield tests--such as 5 kilotons--can 
be disguised by the techniques known as ``decoupling,'' where 
detonations are set in larger, either natural or specially constructed, 
subterranean settings.
  Today we are uncertain about a series of suspicious events that have 
occurred recently in Russia, a country that has not signed the CTBT. 
Some Russian officials have suggested that they would interpret the 
CTBT to allow for certain levels of nuclear tests, a view inimical to 
the Clinton administration's proponents of the CTBT. These are 
troubling questions, Mr. President, which should cast great doubt on 
the hopes of the proponents of the CTBT.
  But the proponents say, under a CTBT regime we could demand an on-
site inspection. But the on-site inspection regime is, by the terms of 
the treaty, weak. It is a ``red-light'' system, which means that 
members of the Executive Council of the Conference of States Parties 
must vote to get affirmative permission to inspect--and the vote will 
require a super-majority of 30 of 51 members of the Council for 
permission to conduct an inspection. The terms of the treaty allow for 
numerous obstructions by a member subject to inspection. Some of these 
codified instructions appear to have come out of

[[Page S12401]]

Saddam Hussein's play book for defeating UNSCOM.
  Some have suggested that Senate rejection of this treaty, which seems 
likely, will undermine this country's global leadership. It is said 
that, if we fail to ratify, critical states will not ratify the treaty. 
This assertion strikes me as highly suppositious.
  Since the end of World War II, there are very few instances of the 
United States using its nuclear threat explicitly. Besides the Soviet 
Union, locked in a bipolar global competition with us until its 
collapse in 1991, other nations' decision to develop nuclear programs 
were based, not on following ``U.S. leadership,'' but on their 
perception of regional balances of power, or on their desire to 
establish global status with a strategic weapon. Their decisions to 
cease testing will be similarly based.

  The CTBT, it is argued, will prevent China from further modernizing 
its nuclear forces. It would be more accurate, in my opinion, to state 
that the treaty, if it works as its proponents wish, may constrain 
China from testing the designs for nuclear warheads it has gained 
through espionage. The debate over future military developments always 
hinges on the distinction between intentions and capabilities. China's 
current nuclear capabilities are modest, although it has a handful of 
warheads and the means to deliver them to the North American continent.
  But I have to ask: Are the analysts in the Clinton administration 
confident that China's intentions are consistent with a view embodied 
in the CTBT that would lock China into substantive nuclear inferiority 
to the United States?
  Is that what their espionage was about? Or their veiled threats--such 
as the famous ``walk-in'' in 1995, when a PRC agent showed us their 
new-found capabilities? And how about the PRC's explicit threat to rain 
missiles on Los Angeles? That was a reflection on intentions.
  Those of us who study intentions and capabilities of such a key 
geopolitical competitor as China know that their capabilities are far 
inferior to us. But you have to wonder, based on their statements and 
other actions, whether the Chinese are willing to accept the current 
strategic balance that would be locked in with the CTBT.
  And, does it make sound strategic sense for the defense of our 
country that the United States, in effect, unilaterally disarms our 
technological superiority by freezing our ability to modernize and 
test?
  When we freeze our deterrent capability, we are, in effect, 
abandoning America's technological edge and mortgaging that 
deteriorating edge on the belief and hope that all of our geopolitical 
competitors will do the same. This reflects a view of the world that is 
far more optimistic than I believe is prudent. A substantial dose of 
skepticism should be required when thinking about the defense of our 
country.
  To address these concerns, the administration has waived ``Safeguard 
F,'' which it will attach to the treaty. This addendum states that it 
is its understanding that if the Secretaries of Defense and Energy 
inform the President that ``a high level of confidence in the safety or 
reliability of a nuclear weapon type which the two Secretaries consider 
to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, 
the President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared to 
withdraw from the CTBT under the standard ``supreme national 
interests'' clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be 
required.''
  This vaguely worded escape clause is the manifestation of what is 
known in international law as rebus sic stantibus. This famous 
expression is attributed to Bismark, who declared: ``At the bottom of 
every treaty is written in invisible ink--rebus sic stantibus--`until 
circumstances change'.'' This is a recognition common in international 
law, and now manifest in black-and-white in ``Safeguard F,'' that 
agreements hold only as long as the fundamental conditions and 
expectations that existed at the time of their creation hold.
  The fundamental conditions that the CTBT seeks to address are where 
my fundamental reservations lie. There are too many factors that we 
cannot control and that will not be restrained by the best intentions 
of a testing freeze.
  The world is changing, and alliances are subtly changing. 
Geopolitical competitors such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea 
are undergoing radical--radical--social changes that are demonstrably 
affecting their governments, foreign policies, and militaries. An 
agreement on a test ban freeze today does not reconcile with these 
realities.
  Even the most stalwart proponents of the treaty can only argue that 
U.S. ratification of the treaty may influence other states' behaviors. 
That is a hope, not a certainty. The need for a reliable nuclear 
deterrent, last tested in 1992, remains a certainty. I firmly believe 
that the CTBT will not control these external realities. While some 
countries may see a test ban regime in their interests, others, 
motivated not by the norms we hope for in the international community, 
but by the more historic realities of national interest and 
competition, may not.
  The timing is simply wrong to pass this treaty. The science has not 
been sufficiently reassuring, and global developments have not been 
encouraging.
  I must admit that my ongoing concerns about this administration's 
understanding of the world do not promote confidence in their support 
for this treaty. Under this administration, we have seen a precipitous 
decline in the funding of the military; we have seen an unacceptable 
resistance to missile defense; we have seen that it was Congress that 
had to promote sanctions on nuclear and missile proliferation from 
Russian firms spreading nuclear and missile technology to rough states. 
All of this belies confidence.
  Combine this with a lack of confidence in the science-based 
alternative to testing promoted by the administration, which even its 
supporters recognize is not up to speed, and I must conclude that it is 
against the U.S. national interest to vote for the CTBT.
  This vote is not about the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is 
about whether the nuclear deterrent that has kept this country secure 
for half a century and will keep this country secure for the 
foreseeable future.
  Deterrence is not static, it is dynamic. The world is not static, it 
is unpredictable and dangerous. The CTBT is an attempt to impose a 
static arms control environment--to freeze our advantage--while 
gambling that our competitors abide by the same freeze. Today, that is 
unsound risk.
  I will vote to oppose the resolution of ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Signed by the President on 
September 24, 1996, and submitted to the Senate approximately one year 
later, the CTBT bans all nuclear explosions for an unlimited duration.
  Every member of the Senate would like to strengthen the national 
security of the United States. Every member of the Senate would like to 
leave this country more safe and secure. There are time-honored 
principles which undergrid genuine security, however. As George 
Washington stated over two centuries ago, ``There is nothing so likely 
to produce peace as to be well prepared to meet an enemy.'' Washington 
believed that if we wanted peace, we must be prepared to defend our 
country.
  The CTBT is not based on the national security principles of 
Washington or any other President who used strength and preparedness to 
protect our way of life and advance liberty around the globe. This 
treaty is based on an illusion of arms control, dependent on the 
unverifiable good will of signatory nations--some of which are openly 
hostile to the United States. The CTBT will do nothing to stop 
determined states from developing nuclear weapons and will degrade the 
readiness of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The U.S. nuclear arsenal is 
still the most powerful deterrent to aggression against the United 
States, but this treaty would place the reliability of that arsenal in 
question.
  Is such a step worth the risk? What does the CTBT give us in return? 
Is the treaty really the powerful weapon in the war against 
proliferation that the Administration claims? Several critical 
deficiencies of the CTBT make this treaty a genuine threat to U.S. 
national security.
  First, the monitoring system of the treaty will not be able to detect 
many nuclear tests. The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the 
CTBT is designed to detect nuclear blasts greater

[[Page S12402]]

than one kiloton, but tests with a smaller blast yield may be used to 
validate or advance nuclear weapons designs. Tests larger than one 
kiloton can be masked through certain testing techniques. By testing 
underground, for example, the blast yield from a nuclear test can be 
reduced by a factor of 70. The bottom line is that countries will be 
able to continue testing under this treaty and not be detected.
  The unverifiability of the CTBT was highlighted by the Washington 
Post on October 3, 1999. In an article entitled ``CIA Unable to 
Precisely Track Testing,'' Roberto Suro writes that ``the Central 
Intelligence Agency has concluded that it cannot monitor low-level 
nuclear tests by Russia precisely enough to ensure compliance with the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. . .'' Twice last month, Russia may have 
conducted nuclear tests, but the CIA was unable to make a 
determination, according the Post article.
  Senator John Warner, the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee, is quoted in the Post article concerning a broader pattern 
of Russian deception with regard to nuclear testing. According to a 
military assessment mentioned in the Post, Russia has conducted 
repeated tests over the past 18 months to develop a low-yield nuclear 
weapon to counter U.S. superiority in precision guided munitions.
  Such behavior reinforces the central point that proponents of the 
CTBT seem to miss in this debate. When nations have to choose between 
the communal bliss of international disarmament or pursuing their 
national interest, they follow their national interest. Countries such 
as Russia have the best of both worlds with an unverifiable treaty like 
the CTBT: Russia can continue to test without being caught and the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal cannot be maintained or modernized and eventually 
deteriorates over time.
  A second critical problem with the CTBT is that countries do not have 
to test to develop nuclear weapons. The case of India and Pakistan 
provides perhaps the best example that a ban on nuclear testing can be 
irrelevant. Pakistan developed nuclear explosive devices without any 
detectable testing, and India advanced its nuclear program without 
testing for twenty-five years.
  Proliferation in South Asia also lends itself to a broader discussion 
of this Administration's nonproliferation record. The Administration's 
rhetoric on the CTBT has been strong in recent weeks, but has the 
Administration always been as committed to stop proliferation?
  The case of Pakistan is particularly illustrative of this 
Administration's flawed approach to nonproliferation and arms control. 
In an unusually candid report in 1997, the CIA confirmed China's role 
as the ``principal supplier'' of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. 
Although the Administration has been careful to use milder language in 
subsequent proliferation reports, China is suspected of continuing such 
assistance. Rather than take consistent steps to punish Chinese 
proliferation, however, the Administration is pushing a treaty to stop 
nuclear testing--testing which is not needed for the development of 
nuclear weapons in the first place.
  This Administration would have more credibility in the area of 
nonproliferation if it had been taking aggressive steps to punish 
proliferators and defend America's interests over the last seven years. 
When China transfers complete M-11 missiles to Pakistan, this 
Administration turns a blind eye. When China is identified by the CIA 
in 1997 as the ``. . . the most significant supplier of WMD-related 
goods and technology to foreign countries,'' the Administration rewards 
China with a nuclear cooperation agreement in 1998.

  These severe lapses in U.S. nonproliferation policy cannot be covered 
over with the parchment of another unverifiable arms control treaty.
  A third problem with the CTBT is that it places the reliability of 
the U.S. nuclear arsenal at risk. While other countries can develop 
simple nuclear weapons without testing, such tests are critically 
important for the maintenance and modernization of highly sophisticated 
U.S. nuclear weapons. In that it forbids testing essential to ensure 
the readiness of the U.S. stockpile, the CTBT is really a back door to 
nuclear disarmament. The preamble of the CTBT itself states that the 
prohibition on nuclear testing is ``a meaningful step in the 
realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament . . 
.''
  Proponents of the CTBT argue that we have the technology and 
expertise to ensure the readiness of our nuclear arsenal through the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program. The truth of the matter is that only 
testing can ensure that our nuclear weapons are being maintained, not 
computer modeling and careful archiving of past test results. As Dr. 
Robert Barker, a strategic nuclear weapons designer and principal 
advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all nuclear weapons matters from 
1986-92, stated, ``. . . sustained nuclear testing . . . is the only 
demonstrated way of maintaining a safe and reliable nuclear 
deterrent.''
  Dr. James Schlesinger, a former Secretary of the Defense and Energy 
Departments, is one of the most competent experts to speak on the 
national security implications of the CTBT and the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program. His comments on the Stockpile Stewardship Program 
should be heeded by every Senator. In testimony before Congress, Dr. 
Schlesinger stated that the erosion of confidence in our nuclear 
stockpile would be substantial over several decades. Dr. Schlesinger 
states that ``In a decade or so, we will be beyond the expected shelf 
life of the weapons in our nuclear arsenals, which was expected to be 
some 20 years.''
  The real effect of the CTBT, then, is not to stop the spread of 
nuclear weapons, for less developed countries can develop simple 
nuclear weapons without testing and countries like Russia and China can 
test without being detected. The real effect of the CTBT will be to 
degrade the U.S. nuclear arsenal, dependent on periodic testing to 
ensure readiness.
  Modernization and development of new weapons systems, also dependent 
on testing, will be precluded. The need to modernize and develop new 
nuclear weapons should not be discounted. New weapons for new missions, 
changes in delivery systems and platforms, and improved safety devices 
all require testing to ensure that design modifications will and be 
effective. In supporting this treaty, the President is saying that 
regardless of the future threats the United States may face, we will 
surrender our ability to sustain a potent and effective nuclear 
deterrent. Mr. President, such shortsighted policies which leave 
America less secure are completely unacceptable and should be rejected.
  It is difficult for me to understand how a President who determines 
that ``the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a 
supreme national interest of the United States'' can support the CTBT, 
a treaty which could jeopardize the entire nuclear arsenal within 
years.
  Those who favor the CTBT argue that the treaty will create an 
international norm against the development of nuclear weapons. If the 
United States will take the lead, advocates for the treaty state, then 
other countries will see our good intentions and follow our example.
  Mr. President, moral suasion carries little weight with countries 
like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Moral suasion means little more to 
Russia, China, Pakistan, and India. These countries follow their 
security interests, not the illusory arms control agenda of another 
international bureaucracy.
  It is folly to degrade the U.S. nuclear deterrent through a treaty 
that has no corollary security benefits. I am not opposed to treaties 
and norms which seek to reduce the potential for international 
conflict, but arms control treaties which are not verifiable leave the 
United States in a more dangerous position. When we can trust but not 
verify, the better path is not to place ourselves in a position where 
our trust can be broken, particularly when the security of the American 
people is at stake.
  I thank the Chair for the opportunity to address this important 
matter and I urge my colleagues to oppose the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the incredible and contrived rhetoric 
pouring forth constantly from the White House for the past few weeks 
has at times bordered on absurd and futile efforts to

[[Page S12403]]

sell to the American people the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. For 
example, only this administration could attempt to put a positive spin 
on a Washington Post article reporting that the CTBT is unverifiable. 
It didn't work and once again it was demonstrable that you can't make a 
silk purse out of a sow's ear.
  No administration, prior to the present one, has ever tried to argue 
with a straight face that a zero yield test ban would or could be 
verifiable. A treaty which purports to ban all nuclear testing is, by 
definition, unverifiable. In fact, previous administrations admitted 
that much less ambitious proposals, such as low-yield test ban, were 
also not verifiable.
  This is not a ``spin'' contest. This is a fact.
  There is one hapless fellow, at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, 
who is bound to know this, and he should not be lending his name to 
such shenanigans.
  I am not referring to the President. This is his treaty--the only 
major arms control agreement negotiated on his watch--and its 
ratification is entirely about his legacy. No, I am talking about Vice 
President Gore, who took the correct, flat-out-position--when he was a 
United States Senator--he was opposed to even a 1-kiloton test ban. 
According to then Senator Gore, the only type of test ban that was 
verifiable was, in his estimation, one with no less than a 5-kiloton 
limit. He was quite clear, Mr. President, in saying that anything 
less--such as the CTBT treaty now before the Senate--would be 
unverifiable.
  On May 12, 1988, Senator Gore objected to an amendment offered to the 
1989 defense bill which called for a test ban treaty and which 
restricted nuclear tests above 1 kiloton. Then-Senator Gore declared:

       Mr. President, I want to express a lingering concern about 
     the threshold contained in the amendment. Without regard to 
     the military usefulness or lack of usefulness of a 1 kiloton 
     versus the 5 kiloton test, purely with regard to 
     verification, I am concerned that a 1 kiloton test really 
     pushes verification to the limit, even with extensive 
     cooperative measures. . . . I express the desire that this 
     threshold be changed from 1 to 5.

  In other words, the Vice President knows full well that a 1-kiloton 
limit--to say nothing of 0-kiloton ban--was unverifiable. In fact, at 
his insistence, the proposed amendment was modified upwards to allow 
for all nuclear tests below 5 kilotons.
  Why then, is the administration, of which he is now a part, claiming 
that a zero-yield ban is ``effectively verifiable''?
  Numerous experts have cautioned the Senate that a ``zero-yield'' CTBT 
is fundamentally unverifiable. Other nations will be able to conduct 
militarily significant nuclear tests well below the detection threshold 
of the Treaty's monitoring system, and even below the United States' 
own unilateral capability.
  President Clinton's own former Director of Central Intelligence, Jim 
Woolsey, testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, on May 13, 
1998, that ``With the yield of zero, I have very serious doubts that we 
would be able to verify.''
  On August 5, 1999, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger noted: 
``When I was involved in test-ban negotiations, it was understood that 
testing below a certain threshold was required to ensure confidence in 
U.S. nuclear weapons. It also was accepted that very low-yield tests 
would be difficult to detect, and an agreement to ban them would raise 
serious questions about verifiability.''
  Most significantly, Fred Eimer, former Assistant Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency and chief verification expert for both 
the Reagan and Bush administrations, wrote to me this past Sunday 
stating his opposition to the CTBT.
  Dr. Eimer noted that: ``Other nations will be able to conduct 
militarily significant nuclear tests well below the verification 
threshold of the Treaty's monitoring system, and well below that of our 
own National Technical Means.''
  Now, of course, the Administration has claimed on a variety of 
occasions that the CTBT is ``effectively verifiable.'' It seems, 
however, that this administration is saying one thing to the Senate and 
the American people, and admitting quite another thing overseas. I will 
read into the Record the criticism that was leveled against the CTBT on 
August 1, 1996, by Mr. John Holum--President Clinton's ACDA Director--
when he was in Geneva. Mr. Holum stated:

       The United States' views on verification are well known: We 
     would have preferred stronger measures, especially in the 
     decision-making process for on-site inspections, and in 
     numerous specific provisions affecting the practical 
     implementation of the inspection regime. I feel no need to 
     defend this view. The mission on the Conference on 
     Disarmament is not to erect political symbols, but to 
     negotiate enforceable agreements. That require effective 
     verification, not as the preference of any party, but as the 
     sine quo non of this body's work. . . . On verification 
     overall, the Treaty tilts toward the `defense' in a way that 
     has forced the United States to conclude, reluctantly, that 
     it can accept, barely, the balance that Ambassador Ramaker 
     has crafted.

  ``Reluctantly''?
  ``Accept, barely''?
  Does this sound like a ringing endorsement of the CTBT's verification 
regime? I would say this is tantamount to ``damnation by faint 
praise''.
  The fact of the matter is that the CTBT's much-vaunted international 
monitoring system (IMS) was only designed to detect ``fully coupled'' 
nuclear tests down to one kiloton, and cannot detect evasive nuclear 
testing. Any country so-inclined could easily muffle its nuclear tests 
by conducting them in natural cavities (such as salt domes or caverns) 
or in man-made excavations. This technique can reduce the seismic 
magnitude of a test by a factor of 70. In other words, countries can 
conduct tests of up to 60 kilotons without being detected by the IMS.
  Every country of concerns to the United States is technically capable 
of decoupling its nuclear explosions. In other words, countries such as 
North Korea, China, and Russia will be able to conduct very significant 
work on their weapons programs without fear of detection by the IMS. I 
point out to Senators that, according to Department of Energy data, 56 
percent of all U.S. nuclear tests were less than 20 kilotons in yield. 
Such tests, if decoupled, would all have been undetectable by the IMS. 
In other words, one out of every two nuclear tests ever conducted by 
the United States would not have been detected by the IMS--had the U.S. 
chosen to mask its program. I fail to see how the administration does 
not think this monitoring deficiency is not militarily significant.
  Moreover, claims that the IMS will provide new seismic monitoring 
capabilities to the United States are ludicrous. The vast majority of 
seismic stations listed in the CTBT already exist, and were funded by 
the U.S. taxpayer; 68 percent of the ``Primary Seismological 
Stations,'' and 47 percent of the ``Auxiliary'' stations called for 
under the treaty already are in place because the United States put 
them there years ago. I repeat, the only reason the IMS has any value 
to the United States is because it was already U.S. property long 
before the CTBT was negotiated.
  So where are the additional 32 percent of the stations going to be 
located? In places such as the Cook Islands, the Central African 
Republic, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Cameroon, Niger, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Costa Rica, Samoa, and so on and so forth. There is 
no benefit to having seismic stations in these places. In other words, 
Mr. President, the CTBT will provide zero benefit to our nuclear test 
monitoring.

  In fact, it is going to make life more difficult for the United 
States. The same ``overselling'' of the IMS that is going on here in 
the United States is also occurring internationally. Ultimately, this 
is going to cause great problems for the United States in arguing that 
a country has violated the treaty when the much-vaunted IMS has not 
detected anything. Few nations are likely to side with the United 
States in situations where the IMS has not detected a test.
  Moreover, the IMS also will complicate U.S. efforts by providing 
false or misleading data, which in turn will be used by countries to 
conceal treaty violations. Specifically, the CTBT fails to require 
nations to ``calibrate'' their regional stations to assess the local 
geology.
  Naturally, countries such as Russia and China have refused to 
volunteer to do so. By consequence, these stations will record data 
that will be inconsistent with U.S. national information

[[Page S12404]]

and will be used to argue against U.S. on-site inspection initiatives.
  While it is important to realize the deficiencies of the CTBT's 
seismic monitoring regime, it also is a fact that several treaty 
provisions will severely impair the ability of any on-site inspection, 
if launched, to uncover credible evidence of a violation. First, the 
aforementioned failure to calibrate regional stations will introduce 
inaccuracies in the location of suspicious events, creating a broader 
inspectable area than otherwise would be the case. Second, if the 
United States requests an inspection, no U.S. inspectors would be 
allowed to participate, and the country in question can refuse to admit 
other specific inspectors. Third, the treaty allows for numerous delays 
in providing access to suspect sites, which will cause dissipation of 
most of the best technical signatures of a nuclear test.
  Indeed, in the case of low-yield testing, there are few enough 
observable signatures to begin with, and on-site inspections are 
unlikely to be of use at all. Finally, the inspected party is allowed 
to restrict access under the treaty and to declare up to 50 square 
kilometers as being ``off-limits.'' As UNSCOM found with Iraq, any time 
a country is given the right to designate sites as off-limits to 
inspectors, the inspection regime is undermined.
  In conclusion, the IMS and the inspection regime is likely to be so 
weak that I would not be surprised if countries such as Iraq and North 
Korea did not ultimately sign and ratify. Because of the technical 
impossibility of verifying a zero-yield test ban, such rogue regimes 
can credibly claim to adhere to a fraudulent, unverifiable norm against 
testing without fear of ever getting caught.
  The only puzzling question for me, Mr. President, is why, with a Vice 
President who knows the truth quite well, does the Clinton 
administration continue to insist otherwise?
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Senate giving its 
advice and consent to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
  Debate on the CTBT has unfortunately become politicized. It should 
not be. The series of hearings held in the Armed Services Committee and 
the Foreign Relations Committee were fair and serious. I was impressed 
by the intelligent discussion and debate. But I wish that we had heard 
more. As Senator Hagel indicated in his statement on the floor, we 
should not be compressing debate on this issue. We should hold more 
extensive hearings.
  This treaty is about the future. It is about making a world more 
secure from the threat of nuclear war. This issue is too important, too 
important for the Senate of the United States not to have held hearing 
after hearing on all aspects of the treaty. Such hearings would, in my 
view, have better clarified all the benefits of the Treaty.
  I have supported the treaty, I continue to support the treaty, and I 
will vote for the treaty, not because it is perfect--the CTBT does not 
mean an end to the threat of nuclear war or nuclear terrorism or 
nuclear proliferation, but it does represent a step in the right 
direction of containing these threats.
  Let us be clear on what not ratifying the CTBT means:
  A vote against the CTBT is a vote for the resumption of nuclear 
testing by the United States.
  A resumption of nuclear testing is the clear consequence of the 
criticism by opponents of the CTBT that the stockpile Stewardship 
Program is not sufficient to guarantee the safety, reliability and 
performance of the nation's nuclear weapon stockpile.
  Critics of the Stockpile Stewardship Program argue that only actual 
testing can preserve our nuclear deterrence. Indeed at least one 
witness testifying before the Armed Services Committee advocated a 
resumption of 10 kiloton testing. That means testing a weapon almost 
the size of what was dropped on Hiroshima.
  I do not believe that the American public wants to see the resumed 
testing of Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons.
  Nor do I believe such testing is necessary, not as long as America 
persists in investing sufficient resources in the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program.
  Yes, there are uncertainties about the ability of the Stewardship 
Program over time to be successful. As the Director of Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, John Browne, has testified, ``the average age of 
the nuclear stockpile is older than at any time in history, and nuclear 
weapons involve materials and technologies found nowhere else on 
earth.'' And as his colleague at the Lawrence Livermore laboratories, 
Bruce Tarter, stated, ``the pace of progress must be quickened. Much 
remains to be accomplished, and the clock is running.''
  Indeed, the United States has no alternative to the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program unless we want to return to the level of nuclear 
testing that we saw prior to President Bush ordering a moratorium on 
testing in 1992.
  I ask unanimous consent that a chart demonstrating the number of 
United States nuclear tests, from July 1945 through September 1992, be 
printed in the Record following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. AKAKA. The United States needs to train people, design equipment, 
and to invent new techniques if it is going to preserve the safety and 
reliability of its nuclear deterrent. The Stockpile Stewardship Program 
can accomplish all of these objectives.
  The Stockpile Stewardship Program has had problems but it has made 
great progress. As Director Tarter noted, it has opened up new 
possibilities for weapons science not even contemplated a few years 
ago.
  This is the future: one of science, not one of testing.
  As a strong advocate of National Missile Defense, I have been struck 
by how some are willing to have such extraordinary confidence in the 
ability of American scientist and engineers to overcome problems in 
missile defense but do not seem to place the same confidence in the 
ability of American scientists and engineers to do the same with 
stockpile stewardship.
  Choosing the path of science does not mean the United States cannot 
test if science proves inadequate to practice. The assurances contained 
in the President's six safeguards attached to this treaty mean that, if 
necessary, we can resume testing. I have full confidence in this 
President or any future President being willing to take this 
extraordinary step, and I have full confidence that this or any future 
Congress will back that President up should such a decision to return 
to testing be necessary.
  Supporting the CTBT does not preclude America from taking whatever 
steps are necessary to preserve our national security.
  I would argue, as have many of my colleagues, and interestingly 
enough, many of our allies, that ratification of the treaty helps 
preserve American security by locking in our nuclear superiority and 
limiting the abilities of other nations to match our nuclear 
capability. Our allies, who benefit from the security of the American 
nuclear umbrella, want the CTBT because they know it enhances, not 
detracts, from their security.
  Yes, it is true that the treaty will not prevent proliferation 
absolutely. A country does not need to conduct nuclear tests to have a 
nuclear capability. But will it have a reliable weapons system? I do 
not think so.
  Yes, it is true that the CTBT will not prevent a country from trying 
to hide small scale nuclear tests. But I believe that the international 
monitoring system which will be in place as well as the United States' 
own national technical means will be so extensive that any test will be 
detected. That country will then be subject to an international 
inspection. Some suggest that the United States will not be able to 
gain a consensus for such an inspection. I do not see why not: it will 
be in the interest of all signatories to ensure that no countries 
violate the agreement. I cannot envision a majority of states not 
agreeing to an inspection of a suspected nuclear test.
  I do not know if the CTBT will create a new international norm 
discouraging nuclear weapons development. I do know that the CTBT will 
make such development technically more difficult to do and politically 
more difficult to deny.
  Let me conclude by asking this simple question: do my colleagues who 
oppose the CTBT want our country to resume nuclear testing?
  If not, then I suggest that the only course is to invest in the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program. I say, give

[[Page S12405]]

American science a chance. Invest in the future of weapons science, not 
in the past of weapons testing by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty.

                             Exhibit No. 1

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    U.S.      U.S.-U.K.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total tests by calendar Year:
    1945........................................         1             0
    1946........................................         2             0
    1947........................................         0             0
    1948........................................         3             0
    1949........................................         0             0
    1950........................................         0             0
    1951........................................        16             0
    1952........................................        10             0
    1953........................................        11             0
    1954........................................         6             0
    1955........................................        18             0
    1956........................................        18             0
    1957........................................        32             0
    1958........................................        77             0
    1959........................................         0             0
    1960........................................         0             0
    1961........................................        10             0
    1962........................................        96             2
    1963........................................        47             0
    1964........................................        45             2
    1965........................................        38             1
    1966........................................        48             0
    1967........................................        42             0
    1968........................................        56             0
    1969........................................        46             0
    1970........................................        39             0
    1971........................................        24             0
    1972........................................        27             0
    1973........................................        24             0
    1974........................................        22             1
    1975........................................        22             0
    1976........................................        20             1
    1977........................................        20             0
    1978........................................        19             2
    1979........................................        15             1
    1980........................................        14             3
    1981........................................        16             1
    1982........................................        18             1
    1983........................................        18             1
    1984........................................        18             2
    1985........................................        17             1
    1986........................................        14             1
    1987........................................        14             1
    1988........................................        15             0
    1989........................................        11             1
    1990........................................         8             1
    1991........................................         8             1
    1991........................................         7             1
    1992........................................         6             0
                                                 -----------------------
      Total tests...............................     1,030            24
Total tests by location:
    Pacific.....................................         4             0
    Johnston Island.............................        12             0
    Enewetak....................................        43             0
    Bikini......................................        23             0
    Christmas Island............................        24             0
                                                 -----------------------
      Total Pacific.............................       106             0
    Total S. Atlantic...........................         3             0
    Underground.................................       604            24
    Atmospheric.................................       100             0
                                                 -----------------------
      Total NTS.................................       813            24
                                                 =======================
    Central Nevada..............................         1             0
    Amchltka, Alaska............................         3             0
    Alamogordo, New Mexico......................         1             0
    Carlsbad, New Mexico........................         1             0
    Hattiesburg, Mississippi....................         2             0
    Farmington, New Mexico......................         1             0
    Grand Valley, Colorado......................         1             0
    Rifle, Colorado.............................         1             0
    Fallon, Nevada..............................         1             0
    Nellis Air Force Range......................         5             0
                                                 -----------------------
      Total Other...............................        17             0
                                                 =======================
      Total tests...............................     1,030            24
                                                 =======================
Total tests by type:
    Tunnel......................................        67             0
    Shaft.......................................       739            24
    Crater......................................         9             0
                                                 -----------------------
      Total underground.........................       815            24
                                                 =======================
    Airburst....................................         1             0
    Airdrop.....................................        52             0
    Balloon.....................................        25             0
    Barge.......................................        36             0
    Rocket......................................        12             0
    Surface.....................................        28             0
    Tower.......................................        56             0
                                                 -----------------------
      Total atmospheric.........................       210             0
      Total underwater..........................     1,030            24
                                                 =======================
      Total tests...............................     1,030            24
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total detonations by purpose: Joint US-UK, 24 detonations; Plowshare, 35
  detonations; Safety Experiment, 88 detonations; Storage-
  Transportation, 4 detonations; Vela Uniform, 7 detonations; Weapons
  Effects, 98 detonations; Weapons Related, 883 detonations.
176 detonations (1980-1992)    14 detonations (1980-1992).
 
Note: Totals do not include two combat uses of nuclear weapons, which
  are not considered ``tests.'' The first combat detonations was a 15 kt
  weapon airdropped 08/05/45 at Hiroshima, Japan. The second was a 21 kt
  weapon airdropped 08/09/45 at Nagasaki, Japan.

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, yesterday President Clinton sent a written 
request to the Senate asking that we ``postpone'' a vote on the CTBT. 
In light of the President's outburst on Friday lashing out at Senate 
Republicans, and his adamant declaration that he would never submit a 
written request asking the Senate to withdraw the CTBT from 
consideration, his decision to send just such a letter is interesting.
  His letter, was a baby-step in the right direction, insufficient to 
avert a vote on the CTBT today. The President is clearly playing poker 
with the Senate, but he doesn't have a winning hand, and I think he 
knows it.
  The President sent this letter only because he realizes he has failed 
to make a compelling case for the treaty, and failed to convince two-
thirds of the Senate that this treaty is in the national interest. He 
knows that if we vote on the CTBT today, the treaty will be defeated.
  His letter did not meet both the criteria set by me and others. For 
example, he requested: (a) that the treaty be withdrawn and (b) that it 
not be considered for the remainder of his presidency.
  The President has repeatedly dismissed the critics of this treaty as 
playing politics. Look who's talking. In his mind, it seems, the only 
reason anyone could possibly oppose this treaty is to give him a 
political black eye. Putting aside the megalomania in such a 
suggestion, accusing Republicans of playing politics with our national 
security was probably not the most effective strategy for convincing 
those with substantive concerns about the treaty.
  The fact is, we are not opposed to this treaty because we want to 
score political points against a lame-duck Administration. We are 
opposed because it is unverifiable and because it will endanger the 
safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal. The White House and 
Senate Democrats have failed to make a compelling case to the contrary. 
That is why the treaty is headed for defeat.
  Of course, treaty supporters want to preserve a way to spin this 
defeat into a victory, by claiming that they have managed to ``live to 
fight another day.'' That's probably the same thing they said after 
President Carter requested the SALT II Treaty be withdrawn. But they 
will be fooling no one but themselves.
  Before this debate is over, it must be made clear that to one and all 
this CTBT is dead--and that the next President will not be bound by its 
terms. The next administration must be left free to establish its own 
nuclear testing and nuclear non-proliferation policies, unencumbered by 
the failed policies of the current, outgoing administration.
  Without such concrete assurances that this CTBT is dead, I will 
insist that the Senate proceed as planned and vote down this treaty.

                          ____________________