Congressional Record, Volume 145 Issue 137 (Tuesday, October 12, 1999)

[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 137 (Tuesday, October 12, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12329-S12395]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now
go into executive session and resume consideration of Executive
Calendar No. 3, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolution to Advise and Consent to the Ratification of
treaty document No. 105-28, Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. REID. Will the Chair inform the two managers what time is
remaining for both sides on the debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from Nevada that
the majority has 2 hours 53 minutes; the minority, 3 hours 23 minutes.
Mr. REID. I say to my friends from Arizona and Virginia that we will
try to speak now and even out the time.
Mr. President, I give myself such time as I may consume.
We have heard a lot about nuclear testing recently, but no one has
experienced nuclear testing as has the State of Nevada. Just a few
miles from Las Vegas is the Nevada Test Site. There we have had almost
1,000 tests, some above ground and some below ground. You can travel to
the Nevada Test Site now and go and look at these test sites. You can
see where the above-ground tests have taken place. You can drive by one
place where bleachers are still standing where people--press and
others--would come and sit to watch the nuclear tests in the valley
below. You can see some of the buildings that still are standing
following a nuclear test. You can see large tunnels that are still in
existence where scores and scores of tests were set off in the same
tunnels. You can go and look at very deep shafts where underground
tests were set off.
The State of Nevada understands nuclear testing. At one time, more
than 11,000 people were employed in the Nevada desert dealing with
nuclear testing. Now, as a result of several administrations making a
decision to no longer test nuclear weapons, there are only a little
over 2,000 people there. Those 2,000 people are there by virtue of an
Executive order saying we have to be ready if tests are deemed
necessary in the national interest. So the Nevada Test Site is still
there. The people are standing by in case there is a need for the test
site to again be used.
The cessation of testing caused the largest percentage reduction of
defense-related jobs in any Department of Energy facility. Today, as I
indicated,

[[Page S12330]]

there are a little over 2,000 of those jobs.
The State of Nevada is very proud of what we have done for the
security of this Nation. Not only have we had the above-ground nuclear
tests and the below-ground nuclear tests, but we have Nellis Air Force
Base which is the premier fighter training center for the U.S. Air
Force--in fact, it is the premier fighter training center for all
allied forces around the world. I had a meeting recently with the
general who runs Nellis Air Force Base. He was preparing for the German
Air Force to come to Las Vegas to be involved in the training systems
available for fighting the enemy in fighter planes.
Also, 400 miles from Las Vegas and Nellis Air Force Gunnery Range,
you have Fallon Naval Air Station. It is the same type of training
facility, not for the Air Force but the Navy. Virtually every pilot who
lands on a carrier has been trained at Fallon. It is the premier
fighter training center for naval aircraft--Fallon Naval Air Station.
There are many other facilities that have been used over the years.
Today, we have Indian Springs Air Force Base which is 50 miles out of
Las Vegas--actually less than that--where they are testing drones, the
unmanned aircraft. So we have given a lot to the security of this
Nation; we continue to do so.
When we talk about nuclear testing, I can remember as a young boy, I
was raised 60 miles from Las Vegas.
We were probably 125 miles from where the actual detonations took
place. We would get up early in the morning at my home in Searchlight
and watch these tests. They would announce when the tests were coming.
We always saw the flash of light with the above-ground tests.
Sometimes we did not hear the sound because it would sometimes bounce
over us.
We were the lucky ones, though, because the winds never blew toward
Searchlight or Las Vegas. The winds blew toward southern Utah and
Lincoln County in Nevada.
As a result of these above-ground tests, many people developed
radiation sickness. They did not know it at the time. People did not
understand what fallout was all about.
Yes, in Nevada, we understand nuclear testing as well as anyone in
the world.
Nevada is going to continue its national service whether this treaty
is ratified or not. We have already stopped testing in the traditional
sense.
I want everyone to understand that even though I am a supporter of
this treaty, I believe it would be much better, rather than having
everyone march in here tonight and vote up or down on this treaty, that
we spend some more time talking about it. I am convinced it is a good
thing for this country, a good thing for this Nation, but I have some
questions. We should answer some questions.
I have the good fortune of serving on the Energy and Water
Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. I am the ranking Democrat
on that subcommittee, with the head Republican on the subcommittee,
Senator Domenici of New Mexico. It is our responsibility to appropriate
the money for the nuclear defense capabilities of this country. We do
that. We spend billions of dollars every year.
One of the things we have tried to do, recognizing we do not have
traditional testing--that is underground testing or above-ground
testing; of course, we do not do above-ground testing--is to provide
other ways to make sure our nuclear stockpile is safe and reliable. No
matter what we have done in the past, we have to make sure our weapons
are safe and reliable.
How can we do that? We are attempting in this country to do the right
thing. We have the Stockpile Stewardship Program under which we are
conducting tests now. They are not explosions. We are doing it through
computers. We have some names for some of our tests.
One of them is subcritical testing. What does that mean? It means we
set off an explosion involving nuclear materials, but before the
material becomes critical, we stop it. There is no nuclear yield. Then
through computerization, in effect, we try to determine what would have
happened had this test gone critical. That is an expensive program, but
it is a program that is absolutely necessary, again, for the safety and
reliability of our nuclear stockpile.
About 2 years ago, I gave a statement before our subcommittee. This
was a statement on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on which we had a
hearing. In that statement, I wrote about the loss of confidence in new
weapons that could not be tested under the treaty and how this loss of
confidence would prevent recurrence of the costly and dangerous nuclear
arms race of the past 50 years.
I wrote about the confidence between former adversaries that would
come from the treaty because no longer would we or they have to worry
about significant new imbalances in deterrent forces, because no new
weapons could be built.
I wrote about how that confidence would lead to more and more
reductions in nuclear stockpiles and move the world even further away
from nuclear annihilation.
I wrote about how the international example of refraining from
nuclear testing, along with stockpile reductions, would reduce
the incentives for non-nuclear states to develop nuclear weapons.

I did not write 2 years ago about the upcoming Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty review conference in which only states that have ratified the
treaty will have effective membership.
That review conference will be able to change the conditions under
which the treaty goes into force, and the United States, I am sorry to
report, will have no place at that table unless the treaty is ratified
by this Senate before that conference.
I wrote about more than the benefits of this treaty. I also wrote
about some of its uncertainties and some of the concerns, I believe, we
need to study and review, and about the debate that is needed for their
resolution.
I pointed out that a prohibition against any and all nuclear
explosions would reduce confidence in stockpile reliability and safety
unless some other means was developed to maintain that confidence.
I noted that the Stockpile Stewardship Program was conceived to
provide that other means. We have had 2 years of experience with this
program, but I wrote about the uncertainties faced by science-based
stockpile stewardship. I noted the plan depends critically on dramatic
increases in computational capability. That is why in our subcommittee
we have worked very hard to spend hard-earned tax dollars to develop
better computers. The development of computers is going on around the
world, but no place is it going on at a more rapid pace than with the
money we have provided through this subcommittee. We are doing it
because we believe through computerization, we can have a more safe and
more reliable stockpile.
It is only through, as I wrote, these dramatic increases in
computational capability and equally dramatic increases in resolution
with which non-nuclear experiments can be measured that we can go
forward with certainty of having a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile.
I noted persistent support by Congress and the administration was
absolutely necessary, not on a short-term basis but on a long-term
basis. I noted Congress and the administration had to support the
science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program; that we must set the
pattern for the world; it can be done, and we can do it.
I did say that the support of Congress and the administration was
absolutely necessary but not necessarily sufficient because the
stewardship program is being developed at the same time that its
architects are learning more about it. It is a study in progress. I
wrote then, and I believe now, the learning process will continue.
I pointed out that the test ban treaty would not prevent nuclear
weapons development. It would only inhibit the military significance of
such development. We are not going to develop new weapons. We have not
developed new weapons.
Let's talk, for example, about what can be done. You can have the
development of crude nuclear explosives that are difficult to deliver,
but these could be developed with confidence without testing. We know,
going back to the early days of things nuclear, that ``Fat Man'' had
not been tested. That was the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. There
was no test. It was a huge

[[Page S12331]]

weapon, as large as the side of a house. They had to build a pit in the
runway to load it. They had to reconfigure the B-29 so it could drop
this huge weapon, but it was not tested.
Stopping testing is not going to stop the development of nuclear
weapons. Rogue nations and other nations can develop these weapons if
they see fit. But these crude weapons will not upset the deterrent
balance.
Also, some say the treaty would prevent the introduction of new
modern weapons that could weaken strategic deterrence. For example,
nations could not build sophisticated new weapons; they would be stuck
with what they have. What they have may be good, may be bad.
I pointed out the treaty could not guarantee total cessation of
nuclear testing because very low-yield tests and higher yield
``decoupled'' tests might not be detected with confidence. You could
have small, very small tests. It would be very hard to detect.
You could also have the situation where a signatory nation could
execute a high-yield ``unattended'' explosion. What does that mean?
What it means is that for a high-yield ``unattended'' explosion in a
clandestine operation--nobody could identify the signatory nation that
was being noncompliant.
For example, let's say someone developed a nuclear device and
secretly dropped it in the ocean and then left. When the device went
off someplace deep in the ocean, the country that dropped it in the
ocean could certainly know that it exploded. But others could not
identify who did it. It would be very hard to develop or make a new
stockpile doing it this way, but it is possible. There are ways around
everything.
But in spite of all these things that you could throw up as ways to
get around the treaty--the ``decoupled'' tests and dropping them in the
ocean, of course, you can do those kinds of things--but in spite of
that, the positive nature of this treaty far outweighs any of these
things that I have mentioned.
I did say in that statement I made before our subcommittee that the
United States takes its treaty obligations seriously. We would not in
any manner do what I have just outlined. But other nations might
conduct themselves in that fashion. You cannot conduct your foreign
policy believing that everybody is going to do everything the right
way.
I do say that in all of these areas of uncertainty, I wrote about the
need of the United States for a prolonged, comprehensive investigation
and debate. That is where we have failed. We should have had hearings
that went over a period of years, not a few days.
It is through consultation and the testimony of experts, and debate
among Members of this body and the other body, that the issues and
questions can be properly framed, examined, and resolved.
I was overly optimistic when I wrote in the conclusion of my
statement to the hearing as follows:

These uncertainties and their associated issues will be the
subject of intense debate by the Senate as we move toward a
policy decision that will define an appropriate balance
between the treaty's costs, its risks, and its promised
benefits.

There has been no intense debate. I was too optimistic because we did
not ``move'' toward a policy decision; we did not do anything. We
stumbled, lurched perhaps. I was too optimistic because intense debate
has not been conducted by the Senate. There have been a few little
things that have gone on. For example, in my subcommittee we have done
a few things. But we have needed extensive debate.
What have we had in the last few days, literally? We have had some
experts come in. We have had some hurriedly conducted hearings. That
isn't the way you approach, perhaps, one of the most important treaties
this country has ever decided.
I think the chairmen and the ranking members of both the Armed
Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, during the last
few days, have done the best they could under the circumstances. I
commend them for trying. But I do not think we should base this treaty
on what has gone on in the last few days.
I was too optimistic because I did not realize we would enter a time
agreement to debate this most important issue for 14 hours. I do not
think it is appropriate. I think it prevents amendments that may be
necessary.
I indicate that I rise in support of this treaty. I do it without any
reluctance. I do say, however, that we should have more debate. We
should have more consultation. We should have more hearings. That would
allow us to arrive at a better, more informed decision.
I have heard some people speak on this floor saying they want more
information. They are entitled to that. I think we are rushing forward
on a vote on this. We should step back. I think if there is an
opportunity today to avoid the vote this afternoon or tomorrow, we
should do that. I do not think we need to rush into this.
The President has written a letter indicating, for the good of the
country, this vote should be put off. I agree with that. I am not
afraid to cast my vote. I have indicated several times this morning
that I will vote in favor of the treaty. I do not, for a moment,
believe that there are others who feel any differently than I in our
responsibility. Our job is to cast votes. I only wish Members were
given the time and opportunity to become as informed as possible so
that all Members are given an opportunity to improve this treaty--
through debate, through dialogue, and perhaps even through amendment.
Again, I rise in support of this treaty, not because I had an
opportunity to consider all the issues and the expert opinion on these
issues. I rise in support of the treaty because on the whole we are
much, much, much better off with it than without it.
I have only a partial list of prominent individuals and national
groups in support of this test ban treaty: Current and former Chairmen
and Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; former Secretaries of
Defense; former Secretaries of State; former Secretaries of Energy;
former Members of Congress; Directors of the three National
Laboratories; we have other prominent national security officials; arms
control negotiators; we have many prominent military officers who have
been members of the Chiefs of Staff; scientific experts from all over
the United States with the greatest academic institutions; we have
Nobel laureates--more than a score of Nobel laureates who support this
treaty--former senior Government officials and advisors; ambassadors;
national groups; medical and scientific groups; public interest groups;
religious groups.
I have eight or nine pages of prominent individuals and national
groups in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty that I
ask unanimous consent be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Partial List of Prominent Individuals and National Groups in Support of
the CTBT--October 9, 1999

current and former chairmen/vice-chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff

General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
General Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
General David Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Admiral William Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
General Joseph Ralston, Vice Chairman.
Admiral William Owens, former Vice Chairman.

former secretaries of defense

Robert McNamara.
Harold Brown.
William Perry.

former secretaries of state

Warren Christopher.
Cyrus Vance.

former secretaries of energy

Hazel O'Leary.
Federico Pena.

former acda directors

Ambassador Ralph Earle II.
Major General William F. Burns.
Lt. General George M. Seignious II.
Ambassador Paul Warnke.
Kenneth Adelman.

former members of congress

Senator Dale Bumpers.
Senator Alan Cranston.
Senator John C. Danforth.
Senator J. James Exon.
Senator John Glenn.
Senator Mark O. Hatfield.
Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum.
Senator George Mitchell.
Representative Bill Green.
Representative Thomas J. Downey.

[[Page S12332]]

Representative Michael J. Kopetski.
Representative Anthony C. Bellenson.
Representative Lee. H. Hamilton.

directors of the three national laboratories

Dr. John Browne, Director of Los Alamos National
Laboratory.
Dr. Paul Robinson, Director of Sandia National Laboratory.
Dr. Bruce Tarter, Director of Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory.

other prominent national security officials

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, arms control negotiator, Reagan
Administration.
Admiral Stansfield Turner, former Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Charles Curtis, former Deputy Secretary of Energy.
Anthony Lake, former National Security Advisor.

prominent military officers--service chiefs

General Eric L. Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff.
General Dennis J. Reimer, former Army Chief of Staff.
General Gordon Russell Sullivan, former Army Chief of
Staff.
General Bernard W. Rogers, former Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army; former NATO Supreme Allied Commander.
General Michael E. Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff.
General Merrill A. McPeak, former Air Force Chief of Staff.
General Ronald R. Fogleman, former Air Force Chief of
Staff.
General James L. Jones, Marine Corps Commandant.
General Charles C. Krulak, former Marine Corps Commandant.
General Carl E. Mundy, former Marine Corps Commandant.
Admiral Jay L. Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations.
Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, former Chief of Naval
Operations.
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., former Chief of Naval
Operations.
General Eugene Habiger, former Commander-in-Chief of
Strategic Command.
General John R. Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
Admiral Noel Gayler, former Commander, Pacific.
General Charles A. Horner, Commander, Coalition Air Forces,
Desert Storm, former Commander, U.S. Space Command.
General Andrew O'Meara, former Commander U.S. Army Europe.
General Bernard W. Rogers, former Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army; former NATO Supreme Allied Commander.
General William Y. Smith, former Deputy Commander, U.S.
Command, Europe.
Lt. General Julius Becton.
Lt. General John H. Cushman, former Commander, I Corps
(ROK/US) Group (Korea).
Lt. General Robert E. Pursley.
Vice Admiral William L. Read, former Commander, U.S. Navy
Surface Force, Atlantic Command.
Vice Admiral John J. Shanahan, former Director, Center for
Defense Information [19].
Lt. General George M. Seignious II, former Director Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
Vice Admiral James B. Wilson, former Polaris Submarine
Captain.
Maj. General William F. Burns, JCS Representative, INF
Negotiations, Special Envoy to Russia for Nuclear
Dismantlement.
Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., Deputy Director,
Center for Defense Information.
Rear Admiral Robert G. James.

Other Scientific Experts

Dr. Hans Bethe, Nobel Laureate; Emeritus Professor of
Physics, Cornell University; Head of the Manhattan Project's
theoretical division.
Dr. Freeman Dyson, Emeritus Professor of Physics, Institute
for Advanced Study, Princeton.
Dr. Richard Garwin, Senior Fellow for Science and
Technology, Council on Foreign Relations; consultant to
Sandia National Laboratory, former consultant to Los Alamos
National Laboratory.
Dr. Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, Director Emeritus, Stanford
Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University.
Dr. Jeremiah D. Sullivan, Professor of Physics, University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Dr. Herbert York, Emeritus Professor of Physics, University
of California, San Diego; founding director of Lawrence
Livermore, National Laboratory; former Director of Defense
Research and Engineering, Department of Defense.
Dr. Sidney D. Drell, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center,
Stanford University.

Nobel Laureates

Philip W. Anderson.
Hans Bethe.
Nicolaas Bloembergen.
Owen Chamberlain.
Steven Chu.
Leon Cooper.
Hans Dehmelt.
Val F. Fitch.
Jerome Friedman.
Donald A. Glaser.
Sheldon Glashow.
Henry W. Kendall.
Leon M. Lederman.
David E. Lee.
T.D. Lee.
Douglas D. Osheroff.
Arno Penzias.
Martin Perl.
William Phillips.
Norman F. Ramsey.
Robert C. Richardson.
Burton Richter.
Arthur L. Schawlow.
J. Robert Schrieffer.
Mel Schwartz.
Clifford G. Shull.
Joseph H. Taylor, Jr.
Daniel C. Tsui.
Charles Townes.
Steven Weinberg.
Robert W. Wilson.
Kenneth G. Wilson.

Former Senior Government Officials and Advisors

Ambassador George Bunn, NPT Negotiations and former General
Counsel of ACDA.
Ambassador Jonathan Dean, MBFR negotiations.
Ambassador James E. Goodby, Ambassador to Finland and to
U.S.-Russian Nuclear negotiations.
Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., Special Representative of
the President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament.
The Honorable Paul Ignatius, Secretary of the Navy.
The Honorable Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director of ACDA.
The Honorable Lawrence Korb, Assistant Secretary of
Defense.
Ambassador Steven Ledogar, CTBT negotiations.
Ambassador James Leonard, Deputy U.N. Representative.
Jack Mendelsohn, senior arms control negotiator.
Lori Murray, Assistant Director of ACDA.
Ambassador Michael Newlin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Export Controls and Policy.
Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan.
Daniel B. Poneman, Senior Director, National Security
Council.
The Honorable Stanley Resor, Secretary of the Army and
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.
The Honorable John Rhinelander, Legal Adviser to SALT I
Delegation.
Elizabeth Rindskopf, General Counsel of CIA and National
Security Agency.
Ambassador Robert Gallucci, DPRK Agreed Framework
negotiations.
The Honorable Lawrence Scheinman, Assistant Director of
ACDA.
Ambassador James Sweeney, Special Representative of the
President for Non-Proliferation.
Ambassador Frank Wisner, U.S. Ambassador to India.

former government advisers

Paul Doty.
Richard Garwin.
John Holdren.
Wolfgang Panokfsky.
Frank Press.
John D. Steinbruner.
Frank N. von Hippel.

National Groups

Medical and Scientific Organizations

American Association for the Advancement of Science.
American Geophysical Union.
American Medical Students Association/Foundation.
American Physical Society.
American Public Health Association.
American Medical Association.

Public Interest Groups

20/20 Vision National Project.
Alliance for Nuclear Accountability.
Alliance for Survival.
Americans for Democratic Action.
Arms Control Association.
British American Security Information Council.
Business Executives for National Security.
Campaign for America's Future.
Campaign for U.N. Reform.
Center for Defense Information.
Center for War/Peace Studies (New York, NY).
Council for a Livable World.
Council for a Livable World Education Fund.
Council on Economic Priorities.
Defenders of Wildlife.
Demilitarization for Democracy.
Economists Allied for Arms Reduction (ECAAR).
Environmental Defense Fund.
Environmental Working Group.
Federation of American Scientists.
Fourth Freedom Forum.
Friends of the Earth.
Fund for New Priorities in America.
Fund for Peace.
Global Greens, USA.
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment.
Greenpeace, USA.
The Henry L. Stimson Center.
Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (Saugus, MA).
Institute for Science and International Security.
International Association of Educators for World Peace
(Huntsville, AL).
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.
International Center.
Izaak Walton League of America.

[[Page S12333]]

Lawyers Alliance for World Security.
League of Women Voters of the United States.
Manhattan Project II.
Maryknoll Justice and Peace Office.
National Environmental Coalition of Native Americans
(NECONA).
National Environmental Trust.
National Commission for Economic Conversion and
Disarmament.
Natural Resources Defense Council.
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.
Nuclear Control Institute.
Nuclear Information & Resource Service.
OMB Watch.
Parliamentarians for Global Action
Peace Action.
Peace Action Education Fund.
Peace Links.
PeacePAC.
Physicials for Social Responsibility.
Plutonium Challenge.
Population Action Institute.
Population Action International.
Psychologists for Social Responsibility.
Public Citizen.
Public Education Center.
Saferworld.
Sierra Club.
Union of Concerned Scientists.
United States Servas, Inc.
Veterans for Peace.
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation.
Volunteers for Peace, Inc.
War and Peace Foundation.
War Resistors League.
Women Strike for Peace.
Women's Action for New Directions.
Women's Legislators' Lobby of WAND.
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.
World Federalist Association.
Zero Population Growth.

religious groups

African Methodist Episcopal Church.
American Baptist Churches, USA.
American Baptist Churches, USA, National Ministries.
American Friends Service Committee.
American Jewish Congress.
American Muslim Council.
Association General Secretary for Public Policy, National
Council of Churches.
Catholic Conference of Major Superiors of Men's Institutes.
Church Women United.
Coalition for Peace and Justice.
Columbian Fathers' Justice and Peace Office.
Commission for Women, Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America.
Covenant of Unitarian Universalist Pagans.
Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in the United States
and Canada.
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church.
Church of the Brethren, General Board.
Division for Church in Society, Evangelical Lutheran Church
in America.
Division for Congregational Ministries, Evangelical
Lutheran Church in America.
Eastern Archdiocese, Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch.
The Episcopal Church.
Episcopal Peace Fellowship, National Executive Council.
Evangelicals for Social Action.
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America.
Fellowship of Reconciliation.
Friends Committee on National Legislation.
Friends United Meeting.
General Board Members, Church of the Brethren.
General Board of Church and Society, United Methodist
Church.
General Conference, Mennonite Church.
General Conference of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.
Jewish Peace Fellowship.
Lutheran Office for Governmental Affairs, Evangelical
Lutheran Church in America.
Mennonite Central Committee.
Mennonite Central Committee, U.S.
Mennonite Church.
Methodists United for Peace with Justice.
Missionaries of Africa.
Mission Investment Fund of the ELCA, Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America.
Moravian Church, Northern Province.
National Council of Churches.
National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA.
National Council of Catholic Women.
National Missionary Baptist Convention of America.
NETWORK: A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby.
New Call to Peacemaking.
Office for Church in Society, United Church of Christ.
Orthodox Church in America.
Pax Christi.
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.).
Presbyterian Peace Fellowship.
Progressive National Baptist Convention, Inc.
Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism.
The Shalom Center.
Sojourners.
Union of American Hebrew Congregations.
United Church of Christ.
United Methodist Church.
United Methodist Council of Bishops.
Unitarian Universalist Association.
Washington Office, Mennonite Central Committee.
Women of the ELCA, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America.

Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thought it was understood that we would
alternate sides as we proceeded this morning.
Mr. REID. I would only say to my friend from Virginia, I am happy to
alternate. The only thing is, you will have to speak less than we do.
Your speeches will have to be shorter because you have less time. I
spoke with the Senator from Arizona. What is the time now?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority has 2 hours 53 minutes; the
minority, 3 hours 2 minutes.
Mr. REID. So it has narrowed down to about the same time. Fine, we
will alternate back and forth.
Mr. WARNER. The time--
Mr. REID. Is very close to being equal.
Mr. WARNER. As an opponent to the treaty, I would like to proceed,
Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is that all right with the Senator from
Wisconsin?
Mr. FEINGOLD. My understanding is, I would be next in line after the
Senator from Virginia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator from Wisconsin.
During the period of last week, a number of Senators sought to obtain
from the President a letter addressing his views on the timing of a
vote on this treaty. Over the weekend, in consultation with the White
House staff, I learned that this letter would be delivered. It was
delivered to the Senate leadership yesterday afternoon.
I shall now read it and place it in the Record:

Dear Mr. Leader:
Tomorrow, the Senate is scheduled to vote on the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I firmly believe the Treaty is
in the national interest. However, I recognize that there are
a significant number of Senators who have honest
disagreements. I believe that proceeding to a vote under
these circumstances would severely harm the national security
of the United States, damage our relationship with our
allies, and undermine our historic leadership over 40 years,
through administrations Republican and Democratic, in
reducing the nuclear threat.
Accordingly, I request that you postpone consideration of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on the Senate floor.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.

Throughout this debate, the hallmark has been differing views,
differing views by honestly motivated colleagues on both sides of the
aisle. I am not suggesting everyone on this side, in other words, is
opposed to the treaty, but the practical matter is, there seems to be a
division along this aisle.
In addition, as recited by my good friend, the deputy leader of the
Democrat side, the Senate has received communications from a wide range
of individuals, again, on both sides of this issue. The Armed Services
Committee held three consecutive hearings. Secretary Schlesinger came
forward with a very clear statement in opposition to the treaty and
expressed, on behalf of five other former Secretaries of Defense, the
same viewpoint. That occurred immediately following the current
Secretary of Defense, Secretary Cohen, appearing before the Armed
Services Committee, together with General Shelton, and taking the view
in support of the treaty. All through last week intermittently these
communications came to the Senate in writing, orally or otherwise--
former Secretary of State Kissinger, former National Security Adviser
Brent Scowcroft, again, communicating their desire to see that the
treaty not be voted upon at this time.
I mention that because of the seriousness of the treaty, one that
lasts in perpetuity--theoretically, in perpetuity--asking this Nation
to take certain steps with regard to our ability to monitor the
effectiveness and the safety of our nuclear arsenal. To me, it is clear
such a treaty should only be voted on when those types of conflicting
opinions have been, as nearly as possible, resolved. The laboratory
Directors, likewise, came before our committee; they are not involved
in the political arena. But one after the other in testimony tried to
indicate where they are in the test program. We

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are not there yet. It could be anywhere from 5 and, one even said, 20
years before the milestones now scheduled are put in place for this
substitute scientific, largely computerized test program will take the
place of the actual tests.
Against that background--and I speak only for myself--I have joined
with Senator Moynihan and, hopefully, others in preparing a Dear
Colleague letter, which will be circulated this morning, with the
Senator from Virginia opposed to the treaty, prepared tonight to vote
against it or tomorrow, whenever the case may be, and my distinguished
colleague, the senior Senator from New York, who spent much of his
lifetime in foreign affairs, a recognized expert, steadfastly in favor
of the treaty and prepared to vote in support of it. I find on both
sides of the aisle there are Senators of a like mind who believe that
in the interest of national security, today is not the time to vote for
that treaty.
The letter from the President, it was hoped by some, would refer to
his belief as to the scheduling of when this treaty should next be
addressed in terms of a vote by the Senate. It is clear; his last
paragraph does not address that issue. He simply says: Accordingly, I
request that you postpone consideration on the Senate floor.
Given that situation, it seems to me it is incumbent upon, hopefully,
a majority of Senators, hopefully 25 or more from each side, to come
forward and state that they firmly believe the final consideration of
this treaty should be laid at a time beyond the current Congress and
that final vote should not take place until the convening of the 107th
Congress. The Senate at that time would review the entirety of the
record. A new President will be in office, and the combination of a new
President and his perspective, the Senate constituted, as it will be in
the 107th, and that point in time is the critical moment for this
Senate to determine the merits and demerits of this treaty to the
extent that, through reservations and other means, changes could be
brought about and then, if it is the desire of the majority of the
Senate, to move towards a vote.

That, to me, is a reasonable course of action. Next year
constitutional elections of the United States take place. We all are
very familiar with the dynamics of that critical period in American
history, particularly in the months preceding the election. Should this
treaty be subjected to the rifts of the dynamics of an election year,
given its importance to our national security? Clearly in this
Senator's mind, I say no. My distinguished colleague from New York has
joined me in the same conclusion. This country has exercised a
leadership role in arms control for 40 years. Indeed, this treaty has--
not in my judgment in its present form--in the minds of others a
potential to be another milestone in our progress towards arms control
and the reduction of the threat of nuclear weapons.
In fairness to all sides, would it not be wiser to delay the vote and
make certain it is the consensus of a majority of this Chamber, before
that decision is finalized today or tomorrow, the majority of this
Chamber saying we concur in the observation for a number of reasons,
one of which clearly came before the Armed Services Committee, and that
is, that the Intelligence Committee, on its own initiative, has
initiated a new study of the capabilities of the United States to
monitor low-level tests of actual weapons, should some nation, a
signatory to this treaty or otherwise, decide to test live weapons.
We are at a crossroads in history which will affect this Nation for
decades to come. What possible rush to judgment compels a vote tonight
or tomorrow? Would it not be more prudent that such a vote now be by a
majority of the Senate in support of the two leaders, Senator Lott and
Senator Daschle, both of whom have handled this matter, in my judgment,
conscientiously, always foremost in mind the security interests of this
country today, tomorrow, and the indefinite future? I salute both
leaders.
That is my brief opening. I wish to continue and summarize what our
committee did last week. We received over 15 hours of testimony from a
wide range of witnesses, from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs to current and former National Laboratory Directors
and career professionals in the field of nuclear weapons. We also
received letters from many public officeholders, former Secretaries of
Defense, State, Secretaries of Energy, Chairmen of the Joints Chiefs,
Directors of Central Intelligence, and former lab Directors on the
merits and the pitfalls of the CTB Treaty. Other public officeholders
came forward in favor, but there is a strong division.
I don't think anyone, the President or, indeed, the Senate, could
have foreseen the outpouring of conscientious opinion, opinions
directed solely in the best interests of this country, not politics, by
these former officials. They are in the Record for all to see. These
are people with decades of experience in national security. Their
statements reflect honest disagreements, disagreements primarily with
the stance taken by the President and senior members of his
administration.
In my view, the body of facts that the Armed Services Committee has
accumulated over the past several days clearly puts the arguments of
many of the administration officials in serious question. We have
learned we do not have the full confidence in the United States'
technical capability to verify this treaty to the zero-yield threshold
that President Clinton unilaterally imposed, more or less, on this
country. And other countries can conduct military-significant live bomb
tests at levels below our detection capability. That is the essence of
it. We do not have all of the seismic equipment, in the judgment of the
Intelligence Committee, in place and ready to meet the deadlines of
this treaty so we could detect another nation that desired to use live
tests in violation of their commitments under this treaty.
We have learned that our nuclear weapons will, to some degree,
deteriorate over time. That is pure science. The physical properties of
the materials deteriorate over a period of time. We cannot guarantee
the safety and reliability of our highly sophisticated nuclear weapons
in perpetuity--always remember, in perpetuity. Testing is needed.
The Stockpile Stewardship Program is the concept of a substitute for
the live testing that we have had these 50 years. That 50-year record
of testing gives us the confidence today, and for a number of years
forward, in the reliability and safety of our stockpile. But there is
some point in time, due to the deterioration of weapons, and other
factors, that we will have to shift to a new means of testing. The
administration's proposal under this treaty is the Stockpile
Stewardship Program. It is a computer simulation substitute for actual
testing. The scientists tell us this will not be proven--this
substitute--for perhaps 5, 10, maybe up to 20 years. I repeat,
milestones are being put in place, but there is no certainty as to
when, collectively, those milestones will constitute a system to
replace actual testing. The estimates vary from 5, 6, 7 years, perhaps
out to 20.
Yet we are being asked to ratify a treaty affirming that we shall
never again, in perpetuity, actually test any of our nuclear weapons.
We have learned the CTBT will do nothing--not a single thing--to stop
proliferation by rogue nations and terrorists. Iraq and Iran will sit
back and laugh. Right now, Iraq is defying the world over similar arms
control agreements, similar U.N. sanctions, and the United Nations is
entangled in what appears to be a hopeless debate over how to resolve
the need to continue to monitor Saddam Hussein's program of weapons of
mass destruction. A clear example of how the most well-intentioned
international agreements have failed is right there, today.
Rogue nations can easily develop and field, with a high degree of
confidence, a single stage device--a ``dirty old bomb,'' as they refer
to it--without any testing. Ironically, the first weapon dropped by the
United States was never tested with an actual test.
Many of my colleagues, again, honestly disagree on the conclusions,
pointing out that reasonable people can examine the same body of facts
and reach different conclusions. That is my grave concern. We should
not be ratifying a treaty as long as reasonable doubt to that degree
exists as to whether the treaty is in the national security interest of
the United States. The stakes are far too high.

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The Armed Services Committee began its hearings with a closed
hearing, where we heard from career professionals and experts with
decades of experience, from the Department of Energy, the National
Laboratories, and the Intelligence Committee. Their testimony focused
on recent facts--facts that were not fully known at the time this
treaty was signed by the President some 2 years ago. Their assessment
is they would have to go back and reexamine a lot of facts to determine
the viability, or lack of viability, of the capability of this Nation
to monitor low-level tests.

Much of that information we learned was developed over the last 18
months. Therefore, those facts were not available to the Congress or
the President when the CTBT was signed in 1996. The information
presented to the Armed Services Committee on Tuesday is highly
classified and, of course, cannot be discussed in open session. But one
fact is very relevant. Because of disturbing new information, the
Intelligence Committee--on its own initiative--decided to revisit and
update the 1997 NIE, national intelligence estimate, on the U.S.
ability to monitor the CTBT. I have been informed, as have other
members of the committee, that it will take until next year to complete
that work. That is a clear, credible basis for not moving forward today
or tomorrow on a vote.
I advised Secretary Cohen and General Shelton on the following day,
Wednesday morning, when they testified before the Armed Services
Committee that they had the opportunity to make their case for this
treaty before the elected representatives of the American people, and
that they did. I believe the burden is on the administration to prove--
maybe beyond a reasonable doubt--that ratification of this treaty is in
the national security interest of our Nation. They simply did not make
that case. And I say that with all due respect to my good friend and
former colleague, Secretary Cohen.
We are being asked to give up--permanently--our tried and true,
proven ability to maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear
stockpile and to rely instead on a computer simulation and modeling
capability that will not be fully developed or proven for many years--
if at all. We are being asked today to put at some degree of risk our
nuclear deterrent capability, in exchange for the promise that we may
have a way to adequately certify that capability at some uncertain
future date. The question before the Senate is, Can we afford to take
such a gamble? This Senator believes the answer is no.
For more than 50 years, one of the top national security priorities
of every American President has been to maintain a credible nuclear
arsenal and deterrent to aggression against ourselves and our allies,
and it has worked. The credibility of the United States in the world is
a direct reflection of our military capability. If that credibility is
ever called into question by our inability to ensure the safety and
reliability of nuclear weapons--a vital segment of our military
capability--then we have done our Nation a great disservice. The stakes
for this debate are very high.
For 50 years, our nuclear umbrella--the deterrent provided by the
U.S. nuclear arsenal--has kept peace in Europe. Unquestionably, the
threats in Europe following World War II were deterred by this
capability. Yet it is that very deterrent that could be jeopardized by
this treaty. Dr. Schlesinger stated it clearly when he asked, ``Do we
want a world that lacks confidence in the U.S. deterrent or not?''
I hope all Members will take the time to examine carefully the body
of facts that the Armed Services Committee and, indeed, the Foreign
Relations Committee have accumulated and recorded for Senators.

Simply put, the CTBT, at this time, jeopardizes our ability to
maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal--perhaps not
right away but almost certainly over the long run. According to Dr.
James Robinson, Director of Sandia National Laboratory: ``To forego
testing is to live with uncertainty.''
Much has been said about what other Presidents have done. They have
all examined the possibility of entering into some type of
international treaty. But no previous President has ever opposed a test
ban of zero yield and unlimited duration. President Eisenhower insisted
that nuclear tests of less than 4.75 kilotons be permitted and, in
fact, continued low-yield testing through his administration's test ban
moratorium. President Kennedy terminated a 3-year moratorium on testing
when the adverse consequences of the moratorium were realized, and he
declared that ``never again'' would the United States make such a
mistake. President Kennedy then embarked on the most aggressive series
of nuclear tests in the history of the U.S. nuclear weapons program.
President Carter also opposed a zero-yield test ban while in office.
To have an effective nuclear deterrent, we must have confidence in
the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons. These weapons are
the most sophisticated designs in the world. It is a certainty that,
over time, these arsenals, high explosives, and electronic components
contained in these weapons will experience some level of deterioration.
That is simple science. The nature of our nuclear weapons program over
the past five decades provides little practical experience in
predicting the effects of these changes.
What do we say to our sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines who live
and work in close proximity with these nuclear weapons? What do we say
to the people of our Nation, and indeed nations around the world, who
live in the vicinity of our nuclear weapons? These are weapons that are
stored in various locations around the world, that rest in missile
tubes literally several feet away from the bunks of our submarine
crews, that are regularly moved across roads and airfields around the
world. How can we take any action which in any way jeopardizes or calls
into question the safety of these weapons? As Dr. Bob Barker, former
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, told the Armed
Services Committee on Thursday, ``to leave in place weapons that are
not as safe as they could be is unconscionable.''
History tells us that weapons believed to be reliable and thoroughly
tested, nevertheless, develop problems which, in the past were only
discovered, and could only be fixed, through nuclear testing. As
President Bush noted in a report to Congress in January 1993: ``Of all
U.S. nuclear weapons designs fielded since 1958, approximately one-
third have required nuclear testing to resolve problems arising after
deployment.'' In three-quarters of these cases, the problems were
identified and assessed only as a result of nuclear testing, and could
be fixed only through testing. Let me emphasize, most of these problems
were related to safety.
The Clinton administration has proposed remanufacturing aging weapons
rather than designing and building new ones. The problem is that we
simply don't know if this new approach is possible. Almost every
weapons designer we have heard from over the past 3 years has raised
concerns with any attempts to change components, such as plutonium and
high explosives, in the heart of the weapon. Many of the materials and
methods used in producing the original weapons are no longer available.
To assure that the remanufactured weapons work as intended most agree
the new weapons would have to be validated through underground nuclear
testing.
Every system will become obsolete at some point in time--if for no
other reason, for deterioration due to aging. CTBT will not allow us to
replace aging or unsafe systems in the future.
Supporters of the treaty, argue that if a problem with the stockpile
is identified, the President can always exercise ``Safeguard F'' and
withdraw from the treaty and test. The military leaders and the three
lab directors have all conditioned their support for CTBT on the
guarantee that the President would exercise ``Safeguard F'' and
withdraw from the treaty if a problem develops with our nuclear
stockpile. But how realistic is that? It is highly unlikely that this
safeguard would ever be used by the United States to withdraw from the
treaty even if serious problems should occur in the stockpile. Has the
United States ever withdrawn from a treaty? We are struggling today
under the weight of the ABM Treaty which was signed in 1972 with a
nation that no longer exists: withdrawing from the treaty is simply
without precedent.
And what would the international ramifications be of such a
withdrawal

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from the treaty? Wouldn't it be worse to withdraw years down the road,
after other nations have presumably followed our lead, than to simply
not ratify in the first place?
In addition, the notion of being able to test quickly in an emergency
is unrealistic. Even if the United States should decide to withdraw
from CTBT, the lab directors report that it would take at least 2 to 3
years of preparation before a test could be conducted, and our testing
infrastructure continues to deteriorate. By withdrawing, the United
States would be announcing to the world that we have such a serious
problem with our nuclear deterrent that we have lost confidence in the
reliability of our nuclear stockpile, and that we must initiate a
program to repair or replace the weapon or weapons and conduct tests to
confirm the results. Such an action would be highly destabilizing.
Proponents of the CTBT have asserted that the treaty will have no
adverse impacts on U.S. national security, that we will be able to
confidently maintain and modernize U.S. strategic and theater nuclear
forces to the extent necessary without ever conducting another nuclear
explosive test. In fact, the CTBT will force the United States to forgo
any number of important initiatives that may be required to ensure the
long-term viability and safety of our strategic and theater nuclear
deterrent forces.
The CTBT will lock the United States into retention of a nuclear
arsenal that was designed at the height of the cold war. Many of the
nuclear systems that we developed to deter the Soviet Union are simply
not suited to the subtle, and perhaps more difficult, task of deterring
rogue states from using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Such
deterrence will require the United States to possess nuclear weapons
that pose a credible threat to targets such as rogue state biological
weapon production facilities that may be located deep underground in
hardened shelters. At the same time, for such weapons to be credible
deterrents, they must not threaten to create significant collateral
damage or radioactive fallout. Such weapons do not exist today in the
U.S. arsenal.
I am also concerned that this treaty's zero yield test ban is not
verifiable. It is difficult, if not impossible, to detect tests below a
certain level. And testing at yields below detection may allow
countries, such as Russia, to develop new classes of low-yield,
tactical nuclear weapons. This possibility makes recent statements by
senior Russian officials claiming that they are now developing tactical
nuclear weapons especially troubling. For example, this August, the
Russian Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy, Lev Ryabev, stated that a
key Russian objective was the development of a tactical nuclear system.
This April, President Yeltsin reportedly approved a blueprint for the
development and use of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Would we be able
to detect tests of such tactical weapons? The development of any
nuclear weapon, regardless of its yield, is militarily significant to
this Senator.
Further, countries that want to evade detection can do so by masking
or muffling tests in mines, underground cavities, salt domes, or other
geological formations. I am convinced that the United States and the
international community cannot now, and will not in the foreseeable
future, be able to detect such cheating or testing below a certain
level.
Proponents of the CTBT argue that the International Monitoring System
established under the treaty will put in place capabilities exceeding
those that the United States and its allies can field today. These
monitoring sites will be owned and operated by the host countries,
which I believe calls into serious question the reliability of the
information collected and, thus, its value to our ability to detect a
nuclear test.
Proponents of CTBT also argue that although the treaty may not be
verifiable through detection methods, the on-site inspections make the
CTBT verifiable. I disagree. The treaty requires an affirmative vote of
30 of 51 members of the Executive Council to initiate an inspection.
The likelihood of obtaining that number, which could include such
countries as Iran and North Korea, is remote, if not impossible.
Further, the United States would have to present a case to the
Executive Council which would most likely compromise sensitive U.S.
intelligence sources and methods. The timelines imposed by the treaty
for on-site inspections permit considerable coverup and deterioration
of evidence. In addition, there is no guarantee that Americans will be
on the inspection teams. In fact, any state is explicitly permitted to
block inspectors from countries it does not like. The treaty gives the
inspected state the final say in any dispute with inspectors.
Finally, ambiguities in the CTBT may allow other nations to legally
circumvent the clear intent of the treaty. The treaty does not define
what constitutes a nuclear test. However, President Clinton has said
that the United States will interpret nuclear test to mean any nuclear
explosion, thus all tests are banned unless they are zero-yield.
However, if other signatory nations interpret a less restrictive
definition, they could conduct very low-yield tests and argue that they
are not violating the language of the treaty.
I am concerned that while the United States would adhere to the CTBT,
thereby losing confidence over time in our nuclear deterrent, other
countries would capitalize upon U.S. deficiencies and vulnerabilities
created by the CTBT and violate the treaty, by escaping detection and
building new weapons.
I believe the risk the CTBT poses to U.S. national security by far
outweighs any of the benefits that have been identified.
Mr. President, I shall reengage in this debate as the day progresses.
I will pursue with Senator Moynihan the final presentation of our Dear
Colleague letter in the hopes that a number of Senators will see the
wisdom in giving the leadership of the Senate the support they deserve
should a decision be made not to go forward today. That decision should
embrace very clearly that it would be in the Senate's interest, in the
Nation's interest, and our security interest to revisit this treaty in
terms of a final vote in the balance of this Congress.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.
Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of Senate advice and
consent to the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty.
As a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, I have
advocated for consideration of this treaty since President Clinton
submitted it to this body for advice and consent on September 22, 1997.
Now, more than 2 years later, this important treaty is being considered
on the Senate floor. While I am pleased that we are having this debate,
I am concerned about the manner in which we reached this point. I
regret that the Foreign Relations Committee, of which I am a member,
had only one day of hearings on this important arms control agreement
and that the committee did not consider and mark up a resolution of
ratification.
I am concerned that this debate is too limited in duration and scope.
This is obviously serious business. And I hope that the manner in which
this treaty was brought to the floor does not doom it to failure. This
treaty should be fully debated on its merits. And this body should have
the opportunity to offer any statements, declarations, understandings,
or conditions that we deem necessary. But this treaty should not be
defeated simply because the Senate has backed itself into a corner in
which the choice is to vote up or down now without the option to
postpone this important vote in favor of further consideration. Some of
our colleagues have expressed their desire for further consideration.
But they have said that if they are forced to vote today, they will
oppose this treaty--not necessarily because they do not support the
treaty, but rather because they feel they cannot yet fully support it
without further study.
I think putting Senators in this position is an irresponsible course
of action.
As my colleagues know, I support this treaty. And I will vote in
favor of it today should it come to that. But I hope we will consider
the consequences of defeating this treaty, not on its merits, but
because of the political box in

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which we find ourselves. This treaty must not fall victim to politics.
The consequences of its defeat will be felt from Moscow to New Delhi to
Beijing to Baghdad. And this body, the greatest deliberative body in
the world, would be sending the message that we did not want to spend
more time on one of the most important issues facing the world today.
We do live in dangerous times, Mr. President. Weapons capable of mass
destruction have replaced more conventional weapons in our world. New
threats continue to emerge. But we have the power to stem the tide of
nuclear proliferation. Perhaps we cannot stop it completely. But we can
make sure that the nuclear arms race is stopped in its tracks and we
can make it extremely difficult for those with nuclear aspirations to
develop a weapon in which they can have high confidence.
And we should do everything in our power to make the world safer for
future generations. And if that includes delaying the vote on this
treaty, then we should swallow our political pride and do that.
As a number of my colleagues have already said, both in committee and
on this floor, the idea of a nuclear test ban dates back to the
Eisenhower administration. For more than 40 years, Presidents of both
parties have advocated for such a treaty.
In a speech delivered on June 10, 1963, President John F. Kennedy
discussed his support for the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban
treaty. He said--and I quote:

The conclusion of such a treaty, so near and yet so far,
would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most
dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a
position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest
hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of
nuclear arms. It would increase our security--it would
decrease the prospects of war. Surely this goal is
sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit,
yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole
effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital
and responsible safeguards.

Mr. President, those words are as relevant today as they were when
President Kennedy spoke them 36 years ago. Nuclear weapons are still
one of the greatest hazards on the planet. And they have been joined by
chemical, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction. President
Kennedy spoke from the perspective of the cold war and the still
escalating arms race with the Soviet Union. Now, in 1999, the cold war
is over and the Soviet Union is no more. But we are on the brink of
another nuclear arms race, this time in south Asia. India and Pakistan
are watching, Mr. President. And we have the opportunity to end their
nuclear aspirations once and for all. Or to give them the cover they
need to continue testing.
We have the opportunity today at long last to become a party to a
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty that will both stop the nuclear
arms race in its tracks and maintain our option to withdraw from its
provisions if our national security is threatened.
I hope that will be our paramount consideration in the coming hours
as we decide whether to put this treaty up for a vote today or
tomorrow.
Mr. President, as many of my colleagues have noted throughout this
debate, there are many reasons why the United States should become a
party to this important treaty. I will address three of them here.
First, this treaty will allow the United States to maintain our
strong nuclear deterrent. This treaty does not require the parties to
dismantle their existing nuclear stockpiles. It does not prevent them
from maintaining those stockpiles through scientific means. Rather,
this treaty prohibits further nuclear testing. The United States has
not conducted any nuclear tests for 7 years, and the administration has
testified that we have no intention of performing any further tests.
The Departments of Defense and Energy already have a substantial
database of information on the more than 1,000 nuclear tests that we
have already performed. And this information has been the basis for the
development of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which the high-
ranking administration officials have testified is an effective
mechanism for maintaining the safety and reliability of our nuclear
arsenal.
Second, this treaty will help to create a worldwide nuclear status
quo. Parties to the CTBT will be unable to conduct nuclear explosive
tests to improve their existing weapons or develop stronger ones. This
means that the nuclear arms race will be literally frozen where it is.
This is beneficial to the United States for several reasons. It will
allow us to maintain our nuclear superiority. It will protect us from
the threat of stronger weapons in the future. And, in fact, it ensures
that we will have the dubious distinction of having won the nuclear
arms race.
The third point in favor of this treaty I will make is this: the CTBT
is effectively verifiable. Some have argued that this treaty is not
verifiable. It seems that argument echoes in these halls every time we
debate an arms control treaty. But, again, that argument rings hollow.
Verification is a tricky thing. All treaties, including arms control
treaties, are largely based on good faith among the parties to them.
Good faith in the sense that the parties who have ratified the treaty
have promised to comply with the treaty's provisions. Collectively, the
parties have agreed to a set of provisions, in the case of the CTBT to
not perform nuclear tests. Alone, a country can decide to no longer
perform nuclear tests--as the United States has already done--but no
other nation knows for sure if that country is living up to its
promise.
Under a multilateral treaty such as the CTBT, all parties have agreed
to the provisions and are subject to a verification regime that
otherwise would not exist. The CTBT says that if one party to the
treaty has evidence that a test has occurred, that party can request an
onsite inspection. This inspection will occur if 30 of the 51 members
of the CTBT's Executive Council agree that the evidence warrants such
an inspection. This type of onsite inspection cannot occur outside the
CTBT regime, Mr. President. And this inspection will allow the parties
to the treaty to obtain information that cannot be obtained outside the
treaty regime.
No one here will claim that any treaty is 100 percent verifiable or
that some countries may try to cheat. But the Pentagon has said that
this treaty is effectively verifiable. And that is the key. The
International Monitoring System created by this treaty includes 230
data gathering stations around the world in addition to those already
operating in the United States. Last week, Secretary of Defense William
Cohen told the Senate Armed Services Committee that ``the information
collected by these sensor stations would not normally be available to
the U.S. intelligence community.'' In addition to this enhanced
capability, the United States is also permitted, under the provisions
of the treaty and in accordance with international law, to use our own
national technical means to detect nuclear tests.
Mr. President, some people say that, because the United States has
already made the decision not to do any further nuclear testing--and
indeed that we have not tested in seven years--that this treaty is
unnecessary. They claim that the CTBT merely reinforces what we have
already done and that there is no real benefit to our ratification. In
fact, as many of my colleagues have already addressed during this
debate, and as I have already noted, there are many benefits to this
treaty. We retain our leadership in the arms control arena. We maintain
our nuclear superiority. And, importantly, we gain the ability to
request and participate in onsite inspections of suspected nuclear
testing abroad. And, if the President is unable to certify that our
nuclear arsenal is sound, we have the option to withdraw from the
treaty.
Mr. President, in urging my colleagues to support this important
treaty, I will again quote President Kennedy:

The United States, as the world knows, will never start a
war. We do not want a war. We do not now expect a war. This
generation of Americans has already had enough--more than
enough--of war and hate and oppression. We shall be prepared
if others wish it. We shall be alert to try to stop it. But
we shall also do our part to build a world of peace where the
weak are safe and the strong are just. We are not helpless
before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and
unafraid, we labor on--not toward a strategy of nuclear
annihilation but toward a strategy of peace.

Thank you, Mr. President.

[[Page S12338]]

Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Arizona such
time as he may consume.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. President, a number of us have concluded that we cannot support
ratification of the CTBT, that it will be defeated. But some have urged
that we put the vote off out of concern that rejection would send an
undesirable message to the world.
I believe, however, that we should vote precisely because the world
would get a desirable message that the Senate took a stand that
treaties such as this must meet at least minimum standards for sensible
arms control. The CTBT fails that test. It is a sloppy, altogether
substandard piece of work, and it deserves rejection.
Our colleague, Dick Lugar, opposes the CTBT ratification, as he has
explained, because he does not believe the treaty is of the same
caliber as arms control agreements that have come before the Senate in
recent decades. He cites two of the CTBT's many deficiencies: ``an
ineffective verification regime and a practically nonexistent
enforcement process.''
Contrary to what treaty supporters have argued, the CTBT's rejection
would strengthen the hands of U.S. diplomats on such matters in future
negotiations. When they insist on more effective provisions, citing the
need to satisfy a rigorous U.S. Senate, their warnings would become
credible and influential. Such warnings would help free the United
States from having to go along with wrong-headed treaty terms dictated
by countries that lack U.S. responsibilities around the world.
I note that as a good example of our negotiators changing their
position from that originally supported by the administration to go
directly to the heart of key objections to this particular treaty. As
you know, no President had ever sought a zero-yield test ban treaty in
perpetuity. In this case, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that we
should not have such a treaty.
The original position of the administration in the negotiations was
to grant the United States an option without having to invoke the
supreme national interest clause to retire from the treaty after 10
years and not to insist upon a zero-yield but, rather, to permit low-
yield, what are called hydronuclear tests. Over time, our negotiators'
position was undercut, and in the end, according to the very people who
negotiated the treaty, in order to reach an agreement with other
countries, the United States conceded on those and other important
points. Those are two of the critical deficiencies in this treaty.
By rejecting the treaty now, the Senate would strengthen the hands of
our future diplomats who negotiate these arms control agreements to
enable them to make the point to their counterparts that the United
States is serious about treaties at least achieving minimal standards;
we consider these to be the kinds of minimal standards that are
necessary to bind the American people; and those negotiators would know
that Senate ratification would not occur unless the terms were as
proposed by the United States.
As I said, no other President ever supported a zero-yield treaty, let
alone one that would bind the United States forever, and neither should
the Senate.
If we proceed today to reject the CTBT, future U.S. negotiators will
be more inclined to seek the Senate's advice before the deal is
finalized and the administration demands our consent. This will serve
the U.S. national interests in various ways.
First, the Senate was never intended to be a rubber stamp, approving
any ill-advised treaty negotiated by an administration. Our
constitutional duty in treaty-making is to perform the equivalent of
quality control. Under the Constitution, the Senate's role is of equal
stature with the President's. We in the Senate are entitled--indeed, we
are obliged--to second guess the President's national interest
calculations regarding treaties.
There would inevitably be complaints from abroad, including from
friends, if we upset the CTBT apple cart. But that unpleasantness would
be minor and transitory, especially in light of the permanent harm the
CTBT would do to our national security. The embarrassment of the
President for buying into such a flawed treaty in the first place is
not desirable, but the Senate cannot avert it at any price.
Consider again Senator Lugar's words:

[The CTBT] is problematic because it would exacerbate risks
and uncertainties related to the safety of our nuclear
stockpile.

Those are the stakes, and they are serious. That crucial observation
should put into perspective the issue of likely complaints from foreign
foes and friends.
The Senate must fulfill its constitutional duty to ensure that
treaties meet at least minimum standards. We do the Presidency no
favors by shirking, and we do the Senate and the Nation harm if we
accede to the President's diplomatic recklessness simply to spare him
the chore of mollifying the other states that forged the flawed treaty.
A query to my colleagues who are interested in delaying this vote to
avoid the embarrassment of rejecting a treaty negotiated by the
administration: Will the Senate defer to the President on the Kyoto
Global Warming Treaty or the ABM multilateralization or demarcation
treaties?

Some administration spokesmen have used the offensive argument that
Senate rejection of the CTBT would be a message to the world that we
are not serious about arms control. To the contrary, rejecting this
treaty will help establish that we demand real arms control--not the
show, not the empty symbols, not the flimflam treaties that cannot
accomplish their purposes. In rejecting the CTBT, we will be asking the
world to join in real antiproliferation measures, such as enforcement
of the nonproliferation treaty which Russia, China, and North Korea
violate every time they spread nuclear weapons technology.
I quote again from Senator Lugar:

If a country breaks the international norm embodied in the
CTBT, the country has already broken the norm associated with
the nonproliferation treaty.

Mr. President, that is because 185-some nations have agreed not to
possess these nuclear weapons, except for the nuclear powers. The
testing is simply a redundant violation of the possession in the first
place, which is already a violation of the NPT. So this treaty won't
accomplish its minimal objective.
Second, enforcement of the United States resolutions requiring
inspection of Iraq: It would be very helpful if our allies would help
in this very meaningful and important activity rather than undercutting
the United States at every turn.
Again, Senator Lugar hit the point squarely:

The CTBT verification regime seems to be the embodiment of
everything the United States is fighting against in the
UNSCOM inspection process in Iraq . . . [which is] best not
repeated under the CTBT.

Third, perhaps we could get their support in our efforts to free U.S.
policy from the dead hand of the ABM Treaty and to deploy missile
defenses.
These are real, meaningful actions against the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction rather than empty symbolic gestures.
In asking the Senate to postpone the vote on this treaty until he has
the votes, the President is asking, first, to spare him personal
embarrassment; and, second, to give him a chance to bind the United
States to a treaty that most do not think should ever go into force.
The CTBT will not improve with age.
Most Senators would have been content never to have voted on the
treaty. But the President has now denied the Senate that option. He
will not agree to forbear demanding consideration of the treaty next
year when he hopes to have the votes to pass it. Republicans have not
politicized this debate, but it is clear that unless we defeat this
treaty now, it will be a political issue next year when allegedly
changed circumstances--created, for example, by a new test by India or
Pakistan--will give the President the pretext to revive the debate.
It has become clear that the assurances we may now get from the
President and our Democratic colleagues will not be the ironclad
commitments we recently agreed were necessary to induce the Senate to
defer this vote.

[[Page S12339]]

Therefore, to avoid the President politicizing the issue next year, we
should vote now.
Sometimes it is necessary to say or do the right thing and just let
the chips fall where they may. Ronald Reagan knew he would ruffle lots
of foreign feathers--including some of our respected allies--when he
called the Soviet Union an evil empire and when he stood his ground
against Gorbachev in Reykjavik in favor of strategic defense. These
messages he sent were criticized by many as disruptive. They were
sound. They served our national interests and the interests of decent
people around the world, and history has judged them favorably.
The Senate now has a chance to demonstrate strength and the good
sense worthy of Ronald Reagan. If we do it, we will be flouting much
conventional thinking, but we will, in fact, enhance our Nation's
diplomatic strength, protecting our national security and vindicating
the wisdom of America's founding fathers who assigned to the Senate the
duty to protect the country from ill-conceived international
obligations.
Let the Senate vote to reject the CTBT.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, in the waning days of his administration,
President Eisenhower proposed a test ban treaty to end all nuclear
tests in the atmosphere, in the oceans, and under the ground. Nearly
four decades later, the Senate stands on the verge of a vote on
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I will vote in favor
of ratification. I regret the move to postpone a vote because I am of
the firm conviction this treaty will help end the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and increase the safety of the American people.
President Eisenhower proposed the test ban having recognized the
increasing danger posed by nuclear weapons. At that time, the threat
was very real. The American people had a vivid understanding of the
devastating consequences of nuclear weapons.
Those of us in our fifties remember the threat and the fear that we
had as children--the duck and cover drills, the constant reminders of
the devastation that a single nuclear weapon could produce to our
cities and to our communities. In many ways, the problem we have today
comes from our success because the fear we once had has been displaced
by a false sense of complacency, a sense of security that, in my view,
is not justified, given the facts.
I would like to illustrate this danger by a realistic scenario, in my
view, with a single Russian nuclear weapon. It is possible for a small
band of discontented or terroristic members of either the Russian
society or some other nation to raid a silo of Russian missiles in the
Russian wilderness. Soldiers who are poorly trained, sparsely equipped,
and irate at not having been paid in a year are easily overtaken or are
willing to cooperate.
Let's pick one city to illustrate the damage. I, again, call to my
colleagues' attention that this kind of game playing, this kind of
example was quite common as recently as 10 years ago. But today, when
you ask what kind of damage could occur as a result of a single nuclear
blast, you are apt to have people scratching their heads, wondering
what could happen. So let me take Chicago as an example.
First of all, unlike many of the other threats in the world, if a
rocket left Russia, it would arrive in Chicago within an hour, probably
taking a trajectory over the top of the world across the Arctic pole.
It would detonate in Chicago within an hour, and on a bad day it would
hit a target within a few hundred yards off Lake Michigan.
We spent a great deal of time assessing the danger of the nation of
China. Their missiles are not connected to their warheads. Their
warheads are disconnected; they are not together. It would take them
several days and they are not targeted with the accuracy and would not
arrive with the same swiftness as an unauthorized or accidental launch
coming from Russia.

The first effect of the blast would be the nuclear flash. The air
would be heated to 10 million degrees Celsius. The blast would move out
at a few hundred kilometers a second and its heat would be sufficient
to set fire to anything combustible at a distance of 14 kilometers.
People within 80 kilometers would be blinded. The blast effect would
follow. It would travel out from ground zero. Within 3 kilometers,
those who had not already been killed would die from this percussive
force.
The details of this kind of a blast needs to be understood by the
American people as this debate goes forward, because the good news of
the end of the cold war has been replaced with the bad news that we are
increasingly at risk of individuals or nonnation state people who
choose to do damage to the United States of America and do not care if
they die in the execution of their mission. They are willing to attack
the United States of America and they are willing to take American
lives without regard to the fact that they may die in the execution of
their mission.
A single Russian nuclear weapon launched accidentally, or a single
nuclear weapon assembled by some rogue nation and delivered by whatever
the means to the United States of America, would do more damage than
any other threat we currently have on the horizon. A single Russian
submarine that was taken over by a similar sort of dissident faction
could launch 64 one-hundred-kiloton weapons at the United States. I do
not come here to alarm anybody about this. I come simply to remind
people that nuclear weapons are still the only threat that could kill
every single American. It would not take thousands to bring the United
States of America to its knees. It would not take the kind of total
attack we once feared from the Soviet Union to bring America from being
the most powerful economic and military force on the Earth to being
somewhat short of No. 1, not only putting us at increasing risk but
putting the rest of the world at risk as well.
CTBT is by no means the only thing we must do in order to reduce the
risk of proliferation. I would like to go through a few ideas prior to
talking about both our capacity to verify and the confidence I have
that we can maintain our stockpile without the need to test.
First, we have to maintain our intelligence capabilities: our ability
to collect intelligence, to process, to disseminate, to deliver that
intelligence to warfighters is far and away the best in the world. Talk
to our allies in Kosovo, in Bosnia, in Desert Storm; talk to any of
those whose lives were at risk and were allied with the United States
of America in a military effort and they will tell you our intelligence
collection and dissemination capability gave us the capacity to do the
impossible.
Our intelligence agencies, from time to time, make very highly
publicized mistakes. Unfortunately, the publicity given to those
mistakes gives some a lack of confidence in our capability of doing our
mission. That lack of confidence is misplaced. We are an open society.
As a consequence, we tend--correctly so--to examine the things we do
when we make mistakes. Unfortunately, at times it produces a situation
where we are afraid of doing things because we are worried we are going
to make a highly publicized mistake and therefore that mistake is going
to ruin our career or make it difficult for us to advance. As a
consequence, we sometimes are a little too cautious.

Americans should not suffer the illusion we currently have the
intelligence capacity to know everything that is going on in the world;
we simply do not. Indeed, we should not. We are not, as well,
allocating enough resources, in my view, to make certain policymakers
of the future are informed so conflicts that might occur can be avoided
and so nuclear threats can be confronted before they emerge to be
challenges.
The second tool that must be maintained to confront the emerging
nuclear threat is not only a strong military but an intent to use that
military to meet any individual or nation state that threatens the
United States of America. Our military is the envy of the world. While
we must avoid the temptation of using our military forces in situations
not vital to U.S. interests, we must also continue to maintain the will
to use military force in instances in which our national security is at
risk.
The third tool is national missile defense. I support the creation of
a limited national missile defense designed

[[Page S12340]]

to protect the United States of America from rogue state ballistic
missile launches and accidental launches. While the success of the
recent test of a prototype missile defense system demonstrates that
limited national missile defense is possible, we must also realize it
is not a panacea for the dangers we will confront.
The fourth tool in our effort to secure the post-cold-war peace is
further reductions in the American and Russian nuclear arsenals. I have
argued on the Senate floor previously the President should immediately
take bold action to restart the arms control process. If we do not
drastically reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, the danger of
their accidental use or proliferation will increase exponentially. I
recognize that deep reductions--while decreasing the chance of
unauthorized or accidental launch--could actually increase the danger
of material proliferation. Therefore, any such parallel reductions in
our nuclear forces must include arrangements and a U.S. commitment to
provide funding to secure and manage the resultant nuclear material.
This is the fifth tool. We are fortunate we will not begin from scratch
on this problem. We can build on one of the greatest acts of the post-
cold-war statesmanship, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program.
The final piece of the nuclear safety puzzle is the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty. I support the CTBT because I believe it will enhance
U.S. national security, reduce nuclear dangers, and keep the American
people safe. Let me explain how.
First, a fully implemented CTBT will all but halt the ability of
threshold states from establishing an effective and reliable strategic
nuclear force. The inability of nations such as Iran and North Korea to
conduct nuclear tests will make it much less likely for them to become
nuclear powers. Along the same line, the inability of existing nuclear
states to conduct further nuclear tests will impede, if not stop, their
efforts to make technological advances in yields and miniaturization,
advances already achieved by the United States.
Bluntly speaking, we have the most effective and deadly nuclear force
in the world. Therefore, to maintain our existing nuclear edge, it is
in our interest to ratify the CTBT and to halt the nuclear development
advancement of other nations.
In addition, we all have experienced coming to this Chamber to vote
on a sanction imposed upon an individual nation as a consequence of us
judging correctly that that nation poses a threat and, in many cases, a
potential nuclear threat to the United States of America.
We struggle with that vote because we know a unilateral sanction by
the United States of America will oftentimes be used by our allies as a
means for them to capture the market share of some product we were
selling to that nation. With this treaty, it is far more likely the
Security Council will support multilateral sanctions that will enable
us to get the desired effect without us having to suffer adverse
consequences as a consequence of unilateral sanctions.
In the post-cold-war era, nuclear weapons have become the Rolex
wristwatch of international security, a costly purchase whose real
purpose is not the service it provides but the prestige it confers.
Ratification and implementation of the CTBT is in our national security
interest precisely because it will help slow the expansion of the
nuclear club and make it more difficult for nations to acquire these
deadly weapons.
Opponents of the CTBT focus their criticisms on two main points:
verifiability of the treaty and the safety of our nuclear stockpile.
Let me address each of these issues separately.
First, we can effectively monitor and verify CTBT. I purposely say
``effectively monitor and verify'' because absolute verification is
neither attainable nor a necessary standard. But it is the standard
that some have attempted to establish as a benchmark for ratification.
No treaty is absolutely verifiable.
My support for this treaty comes from my firm conviction that by
using existing assets, the United States can effectively monitor and
verify this treaty. I base my convictions on the testimony of Gen. John
Gordon, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and on the briefings
on this topic received by the Intelligence Committee over the years
and, most important, the performance of those men and women who work in
a variety of agencies whose task it is to collect, to process, to
evaluate, to analyze, and to disseminate intelligence to national
customers, as well as war fighters who are defending the people of the
United States of America.
The United States has the capability to detect any test that can
threaten our nuclear deterrence. The type of test that could be
conducted without our knowledge could only be marginally useful and
would not cause a shift in the existing strategic nuclear balance. In
addition, the United States has the capability to detect the level of
testing that would be required for another country to develop and to
weaponize an advanced thermonuclear warhead.
Our intelligence community is the best in the world. This gives us an
enormous lead over every other signatory. Public disclosures of
intelligence community problems may have shaken confidence in our
intelligence capabilities, but let me assure my colleagues that their
confidence should not be shaken. U.S. intelligence has the ability to
know what is occurring around the world regarding the development of
nuclear weapons. It is our intelligence community that largely gives
Secretary Cohen and General Shelton their confidence to say the treaty
should be ratified because it is in our national interest to do so.

I will briefly describe how we will know what is happening when
someone tries to cheat. I will use all caution to make certain I give
away nothing that will provide our enemies with indications of what our
sources or our methods are, but I urge colleagues who doubt this to get
full briefings on what our collection capability is and what we are
able to do to determine whether or not somebody is in violation of this
treaty.
I will briefly describe, as I said, and because the existence of this
highly secretive organization, the National Reconnaissance Office, has
finally been declassified--we are able now to admit that from space,
the United States can see you and can gather signals intelligence. I
urge colleagues to get a full briefing on what the NRO can do in a
classified fashion. I believe my colleagues fully understand the
significance of what I just said.
Every part of the globe is accessible from space. There you will find
satellite reconnaissance either watching or collecting electrical
signals from those who would do damage to the United States of America.
That is a tremendous capability that no one else can equal. This global
accessibility from space is just one feature of a very complicated and
complex system of collecting and analyzing information.
The National Security Agency is a second feature. They exploit
foreign communications. That is the official unclassified description
of its mission: NSA exploits foreign communications. Recently,
Hollywood has enjoyed making a couple of movies showing how NSA is a
threat to our Nation. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is a
Hollywood make-believe story that is completely inaccurate and false.
NSA is not a threat to us. If you are an unfriendly foreign government
wanting to cheat on CTBT, NSA is certainly a threat to you.
To quote from their official unclassified agency description: ``They
are on the cutting edge of information technology.'' They know what is
going on in the explosion of information technology.
There is a third area beyond NSA, and that is called MASINT. It is a
pretty strange term for most people. It means measurement and
signatures intelligence, the recognition that in addition to being seen
and being heard, objects, especially electronic objects, have other
signatures. Like your personal signature--if we collect enough
information about someone's signature, it is not like anything else, it
is unique, and we know exactly what it is, and we are collecting
MASINT.
The Central Intelligence Agency gives us a fourth important feature.
The CIA employs a network of agents around the world who constantly
provide what is called HUMINT, human intelligence. HUMINT is a term of
art

[[Page S12341]]

which simply recognizes people tend to talk, and when they do talk, we
try to have an agent listening. If an agent hears something, it is fed
into a fifth and important feature of the agency, and that is the CIA
Directorate of Intelligence.
The men and women of the CIA DI sift through enormous amounts of data
every day and separate fact from fiction, truth from lies. Through
their analysis of all intelligence sources, they provide policymakers
with crisp statements of what our potential adversaries are doing and
not doing. If information is out there to get, we will get it. If it is
important, we will analyze it and understand it. Once we understand
it, policymakers will make sound decisions if someone decides to cheat
on the CTBT.

I am trying to paint a picture of just how sophisticated our
intelligence community is. It is a community that on occasion has been
fooled, but it has not been fooled often, and it has rarely been fooled
for very long. We have a world-class intelligence capability. We can
count on the intelligence community to monitor the CTBT and effectively
verify it.
A second argument that has been used against the treaty by some is
based upon the suspension of nuclear testing required by the CTBT and
the argument that this will jeopardize the safety and reliability of
the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. I have an extremely high level of
confidence in the nuclear stockpile even without continued testing.
The science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program, on which the United
States is spending $4.5 billion a year, is maintaining our
technological edge without the need for further testing for the
foreseeable future. This program is based on the most advanced science
in the world. It is based on over 50 years of nuclear experience. It is
based on the results of over 1,000 American nuclear tests. It is a
program that relies on the ability and ingenuity of U.S. scientists to
maintain our nuclear edge. But it is also a program that recognizes the
need to build in adequate safeguards to ensure safety and reliability.
The Stockpile Stewardship Program requires a rigorous annual review
of the entire nuclear stockpile. As a part of this regime, both the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy must certify to the
President on an annual basis the stockpile is safe and is reliable.
Should either Secretary be unable to offer this certification, the
President, in consultation with Congress, is prepared to exercise the
right of the United States to withdraw from the treaty and to resume
testing.
The United States has not conducted a nuclear test for over 7 years,
but the American people should understand our nuclear stockpile is
safe. Both the safeguards and the science exists to continue to assure
its safety well into the future. And since we have made the decision we
do not need to test, it only makes sense that we use the CTBT to end
testing throughout the world.
Reflecting on his time in office, and his failure to achieve the goal
of a nuclear test ban, President Eisenhower stated: ``Disarmament . . .
is a continuous imperative. . . . Because this need is so sharp and
apparent, I confess I lay down my official responsibilities in this
field with a definite sense of disappointment.''
The Senate now has the opportunity to ratify the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty. We should ratify this treaty because, just as when it was
first proposed nearly 4 decades ago, it is a positive step toward
reducing nuclear dangers and improving the safety of the American
people.
I yield the floor.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I see my friend from the great State of
Montana is up to speak. I ask the chairman of the----
Mr. SPECTER. Will the Senator from Delaware yield for a question?
Mr. BIDEN. Yes, I would be happy to yield.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the question that I have for the Senator
relates to the letter from President Clinton to our distinguished
majority leader, Senator Lott, where President Clinton has asked that
the Senate not consider consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty.
I believe it is very much in the national interest that we not vote
on the treaty today because it would undermine national security by
sending a message to the world that we are not for this treaty. I think
it would encourage nations such as India and Pakistan, and perhaps
rogue nations such as Libya, Iraq, and Iran, to test.
But the first of two questions which I have for the Senator from
Delaware is whether the President might go further. The Senator and I
attended a dinner last Tuesday night with the President. We both had
occasion to talk to the majority leader and have heard the public
pronouncements. The majority leader has set a threshold, asking that
the President commit in writing that he would not ask to have the
treaty brought up next year. I believe we have to find a way to work
this out so the treaty is not voted on.
The first question I have of the Senator from Delaware is, What are
the realities of getting the President to make that request? He has
come pretty close in this letter. Why not make that additional request?
Mr. BIDEN. In response to my friend from Pennsylvania, I will say
that I, obviously, cannot speak for the President. But he has gone
awfully far. He says: ``I believe that proceeding to a vote under these
circumstances would severely harm the national security of the United
States, damage our relationship with our allies, and undermine our
historic leadership,'' et cetera. ``Accordingly, I request that you
postpone consideration of [this] Test Ban Treaty on the Senate floor.''
Unless there is something incredible that is likely to happen in the
next 8 months, the President is not going to be--and I realize this is
a legitimate worry on the part of some; that the President will wait
until the middle of an election year and raise a political issue by
forcing people to vote for or against this treaty--but the likelihood
of changing the votes of 22 Republican Senators between now and the
election is zero, I would respectfully suggest.
So what the President has done here is done the only thing I think a
chief executive--Democrat or Republican--should do; that is, he did
just as Jimmy Carter did when he asked for SALT II to be taken down. He
did not make a commitment he would not try to have it brought up. That
is not what his letter said. What he said is: Bring it down. Don't vote
on it now. It is not in the national interest.
To have a President of the United States say, the treaty I, in fact,
negotiated--I want to go on record as saying you should not consider it
at all during the remainder of my term in office, surely damages his
ability to deal internationally.
So I think he is observing the reality of the circumstance, which
means that there will be no vote next year on the floor of the Senate--
for if that were the case, you might as well go ahead and have the vote
now.
The letter Jimmy Carter sent--and I shall read it--said:

In light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I
request that you delay consideration of the SALT II Treaty
on the Senate floor.
The purpose of this request is not to withdraw the Treaty
from consideration, but to defer the debate so that the
Congress and I as President can assess Soviet actions and
intentions, and devote our primary attention to the
legislative and other measures required to respond to the
crisis.
As you know, I continue to share your view that the SALT II
Treaty is in the national security interest of the United
States and the entire world, and that it should be taken up
by the Senate as soon as these more urgent issues have been
addressed.
Sincerely,
Jimmy Carter.

This letter of the President of the United States--this President--
goes a lot further than President Carter went in pulling down SALT II.
But for the President to go beyond that, it seems to me, is to be
beyond what we should be asking any executive.
The Senator from Virginia has worked mightily to try to resolve this.
He has gone so far as to draft a letter which a number of Senators are
likely to sign, if they have not already signed, saying: In addition to
the President asking this be brought down, we the undersigned Senators
ask that it be brought down. And we have no intention of bringing that
treaty up next year. We do not think the treaty should be brought up in
the election year.
To make the President, from an institutional standpoint, guarantee
that

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he is now against the treaty that he ratified, it seems to me, is to be
going beyond institutional good taste.
Mr. HELMS. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. BIDEN. For a question, I would be happy to yield.
Mr. HELMS. I want to ponder a question to the Chair.
Mr. BIDEN. Surely.
Mr. HELMS. It was my understanding--perhaps mistakenly--that we were
to go from side to side in our discussions. If that is not the case, I
ask unanimous consent that it be the case, when both sides are on the
floor seeking the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will respond. There has been a
unanimous consent request that has been agreed to that to the extent
possible that will be done. In this case, the ranking member sought
recognition, and no other person sought recognition.
Mr. HELMS. The Senator has been on his feet 20 minutes here. And two
Senators have taken the floor from him. I want it to be understood I do
not want that to happen again.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it was not my intention--I thought the
Senator from North Carolina, in effect, acknowledged that I should take
the question from the Senator from the State of Pennsylvania. I
apologize.
Mr. HELMS. I did not think it would be four questions.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am not propounding the questions. I am
just trying to answer the question. I hope I answered the Senator's
question.
Mr. SPECTER. I believe I asked one question.
Mr. BIDEN. Yes.
Mr. SPECTER. I had one more.
I believe I asked one question. I had one more. I would like leave to
ask one more question.
The question I have for Senator Biden is, Is there any other way
procedurally that this vote can be put off? We are considering the
treaty. There is a unanimous consent request, and while I do not agree
with what the Senator said in his first response--I believe the
President can say more without being against the treaty. And I believe
there are political considerations which are behind not having the
matter brought up in fair consideration to Senator Lott's request there
be a commitment not to take it up all year. I think it highly unlikely
that there would be a shift among Republicans on a procedural matter to
find 51 votes--50 votes plus the Vice President. But we are dealing
here with matters of extraordinary gravity. I hope this matter can be
worked out short of a procedural vote.
But I direct this question to the Senator from Delaware, whether
there is any other procedural alternative to getting this vote off the
Senate agenda.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will respond very briefly and then yield
to my friend from North Carolina.
My knowledge of Senate procedure pales in comparison to the Senator
from North Carolina. I am not being solicitous. That is a statement of
fact. But it is my understanding that the only procedural means by
which we could move from this treaty to other business without a vote
would be if there were a motion to move from the Executive Calendar to
the legislative calendar. That would, as I understand it, require 51
votes. That is the only thing of which I know. I do not know if anyone
is going to do that.
Mr. HELMS. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. BIDEN. I yield the floor to my friend.
Mr. HELMS. I ask the Parliamentarian for his views on it now, to get
that settled.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Parliamentarian advises that the Senator's
statement is correct.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, that may be the first time my procedural
judgment has ever been ruled to be correct on the floor of the Senate.
I am very happy the Senator suggested I ask that.
Mr. HELMS. I think the Senator has forgotten many times when he was
correct.
Mr. BIDEN. The Senator is very nice to say that. Seldom procedurally.
I yield the floor.
Mr. HELMS. I ask the distinguished Senator from Montana, who has been
awaiting a chance to speak, be recognized for such time as he may
require.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana.
Mr. BURNS. I thank the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee
and the Chair.
I listened to the exchange. It is very interesting. Why we are in
this debate was not initiated by this side of the aisle. This whole
process was not initiated by this side of the aisle. It was a reaction
that was initiated by our friends on the other side. That is irrelevant
right now. What is relevant is our Nation's security and the merits of
this treaty and how it affects us and our national security. We have
but one deterrent for the safety of the people who live in this
country, and that is our reliable nuclear capability. Once it is
questioned, then our ability to deter in this world of uncertainty
would be damaged.
I rise to record my opposition to Senate passage of the Comprehensive
Test Ban treaty. This treaty bans all nuclear testing forever. Thus, it
is a ban on ``bang'' for all time; it is not a ban on bombs. No one
ought to be under the illusion that this treaty ends nuclear weapons
development by America's foes. At home, an essential part of the
administration's plan to implement the treaty is a ``safeguards
package''. The mere existence of the safeguards package speaks for
itself: without them, the treaty poses too many risks. Unfortunately,
the treaty we are asked to vote upon contains none of the safeguards
because the terms of the treaty expressly preclude making the
safeguards package part of the treaty. In other words, the treaty
prohibits meaningful reservations. Consequently, we are asked to bet on
the come that the administration can deliver all that is promises in
the safeguards package, not only in the next few years but far into the
future. We are told that the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the treaty
with the safeguards and is unable to comment on the merits of the
treaty without the safeguards. I fully understand the Chain of Command.
Our leaders also understand the Chain of Command. We do not have to
read too much between the lines to conclude that without the safeguards
package, this treaty poses unacceptable risks to our national security.
A total ban on all nuclear testing for all time has never been
supported by prior Presidents-and for sound reasons. This
administration's best sales pitch for a total ban on bangs for all time
is that it is an important step in the direction of doing away with the
threat of nuclear war. This is a nice dream and a great idea for
another planet. But on earth it is a downright dangerous false hope.
The complete ban treaty has a fatal flaw in the real world: the treaty
is unenforceable. In one sentence, the fatal flaw is that violations
cannot be verified.
The best intentions humans can conceive are of no use if the treaty
is not implemented not only by us but also by the other nuclear
players. And what is the score? Well Russia and China have not ratified
this treaty and they are unlikely to do so. Even if they did, either
one could veto any attempts at enforcement by the U.N. Security
Council. North Korea did not even participate in the negotiations about
the treaty. India and Pakistan have not signed on to the treaty. The
score on rogue nations such as Iraq and Libya varies but we have to ask
whether they could be trusted to keep their commitments anyway. The
administration has, once again, gone off and negotiated a deal that is
not acceptable to the Senate. I suppose the White House media spin will
again be that the United States will suffer a loss of world leadership
if the Senate does not buy this pig in a pike treaty. Well maybe the
negotiators should have thought of that before they put American's
credibility on the line. The spinmeisters should re-read our
Constitution. Treaties must be acceptable to two thirds of the
Senators. That requirement has been there since the founding of the
Republic. The White House should not pretend to be shocked when the
Senate turns down a treaty that it does not like because the treaty has
no teeth. there are too many undefined characters in the world who are
unaffected by this treaty.
This treaty is not a good idea for a number of other reasons. The
agreement puts international handcuffs on nuclear technology testing by
the United States. Our country needs to have access to the testing of
current and possible future nuclear weapons,

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defensive as well as offensive. We know that some nations play fast and
loose with nuclear weapons technology. This is not the case generally
in the United States and is not the case specifically in Montana where
we maintain many Minutemen III missiles. Part of the Safeguard
Stewardship and Management Program proposed by the Administration to
sell this treaty is to assure us that the nuclear stockpile remains
safe and reliable. But tests needed to create the data base and
methodologies for stockpile stewardship have not been done during the
seven year moratoria our nation has voluntarily followed on testing and
would not be done under the mandatory terms of the treaty before us.
Simply stated, the technology for stockpile stewardship is unproven.
Key safety and reliability data can only be obtained from the actual
testing of weapons. We cannot take a chance on when or whether our
nuclear weapons will go off. Can you imagine putting all your faith in
an airplane flying right without making actual flight tests.? The
pilots I know still think an aircraft has to be flown before they are
convinced of its safety and reliability. Likewise, data from past tests
cannot adequately predict the impacts of ongoing problems such as aging
taking into account the highly corrosive nature of materials with a
shelf life of 20 years. What do we do in 25 years? The administration's
answer is to rely upon computer simulations or, as a last resort, to
withdraw from the treaty. The stakes are too high to depend upon
theoretical models and any treaty can be killed by a later law. But I
submit these actions are closing the barn door after the horses are
gone. Montanans as well as all Americans must have confidence in the
safety and reliability of the refurbished nuclear warheads remaining in
our country. Our troops in the field must also have confidence in the
nuclear weapons they carry. This test ban treaty precludes us from
undertaking the technology testing that is essential for keeping
confidence in our nuclear deterrent capability.
The cold war may be over but the threat posed to the United States
from nuclear weapons in hostile hands is far from over. Russia refuses
to ratify Start II and continues to insist (along with the
administration) on strict compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty. If ever
there was a lesson about not freezing nuclear technology in time, the
ABM Treaty is the model. Most Americans still do not know that our
country is absolutely defenseless against ballistic missile attack not
only from Russia but also from any where else. There is mounting
evidence that China has stolen priceless nuclear secrets from our
national laboratories. Only a complete fool would think that the
actions of the Chinese indicate that they would curtail their rapid
advancement towards being a nuclear power, with or without this test
ban treaty. Neither India nor Pakistan have signed on to this treaty
and I suppose the administration will try to blame that on the Senate
somehow. I submit, however, that the positions of Pakistan and India on
their nuclear status have nothing whatsoever to do with this debate in
the Senate. We are aware that there are half dozen rogue nations out
there. They must really lick their lips when they think about America
not testing nuclear weapons anymore. Who seriously thinks this treaty
will slow down despots who pose current and future irresponsible and,
perhaps, irrational nuclear threats to the United States? The
administration is making a serious error in judgment in mixing up what
States say at diplomatic conferences with what they go back home. This
is not the time to handicap ourselves by assuming test ban obligations
that we would keep but others would either violate or ignore.
I have been called by many representatives of other states and heads
of states. I asked one question: Will the signing of this test ban
treaty change the attitude of the Russians? Answer: No. By the PRC, the
Chinese? No. Will it change the attitude in India or Pakistan or North
Korea or other suspected rogue entities? No. Then why do we put
ourselves in jeopardy by not testing?
In conclusion, I believe this treaty is fatally flawed because it is
not enforceable and will be ignored by the very nations we distrust.
Moreover, to retain a credible nuclear deterrent capability, we must
retain our ability to test our weapon systems for safety and
reliability. Therefore, this treaty hurts us while helping our
potential enemies. My vote is to oppose advice and consent.
I yield the floor.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I believe the real question before us is
whether or not the world will be safer with or without the nuclear test
ban treaty. I believe we are safer.
From a very self-interested standpoint, if this treaty is adopted, it
gives us the very real potential of locking all of our potential
adversaries into permanent nuclear inferiority because they will not be
able to conduct the sophisticated tests necessary to improve their
technology, particularly when it comes to the miniaturization of
nuclear warheads. It will, also, I think, contribute to an overall
spirit which is advancing the cause of nuclear disarmament and also
ending the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
On the other side of the coin, if we step back from this treaty today
and vote it down, I think we will set back this progress in trying to
reduce nuclear arms throughout the world. All of us have come to this
floor with different viewpoints, but I suspect we would all say the
process we have undertaken is somewhat suspect. I spent 12 years in the
Army, and I learned to grow up under the rule of ``hurry up and wait.''
Well, this process resembles ``wait and hurry up.'' The President
submitted this treaty to the Senate over 2 years ago. Yet for months,
no action was taken. Then last week, suddenly it was announced that we
would conduct a very limited debate, that we would have hastily
constructed hearings, and that we would move to a vote.
I think that process alone suggests that we wait, at least--as we
consider more carefully this treaty to discharge our obligations under
the Constitution--for a thorough and detailed analysis of all the
consequences. Indeed, this is a very complex subject matter, as the
debate on the floor today and preceding days has indicated.
I believe we need to take additional time. I hope we can take
additional time. But if the measure were to come before this body for a
vote, I would vote to support the treaty because, as I have said, I
think passing this treaty would provide a safer world. Rejecting this
treaty would, I think, disrupt dramatically any further attempts at a
significant comprehensive reduction of nuclear weapons throughout the
world.
I think it is somewhat naive to suggest that if this Senate rejected
the treaty, we could simply go back next week and begin to negotiate
again on different terms. I think we would be sending a very strong and
dangerous signal to the world that we, rather than carefully
considering this treaty, have rejected it almost outright. I think,
also, together with other developments, such as our genuine attempts to
look for a relaxation of the ABM Treaty, rejection could be construed
as not suggesting we are serious about nuclear disarmament but, quite
the contrary, that we ourselves are beginning to look at nuclear
weapons and nuclear technology in a different light, a light less
favorable.
Let me suggest something else. This treaty will not prevent us from
testing our nuclear technology. It will prevent us, though, from
conducting tests involving nuclear detonation. We can in fact go on and
test our technology. We have been testing our technology constantly
over the last 7 years without a nuclear detonation.
This treaty would not ban nuclear weapons. This treaty also would
provide for an extensive regime of monitoring sites--over 300 in 90
countries. It would allow for onsite inspection if, in fact, a
significant number of signatories to the treaty were convinced that a
violation took place. These additional monitoring sites, together with
the onsite inspections, are tools that do not exist today to curb the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and the development of new nuclear
weapons.
There has been some discussion about our ability to monitor the
development of nuclear weapons and, indeed, to monitor clandestine
tests of nuclear devices. I think the suggestion has been made--and I
think it is inaccurate--that a nuclear detonation could take place
without anybody

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knowing anything at all about it. That is not the case at all. Just
last week, there was an article in the Washington Post entitled ``CIA
Unable To Precisely Track Testing.'' If you read the article, it is
clear that the CIA was able to detect two suspicious detonations at a
Russian test site in the Arctic from seismic data and other monitoring
devices. What they could not determine is whether this detonation was
high explosives of a nonnuclear category or a nuclear detonation. But
certainly we will have indications, if there is a clandestine test,
that the possibility of a nuclear detonation has taken place. That
alone will give us, I believe, the basis to go forward and ask for
onsite inspections and for an explanation, to use the levers of this
treaty which we do not have at this moment.

So the issue of verification, I think, is something that is quite
obvious and prominent within this treaty, and the means of verification
were discussed at length by my colleague from Nebraska who pointed out
all the different techniques our intelligence service has to identify
possible violations of this treaty and, with this treaty, to be able to
press those violations in a world forum so we can ascertain whether the
treaty has been adhered to or violated.
The whole notion of controlling nuclear testing is not new.
Throughout this debate, my colleagues have discussed the initiatives
that began as early as the 1950s with President Eisenhower. Then, in
1963, President Kennedy was able to sign, and the Senate ratified, the
Limited Test Ban Treaty which outlawed nuclear explosions in the sea,
atmosphere, and in outer space. In 1974, we entered into a treaty with
the Soviet Union--the Threshold Test Ban Treaty--which prohibited
underground testing with yields greater than 150 kilotons. In 1992,
Congress passed the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment which called for a
moratorium on testing. We are still observing today.
Also, I think it would be appropriate to point out that in fact for
the last 7 years, we have not detonated nuclear devices. Yet each and
every year, our scientists, the experts in the Department of Defense
and Department of Energy, have certified that our nuclear stockpile is
both safe and reliable. So the assertion that we can never assure the
reliability and safety of our nuclear stockpile without testing has
been disproven over the last 7 years. We have done that.
Now, I believe we can in fact maintain a nuclear stockpile that is
both safe and reliable. We can do it using the new technology we are
developing, including but not exclusively related to, computer
simulations. We can do it by investing, as we are each year, billions
of dollars--over $4 billion--so we can ensure that we have a safe
nuclear stockpile and that these weapons would be reliable if we were
forced to use them.
There is something else I think should be pointed out. This treaty
has been endorsed and recommended to us by the Secretary of Defense,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Energy.
These are individuals who take very seriously their responsibility for
the national security of the United States. But some might suggest,
well, they are part of this administration and we really know that,
reading between the lines, their recommendation might not be as
compelling as others.
But such logic would not suggest or explain why individuals such Gen.
John Shalikashvili, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Gen. Colin Powell; Gen. David Jones; or Adm. William Crowe would in
fact be supportive of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Nobody would
suggest why other prominent military officers, such as John Galvin,
former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe; Gen. Charles Horner, who
commanded the air forces in Desert Storm; Bernard Rogers, another
former Commander of NATO and Supreme Commander in Europe, would also
recommend and support this treaty. These individuals are concerned
about security and have spent their lives in uniform dedicated to the
security of this Nation and the protection of our people. They believe,
as I do, that this will be a safer world with this treaty rather than
if we reject this treaty. With this treaty, I think we can curtail
dramatically the development of nuclear weapons by opposing powers to
the United States.
It is true that you can develop a nuclear weapon without a test. You
can develop the unsophisticated rudimentary weapons that were used in
World War II. But you cannot develop the sophisticated technology which
is the key to strategic nuclear power without nuclear testing.
If we accept this treaty, if we join with other nations, then we will
be in a much stronger position, and the world will be in a much
stronger position, to ensure that countries such as India, Pakistan,
and North Korea will be very challenged to develop the kind of
sophisticated nuclear weapons that will alter the strategic balance
throughout the world. That in and of itself, I believe, will make it a
safer world.
Of course, the elimination of testing will have a positive
environmental effect. Even though our tests now throughout the world
are restricted underground, there is always the possibility of leakage
of radioactive material. And we know how devastating that can be.
There are those who have been here today who argued that we should
reject this treaty because it is not 100 percent verifiable. I would
suggest that we can, in fact, verify this treaty--that 100 percent is
not the standard we would reasonably use. As I have indicated
previously, we have already detected what we suspect are suspicious
detonations in Russia. We would be even better prepared to do that with
300 more monitoring stations in 90 countries around the world. In fact,
we would then have an international forum to take our complaints and to
force an explanation, and, if necessary, an onsite inspection of a
test.
I think we have an obligation to carefully review and consider this
treaty. I believe that we do. And that consideration would be enhanced
by additional time. I think it would be appropriate to take additional
time. But it would be a terrible, I think, disservice to the process of
nuclear disarmament, of nuclear nonproliferation, and of a saner world
if we were to reject this treaty out of hand. And the world is
watching.
President Clinton was the first head of state to sign this treaty.
One-hundred and fifty nations followed. Forty-one nations have ratified
the treaty, and several more, including Russia, are waiting again for
our lead in ratifying. Unless we are part of this treaty, this treaty
will never go into effect because it requires all of the nuclear
powers--those with nuclear weapons or with nuclear capabilities--to be
a party to the treaty before it can go into effect. I hope we either in
our wisdom consider this more, or in our wisdom accept ratifying this
treaty.
Thirty-six years ago when the Limited Test Ban Treaty came to this
floor, a great leader of this Senate, Senator Everett Dirksen, was one
of the forces who decided to take a very bold step that was as equally
daunting and challenging as the step we face today. His words were:

A young President calls this treaty the first step. I want
to take a first step, Mr. President. One my age should think
about his destiny a little. I should not like to have written
on my tombstone, ``He knew what happened at Hiroshima, but he
did not take a first step.''

The treaty is not the first step. But it is, I believe, the next
logical step that we must take. I believe none of us want to look back
and say that we were hesitant to take this step, that we were hesitant
to continue the march away from the nuclear apocalypse to a much saner
and a much safer world.
I yield my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield time to the Senator from Kentucky.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. BUNNING. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank Senator Helms.
Mr. President, this whole debate reminds me of what the great
philosopher Yogi Berra once said: It is like ``deja vu all over
again.''
I thought we pretty well settled this argument years ago--back in the
1970s and the 1980s--when the idea of unilateral disarmament through a
nuclear freeze was proposed as the only way to end the nuclear arms
race between the United States and Russia. We rejected the nuclear
freeze concept. We put national security first. We won the cold

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war, not through unilateral disarmament and symbolic gestures but
through strength, and we defeated the evil empire. The world is safer
and we have been able to substantially reduce the number of nuclear
warheads and the threat of nuclear conflict.
So it is difficult to understand why this argument is back before the
Senate today. It is difficult to understand why a U.S. President is
back before us asking us to ratify an agreement which would tie this
Nation's hands behind its back and jeopardize our national security.
None of us support nuclear war. We are all against nuclear
proliferation. But agreeing to forego all future testing of nuclear
weapons is not the way to get there. It is a matter of national
security, of safety, and of common sense.
Because we refused to accept the siren call of the nuclear freeze
movement in the 1970s, we won the cold war, and we have subsequently
been able to reduce our arsenal of nuclear warheads from 12,000 to
6,000 under the START II treaty. The number is expected to be reduced
further to 3,000 warheads by the year 2003. But despite these
reductions and this progress, the United States must maintain a
reliable nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future.
Although the cold war is over, significant threats to our country
still exist. At present, our nuclear capability provides us a deterrent
that is critical to our Nation and is relied on as a safety umbrella by
most countries around the world.
As long as our national security and our own nuclear deterrent rely
on the nuclear capability, we must be able to periodically test our
existing weapons as necessary to ensure their reliability and their
safety.
Reliability is essential. If our nuclear weapons are not reliable,
they are not much of a credible deterrent, and the nuclear umbrella
that we and our allies count on for our mutual defense will have gaping
holes in it.
We have to face reality. Our nuclear stockpile is aging. Our nuclear
inventory is older than it has ever been, and nuclear materials and
components degrade in unpredictable ways--in some cases causing the
weapons to fail. Without testing, those potential problems will go
undetected. Upgrades will not be possible. Reliability will suffer.
Safety is also essential. A permanent ban on testing would jeopardize
the safety of our nuclear arsenal by preventing us from integrating the
most modern advanced safety measures into our weapons. Even now our
nuclear arsenal is not as safe as we can make it. Of the nine weapons
systems currently on hand, only one employs all of the most modern and
secure measures available. Safety modifications of this kind would
require testing to make sure they worked as intended.
Sure, advocates of this treaty argue there are some other measures of
testing a weapon--safety and reliability. The Clinton administration
has proposed an ambitious program known as the Stockpile Stewardship
Program which would use computer modeling and simulations to detect
reliability and safety. However, many of the components of this system
are unbuilt and untested. The National Ignition Facility, which is the
centerpiece of this program, is not scheduled to be completed until the
year 2003. There are already reports that it is years behind schedule.
It would be foolhardy to entrust our nuclear security to an unproven
program which probably won't even be fully operational by the year
2010. Reliability and safety: There must be certainty; at this point
only live testing provides that kind of certainty.

This treaty is based on a very noble, well-intentioned goal. There is
no question that if the Senate were to ratify this treaty, it would be
a grand symbolic gesture, but noble goals and symbolic gestures are no
substitute for good policy and hard reality.
I have already talked about a couple of reasons why this treaty is
not good policy--safety and reliability. But there are a couple of
other reasons this treaty fails the hard-reality test, as well:
Verification and enforcement. The hard reality is that the United
States usually tries to live up to the agreements it signs. If we
ratify this treaty, we will live by it; we have no guarantee other
nations will be so inclined to follow the letter of the law.
Under this treaty, verification would be very difficult and
enforcement would be impossible. It has no teeth. It is difficult now
to detect nuclear tests with any confidence, and the verification
monitoring provisions in this treaty don't add to that confidence level
at all. Yes, we could request onsite inspections if we thought someone
had been cheating, but that request would have to be approved by a
supermajority in the 51-member executive council. In addition, each
country under the treaty has the right to declare 50-square-kilometer
areas off limits to any inspection.
Even if we did catch a cheater, the treaty has almost no teeth--
possible trade sanctions. That's it, possible trade sanctions. And we
know how difficult it is to maintain multilateral trade sanctions
against Iraq, a country that blatantly invaded and looted a neighboring
country and which consistently defies international inspection teams.
No one can believe we would be more effective at enforcing sanctions
against more responsible nations of greater commercial importance such
as India and Pakistan. There are no teeth.
That brings us back to the hard reality. Would we obey the treaty?
Yes, we would obey the treaty because that is the way we are. And
others would obey the treaty if it suited their whims of the moment.
The hard reality is if we ratify this treaty, we sacrifice our national
security, jeopardize the safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal.
And what do we get in return? A noble, symbolic gesture. Nothing more.
It is not worth it.
I urge my colleagues to vote no. Unilateral disarmament was a bad
idea in the 1970s and 1980s; it is a bad idea for the 21st century.
I yield the floor.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield to the Senator from Montana.
Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I strongly support the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty. Why? Various reasons.
First, we have an opportunity to vote this week. I will cast my vote
in favor of ratification because I believe to do otherwise would be a
tragic mistake with extremely dire consequences for our Nation and
equally dire consequences for the world. However, given the likelihood
the Senate will fall short of the two-thirds majority required under
the Constitution for ratification, I will support efforts to postpone
this vote. We cannot tell the world the United States of America, the
leader of the free world, opposes this treaty. It would be a travesty.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty gives America a unique opportunity
to leave a safer world for our children and for our grandchildren. We
cannot prevent earthquakes; we can't prevent hurricanes or tornadoes,
not yet. I hope over time our ability to predict them--minimizing the
destruction of human life and property--will improve. But we can
prevent nuclear war. We can halt the spread of nuclear weapons. We can
prevent nuclear fallout and environmental destruction caused by nuclear
testing. And we can reduce the fear of a nuclear holocaust that all
Americans have lived with since the start of the cold war 50 years ago.
We can do all this, and we should.
Let me review some of the benefits we get from the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, and let me explain why this treaty will make the world
safer for our children and grandchildren. First, under the CTBT, there
is an absolute prohibition against conducting nuclear weapon test
explosions by the signators. This would include all countries that
possess nuclear weapons, as well as those countries that have nuclear
power or research reactors. It would also include countries that do not
yet have nuclear facilities. This absolute prohibition of testing makes
it much harder for countries that already have advanced nuclear weapons
to produce new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons. Russia and China
are prime examples.
The CTBT prevents the kind of arms competition we had during the cold
war. For example, without nuclear tests the Chinese will be unable to
MIRV ICBMs with any degree of reliability. The Chinese have no
assurance of the effectiveness of putting multiple warheads on missiles
because they would not be able to test. Many believe China has made
enormous strides in

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their nuclear weapons capability because of decades of espionage, but
the CTBT provides one way to limit further sophisticated development.
The absolute prohibition on nuclear testing also helps prevent
countries with smaller and less advanced nuclear weapons from
developing more advanced nuclear warheads. This applies especially to
India and to Pakistan. The strategy of using advanced nuclear weapons
depends on confidence. It depends on reliability. India and Pakistan
would not be able to build reliable and sophisticated nuclear weapons
under the treaty.
The treaty's terms also help prevent nations that are seeking nuclear
arms from ever developing them into advanced sophisticated weapons. I
refer to countries such as Iran and Iraq.
The second major reason for adopting this treaty is that ratification
is critical to our ability to enforce and maintain the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, another treaty. The NPT is the bedrock of our
efforts to stop the spread of nuclear arms to non-nuclear weapon
states. Many of the nations that signed the NPT, the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and agreed to its indefinite extension did so on the
understanding that there would be a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The third reason for support is the CTBT will improve the ability of
the United States to detect nuclear explosions. Let me repeat that. It
will improve our ability to detect current explosions, the status quo
compared with today. The international monitoring system will have 321
monitoring stations, including 31 in Russia, 11 in China, and 17 in the
Middle East. These stations will be able to detect explosions down to
about 1 kiloton, the equivalent of 1,000 tons of TNT--much lower than
the kinds of explosions we are talking about in this Chamber. In the
case of a suspicious event--that is, a report of an explosion that
could be nuclear, a mine site, or even an earthquake--any party can
request an onsite inspection. With or without a treaty, we must
continue all efforts at monitoring nuclear developments worldwide, but
the treaty provides a system that far exceeds current capabilities of
inspection.
Now, turning to two of the major objections to those who oppose the
treaty: First, they claim actual nuclear tests--that is, explosions--
are necessary to ensure that our stockpile of weapons works. We have
put in place a science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program. Its purpose
is to provide a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability
of America's inventory of nuclear weapons. Under this program, our
National Weapons Laboratories spend $4.5 billion each year to check and
to maintain these weapons. We can still test; we do test. We just
cannot explode. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy, with the help of
the Directors of the National Laboratories, the Commander of the U.S.
Strategic Command, and the Nuclear Weapons Council, must certify every
year to the President that the necessary high level of confidence
exists.
Do not forget, $4.5 billion a year is spent on this. If they cannot
give that certification to the President, the President can then use
the so-called Safeguard F. What is that? That is the United States will
be able to withdraw from the treaty and test the weapon that is in
doubt; that is, if the President is not confident, the President can
withdraw.
The Directors of our weapons labs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, along with four of his predecessors, and an impressive array
of Nobel Prize winners believe the Stewardship Program will provide
appropriate protection for our national security.
The second objection against the treaty is that it is impossible to
verify that all nations are complying with the treaty. That is true. It
is true we cannot detect every conceivable explosion at low yields. But
our defense agencies have concluded--the Department of Defense--that we
will be able to detect tests that will have an impact on our national
security, and that is the threshold of concern to us.
Let me go through a few likely scenarios that would occur if we
reject the treaty. First and most immediate would be on the Indian
subcontinent. India and Pakistan matched each other with nuclear tests.
Kashmir remains one of the world's most dangerous trigger points. U.S.
rejection of the test ban treaty would destroy our ability to pressure
those two countries to halt further nuclear tests. Those countries
would likely begin to develop more sophisticated nuclear weapons,
heightening the probability of their actual use in the region.

The second adverse consequence of rejection is this: China would
certainly prepare for more tests to increase the sophistication of its
nuclear arsenal. At present, Chinese nuclear weapons do not pose a
strategic threat to the United States. Our rejection of the CTBT would
allow them to begin a long-term development program with testing that
would make them such a threat.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 8 minutes have expired.
Mr. BAUCUS. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 more minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BAUCUS. The third adverse consequence is American efforts to
promote nuclear nonproliferation would become much more difficult
because other nations would believe America's moral authority and its
leadership were destroyed by our rejection of the CTBT.
The United States has been the world's leader in promoting arms
control. If we do not lead, no one else will. It is that simple. Our
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention led to its approval by
Russia, by China, and others. Our ratification of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty will lead other countries to agree to a complete ban on
nuclear explosions.
As a footnote, let me add the American people, by an overwhelming
margin, understand the need to control nuclear testing. In a recent
poll, 82 percent of Americans responded that they would like to see the
treaty approved. That is not a sufficient reason to vote for
ratification, but we should take note the public well understands the
dangers of nuclear testing.
President Eisenhower began the first comprehensive test ban
negotiations in 1958 with the goal of constraining the nuclear arms
race and halting the spread of nuclear weapons. Mr. President, 31 years
later we have an opportunity to make this goal a reality. That is the
legacy I want to leave my son and all the children of Montana, of the
United States, and of the world.
In sum, I think each of us has a moral obligation to leave this world
in as good shape or better shape than we found it, and certainly
ratification of the test ban treaty fulfills that moral obligation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from North
Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Maine is
here. I yield 15 minutes to the gracious Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Maine.
Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee for his effort and cooperation.
With this debate on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the
Senate discharges one of its most fundamental and solemn duties, the
stewardship of our national defense. I think there is little question
among us that a world free of nuclear weapons would be a world more
secure. Obviously, we all look forward to the day when we do not have
to rely on our nuclear stockpile as a necessary deterrent. We know full
well over 80 percent of the American people share that point of view.
But the fact is, that day has not yet arrived. Until it does, as the
world's last remaining superpower, we walk a line both fine and
blurred. This debate must be about how we walk that line. It should be
about how we balance our clear and shared interests in a nuclear-free
planet within the reality of a post-cold-war world.
The reality is this: At the same time the world looks to us to
provide leadership in stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
so, too, does it rely upon us for a credible nuclear deterrent that
will keep in check international aggressors, nations that seek to
undermine democracy and freedom. That is the challenge before us, to
move towards our shared goal in a responsible and measured manner, ever
mindful

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that a post-cold-war world does not mean a world devoid of duplicity or
danger. That is the dynamic we can neither escape nor ignore. That is
the dynamic that must inform each and every one of us as we consider
the ramification of a zero-yield treaty of unlimited duration.
The question is not whether we support nonproliferation measures. We
obviously make that as one of our key national security objectives. The
question is, Are we going to support a treaty that is a significant
departure from what every Chief Executive of the atomic age, except
President Clinton, has laid down for criteria in any test ban treaty?
Are we going to support a treaty predicated on a program that is yet to
be tested and may remain unproven for decades? Are we going to support
a treaty that assumes reliable verification when we know we cannot
always detect low-level tests, when we know that rogue nations such as
North Korea, Iraq, or Iran could develop crude first-generation nuclear
devices with no testing at all? In fact, the CIA Director George Tenet
stated, back in 1997, in response to questions submitted to him by the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:

Nuclear testing is not required for an acquisition of a
basic nuclear weapons capability. Tests using high explosive
detonations only could provide reasonable confidence in the
performance of a first generation device. Nuclear testing
becomes critical only when a program moves beyond basic
designs, incorporating more advanced concepts.

We cannot even verify what is going on in Iraq with Saddam Hussein.
We all recall we set up an onsite inspection program as a condition for
his surrender in the Persian Gulf war. Today he has systematically and
unilaterally dismantled the U.N. weapons inspection system regime.
So these are the pressing issues that confront us about the
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That is why I am
disappointed, regretting that we have had politics permeate both sides
of the political aisle, both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue with respect
to this debate. Because the ratification of any treaty, and certainly
this one, is a solemn and unique responsibility for the Senate, and we
should accord this debate the level of gravity it deserves. It is not
just about process and procedure. It is certainly not about politics.
It is about policy; what is in the best interests of this country as
well as the security interests of the world. What is at stake is no
less than our ability to stop proliferation and to ensure at the same
time the continued viability of our stockpile.
When we get into debates about procedure and process, I think it
ignores the overwhelming magnitude and gravity of the centerpieces of
this treaty. We should not be making this agreement a political
football. Duty, a constitutional duty, compels us to look at the facts
before us.
I can tell you, after I sat through hours of deliberations and
testimony on the Armed Services Committee last week, the facts are not
reassuring. I know there is an honest difference of opinion among
experts, among former Secretaries of Defense. But you have to look at
the honest difference of opinion and take pause when you have six
former Secretaries of Defense, two former Clinton administration CIA
Directors, four former National Security Advisers, and three former
National Weapons Lab Directors, all opposing the treaty before us.
Why? Because they believe a no-testing, unlimited duration policy at
this time would fatally undermine confidence in the reliability of the
U.S. nuclear stockpile as a sturdy hedge against the aggressive intent
of once and future tyrants. That is a risk we simply cannot afford to
take.
Consider the backdrop of the Rumsfeld Commission report in 1998. We
are all too familiar with the stark fact that North Korea, Iran, and
Iraq, to name a few, would be able to inflict major destruction on the
United States within 5 to 10 years of making a decision to acquire
ballistic missile capabilities.
Thanks to the testimony last week of three current National Weapons
Laboratory Directors, we also know full well that the very program the
administration proposes to rely on to monitor the safety,
effectiveness, efficiency, and accuracy of the arsenal is between 10
and 20 years away from being fully validated and operational, and that
is assuming it will work. That is 10 to 20 years. We could have weapons
in our stockpile left untested and unproven for decades while rogue
states acquire the means of mass destruction.
That is what we are addressing today fundamentally: a treaty that has
ultimately been negotiated by this administration with a noble long-
range goal that almost everyone accepts but one which requires this
country to accept an unproven and incomplete computer-model-based
system for the security of our nuclear deterrent in this age of weapons
proliferation. In other words, we put the cart before the horse. We
ought to know that our Stockpile Stewardship Program works first before
we commit to any zero-yield, unlimited-duration treaty.
As the Director of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Dr. Tarter,
testified to the committee last week, the program is an approach that
the country must pursue ``short of a return to a robust schedule of
nuclear testing.'' By closing the door entirely, we would be making a
question mark of our nuclear stockpile.
As President Bush reminded us in 1993, one-third of all U.S. nuclear
weapons designs fielded since 1958--one-third--have required nuclear
testing to correct deficiencies after deployment.
In his words:

The requirement to maintain and improve the safety of our
nuclear stockpile and to evaluate and maintain the
reliability of U.S. forces necessitates continued nuclear
testing for those purposes, albeit at a modest level, for the
foreseeable future.

Even within the Clinton administration, these conditions found a
voice. According to Mr. Robert Bell, a member of the National Security
Council staff, soon before President Clinton released his August 1995
statement of support for the treaty, Defense Department officials
argued that the United States should continue to reserve the right to
conduct underground nuclear tests at a threshold of 150 kilotons or
below.
That would seem to be the prudent course on what we know at this
moment in time. It is yet another fact today that we face a real danger
of fewer and fewer scientists with the first-hand knowledge that comes
from a testing process. Indeed, of the 85 remaining nuclear weapons
experts at the Los Alamos and Livermore Laboratories today, only 35
have coordinated live underground tests.
Even as early as 1994, barely 18 months after the United States
stopped underground nuclear testing, a report from the Congressional
Research Service sounded an alarm, and my colleagues would be wise to
read it. Back in 1994, it sounded the alarm that:

These trends . . . threaten to undercut U.S. ability to
maintain the safety, reliability, and performance of its
warheads; to correct defects that are discovered or that
result from aging; and to remanufacture warheads. They also
work at cross-purposes with President Clinton's declaration
that the United States will maintain the capability to resume
testing if needed.

Again, we must remember that these considerations must be made in the
context of a treaty that raises the bar by allowing absolutely no
testing at any level in perpetuity.
As Dr. John Nuckolls, the former Director of the Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory, put it, even an ``extended duration test ban'' would
trigger the loss of all nuclear trained expert personnel as well as
``major gaps in our understanding of scientific explosives.''
Again, the CRS in 1994 in its report said:

This skills loss is in its greatest jeopardy.

Director Tarter, the current Director of Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory, testified before our committee last week. What did he say
in his testimony?

It is a race against time. Before long, our nuclear test
veterans will be gone.

We are counting on our current cadre of experienced scientists to
help develop and install the new tools that are only now starting to
come online.
We have now heard from our Directors: A minimum of 10 years and maybe
as high as 20 years from now, the Stockpile Stewardship Program will be
determined to be workable.
We have the loss of our nuclear scientists trained in the testing
field. That is a safety net we cannot do without as we walk the
tightrope of sustaining a credible strategic nuclear deterrent and
aggressively promoting

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global arms control. Consider that our successive agreements with the
Soviet Union, and now Russia, will eventually reduce the entire
American nuclear warhead stock to about 25 percent of its peak size in
the cold war. Consider also that we maintain only 9 categories of
nuclear weapons today from a level of more than 30 in 1985.
We are making remarkable strides, as we should, on our priorities in
the arms control arena. But knowledge about the arms we must sustain as
bulwarks against future military conflicts cannot be lost, and this
fact suggests that time has not ripened for the United States to
sacrifice a 50-year, fool-proof position to keep the testing option
open as unprecedented arms reductions have occurred and must continue.
Indeed, the administration itself agrees we need a viable strategic
nuclear arsenal to deter conflicts that could arise in critical areas
such as the Middle East, the western Pacific, or northern Asia.
In the view of the vast majority of treaty opponents and supporters
alike who submitted opinions and testimony to the Armed Services
Committee last week, the Stockpile Stewardship Program will produce low
levels of confidence in many aspects of nuclear warhead capability for
at least a decade to come and perhaps more.
Perhaps Dr. Robinson, the Director of the Sandia National Laboratory,
put it best and simplest when he told the committee:

Confidence on the reliability and safety of the nuclear
weapons stockpile will eventually decline without nuclear
testing.

It was expert scientists, not politicians, who told the committee
that the Stockpile Stewardship Program brings the U.S. nuclear weapons
complex into uncharted waters of reliability.
So, too, is confidence key when it comes to another vital component
of this treaty, and that is verification. At first glance, the
technology behind the treaty's verification regime seems airtight.
Article IV of the accord establishes a joint international monitoring
system and international data center with a total of 337 facilities
around the world. If these installations detect a potentially illegal
underground explosion that subsequent diplomacy cannot resolve, the
accusing state may request an onsite inspection.
Fair enough, you might say, until you read the fine print. Then you
discover that the onsite inspection provision requires an affirmative
vote by 30 of the 51 members of the Executive Council of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization authorized under
article II, an awfully high threshold. Article II does not give the
United States or any of its allies permanent or rotating seats on the
Council.
That is not all. Science itself throws a wrench into the treaty's
verification mechanism.
According to a 1995 study by the Mitre Corporation, an established
scientific research center, neither the National Technical Means of the
United States nor the Monitoring System envisioned by the treaty can
detect very low-yield or zero-yield tests.
Finally, article V of the treaty establishes ``measures to ensure
compliance.'' The most important of these measures entrusts the
Conference of States Parties, the treaty's ratifying governments, to
refer urgent cases to the United Nations Security Council, a forum in
which Russia or China could exercise a unilateral veto.
In other words, article V could mean if the United States diagnosed
an imminent nuclear danger in a strategic region of the world, Moscow
or Beijing might emerge as the final courts of appeal for sanctions or
other punitive acts.
The day for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty may come where we could
have a zero-nuclear testing regime for an unlimited period of time. It
may arrive. And we may be confident that we will be able to verify that
level, as well as the low-level detections of other countries when it
comes to explosions. But I think we have to consider the facts as we
know them now.
I think we have to look very carefully at the troubling aspects of
the Stockpile Stewardship Program and whether it is a viable
alternative to nuclear testing. In the strategic and scientific
communities many say it is not, and maybe we will not know for 10 to 20
years. That is what we are predicating our nuclear deterrent strategy
on.
So we have to vote--if we do vote today or tomorrow--on what we know
today. We may know something differently in the future. But I submit
that we cannot subject our security interests to what we might know 20
years from now.
I hope we will defer the vote on ratification because of all the
current concerns that I and others have cited. We would do well to heed
the advice of the letter that was submitted to the majority leader
asking for deferral, the letter that was written by Henry Kissinger;
John Deutch, a former CIA Director for the administration; and Brent
Scowcroft, that we should defer until we can give more consideration to
all of the issues that are before the Senate with respect to this
treaty.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
I respect the Senator from Maine very much, as I do the Senator from
Indiana, who put out the five-page statement on why he opposes the
treaty. I want to speak to some of the things that some Senators have
spoken to.
First of all, the Senator from Maine says we have to deal with the
facts as we know them. I hope she will keep that in mind when she votes
on missile defense. I hope the rest of my colleagues, who say we have
to deal with the facts as we know them, keep that in mind when we vote
on missile defense.
I find it fascinating some of the very people who push the missile
defense and the abandonment of the ABM Treaty--where we have only had
basically one successful test, which is a far cry from what we are
going to need to be able to develop a missile defense initiative--are
the same ones saying: But we can't go ahead with this treaty because we
don't know everything.
I respectfully suggest the ability of the scientific community to
shoot multiple nuclear weapons out of the sky in the stratosphere and
make sure not a single one gets through is an even more daunting and
challenging program than the Stockpile Stewardship Program. But they
seem to have no problem to be ready to abandon the ABM Treaty, which
has been the cornerstone, since Nixon was President, for our arms
control regime. But they have no faith. I find that fascinating, No. 1.
No. 2, I also find it very fascinating that everybody keeps talking
about nonverifiability. I have heard more than once this morning--not
from the Senator from Maine but from others --the dictum of President
Ronald Reagan: Trust, but verify. That is constantly brought up: There
is a reason why we can't be for this treaty. We can't verify it.

They say this treaty is not perfectly verifiable. That is true. But
it is a red herring. This body has never demanded perfect verification.
Consider Ronald Reagan's treaty, the INF Treaty, that eliminated
land-based intermediate-range missiles. That treaty was signed by
President Reagan, the same man who coined the phrase: Trust, but
verify.
Was the INF Treaty verifiable? Give me a break. No; it was not
verifiable. It was not.
Listen to what the Senate Intelligence Committee said in response to
Ronald Reagan's assertion: Trust, but verify my INF Treaty. The
Intelligence Committee said at the time:

Soviet compliance with some of the Treaty's provisions will
be difficult to monitor. This problem is exemplified by the
unresolved controversy between DIA [the Defense Intelligence
Agency] and other intelligence agencies over the number of
SS-20's in the Soviet inventory.
Ground-launched cruise missiles pose a particularly
difficult monitoring problem as they are interchangeable with
long-range Soviet sea-launched cruise missiles.

This the INF Treaty did not ban.

We are concerned that the Soviets could covertly extend the
range capability of a cruise missile, or covertly develop a
new ground-launched cruise missile which prohibited long-
range capability. . .
In an INF/START environment. . .the Soviet incentive to
cheat could increase because of a greater difficulty in
meeting targeting requirements.

Still, this Senate and my Republican colleagues--from Dick Lugar, who

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quotes that he fought for the INF Treaty, and others, had no problem
saying that was a verifiable treaty. The ability to hide these things
in barns, to hide them in haystacks, was greater than the ability of
someone to muffle a nuclear explosion.
But no, I did not hear anything over on that side. I did not hear
anybody saying: No, that's not verifiable. I guess that was a
Republican treaty. Maybe this is a Democrat's treaty. Maybe that is how
they think about it.
But I find this absolutely fascinating. It really--if my staff gives
me one more suggestion, I am going to kill them. It says: The INF was
approved 93-5. I thought I kind of made that point clear.
But at any rate, let me point out what else the Intelligence
Committee said about that INF Treaty. It said:

Since no verification and monitoring regime can be
absolutely perfect--

Let me read it again:

Since no verification and monitoring regime can be
absolutely perfect, a central focus for the Committee--

That is the Intelligence Committee--

has been to determine whether any possible infractions
would be of sufficient military significance to constitute a
threat to our national security interests. This calculus is
one which the Senate should bear in mind in its consideration
of the treaty.

The Senate Intelligence Committee was right in 1988, and their
standard is right today, even though this is pushed forward by a
Democratic President instead of a Republican President.
To impose this utterly unrealistic standard of verifiability on Bill
Clinton's test ban treaty, when no such standard was imposed on Ronald
Reagan's INF Treaty, may be an effective ``gotcha'' in politics, but it
clearly does not look to the national interest of the United States.
No inspection--no inspection--by the way, for onsite inspections in
the INF Treaty, unless it was on prearranged sites. By the way, those
of my colleagues who point out that we have to get 30 or 50 votes, our
negotiators are pretty smart. We have 30 to 50 votes based on
categories.
Let me tell you how membership on that committee would be determined.
The Executive Council is the decisionmaking body of the Treaty
Organization. Among other things, it authorizes on-site inspections.
There are 51 seats on the Council, divided geographically. Ten seats
are allocated to parties from North America and Western Europe.
Of these, the treaty provides that ``at least one-third of the seats
allocated to each geographical region shall be filled taking into
account political and security interests, by States Parties in that
region designated on the basis of the nuclear capabilities relevant to
the Treaty. . . .
The chief negotiator, Stephen Ledogar, told the Foreign Relations
Committee on Thursday that ``this is diplomatic language'' that assures
that the United States gets a de facto permanent seat on the Council.
Moreover, he said that there was an agreement among the Europeans and
us that we would always have a seat.
Makeup of the Council is: Africa, 10 seats; Eastern Europe, 7 seats;
Latin America, 9 seats; Middle East/South Asia, 7 seats; N. America/W.
Europe, 10 seats; East Asia/Pacific, 8 seats.
There are 2-year terms.
A quick review of the candidates for seats that we should expect, in
almost all instances, to get all the votes of the West Europe/North
America group. So we start with 10.
Aside from Yugoslavia, Russia, and one of two others, the Eastern
Europe group comprises strong United States allies. So that's another
5-7 votes.
Similarily, many of the Latin American states are either: (1) strong
allies or (2) strongly favor the test ban. So we should usually get
most of those 9 votes.
That gets us very quickly to the low-mid-20s, in most instances--even
being conservative and assuming that we don't get all the votes in the
above 3 groups.
That leaves Africa, 10 seats; Middle East/South Asia group, 7 seats;
and the East Asia, 8 seats. There is where our work, depending on the
makeup of the Council at the particular time, could get a little
harder.
But even there the rosters have U.S. allies, or proponents of non-
proliferation.
It is hard to see how we will not get to 30 in most instances.
In truth, it is more likely that most U.S. inspection requests, based
on our intelligence and the data from the International Monitoring
System, will be easily approved.
It should also be noted that, unlike the U.N., Israel is a member of
a regional group, and will automatically get a seat on the Council
under a special rule that guarantees that one seat within each region
be filled on a rotational basis.
We can get 30 votes. We can get 30 votes any time we want. The reason
why is we set up the committees the way we did. The flip side of that
is, it will be hard for them to get 30 votes because the fact is that
our intelligence community is saying we do not want onsite inspections
in the United States. I don't know what treaty these folks are reading.
Let me make a second point. Here is the one lately that really gets
me: The Soviet Union is going to be able to develop very small tactical
nuclear weapons that, in fact, will lead to a different strategy in
terms of their conventional defense. Guess what. We should all be
standing up on this floor going hooray, we did it, because I remember
last time we debated this issue of strategic weapons. What were we
saying?
I watched, by the way, with great interest Dr. Edward Teller last
night. I watched a long documentary because I used to have to debate
him around the country on SALT. He was wrong then; he is wrong now.
We used to argue that the real concern--I have been here for 27
years--was the Soviets seeking a first strike capability. Remember? The
Soviets are seeking a first strike capability. And all of their actions
were designed to do that. That is why they were building these new
massive SS-18s with 10 nuclear warheads, independently targeted, et
cetera, et cetera. Through the leadership of a Republican President, we
have an agreement whereby they are going to dismantle those if we get
the treaty, the START treaty, passed. So guess what we are worried
about now. The exact opposite. We are worried now that they don't have
a first strike capability, that they aren't seeking nuclear
predominance, but they are acknowledging their conventional forces are
so bad they need tactical nuclear defense on their territory.
As they say in my church, examine your conscience, folks. Take a look
at what this is. We hear this thing, and the public says: Is it true,
Joe, they really are developing a new tactical weapon? My response is,
it probably is true. But guess what. They now have 10,000 tactical
nuclear weapons.
I yield myself such time as I may consume.
They are worried now that they are going to be able to develop
another smaller tactical nuclear weapon, as if this treaty has anything
to do with that. Come on. Come on. What we should be doing is rejoicing
in the fact that the whole emphasis in the Soviet program has shifted
to a recognition that they have to defend their homeland--their
judgment--and they do not have the conventional forces capable of doing
that--their judgment--and so they are developing, allegedly, a very
small tactical nuclear weapon--their judgment. Does that shift the
strategic balance? Give me a break. Give me a break.
I find this one of the most fascinating debates in which I have ever
been engaged. I don't know what we are talking about. When my friend
from Kentucky stands up and says, I thought we decided against
unilateral disarmament, me, too--an are-you-still-beating-your-wife
kind of question. Who is talking about unilateral disarmament? Where is
that anywhere in this treaty? Where does it say that? Where does it
imply that? That is like my standing up and saying: I am very surprised
my friends who oppose this treaty want to go to nuclear war; I am very
surprised they are advocating nuclear war. That would be equally as
unfounded and outrageous a statement as the assertion this treaty is
unilateral disarmament.
I will repeat this time and again, and I will yield the floor in a
moment. My problem is, we have a President of the United States of
America who has sent a formal message to the Republican leader asking
that a vote on this treaty

[[Page S12350]]

be delayed. Apparently, there is a consensus on the other side, thus
far at least, not to allow it to be delayed. This is the total
politicization of a national security debate. Could anyone have
imagined before this came up, if a President of the United States of
any party said: This issue, which is of the gravest consequence to the
United States of America, I respectfully ask that you delay a vote on
it, could anyone have imagined anything other than a response that
says: Mr. President, we will concur with the delay, unless it was for
stark political reasons? I can't fathom this one. I can't fathom this.
I wasn't sure the President should have sent the letter in the first
place.

If this treaty is defeated and India and Pakistan test, we are going
to find ourselves in the ugliest political brawl we have seen in this
place since Newt Gingrich left the House. You are going to have
Democrats standing up on the floor saying: The reason why India and
Pakistan have tested is because the Republicans defeated this treaty
and gave a green light. That is not a provable assertion, but mark my
words, we are going to hear it. Then the response is going to be even
more political.
We ought to take a deep breath. My mom always said, when you lose
your temper, take a deep breath, count to 10. Not that I have ever lost
my temper in my life. You can tell I am not at all passionate about any
of these issues. But let us count to 10. The President of the United
States has asked this treaty vote be delayed. It seems to me it is
common courtesy and totally consistent with national interests to grant
that request.
I will speak to other aspects of this. Let me conclude by saying two
things: One, to move to a very small tactical nuke on the part of the
Russians is an absolute outward admission that they lack the capability
in their minds for fighting the conventional war. Twenty years ago, we
would have paid billions of dollars, if the Russians had come to us--I
say to my friend from Massachusetts who knows a great deal about this--
we would have been prepared to vote to pay them $10-, $20 billion if
they would stop developing intercontinental range missiles that had the
capacity to penetrate our airspace and in all probability hit hardened
targets here. If they had said to us, we won't do that but we are going
to build a very small tactical nuke, we would have paid them to do
that. Now we hear on this side, if we pass this treaty, they are going
to build tactical nuclear weapons that are very small, smaller than the
10,000 they now have and are able to have and legally can have. That is
a very bad thing. That is why we should reject this treaty. So we
encourage the Chinese to go from 18 to 800 or 8,000 nuclear weapons
that have MIRV capability and are thermonuclear in capacity. That is
wonderful reasoning.
There are legitimate arguments against this treaty, which I believe
do not rise to the level of being against a treaty, but I haven't heard
them made this morning, with all due respect.
I yield the floor.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I want 30 seconds to respond to the challenge
of my friend from Delaware with respect to unilateral disarmament. I
think the point the Senator from Kentucky was making was that the
United States will consider itself bound to the zero-yield standard. We
will abide. But we know that certain other countries don't see the
treaty that way, don't interpret the language that way. We suspect they
have reason to and probably will be conducting so-called hybrid nuclear
tests and, second, couldn't verify whether those kinds of tests are
conducted. As a result, the United States would not be conducting any
kind of nuclear tests, whereas other countries would have the
capability and, indeed, the motivation to do so.
I believe that is what the Senator was talking about when he talked
about the concept of unilateral disarmament.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will take a minute to respond. I
understand the point made. We have 6,000 intercontinental ballistic
missiles that are on line right now. The Russians have a similar
number. After you get by that, the numbers drop off precipitously.
China is down in the teens. This unilateral disarmament notion or, as
explained by the distinguished Senator from Arizona, I understand his
point, but what are we doing? Are we going to give up? Are we freezing
in place the fact that we stay at 6,000, and if they take the worst
case of a stockpile that is in atrophy versus the dozen or more that
the Chinese have? I mean, come on. Come on. You know, if you told me
the Chinese had 6,000 nuclear weapons, MIRV capability, thermonuclear
yield, or if you told me the Koreans and Libyans had that and the
Russians had that, then you would have an argument. After the Soviet
Union and then our allies, it drops off precipitously into double
digits, max--max.

Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I want to thank the Senator from Delaware
for his terrific leadership on this issue over the last few days, and
for a long period of time.
Let me quickly address, if I may, one point. The Senator from
Delaware a few moments ago referred to the strange dynamic that has set
in here in the Senate. I just want to underscore that, if I may, for a
moment.
I grew up, as many of us did, looking at the Senate with a sense of
great respect and awe for the capacity of the Senate to come together
around the most significant national security issues that faced the
country. I think all of us always looked at this institution as the
place that, hopefully, could break through the emotions and find the
most common sense solution that is in the interests of the American
people.
Some of the great history of the Senate has been written about those
moments where Senators crossed the aisle and found commonality in
representing the interests of the Nation. I must say that in the 15
years I have been privileged now to serve here, representing
Massachusetts, I have never seen the Senate as personally and
ideologically and politically divided and willing to subvert what we
most easily can define as the common national interest for those pure
ideological or political reasons. And I don't think that is mere
rhetoric when I say that.
I noticed when Presidents Reagan and Bush were in office, there was a
considerable thirst on the other side of the aisle for adventures in
Granada, Panama, and Somalia, and the obvious need to respond to the
threat in Iraq and the Middle East. But suddenly, with President
Clinton, we saw those very people who were prepared to support those
efforts, even in a Granada or in a Panama, suddenly people argued that
Kosovo didn't have any meaning, Bosnia didn't have meaning, and even
Haiti, where there was an incredible influx of refugees and chaos right
off our shore, failed to elicit the same kind of responsible
international reaction as we had seen in those prior years. Now,
regrettably, this treaty finds itself being tossed around as the same
kind of ``political football,'' to a certain degree. And I think that
is unfortunate, and it certainly does not serve the best interests of
the Nation.
Mr. President, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is one
of the most important issues facing the United States today. Since the
end of the Cold War, we have made great strides in reducing the danger
to the American people of the vast nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet
Union. But the nuclear danger persists, and the job of nuclear arms
control is far from finished. Multiple nuclear tests detonated by India
and Pakistan emphasize the need for greater U.S. leadership on this
critical issue--not less.

In the last week, we have been told by critics of the CTBT that, for
a variety of reasons, it will increase, rather than reduce the danger
from nuclear proliferation. I believe that a careful examination of the
criticism of this treaty will show that, on balance, it will enhance--
not undermine--U.S. national security interests.
First, critics argue that, in their desire to conclude a
comprehensive test ban, the Clinton administration made key concessions
resulting in a flawed Treaty that is worse than no Treaty at all. Let
me say at the beginning that I believe the CTBT is far from perfect. I
am not going to argue with my colleagues on the other side that you
can't find a legitimate point of disagreement about the Treaty. I'm not

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going to argue with those who don't like the way a particular
compromise was arrived at in the treaty, or that think a particular
principle might have been fought for harder and the absence of victory
on that particular principle somehow weakens the overall implementation
of the Treaty.
The negotiating record--which has been subject to great scrutiny in
recent days--reflects as many compromises from the original U.S.
position as triumphs in achieving our objectives. There are legitimate
reasons for concern that we did not achieve all of the original goals
of the United States in negotiating this Treaty. I certainly take to
heart Secretary Weinberger's admonition that you should not want the
end goal so much that you give up certain substance in arriving at that
end goal. I think that is a laudable and very important principle
around which one ought to negotiate.
But my colleagues in this body understand better than most the
necessity of compromise in finding pragmatic solutions to the many
difficult problems we face. And the compromises we agreed to in the
CTBT will allow us to achieve the nonproliferation goals we seek.
What has often been lost throughout this debate is that the United
States enjoys a tremendous technological advantage over the other
nuclear powers in both the sophistication of our weapons and our
ability to maintain them reliably. The Administration and the Congress
initially agreed to seek a test ban that would permit only the lowest-
yield nuclear tests, which was soundly rejected by our negotiating
partners because it would essentially ensure that only the United
States, with the technical capacity the others lack to conduct those
low-yield tests, would be permitted to continue testing its nuclear
stockpile.
As Ambassador Stephen Ledogar--the head of the U.S. negotiating
team--testified before the Foreign Relations Committee last Thursday,
the other four nuclear powers argued that they needed a higher
threshold in order to gain any useful data. Russia argued that, if a
testing threshold were to be established for the five nuclear powers,
it should allow for nuclear yields of up to ten tons of TNT equivalent,
hardly a level that constituted an effective testing restriction.
Our negotiators quickly rejected that idea, and President Clinton
decided the best way to resolve the impasse and protect U.S. interests
would be to pursue a policy of zero-yield--a ban should be a ban. The
Russians were not happy with this proposal, but eventually were
persuaded to accept a total ban on any nuclear test that produced any
nuclear yield.

Clearly, the United States would have been better off if we had been
able to negotiate a test ban that allowed us to continue testing. But
it is ridiculous to argue that, because the CTBT does not protect the
U.S. advantage it represents a dangerous capitulation on our part. To
implement and verify a zero-yield test ban, we need not be worried
about distinguishing between a low-yield test and a medium-yield test
to determine if the Treaty has been violated. Any test of any yield is
a violation. In this regard, the Treaty's strength is in its
simplicity.
Second, critics argue that we shouldn't ratify the CTBT because we
can't verify compliance. There has never been an arms control treaty
that is 100% verifiable, and the CTBT is no exception. We will not be
able to detect nuclear tests down to the most minute level of nuclear
yield. But we will be able to verify that the Test Ban is accomplishing
what it is meant to accomplish: an end to nuclear testing that advances
the sophistication of current nuclear stockpiles or the development of
new nuclear stockpiles.
The key to a successful verification system is that a potential
violator must believe that the risk of getting caught is greater than
the benefit of the violation. The lower the yield of the nuclear test,
the smaller the chance of detection by seismic means. But at the same
time, the amount of useful information a nation would get by conducting
a low-yield clandestine test would be limited. As a result, a potential
violator would likely decide that the risk of getting caught is greater
than the benefit of conducting the test. In addition, clandestine
testing will not allow any developing weapons program to approach
current U.S. capabilities.
For those who are concerned about the danger from low-yield nuclear
testing, I would also argue that defeating this treaty will make it
more difficult, not less, for the United States to detect those tests
by denying us the benefits of the International Monitoring System that
will verify the CTBT. The International Monitoring System will include
50 primary seismic monitoring stations and an auxiliary network of 120
stations, 80 radionuclide stations for atmospheric measurements, 11
hydroacoustic stations to detect underwater signals, and infrasound
monitoring as well. This system will be augmented by the very powerful
national intelligence-gathering technologies currently operated by the
U.S. and others.
The CTBT also allows any state party to request an on-site inspection
of a questionable seismic event. The Treaty calls for on-site
inspection requests to be submitted to the Executive Council of the
CTBT Organization--the body charged with implementing the Treaty--along
with supporting data, collected either from the monitoring and data
mechanisms established under the Treaty or from national technical
means. The Executive Council will have representatives from every
region, and nations within each region will rotate membership on the
Executive Council on a set schedule. The United States has reached
agreement with the nations in our region that we will always be one of
the 10 nations representing our region, so we will always have a vote
on the Executive Council.

Thirty of the 50 members of the Executive Council must approve an on-
site inspection request. Critics have argued that it will be very
difficult for the United States to garner the support of 30 nations to
allow for an on-site inspection. They argue that our traditional
adversaries will use the Executive Council to block inspections that
are necessary to protecting the U.S. national interest.
It is true that countries such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq and their
few supporters can be counted on to block U.S. and other requests for
on-site inspections. However, most of the nations of the world have no
interest either in pursuing nuclear weapons or allowing their neighbors
to pursue them unchecked, which is why this Treaty enjoys such strong
support throughout the international community.
Rogue nations would have to find support among more than 40 percent
of the Executive Council to block our request for an on-site
inspection. But it is unlikely that the United States would not be able
to persuade at least 30 members of the merits and importance of our
inspection request.
The CTBT will give us access to tools we otherwise would not have for
monitoring nuclear tests, and an option for on-site inspection of
seismic events that we do not fully understand. Defeating the treaty
would deny our intelligence community the additional benefits of those
additional tools.
Third, critics argue that the CTBT will not end nuclear
proliferation, because key countries of proliferation concern will not
sign or ratify. This is an important argument, because it goes to
whether this Treaty can accomplish the fundamental purpose for which it
is designed--stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
It is true that countries will halt nuclear testing, or not, based on
a calculation of their own national interest. But by creating an
international norm against nuclear testing, the CTBT will add a
powerful factor in a rogue nation's assessment of whether its national
interest will be helped or harmed by the conduct of a nuclear weapon. A
nation that chooses to test will face considerable costs to its
political, economic and security interests. U.S. ratification of the
CTBT will lay the basis for universal enforcement of the Treaty, even
against the few nations that may not sign.
The CTBT is a critical component of broader U.S. strategy on nuclear
non-proliferation, which has the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
at its core. In 1995, states parties to the NPT agreed to extend that
Treaty indefinitely, in large part based on the commitment of the
declared nuclear weapons states to conclude a CTBT. The failure of the
United States to ratify

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the CTBT will seriously undercut our ability to continue our critical
leadership role in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Formal entry-into-force of the Treaty requires ratification by the 44
countries that have nuclear power reactors or nuclear research reactors
and are members of the Conference on Disarmament. And in my mind, it is
altogether appropriate that a treaty banning the testing of nuclear
weapons requires the participation of all the nuclear-capable states
before it can enter into force. Of those 44, 41 have signed the CTBT,
and 23 have ratified. All of our allies have signed the Treaty. Russia
and China have signed the Treaty. Only India, Pakistan and North Korea
have not signed.

Now, some have argued that the United States should be in no hurry to
ratify the Treaty, that we should wait until Russia, China, India,
Pakistan and North Korea have ratified. They worry that the United
States will forfeit its ability to conduct nuclear tests with no
guarantee that the countries we are most concerned about will make the
same commitment. But the United States has already concluded that we do
not need to conduct nuclear tests to maintain our vast nuclear
superiority.
No one on the other side of the aisle is arguing we should go out and
test tomorrow. Why? Because we don't need to test tomorrow. We don't
need to test next year. We don't need to test for the foreseeable
future, according to most scientists in this country, because we don't
test the nuclear explosion itself for the purpose of safety and for
making judgments about the mechanics of both the electrical and
mechanical parts of a nuclear warhead.
The CTBT binds us to a decision we have already made, because it is
in our national interests to stop testing. And if, at some point down
the line, it becomes necessary to resume testing to preserve the
reliability of our nuclear deterrent, we can withdraw from the Treaty
to do so.
Clearly, we want countries like India and Pakistan to ratify the
Treaty and commit themselves to refraining from nuclear testing. Aren't
we more likely to convince them to do this if we ourselves have already
ratified the Treaty? As Secretary Albright correctly pointed out on
Thursday, waiting is not a strategy. During the debates on the Chemical
Weapons Convention, there were those who advocated taking this passive
approach to protecting our interests. But in fact, after the United
States ratified the CWC, Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran and Cuba
followed our lead. The best chance for achieving the nonproliferation
goals of the CTBT is for the United States to lead. If the Senate were
to reject the Treaty, international support for the test ban would be
gravely undermined, and countries like India and Pakistan would have no
reason to refrain from continued testing.
Aren't we better off with a treaty that gives us the capacity to
monitor, the capacity to continue to show leadership with India and
Pakistan, the capacity to set up a process with China before the
Chinese test in a way that gives them the ability to translate the
information stolen--referred to in the Cox commission report--into a
real threat to the United States?
That seems to me to be a very simple proposition. The Cox Report, and
others, all acknowledge that at this point in time China has not
created a new weapon or changed its nuclear capacity, using our
information. And we know that, in order to do so, using on our
information, they have to test. China has signed the treaty, and is
prepared to adopt the restraints of this treaty. Those who argue that
we are better off allowing China the window to go out and test and now
profit from what it has stolen elude all common sense, in my judgment.
How would the United States be better off with a China that is allowed
to test and translate the stolen information into a better weapons
system? That is not answered on the floor of the Senate. But some argue
that that is the way they would like to proceed.

U.S. ratification of the CTBT won't end nuclear proliferation, but
U.S. rejection of the Treaty undermine the credibility of U.S.
leadership on nonproliferation, which will jeopardize U.S. work to
prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, to eliminate
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and to block the sale of sensitive
technologies that could contribute to proliferation.
Finally, critics argue that the United States will not be able to
maintain a reliable nuclear deterrent without nuclear tests. I take
very seriously the argument that, without nuclear testing, the
credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent will be undermined. The
security of the American people--and the security of our friends and
allies around the world--depends on maintaining the credible perception
that an act of aggression against us will be met with an overwhelming
and devastating response. If I thought for a minute that U.S.
ratification of the CTBT would undermine this deterrent, I would not--I
could not--support it.
In fact, the United States has today and will continue to have in the
future high confidence in the safety, reliability and effectiveness of
our nuclear stockpile. This confidence is based on over 50 years of
experience and analysis of over 1,000 nuclear tests, the most in the
world.
Most of the nuclear tests the United States has conducted have been
to develop new nuclear weapons; for the most part, we use non-nuclear
tests to ensure the continued reliability of our nuclear arsenal.
This is a key point--even with no test ban, the United States would
not rely primarily on detonating nuclear explosions to ensure the
safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile. Most of the problems
associated with aging nuclear weapons will relate to the many
mechanical and electrical components of the warhead, and the CTBT does
not restrict testing on these non-nuclear components. Moreover, we have
already proven that we can make modifications to existing designs
without nuclear testing. In 1998, we certified the reliability of the
B-61 Mod 11, which replaced an older weapon in the stockpile, without
conducting a nuclear test.
Looking to the future, the center of U.S. efforts to maintain our
nuclear stockpile is the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program,
initiated by President Clinton in 1992. This 10 year, $45 billion
program has four major objectives: to maintain a safe and reliable
stockpile as nuclear weapons age; to maintain and enhance capability to
replace and certify nuclear weapons components; to train new weapon
scientists; and to maintain and further develop an operational
manufacturing capability.
And it is already working. Since our last test in 1992, the
Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the Commander-in-Chief of
Strategic Command have certified 3 times (and are about to certify for
the fourth time) that the U.S. nuclear stockpile is safe and reliable.
It is only in the distant future--2010 perhaps, but we don't know the
answer to this yet--that conceivably the physics package of a nuclear
weapon might provide the level of deterioration that might not be able
to be replaced with totally new parts and therefore might somehow
lessen our nuclear deterrent capacity. To enable us to respond to such
a situation, President Clinton has established six Safeguards that
define the conditions under which the U.S. will remain a party to the
CTBT.

Presidential Safeguards A through F, as they are known, outline the
U.S. commitment to maintaining a science-based stockpile stewardship
program to insure a high degree of confidence in the reliability of the
U.S. nuclear stockpile. The final safeguard, Safeguard F, states U.S.
policy--as embodied in the official negotiating record of the CTBT--
that, if the President is advised that the safety or reliability of the
U.S. nuclear stockpile can no longer be certified, the President, in
consultation with the Congress, will withdraw from the CTBT under the
``supreme national interests'' clause of the Treaty.
Now, critics of this Treaty have suggested that a future President,
upon learning from his Secretaries of Defense and Energy that the
nuclear stockpile can not be certified, and upon confronting all the
scientific data that tells him our nuclear deterrent is eroding, will
somehow fail to act--fail to invoke the ``supreme national interest''
clause--and withdraw the United States from the Treaty. I ask my
colleagues, Is there one among us who, when confronted with this
information, would hesitate to act? When the Congress is informed of
the status of the

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nuclear arsenal--and those reports are given in full to the Congress--
is there anyone who doubts that the Congress would immediately demand
that the White House take action to protect our nuclear deterrent?
Surely, the critics of this Treaty who doubt that a President could
find the political will to withdraw the United States from the CTBT
when our ``supreme national interests'' are at stake aren't suggesting
that there is a confluence of political factors that could possibly
place the sanctity of a treaty above the sanctity of the lives of the
American people. No one can tell me that any President of the United
States is going to diminish the real national security interests of
this country against some desire to keep a treaty in effect for the
sake of having a treaty if, indeed, doing so will threaten the real
interests of this Nation.
U.S. ratification of, and adherence to, the CTBT will not jeopardize
our nuclear deterrent, because the United States does not today, and
will not tomorrow, rely on nuclear explosions to ensure the safety and
reliability of our nuclear stockpile. We have embarked on a high-tech,
science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program that will allow the United
States to maintain the superiority of its nuclear arsenal. And in the
event that we can not certify the reliability of our nuclear deterrent,
we have given notice to our negotiating partners that we will not
adhere to the CTBT at the expense of our supreme national interests.
So, in effect, we are talking about what we could achieve by passing
this treaty and showing leadership on the subject of implementing an
international regime of monitoring and of nonproliferation, versus
continuing the completely uncontrolled capacity of nations to provide a
true threat to the United States.
Mr. President, critics of this Treaty argue that the United States
today faces too many uncertainties in the realm of nonproliferation to
commit ourselves to a leadership position on the CTBT. I can not speak
to those uncertainties, but of the following, I am absolutely certain:
if the Senate rejects the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, there will be
more nuclear tests conducted around the world, not fewer, and we will
be no better equipped than we are today to detect and monitor those
tests; the U.S. nuclear arsenal will not be made more reliable--and
other nuclear nations will have the freedom to conduct the necessary
tests to bring their weapons on a technological par with our own,
undermining the strength of our nuclear deterrent; and finally, the
American people will be more vulnerable, not less, to the nuclear
danger, because we will have undercut more than 30 years of work to
build and fortify international norms on nuclear nonproliferation.
The Senate has before it today an opportunity to send a signal to the
world that the United States will continue to lead on international
efforts to reduce the nuclear danger. We also face the prospect of
acting too soon, after too little time for deliberation, and sending a
signal that the United States can no longer be counted on to stand
against the forces of nuclear proliferation.
It seems to me that when the President of the United States makes a
request in the interest of our Nation to the Senate to delay a vote, it
is only politics that would drive us to have that vote notwithstanding
that request.
My plea would be to my colleagues in the Senate that we find the
capacity to cool down a little bit, to have a vote that delays the
consideration of this treaty so that we may proceed to answer properly
each of the questions raised by those who oppose it, and, if need be,
make changes that would not send the message that the United States of
America is rejecting outright this opportunity to embrace a policy that
from Eisenhower on we have fought to try to adopt.
I hope that the leadership of the Senate on both sides of the aisle
can be prevailed upon to prevent a tragic misstep that I fear will have
grave consequences for the strategic interests of the United States and
our friends and allies.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry, please. Somewhere
down the line we are going to find it wise to yield back time. That
would not forbid a Senator on this side from suggesting the absence of
a quorum or any other routine motion of the Senate. Is that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is not correct. The Senator would have to
have debatable time left or there would have to be a nondebatable
motion. There would have to be debatable time left or there would have
to be a nondebatable motion before a Senator would be able to suggest
the absence of a quorum.
Mr. HELMS. Very well. I thank the Chair for the information.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I say to my colleagues on the Democratic
side who want to speak on this treaty, if I am not mistaken, there is
less than 1 hour--approximately 1 hour--left under the control of the
Senator from Delaware, and 13 Members wish to speak to it; and,
further, if my Republican colleagues conclude that they wish to yield
back their time, the time is going rapidly as we approach this vote. I
urge Senators, if they wish to speak, to be prepared, as my friend from
the State of Connecticut is, to speak for 5 minutes.
I yield 5 minutes to my friend from Connecticut.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Delaware.
As I have listened to my colleagues during this debate, I feel as if
the Senate has backed itself at least into a procedural corner in the
midst of a policy disagreement.
This is not the first time this has happened in the history of the
Senate--not even in the 10\1/2\ years I have been here. But this is one
of the most consequential times we have done so. For it seems to be a
combination of reasons that are part ideological, part partisan, and
part just plain personal. I hope we can find a way to work ourselves
out of this corner because the stakes here are high.
As the debate has been going on, I have been thinking about the two
big debates that have occurred here in the decade that I have been
privileged to serve in this body. One was the gulf war debate and the
other was the Middle East peace accords, the Oslo accords.
I think of the gulf war debate because I remember as President Bush
dispatched a half million troops to the gulf that I was dismayed at how
the reaction to that act by President Bush was dividing along partisan
lines. It didn't seem like a partisan question to me. People could have
good faith opinions on both sides, but the opinions were not based on
party affiliation.
I have the same feeling as I listen to this debate, and watch the
lines harden. Something unusual and unsettling has happened to our
politics when party lines divide us so clearly and totally on a matter
of national security. That is not the way it used to be in the Senate.
And that is not the way it ought to be.
The same is true of the procedural dilemma to which we have come. We
have a President--and those of us who support this treaty--
acknowledging that the votes are not there to ratify it now. That says
that the opponents of the treaty have won for now.
So why push for the vote? If the President of the United States has
asked that it be delayed because of his fear of the consequences of a
vote failing to ratify on nuclear proliferation, this is not political.
This goes to the heart of our security and the hopes and fears we have
for our future and our children's future.
But I will say if there is one thing, in my opinion, that would be
worse than going ahead and voting, even though we know those who oppose
ratification of the treaty have won. That would be for us as a majority
to voluntarily say that we will prohibit the President or ourselves
from raising the question of this critical and progressive treaty again
for the next year and a half. I think to do that would send an even
worse signal to India, to Pakistan, to China, and to Russia.
Let's keep the hope of a more secure world alive. Let's acknowledge
that we have a common goal.
Is anybody for nuclear proliferation? Don't we all agree that the
atmosphere

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is cleaner and the likelihood of nuclear proliferation less if nations
can't test? Can't we find a way across party lines to do what we have
done with other treaties--to adopt reservations or safeguards or
conditions which allow enough of us to come together to ratify this
treaty? Why are we heading toward a wall from which there will be no
good return and no good result?
I have also been thinking of the Middle East peace accords and the
Oslo accords because I remember what Prime Minister Rabin said.
If you are strong you can take risks for peace.

We are the strongest nation today in the history of the world. When
it comes to strategic nuclear weapons, we are dominant. We have more
than 6,000. If, tragically, for whatever reason, a few of them don't
work we have such--in the marvelous term of the Pentagon--
``redundancy'' that we have thousands of others that we can rely on in
the dreadful occasion that we might need to use them.
This treaty promises to freeze our advantage in nuclear weapons.
Since we are the strongest nation in history and this treaty may well
make us more dominant in the crucial, terrible arena of nuclear
weapons, why would we not want to take the risk of ratifying this
treaty? It is, in my opinion, a very small risk for increasing peace
and security for all--for our children, for our grandchildren. If we
decide that testing is once again required by the United States in
pursuit of our national interests, that option is protected. The treaty
language is very clear: We can--and I am sure we will--withdraw.
My appeal in closing is to say, Can't we find a way to come back to
some sense of common purpose and shared vision of a future? Both sides
have said on the floor that nuclear proliferation is one of the great
threats to our future. We are hurtling down a path, as this dreadful
power spreads to other countries of the world, many of them rogue
nations, where we cannot rely on the bizarre system of mutual assured
destruction that saved the United States from nuclear war during the
cold war. If an accident becomes more likely, the consequences will be
dreadful. Can't we find a way to avoid good old-fashioned gridlock,
which is survivable on most occasions in this Senate, but I think
potentially devastating on this occasion?
I appeal to my colleagues on the other side, whether there is or is
not a vote now on this treaty, let's get together and figure a way we
can sit, study the matter, talk to people in the Pentagon and people in
allied countries, and see if we cannot find a way to agree on enough
reservations, safeguards, and conditions to come back, hopefully next
year, and ratify this treaty.
I yield the floor.
Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry: If we go into a quorum call at this
point, the time is taken out equally from the opponents and proponents;
is that right or wrong?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. It takes unanimous consent to be charged
equally. Otherwise, the time will be charged against the side which
suggests the absence of a quorum.
Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts,
Mr. Kennedy.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, this may be one of the most important
debates the Senate will have in this recent time. In my view, the
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is the single most
important step we can take today to reduce the danger of nuclear war.
Surely we are in no position to hold a premature vote today or tomorrow
on this.
After 2 years of irresponsible stonewalling, the Senate has finally
begun a serious debate on this treaty. This debate should be the
beginning--not the end--of a more extensive and thoughtful discussion
of this extremely important issue. The stakes involved in whether to
ratify or reject this treaty are clear. Our decision will reverberate
throughout the world, and could very well determine the future of
international nuclear weapons proliferation for years to come.
We have a unique opportunity to help end nuclear testing once and for
all. The United States is the world's premiere nuclear power. The
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty locks us into that position. No other
nations have the capability to assure that their nuclear arsenals are
safe and reliable without testing. We have that capability now, and the
prospects are excellent that we can retain that capability in the
future.
Over the past 40 years, we have conducted over 1,000 nuclear tests.
We currently have extensive data available to us from these tests--data
that would provide us with an inherent advantage under the Treaty. As
Hans A. Bethe, the Nobel Prize winning physicist and former Director of
the Theoretical Division at Los Alamos Laboratory, stated in an October
3 letter to President Clinton,

Every thinking person should realize that this treaty is
uniquely in favor of the United States. We have a substantial
lead in atomic weapons technology over all other countries.
We have tested weapons of all sizes and shapes suitable for
military purposes. We have no interest in and no need for
further development through testing. Other existing nuclear
powers would need tests to make up this technological gap.
And even more importantly, a test ban would make it
essentially impossible for new nuclear powers to emerge.
As the foremost nuclear power, other nations look to us for
international leadership. We led the negotiations for this treaty. We
were the first of the declared nuclear powers to sign the Treaty. Yet,
now, because of our inaction and irresponsibility, we have made it
necessary for the leaders of three of our closest allies to plead with
us not to defeat the Treaty.
These three leaders--Prime Minister Chirac of France, Prime Minister
Blair of Britain, and Chancellor Schroeder of Germany--wrote in an OpEd
article in the New York Times last Friday that, ``Failure to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will be a failure in our struggle against
proliferation. The stabilizing effect of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
extended in 1995, would be undermined. Disarmament negotiations would
suffer.'' They also go on to say that, ``Rejection of the treaty in the
Senate would remove the pressure from other states still hesitating
about whether to ratify it. Rejection would give great encouragement to
proliferators. Rejection would also expose a fundamental divergence
within NATO.''
Our relationship with our most valuable allies is on the line. It
would be the height of irresponsibility for the United States Senate to
send the world a message that we don't care if other nations test
nuclear weapons, or develop their own nuclear arsenals. Surely, the
risks of nuclear proliferation are too great for us to send a message
like that.
The United States stopped conducting nuclear tests in 1992. Doing all
we can to see that other nations follow suit is critical for our
national security. Russia and China have both indicated that they are
prepared to ratify the Treaty if the U.S. ratifies it. If the Senate
fails to ratify it, the likely result is a dangerous new spiral of
nuclear testing and nuclear proliferation.
Many of my colleagues have spoken about the fact that there is no
guarantee about this Treaty. I argue that there is one guarantee--if we
fail to ratify the Treaty, the consequences are grave, and could be
catastrophic for our country and for all nations.
Last week, we held hearings in the Armed Services Committee on the
Treaty, and I commend the distinguished Chairman and Ranking Member of
that Committee for taking the lead on this extremely important issue.
We listened to expert witnesses on both sides of the aisle, as they
presented testimony on the Treaty and the Stockpile Stewardship
Program.
General Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified
that it was the unanimous conclusion of all of the Joint Chiefs, that
the Treaty is in our national interest. General Shelton said, ``The
CTBT will help limit the development of more advanced and destructive
weapons and inhibit the ability of more countries to acquire nuclear
weapons. In short, the world will be a safer place with the treaty than
without it, and it is in our national security interests to ratify the
CTBT.''
Some of my colleagues have referred to the Treaty as ``unilateral
disarmament.'' This characterization is grossly inaccurate, both in
policy and in practice. A key element of our adherence to the Treaty,
with the Administration's safeguards, is the Stockpile Stewardship
Program.

[[Page S12355]]

Last Thursday, in the Armed Services Committee, each of the directors
of our nuclear labs testified about that program. John Browne, the
director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, said, ``Through the
Stockpile Stewardship program, we intend to demonstrate a technical
excellence in weapons-relevant science and engineering that will
project confidence in our nuclear capability. This technical excellence
will be evident in our unclassified publications and presentations at
scientific conferences. Other countries will see these accomplishments
and will understand their connection to the quality of our weapons
programs.'' With the Stockpile Stewardship Program, we will still be
able to maintain a powerful nuclear deterrent.
Critics argue that the Treaty's not 100 percent verifiable. In
reality, the Treaty enhances our current ability to monitor nuclear
testing worldwide. It establishes an International Monitoring System,
which creates a global network of 321 testing monitors. We would get
all of the benefits of this larger system and only have to pay 25
percent of its total cost. The Treaty also establishes an on-site
inspection system. Perhaps most important, it will hold other nations
accountable for their actions, and require them to provide explanations
for suspicious conduct.
We also have a safety valve in the Treaty--Safeguard F. The
Administration didn't send this Treaty to the Senate as a stand-alone
document. They sent it here with six Safeguards under which, and only
under which, the United States will adhere to the Treaty.
As Safeguard F states, adherence to the Treaty is explicitly
conditioned on:

. . . the understanding that if the President of the United
States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Energy that a high level of confidence in the
safety or reliability of our nuclear weapons can no longer be
certified, the President, in consultation with Congress, can
withdraw from the Treaty.

The importance of this safeguard cannot be overstated. It ensures
that we will be able to do what is necessary to maintain our nuclear
arsenal.
President Kennedy, in his address to American University on June 10,
1963, spoke about the issue of verification while discussing the
Limited Test Ban Treaty. He said,

No treaty, however much it may be to the advantage of all,
however tightly it may be worded, can provide absolute
security against the risks of deception and evasion. But it
can--if it is sufficiently effective in its enforcement and
if it is sufficiently in the interests of its signers--offer
far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated,
uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race.

These words still hold true today. The risks posed by ratification of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty pale in comparison to the risks posed
if we reject it. We have the opportunity, with this treaty, to open the
door to a world without nuclear testing--a world that will be far safer
from the danger of nuclear war.
Voting on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is one of the most
important decisions that many of us will ever make. This vote holds
profound implications not only for our generation, but for all the
generations in the future. It makes no sense to risk a premature vote
now that could result in rejection of the Treaty. As the poet Robert
Frost pointed out, ``Two roads diverged in a wood''--and the one we
take may well make all the difference between peace and nuclear war.
I reserve the remainder of my time and yield it back to Senator
Biden.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will yield myself 5 minutes.
The argument has been made that the United States will not be able to
modernize its deterrent arsenal to meet new threats or encounter new
technologies under the Strategic Stockpile Stewardship Program, and
that is why some of my colleagues are saying we cannot go ahead with
this treaty.
I want to make it clear, the test ban treaty does not prevent us from
adapting most operational characteristics of a nuclear weapons system
to changing military missions, should we determine we have to do that.
Many important parts of a nuclear weapon can confidently be developed,
tested, and integrated into nuclear weapons without any nuclear tests
because they do not involve changes in the primary or secondary
components of the warhead; that is, the so-called physics package.
Dr. Paul Robinson, the Director of the Sandia National Laboratory,
told the Armed Services Committee on Thursday night:

Adapting deployed nuclear designs to new delivery systems,
or even other delivery modes, is not constrained by the
elimination of nuclear yield testing.

Let me put this in ordinary English. We keep being told here what has
happened is, if we sign on to this treaty without this Stockpile
Stewardship Program being fully completed, we are going to put
ourselves at great disadvantage, amounting to nuclear disarmament; we
will not be able to modernize our systems, and our systems are going to
atrophy.
Dr. Robinson, the Director of Sandia, went on to describe a prominent
success in the Stockpile Stewardship Program that is working now. We
have nine deployed systems, nine different kinds of nuclear bombs. One
of them is the B61 Mod-7 strategic bomb. That was adapted without any
nuclear tests.
I have a photograph of that I will hold up now. That is a B-1 bomber.
That red missile that is being dropped out of the belly of that bomber
is a change in the B61 Mod-7 to a B61 Mod-11, in response to a
different requirement.
What was the different requirement? The military said they needed a
nuclear weapon that could destroy targets that were buried very deeply
in the ground, and that Mod-7 version of the B61 nuclear warhead could
not do that. So without any nuclear test, they tested a new system. It
is called the Mod-11. That can penetrate the Earth deeply and destroy
deeply buried targets.
This picture illustrates an important fact. You can test nearly
everything in a nuclear weapon so long as you do not put enough nuclear
material in it to cause an uncontrolled chain reaction. We did not set
off this bomb, but we did test the bomb. You can take the plutonium out
of the bomb, and put uranium in the bomb, and you can test it. It just
doesn't set off this uncontrolled chain reaction. So this idea that we
cannot change anything in our arsenal if we sign on to this is simply
not correct.
By the way, the JASON Group, which is the most prestigious group of
nuclear scientists in the United States of America, studied this, and
they said the Strategic Stockpile Stewardship Program can maintain all
of our systems. One particular member of that group, testifying before
the committee, Dr. Garwin, points out that we can even exchange entire
physics packages; that is the plutonium and that secondary package,
that device that explodes it, that blows up. In my visual image of it,
the best way to explain it, as I was trying to explain it to my
daughter who is a freshman in college, what happens is you get this
plutonium, and you have to have something to ignite it, set it off. So
there is a secondary explosion that takes place, and it shoots all
these rods into this plutonium at incredible speeds.
I yield myself 2 more minutes.
What happens is it detonates the weapon, this chain reaction starts,
and you have a thermonuclear explosion.
The question has been raised whether or not, if we figured out that
this plutonium was no longer either stable or functional or was not
reliable, could you take out of the warhead the thing that makes it go
boom, the thing that causes the chain reaction, the thermonuclear
explosion, and put a new package in? Dr. Garwin says you sure can do
that, without testing, without nuclear tests.
This year, the first W-87--that is another warhead--life extension
unit was assembled in February for the Air Force at the Y12 plant in
Oak Ridge. It met the first production milestone for the W-87 life
extension.
These are major milestones and successes in the Stockpile Stewardship
Program. I might add, as my friend from Massachusetts knows, nobody is
suggesting we start to test now--nobody that I am aware of. I should
not say nobody. Nobody I am aware of. There may be somebody suggesting
it.
Preservation of the option of modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons to
counter emerging defensive technologies, the phrase you hear, does not
require ongoing nuclear testing. The most likely

[[Page S12356]]

countermeasures would involve changes to the missile and its reentry
system, not to the nuclear explosive.
It is a red herring to suggest if we sign on to this treaty, we are
locking ourselves into a system that is decaying and moving into
atrophy and we are going to find ourselves some day essentially
unilaterally disarmed. That is a specious argument.
Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. BIDEN. I will be happy to yield.
Mr. KENNEDY. There were some questions raised in the Armed Services
Committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 2 minutes have expired.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield time to the Senator.
Mr. KENNEDY. What assurances will we have that there will be
continued funding for the Stockpile Stewardship Program? I imagine that
the Senator agrees, if this is indeed a concern, that we would be glad
to make funding for the Stockpile Stewardship Program mandatory. And, I
doubt that there would be any hesitancy, on the part of our colleagues,
to get broad support for this in the Senate, if that was what was
needed so that ensuring funding for this important program wasn't an
issue or a question.
Many of the witnesses at the hearings said: ``How do we know there
will be continued funding? They may very well cut back that program.''
Is this another area about which the Senator is concerned, that we
don't know whether, year-to-year, the funds will be available for the
Stockpile Stewardship Program.
Can he give us some insight about his own thinking on how we can give
assurances to the lab directors that there will be adequate funding for
that program in the future?
Mr. BIDEN. The Senator, as usual, puts his finger on one of the
incredible flaws in our opponents' reasoning. They engage in circular
reasoning. It goes like this: Without spending money on the Stockpile
Stewardship Program, roughly $4.5 billion a year for 10 years, we will
not be able to attain, when the shelf life of these weapons is reached
10 years out or more, a degree of certainty that they are reliable and
safe.
You say: OK, we will fund it; we are for it, and the President sends
up that number.
Then they say: But we have a problem. Our Republican friends in the
House won't vote for that much money, and we had to fight too hard to
get it and they probably won't do it next year. The reason why, they go
on to say, I am against this, although I think if we funded it, it
would work and it would make sense, is my Republican colleagues in the
House probably won't fund it; therefore, I can't be for this treaty
because you guys are not funding the stockpile.
I find that absolutely fascinating, but it is the circular reasoning
which is being engaged. It strings together a group of non sequiturs
that end up leading to a conclusion that makes no sense.
The Senator has been here longer than I. Can he imagine, if we vote
this treaty down and other nations begin to test, and those who voted
it down are saying, by doing that, we think the United States should be
able to test, can you imagine this or future Congresses coming up with
$45 billion to perfect a Stockpile Stewardship Program which purpose
and design is to avoid nuclear testing, to spend $45 billion for the
redundancy? Can the Senator imagine us doing that?
Mr. KENNEDY. I certainly cannot. The Senator has put his finger on
one of the many reasons for supporting the Stockpile Stewardship
Program which is to give the necessary assurances that funding for
maintaining our weapons stockpile will be there year after year. This
was something I noted was a concern during the course of our hearings--
this question about the need for adequate funding. And, the Senator has
responded to that concern. There is broad support, certainly on our
side or for those who support this treaty, for giving the assurance
that funding would be there. It is just one more of the arguments made
by those who oppose this treaty that has now been rebutted. I thank the
Senator.
Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator for his response. I will raise this
when we get to the amendments. I wish to point out there is one other
ultimate safeguard. The ultimate safeguard is in the amendment, our
last provision, which says, if, in fact, we do not fund the stockpile
and that causes the laboratory Directors to say, ``We cannot certify,''
and that means the Secretary of Energy says, ``We cannot certify,'' the
President of the United States, upon that determination, must withdraw
from the treaty and allow us to begin to test. I am amazed at the
arguments that are being made on the other side.
Mr. KENNEDY. If the Senator will yield on that question, so the
amendment makes a change to the safeguards and makes this a mandatory
requirement on the President to exercise the Supreme National Interest
if the stockpile cannot be certified?
Mr. BIDEN. Yes.
Mr. KENNEDY. And, that is the measure that is going to be advanced by
the leadership, yourself included, to be a part of the Resolution of
Ratification?
Mr. BIDEN. That is correct. By the way, it is much stronger than any
President wants. It is section (E) of the amendment we sent. I will
read it to the Senator:

Withdrawal from Treaty.--If the President determines that
nuclear testing is necessary--

The antecedent to that is the lab Directors say it--

to assure, with a high degree of confidence, the safety and
reliability of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile,
the President shall consult promptly with the Senate and
withdraw from the Treaty pursuant to Article IX (2) of the
Treaty in order to conduct whatever testing might be
required.

It is pretty strong.
Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator. It is about as clear as can be. I
see our ranking member of the Armed Services Committee ready to speak,
but I welcome again the comments of the Senator from Delaware about the
risks to our international position if we fail to ratify or defeat the
CTBT in terms of security and stability around the world and the
continued possibility of nuclear testing over time.
As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I am pleased that we
held narrowly focused hearings on the many national security
implications of this treaty. It is important that we narrowly focused
our attention on our own national security issues. But, these broader
international security issues are powerful, and in rereviewing and
reading again the letters, statements, and editorials sent in
opposition to the Treaty, I think the importance of the broader
international security issues, of further testing by other countries,
and what the implications are going to be has been missed. I know the
Senator addressed those, but I hope before we get into the final hours
of this debate the Senator from Delaware will review that for the
benefit of the membership.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Massachusetts, this
is another part of the circular reasoning. What I heard this morning on
the floor and heard all day on Friday went like this: Without us being
able to test, our 6,000 strategic nuclear weapons are going to become
unreliable--which is ridiculous in my view. I strike the word
``ridiculous.'' Which is highly unlikely. I am trying to be polite. It
is hard.
Then they say because it is going to become unreliable, two things
are going to happen. One is that our allies are going to conclude that
our deterrent is no longer credible and, therefore, they are going to
lose faith in us. What they are then going to do is decide--Japan and
Germany, which are nonnuclear powers--to become nuclear powers, and we
are going to be escalating the arms race by passing this treaty.
The same day in an unprecedented move, to the best of my knowledge,
the leader of Germany, the leader of France, and the leader of Great
Britain sent an open letter to the Senate saying: We, Germany, Japan,
and France, have ratified this treaty. We strongly urge you, the
Senate, to ratify this treaty in the interest of your country as well
as ours.
One of those signatories was the Chancellor of Germany, the very
country my friends on the other side say, if we pass this treaty,
Germany will go nuclear. I guarantee--I cannot guarantee anything. I
will bet--I guess I am betting my career on this one--I will bet you
anything that if we turn down

[[Page S12357]]

this treaty and it is clear that it cannot be revived, within a decade
Germany and Japan are likely to be nuclear powers, particularly Japan,
because what is going to happen is, India and Pakistan are going to
continue testing. They will not sign this treaty. They say they will
sign it now if we do. They will not sign the treaty. As India tests
more and they move to deployment, China will test more.
China will test in order to determine whether or not they can build
smaller, lighter thermonuclear devices where multiple numbers can be
put on missiles. They will move from 18 nuclear weapons to God knows
how many. Then Japan, sitting there in the midst of that region, is
going to say, mark my words: We, Japan, have no choice but to become a
nuclear power.
We have spent 50 years of our strategic and foreign policy
initiatives to make sure that does not happen. But that is what will
happen. So now, at the end of the day, are we likely to be more secure
15 years from now with the scenario I paint? Which is more likely? Is
it more likely that turning down this treaty is going to turn Japan and
Germany into nuclear powers, increase the total nuclear capacity of
China, and move India and Pakistan further along the nuclear collision
path? Is that more likely?
Or is it more likely--which is their worst case scenario--that what
is going to happen is we are not going to fund the stockpile, we are
not going to be able, in 10 years, to count on the reliability of our
weapons, the weapons lab Directors are going to come to the Secretary
of Energy, the Secretary of Defense and say, we can't certify any more
Messieurs Secretaries, and they go to the President of the United
States and say, we can't certify, and the President is going to say,
oh, that is OK; don't worry about it. We are going to be bound by the
treaty.
Which is a more likely scenario? What do you think? Which is more
likely, that even if the stockpile degrades, any country, from China to
our allies, is going to say, gee, their B-60 M-11 may not function as
they thought it would, and maybe they will only be able to fire off
4,900 strategic hydrogen bombs. Maybe they will only be able to do
that; therefore, they have lost their deterrent capacity. They no
longer have credibility.
That is what you have to accept. You have to accept those kinds of
arguments to sign on to the notion that most of our Republican friends
are arguing.
Which is the more likely scenario? I would respectfully suggest that
85 percent or 80 percent of the American people are right. They figured
it out. They figured it out.
So I hope I have responded, in part at least, to the Senator's
question.
Mr. KENNEDY. You did. I thank the Senator.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield to the ranking member of the Armed Services
Committee, the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank my good friend from Delaware. I thank him also for
the leadership he has shown, both on the floor and off the floor, in
trying to bring this treaty to hearings before the Foreign Relations
Committee, so that the full Senate could look at the pros and cons of
this in a deliberative way.
I start with a reference that Senator Biden made to three of our good
allies--France, Germany, and Great Britain. The chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee is here and perhaps he will recollect otherwise;
and I would trust his recollection on this, if he does--but I cannot
remember when three of our closest allies' leaders have addressed a
direct plea to the Senate. At least in the 20 years I have been here, I
do not remember a letter coming in from the Chancellor of Germany and
the President of France, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain
pleading with us to ratify a treaty. That is how serious the stakes are
in this debate.
The world is looking to the Senate. Sometimes we say that and believe
it is true; but in this case we say it and know it is true. Because the
world has signed on both to a nonproliferation treaty and to a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
There are a few exceptions, obviously. There are some states which
will not sign any such treaty. But except for a few rogue nations, the
world has signed on to a nonproliferation treaty and a Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty. The world is looking at us, expecting our leadership.
Even though the world is looking to us to ratify, that does not mean
we should ratify this treaty if it makes us less secure. We should do
what is in our security interests. But unless all of our allies and the
rest of the world are wrong, the world will be a much more secure place
if we stop testing nuclear weapons and if other countries stop testing
nuclear weapons as well.
How do we tell India ``don't test'', if we ourselves want to test?
How do we tell Pakistan, ``don't test; for God's sake, for your
security and the world, don't test'', if we say, oh, but we want to
continue to test?
What does that do to our argument? I would suggest it destroys it. It
destroys our standing to try to persuade countries that want to become
nuclear powers, that want to add to their inventories, that want to
improve their inventories--it wipes out our standing to make the
argument, if we say everybody else ought to stop testing but us.
We are the only superpower in this world. That gives us certain
responsibilities. But one of those responsibilities is that we should
be not just a superpower, but we should be superwise as well. We should
realize that we are not always going to be the world's only
superpower--nuclear or otherwise. We should behave with the realization
that our actions today are going to affect the rest of the world,
including the direction they go in terms of nonproliferation.
As I said, I would not care if every country in the world signed or
ratified this treaty if it was not in our security interests. I think
we ought to listen, we ought to understand what the rest of the world
is saying to us, we ought to remember our own commitments. We signed up
to the indefinite extension of the nonproliferation treaty, and made a
commitment to the world to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty. We
should remember our own commitments. We should consider what our allies
and the rest of the world are saying to us. But if it were not in our
own security interest, I would not recommend that we ratify the treaty.

But we should surely listen to our top military leaders as to what
they recommend to this Senate? What does the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff recommend strongly to the Senate? He says:

The test ban treaty will help limit the development of more
advanced and destructive weapons and inhibit the ability of
more countries to acquire nuclear weapons. It is true that
the treaty cannot prevent proliferation or reduce current
inventories, but it can restrict nuclear weapons progress and
reduce the risk of proliferation.

General Shelton said:

In short, the world will be a safer place with the treaty
than without it. And it is in our national security interest
to ratify the CTBT.

Secretary Cohen said the following:

By banning nuclear explosive testing, the treaty removes a
key tool that a proliferator would need in order to acquire
high confidence in its nuclear weapons designs.

Secretary Cohen said:

Furthermore, the treaty helps make it more difficult for
Russia, China, India, and Pakistan to improve existing types
of nuclear weapons and to develop advanced new types of
nuclear weapons.

Secretary Cohen said:

In this way, the treaty contributes to the reduction of the
global nuclear threat. Thus, while the treaty cannot prevent
proliferation or reduce the current nuclear threat, it can
make more difficult the development of advanced new types of
nuclear weapons and thereby help cap the nuclear threat.

What the three world leaders, to whom I referred before and to whom
Senator Biden referred earlier, said in their article and in their
letter to us was the following:

Rejection of the treaty in the Senate would remove the
pressure from other states still hesitating about whether to
ratify it. Rejection would give great encouragement to
proliferators. Rejection would also expose a fundamental
divergence within NATO. The United States and its allies have
worked side by side for a comprehensive test ban since the
days of President Eisenhower. This goal is now within our
grasp. Our security is involved as well as America's. For the
security of the world we will leave to our children, we urge
the U.S. Senate to ratify the treaty. We

[[Page S12358]]

have President Chirac, Prime Minister Blair, Chancellor
Schroeder of Germany, from their perspective, pleading
with us to ratify this treaty. We have our top military
leadership, uniformed and civilian, urging us to ratify
this treaty. That is the kind of assessment which has been
made of the value of this treaty. That is the kind of
analysis which has been made.

We should think carefully before we reject it; before we defeat a
treaty that is aimed at reducing the proliferation of nuclear weapons
in the world; before we give up our leadership in the fight against
proliferation; and our efforts to go after proliferators. We keep
saying the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the greatest
threat this Nation faces; our military leaders tell us this treaty is
an important step in the fight against proliferation. Before we give up
that leadership and defeat a treaty which is adding momentum to the
battle against proliferators, we surely should stop and assess what it
is this Senate is about to do.
It has been argued that we need testing for the safety of our
stockpile. The answer is that the stewards of the stockpile, the lab
Directors, for the last 7 years have been certifying safety and
reliability of the stockpile based not on testing, which we have given
up for 7 years already, but based on a Stockpile Stewardship Program
which has allowed them to certify with a high degree of confidence that
our stockpile is safe and reliable, without one test in the last 7
years.
Will they be able to do that forever? They think they can, but they
are not sure. They told us they believe they will be able to continue
to certify the safety and reliability of our stockpile without testing.
They have also told us something else. Here I want to read a letter
from them because there has been such a misunderstanding about what
these three lab Directors have told us at our hearing. After the
hearing, they wrote a joint statement from which I want to read:

While there can never be a guarantee that the stockpile
will remain safe and reliable indefinitely without nuclear
testing, we have stated that we are confident that a fully
supported and sustained stockpile stewardship program will
enable us to continue to maintain America's nuclear deterrent
without nuclear testing. If that turns out not to be the
case, Safeguard F--which is a condition for entry into the
Test Ban Treat by the U.S.--provides for the President, in
consultation with Congress, to withdraw from the treaty under
the standard ``supreme national interest'' clause in order to
conduct whatever testing might be required.

People can quote different parts of the lab Directors' testimony. I
was there for it. The bottom line is, while they cannot guarantee that
the Stockpile Stewardship Program will always allow them to certify
safety and reliability, they believe it will be able to do so, and
therefore they are, in the words of one of them, ``signed onto'' this
treaty. That is because if they can't certify the safety and
reliability of our nuclear stockpile in some future year they have the
assurance in safeguard F, by which we can withdraw from the treaty if
we need to conduct a nuclear test. We have incorporated that safeguard
and, indeed, strengthened it in the amendment to this resolution, that
we will withdraw from this treaty and begin nuclear testing again if
necessary. We do not want our stockpile to be unsafe or unreliable.
Nobody does--none of us.
The question then is, Can we join the rest of the world, at least the
civilized world, in a comprehensive test ban to fight the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, and at the same time assure ourselves that if we
need to test again, we will be able to do so by notifying the rest of
the civilized world in advance that we retain the right to withdraw
from the treaty and test if our security requires it? In other words,
in the event the day comes when testing is needed to certify safety and
reliability, we are putting the world on notice now that we intend to
exercise that withdrawal clause.

Could somebody cheat? That is the other argument which has been used,
that somebody could cheat at a very low level of testing, that somebody
might be able to get away with it, that our seismic detection
capability is not such that we would be certain we would catch a very
low level test.
This is what Secretary Cohen says about the cheating question:

Is it possible for states to cheat on the treaty without
being detected? The answer is yes. We would not be able to
detect every evasively conducted nuclear test. And from a
national security perspective, we do not need to. But I
believe that the United States will be able to detect a level
of testing, the yield and number of tests, by which a state
could undermine the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

So the Secretary of Defense is testifying that militarily significant
cheating would be caught, that a low-level test by a power would be
taking a huge risk in cheating, because there are other means besides
seismic detection to get evidence of a cheating. But most importantly,
if a signatory to this treaty decided to cheat and take that risk, they
could not undermine our nuclear deterrent. It would not be a militarily
significant cheating that could occur without our knowing it
seismically. We would not have to rely on other means in order to
discover a militarily significant act of cheating. Plus, General
Shelton and Secretary Cohen have both told us that the treaty, if it
comes into effect, will increase our ability to observe and monitor
tests because it will create over 300 additional monitoring stations in
90 countries specifically in order to detect nuclear testing.
I will conclude with two points. One, this Senate is not ready to
ratify this treaty. Indeed, maybe it never will ratify the treaty. But
it is clear now that this Senate will not ratify the treaty at this
time. I believe at a minimum we should do no damage, do no harm.
There are many of us who have not focused adequately on these issues,
by the way. This has been a very truncated period of time for
consideration, with very few hearings focused directly on the treaty. I
know we had three hearings in the Armed Services Committee, and there
was one in Foreign Relations last week that focused directly on this
treaty.
We are here under a unanimous consent agreement which allows only one
amendment by the majority leader and one by the Democratic leader to
this treaty, an unusual restriction for consideration and deliberation
of a treaty. No other amendments are in order; no other restrictions,
conditions on a resolution of ratification, but the one. So we are here
in a very restricted circumstance and a very short time limit. It is
not a deliberative way to address a treaty. This Senate should do
better.
At a minimum, my plea is, do no harm. Do no harm to the cause of
antiproliferation. The way to avoid doing harm, regardless of where
people think they are on the merits of the treaty, is to delay
consideration of this treaty.
My final point has to do with the delay issue. There is a precedent
for delaying a vote on a treaty even though a vote had actually been
scheduled. The precedent is the most recent arms control treaty we
looked at, I believe, which is the Chemical Weapons Convention. There
was a vote actually scheduled on the Chemical Weapons Convention. There
was a vote that was scheduled on the Chemical Weapons Convention for
September 12, 1996. Shortly before that vote, Senator Dole, who was
then a candidate for President, announced his opposition to the
Chemical Weapons Convention. It was decided on the 12th, which I
believe was the actual day scheduled by unanimous consent for a vote on
the convention, it was decided to vitiate that unanimous consent
agreement and to delay the vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. A
vote was set, by unanimous consent agreement, but given the opposition
of one of the Presidential candidates--similar to what we have going on
now, by the way, where we have opposing positions taken by Presidential
candidates of both parties--it was decided then that it was the wiser
course for the Senate to delay the vote on the Chemical Weapons
Convention.

I said before on this floor last week that I think we are in an
analogous situation to what occurred back in September of 1996. I raise
it again for a very specific point. At that time, there were no
conditions attached to the decision to delay the vote. The Senate
agreed to vitiate the unanimous consent agreement, to delay the vote;
but there was no requirement, no condition attached as to when it would
be brought up or not brought up. It was simply to vitiate. People
decided--we decided in this body--that it was a wiser course of action
not to proceed under the circumstances--one similar to what exists now,
but there are different circumstances now that are, I think, additional
reasons not to vote at

[[Page S12359]]

this time, including the very narrow UC under which we are operating,
with the strict consideration of a total of two amendments.
I suggest we look back--and we are going to do what each of us always
does, which is follow our own consciences as to what is best for this
Nation. In my judgment, ratification is best, but, clearly, that is not
where the Senate is now. I hope there is a majority of us who believe,
for various reasons, the better course of wisdom is that we not proceed
to defeat this treaty at this time--whether it is because that defeat
would constitute a blow to our leadership in the battle against
proliferation in this world, as three major allies have told us, or
whether it is because this institution has not had adequate time yet to
fully understand and consider and deliberate over this very complicated
treaty; for whatever reason--and many exist--I hope we will delay this
vote. I cannot foresee a circumstance, as I have told my good friend
from Virginia, where I would want to see this treaty brought up next
year, given the fact that the election is at the end of next year.
However, I can't preclude any circumstance from existing. I can't
predict every world circumstance that would exist, where I would be
comfortable saying we should under no circumstances consider this
treaty, no matter what happens.
But I can, in good conscience, say I can't foresee any such
circumstances because I can't. Will the world situation change? Will
India and Pakistan begin testing because we fail to ratify? Will that
then lead to China to begin their testing again? Will that have an
impact on Russia? Will the political situation change in the United
States where candidates of both parties will possibly decide that this
treaty is in our best interest? Can I foresee any of that happening?
No. Do I believe any of that will happen? No. But it could.
Circumstances can change. So I would not want to see us saying there
are no circumstances under which anybody could even raise the question
of consideration of this treaty next year. It is a very straightforward
statement and, again, I conclude by saying, personally, I hope we delay
the vote. Personally, I can foresee no circumstances under which this
should be brought up next year. We should wait until after the
Presidential elections, in the absence of some unforeseeable
circumstance. But I hope that is what the Senate, in its deliberative
wisdom, decides to do.
At this time, I have been authorized to yield 5 minutes to Senator
Dorgan. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). The Senator from North Dakota is
recognized.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, who will acquire nuclear weapons in the
months and years ahead? Which countries? Which groups? Which
individuals, perhaps, will acquire nuclear weapons? Many would like to
acquire nuclear weapons. Terrorist groups would like access to nuclear
weapons. Rogue countries would like access to nuclear weapons.
The cold war is over, the Soviet Union is gone, the Ukraine is
nuclear free; the two nuclear superpowers are Russia and the United
States. Between us, we have 30,000 nuclear weapons. What responsibility
do we have as a country to try to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
to other countries and to reduce the nuclear weapons that now exist?
Well, we have a lot of responsibility. It is our requirement as a
country to exercise the moral leadership in the world, to reduce the
dangers of nuclear war, and stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
Some have never supported any arms control agreements. I respect
that. They have a right to do that. I don't agree with it. I think it
is wrong. Nonetheless, there are those who have never supported any
arms control agreements. Yet, arms control agreements work. We know
they work.
I ask unanimous consent to show a piece of a Russian Backfire bomber
wing on the floor of the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DORGAN. This is a piece of a wing sawed off of a Russian Backfire
bomber. This bomber wasn't brought down from the skies with hostile
fire. This bomber wasn't destroyed because of conflict. This piece of
wing came from a Russian bomber because this country and the Russians
have an agreement to reduce the number of bombers, missiles, and
submarines in our arsenal, and reduce the number of nuclear warheads.
This other item is copper wiring, ground up from a Russian submarine
that used to carry missiles with nuclear warheads aimed at the United
States of America. Did we sink that submarine in hostile waters? No, it
was destroyed and the wiring ground up by the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program, under which the United States assists in the
destruction of bombers, missiles, and warheads in Russia. We bring down
the number of weapons in our stockpile; they bring down the weapons in
theirs. The delivery systems are brought down as well.
Does arms control work? Of course, it works. We know it works. That
is why I am able to hold the part of a Russian bomber here in the U.S.
Senate. Of course, it works. There are some who have never supported
any of this. They have that right. But, in my judgment, the decision
not to support aggressive arms control efforts is inappropriate and
wrong.
Now we are debating the issue of whether we will have a Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty--something that was aspired to by President
Eisenhower nearly 40 years ago. A Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
was something that President Eisenhower lamented he was not able to
accomplish. Forty years later--after years of negotiation--2 years ago,
it was sent to the Senate, signed by the President, and asked to be
ratified in the Senate. It was sent to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. I know there have been debates about it, but there was not
one hearing in that Foreign Relations Committee in 2 years on the CTBT.
And then, with 10 days' notice, it is brought to the floor of the
Senate for a vote. Some say, well, that is fine. That is a
consideration. That is not thoughtful consideration; that is a
thoughtless way to handle this issue.
This is a serious issue, a big issue, an issue with great
consequence. Ten days, no comprehensive hearings--that is a thoughtless
way to handle this issue. India and Pakistan have detonated nuclear
weapons literally under each other's chin. They don't like each other.
That is an ominous development for the world. The question of whether
it could result in a nuclear exchange or a nuclear war is a very real
question. Can we as a country intervene to say, do not explode these
nuclear weapons, do not test nuclear weapons? Do we have the ability to
say to India and Pakistan that this is a dangerous step?
Mr. President, we had better have that resolve. That resolve must
come from us.
I have heard a lot of reasons on the Senate floor why this should not
be ratified all from the same folks who have never supported
ratification of any treaty that would lead in the direction of arms
control. All of the arguments I have heard, in my judgment, are not
relevant to this treaty. It is proposed that somehow this treaty would
weaken our country.
Here is what would happen when this treaty is ratified. The number of
monitoring stations across the world will go to well over 300. We will
substantially enhance our capability to monitor whether anyone explodes
a nuclear weapon.
Here is what we have now. Here is what they will have if the CTBT
enters into force.
How on Earth can anyone credibly argue that this doesn't strengthen
our ability to detect nuclear explosions anywhere on the Earth? It is
an absurd argument to suggest that somehow ratifying this treaty will
weaken our country.
The last four Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all the senior
military leadership now serving in this country, including Gen. Colin
Powell, and previously retired Joint Chiefs of Staff support this
treaty. Would they do so because they want to weaken this country? Of
course not. They support this treaty because they know and we know this
treaty will strengthen this country. It will strengthen our resolve to
try to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
say in a very real sense that one of the best ways to protect our
troops and our interests is to promote arms control, in both the
conventional and nuclear realms, arms control can reduce the chances of
conflict.

[[Page S12360]]

Gen. Omar Bradley said, ``We wage war like physical giants and seek
peace like ethical infants.''
There is not nearly the appetite that, in my judgment, must exist in
this country--and especially in this Senate--to stand up for important
significant issues--serious issues. That is what we have here.
The military leaders say this treaty is in this country's security
interest. The scientists, 32 Nobel laureates, the chemists, physicists,
support ratification. Dr. Garwin, who I was out on the steps of the
Capitol with last week, who worked on the first nuclear bomb in this
country, says this treaty is in this country's interest. We can
safeguard this country's nuclear stockpile, the scientists say; we can
do that, they say. And the detractors say, no, you can't. These
detractors--let me talk for a minute about this.
National missile defense: They say: Let's deploy a national missile
defense system right this minute. The Pentagon and the scientists say
we can't, we don't have the capability. Our friends say: No. We don't
agree with you. You can and you have the capability. They say: We
demand you do it, and we want you to deploy it.
On the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the detractors say:
Well, it would weaken this country because we can't detect nuclear
tests and we can't maintain our stockpile. And the military leaders and
the scientists say: You are wrong. We can safeguard our stockpiles. We
can detect nuclear explosions.
This selective choosing of when you are willing to support the
judgment of the best scientists in this country or the military leaders
of this country is very interesting.
Last week, Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac, and Gerhard Schroeder, the
leaders of England, France, and Germany, sent an op-ed piece to the New
York Times asking this country to ratify this treaty. That ought not be
the position this country is in. This country ought to be a leader on
this issue. Now, we are being asked by our allies to please lead. We
ought not have to be asked to provide leadership to stop the spread of
nuclear weapons. What are we thinking of?
Last week, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee referenced
comments from the Governor of my State on the floor of the Senate,
saying he is worried that the nuclear stockpile is not safe and
pointing out that we have nuclear weapons in our State.
It is an interesting and brand new argument that I hear. I have not
heard anyone stand on the floor of the Senate in recent months saying
we have a real problem with the safety of the nuclear stockpile. This
is just a straw man. That is what this is.
I know the majority leader thought it was probably an interesting
strategy to bring up the treaty without comprehensive hearings, without
comprehensive discussions and debate, and without much of an
opportunity for the American people to be involved in the debate on a
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and then say we want to vote on
it. We are going to kill this thing.
You know those who think that way I guess can grin all the way to the
vote tally. But there won't be smiles on the faces of those around the
world who rely on this country to be a leader in stopping the spread of
nuclear weapons. This country has a greater responsibility in this
area, and we can exercise that responsibility by voting to ratify this
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Voinovich). The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry: How much time is under the control
of the Senator from Delaware?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. Is there time on the amendment once the amendment is
called up?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will be 4 hours equally divided on each
of the two amendments that may be called up.
Mr. BIDEN. One last parliamentary inquiry. Am I able to call up the
Democratic leader's amendment now, and would the time begin to run on
that amendment now?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may proceed.

Amendment No. 2291

(Purpose: To condition the advice and consent of the Senate on the six
safeguards proposed by the President)

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on behalf of the Democratic leader, I call
up amendment No. 2291.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Delaware (Mr. Biden), for Mr. Daschle,
proposes an amendment numbered 2291.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:

Strike all after the resolved clause and insert the
following:

SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS.

The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, opened for signature
and signed by the United States at New York on September 24,
1996, including the following annexes and associated
documents, all such documents being integral parts of and
collectively referred to in this resolution as the
``Treaty,'' (contained in Senate Treaty document 105-28),
subject to the conditions in section 2:
(1) Annex 1 to the Treaty entitled ``List of States
Pursuant to Article II, Paragraph 28''.
(2) Annex 2 to the Treaty entitled ``List of States
Pursuant to Article XIV''.
(3) Protocol to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.
(4) Annex 1 to the Protocol.
(5) Annex 2 to the Protocol.

SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.

The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of
the Treaty is subject to the following conditions, which
shall be binding upon the President:
(1) Stockpile Stewardship Program.--The United States shall
conduct a science-based Stockpile Stewardship program to
ensure that a high level of confidence in the safety and
reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile is
maintained, including the conduct of a broad range of
effective and continuing experimental programs.
(2) Nuclear laboratory facilities and programs.--The United
States shall maintain modern nuclear laboratory facilities
and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear
technology that are designed to attract, retain, and ensure
the continued application of human scientific resources to
those programs on which continued progress in nuclear
technology depends.
(3) Maintenance of nuclear testing capability.--The United
States shall maintain the basic capability to resume nuclear
test activities prohibited by the Treaty in the event that
the United States ceases to be obligated to adhere to the
Treaty.
(4) Continuation of a comprehensive research and
development program.--The United States shall continue its
comprehensive research and development program to improve its
capabilities and operations for monitoring the Treaty.
(5) Intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities.--
The United States shall continue its development of a broad
range of intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities
and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive
information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons
development programs, and related nuclear programs.
(6) Withdrawal under the ``supreme interests'' clause.--
(A) Safety and reliability of the u.s. nuclear deterrent;
policy.--The United States--
(i) regards continued high confidence in the safety and
reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile as a matter
affecting the supreme interests of the United States; and
(ii) will regard any events calling that confidence into
question as ``extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of the Treaty'' under Article IX(2) of the Treaty.
(B) Certification by secretary of defense and secretary of
energy.--Not later than December 31 of each year, the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, after
receiving the advice of--
(i) the Nuclear Weapons Council (comprised of
representatives of the Department of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Energy),
(ii) the Directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories of
the Department of Energy, and
(iii) the Commander of the United States Strategic Command,
shall certify to the President whether the United States
nuclear weapons stockpile and all critical elements thereof
are, to a high degree of confidence, safe and reliable. Such
certification shall be forwarded by the President to Congress
not later than 30 days after submission to the President.
(C) Recommendation whether to resume nuclear testing.--If,
in any calendar year, the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Energy cannot make the certification required by
subparagraph (B), then the Secretaries shall recommend to the
President whether, in their opinion (with the advice of the
Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of the nuclear weapons
laboratories of the Department of Energy, and the Commander
of the United States Strategic Command),

[[Page S12361]]

nuclear testing is necessary to assure, with a high degree of
confidence, the safety and reliability of the United States
nuclear weapons stockpile.
(D) Written certification; minority views.--In making the
certification under subparagraph (B) and the recommendations
under subparagraph (C), the Secretaries shall state the
reasons for their conclusions, and the views of the Nuclear
Weapons Council, the Directors of the nuclear weapons
laboratories of the Department of Energy, and the Commander
of the United States Strategic Command, and shall provide any
minority views.
(E) Withdrawal from the treaty.--If the President
determines that nuclear testing is necessary to assure, with
a high degree of confidence, the safety and reliability of
the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, the President
shall consult promptly with the Senate and withdraw from the
Treaty pursuant to Article IX(2) of the Treaty in order to
conduct whatever testing might be required.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, to put this in context, one of the
unfortunate ways in which this debate has developed, in my view, on
this very important treaty is that the President of the United States
when he put his signature on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
attached to it a number of conditions when he referred the treaty to
the Senate. He sent up, along with the treaty, a total of six
conditions that he said he wanted added to the treaty before we
ratified the treaty.
As we all know, in previous arms control agreements, it has been our
practice in the Senate to add conditions to treaties. When it was
agreed that we were given essentially an ultimatum that if we wanted to
debate this treaty at all, we had to agree to the following time
constraints.
I was under the impression that the starting point for this debate
would be what the President said he wanted, which was he wanted us to
ratify the treaty itself and the six conditions. I found out later it
was only the treaty.
Although we were entitled to an amendment on each side, the
Democratic side, or in this case the Democratic leader's amendment
would have to be what the President said he wanted as part of the
package to begin with in order to be for the treaty.
Usually what has happened, as the chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee knows, we debated at length, for instance the treaty on the
Chemical Weapons Convention we had extensive hearings in the Foreign
Relations Committee. The outcome of those hearings was that we voted
on, or agreed upon, or we negotiated a number of conditions. There were
28 conditions before we brought it to the Senate floor.
That is the usual process. But since we didn't have the first formal
hearing on this treaty until after it was discharged--that is a fancy
word for saying we no longer had any jurisdiction--and it was sent to
the floor, here we are in the dubious position of having to use 2 hours
on the one amendment we have available to us, an amendment to ask that
the President's whole package be considered. That is where we are.
The amendment that has been submitted by the Democratic leader
contains six conditions that corresponded to the six conditions that
the President of the United States said were needed in order for him to
be secure with the Senate ratifying this treaty. These conditions were
developed in 1995 before the United States signed the treaty. They were
critical to the decision by the executive branch to seek the test ban
treaty in which the standard would be a zero yield; that is, zero yield
resulting from an uncontrolled chain react--a nuclear explosion.

We in turn think it is critical that in providing the advice and
consent to this treaty, the Senate codify these six safeguards that the
President of the United States said were conditions to the Resolution
of Ratification. Let me explain why.
The safeguards were announced by President Clinton in August of 1995.
They were merely statements of policy by the President, and there is no
way for President Clinton to bind future Presidents with such
statements. However, we can.
Conditions in a Resolution of Ratification, by contrast--which is
what I am proposing now--are binding upon all future Presidents.
Therefore, approval of these conditions will lock them in for all time,
so that any future President or future Congress, long after we are
gone, will understand that these safeguards are essential to our
continued participation in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Administration witnesses who testified before the Armed Services
Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee underscored the
importance of these safeguards during the Senate hearings last week. I
suspect that is why our Republican friends didn't allow Members to
bring these up as part of the original instruments. So we started off
as we would had it come out of committee, with the actual treaty, plus
the conditions attached. I expect the reason they didn't want this side
to do that is it would strengthen the hands of those who were for the
treaty.
I understand the tactical move, but I think it is unfortunate
because, as we all know, the witnesses who testified from the
administration, others from the laboratories, and others who were with
the laboratories and were in former administrations, all those people
who testified underscored the importance of these safeguards. In other
words, they didn't want the treaty without these safeguards.
During the testimony before the Armed Services Committee, Dr. Paul
Robinson, Director of Sandia Laboratory, testified:

The President's six safeguards should be formalized in the
resolution of ratification.

General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated:

The Joint Chiefs support ratification of CTBT with the
safeguards package.

Of the six conditions, the first, the third, and the last are
interrelated and probably the most important. The first condition
relates to the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Anyone who has listened
to this debate now understands what that is. The Stockpile Stewardship
Program will be essential to ensuring the safety and reliability of our
nuclear weapons in the future. It requires this condition: That the
United States shall conduct a science-based Stockpile Stewardship
Program to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and the
reliability of nuclear weapons in our active stockpile.
As we have all heard over the course of this debate, this Stockpile
Stewardship Program is a 10-year, $45 billion, or $4.5 billion-a-year,
project that is designed to maintain the nuclear stockpile, and it will
involve cutting-edge science, as it already has. It is already
underway, and the Directors of the three National Laboratories have
testified they believe they can maintain the stockpile of our nuclear
weapons if the funding is provided.

Already there have been difficulties, particularly in the other body,
in securing this level of funding. This first condition our amendment
contains will assure that the funding will be there. The third
condition which is in the amendment before the Senate requires that the
United States ``maintain the basic capability to resume nuclear test
activities prohibited by the treaty in the event that the United States
ceases to be obliged to adhere to the committee.'' That means countries
have to have a place to test the weapons underground.
We could let our underground test facilities go to seed and not
maintain them, so that when the time came that we ever did have to pull
out of this treaty, we would not be prepared to be able to resume
testing. So we say as a further safeguard against the remote
possibility that we will not be able to, through the Stockpile
Stewardship Program, guarantee the reliability and safety of our
weapons, a condition of the United States staying in this treaty is
that the Congress appropriate the money and the President and future
Presidents use the money to maintain the facilities necessary to be
able to resume this testing if that event occurs.
The effort to maintain this capacity is also well underway, I might
add. It is also tied to the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Subcritical
experiments--and we use certain phrases so much around here, sometimes
it is easy to forget that most Members don't have nuclear weapons as
their primary responsibility, and people listening on C-SPAN or the
press aren't--although many are--required to spend time to know what
certain phrases mean. A subcritical experiment means a country can set
off an explosion that doesn't start a chain reaction. It only becomes
critical when there is a chain reaction, which makes it a nuclear
explosion. Subcritical means before the rods go banging

[[Page S12362]]

into the plutonium and something is started. That is a chain reaction.
The subcritical experiments at the Nevada Test Site, which are a
vital part of our stockpile stewardship, also enable test site
personnel to keep and hone their skills and practice the procedures for
actual nuclear weapons tests. Translated, that means we have
specialized scientists who in the past have participated in the over
1,000 nuclear detonations we have used over the history of our program,
and that without having detonated a nuclear explosion since 1992, these
skilled scientists still keep their skills honed by going into this
test site facility and doing subcritical tests; for example, using
uranium instead of plutonium or performing other tests that don't
require a nuclear explosion.
We are not only maintaining the capability of being able to do a
nuclear explosion; we are maintaining the necessary personnel. The fact
that subcritical experiments are scientifically valid and challenging
also serves to make work at the test site worthwhile and attractive to
skilled personnel.
The reason I bother to mention that, in an argument against the
treaty by one of the scientists who testified, I think before Senator
Helms' and my committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, he said: We
really like to make things go boom. He said: I'm a scientist; I like to
make them go to the end of the experiment. I like to conduct them that
way. But I can do it without making them go boom.

What people worry about now, if you are not going to ``make 'em go
boom,'' if you are not going to explode them, some will say scientists
won't want to be involved in that; it is not as exciting as if they
could actually test. That is an argument that says we will lose a whole
generation of nuclear scientists who know how to conduct these tests
and know how to read them.
Other scientists come along and, with the laboratories, say: No, no,
no; we can keep all the interest we need to keep in a group of young
scientists who will replace the aging scientific community who have
been performing the tests because we will do what we call subcritical
tests at the sites where we used to do the critical tests.
Part of the agreement, part of the understanding, the requirement, is
these facilities have to be maintained as opposed to saying we have a
treaty now, we will not do nuclear explosions, so why spend the money
on maintaining these facilities?
The answer is: To keep scientists interested and to bring a whole new
next generation of brain power into this area so they will have
something they believe is worthwhile to do, as opposed to them going
out and inventing new widgets, or deciding they are going to develop a
commercial product or something. That is one of the legitimate
concerns.
The second concern has been: Once you pass this treaty, you know what
you are going to do; you are going to stop funding the hundreds of
millions of dollars it takes over time to maintain this place to be
able to explode a nuclear weapon if we need to.
We said: Do not worry about that; we are going to pass a treaty, and
we commit to spend money to continue to do it. If we do not, it is a
condition not met and the President can leave the treaty. That is the
third condition.
The sixth condition is a failsafe mechanism, available to future
Presidents in case the critics of the stockpile program turn out to be
right. Again, I might point out the critics of the stockpile program,
including my good friend, and he is my good friend, are the very ones
who have great faith in the Star Wars notion, great faith in the
ability to put this nuclear umbrella over the United States so not a
single nuclear weapon could penetrate and blow up and kill 5, 10, 20
million Americans. They have faith in that scientific capability,
whether it is laser-based space weapons or whether it is land-based
systems. But they do not have faith in the ability to be able to test a
weapon that has not been exploded.
I understand that. It is a bit of a non sequitur for me to suggest
you can have faith in one and not the other. I point out, as a
nonscientist, as a plain old lawyer, it seems to me it takes a lot more
to guarantee if somebody flies 2, 10, 20, 50, 100 nuclear weapons at
the United States, you will be able to pick them all out of the sky
before they blow up and America will be held harmless, than it would be
to determine the reliability of this bomb you take out of a missile,
sit on a table at a test site, and test whether or not it still works
or not without exploding it. One seems more complicated than the other
to me. But maybe not. At any rate, after spending $45 billion and all
this scientific know-how, we have to continue to be able to guarantee
the reliability of our weapons. We have a sixth condition.

Article IX of the treaty, I remind everyone, contains a standard
withdrawal clause. I am talking not about the condition; I am talking
about the treaty itself now. Article IX has a standard withdrawal
clause, permitting any party who signs the treaty the right to withdraw
6 months after giving notice; that is, start testing.
We could ratify this tomorrow. We still have to wait for another 23
nations to ratify it, but we could reach the critical mass--no pun
intended--where enough nations sign and the treaty is in effect, and 6
months after that the President of the United States says: I no longer
think this is in the national interest of the United States of America.
I am notifying you within 6 months we are going to start testing
nuclear weapons and withdraw. That is what this article IX does.
But what we do is, if the President--and this is a quote:

. . . decides that extraordinary events related to the
subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme
interests[,]

--he can withdraw from the treaty.
Every year pursuant to the safeguard--I am back on the safeguards
now--every year, we are saying, if this amendment is adopted, pursuant
to safeguard 6, the National Laboratories' Directors at Las Alamos,
Sandia and Lawrence Livermore, all three of them have to go to the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy and certify that the
Stockpile Stewardship Program is still working and they, the scientists
at our three National Laboratories say: We certify the reliability and
safety of our nuclear weapons.
The President, then, certifies to the Congress that there is a high
degree of confidence in a safe and reliable stockpile.
If any one of those National Laboratory Directors--and there is a
redundancy in what they check. By the way, do you know how it works
now? The way it works now, we have nine deployed systems, nine
different types of hydrogen bombs located in the bellies of airplanes,
on cruise missiles, in the bellies of submarines, on longer range
missiles, or in a silo somewhere in the United States of America. Every
year these National Laboratory Directors go out and get 11 of these
warheads from each of those nine deployed systems. They take them back
to the laboratories and they dissect them, they open them up, they look
at them--to overstate it--to see if there is any little corrosion there
in the firing pin, that sort of thing. It is much more complicated, but
they check it out.
They take one of them and they dissect it, similar to what a medical
student does with a cadaver. They bring in 11 people, 10 of whom they
give a thorough physical, the 11th they kill, cut up, and see if
everything is working when they look inside. They do that now, and
there is redundancy in the system. The three laboratories do that.

Then they have to go to the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of
Defense and say: We can certify that our arsenal out there is reliable
and safe.
But, if, under our condition 6, any one of those lab Directors says,
``No, I don't think I can certify this year, I don't think I can do
that,'' then the Secretary of Energy has to be told that, and the
Secretary of Energy, who is their immediate boss, has to then tell the
President: No, no, we can't certify, Mr. President. And under No. 6,
safeguard No. 6, the President shall consult with us and must withdraw
from the treaty.
Let me read the exact language. It says this under E, page 5 of the
amendment, ``Withdrawal from the treaty.'' ``If the President
determines,'' and I just explained how he determines--if it is sent to
him by the lab Directors and the Secretaries of Energy and Defense who
say we can't certify:

. . . if the President determines that nuclear testing is
necessary to assure with a high degree of confidence the
safety and reliability of the United States nuclear weapons

[[Page S12363]]

stockpile, the President shall consult promptly with the
Senate and withdraw from the treaty pursuant to article IX.

He doesn't have a choice. He has to withdraw. That is the ultimate
safeguard.
So for those over there who say if it turns out this Stockpile
Stewardship Program doesn't work, they have to assume one of two things
if that conclusion is reached. They have to assume the lab Directors
are going to lie and they are going to lie to the Secretary of Energy.
They are going to say: We can't verify this, we can't certify it, but
we are going to do it anyway. They then have to assume the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of Energy will say: Although we know we can't
certify, we are going to lie to the President, and we are going to tell
the President our nuclear stockpile is no longer reliable, but don't
say anything, Mr. President.
And they have to assume, then, that the President, knowing that this
stockpile is no longer reliable, would look at the U.S. Congress and
say: I, President Whomever, next President, certify that we can rely on
our stockpile.
They either have to assume that or they have to assume their concern
about our stockpile is not a problem because the moment the President
is told that, he has to call us and tell us and withdraw from the
treaty, which means he can begin nuclear testing.
Remember condition 3. We said you have to keep those big old places
where they do the nuclear tests up to date. So he can begin to test.
So what is the big deal? What are we worried about, unless you assume
future Presidents are going to lie to the American people, they are
going to lie, they are going to say we can rely on this when we cannot?
At the end of the process, if the President determines resumption of
testing is necessary, then he has to start testing. That is what
section 6 says. So we put the world on notice that we have a program in
place to maintain a reliable stockpile.
If that does not work and we need to test, we put the world on notice
as well today that we will and are prepared, politically and in
practical terms, to withdraw from this treaty. I should emphasize that
the certification process, as I have said, is extremely rigorous: For 3
years running, the lab Directors have certified to the safety and
reliability of our stockpile, but only after detailed review by
thousands of people at our labs.
The other three conditions involve the need to maintain several key
elements of our national infrastructure. They require us to maintain
modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and
exploratory nuclear technology and infrastructure of equipment and
personnel, if you will--that is required--the continuation of a robust
research and development program for monitoring, and, finally, our
amendment requires the development of a broad range of intelligence
gathering and analytical capabilities and operations to ensure accurate
information about nuclear programs around the world.
These six conditions should have been part of the treaty anyway, but
they would not let us add them. We are going to add them now, with the
grace of God and goodwill of our neighbors and 51 votes. These six
conditions are essential to ratification of the treaty. If you do not
want this treaty to work, then you will vote against this amendment.
I acknowledge if these safeguards are not there, nobody wants the
treaty. The President does not want the treaty. The lab Directors do
not want the treaty. No one wants the treaty. There may be others that
would be useful to add or even necessary for ratification of the
treaty, but the leadership has said we can only have one amendment.
They will recall that my own resolution, which led to this process,
proposed only hearings and final adoption by March 31 of next year. I
want to put that in focus. I see others want to speak, so I will yield,
but I want to make it clear it has been said time and again on the
floor by the leader himself--and I am sure he unintentionally
misspoke--he said he received a letter from 45 Democratic Senators
saying they wanted a vote.
Mr. HELMS. I don't want the Senator to yield at an improper time----
Mr. BIDEN. I will finish this one point, and I will be delighted to
yield the floor.
Mr. HELMS. I have been following the amendment.
Mr. BIDEN. I know the Senator has, and I appreciate that. I
appreciate the respect he has shown for the efforts I have been making,
notwithstanding we disagree on this considerably.
I want to make this closing point at this moment, and that is, it has
been said by the Republican leader, Senator Lott, that 45 Senators
demanded a vote on this treaty now. But 45 Senators signed a letter,
including me. It was a Biden resolution--one that was about to be voted
on when we were on another piece of legislation--that we have extensive
hearings this year and that final action not occur until the end of
March of next year, so everybody could have a chance to go through all
of these hearings, so everybody could have a chance to debate what we
are talking about at much greater length than today.
There has not been the bipartisan negotiation on conditions to this
Resolution of Ratification that usually occurs during consideration of
treaties.
Mr. President, I see my friend from North Carolina is seeking
recognition. I will be delighted to yield the floor to him.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. If the Senator will yield.
Mr. BIDEN. I will be delighted to.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I compliment the Senator on the explanation
of his amendment. I have been following him as he has been going along.
We are far from being opposed to the amendment. We do not have any
problem with the safeguards.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment No.
2291 be agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object--and I
obviously do not want to object to my own amendment--we do have a time
problem. I would be delighted to do that if the Senator would allow the
remainder of the time on this amendment to be used on the Resolution of
Ratification, so we do not use up--I have a number of Senators who wish
to speak. That means I will only have 20 minutes left to debate this
entire issue. I will be delighted to have it accepted. I probably have
about an hour or 20 minutes or 30 minutes or 40 minutes left on the
amendment; is that correct?
Parliamentary inquiry: How much time is left on the amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ninety-one minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous-consent that the Senator's
unanimous consent request be agreed to, with the condition that the
remaining 91 minutes and the 2 hours remaining on the side of the
Republican leadership be added to the time remaining on the Resolution
of Ratification.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I have no objection to that.
Mr. BIDEN. I have no objection to the unanimous consent request. I
thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there an objection to the request of the
Senator from North Carolina with the proposed modification?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 2291) was agreed to.
Mr. SARBANES addressed the Chair.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we have been going back and forth. Senator
Sarbanes is seeking recognition, but I see our friend Senator Brownback
is here. It is his turn if he wishes to speak.
Mr. BROWNBACK. I am willing to yield to Senator Sarbanes if he wishes
to speak.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
Mr. BIDEN. How much time does the Senator need?
Mr. SARBANES. Ten or 12 minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Maryland.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Inhofe). The Senator from Maryland.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. The amendment was
adopted; is that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. SARBANES. I thank the Chair.
Mr. BIDEN. There was a motion to reconsider made as part of the
unanimous consent agreement and the motion to table.

[[Page S12364]]

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
The Senator from Maryland.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the CTBT, to which the Senate has been asked
to give its advice and consent. This is a landmark agreement that will
help stem the tide of nuclear proliferation and reduce the risk of
nuclear confrontation. In my view, it is a treaty that, on balance,
will serve U.S. interests and strengthen U.S. security.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a product of nearly 40 years of
labor. The idea was first endorsed in 1958 by President Eisenhower, who
recognized that the most effective way of controlling the development
and spread of nuclear weapons was to ban their testing.
In 1963, the United States took the first step toward this end by
signing and ratifying the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits
nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.
Further limitations were established through the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty, signed in 1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty,
signed in 1976. Under those treaties, the United States and the Soviet
Union agreed to halt underground explosions larger than 150 kilotons.
When the cold war came to an end, sentiment began to build for a
comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. President Bush signed legislation
establishing a moratorium on such testing that was joined by France and
Russia and continues to this day.
In January 1994, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament began
negotiations on a treaty to forbid all nuclear explosions. An agreement
was concluded in August of 1996, and the following month, President
Clinton became the first world leader to sign the new treaty. It was
submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification just
over 2 years ago, on September 24, 1997.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is relatively simple and
straightforward.
First, it prohibits all explosions of nuclear devices. It does not
ban the development or production of nuclear materials, nor does it
affect activities to maintain a secure and reliable stockpile. By
establishing a zero threshold on nuclear yield that affects all
countries equally, the treaty draws a clear and consistent line between
what is permitted and what is not.
Second, the treaty sets up a regime of verification and inspections,
consultation and clarification, and confidence-building measures. An
International Monitoring System of 321 monitoring facilities is to be
established, and all data will be stored, analyzed, and disseminated by
an International Data Center. In addition, information that the United
States obtains through its own intelligence can be used as the basis
for a short-notice, on-site inspection request.
Let me emphasize that. Information that the United States obtains
through its own intelligence can be used as the basis for a short-
notice, on-site inspection request.
Third, the treaty creates an organization to ensure proper
implementation and compliance, and to provide a forum for consultation
and cooperation among States Parties. The new body will have a
Technical Secretariat responsible for day-to-day management and
supervision of the monitoring and data-collection operations, as well
as a 51-Member Executive Council, on which the United States would have
a seat. Both the Technical Secretariat and the Executive Council are to
be overseen by a Conference of States Parties, which will meet at least
annually.
Finally, the treaty provides for measures to redress a situation and
ensure compliance, including sanctions, and for settlement of disputes.
Violations may result in restriction or suspension of rights and
privileges under the treaty, as well as the recommendation of
collective measures against the offending party and the referral of
information and conclusions to the United Nations.
As Stephen Ledogar, who was the Chief Negotiator of the treaty for
the U.S., testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, the United
States objected to the inclusion of specific sanctions because of
concerns about appointing an international organization ``to be not
just the investigator and special prosecutor, but also the judge, jury,
and jailer.'' He explained, ``we reserve for a higher body, the United
Nations Security Council in which we have a veto, the authority to levy
sanctions or other measures.''
The CTBT, which has been signed by some 154 countries and ratified by
48, has drawn broad support not only from among the American
population, but from key U.S. military and intelligence officials and
from our key allies.
It has been endorsed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Gen. Hugh Shelton, as well as former Chairmen Gen. John Shalikashvili,
Gen. Colin Powell, Gen. David Jones, and Adm. William Crowe, and the
directors of all three national laboratories that conduct nuclear
weapons research and testing.
NATO's Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group called
for ratification and entry into force ``as soon as possible.'' Thirty-
two Nobel laureates in physics have written to the Senate stating that
``it is imperative that the CTBT be ratified,'' and noting that ``fully
informed technical studies have concluded that continued nuclear
testing is not required to retain confidence in the safety, reliability
and performance of nuclear weapons in the United States' stockpile,
provided science and technology programs necessary for stockpile
stewardship are maintained.''
Despite the importance of the CTBT for U.S. national security, formal
consideration of the treaty has not taken place over the last 2 years.
Now we are suddenly called upon to register a judgment without the
benefit of proper hearings and committee debate. While I have come to
the conclusion that the merits of this treaty outweigh its risks, and
that it is therefore deserving of Senate advice and consent to
ratification, I do regret that an issue of such significance should be
taken up without the normal course of hearings and proceedings leading
up to the consideration of a measure of this magnitude.
Let me outline a few of the reasons why I support this treaty. First,
it will help reduce threats to U.S. national security. A complete ban
on testing makes it harder for countries already possessing nuclear
weapons to develop and deploy more sophisticated new designs, and for
those seeking nuclear capability to initiate a nuclear weapons program.
As we know, relatively simple bombs can be built without testing, but
creating smaller, lighter weapons that are easier to transport and
conceal and that require less nuclear material is difficult without
explosive tests.
With a global ban in place, a nation intent on conducting tests would
take on the burdens not only of increased expenses and technical
dangers, but also the risk of detection and imposition of international
sanctions. In a very real sense, the CTBT locks in U.S. nuclear
superiority while preventing reignition of arms races that constitute
serious threats to our national security.
The CTBT also promotes U.S. security by strengthening the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, which entered into force in 1970 and
was extended indefinitely in 1995. The NPT is the bedrock of
international arms control policy, representing a bargain in which non-
nuclear weapons states promised to foreswear the acquisition of nuclear
weapons and accede to a permanent inspection regime so long as the
nuclear powers agreed to reduce their arsenals. In order to gain
approval for permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the five declared nuclear powers promised to negotiate and
ratify a test ban treaty.
The CTBT further advances U.S. interests by providing additional
tools to enhance our current monitoring and detection capability. The
International Monitoring System will record data from 321 sensor
stations--262 beyond what the United States possesses today.
The new facilities include 31 primary and 116 auxiliary seismic
monitoring stations, 57 radionuclide stations to pick up traces of
radioactivity, 8 hydroacoustic stations to detect explosions on or in
the oceans, and 50 infrasound stations to detect sound pressure waves
in the atmosphere. Thirty-one of the new or upgraded monitoring
stations are in Russia, 11 in China, and 17 in the Middle East, all

[[Page S12365]]

areas of critical importance to the United States.
And one of the burden-sharing advantages of the treaty is that the
United States will have access to 100 percent of the information
generated by these 321 sensor stations but will pay only 25 percent of
the bill for obtaining it.
Since the United States has not conducted a nuclear explosion in 7
years, and is unlikely to test with or without this treaty, the major
effect of the CTBT is to hold other countries to a similar standard. It
includes surveillance to identify warhead problems, assessment to
determine effects on performance, replacement of defective parts, and
certification of remanufactured warheads. Our policy is to ensure
tritium availability and retain the ability to conduct nuclear tests in
the future, should withdrawal from the test ban regime be required.

Thus, under the treaty, the United States will be able to depend on
its nuclear deterrent capability, while other nations will find it much
more difficult to build weapons with the degree of confidence that
would be needed to constitute an offensive military threat. Any country
that should test would find itself the subject of international
response; whereas in the absence of a treaty, such behavior carries no
penalty.
It has been suggested that the United States should wait until more
of the nuclear capable countries--whose ratification is essential for
the treaty to go into effect--have ratified before moving forward on
the treaty ourselves. Yet what incentive have the countries with only
peaceful nuclear reactors to proceed, when the one country with the
greatest number of deployed strategic warheads is unwilling to do so?
Just as with the Chemical Weapons Convention, where U.S. approval
facilitated ratification by Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran, U.S.
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will create increased
momentum and pressure for others to come along. The treaty cannot enter
into force without us, but it needs our support to convince others to
join.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I yield myself 4 additional minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SARBANES. Indeed, all of our major allies have weighed in with
their strong support for this treaty, which is particularly significant
since they rely on our nuclear deterrent for their own defense.
An article in the Washington Post on October 8 reported that:

The world's major powers, including America's closest
allies, warned the United States today that failure to ratify
the multinational nuclear test ban treaty would send a
dangerous signal that could encourage other countries to
spurn arms control commitments.

German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was quoted as saying:

What is at stake is not just the pros and cons of the test
ban treaty, but the future of multilateral arms control.

I ask unanimous consent the full text of that article be printed in
the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibit 1.)
Mr. SARBANES. Perhaps as compelling as the case in favor of the
treaty are the potential consequences of a negative vote. Senate
rejection of the treaty could severely weaken the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, for which a review conference is scheduled next
April.
It is entirely possible, as the Washington Post reported, that ``some
nonnuclear countries might regard failure to ratify the treaty as a
broken promise that would relieve them of the obligation to comply with
key parts'' of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such a result
would not only undercut U.S. leadership and credibility on
nonproliferation, threatening our policy objectives in Iraq and North
Korea, among other places, but could increase the likelihood of resumed
testing and aggravate the situation in South Asia.
Resumed testing would not only threaten regional security and U.S.
strategic interests but could pose new challenges to public health and
the natural environment. According to the Energy Department, more than
one out of seven underground U.S. nuclear tests since 1963 vented
radioactive gases into the atmosphere, and the problem will obviously
be much worse in countries that do not take or cannot afford the same
level of environmental protections.

Some have objected that the treaty will be difficult to verify, that
it will prevent the United States from maintaining a safe and reliable
nuclear arsenal. While no treaty is completely verifiable, I believe
the CTBT will increase, rather than decrease, our ability to monitor
the development of nuclear weapons and preserve, not forfeit, our
nuclear superiority.
In his statement before the Armed Services Committee on October 6,
Secretary of Defense William Cohen addressed this point at length. I
will quote the Secretary because I think his observations are extremely
important.

CTBT evasion is not easy; it would require significant
efforts in terms of expertise, preparations and resources. In
the end, the testing party has no guarantees that its
preparation or its nuclear test will escape detection and
possible on-site inspection, despite its best efforts. In
addition, detection capability varies according to the
location of the clandestine test and the evasion measures
employed; a potential evader may not understand the full U.S.
monitoring capability, thus adding to his uncertainty.
Further, detection of a nuclear explosion conducted in
violation of the CTBT, would be a very serious matter with
significant political consequences. . . . Under CTBT, I
believe the U.S. will have available sufficient resources to
deter or detect, with confidence, the level of clandestine
nuclear testing that could undermine the U.S. nuclear
deterrent and take timely and effective counteraction to
redress the effects of any such testing.

I yield myself 2 additional minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SARBANES. Moreover, to the extent Members are concerned with the
adequacy of procedures for onsite inspections, I would remind them
that, as with the Chemical Weapons Convention, these procedures were
crafted with an eye not only to gaining access to other countries'
facilities, but also to guarding against overly intrusive inspections
within the United States. The lead U.S. treaty negotiator, Stephen
Ledogar, explained to the committee how those procedures were
developed:

This Treaty provides for on-site inspections on request by
any Treaty party and with the approval of the Executive
Council. No state can refuse an inspection. The U.S. position
from the start was that on-site inspections were critical to
provide us with added confidence that we could detect
violations. And, if inspections were to be effective, they
had to be conducted absolutely as quickly as possible after a
suspicion arose, using a range of techniques with as few
restrictions as possible. However, the U.S. also had to be
concerned with its defensive posture, as well as an offensive
one. It was necessary to ensure that sensitive national
security information would be protected in the event of an
inspection on U.S. territory. The U.S. crafted a complicated,
highly detailed, proposal that balanced our offensive and
defensive needs. There was resistance from some of our
negotiating partners. However, by the time we were through,
the Treaty read pretty much like the original U.S. paper put
together jointly by the Departments of Defense, Energy, and
State, the Intelligence Community, and the then-existing Arms
Control Agency.

With regard to the security of our nuclear arsenal, the President has
proposed six safeguards which will define the conditions under which
the United States enters into the CTBT, and which, as I understand it,
have been incorporated into the Resolution of Ratification. I ask the
ranking member, these have now been adopted; is that correct?
Mr. BIDEN. That is correct, with some modifications making them even
stronger.
Mr. SARBANES. And those dealt with the conduct of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program, the maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory
facilities, the maintenance of a basic capability to resume testing,
should it become necessary, the continuation of a comprehensive
research and development program to improve our monitoring
capabilities, the continued development of a broad range of
intelligence gathering, and the ability to withdraw from the CTBT if
the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type critical to our
nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified.
I believe these safeguards will ensure that U.S. national security
interests can be met within the context of the treaty.
Mr. President, I support ratification, but there do not appear to be
enough

[[Page S12366]]

votes to approve it. The President, in his letter requesting that
action be delayed, stated that

. . . proceeding to a vote under these circumstances would
severely harm the national security of the United States,
damage our relationship with our allies, and undermine our
historic leadership over 40 years, through administrations
Republican and Democratic, in reducing the nuclear threat.

I agree with the President's assessment. Therefore, I urge my
colleagues to join in voting to postpone consideration of the treaty
while we undertake to build the necessary understanding and political
support that will lead to its ultimate ratification.
If we cannot approve the treaty, ratify it, then surely we should
delay its consideration, postpone its consideration while we continue
to explore the matter further, rather than, in my judgment, doing the
grave harm that would come to the national security, as the President
has outlined.
I ask unanimous consent that two editorials from the New York Times
in support of the treaty be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Oct. 12, 1999]

Fighting for the Test Ban Treaty

Despite the important contribution it would make to a safer
world, the nuclear Test Ban Treaty stands virtually no chance
of mustering enough support to win Senate ratification this
week. Allowing it to be voted down would deal a damaging blow
to America's foreign policy and military security. The wiser
course is to delay Senate action for at least a few months,
as President Clinton requested yesterday, giving the White
House more time to overcome the arguments of treaty critics.
But Republican senators are recklessly insisting on an
immediate vote unless Mr. Clinton agrees to withdraw the
treaty for the rest of his term. That is something he should
avoid, because it would signal to the rest of the world that
the White House, not just the Senate, is edging away from the
Test Ban Treaty.
Mr. Clinton refuses to be bound by such conditions.
Nevertheless some Senate treaty supporters, including Daniel
Patrick Moynihan of New York, are trying to put together a
deal under which Mr. Clinton would not give up on the treaty,
while Senate Democrats would refrain from pushing it in this
Congress. The White House suggests it could accept such an
arrangement.
The message that Washington sends to the world matters a
lot. One audience consists of countries like India and
Pakistan, which are still trying to decide whether to sign
the treaty and would be unlikely to do so if the Clinton
White House gave up on eventual Senate ratification. For
these countries to remain outside the test ban would
encourage a dangerous nuclear arms race in south Asia that
could easily draw in nearby countries like Iran and China. It
could also fuel the ambitions of other intermediate powers,
like Saudi Arabia and Taiwan, to join an expanding nuclear
club.
Another group of countries includes established nuclear
nations such as China and Russia. Like Washington, Beijing
and Moscow have signed the treaty but not yet ratified it,
and are observing a voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests.
As long as Mr. Clinton continues to campaign for the Test
Ban Treaty and there remains a reasonable chance that
Washington will someday ratify it, these countries are likely
to refrain from further testing. But if hopes for eventual
American ratification recede, China or Russia might be
tempted to test again in an effort to improve their bomb
designs and narrow America's present lead in nuclear weapons
technology.
These considerations argue strongly for delaying the vote
rather than giving up on it for this Congress. The treaty is
backed by America's military leaders, public opinion and
Washington's main allies. Good answers are available to the
objections so far raised by Senate critics. True, the
election-year political calculus is not favorable, and
ultimately it may be necessary to wait until a new President
and a new Senate take office early in 2001. But American
interests are best protected if in the interim Washington
does not disavow the treaty.
____

[From the New York Times, Oct. 8, 1999]

Keeping the Test Ban Treaty Alive

If the nuclear Test Ban Treaty fails to win ratification
next week, as it probably will, Senate Republicans will
deserve much of the blame. The Republican leadership has
behaved in a narrowly partisan fashion that paid little heed
to America's international interests and trivialized the
Senate's constitutional role in evaluating treaties. But the
White House failed to put together a coherent strategy for
assembling the needed two-thirds Senate majority, and then
allowed itself to be outmaneuvered into a compressed
timetable that left too little time for an intensive lobbying
campaign.
The resulting failure will weaken American security. India
and Pakistan will be more likely to develop their nuclear
arsenals and China will be increasingly tempted to resume
testing to exploit new weapons designs, some of which may
have been stolen from the United States. The goal now should
be to try to limit the damage by keeping open the possibility
that the Senate can be persuaded to ratify the treaty in the
months to come.
To that end, the White House must reject the terms the
Republicans now offer for canceling next week's vote. These
include the outrageous requirement that President Clinton not
seek ratification during his remaining 15 months in office.
That would make things worse than they already are, leaving
other countries wondering whether Mr. Clinton has abandoned
the treaty he signed three years ago. Unless the Republicans
agree to a postponement without this timetable, the White
House should let the Senate proceed toward a vote next week--
trying, between now and then, to win as many extra Republican
votes as possible. If that effort falls short, Mr. Clinton
should concentrate his Presidential energies on building
enough support to justify a new ratification effort as soon
as possible.
Republican senators have raised several arguments against
the treaty, most of which evaporate on close inspection. Some
doubt whether American intelligence agencies can detect very-
low-yield nuclear tests. Others worry that America's nuclear
stockpile might deteriorate without testing. Some mistakenly
believe that missile defenses will make arms control treaties
unnecessary.
The Administration has answered these objections
convincingly. Approving the treaty would speed creation of a
stronger worldwide monitoring system. Despite doubts
expressed yesterday by the heads of America's nuclear labs,
Washington's stockpile stewardship program, based on computer
simulations, can keep existing weapons reliable and nurture
the scientific skills that could create new ones if the
treaty ever broke down. Missile defense can at best
supplement arms control, not replace it.
There is every reason for Republicans of conscience to vote
for this treaty, but little chance that they will. Mr.
Clinton's challenge now will be to sway enough Senate votes
to make ratification possible before he leaves the White
House.

Exhibit 1

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 8, 1999]

U.S. Allies Urge Senate To Ratify Test Ban

(By William Drozdlak)

VIENNA, Oct. 7--The world's major powers, including
America's closest allies, warned the United States today that
failure to ratify the multinational nuclear test ban treaty
would send a dangerous signal that could encourage other
countries to spurn arms control commitments.
With the Senate scheduled to begin debating the treaty
Friday, envoys from nearly 100 nations at a conference here,
including Russia, China, Britain and Germany, expressed alarm
that the United States appears to be on the brink of
rejecting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The pact, which
President Clinton signed in 1996, would prohibit nuclear test
explosions world-wide.
Diplomats said British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French
President Jacques Chirac will soon make rare personal appeals
to the United States to approve the accord, prior to a
possible Senate vote next week.
In Washington, it was unclear if a compromise would be
reached to postpone a vote on the treaty. Both sides agree
that the pact will be defeated if it comes to a vote on
Tuesday or Wednesday as scheduled. In the latest blow to the
accord's prospects, Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), an
influential arms control advocate, declared his opposition.
Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) was sticking to his
position late today that a vote can be delayed only if the
Clinton administration promises not to try to revive the
treaty before the president leaves office. The White House
has rejected that proposal, and Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-
Del.), the ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations
Committee, said he is ``not hopeful'' that the vote could be
postponed.
Here in Vienna, diplomats said that Blair and Chirac will
urge American treaty opponents to forgo partisan politics and
weigh the damaging impact a negative vote would have on U.S.
leadership in the effort to halt the spread of weapons of
mass destruction.
There was particular concern here that some non-nuclear
countries would regard failure to ratify the treaty as a
broken promise that would relieve them of the obligation to
comply with key parts of another accord, the Nuclear Non-
proliferation treaty. That pact is considered the linchpin of
international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.
International anxiety also has been compounded by new
worries over U.S. efforts to escape constraints imposed by
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limits the
ability of the United States to build systems to defend
against missile attack.
Russia and China say it would destabilize the strategic
balance if the United States built a missile defense system,
because Washington could be tempted to attack others if it
felt invulnerable to retaliation. That could trigger a new
arms race as other nations sought ways to overwhelm missile
defenses.
Many nations are surprised by the Senate's hesitation to
approve the test ban treaty, in part because the accord is
widely regarded

[[Page S12367]]

abroad as locking in American nuclear superiority. Until
recently, the treaty had gained strong momentum as the
ratification process moved ahead and a world-wide sensor
system was deployed to detect even the tiniest indication of
a nuclear explosion.
More than half of the 44 nations with nuclear facilities
whose ratification is necessary for the treaty to take effect
have already done so. U.S. approval is deemed critical to
persuade other nations, including Russia and China, to
ratify. Even more important, India and Pakistan, who pledged
to sign the test ban treaty under enormous international
pressure, are said to be awaiting Senate action before making
their final decision.
``It would be a highly dangerous step for the Senate to
reject this treaty,'' said Peter Hain, Britain's minister of
state for foreign affairs. ``If the test ban treaty starts to
unravel, all sorts of undesirable things could happen. It
would send the worst possible signal to the rest of the world
by giving a green light to many countries to walk away from
promises not to develop nuclear arsenals.'' Hain and other
delegates here spoke at a long-planned conference organized
to discuss how to put the test ban treaty into effect.
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said the rest of
the world would be watching the Senate test ban vote closely
because of its possible effect in eroding support for the
non-proliferation treaty. ``What is at stake is not just the
pros and cons of the test ban treaty, but the future of
multilateral arms control,'' Fischer said.
Diplomats fear that a failure to put the test ban treaty
into effect soon would discourage some ``threshold''
countries--those close to developing nuclear weapons--from
cooperating with intrusive inspections under the non-
proliferation treaty. Such inspections are designed to
prevent them from cheating and secretly developing nuclear
weapons.
Jayantha Dhanapala, the U.N. undersecretary for disarmament
affairs, said many countries agreed to a permanent inspection
regime four years ago only on the basis of a written
guarantee by the nuclear powers to negotiate and ratify a
worldwide test ban as one of several key steps toward nuclear
disarmament.
In a grand diplomatic bargain struck in 1995, the
inspection program was made permanent for some 175 nations
that have promised to forswear nuclear weapons. In exchange,
the powers--the United States, France, Britain, Russia and
China--pledged to reduce nuclear arsenals and approve a
treaty that would ban test explosions that help upgrade their
weapons.
``If the Senate rejects ratification, it would send a very
negative signal that will act as a brake on the momentum we
have achieved to control the nuclear threat, because some
countries would see this vote as a betrayal of a promise,''
Dhanapala said.
The head of the U.S. delegation, Ambassador John B. Ritch
III, said a main theme of the Vienna conference has been
international alarm over isolationist thinking that has
spurred Senate opposition to the treaty. He said foreign
delegates found it difficult to understand how the Senate
could consider backtracking from a ban on nuclear explosions
even though polls show as much as 80 percent of the American
public support the treaty.
China's representative here said that U.S. failure to
ratify the test ban treaty would be ``a very negative
development'' and joined others in expressing concern that
the United States is shunning its obligations on global arms
control.
``I don't like to talk about any country exercising world
leadership, but in this case we see that the United States
must play a special role,'' Sha Zukang, China's top arms
control official, said in an interview. Sha added that China
is even more alarmed by U.S. efforts to develop a regional
missile defense system than by the Senate's reluctance to
approve the test ban treaty.
Boris Kvok, Russia's deputy chief of disarmament issues,
said the U.S. decision on the test ban treaty would not
affect the deliberations of Russia's parliament on the pact
or alter his country's test moratorium. ``But if the U.S.
moves ahead with ballistic missile defense, it would be a
disaster for strategic stability in Europe and the world. And
we would have to start developing new weapons to correct this
imbalance,'' Kvok said.

Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. BROWNBACK addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas is recognized.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I yield myself up to 10 minutes to
speak on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Mr. President, there have been a number of arguments put forward
against and for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We have heard, most
recently, arguments for ratification of the treaty. I join my colleague
from Maryland in noting that I think there would be a wide basis of
support saying we should not bring it up at this time. But neither
should we bring it up next year. I know a number of my colleagues on
this side of the aisle would say it would be a good thing if we could
agree not to go ahead and go forward with a vote now, but not to do
that during this session of Congress, either the rest of this year or
next year, so we won't constantly be going back and visiting this issue
during this Congress. We have it on the floor and it is time to discuss
it. I think people can agree that we won't hear it again this Congress,
and we can move forward with that discussion and have this debate and
not proceed to a vote if people think that would do more harm than
good.
I want to address a number of arguments put forward by the President
and by others on this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I note the
President stated in his weekly radio address that every President since
Eisenhower--a Kansan--has supported this treaty. The reality of this is
actually that no previous administration, either Republican or
Democrat, has ever supported the zero-yield test ban now in this treaty
before the Senate. Eisenhower insisted that nuclear tests with a
seismic magnitude of less than 4.75 be permitted. Kennedy terminated a
3-year moratorium on nuclear tests, declaring that ``never again''
would the United States make such a mistake. He then embarked upon the
most aggressive series of nuclear tests in the history of the weapons
program. Carter, Reagan, and Bush all opposed a zero-yield test ban
while in office. Even the present administration initially opposed a
permanent zero-yield test ban before signing onto the CTBT.
It has been claimed that the CTBT hasn't been given enough Senate
floor time. The unanimous-consent agreement provides for 22 hours of
debate on the CTBT. By contrast, the START treaty had 9.5 hours; START
II had 6 hours; the Chemical Weapons Convention had 18 hours. We are
going to put a lot of time in on this. The White House insisted for 2
years that the Senate vote on the CTBT, using terms such as ``now,''
``immediately,'' ``right away.'' Now when we are ready to vote, they
don't seem to be willing to enter into that debate and vote.
Another thing the President said in his news conference in Canada was
this was being ``politically motivated.'' I reject that, Mr. President.
You do not consider items such as this with any consideration for
political motivation. This is nuclear testing we are talking about.
This is a critical issue to the world--to my four children. That is
something you don't interject any bit of politics into. I reject that
notion altogether.
There are a couple of other arguments bantered about quite a bit--one
that I have taken most note of because it causes me the most pause to
think is what would other countries think if we voted down the treaty?
Would that cause more proliferation? I cannot read the minds of the
leaders in China, Russia, Pakistan, or India, but there are people with
a great deal of wisdom and experience who did hazard a guess in that
area and have put forward thoughtful statements. One was put forward by
former Secretaries of Defense Weinberger, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Laird,
Carlucci, and Schlesinger. All of them signed this quote:

We also do not believe the CTBT will do much to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons.

Now, you have six former Secretaries of Defense saying that.

The motivation of rogue nations like North Korea and Iraq
to acquire nuclear weapons will not be affected by whether
the U.S. tests. Similarly, the possession of nuclear weapons
by nations like India, Pakistan, and Israel depends on the
security environment in their region, not by whether or not
the U.S. tests. If confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent
were to decline, countries that have relied on our protection
could well feel compelled to seek nuclear capabilities of
their own. Thus, ironically, the CTBT might cause additional
nations to seek nuclear weapons.

That was a quote from the six former Defense Secretaries--Weinberger,
Cheney, Rumsfeld, Laird, Carlucci, and Schlesinger.
This is a quote from General Vessey, former Chairman of the Joint
Chief of Staff:

Supporters of the CTBT argue that it reduces the chances
for nuclear proliferation. I applaud efforts to reduce the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, but I do not believe that
the test ban will reduce the ability of rogue states to
acquire nuclear weapons in sufficient quantities to upset
regional security in various parts of the world. ``Gun-type''
nuclear weapons can be built with assurance they'll work
without testing. The Indian and

[[Page S12368]]

Pakistani ``tests'' apparently show that there is adequate
knowledge available to build implosion type weapons with
reasonable assurance that they will work. The India/Pakistan
explosions have been called ``tests,'' but I believe it to be
more accurate to call them ``demonstrations,'' more for
political purposes than for scientific testing.

A letter signed by John Deutch, Henry Kissinger, and Brent Scowcroft
says:

Supporters of the CTBT claim that it will make a major
contribution to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

It is the same argument we hear time and time again, which I wish to
be true because I want this to be a nuclear-free world. They say:

This cannot be true if key countries of proliferation
concern do not agree to accede to the treaty. To date,
several of these countries, including India, Pakistan, North
Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, have not signed and ratified
the treaty. Many of these countries may never join the CTBT
regime, and ratification by the United States, early or late,
is unlikely to have any impact on their decisions in this
regard. For example, no serious person should believe that
rogue nations like Iran or Iraq will give up efforts to
acquire nuclear weapons if only the U.S. signs the CTBT.

If you think about that, they are not going to respond to what we do.
This is a letter from Edward Teller to Senator Helms. He says this in
the letter, dated February 4, 1998:

The point I must make is that, in the long run, knowledge
and ability to produce nuclear weapons will be widely
available. To believe that, in the long run, proliferation
of nuclear weapons is avoidable is wishful thinking and
dangerous. It is the more dangerous because it is a point
of view that the public is eager to accept. Thus,
politicians are tempted to gain popularity by supporting
false hopes.

This is a former Assistant Director, ACDA, Fred Eimer. He says this:

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the proposed treaty will put
our nuclear deterrent at risk without significant arms
control or nonproliferation benefits. Other nations will be
able to conduct militarily significant nuclear tests well
below the verification threshold of the Treaty's monitoring
system, and our own unilateral capability.

I make these statements simply because this is a big issue. It is an
important issue, and a lot of people have thought a great deal about
it. I think it to be an inappropriate time to enter into such a treaty
that would so limit the United States, given all the great concerns and
testing and things going on around the world.
I want to give some final quotes of former Directors of the National
Weapons Laboratories. They also oppose the CTBT.
Roger Batzel, Director Emeritus, sent this letter on October 5:

I urge you to oppose the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. No
previous administration, either Democrat or Republican, ever
supported the unverifiable, zero yield, indefinite duration
CTBT now before the Senate. The reason for this is simple.
Under a long-duration test ban, confidence in the nuclear
stockpile will erode for a variety of reasons. I don't think
it can be put forward any clearer than that. This is a key
part of our deterrence. We simply cannot go ahead and enter
into this treaty at this time at our own great loss and our
own great peril.

I note again for my colleagues on the other side of the aisle that a
number of us are very willing and interested that this not go forward
for a vote. We don't want it to go forward for a vote in this session
of Congress, either this year or next year.
The notion that it would be pulled down now, then somehow come back
next year during the middle of a Presidential election, and be used as
some sort of political tool at that time seems to many of us to be far
more frightening, with what might happen in the political debate, with
the atmosphere and the use of this treaty in its discussions for
political purposes.
That is why we continue to support not voting on this now. Let's also
agree that we will not do it during this session of Congress.
I have used up my allotted period of time. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I know that earlier the Democratic side
proposed an amendment which was accepted by this side. I did want to
speak to that for just a moment because I don't believe anyone should
suffer any illusions that the so-called safeguards that are part of
this amendment are going to in any way enhance the treaty and make it
more palatable. We accepted it because it is what is being done anyway.
It wouldn't have to be added to the treaty. The President theoretically
is pursuing these things. He should pursue them. But they are not going
to make the treaty any better or worse.
For example, the first item is the Stockpile Stewardship Program. It
has been assumed all along that there would be a Stockpile Stewardship
Program. We don't have to amend this in order to achieve that.
The problem is, the Stockpile Stewardship Program is very troublesome
even if you assume there would be assurance at the end of the day that
it could do the job it was designed to do because some people are
assuming that design is a total replacement of testing. It was never
designed to totally replace testing but merely to give us a greater
degree of confidence in the reliability and safety of our nuclear
weapons, not that it could totally replace testing.
But even if you laid that aside, the notion was that the Stockpile
Stewardship Program would be ready in a decade. This was announced
about 3 years ago. Now we are being told it will be ready by the year
2010.
There are slips along the way that suggest problems with the
Stockpile Stewardship Program. It is behind budget. We haven't been
budgeting the amount of money that was indicated as necessary to
maintain it--the $4.5 billion a year. We have also not indexed for
inflation. So each year that we supply the $4 billion or so, we are
getting further behind because we are not indexing that to inflation.
We have also included other programs within the Stockpile Stewardship
Program that were never intended to be funded out of it, such as the
tritium production facility for our nuclear weapons. That was to be a
separate area of funding. This administration has folded that into the
Stockpile Stewardship Program, with the result that even more of the
money necessary for the ASCI Program and other key parts of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program will be shorted if we have to spend that
money for tritium.
In addition to that, let me quote a letter I received from the former
Director of one of our National Laboratories. This is a letter sent to
me in September of this year from John Nuckolls who is the former
Director at Livermore. Here is what he said:

A post-CTBT or other funding reduction would increase the
uncertainty in long-term stockpile reliability. Current and
projected funding is inadequate. Substantial additional
funding is needed for SSP experimental efforts including
construction of an advanced hydro facility.

I also note that the so-called ignition facility, which is planned as
a part of this, is also behind schedule and over budget.
As Mr. Nuckolls pointed out, we are already behind. We are getting
further behind, and I don't think anyone should put that much reliance
as a result in the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
Another safeguard is the nuclear laboratory facilities and programs.
Of course, we are going to maintain our nuclear laboratories and
facilities. I don't think anybody would ever assume we were not going
to do that. So this adds nothing to the treaty. The question is, Can
you maintain these without nuclear testing? It turns out it is much
more difficult to do so.

Again, quoting from Mr. Nuckolls' letter to me, I will quote the
first part of his answer:

In an extended duration nuclear test ban, confidence in the
stockpile would be adversely affected by loss of all nuclear
test trained and validated expert personnel, major gaps in
our scientific understanding of nuclear explosives, nuclear
and chemical decay of warheads, accidents and inadequate
funding of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
All nuclear test trained/validated expert personnel would
eventually be lost. Training of the replacement workforce
would be seriously handicapped without nuclear testing, and
expert judgment could not be fully validated. A serious
degradation of U.S. capabilities to find and fix stockpile
problems, and to design and build new nuclear weapons would
be unavoidable.

In other words, what is perceived as a good thing--these nuclear
laboratory facilities and programs--is actually being allowed to
deteriorate without testing. We simply won't have the people available
in order to maintain those facilities and to be prepared to do the
things he says are necessary to be done. A serious degradation of U.S.
capabilities would be unavoidable.

[[Page S12369]]

We are not talking about something hypothetical and unimportant. We
are talking about the U.S. nuclear stockpile. This is the person who
used to run this National Laboratory. He is telling us we had better be
careful putting our reliance on that program.
The third of the so-called safeguards is the maintenance of nuclear
testing capability. That is fine, except that we are not doing it. This
President should be doing it. He claims to be doing it. But it is not
being done. We now know it would take 2 or 3 years to get back to the
point where we could test.
I again quote from Mr. Nuckolls' letter:

In an extended duration nuclear test ban, the nuclear test
site infrastructure is likely to decay or become obsolete.
Nuclear test experienced personnel would be lost. A series of
nuclear tests to diagnose complex reliability problems and to
certify a fix, or to develop new weapons could take several
years. . . .
Nuclear testing has been essential to the discovery and
resolution of many problems in the stockpile.

The point he is making is that you can't just say you are going to be
able to resume testing unless you take active and take serious steps to
maintain that readiness. We are not doing it. And he says in a test ban
of this kind, we would not be able to do it.
The fourth item is the continued comprehensive research and
development program. Of course, we are going to be doing that.
Intelligence gatherings, analytical capabilities--we will do the best
we can on that, although, as has been pointed out, it is inadequate.
Senator Richard Lugar, an arms control advocate and an expert in this
body, has concluded reluctantly that this treaty is not verifiable and
enforceable and, as a matter of fact, it cannot be made so.
Let me quote from the Washington Times of today because it talks
about how we negotiated this treaty and how we negotiated the
provisions for verification and enforcement. Let me read from the story
which is headlined, ``Moscow, Beijing balk at monitors. Testing sites
not included in nuke treaty.'' I am quoting now:
Russia and China refused to permit seismic monitoring near
their nuclear weapons test sites that could have resolved
some verification problems now troubling the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, according to U.S. government officials.
Clinton administration officials and congressional aides
said the failure of U.S. negotiators to win the cooperation
of Moscow and Beijing was a ``negotiating failure'' that
undermined the treaty. It also is a key reason U.S.
intelligence agencies said both nations could conduct hidden
nuclear tests without detection.

Before I finish this quotation, let me point out why this is
important.
Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, from what document is he
reading?
Mr. KYL. The Washington Times, Tuesday, October 12.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that The Washington Times
article be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Moscow, Beijing Balk at Monitors

(By Bill Gertz)

Russia and China refused to permit seismic monitoring near
their nuclear weapons test sites that could have resolved
some verification problems now troubling the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, according to U.S. government officials.
Clinton administration officials and congressional aides
said the failure of U.S. negotiators to win the cooperation
of Moscow and Beijing was a ``negotiating failure'' that
undermined the treaty. It also is a key reason U.S.
intelligence agencies said both nations could conduct hidden
nuclear tests without detection.
The officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity
because of sensitive intelligence issues, said the treaty's
international monitoring system that includes 50 ``primary''
seismic stations and 120 ``auxiliary'' seismic stations does
not include stations close to China's remote northwestern Lop
Nur testing site in Xinjiang province, or Russia's arctic
Novaya Zemlya.
U.S. intelligence agencies suspect the two locations were
used recently for small nuclear test blasts.
China's test on June 12 may have been part of efforts by
Beijing to build smaller warheads for its short-range
missiles, or multiple warheads for its intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), U.S. intelligence officials said.
Two suspected nuclear tests detected near Novaya Zemlya on
Sept. 8 and Sept. 23 are believed to be part of Russia's
secret nuclear testing program.
U.S. intelligence agencies reported recently to policy-
makers and members of Congress that Russia and China are the
two nations are most interested and capable of conducting
covert tests. ``Both have locations where they could conduct
secret tests that would not be detected,'' said one
intelligence official.
The official said that during treaty negotiations from 1994
to 1996 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, U.S.
negotiators failed to press for Russian and Chinese agreement
to tougher monitoring provisions in the treaty that would
satisfy the concerns of U.S. spy agencies about cheating.
According to the official, ``if Russia had been convinced
to have one facility at Novaya Zemlya and China agreed to
have one near Lop Nur, the level of verification would have
improved greatly.''
Russia and China also blocked a treaty provision that would
have required treaty signatories to allow small explosive
tests that would have ``calibrated'' regional seismic
stations so they accurately measure underground blasts, the
officials said.
Without the calibration, the regional stations will provide
misleading or confusing data that undermines more accurate
data provided by primary stations, they said.
A National Intelligence Estimate, the consensus judgment of
all U.S. intelligence agencies, presented a finding in 1997
that said verifying the test-ban treaty will be difficult.
That estimate is currently being revised and is expected to
conclude that because of the lack of verification and the
possibility that states could conduct secret tests without
detection, the treaty is even more difficult to verify, said
officials close to the intelligence community.
Under the treaty, Russia will have six primary seismic
stations and 13 secondary stations; China will have two
primary seismic posts and four secondary facilities.
None of these stations, however, is located close enough to
the main Russian and Chinese testing facilities to be able to
detect tests conducted covertly inside underground caves, or
tests of very small nuclear blasts, the officials said.
By contrast, the United States has five primary seismic
monitoring facilities under the treaty, including one in
Nevada, where the main U.S. nuclear testing site is located.
It will also have 11 secondary sites.
Michael Pillsbury, a former acting director of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said China would have
agreed to better seismic monitoring if Beijing were pushed
into it.
``Chinese officials have told me that if the Clinton
administration had pushed harder they would have agreed to a
primary site near the test site,'' said Mr. Pillsbury, who
also took part in a recent Defense Science Task Force study
on nuclear weapons, ``but the Chinese had the impression the
Clinton administration didn't place as a high priority on
treaty verification as they did on maintaining good trade
relations.
A Senate defense specialist said Russia agreed to allow
more sensitive seismic monitors to be placed near Novaya
Zemlya, but only if the United States agreed to provide
Moscow with advanced computers and U.S. nuclear weapons
testing data. The administration refused.
On Russia, the aide said the administration faces a
dilemma. ``Either they accuse the Russians of violating the
treaty or concede the treaty cannot be verified,'' the aide
said.
U.S. intelligence agencies are now saying that ``you can
have militarily significant developments below the [seismic]
detection threshold,'' the aide said.
Administration officials have said verification is not as
important as promoting the agreement itself as a deterrent to
nuclear weapons proliferation.
``The CIA has indicated that they cannot verify to a
hundred percent whether or not someone has conducted a
nuclear test,'' Defense Secretary William S. Cohen said
Sunday on NBC's ``Meet the Press.''
``But we believe with this treaty, you're going to have at
least an additional 320 sites that will help monitor testing
around the world,'' he said. ``. . . We are satisfied we can
verify adequately, not a hundred percent, but satisfy
ourselves that there is no testing doing on that would put us
at any kind of a strategic disadvantage.''
Asked about the fact, that the United States cannot detect
unclear blasts below a few kiloton yield, Secretary of State
Madeleine K. Albright said: ``We can detect what we need
to.''
``Those that are below a certain level, we do not think
would undercut our nuclear deterrent because they would be so
small that they would not affect our nuclear deterrent
capacity,'' Mrs. Albright said on ABC's ``This Week.''
A Pentagon official, however, said the Clinton
administration is supporting anti-nuclear-weapons activists
by supporting the test ban.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, the Senate has a solemn obligation under our
Constitution to be a backstop. We are not supposed to be a rubber stamp
to treaties. If we were simply to rubber stamp whatever the President
sent to us, our founding fathers wouldn't have provided a separate
advice and consent responsibility for the Senate. As a matter of fact,
we would be doing the Office of the Presidency a big favor by
exercising that responsibility in a responsible way, saying that when
we find

[[Page S12370]]

treaties that lack even minimal standards, then we need to say no, so
that our negotiators in the future will be able to negotiate stronger
provisions--provisions that we seek because we understand their
importance and necessity for sensible arms control.
If we simply ratify what is acknowledged to be a flawed treaty, then
our negotiators are never going to be able to say no to bad terms and
we are always going to have to then go to the lowest common denominator
in these treaties--treaties which then become bad for the United
States; treaties which are unverifiable and unenforceable. Those are
concepts that used to cause the Senate to say no, to say we won't
approve a treaty that doesn't have good verification or enforcement
provisions. Those are minimally necessary for sensible treaties.
Our negotiators tried to avoid a zero-yield basis in this treaty but
they couldn't so they gave up. They tried to have a 10-year limit
rather than having this treaty be in effect in perpetuity, but they
couldn't get it done. So in order to make a deal, they said: All right,
we will agree to something less. If they knew and if their counterparts
understood that the Senate at that point would say: No, we are not
going to ratify such a treaty, they would more likely have stood firm
and been able to hold their ground.
The same thing is true with respect to these monitors. Administration
officials have tried to suggest that actually we will have a better
chance of monitoring in the future than we do today, while many of the
experts have debunked that. The fact that the treaty calls for
monitoring sites around the world is irrelevant if the sites are not
placed in the positions that are best for detection of nuclear weapon
explosions. What this article is pointing out is that when the United
States tried to interpose that requirement on Russia and China, the
Russians and Chinese said no, and we backed down. So now we don't have
monitoring stations in key locations in the world near the Chinese and
Russian test sites that would enable the United States to understand
whether or not they have violated the treaty by engaging in nuclear
tests.
Let me quote further from the article, while it points out that
Russia and China will have some seismic stations:

None of these stations, however, is located close enough to
the main Russian and Chinese testing facilities to be able to
detect tests conducted covertly inside underground caves, or
tests of very small nuclear blasts, the official said.
By contrast, the United States has five primary seismic
monitoring facilities under the treaty, including one in
Nevada, where the main U.S. nuclear testing site is located.
It will also have 11 secondary sites.
Michael Pillsbury, a former acting director of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said China would have
agreed to better seismic monitoring if Beijing were pushed
into it.
``Chinese officials have told me that if the Clinton
administration had pushed harder they would have agreed to a
primary site near the test site,'' said Mr. Pillsbury, who
also took part in a recent Defense Science Task Force study
on nuclear weapons, ``but the Chinese had the impression the
Clinton administration didn't place as high a priority on
treaty verification as they did on maintaining good trade
relations.''
A Senate defense specialist said Russia agreed to allow
more sensitive seismic monitoring to be placed near Novaya
Zemlya, but only if the United States agreed to provide
Moscow with advanced computers and U.S. nuclear weapons
testing data. The administration refused.

I think the point of this article and the point of the testimony of
several of the people who came before the committees was that the
people who negotiated this treaty gave up too soon on too many
important provisions, and because they wanted a treaty more than they
were concerned about the specific provisions--such as verification and
enforcement--they were willing to commit the United States to a series
of obligations that will have a profound negative impact on our nuclear
stockpile and yet do very little, if anything, to ensure that other
nations in the world will not proliferate nuclear weapons.

The President has signed the treaty. That doesn't mean the United
States needs to ratify it. We should exercise our independent judgment,
our constitutional prerogative, to provide, as I said, before the
quality control. If we do that, this President and future Presidents'
hands will be strengthened when they go to the negotiating sessions to
talk about such things as where to place the monitors. Maybe the
Chinese and the Russians and others at that time will understand they
are not going to bamboozle our negotiators. Because the Senate provides
a backstop, we will say no. That is the way the Founding Fathers
understood we could ensure that the United States did not take on
inadequate or offensive international arms obligations or limitations.
I have mentioned all the safeguards but the last one. These
safeguards add nothing to the status quo. In fact, I hope they will be
more robustly pursued than this administration has pursued.
Last is the withdrawal under the supreme interest clause. Even this
was something that the administration sought to avoid when it
negotiated the treaty initially. The negotiators understood how very
difficult--in fact, how almost impossible--it is to invoke the supreme
interest clause. There are two reasons for that. They are very simple.
First, if a country hasn't tested for a decade and all of a sudden this
clause is invoked, that country is, in effect, telling all the rest of
the world, whoops, we have a problem; please excuse us while we test.
That is not a good message to send to the rest of the world. As
difficult as the political inability to invoke this clause, if we think
it is hard now to reject this treaty--which most on this side believe
should be rejected--if we think it is difficult now because world
opinion will react badly to a negative vote by the Senate, what do
Members think world opinion will be after the treaty has been in effect
for a decade and all of a sudden the United States tries to withdraw
from it because we need to test?
That is real pressure. It is a virtual impossibility. In fact,
President John F. Kennedy said exactly that in speaking about the
moratorium that he inherited from the Eisenhower administration. He
said never again should we do that because it is not only difficult, it
is impossible to go back to testing without political ramifications
after having had a moratorium condition.
The supreme interest clause is certainly something that would be part
of any administration's options; whether or not it is added to the
treaty is irrelevant. The administration always has that option. It
adds nothing.
The reason we were happy to accept the amendment offered by the
Senator from Delaware is that it adds nothing to the treaty. We assume
those provisions would be extant and therefore there is no reason to
object to it. There is also no reason to celebrate because it adds
nothing to what we already have.
As I said, unless we are a lot more serious about providing the
funding that is called for under the amendment and doing the science
that is required, we are going to find ourselves getting further and
further behind, especially with respect to the Stockpile Stewardship
Program.
I don't think we should say that the safeguard package has made the
treaty any better than it was to begin with.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a letter from
John H. Nuckolls.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

John H. Nuckolls,

Livermore, CA, September 2, 1999.
Hon. Jon Kyl,
U.S. Senate, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Kyl: This letter responds to your April 1,
1999 request for my answers to five questions concerning the
effects of a nuclear test ban on the reliability and safety
of the nuclear stockpile. My views do not represent LLNL.
1. To maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of
the U.S. nuclear stockpile in absence of nuclear testing, the
United States intends to rely on the Stockpile Stewardship
Program to accomplish the goals previously achieved through
nuclear testing. Setting aside the controversial issue of
sustained funding for the Program, how confident should we be
that the Program will achieve its goals? In your answer,
please address not only the level of certainty we should have
regarding the Program's technical goals, but also the goal of
attracting and training nuclear weapons experts who could fix
problems that may develop in the existing stockpile or design
and build new nuclear weapons.
In an extended duration test ban, confidence in the
stockpile would be adversely affected by loss of all nuclear
test trained

[[Page S12371]]

and validated expert personnel, major gaps in our scientific
understanding of nuclear explosives, nuclear and chemical
decay of warheads, accidents and inadequate funding of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP).
All nuclear test trained/validated personnel would
eventually be lost. Training of the replacement workforce
would be seriously handicapped without nuclear testing, and
expert judgment could not be fully validated. A serious
degradation of U.S. capabilities to find and fix stockpile
problems, and to design and build new nuclear weapons would
be unavoidable.
There are major gaps in our scientific understanding of
critically important processes essential to the operation of
nuclear explosives. These gaps create a serious vulnerability
to undetected problems. Uncertainties in performance margins
increase this vulnerability. Consequently, there will be a
growing uncertainty in long-term reliability.
It cannot be assured that the powerful computational and
experimental capabilities of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program will increase confidence in reliability. Improved
understanding may reduce confidence in estimates of
performance margins and reliability if fixes and validation
are precluded by a CTBT.
Key components of nuclear warheads are ``aging'' by
radioactive decay and chemical decomposition and corrosion.
Periodic remanufacture is necessary, but may copy existing
defects and introduce additional defects. Some of the
remanufactured parts may differ significantly from the
original parts--due to loss of nuclear test validated
personnel who manufactured the original parts, the use of new
material and fabrication processes, and inadequate
specification of original parts. There are significant risks
of reducing stockpile reliability when remanufactured parts
are involved in warhead processes where there are major gaps
in our scientific understanding.
In spite of extraordinary efforts to prevent accidents,
sooner or later ``accidents will happen.'' Accidents (very
probably those of foreign nuclear forces) are likely to
generate requirements for incorporating modern damage
limitation technologies in our nuclear warhead systems which
lack these safety features. Without nuclear tests, confidence
in reliability would be substantially reduced by the
introduction of some safety technologies.
A post-CTBT or other funding reduction would increase the
uncertainty in long-term stockpile reliability. Current and
projected funding is inadequate. Substantial additional
funding is needed for SSP experimental efforts including
construction of an advanced hydro facility.
The uncertainty in long-term stockpile reliability may be
reduced somewhat by increasing performance margins. Depending
on national security requirements, operational measures may
be feasible which compensate for uncertain stockpile
reliability, e.g., limit arms control agreements so that
large and diverse reserves of warheads and delivery systems
can be maintained, use multiple independent forces on each
target and maximize use of shoot-look-shoot.
2. Certification of U.S. nuclear weapons, once achieved
through nuclear testing, is now accomplished through a
process of review by experts. How crucial is the nuclear
testing experience of those experts to their ability to
perform the certification task? What level of risk would you
associate with having a certification process in the future
that utilizes only individuals who have had no nuclear
testing experience?
Stockpile confidence would be reduced if certification were
performed by experts lacking nuclear test experience. The
level of risk would be high unless arms control agreements
were restrained, and substantially reserve forces maintained
so that the capabilities of our nuclear forces substantially
exceeded national security requirements.
3. Current U.S. plans are to maintain ``the basic
capability to resume nuclear test activities.'' In your view,
is it technically possible to maintain the nuclear test site,
together with the requisite skilled personnel, in a state
whereby nuclear testing can readily be resumed if needed? How
quickly do you believe that testing can be resumed?
In an extended duration nuclear test ban, the nuclear test
site infrastructure is likely to decay and become obsolete.
Nuclear test experienced personnel would be lost. A series of
nuclear tests to diagnose complex reliability problems and
certify a fix, or to develop new weapons could take several
years.
4. In your experience, how vital has nuclear testing been
to the discovery and resolution of problems with the U.S.
stockpile?
Nuclear testing has been essential to the discovery and
resolution of many problems in the stockpile.
5. Experts agree that nuclear testing can be conducted by
other nations at low yields without its being detected. If
other nuclear weapons states were to continue clandestine
nuclear testing at low levels, do you believe that they could
obtain significantly greater confidence in the reliability of
their nuclear arsenals?
With a series of clandestine nuclear tests, Russia could
increase confidence in the reliability of its nuclear
stockpile. Advanced low-yield nuclear weapons could also be
developed, e.g., tactical and BMD warheads.
China and other nations could improve their nuclear forces
by clandestine tests of nuclear weapons, including tests of
U.S. designs obtained through espionage? and Russian designs
obtained through various means?
A ``CTBT'' with clandestine nuclear tests would incentivize
and facilitate espionage. Achieving qualitative parity with a
static U.S. stockpile would be a powerful incentive.
Espionage is facilitated when U.S. progress is frozen, and
classified information is being concentrated and organized in
electronic systems.
These views are my own and do not represent LLNL.
Sincerely,

John H. Nuckolls,

Director Emeritus, LLNL.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator from Virginia would be next,
but he has kindly yielded to the Senator from New Mexico.
My friend from Arizona keeps saying the ``acknowledged flawed
treaty.'' It is not acknowledged to be flawed by 32 Nobel laureates in
physics. It is not acknowledged to be flawed by four of the last five
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is not acknowledged to be
flawed by the weapons lab Directors, et cetera.
I want to make it clear, he states some believe it is flawed. The
majority of the people who are in command and have been in command--the
Secretaries of Defense who have been mentioned--if we balance it out,
clearly think this is not a flawed treaty.
I yield on the Republican time to my friend from New Mexico.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, there can be no question that this
debate and the vote which might occur are very significant and historic
events for the United States. I very much want to be in favor of the
treaty but I cannot favor the treaty because I believe essentially it
jeopardizes U.S. security.
I wish every Senator had the opportunities I have had for the last
5\1/2\ years. I say that knowing full well my friend from Arizona,
while he is not on the committee that funds the stockpile stewardship,
is one of the rare exceptions in that he and a few other Senators have
learned and worked very diligently to understand what we have been
doing since we decided on behalf of the Senate in a Mark Hatfield
amendment that we would not test nuclear weapons.
What has been the U.S. response to our scientific and nuclear
community?
Essentially, what we have been busy doing can be encapsulated in the
words ``science-based stockpile stewardship.'' One might say, since
that pertains to the safety of the weapons system, what we used to do
could be called nuclear testing stockpile stewardship. That occurred
since the beginning of our nuclear weapons programs. The United States
had a formidable, perhaps the world's best, system of underground
testing.
Testing became very important to those laboratories--there are now
three that are principally called nuclear deterrent or stockpile
stewardship laboratories. I am privileged to have two of them in my
State. When I come to the floor, go to meetings, and talk about the
fact this is an important program and these laboratories are important,
it hardly ever comes into focus like it is today, like it was in our
conference at noon, and like it has been for the last week as Senator
Jon Kyl and others have spoken to the fact that what the United States
has been trying to do is develop a science-based system. This system
means supercomputer simulation and other techniques and skills to see
what is going on in a nuclear weapon without any testing to assure the
parts that might be wearing out are discernible and can be replaced and
that the weapon, indeed, is safe.
Frankly, if nothing else, I pray this debate will cause Senators and
Representatives, in particular in the important committees of
jurisdiction, to understand the importance of this program if the
United States continues on a path of no testing, for whatever period of
time--and who knows, we may do that in spite of this treaty not being
ratified by the United States. I do not want to engage in a maybe-and-
maybe-not discussion on that, but the United States is trying hard.
Nonetheless, my principal concerns about this Treaty--and there are
many--center around four reasons, and three of them have to do with
science-based stockpile stewardship.
First, the science-based stockpile stewardship is new; it is nascent;
it is just starting. It is not finished. It has not been completed. It
is not perfected. As a matter of fact, to the Senators who are on the
floor, probably some of

[[Page S12372]]

the most profound testimony regarding America's stockpile of nuclear
weapons occurred in the Armed Services Committee last week when sitting
at the witness table was the Secretary of Energy, surrounded by the
three National Laboratory Directors.
It goes without saying that our country owes them a high degree of
gratitude and thanks for what they do, for they oversee the safety of
our weapons under this new approach which is very different for them,
and that is, no testing; they must certify that everything is OK
without testing. Scientists and physicists steeped in knowledge about
nuclear weapons--one of them is a nuclear weapons expert of the highest
order--testified, and I will quote in a while some of the difficulties
they see with reference to their responsibility.
Secondly, I do not know what to do about it, but the difficulty, as
they testified, in securing the funding they need without new mandates
imposed upon them is very uncertain. The difficulty is real and it is
uncertain as to whether they will continually over time get sufficient
resources.
Third is, and I say this with a clear hope that the Secretary of
Energy and the President will listen, the unknown impact of the failure
on the part of this administration to proceed with reorganizing the
Department of Energy on stewardship efforts. I do not want to belabor
in this speech the efforts that many of us went to in streamlining
accountability of the nuclear weapons programs within the Energy
Department. We called it a semiautonomous agency--so that Department,
which is in charge of the nuclear weapons, including the profound
things we are talking about with respect to their safety, will not be
bogged down by rules, regulations, personnel, and other things from a
Department as diverse as the Department of Energy.
As a matter of fact, the more I think about it, the more I am
convinced they should get on with doing what Congress told them to do
instead of this waffling out of it by putting Secretary Richardson in
charge of both the Energy Department and a new independent agency--
which was supposed to be created so it would be semiautonomous, and he
will head them both under an interpretation that cannot be legal--just
indicates to me that they are not quite willing in this Department of
Energy to face up to the serious problems of our nuclear stockpile and
such things as science-based stockpile stewardship.
Lastly, and for many who talked on the floor, the most important
issue is the ambiguities and threats to our international security at
the present time. I will talk about that a bit because some Senators
are asking: How can you be against the treaty and at the same time say
we ought to put it off?
Let me repeat, my last concern is the ambiguities and threats to our
international security at present.
I will proceed quickly with an elaboration.
When the United States declared a unilateral moratorium in 1992, the
onus was on the scientists and National Laboratories to design and
implement a program that would ensure the safety, reliability, and
performance of our nuclear arsenal without testing. This is an onerous,
complicated task that has yet to be fully implemented and validated,
and I just stated that.
Science-based stockpile stewardship was designed to replace nuclear
tests through increased understanding of the nuclear physics in
conjunction with unprecedented simulation capabilities. This requires a
lot of money. In fact, full implementation of the stewardship program
is more expensive than reliance on nuclear tests, and I do not say this
as an excuse for moving back to testing. The truth of the matter is it
proves we are very willing to keep our stockpiles safe, reliable, and
sound, even if it costs us more money, so long as we do not do
underground testing on the other side of the ledger.
There is no question that in addition, the validity of this approach
remains unproven, and key facilities, such as the National Ignition
Facility, are behind schedule and over budget, and it is supposed to be
one of the integral parts of being able to determine the stockpile
confidence.
This program will attempt to preserve the viability of existing
weapons indefinitely. We no longer possess the production capabilities
to replace the weapons, and maybe Senator Kyl has referred to that. We
have already gotten rid of our production facilities. Currently, seven
highly sophisticated warhead designs comprise our arsenal. Each weapon
contains thousands of components, all of which are subject to decay and
corrosion over time. Any small flaw in any individual component would
render the weapons ineffective. In addition, because we intend to
preserve, rather than replace, these weapons with new designs, aging
effects on these weapons remains to be seen.
I quote Dr. Paul Robinson of Sandia National Laboratory in his
testimony last week:

Confidence in the reliability and safety of the nuclear
weapons stockpile will eventually decline without nuclear
testing. . . . Whether the risk that will arise from this
decline in confidence will be acceptable or not is a policy
issue that must be considered in light of the benefits
expected to be realized [if you have a] test ban.

Are we ready today to accept a decline in confidence of our nuclear
deterrent? Can we today accurately weigh the benefits on either side of
the issue? I do not think so. On the other hand, we risk complete
collapse of ongoing disarmament initiatives by prematurely rejecting
this treaty. That is why I believe it is not inconsistent that I am not
for it, but I would not like it to be voted on.
There are substantial risks with unknown consequences. Success of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program requires recruiting the brightest young
scientists. We have to begin to substitute for the older heads who know
everything there is about it and contain all of the so-called corporate
memory with reference to the science testing and the like.
My colleagues all know that I have fought very hard to get the money
for the Stockpile Stewardship Program. We came perilously close this
year to having this part of our budget cut by as much as $1 billion by
the House. I think after weeks of saying we would not go to
conference--it is not worth going to conference to fight--it was
believed it would be better to stay at last year's level. They finally
came to the point where we have a Stockpile Stewardship Program funded,
but in an almost irreverent way.
Dr. Browne of Los Alamos said:

I am confident that a fully supported and sustained program
will enable us to continue to maintain America's nuclear
deterrent without nuclear testing. However, I am concerned
about several trends that are reducing my confidence level
each year. These include annual shortfalls in planned
budgets, increased numbers of findings in the stockpile that
need resolution, an augmented workload beyond our original
plans, and unfunded mandates that cut into the program.

It is pretty clear that it is not what they would like it to be.
He also said he was

concerned about other significant disturbances this year in
the stability of the support from the government, partially
in response to concerns about espionage. This has sent a
mixed message to the Laboratory that will make it more
difficult to carry out

the stewardship program. According to this good doctor who heads Los
Alamos, the task of recruiting and training the requisite talent is
hindered by the current security climate at the laboratories.
I strongly believe that the establishment of a semi-independent
agency for nuclear weapons activities will significantly enhance
efforts to ensure the success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. At
the same time, this reorganization will require many months to
accomplish. I ask my colleagues the following question: Should we make
an international declaration regarding U.S. nuclear tests in the midst
of a complete overhaul of the Department responsible for those weapons?
I don't think so. Such an action would be premature.
Lastly, today we cannot clearly define the direction the world will
take on nuclear issues. This concern speaks both for and against the
treaty. Treaty proponents believe that U.S. ratification and the
treaty's entry into force will curb proliferation. This treaty, if
fully implemented, would enhance our ability to detect nuclear tests
and create a deterrent to nations that may aspire to possess nuclear
weapons capabilities.
However, others say, without question, this treaty is not a silver
bullet. The administration has touted it as such. This treaty is only
one measure of many that should comprise a solid nonproliferation
agenda. For example,

[[Page S12373]]

this treaty would be acceptable if accompanied by substantive bilateral
commitments with Russia and multilateral commitments among the declared
nuclear powers. A framework for international disarmament,
nonproliferation, and stability may very well include a Test Ban
Treaty, but it should also be accompanied by binding commitments on
future disarmament objectives, such as the Fissile Materials Cutoff
Regime, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
We have only one treaty--one facet of a complex picture--before us
today. It may contribute to achieving other disarmament objectives, but
we are being asked to wager our nuclear deterrent on the hope that
formal commitments from other nuclear powers and threshold states will
be forthcoming. We sign on the dotted line that we will not utilize
testing to maintain our stockpile, and we plead with the world to
follow suit.
Or we reject the Treaty now and eliminate others' potential
hesitation regarding future tests.
Only 23 of the 44 nations required for the Treaty's entry into force
have ratified it. India, Pakistan, North Korea, Russia and China have
not ratified it. Neither India nor Pakistan have even signed the
treaty.
We should not rush to vote on this matter.
Regardless of the vote count, we risk either permanent damage to our
non-proliferation objectives or the safety and reliability of the U.S.
nuclear arsenal. Continuing our moratorium on nuclear testing and not
acting on this Treaty is the best course of action for now.
We have time. Time to observe international changes and formulate a
nuclear posture suitable for a new era. Time to evaluate the future of
our bilateral relations with Russia and China. And time to first ensure
the success of Stockpile Stewardship.
U.S. ratification would provide a positive signal and increase our
leverage at the negotiating table in our pursuit of many non-
proliferation objectives. If the Senate does not ratify this Treaty,
which appears highly likely at the present, many of our current foreign
policy initiatives will unravel.
Most importantly, a negative vote on the CTBT will further erode the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, itself. We secured indefinite
extension of the NPT in 1995 by committing to lead negotiations, sign
and ratify the Test Ban Treaty. There is an explicit link between our
Article VI commitments to disarm and the CTBT.
Many other steps could be taken to demonstrate a good faith effort
toward nuclear disarmament. The Test Ban Treaty is just one element of
a comprehensive strategy to reduce nuclear dangers. The U.S. and Russia
have already radically reduced stockpiles from their Cold War levels.
Progress has been made in the negotiations for a fissile materials
cutoff regime. Currently, all of the declared nuclear powers have a
moratorium on testing, and two of those, Britain and France, have
signed and ratified the Test Ban Treaty.
If the Senate votes against this Treaty, we will send the signal to
the world that the U.S. has no intent to make good on its earlier
commitments. START II will wither in the Duma; negotiations with Russia
on START III and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty will most likely
falter. We would most likely witness a rash of nuclear tests in
response. Killing this Treaty would inevitably also impact upcoming
elections in Russia. To the Russians our actions in Kosovo underscored
NATO's willingness to engage in out-of-area operations, even in
violation of sovereignty. Anti-U.S. sentiments in Russia soared. Not
only would a down vote on this Treaty play into the hands of the
Communists and Nationalists, U.S. actions would essentially give Russia
the go-ahead to begin testing a new generation of tactical nuclear
weapons to secure its border against NATO.
We risk little by postponing consideration of this Treaty. We put our
most vital security interests at stake by rushing to judgement on it.
In sum, defeat of this Treaty at this point will have a devastating
impact on numerous current foreign policy initiatives that are clearly
in the U.S. national interest. We can anticipate an unraveling of
initiatives toward bilateral disarmament with Russia, and we will
forfeit any remaining hope of preventing a nuclear arms race between
India and Pakistan. We will open wide the door for China to proceed
with tests to validate any nuclear designs based on the alleged stolen
W-88 blueprints.
At the same time, Stockpile Stewardship is as yet unproven. We still
do not fully understand the aging effects on our nuclear arsenal. Such
aging effects relate both to the components which comprise the nuclear
weapons and the scientific experts who initially designed and tested
them. Also, as witnessed again this year, the budget for the full
implementation of Stockpile Stewardship is anything but secure. In
light of the current situation, ratification of this Treaty may put us
at risk.
The timing of this debate is such that I have to weigh very carefully
between the negative impact of this Treaty's possible defeat and the
annual budgetary struggles for Stockpile Stewardship in combination
with the scientific community's own doubts about the Stockpile
Stewardship program.
We should maintain the moratorium on testing and postpone the vote on
this matter.
It is irresponsible and dangerous to proceed now with the debate and
vote on this Treaty. We have nothing to lose by maintaining our current
status of a unilateral moratorium and having signed but not yet
ratified the Test Ban Treaty. But we have everything to lose regardless
of the outcome of this vote.
I thank the Senate for listening and the leadership for granting me
this time. I yield the floor.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield 10 minutes to my friend from Virginia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. ROBB. I thank the Chair and thank the distinguished Senator from
Delaware.
Mr. President, on balance I personally believe the arguments for
ratification of the CTBT are far more persuasive than the arguments
against ratification. But I recognize the legitimacy of some of the
arguments made against ratification. I recognize the credibility of
some of those making those arguments. I respect the sincerity of
colleagues who believe that ratification would be a mistake.
Having said that, I will not repeat all of the reasons that I would
vote for ratification, if we are, indeed, forced to go ahead with the
vote scheduled for later this afternoon. I would simply appeal to
colleagues who oppose ratification not to let their feelings--their
personal feelings--toward our Commander in Chief or their desires for a
decisive political victory to weaken the role of the U.S. leadership in
the international community or encourage additional testing by nations
that might not otherwise do so, and thus make the world less secure and
more dangerous.
On the politics, opponents of ratification at this time have already
won. No one contends that 67 Senators are prepared to vote for
ratification. No one is suggesting that this President or any future
President is going to bring the treaty up for ratification again unless
and until they have those 67 votes.
I happen to be one of the 10 Senators who engaged in an extended
discussion of this treaty with the President and his national security
team last Tuesday evening. Many others have been actively engaged in
the debate from the very beginning. As I recall, there were six
Republicans and four Democrats; and we were equally divided on the
question of ratification.
I wish to commend all of the Senators involved in that process and
throughout, but particularly those Republicans who stated during that
meeting, very forcefully, why they oppose the treaty and why a
ratification vote would fail but nonetheless were willing to help find
a way to pull us back from the brink--for the good of the country and
in the interest of a safer world.
In this instance, the President has acknowledged that if we go ahead
with the vote, he will lose. But he is asking us not to defeat our own
national interest as well by voting down this treaty.
The Senate, in pressing its case, however, for an up-or-down vote at
this point, in my judgment, injures the

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country's ability to lead and strikes a blow at American leadership
around the world. Far more is at stake than defeating the policy and
agenda of this particular President. Make no mistake, allies, friends,
and enemies would view the defeat of the CTBT as a green light for more
nuclear testing and further development of nuclear weapons, either
strategic or tactical.
Defeat of the treaty will not be perceived as a signal of restraint.
Just the opposite. Delay of consideration of the matter at least gives
us the opportunity to address continuing concerns about monitoring and
verification, as best we can, while delivering the message to other
nations that we should proceed with yellow-light caution in regard to
testing and development of their programs.
I have carefully reviewed the intelligence community's analysis of
our CTBT monitoring capabilities--including the 1997 national
intelligence estimate and the updating of that document--and
admittedly, there are no absolutes when it comes to our ability to
detect and identify some tests at low yields with high confidence. The
more critical issue at hand, however, is the significance of possible
evasion and the rationale that underlies such action and what it means
for the inherent advantage we currently maintain with our nuclear
arsenal.

I urge our colleagues to weigh very carefully the views of the
intelligence community. The intelligence community believes we can
effectively monitor the CTBT. We approved the Chemical Weapons
Convention aware of the fact that denial and deception techniques would
prevent us from confirming absolutely that production, development, and
stockpiling were not going on. But as with the CTBT, we were able to
approach the subject of monitoring with a high degree of confidence
that signatories were not violating the CWC. As a result,
implementation of that pact is contributing to our national security.
Senate hearings this past week suggest an emerging story at Novaya
Zemlya but not outright violations of CTBT provisions. Transparency is
lacking there, and perhaps a delay in consideration of the treaty will
aid our efforts to sort out ongoing developments in this particular
location. But defeating the CTBT on the concerns we have about this one
site would represent a failure to understand what is in our broad
national interest. Creating a normative global standard not to test
will do enormous good and will act as a powerful force to stop would-be
cheaters in their tracks.
It is reasonably clear to our intelligence community that Russia and
perhaps others would not necessarily make gains in their thermonuclear
weapons program through an evasive low-yield testing program without
risking exposure of such tests to the international community. Given
that reality, it simply begs the question: Under what substantive
rationale would Russia or another country proceed in light of the
outcry and condemnation that would surely follow?
I believe this matter is ripe for an agreement we can negotiate among
ourselves in the Senate, through unanimous consent, that delays CTBT
consideration until the next Congress. I am prepared to support CTBT
regardless of the political affiliation of the Commander in Chief. But
due to the untenable circumstances in which we now find ourselves, we
should honor the request of this Commander in Chief and delay a vote.
With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. HUTCHINSON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I yield myself 15 minutes to speak in
opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
I also sat through a week of hearings last week. I also, as a member
of the Armed Services Committee, had the opportunity to hear our
intelligence community, to hear representatives from the Department of
Defense, and to hear the Directors of our laboratories. I respectfully
reached a different conclusion as to what the evidence is. In fact, in
my estimation, the evidence is strong enough to raise serious doubts
about the wisdom of ratifying this treaty. The evidence, I believe,
indicates that in fact Russia is currently testing low-level nuclear
weapons and is seeking to develop, from their own public statements and
the Russian media, a new type of tactical weapon, and there were
suspected Russian tests as recently as September 8, 1999, and September
23, 1999.
I believe when we have these kinds of issues of the gravest weight to
our Nation and to our Nation's security, when there are doubts about
verification--and I think it is overwhelmingly clear from what I heard
from the intelligence community--we cannot have assurance that we will
be able to verify a zero-yield treaty. That was very plain and very
clear from the testimony we heard. Verification is not possible.
Therefore, it is not in the best interests of our Nation to ratify this
treaty.
There are numerous reasons to oppose the treaty. We have heard many
of them during the debate on the floor of the Senate. Many have been
discussed very clearly. I will focus on one particular feature of this
agreement which, in my view, is sufficient in and of itself to reject
ratification of this treaty. That is the issue of the treaty's
duration.
This is an agreement of unlimited duration. It is an agreement that
is in perpetuity. That means if it is ratified, the United States will
be committing itself forever not to conduct another nuclear test. It
would make us dependent upon, totally reliant upon, the Stockpile
Stewardship Program. From what we heard from the Directors of the labs
last week, the Stockpile Stewardship Program is, by all accounts, a
work in progress. Some said it would take 5 years to reach the point
where we could have confidence in the program; some said 10. One said
it would be as long as 15 to 20 years before we could know whether or
not this program was going to be of a sufficient confidence level that
we could count upon it without reliance upon tests.
There are two major questions about this program. One is, Will it
work? We are not going to know that for many years. Will it work
sufficiently that we can rely upon high-speed computers and modeling
and annual examinations without any kind of test to have the confidence
that they are reliant and safe and that, should they tragically ever
need to be used, we could count on them actually working?
The second very big issue is whether it will be funded adequately so
the program can be developed to that level of confidence. We have every
indication that this will be an area in which Congress in the future
will seek to cut, an area in which there will not be the kind of
commitment, the kind of resources to ensure the development of this
Stockpile Stewardship Program to a point we can have absolute
confidence in it.
I want Members to think about the duration of this treaty--forever.
Are we so confident today that we will never again need nuclear
testing, so certain that we are willing to deprive all future
Commanders in Chief, all future military leaders, all future Congresses
of the one means that can actually prove the safety and reliability of
our nuclear deterrent? Are we that confident? I suggest we are not.
Proponents of the treaty will say that that is not the case, that
this commitment is not forever. They will point to the fact that the
treaty allows for withdrawal if our national interest requires it.
Proponents of the treaty promise that if we reach a point where the
safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent cannot be guaranteed
without testing, then all we need to do is exercise our right to
withdraw and we would, at that point, resume testing.
This so-called ``supreme national interest'' clause, along with
safeguard F, in which President Clinton gives us his solemn word that
he will ``consider'' a resumption of testing if our deterrent cannot be
certified, is supposed to give us a sense of reassurance.
The fact is, this reassurance is a hollow promise. I think supporters
of the treaty realize it. The fact is, if the critical moment arrives
and there is irrefutable evidence that we must conduct nuclear testing
to ensure our deterrent is safe, reliable, and credible, those same
treaty supporters will be shouting from the highest mountain that the
very act of withdrawing from this treaty would be too provocative to
ever be

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justified, that no narrow security need of the United States could ever
override the solemn commitment we made to the world in agreeing to be
bound by this treaty.
If Members don't believe that will happen, they need only to look at
our current difficulties with the 1972 ABM Treaty. I believe it
provides a chilling glimpse of our nuclear future should we ratify an
ill-conceived test ban at this time. As is the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, the ABM Treaty is of unlimited duration. There are many
parallels. That is one of them. The ABM Treaty includes a provision
allowing the United States to withdraw if our national interests so
demand, another very clear parallel and treaty obligations are more
clearly mismatched than with the ABM Treaty today. It is very difficult
to imagine a situation in which the national security interests we have
could be more clearly mismatched than with the ABM Treaty. Its
supporters insist, though, that withdrawal is not just ill advised, but
supporters would say it is unthinkable. The voices wailing loudest
about changing this obsolete agreement are the same ones urging us
today to entangle ourselves in another treaty of unlimited duration.

Earlier, Senator Kyl rightly pointed out that the negotiators for
this treaty originally wanted a 10-year treaty. Previous Presidents
wanted a treaty of limited duration, but we have before us one that
would lock us into a commitment in perpetuity.
Think of the ways in which the ABM Treaty is mismatched with our
modern security needs. Yet we confront our absolute unwillingness to
consider any option to withdraw. The treaty was conceived in a
strategic context utterly unlike today's, a bipolar world in which two
superpowers were engaged in both a global rivalry and an accompanying
buildup in strategic nuclear forces. Now, today, is a totally different
context and situation. One of those superpowers no longer exists at
all. What remains of that superpower struggles to secure its own
borders against poorly armed militants.
The arms race that supposedly justified the ABM Treaty's perverse
deification of vulnerability has not just halted, it has reversed, no
thanks to arms control. Today, Russian nuclear forces are plummeting
due not to the START II agreement--which Russia has refused to ratify
for nearly 7 years--but to economic constraints and the end of the cold
war. In fact, their forces are falling far faster than treaties can
keep up with; arms control isn't ``controlling'' anything; economic and
strategic considerations are. Similar forces have led the United States
to conclude that its forces can also be reduced. Thus, despite a
strategic environment completely different from the one that gave birth
to the ABM Treaty, its supporters stubbornly insist we must remain a
party to it.
In 1972, only the Soviet Union had the capability to target the
United States with long-range ballistic missiles. Today, numerous rogue
states are diligently working to acquire long-range missiles with which
to coerce the United States or deter it from acting in its interests,
and these weapons are so attractive precisely because we have no
defense against them; indeed, we are legally prohibited from defending
against them by the ABM Treaty of 1972.
Technologically, too, the ABM Treaty is obsolete. The kinetic kill
vehicle that destroyed an ICBM high over the Pacific Ocean on October 2
was undreamed of in 1972. So was the idea of a 747 equipped with a
missile-killing laser, which is under construction now in Washington
State, or space-based tracking satellites like SBIRS-Low, so precise
that they may make traditional ground-based radars superfluous in
missile defense. Yet this ABM Treaty, negotiated almost three decades
ago, stands in the way of many of these technological innovations that
could provide the United States with the protection it needs against
the world's new threats.
Now proponents of this new treaty will say we can always pull out,
that if situations and circumstances change, we can always invoke our
national security provision and we can withdraw from this treaty. If in
the future we find we must test in order to ensure the stability and
reliability and safety of our nuclear deterrent, we can pull out and do
that. I suggest that that is not even a remote possibility. Once we
make this commitment, just as we did on the 1972 ABM Treaty, there will
be no withdrawing, there will not even be consideration of the
possibility that it might be in our national interest to withdraw from
a treaty to which we have made a commitment.

These new threats today have led to a consensus that the United
States must deploy a national missile defense system and a recognition
that we are behind the curve in deploying one. The National Missile
Defense Act, calling for deployment of such a system as soon as
technologically feasible, passed this body by a vote of 97-3, with a
similar ratio of support in the House.
Just as obvious as the need for this capability is the fact that the
ABM Treaty prohibits us from deploying the very system we voted to
deploy. But does anybody talk about withdrawing from the ABM Treaty
because it is in our national security interests? Absolutely not. I
suggest we will be in the same kind of context should we ratify the
treaty that is before us today.
Clearly, the ABM Treaty must be amended or jettisoned. The Russians
have so far refused to consider amending it, so withdrawal is the most
obvious course of action if United States security interests are to be
served.
Listen to the hue and cry at even the mention of such an option
today. From Russia to China to France, and even to here on the floor of
the Senate, we have heard the cry that the United States cannot
withdraw from the ABM Treaty because it has become too important to the
world community. Those who see arms control as an end in itself oppose
even the consideration of withdrawal, claiming passionately that the
United States owes it to the world to remain vulnerable to missile
attack. Our participation in this treaty transcends narrow U.S.
security interests, they claim; we have a higher obligation to the
international community, they claim. After all, if the United States is
protected from attack, won't that just encourage others to build more
missiles in order to retain the ability to coerce us, thus threatening
the simplistic ideal of ``strategic stability''? That phrase,
translated, means that citizens of the United States must be vulnerable
to incineration or attack by biological weapons so other nations in the
world may do as they please.
Even though the ABM Treaty is hopelessly outdated--almost 30 years
old--and prevents the United States from defending its citizens against
the new threats of the 21st century, supporters of arms control insist
that withdrawal is unthinkable. Its very existence is too important to
be overridden by the mere security interests of the United States.
Absurd as such a proposition sounds, it is the current policy of this
administration, and it is supported by the very same voices who now
urge us to ratify this comprehensive test ban.
The Clinton administration has been reluctantly forced by the
Congress into taking serious action on missile defenses--thankfully. It
admits that the system it needs to meet our security requirements
cannot be deployed under the ABM Treaty. Yet so powerful are the voices
calling on the United States to subjugate its own security interests to
arms control that the administration is proposing changes to the ABM
Treaty that, by its own admission, will not allow a missile defense
system that will meet our requirements. It has declared what must be
done as ``too hard to do'' and intends to leave the mess it created for
another administration to clean up. All because arms control becomes an
end in itself.

That sorry state of affairs is where we will end up if the Senate
consents to ratification of the CTBT. Those treaty supporters who are
saying now, ``Don't worry, there is an escape clause,'' will be the
same ones who, 5 or 10 years from now--when there is a problem with our
stockpile and the National Ignition Facility is not finished and we
find out we overestimated our ability to simulate the workings of a
nuclear weapon--will be saying we dare not withdraw from this treaty
because we owe a higher debt to the international community. That is
what we will hear.
I don't represent the international community; I represent the people
of the State of Arkansas. Our decision here must serve the best
interests of

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the United States and its citizens. Our experience with the ABM Treaty
is a perfect example of how arms control agreements assume an
importance far beyond their contribution to the security of our Nation.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's unlimited duration is a virtual
guarantee that this agreement will prevent us from conducting nuclear
testing long past the point at which we decide such testing is
necessary. As our ABM experience shows, we should take no comfort from
the presence of a so-called ``supreme national interest'' clause.
Now, should we just put it off or should we vote on it? I believe our
responsibility is not the world opinion. Our responsibility is,
frankly, not the public opinion polls of the United States. The
American people, as a whole, have not had the benefit of hearing the
Directors of our National Labs or the DOD come and testify before us as
to the difficulties of verification and the difficulties of developing
our Stockpile Stewardship Program. If it is a flawed treaty--and I
believe it is--if it is a defective treaty--and I believe it is--if it
is not in our national security interest--and I believe it is not--then
we should vote, and we should vote to defeat the treaty and not ratify
it.
This is a treaty that I believe will not get better with age. It will
not get better by putting it on a shelf for consideration at some
future date. I believe it is flawed. I believe it is defective. I
believe it is not in our national security interest. I believe it is
our constitutional responsibility not to put it off but to vote our
conscience.
I urge the defeat of what I believe is a flawed treaty.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes, and then I would
be happy to yield to the Senator.
I want my colleagues to note--they may not be aware of it, and I
wasn't until a few minutes ago--as further consideration of how this
may or may not affect the events around the world there apparently has
been a coup in Pakistan where the Sharif government fired their chief
military chief of staff when he was out of the country. He came back
and decided he didn't like that. He surrounded the palace and
surrounded the Prime Minister's quarters. The word I received a few
moments ago--I suggest others check their own sources--was that there
is going to be a civilian government installed that is not Sharif, and
that the military will do the installing. I cite that to indicate to
you how fluid world events are. We should be careful about what we are
doing.
I also point out that today before the Foreign Relations Committee,
Dr. William Perry, the President's Korean policy coordinator and former
Secretary of Defense, testified that failure to ratify the CTBT will
give North Korea ``an obvious reason not to ratify the CTBT.''
Dr. Perry, the Secretary of Defense in President Clinton's first
term, endorsed ratification of the treaty. He said it serves well the
security interests of the United States.
I cite that only because it is current.
Lastly, I would say that listening with great interest to the last
several speakers I find it again fascinating that this is a lot more
than about CTBT. It is about ABM. It is about what our nuclear strategy
should be.
My friend from Arkansas, as well as others who have spoken, has great
faith in our ability to erect a nuclear shield that can keep out
incoming nuclear weapons in the scores, dozens, or potentially
hundreds, which is a monumental feat, if it can be accomplished--we may
be able to accomplish it--but don't have the confidence that those same
scientists could figure out a way to take a weapon off the nose of a
missile, look and determine whether or not it has deteriorated. I would
suggest one is considerably more difficult to do than the other. But it
is a little bit about where you place your faith.
Lastly, I, point out for those who are talking about verification--my
friend from Arizona heard me say this time and again, and I would
suggest you all go back and look at, if you were here, how you voted on
the INF Treaty, the Reagan INF Treaty, or if you weren't here, what
President Reagan said because many of my friends on the Republican side
quote Ronald Reagan when he says ``trust but verify.'' Nobody can
verify the INF Treaty. The intelligence community--and I will not read
again all of the detail; it is in the Record--indicated we could not
verify the INF Treaty, and we said and the Reagan administration said
and President Reagan said in his pushing the INF Treaty that no
verification was possible completely. Yet with the fact that we didn't
even know how many SS-20s they had, it was concluded that they could
adapt those to longer range, interchange them with shorter-range
missiles and longer-range missiles, and hide them in silos. But my
Republican colleagues had no trouble ratifying that treaty, which was
not verifiable, or was considerably less verifiable than this treaty.

If you quote President Reagan, please quote him in the context that
he used the phrase ``trust but verify.'' And he defined what he meant
by ``verify'' by his actions.
The military under President Reagan said the INF Treaty was
verifiable to the extent that they could not do anything that would
materially alter the military balance. No one argues that we cannot
verify to the extent as well. But it seems as though we apply one
standard to Republican-sponsored treaties by Republican Presidents and
a different standard to a treaty proposed by a Democratic President. I
find that, as you might guess, fascinating. I will remind people of it
now and again and again and again. But I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I think my colleague from New Hampshire
wishes to speak. Let me take a minute before he does to respond to two
things that the Senator from Delaware said.
I find it interesting that North Korea would be used as the example
of a country that will pursue nuclear weapons if we don't ratify the
test ban treaty, according to Secretary Perry.
Mr. BIDEN. That is not what he said, if I may interrupt, if I could
quote what he said.
Mr. KYL. Please do.
Mr. BIDEN. He said it will give North Korea ``an obvious reason not
to ratify CTBT.'' He did not say it will give them reason to produce
nuclear weapons.
Mr. KYL. I think that is a very important distinction. I thank my
colleague for making it because, clearly, North Korea is not going to
be persuaded to eschew nuclear weapons by the United States ratifying
the CTBT. North Korea will do whatever it wants to do regardless of
what we do. That is pretty clear. To suggest that we need to ratify
this treaty in order to satisfy North Korea is absurd.
North Korea is a member of the nonproliferation treaty right now. By
definition, North Korea is in violation of that treaty if it ever
decides to test a nuclear weapon because it would be affirming the fact
that it possesses a nuclear weapon which is in violation of the NPT.
North Korea is not a country the behavior of which we can affect one
way or the other by virtue of a moratorium on testing. If that were the
case, then North Korea would have long ago decided to forego the
development of nuclear weapons because the United States hasn't tested
for 8 years. Clearly, our actions have had no influence on North Korea,
except to cause North Korea to blackmail the United States by
threatening to develop nuclear weapons and by threatening to develop
missiles unless we will pay them tribute. I don't think North Korea is
a very good example to be citing as a reason for the United States to
affirm the CTBT.

Moreover, I remember this argument a couple of years ago when the
chemical weapons treaty was being brought before the body. They said
this was the only way to get North Korea to sign up to the CWC, and we
certainly wanted North Korea to be a signatory to that treaty because
they might use chemical weapons someday. We ratified it. They still
haven't signed up--2 years later. I don't think North Korea is going to
care one way or the other whether the United States ratifies the CTBT.
To my friend's other point on the comparison between nuclear weapons
and missile defense, I think it makes our point. Missile defenses can
work.

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They are not easy to develop. We have seen several tests that failed
with the THAAD system. What it demonstrated to us was that testing is
required to know that missile defense will work, just as the experts
have all indicated testing is the preferred method of knowing whether
our nuclear weapons will work.
So I think it makes the point that either for missile defense or for
nuclear weapons testing it is the best way to know whether it will
work. That is why we need to test both the missile defense systems that
we have in development right now, and that is why we need the option of
being able to test our nuclear weapons as well.
Mr. BIDEN. I wish to respond, if I may. I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. KYL. We may put off the Senator from New Hampshire for a good
time.
Mr. BIDEN. I hope not.
My friend from Arizona, as I said, is one of the most skillful
debaters and lawyers in here. He never says anything that is not true.
But sometimes he says things that do not matter much to the argument.
For example, he said nuclear testing is the preferred method. It sure
is. Flying home is a preferred method to get there. But I can get there
just as easily and surely by taking the train. It is preferred to fly
home. I get home faster when I fly home. But the train gets me home. In
fact, I can drive home. All three methods can verify for my wife that I
have come from Washington to my front door. They are all verifiable.
They all get the job done. It is the preferred method.
By the way, it is the preferred method to have underground testing.
It is the preferred method to have above-ground testing. That is the
preferred method to make sure everything is working.
If I took the logic of his argument to its logical extension, I would
say, well, you know, my friend from Arizona wanting underground testing
is, in fact, denying the scientists their total capacity to understand
exactly what has happened by denying atmospheric testing. The preferred
method is atmospheric testing. What difference does it make if we can
guarantee the reliability of the weapon?

The question with regard to North Korea I pose this way: If we ratify
the treaty, and my friend from Arizona is correct that North Korea does
not, so what. There is no treaty. It does not go into force. They have
to ratify the treaty for it to go into force. What is the problem? If a
country is certain it will not matter, they are not going to ratify or
abide. Then (a) they don't ratify, we are not in, we are not bound; (b)
if they are in and they do a nuclear explosion underground, we are out,
according to the last paragraph of our amendment. The President has to
get out of the treaty. Must--not may, must. These are what we used to
call in law school red herrings. They are effective but red herrings.
The last point, I heard people stand up on the floor and say: This
country is already or is about to violate the NPT, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, by exploding a nuclear weapon. Guess what. They
are allowed, under the NPT, to blow up things: nuclear bombs, nuclear
weapons, nuclear explosions. They don't call them ``weapons''; they say
it is a nuclear explosion, as long as it is for peaceful means. How
does one determine whether or not an underground test which has
plutonium imploded and has set off a chain reaction was for peaceful,
as opposed to nonpeaceful, means? That is a nuclear test.
We ought to get our facts straight. The distinctions make a
difference. It is true; it is hard to verify whether or not anybody
violated the NPT because if they are caught, that country says it was
for peaceful reasons, dealing with peaceful uses of their nuclear
capability.
I have heard a lot of non sequiturs today. My only point in raising
North Korea was the idea that anybody who thinks we are going to be in
a position that if we turn this treaty down there is any possibility we
will stop testing anywhere in the world is kidding themselves.
I say to my colleagues, ask yourself the rhetorical question. Do you
want to be voting down a treaty on the day there is a coup in Pakistan.
Good luck, folks. I am not suggesting that a vote one way or another is
dispositive of what Pakistan would or wouldn't do. But I will
respectfully suggest we will be answering the rest of the year, the
rest of the decade, whether or not what we did at that critical moment
and what is going on between India and Pakistan and within Pakistan was
affected by our actions.
I conclude by saying, in the middle of the Carter administration
there was a little debate about this notion of a neutron bomb. The
American Government put pressure on Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of
Germany at the time, to agree to deployment of the neutron bomb in
Europe--a difficult position for him to take as a member of the SPD. He
made the decision, and then President Carter decided not to deploy the
neutron bomb. I remember how upset the Chancellor of Germany was. The
Chancellor of Germany was not inclined to speak to the President of the
United States.
I was like that little kid in the commercial with the cereal sitting
on the table. There are two 10-year-olds and a 6-year-old. The 10-year-
old asks: Who eats that? Mom and dad. Is it any good? You try it. The
other kid says: No, you try it. They both turn to the 6-year-old and
say: Mikey will try it.
I was ``Mikey.'' I got sent to Germany to meet with Schmidt, to sit
down at the little conference table in the Chancellor's office to
discuss our relationship. I will never forget something Chancellor
Schmidt said--and I will not violate any security issue; it is probably
long past a need to be secure--in frustration, while he was smoking his
19th cigarette similar to Golda Meir, a chain-smoker, he pounded his
hand on the table and said: You don't understand, Joe; when the United
States sneezes, Europe catches a cold. When the United States sneezes,
Europe catches a cold.
When we act on gigantic big-ticket items such as a treaty affecting
the whole world and nuclear weapons, whether we intend it or not, the
world reacts. This is not a very prudent time to be voting on this
treaty, I respectfully suggest.
I yield the floor.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask my colleague from New Hampshire to
delay his remarks for a moment so I can make a point and perhaps ask
Senator Biden, if he could answer a question regarding something he has
said.
I think it is, first of all, dangerous to suggest that the Senate
cannot do its business with respect to a treaty because a coup is
occurring in another country. I fail to see, if the coup is occurring
today and tomorrow, and we reject the CTBT, how anyone could argue our
action precipitated this coup. Or somehow by failing to approve this
treaty we caused unrest in Pakistan.
I ask the Senator to answer that question on his own time. First, I
make another point. I wasn't trying to make a debater's point but
trying to be absolutely conservative in what I said a moment ago.
Mr. BIDEN. I never thought the Senator was liberal in what he said.
Mr. KYL. And I appreciate that more than you know.
When I say that testing was the preferred method, what the lab
Directors and former officials who have had responsibility for this
have said with these highly complex weapons is that testing is the
preferred method.
They have also said in contradiction to the Senator from Delaware
that there is no certainty with respect to the other method, which is
the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which is not complete and has not
gone into effect and cannot provide certainty, in any event.
Dr. John Foster, who chairs the congressional committee to assess the
efficacy of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, said this in his
testimony last week:

I oppose ratification of the CTBT because without the
ability to perform nuclear weapons tests the reliability and
safety of our Stockpile Stewardship Program will degrade.

There is nobody who is more respected in this field than Dr. John
Foster.
He further said the testing, which has been performed over the years,
``has clearly shown our ability to calculate and simulate their
operation is incomplete. Our understanding of their basic physics is
seriously deficient. Hence, I can only answer that a ban on testing of
our nuclear weapons can only have a negative impact on the reliability
of the stockpile.''

[[Page S12378]]

Dr. Robert Barker, former assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Atomic Energy, who reported the certification of the stockpile to three
Secretaries of Defense, said:

Sustained nuclear testing is the only demonstrated way of
maintaining a safe and reliable deterrent. Our confidence in
the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons has already
declined since 1992, the year we deprived ourselves of the
nuclear testing tool. It should be of grave concern to us
that this degradation in confidence cannot be quantified.

The point is that the reason testing is preferred is because it is
the only demonstrable way of assuring ourselves of the safety and
reliability of our nuclear stockpile. There could be, may be, in a
decade or so, some additional confidence or assurance through a
successful Stockpile Stewardship Program but we won't know that until
the time. Until then, that is why testing is the preferred method. It
is the only way to assure the safety and reliability of our stockpile.
To respond to that and to respond to the first question I asked, I am
happy to yield to the Senator.
Mr. BIDEN. I will try to respond briefly.
No. 1, to suggest our actions would affect the international
community should not be taken in the context and consideration of what
is happening in the international community is naive in the extreme. It
is not suggesting anyone should dictate what we should or should not
do. It is suggesting that it makes sense to take into consideration
what is happening around the world and what appropriate or
inappropriate conclusion from our action will be drawn by other
countries. We have always done that in our undertakings around the
world. It is just responsible stewardship of our national security.

The suggestion was not that because there is a coup, failure to
ratify this treaty, turning it down or ratifying it would have affected
that coup. That is not the issue. The issue is there is a struggle
today within Pakistan, evidenced by the coup, as there was within
India, as evidenced by their recent elections, about what they should
do with their nuclear capacity, whether they should test further,
enhance it, and deploy it, or whether or not they should refrain from
testing and sign the treaty.
The only point I am making is that our actions will impact upon that
debate within those countries. The debate happens to be taking place in
the context of a military coup right now in Pakistan. It took place in
the context of an election where the BJP won and made significant gains
in India just last week, but it does impact upon that.
We lose any leverage we have to impose upon Pakistan, which still
wants to deal with us, still relies upon us or interfaces with us in a
number of areas in terms of food, trade, and aid all the way through to
military relationships. It does make a difference if we are able to say
to them, I posit: We want you to refrain from testing and sign on to
this treaty if, in fact, we have done it. If we say: We want you to
refrain from testing and sign on to the treaty, but by the way, we
already have 6,000 of these little things and we are going to test
ourselves, it makes it very difficult to make that case.
Lastly, I say with regard to Pakistan, it is not so much what anyone
will be able to prove; it will be what will be asserted. We all know in
politics what is asserted is sometimes more important than what is
provable. It should not be, but it is. It does have ramifications
domestically and internationally, I suggest.
Also, with regard to this issue of the preferred versus the only
method by which we can guarantee the reliability of our stockpile,
nobody, including the present lab Directors, suggests that our present
stockpile is, in fact, unreliable or not safe.
We have not tested since 1992. The issue is, and my colleague knows
this, the intersection--and it is clear if we do not test, if we do
nothing to the stockpile, it will over time degrade, just like my
friend and I as we approach our older years, as a matter of medical
fact, our memories fade. It is a medical fact.
To suggest that because our memories fade we should not listen to
someone on the floor who is 8 years older than someone else would be
viewed by everyone as mildly preposterous because when that older
person was younger, their memory may have been so far superior to the
person who is younger now that they still have a better memory. It does
not make a point. It is a distinction without a difference.
It is the same way with regard to our stockpile degrading. At what
point does the degradation occur that it is no longer reliable? I asked
that of Secretary Schlesinger. He said he thinks we are down from 99
percent to about 85 percent now, and he thinks there is no worry at
that 85-percent level. But what he worries about, and then he held up a
little graph and the graph showed based on years and amount of
reliability this curve going down like this, at the same time there was
a dotted line showing the Stockpile Stewardship Program and how that
mirrored that ability to intersect with where we would intersect
our confidence that our Stockpile Stewardship Program would be able to
assure that the stockpile was reliable.

It comes around where the shelf life of these weapons occur about 10
years out. Everyone has said that between now and then, the
overwhelming body of opinion is, from the Jason Group to other leading
scientists, including these 32 Nobel laureates in physics, the
Stockpile Stewardship Program is working now and will if we make the
commitment to intersect at a point where the shelf life begins to
change where it continues to guarantee.
We are never going to be in that line where it is so degraded that
any lab Director will have to say: Mr. President, I cannot certify
anymore.
But as a fail safe, no pun intended, for that possibility--that is
why the amendment was just adopted--the amendment says in the last
paragraph, if that happens and a lab Director tells the President that
has happened and it cannot certify in terms of reliability, the
President must get out of the treaty.
It is true; we are stringing together a lot of true statements that
are not particularly relevant to the question, and the question is: Is
our stockpile now reliable and safe? Is it a deterrent still? Do other
people believe it? Is it a deterrent so that our allies believe it and
they do not go nuclear, such as Japan and Germany? And is it a
deterrent so that our potential enemies, such as China and Russia and
others, believe it so they will not try to do anything that will
jeopardize our security? That is the second question.
The third question is: Are we able to verify this?
My answer to all three of those questions is, yes, yes, yes. And the
answer of the overwhelming body of opinion is yes, yes, yes. But just
in case it is no, the President has to get out. He has to get out. We
just adopted a condition, so he has to get out.
By the way, I listened to people being quoted, like Edward Teller.
God love him. I had the great honor of debating him around the country
on four setup debates. It was intimidating because he would stand there
with those bushy eyelashes and say: My young friend from Delaware does
not know--here is the guy who invented the hydrogen bomb. What am I
going to say? Yeah, right?
I would listen to him, and he would even get me thinking he was right
for a while. Then I would listen to what he said. Last night, I watched
a documentary that is 7 or 8--actually, it is older than that; it was
President Reagan's last year--on the Star Wars notion. Dr. Teller was
sitting there, a very distinguished man, saying things like--and I will
get the exact quote for the Record tomorrow--but he said things like:
We must act now because the Russians are on the verge of having a
missile defense capability.
On the verge; they were on the verge of collapsing. He is never right
about his predictions, so far. But he did invent the hydrogen bomb.
That is a big deal. I cannot argue with that. As my mother would say,
just because you can do one thing well does not mean you can do
everything well. If I need to blow somebody up, I want him with me. If
I need somebody to predict to me what is going to happen in terms of
our interest, of our adversaries, or us, he ``ain't'' the guy I am
going to because he has not been right.
Here we are, we are going to do this weight of authority--we all
learned, and, again, I am not kidding when I say this. Senator Kyl is
not only a first-rate lawyer, he has a first-rate mind.

[[Page S12379]]

We both went to undergraduate school and took courses in logic. We
learned about the 13 logical falacies. We engage in them all the time.
One is the appeal of authority. I will take my authority and trump your
authority. I have 32 Nobel laureates. Are you going to raise me with
six Secretaries of Defense? I have four of the last five Chairmen of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with what are you going to raise me? This is
crazy.
What is true is that it is better to test if you want to know for
certain whether weapons are reliable. I hope if I acknowledge that, he
will acknowledge it is better not to test on one area: If you want to
discourage others from testing. Just discourage. He does not have to
agree that it would do everything, just discourage. It is better not to
test.
If you tell your kid he cannot smoke and you are standing there
smoking and saying: By the way, you can't smoke, it kind of undermines
your credibility.
On the other hand, if you do not smoke--like I don't--and say to your
kid, you can't smoke, they may smoke anyway; but one thing is for
certain: If you are smoking--as my friend who is presiding would say in
a different context--you might lose your moral authority to make the
case.
I think we lose our moral authority to make the case internationally
when we say: By the way, we are unquestionably the most powerful
nuclear nation in the history of the world, and in relative terms we
are far in excess of anyone else, including the former Soviets--now the
Russians--that the Chinese are not, as they say where I come from, a
``patch on our trousers,'' that the Libyans and others may be able to
get themselves a Hiroshima bomb, but they are going to have to carry it
in a suitcase--it ``ain't'' close.
But I tell you what: Because we worry about our reliability--even
though we are going to spend $45 billion, even though we have the best
scientists in the world, the best scientists that we can attract from
other parts of the world--we know we can put up a shield around America
that can stop 10, 20, 100, 1,000 hydrogen bombs from dropping on the
United States--but we believe that we have to test our nuclear weapons
now or be able to test them in the near term in order to be able to
assure that we are safe and secure and that you believe we are
credible.
I will end where I began this debate a long time ago. When the
Senator from New Hampshire and I were college kids, you used to ride
along--he was heading off to Vietnam--and there used to be a bumper
sticker which said: One hydrogen bomb can ruin your day. It just takes
one. One hydrogen bomb can ruin your day.
We are not talking about one hydrogen bomb. No one is doubting that
1,000 people and 15 nations in the world can develop not a hydrogen
bomb but a nuclear bomb like the one dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
No doubt about that. This is not going to stop that. This isn't going
to guarantee that because you do not, everyone has to test that. They
can do that without testing. We dropped it without testing it. The
second one we did not test. So they can test; they cannot test.
But, folks, this is high-stakes poker. All I am saying to you is, you
take the worst case scenario my friends lay out, that we have the
stockpile, but we cannot guarantee it, and we cannot detect testing,
and we have an escape clause--you get out of it because the treaty is
not working. That is their worst case scenario. The escape clause is we
have to get out because it says we must get out.
Let me tell you my worst case scenario. My worst case scenario is we,
in fact, do not sign this treaty, and the Chinese decide all moral
restraints are off--even though they are not particularly a moral
country--we can now, with impunity, go and test and not be buffeted by
world opinion in terms of affecting our trade or our commerce and the
rest. We can go from 16, 18, 20--however many intercontinental
ballistic missiles they have--we can now test to build lighter, smaller
ones with that information we stole from the laboratories. We can now
MIRV our missiles.
The Pakistanis and the Indians agree that: Look, what we have to do
is now deploy nuclear weapons because the restraints are off.
I do not know what we do with that worst case scenario. There is
nothing the President can say, such as: By the way, stop. Out. I want
to pull out. You all can't do that. China, you can't do that. There is
no way out of that one.

This is not like us making the mistake on a tax bill. This is not
like us making a mistake on a piece of welfare or social legislation.
We can correct that in a day. I have been here when we passed reforms
on health care that within 6 months we repealed because we thought it
was a mistake.
You cannot legislate on this floor of the Senate a course of action
that the world is engaged in, a road that has been been taken down away
from nonproliferation to proliferation by a piece of legislation. I
cannot guarantee the Presiding Officer that if this passes there will
not be more proliferation of nuclear weapons.
But I am prepared to bet you anything, if we reject this treaty,
there will be significantly more proliferation of nuclear capability
than there was before because there would be no restraint whatsoever on
the one thing every nation has to do to become a nuclear power that is
not already a significant nuclear power--and that is to test.
I yield the floor.
Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Collins). The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Madam President, let me make a couple comments and then I
will yield to the Senator from New Hampshire.
I appreciate the Senator from Delaware making a slight concession,
and asking for one in return. His concession, of course, is that it is
better to test. I think we would all agree it is better to test. The
question is whether or not there is an adequate substitute if we do not
test. And upon that the jury is still out.
He also asked the question: Isn't it also better not to test if we
can persuade others not to do so by our own willingness to forego
testing? I think that question has actually been answered because for 8
years we have had a moratorium seeking to persuade others not to test.
During that time, we know of at least five countries that have tested:
France, China, Russia, Pakistan, and India. So it is clear that our
foregoing testing has not created the norm against testing that
proponents of the treaty would like to see.
It is also not better to forego testing in an effort to get others to
do so as well if, in fact, our own stockpile would be unduly
jeopardized as a result. On that, there has been a variety of expert
opinion testifying this past week suggesting that the reason it is
better to test is precisely because we cannot confirm the safety and
reliability of our stockpile to an adequate degree of certainty without
that.
To the question of whether or not it is a fallacy of logic to quote
experts, I would simply suggest that while it may not be the most
persuasive argument in the world to quote experts in support of your
position, it is at least some weight of evidence. Both sides have
engaged in that. It is true that on many of these issues there are
opinions on both sides of the issue.
Dr. Edward Teller certainly is an expert in nuclear weapons design
and on many other matters that relate to it. But let's assume he does
not know what he is talking about here and go to people whose job it
was to verify a compliance with arms control treaties.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a letter dated
October 1, 1999, from Fred Eimer, Former Assistant Director of ACDA,
the Arms Control Agency Verification and Implementation Office, to
Senator Helms.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

October 1, 1999.
Senator Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I write to express my opposition to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Numerous experts have
noted that this treaty raises serious questions regarding the
ability of the United States to maintain our nuclear
deterrent. I am particularly concerned, however, that the
United States will be disproportionately harmed by the test
ban. Other nations will be able to conduct militarily
significant nuclear test well below the verification
threshold of the Treaty's monitoring system, and our own
unilateral capability.
I have listened with concern to the various claims being
made regarding the CTBT's

[[Page S12380]]

International Monitoring System (IMS). It is important to
note that the IMS will have serious limitations. While many
in the U.S. recognize the IMS' technical limitations, it is
being oversold internationally as a comprehensive, effective
monitoring regime.
Supporters of the CTBT have sought to divert attention from
the IMS' limitations by emphasizing that the United States
will have its own national technical means (NTM) of
verification and would have the right under the Treaty to
request an on-site inspection. The United States cannot take
comfort in these claims.
The U.S. has stated that an effective verification system
``should be capable of identifying and attributing with high
confidence evasively conducted nuclear explosions of about a
few kilotons yield in broad areas of the globe''. That degree
of verifiability is a goal that is not achieved now, and it
is far from certain that it will be met in the foreseeable
future. It is very unlikely that the verification system will
provide evidence sufficient for U.S. or collective action
should tests of a few kilotons yield take place.
The capability of the U.S. and of the International
Monitoring System (IMS) to detect seismic signals of possible
nuclear test origin can be quantified. Charts can show what
that capability is for the U.S. network, the current IMS and
a possible future IMS for all areas of the world. Thousands
of seismic events will be detected yearly by these systems.
The verification task will be to determine which, if any, of
these signals can be identified as being from nuclear tests.
The large underground tests conducted in past decades were
easily verified as being of nuclear origin. However,
identification of possible future tests in the kiloton yield
range in violation of a CTBT will be a daunting task in most,
if not all instances.
The relationship between detection and identification
depends on a number of factors that will not be known. If
charts are produced that purport to show the identification
capability for areas of interest throughout the world, those
charts would be a result of subjective judgements that are
likely to of limited and uncertain dependability.
You may recall that over the decades of the TTBT that there
was much controversy about the yields of tests that were
deduced from seismic signal magnitudes. This was true even
though the Soviet test sites were studied more than almost
any other part of the world and the signals in question
came from relatively large tests.
It is certain that whatever the minimum detectable yield
capability is of a seismic network, the verification
capability, that is, the ability for identification is
substantially worse, by as much as a factor of ten or more in
some instances.
Furthermore, possible Treaty violators can take steps to
make detection and identification more difficult. For
example, the technique of ``decoupling'', that is, testing in
a sufficiently large cavity, can reduce the seismic magnitude
of a test. Every country of concern to the United States is
technically capable of decoupling at least its small nuclear
explosions.
While in the past primary reliance for obtaining
verification related intelligence was placed on systems that
collected photographic, seismic and other data, the CTBT's
verification system includes on-site inspection (OSI). I
believe that the value of OSI is very limited for the CTBT.
The CTBT's on-site inspection regime is unlikely to provide
evidence of noncompliance. However, it may permit a country
falsely accused of a CTBT violation to help clear its name.
Tests large enough to be unambiguously identified do not need
OSI. For small tests the location of the source of the
seismic signals would be so uncertain, that OSI would need to
cover an impractical large area. Furthermore, it is highly
dubious that the United States would get diplomatic approval
for an on-site inspection since the treaty has a ``red-
light'' requirement that 30 of 51 members must endorse such a
step. The CTBT's negotiating record makes clear that an OSI
request would be viewed as a hostile action.
Furthermore, the OSI regime associated with the Treaty has
a number of as yet unsettled procedural and implementation
issues. It is possible that some of these can be fixed.
However, OSI has very little to offer for confirming that a
nuclear test has been conducted, even if these issues are
resolved.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the proposed treaty will put
our nuclear deterrent at risk without significant arms
control or nonproliferation benefit. Other nations will be
able to conduct militarily significant nuclear test well
below the verification threshold of the Treaty's monitoring
system, and our own unilateral capability.
Best regards.

Fred Eimer,

Former Assistant Director, ACDA,
Verification and Implementation.

Mr. KYL. In this letter he said:

Other nations will be able to conduct militarily
significant nuclear tests well below the verification
threshold of the Treaty's monitoring system, and our own
unilateral capability.

In other words, the treaty is not verifiable.
Testifying last week, one of the experts acknowledged by Senator
Biden, Dr. Paul Robinson, who is the Director of the Sandia National
Laboratories, said:

The treaty bans any ``nuclear explosion,'' but
unfortunately, compliance with the strict zero-yield
requirement is unverifiable.

Finally, the third and most prominent of all experts that I would
like to suggest we pay some attention to with respect to verification
is our own colleague, Senator Richard Lugar from Indiana. I ask
unanimous consent that his press release, dated October 7, 1999, be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Lugar Opposes Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Senator Dick Lugar, a senior member of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, Foreign Relations Committee and
National Security Working Group, released the following
statement today announcing his position on the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty:
The Senate is poised to begin consideration of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty under a unanimous consent
agreement that will provide for 14 hours of general debate,
debate on two amendments, and a final vote on ratification.
I regret that the Senate is taking up the treaty in an
abrupt and truncated manner that is so highly politicized.
Admittedly, the CTBT is not a new subject for the Senate.
Those of us who over the years have sat on the Foreign
Relations, Armed Services, or Intelligence Committees are
familiar with it. The Senate has held hearings and briefings
on the treaty in the past.
But for a treaty of this complexity and importance a more
sustained and focused effort is important. Senators must have
a sufficient opportunity to examine the treaty in detail, ask
questions of our military and the administration, consider
the possible implications, and debate at length in committee
and on the floor. Under the current agreement, a process that
normally would take many months has been reduced to a few
days. Many Senators know little about this treaty. Even for
those of us on national security committees, this has been an
issue floating on the periphery of our concerns.
Presidential leadership has been almost entirely absent on
the issue. Despite having several years to make a case for
ratification, the administration has declined to initiate the
type of advocacy campaign that should accompany any treaty of
this magnitude.
Nevertheless, the Senate has adopted an agreement on
procedure. So long as that agreement remains in force,
Senators must move forward as best they can to express their
views and reach informed conclusions about the treaty.
In anticipation of the general debate, I will state my
reasons for opposing ratification of the CTBT.
The goal of the CTBT is to ban all nuclear explosions
worldwide: I do not believe it can succeed. I have little
confidence that the verification and enforcement provisions
will dissuade other nations from nuclear testing.
Furthermore, I am concerned about our country's ability to
maintain the integrity and safety of our own nuclear arsenal
under the conditions of the treaty.
I am a strong advocate of effective and verifiable arms
control agreements. As a former Vice-Chairman of the Senate
Arms Control Observer Group and a member of the Foreign
Relations Committee, I have had the privilege of managing
Senate consideration of many arms control treaties and
agreements.
I fought for Senate consent to ratification of the INF
Treaty, which banned intermediate range nuclear weapons in
Europe; the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which
created limits on the number of tanks, helicopters, and
armored personnel carriers in Europe; the START I Treaty,
which limited the United States and the Soviet Union to 6,500
nuclear weapons; the START II Treaty, which limited the U.S.
and the former Soviet Union to 3,500 nuclear weapons; and the
Chemical Weapons Convention, which outlawed poison gas.
These treaties, while not ensuring U.S. security, have made
us safer. They have greatly reduced the amount of weaponry
threatening the United States, provided extensive
verification measures, and served as a powerful statement of
the intent of the United States to curtail the spread of
weapons of mass destruction.
I understand the impulse of the proponents of the CTBT to
express U.S. leadership in another area of arms
control. Inevitably, arms control treaties are accompanied
by idealistic principles that envision a future in which
international norms prevail over the threat of conflict
between nations. However, while affirming our desire for
international peace and stability, the U.S. Senate is
charged with the constitutional responsibility of making
hard judgments about the likely outcomes of treaties. This
requires that we examine the treaties in close detail and
calculate the consequences of ratification for the present
and the future. Viewed in this context, I cannot support
the treaty's ratification.
I do not believe that the CTBT is of the same caliber as
the arms control treaties that have come before the Senate in
recent decades. Its usefulness to the goal of non-
proliferation is highly questionable. Its likely
ineffectuality will risk undermining support and confidence
in the concept of multi-lateral arms control. Even as a
symbolic

[[Page S12381]]

statement of our desire for a safer world, it is problematic
because it would exacerbate risks and uncertainties related
to the safety of our nuclear stockpile.

STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

The United States must maintain a reliable nuclear
deterrent for the foreseeable future. Although the Cold War
is over, significant threats to our country still exist. At
present our nuclear capability provides a deterrent that is
crucial to the safety of the American people and is relied
upon as a safety umbrella by most countries around the world.
One of the most critical issues under the CTBT would be that
of ensuring the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons
stockpile without testing. The safe maintenance and storage
of these weapons is a crucial concern. We cannot allow them
to fall into disrepair or permit their safety to be called
into question.
The Administration has proposed an ambitious program that
would verify the safety and reliability of our weapons
through computer modeling and simulations. Unfortunately, the
jury is still out on the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The
last nine years have seen improvements, but the bottom line
is that the Senate is being asked to trust the security of
our country to a program that is unproven and unlikely to be
fully operational until perhaps 2010. I believe a National
Journal article, by James Kitfield, summed it up best by
quoting a nuclear scientist who likens the challenge of
maintaining the viability of our stockpile without testing to
``walking an obstacle course in the dark when your last
glimpse of light was a flash of lightning back in 1992.''
The most likely problems facing our stockpile are a
result components degrade in unpredictable ways, in some
cases causing weapons to fail. This is compounded by the
fact that the U.S. currently has the oldest inventory in
the history of our nuclear weapons programs.
Over the last forty years, a large percentage of the weapon
designs in our stockpile have required post-deployment tests
to resolve problems. Without these tests, not only would the
problems have remained undetected, but they also would have
gone unrepaired. The Congressional Research Service reported
last year that: ``A problem with one warhead type can affect
hundreds of thousands of individually deployed warheads; with
only 9 types of warheads expected to be in the stockpile in
2000, compared to 30 in 1985, a single problem could affect a
large fraction of the U.S. nuclear force.'' If we are to put
our faith in a program other than testing to ensure the
safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent and thus our
security, we must have complete faith in its efficacy. The
Stockpile Stewardship Program falls well short of that
standard.
The United States has chosen to re-manufacture our aging
stockpile rather than creating and building new weapon
designs. This could be a potential problem because many of
the components and procedures used in original weapon designs
no longer exist. New production procedures need to be
developed and substituted for the originals, but we must
ensure that the re-manufactured weapons will work as
designed.
I am concerned further by the fact that some of the weapons
in our arsenal are not as safe as we could make them. Of the
nine weapon designs currently in our arsenal, only one
employs all of the most modern safety and security measures.
Our nuclear weapons laboratories are unable to provide the
American people with these protections because of the
inability of the Stockpile Stewardship Program to completely
mimic testing.
At present, I am not convinced the Stockpile Stewardship
Program will permit our experts to maintain a credible
deterrent in the absence of testing. Without a complete,
effective, and proven Stockpile Stewardship Program, the CTBT
could erode our ability to discover and fix problems with the
nuclear stockpile and to make safety improvements.
In fact, the most important debate on this issue may be an
honest discussion of whether we should commence limited
testing and continue such a program with consistency and
certainty.

verification

President Reagan's words ``trust but verify'' remain an
important measuring stick of whether a treaty serves the
national security interests of the United States. The U.S.
must be confident of its ability to detect cheating among
member states. While the exact thresholds are classified, it
is commonly understood that the United States cannot detect
nuclear explosions below a few kilotons of yield. The
Treaty's verification regime, which includes an international
monitoring system and on-site inspections, was designed to
fill the gaps in our national technical means. Unfortunately,
the CTBT's verification regime will not be up to that task
even if it is ever fully deployed.
Advances in mining technologies have enabled nations to
smother nuclear tests, allowing them to conduct tests with
little chance of being detected. Similarly, countries can
utilize existing geologic formations to decouple their
nuclear tests, thereby dramatically reducing the seismic
signal produced and rendering the test undetectable. A recent
Washington Post article points out that part of the problem
of detecting suspected Russian tests at Novaya Zemlya is that
the incidents take place in a large granite cave that has
proven effective in muffling tests.
The verification regime is further bedeviled by the lack of
a common definition of a nuclear test. Russia believes hydro-
nuclear activities and sub-critical experiments are permitted
under the treaty. The U.S. believes sub-critical experiments
are permitted but hydro-nuclear tests are not. Other states
believe both are illegal. A common understanding or
definition of what is and what is not permitted under the
treaty has not been established.
Proponents point out that if the U.S. needs additional
evidence to detect violations, on-site inspections can be
requested. Unfortunately, the CTBT will utilize a red-light
inspection process. Requests for on-site inspections must be
approved by at least 30 affirmative votes of members of the
Treaty's 51-member Executive Council. In other words, if the
United States accused another country of carrying out a
nuclear test, we could only get an inspection if 29 other
nations concurred with our request. In addition, each country
can declare a 50 square kilometer area of its territory as
off limits to any inspections that are approved.
The CTBT stands in stark contrast to the Chemical Weapons
Convention in the area of verifiability. Whereas the CTBT
requires an affirmative vote of the Executive Council for an
inspection to be approved, the CWC requires an affirmative
vote to stop an inspection from proceeding. Furthermore, the
CWC did not exclude large tracts of land from the inspection
regime, as does the CTBT.
The CTBT's verification regime seems to be the embodiment
of everything the United States has been fighting against in
the UNSCOM inspection process in Iraq. We have rejected
Iraq's position of choosing and approving the national origin
of inspectors. In addition, the 50 square kilometer
inspection-free zones could become analogous to the
controversy over the inspections of Iraqi presidential
palaces. The UNSCOM experience is one that is best not
repeated under a CTBT.

enforcement

Let me turn to some enforcement concerns. Even if the
United States were successful in utilizing the laborious
verification regime and non-compliance was detected, the
Treaty is almost powerless to respond. This treaty simply has
no teeth. Arms control advocates need to reflect on the
possible damage to the concept of arms control if we embrace
a treaty that comes to be perceived as ineffectual. Arms
control based only on a symbolic purpose can breed cynicism
in the process and undercut support for more substantive and
proven arms control measures.
The CTBT's answer to illegal nuclear testing is the
possible implementation of sanctions. It is clear that this
will not prove particularly compelling in the decision-making
processes of foreign states intent on building nuclear
weapons. For those countries seeking nuclear weapons, the
perceived benefits in international stature and deterrence
generally far outweigh the concern about sanctions that could
be brought to bear by the international community.
Further, recent experience has demonstrated that enforcing
effective multilateral sanctions against a country is
extraordinarily difficult. Currently, the United States is
struggling to maintain multilateral sanctions on Iraq, a
country that openly seeks weapons of mass destruction and
blatantly invaded and looted a neighboring nation, among
other transgressions. If it is difficult to maintain the
international will behind sanctions on an outlaw nation, how
would we enforce sanctions against more responsible nations
of greater commercial importance like India and Pakistan?
In particularly grave cases, the CTBT Executive Council can
bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations.
Unfortunately, this too would most likely prove ineffective,
given that permanent members of the Security Council could
veto any efforts to punish CTBT violators. Chances of a
better result in the General Assembly are remote at best.
I believe the enforcement mechanisms of the CTBT provide
little reason for countries to forego nuclear testing. Some
of my friends respond to this charge by pointing out that
even if the enforcement provisions of the treaty are
ineffective, the treaty will impose new international norms
for behavior. In this case, we have observed that ``norms''
have not been persuasive for North Korea, Iraq, Iran, India
and Pakistan, the very countries whose actions we seek to
influence through a CTBT.
If a country breaks the international norm embodied in the
CTBT, that country has already broken the norm associated
with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Countries other than
the recognized nuclear powers who attempt to test a weapon
must first manufacture or obtain a weapon, which would
constitute a violation of the NPT. I fail to see how an
additional norm will deter a motivated nation from developing
nuclear weapons after violating the longstanding norm of the
NPT.

conclusion

[[Page S12382]]

to doing so. The treaty is flawed with an ineffective
verification regime and a practically nonexistent enforcement
process.
For these reasons, I will vote against ratification of the
CTBT.

Mr. KYL. Let me quote three or four lines from it.
He said:

If we are to put our faith in a program other than testing
to ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent
and thus our security, we must have complete faith in its
efficacy. The Stockpile Stewardship Program falls well short
of that standard. . . .
At present, I am not convinced the Stockpile Stewardship
Program will permit our experts to maintain a credible
deterrent in the absence of testing.

He goes on the say:

Unfortunately, the CTBT's verification regime will not be
up to that task even if it is ever fully deployed.

He concludes his statement with this paragraph:

The Senate is being asked to rely on an unfinished and
unproven Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program might
meet our needs in the future, but as yet, it is not close to
doing so. The treaty is flawed with an ineffective
verification regime and a practically nonexistent enforcement
process.
For these reasons, I will vote against ratification of the
CTBT.

So spoke Senator Richard Lugar. I do not suggest that any of us here
in the Senate are as expert as other people I have quoted, but
certainly Senator Lugar has a reputation for being a very serious and
well-informed student of arms control issues, a proponent of arms
control treaties. When he says, as he did with respect to this treaty,
that it is simply not of the same caliber as other arms control
treaties for the variety of reasons he expresses in his release, I
think all of us should pay serious attention to that.
Madam President, it is now my pleasure, at long last, to turn to the
Senator from New Hampshire, who has been very patient in waiting for
Senator Biden and me to conclude.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I won't take the time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has the floor.
Mr. KYL. I yield to Senator Biden and then have a unanimous consent
request.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I want to print in the Record, without
taking the time from the Senator from New Hampshire, some other quotes
from Dr. Robinson from his testimony on October 7, 1999. I ask
unanimous consent they be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Written Testimony of Dr. Paul Robinson to the Armed Services Committee,
Oct. 7, 1999

Nuclear effects tests carried out in underground test
chambers were always a compromise to the actual conditions
that warheads would experience in military use. Thus, this is
not the first time that we have been challenged to do the
best job simulating phenomena which cannot be achieved
experimentally.

Mr. BIDEN. As well, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record
quotes from the October 7 testimony of Dr. Robinson, Dr. Tarter, Dr.
Tarter again, Dr. Browne, Dr. Robinson, Mr. Levin, Dr. Robinson, Dr.
Robinson, Dr. Tarter, Dr. Tarter and Dr. Browne; it is an exchange.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Lab Directors' Written Testimony--Key Quotes on Stockpile Stewardship,
October 7, 1999, Armed Services Committee Hearing

Dr. Robinson, Page 5:
I believed then, as I do now, that it may be possible to
develop the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship approach as a
substitute for nuclear testing for keeping previously tested
nuclear weapons designs safe and reliable.
Dr. Tarter, Page 1:
The bottom line remains the same as it has been in my
previous testimonies before this Committee. Namely, that a
strongly supported, sustained Stockpile Stewardship Program
has an excellent chance of ensuring that this nation can
maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the
stockpile without nuclear testing.
Dr. Tarter, Page 4:
In December 1998, we completed the third annual
certification of the stockpile for the President and were
able to conclude that nuclear tests were not required at this
time to assure the safety and reliability of the nation's
nuclear weapons.
Dr. Brown, Page 1:
I am confident that a fully supported and sustained program
will enable us to continue to maintain America's nuclear
deterrent without nuclear testing.
Senator Levin. . . . what you are telling us is that if
this safeguard and the other safeguards are part of this
process that you can rely on . . ., Dr. Robinson, you are on
board in terms of this treaty; is that correct?
Dr. Robinson. I am on board that science-based stockpile
stewardship has a much higher chance of success and I will
accept it as the substitute.
Senator Levin. For what?
Dr. Robinson. I still had other reservations about the
treaty--
Senator Levin. As a substitute for what?
Dr. Robinson. As a substitute for requiring yield tests for
certification.
Senator Levin. Dr. Tarter?
Senator Tarter. A simple statement again: It is an
excellent bet, but it is not a sure thing.
Senator Levin. My question is are you on board, given these
safeguards?
Senator Tarter. I can only testify to the ability of
stockpile stewardship to do the job. It is your job about the
treaty.
Senator Levin. Are you able to say that, providing you can
rely on safeguard F and at some point decide that you cannot
certify it, that you are willing under that condition to rely
on this stewardship program as a substitute for actual
testing?
Senator Tarter. Yes.
Senator Levin. Dr. Browne?
Senator Browne. Senator Levin, if the government provides
us with the sustained resources, the answer is yes, and if
safeguard F is there, yes.

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair, my colleagues, and my friend from New
Hampshire.
Mr. KYL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to print in the
Record, at a cost of $3,228.00, a series of decision briefs and
newspaper articles on the subject of the test ban treaty.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the Center for Security Policy, Oct. 11, 1999]

Decision Brief No. 99-D 107

c.t.b.t. truth or consequences #1: a safe, reliable nuclear deterrent
demands periodic, realistic underground testing

(Washington, D.C.): In various series settings over the
past few days, President Clinton has made a number of
pronouncements about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the
hope of selling it to an unreceptive U.S. Senate. Many of his
statements are misleading, some simply inaccurate; not a few
fall into both categories.
Fortunately, the hearings held in the Senate Armed Services
and Foreign Relations Committees last week provided needed
rebuttals from respected former Cabinet and sub-Cabinet
officers and other authorities. As a contribution to the
Senate's deliberations, the Center offers highlights of these
expert witnesses' testimony and other relevant information to
help correct the record.
President Clinton: ``Our experts have concluded that we
don't need more tests to keep our own nuclear forces
strong.''
The Truth: The ``experts'' President Clinton cites may feel
as he claims they do, but if so, they are ignoring historical
experience and indulging in wishful thinking of the most
dangerous kind. The more responsible among them make clear
that their ``confidence'' in being able to keep the U.S.
nuclear forces not only ``strong'' but safe and reliable is
highly conditional--dependent upon an as-yet incomplete,
unproven Stockpile Stewardship Program being fully funded for
at least a decade (at a total cost of $45 billion or more)
and no problems that would require testing to correct
developing in the meantime. For example, Dr. John Browne, the
current Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory told
the Armed Services Committee last week:
``The issue that we face is whether we will have the
people, the capabilities and the national commitment to
maintain this confidence in the stockpile in the future, when
we expect to see more significant changes. Although we are
adding new tools each year, the essential tool kits for
stockpile stewardship will not be complete until sometime in
the next decade.''
Last week's testimony, moreover, made clear the views of
other ``experts'' who believe that the American deterrent
cannot be kept safe and relialbe--let alone strong--without
periodic, realistic underground nuclear tests. These include
the following:
Dr. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Energy under
President Carter (as well as former Secretary of Defense,
Director of the CIA and Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission): ``In the absence of testing, confidence in the
reliability of the stockpile will inevitably, ineluctably
decline. In the seen years since our last test, confidence
has declined. It is declining today and will continue to
decline. . . .
``Why is such a decline in confidence unavoidable? Our
nuclear weapons are highly sophisticated devices composed of
thousands of components that must operate with split-second
timing and with scant margin for error. Weapons are also
radioactive, and thus subject to radioactive decay and
chemical decomposition. Other components will age and will
fail. All of the components must ultimately be replaced due
to changes in material, changes in regulations, the
disappearance of manufacturers, the changing of processes.
That replacement can never be perfect.''

[[Page S12383]]

Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger: ``If we need
nuclear weapons, we have to know that they will work. That is
the essence of their deterrence. If there is uncertainty
about that, the deterrent capability is weakened. The only
assurance that you could have that they will work is to test
them, and the only way to test them is the most effective way
to test them.''
``Since [U.S.] testing ended [in 1992] there have been no
weapons ``red-lined'' [i.e., removed from operational status
for safety and/or reliable reasons]. The assumption seems to
be that since we stopped testing everything's fine. Well, I
can't share that assumption, I don't think that's correct,
and I don't want to take a chance. You just aren't allowed
any margin for error in this business. And this treaty gives
a very large margin for error.''
``And all of the discussion in other committees and a great
deal of the discussion in public has been an attempt to show
that the stockpile stewardship program will be an effective
way of testing them, although everyone agrees it's not as
effective as testing them in the way that we have done in the
past with underground explosions, with all precautions to
prevent any of the escape of the material into the
atmosphere.
``You will have all kinds of statements made that the
stewardship stockpile program will be able to be tested by
computer modeling. We've had some less than reassuring
statements that the computers that can do this best will be
available in 2005 or 2008, which is a tacit admission that in
the meantime, the stockpile stewardship program, as it's
presently constituted, is not an effective way of testing.
And the only way to be sure that these weapons will work and
will be able to do their horribly lethal task is to test them
and test them in the most effective way possible.''
Admiral Henry Chiles, President Clinton's former Commander-
in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Forces Command: `'We are going to
have to remove and replace almost all, if not all, of the
non-nuclear components in those weapons with newly designed
components. The older components are not available. They were
originally manufactured by technologies that are obsolete,
and they are not supported in our evolving industrial base.
And without testing I know of no other engineering unit of
comparable complexity that anyone would consider safe and
reliable in a modern world.''
Dr. Paul Robinson, the current Director of the Sandia
National Laboratory: ``I can state with no caveats that to
confirm the performance of high-tech devices--cars,
airplanes, medical diagnostics, computers or nuclear
weapons--testing is the preferred methodology . . . actually
nuclear testing of the entire system. . . . To forego testing
is to live with an uncertainty. And the question is, what is
the risk, can one bound the uncertainty, and how does that
work out?''
``In the past, we used to change out the nation's nuclear
weapons about eight to 10 years; we would replace an old
design with a completely new design at that point in time.
And so we had really very little effects due to aging of the
system sitting in there. Today the stockpile is the oldest
one we've ever had in the 54-year history of the program, so
we're watching for new effects due to aging that we haven't
seen before.''
Dr. John Nuckles, former Director of the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory under President Clinton: ``It cannot be
assured that the powerful computational and experimental
capabilities of the Stockpile Stewardship program will
increase confidence and reliability. Improved understanding
may reduce confidence in the estimates to performance margins
and reliability if fixes and validations are precluded by the
CTBT.''
``The SSP will probably succeed in finding undetected
stockpile defects and in narrowing the major gaps in our
understanding of nuclear weapons which have eluded 50 years
of nuclear testing. Nuclear testing would then be required to
confirm this new understanding and validate the resulting
stockpile fixes.''
Dr. Troy Wade, former Assistant Secretary of Energy for
Defense Programs and nuclear bomb designer: ``Nuclear weapons
are not like artillery shells. You cannot store them in a
bottle or building and then get them whenever the exigencies
of the situation prompt you to do so. Nuclear weapons are
very complicated assemblies that require continued vigilance
to assure reliability and safety.
``It is, therefore, a first-order principle that nuclear
weapons that are now expected to be available in the enduring
stockpile for much longer than was contemplated by the
designers, will require enhanced vigilance to continue to
ensure safety and reliability.
``I am a supporter, only because I believe it is a way to
develop the computational capability to assure the annual
certification process for warheads, that have not changed, or
for which there is no apparent change. For nuclear weapons
that do not fit that category, stockpile stewardship is
merely--as we say in Nevada--a crap shoot. Nuclear testing
has always been the tool necessary to maintain, with high
confidence, the reliability and safety of the stockpile. I
believe this treaty would remove the principle tool from the
tool chests of those responsible for assuring safety and
reliability.''
``Maintaining the nuclear deterrence of the United States,
without permitting needed testing, is like requiring the
local ambulance service to guarantee 99 percent reliability
any time the ambulance is requested, but with a provision
that the ambulance is never to be started until the call
comes. I believe this is a patently absurd premise.''
Dr. Robert Barker, former Assistant for Atomic Energy to
Secretaries of Defense Weinberger, Carlucci and Cheney and a
nuclear weapon designer: ``There are nine weapons in the
continuing inventory; only three of those weapons have the
three modern safety features of enhanced nuclear detonation
safety, the fire resistant pit and insensitive high
explosive. Three of the systems in the continuing inventory
have only one of those features.
``Now, I believe to freeze an inventory in place in which
every weapon is not as safe as it could be is unconscionable.
I think that is a decision that the Senate really needs to
take on and ask itself whether it is comfortable with making
a decision to freeze the stockpile in a situation in which it
is less safe than it could be. Should an accident happen, the
loss of life, loss of property, as a result of not having
included--it could have been precluded by the inclusion of
one of these features--who is it that will take the credit or
take the blame for that? I think any prudent program that
called for a cessation in testing would have made sure that
every weapon in the inventory was as safe as it could be
before such a step was taken.

The bottom line

In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Secretary Schlesinger cited remarks made by Dr.
Victor Reis, President Clinton's erstwhile Assistant
Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs and architect of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program, in a speech delivered before
he left office to the Sandia National Laboratory:
``Think about [the challenge of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program]. We are asking to maintain forever an incredibly
complex device no larger than this podium, filled with exotic
radioactive materials, that must create, albeit briefly,
temperatures and pressures only seen in the nature of the
center of stars. Do it without an integrating nuclear test
and without any reduction in extraordinarily high standards
of safety and reliability. And while you're at it, downsize
the industrial complex that supports this enterprise by a
factor of two and stand up critical new manufacturing
processes; this, within an industrial system that was
structured to turn over new designs every 15 years and for
which the nuclear explosive testing was the magic tool for
demonstrating success.''
Dr. Schlesinger observed dryly: ``Now, this challenge was
laid down by the architect of the SSP. He understood the
risks. The only thing that he might add to that statement is
that, in order to validate the SSP, we would require nuclear
testing.''
The ineluctable reality is that the United States has
already run potentially grave risks by not testing its aging
arsenal for the past seven years. It perpetuates this
moratorium--let alone making it a permanent, international
obligation--at its peril.
____

Decision Brief No. 99-D 108

c.t.b.t. Truth or Consequences #2: This Treaty is Unverifiable--It May
Make Monitoring Others' Nuke Programs More Difficult

(Washington, D.C.): In a daily drumbeat of remarks aimed at
selling the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to an
unreceptive Senate, President Clinton has repeatedly made the
claim that this treaty is ``effectively verifiable.'' While
he and his subordinates acknowledge that all testing will not
actually be detectable, they insist that any that would
undermine our nuclear deterrent would be picked up by U.S.
and/or international monitoring systems--the latter, the
CTBT's proponents assert, representing a significant
augmentation of the former. For example, Mr. Clinton recently
declared: ``The treaty will also strengthen our ability to
monitor if other countries are engaged in suspicious
activities through global chains of sensors and on-site
inspections, both of which the treaty provides for.''

The truth

Fortunately, authoritative testimony in the Senate
Intelligence, Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees
last week provided needed rebuttals to such claims. While the
most sensitive of that testimony was taken by the
Intelligence Committee in closed session, an invaluable
summary was provided by the Chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, Sen. Richard Shelby (R-AL), in an
appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee on 7
October. Highlights of Chairman Shelby's authoritative
statement include the following:
``It's my considered judgment, as chairman of the
Intelligence Committee, based on a review of the intelligence
analysis and on testimony this week from the intelligence
community's senior arms control analyst, that it's impossible
to monitor compliance with this treaty with the confidence
that the Senate should demand before providing its advice and
consent for ratification.
``I'm not confident that we can now or can in the
foreseeable future detect any and all nuclear explosions
prohibited under the treaty. While I have a greater degree of
confidence in our ability to monitor higher-yield explosions
in known test sites, I have markedly less confidence in our
capabilities to monitor lower-yield and/or evasively
conducted tests, including tests that may enable states to
develop new nuclear weapons or improve existing weapons.

[[Page S12384]]

``At this point, I should point out too that while the
proponents of the treaty have argued that it will prevent
nuclear proliferation, the fact is that some of the countries
of most concern to us--North Korea, Iran and Iraq--can
develop and deploy nuclear weapons without any nuclear tests
whatsoever.
``With respect to monitoring, in July of '97, the
intelligence community issued a national intelligence
estimate entitled: `Monitoring the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty Over the Next 10 Years.' . . . The NIE was not
encouraging about our ability to monitor compliance with the
treaty or about the likely utility of the treaty in
preventing countries like North Korea, Iran and Iraq from
development and fielding nuclear weapons. The NIE identified
numerous challenges, difficulties and credible evasion
scenarios that affect the intelligence community's confidence
in its ability to monitor compliance.
``Because the details are classified and because of the
inherent difficulty of summarizing a very highly technical
analysis covering a number of different countries and a
multitude of variables, I recommend that members, including
the members of this committee, review this document with the
following caution: Based on testimony before the committee
this week, I believe that newly acquired information requires
reevaluation of the 1997 estimate's assumptions and
underlying analysis on certain key issues. The revised
assumptions and analysis appear certain to lead to even more
pessimistic conclusions.''
``Many proponents of the treaty place their faith, in
monitoring aids provided under the treaty such as the
International Monitoring System--IMS--a multinational seismic
detection system, and the CTBT's On-Site Inspection regime--
OSI. Based on a review of the structure, likely capabilities
and procedures of these international mechanisms, neither of
which will be ready to function for a number of years, and
based on the intelligence community's own analysis and
statements, I'm concerned that these organizations will be of
at best limited, if not marginal margin.
``I believe this IMS will be technically inadequate. For
example, it was not designed to detect evasively conducted
tests which, if you are Iraq or North Korea, are precisely
the kind you're going to conduct. It was designed, as you
know with diplomatic sensitivities rather than effective
monitoring in mind. And it will be eight to 10 years before
the system is complete.
``Because of these factors and for other technical reasons,
I'm afraid that the IMS is more likely to muddy the waters by
injecting questionable data into what will inevitably be
highly charged political debate over possible non-compliance.
As a result, the value of more accurate, independently
obtained U.S. information will be undermined, making it more
difficult for the U.S. to make its case for noncompliance if
it were to become necessary.
``And with respect to on-site inspection, I believe that
the on-site inspection regime invites delay and confusion.
For example, while U.S. negotiators originally sought an
automatic green light for on-site inspections as a result of
the opposition of the People's Republic of China, now, the
regime that was adopted allows inspections only with the
approval of 30 of the 51 countries on the executive
committee. Members of the Committee will appreciate the
difficulty of rounding up the votes for such a supermajority.
``I am also deeply troubled by the fact that the inspected
party has a veto, a veto over including U.S. inspectors on an
inspection team and the right of the inspected party to
declare areas up to 50 kilometers off limits to inspection. I
understand these provisions mirror limitations sought by
Saddam Hussein on the UNSCOM inspectors, which leads me to
believe that some of the OSI standards could be what's cut
out for Iraq. As a result of these and other hurdles even
if inspectors do eventually get near the scene of a
suspicious event, the evidence, which is highly
perishable, may well have vanished.
In addition to Sen. Shelby's summary of the information
available to the Intelligence Committee, Dr. Kathleen
Bailey--a highly respected former Associate Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--added the following
points in her testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee:
``The international monitoring system of the CTBT is
designed or is capable of detecting greater than one kiloton
of nuclear yield for a non-evasively conducted test. So, if
Russia or someone else decides to conduct a test evasively,
the IMS system will probably not be able to detect it.
``This is because there are various techniques that can be
used to basically mask the fact that you tested. One of the
most widely known is called decoupling, and I would here rely
on an unclassified paper I heard a CIA official present last
year in which he described the fact that a nation could put a
nuclear device in a cavity, detonate it, and essentially the
space around it in this cavity would muffle or mitigate the
sound, so that the seismic signal is reduced by as much as a
factor of 70. This means that a one-kiloton explosion could
look like only 14 tons. So it would be well below the
threshold of the international monitoring system.''

The bottom line

The fact is that militarily significant covert nuclear
testing can--and almost certainly will--be conducted at low-
yields or in other ways aimed at masking the force of an
explosion. Unfortunately, the history of arms control is
riddled with examples of treaties where even clear-cut
violations are excused or ignored by the other parties. Just
as President Clinton has acknowledged a tendency on the part
of his Administration to ``fudge'' the facts when the
alternative of telling the truth will have hard policy
implications, the Comprehensive Test Ban will prompt this
government and others to take the most charitable view of
ambiguous data, rather than conclude the treaty has been
violated.
If anything, as Sen. Shelby has noted, the very fact that a
treaty is at stake will probably make it more likely, not
less, that U.S. intelligence will be discouraged from
ascertaining the true status of potentially hostile powers'
nuclear weapons programs and behavior that may contravene the
CTBT and/or the ``international norm'' it is supposed to
establish and promote. Far from contributing to American
security, the Comprehensive Test Ban would--in this fashion,
among others--degrade that security.
____

Decision Brief No. 99-D 109

C.T.B.T. Truth or Consequences #3: President Bush Did Not `Impose' a
Test Moratorium--It was Imposed on Him

(Washington, DC): One of the more pernicious misstatements
being served up by Clinton Administration officials
desperately trying to induce Republican Senators to agree to
the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
is to the effect that former President George Bush ``imposed
a moratorium'' on U.S. nuclear testing before leaving office.
The most recent such misrepresentation was made on ABC News'
``This Week'' program on Sunday by Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright. By so doing, they transparently hope to
lend an otherwise almost wholly lacking patina of
bipartisanship to this accord.
The fact is that President Bush was euchred on the eve of
the 1992 election into accepting legislative restrictions on
nuclear testing that he vehemently opposed. This point was
made clear in testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee last week by Dr. Robert Barker, a nuclear weapon
designer who served as the Pentagon's top nuclear weapons
expert during the Reagan and Bush Administrations.
There should be no doubt whatsoever that President Bush and
the entire administration that stood behind him believed that
nuclear testing was necessary for the maintenance of a safe
and reliable stockpile. I don't believe the technical facts
have changed since 1993. I believe we are faced with a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty not because the technical facts
have changed but because some political issues are different
now than were true in 1993.

President Bush's legacy

President Bush's attitude towards nuclear testing is made
express in an unclassified passage from a classified report
he submitted to the Congress on his Administration's last
full day in office. This report was written to explain why
the Bush Administration found a statute mandating an end to
all U.S. nuclear testing, following a final series of
underground tests, to be incompatible with the national
security. It read, in part:
``. . . The Administration has concluded that it is not
possible to develop a test program within the constraints of
Public Law 102-377 that would be fiscally, militarily and
technically responsible. The requirement to maintain and
improve the safety of U.S. forces necessitates continued
nuclear testing for those purposes, albeit at a modest level,
for the foreseeable future. The Administration strongly urges
the Congress to modify this legislation urgently, in order to
permit the minimum number and kind of underground nuclear
tests that the United States requires--regardless of the
action of other states--to retain safe and reliable, although
dramatically reduced, nuclear deterrent forces.''
The reasons for President Bush's adamant position on the
need to continue nuclear testing in order to assure the
safety and reliability of the U.S. deterrent is not hard to
comprehend in light of the experience described by Dr. Barker
in his testimony on 7 October:
``During my six years in the Pentagon, from 1986 and 1992,
the people in the nuclear weapons laboratories were even more
experienced [than they are today since they] were doing
nuclear testing. Well, every day of any year I could go to
them and they would tell me my stockpile was safe, my
stockpile was reliable--I could count on their judgment.
``Five times during that six-year period I was faced with
catastrophic failures in the stockpile. The Department of
Energy came to me on five occasions, and I found myself going
to Secretaries Weinberger or Carlucci or Cheney, and telling
them that a weapon in the inventory could not be trusted to
do its job. And until we did further tests those weapons were
basically non-operational, and we were faced with trying to
deal with the situation of instantaneously having a weapons
system not available to us . . . . In every case where a
change had to be made in order to fix the problem, a nuclear
test was required to be sure that the fix worked.''

President Clinton's Legacy

Dr. Barker also pointed out to Senate how the Clinton
Administrations' ideological attachment to the idea of
banning all nuclear testing--without regard to the
implications for the safety and reliability of the
stockpile--had a singularly perverse effect:

[[Page S12385]]

``It's one of the great ironies that there was a thing in
existence back in 1993 called a test ban readiness program,
which called for a significant number of tests each year for
a decade in order to prove whether or not a scheme of
calculation and non-nuclear simulation would provide a
reliable replacement for nuclear testing. . . . That is the
reliable, scientific even business approach. You do not
change your calibration tool without comparing the results.
``No business would change its accounting system without
verifying that the new system gave the same results of the
new. No scientist would change the calibration tool in his
laboratory without validating that the new tool gave the same
result as the old. And in 1993 we were embarked upon a
process of developing a set of tools that we could assess
whether or not they would prove to be a reliable replacement
for nuclear testing.
``The cessation of nuclear testing cut that whole thing
off, and instead we jumped into the replacement and have
denied ourselves the ability to ever calibrate it if we
ratify this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.''

The bottom line

No President since John F. Kennedy has voluntarily imposed
the kind of unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing upon
which Bill Clinton has insisted over the past seven years--
and for good reason. And President Kennedy declared when he
ended the three year testing moratorium he had adopted:
``We know enough now about broken negotiations, secret
preparations and the advantages gained from a long test
series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium. Some
may urge us to try it again, keeping our preparations to test
in a constant state of readiness. But in actual practice,
particularly in a society of free choice, we cannot keep top
flight scientists concentrating on the preparation of an
experiment which may or may not take place on an uncertain
date in the undefined future.
``Nor can large technical laboratories be kept fully alert
on a stand-by-basis waiting for some other nation to break an
agreement. This is not merely difficult or inconvenient--we
have explored this alternative thoroughly and found it
impossible of execution.''
The fact is that President George Bush, many of those who
served in senior ranks of his administration--notably, his
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, his National Security
Advisor Brent Scowcroft and his Secretary of Energy James
Watkins have all expressed their opposition to this treaty--
and his son, George W. Bush, have formally counseled the
Senate against permanent unilateral and/or multilateral bans
on nuclear testing. This counsel should be heeded--not
misrepresented or ignored.
____

Decision Brief No. 99-D 110

c.t.b.t. Truth or consequences #4: the zero-yield, permanent test ban's
pedigree is hard left, not bipartisan or responsible

(Washington, D.C.): President Clinton is fond of saying
that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is the
``longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms
control.'' He and his subordinates and other CTBT proponents
try, however, to confuse by whom the present, zero-yield,
permanent ban on all nuclear tests has been so long sought
and hard fought. This is not an accident. After all, as it
has become clear that this arms control initiative has been
the agenda not, as the CTBT's champions contend, for every
President since Dwight Eisenhower, but rather for radical,
left-wing anti-nuclear ideologies, its prospects for approval
by the Republican Senate dwindle.
The fact is, as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman
Jesse Helms has observed ``not a single president before the
current one has ever sought a zero-yield, indefinite duration
CTBT.'' Actually, every one of his predecessors rejected such
an approach.

President Reagan's legacy

Particularly instructive is the forceful 1988 rejection of
nuclear test bans and other limitations on nuclear testing
beyond those currently on the books that was sent by
President Reagan to the Congress in September of that year.
The highlights of this carefully prepared, interagency-
approved report entitled, The Relationship between Progress
in Other Areas of Arms Control and More Stringent Limitations
on Nuclear Testing should be required reading for Senators
now confronting the decision whether to advise and consent to
the CTBT:

The Requirement for Testing

``Nuclear testing is indispensable to maintaining the
credible nuclear deterrent which has kept the peace for over
40 years.''
``Thus we do not regard nuclear testing as an evil to be
curtailed, but as a tool to be employed responsibly in
pursuit of national security.''
``The U.S. Tests neither more often nor at higher yields
than is required for our security.''
``As long as we must depend on nuclear weapons for our
fundamental security, nuclear testing will be necessary.''

Why the United States Tests Nuclear Weapons

``First, we do so to ensure the reliability of our nuclear
deterrent.''
``Second, we conduct nuclear tests in order to improve the
safety, security, survivability, and effectiveness of our
nuclear arsenal. Testing has allowed the introduction of
modern safety and security features on our weapons. It has
permitted a reduction by nearly one-third in the total number
of weapons in the stockpile since 1960, as well as a
reduction in the total megatonnage in that stockpile to
approximately one-quarter of its 1960 value.''
``Third, the U.S. tests to ensure we understand the effects
of a nuclear environment on military systems.''
``Finally, by continuing to advance our understanding of
nuclear weapons design, nuclear testing serves to avoid
technological surprise and to allow us to respond to evolving
threat.''
``These four purposes are vital national security goals. As
companion reports by the Departments of Defense and Energy
indicate, they cannot currently be met without nuclear
testing.''

Reductions in Nuclear and/or Conventional Arms May Actually Increase
U.S. Testing Requirements

``. . . It is important to recognize that there is no
direct technical linkage between the size of the nuclear
stockpile and the requirements for nuclear testing.''
``Indeed, under [an agreement providing for] deep
reductions in strategic offensive arms the reliability of our
remaining U.S. strategic weapons could be even more important
and the need for testing even greater. . . .''
``Similarly, neither reductions in strategic offensive arms
themselves nor success in conventional arms reductions will
eliminate the third reason for U.S. nuclear testing, the
requirement to ensure we understand, from both an offensive
and defensive standpoint, the effects of the environment
produced by nuclear explosions on military systems. . . .
Even in a world with reduced strategic arms and an improved
balance in conventional forces, nuclear arms will exist. In
such a world, understanding nuclear effects would be no less
important.''

Further Policy Caveats

``. . . The U.S. recognizes that neither nuclear testing
nor arms control per se are ends in themselves. They are
tools to be employed in the interests of enhancing national
security.''
``. . . It is clear that limitations as stringent as a
complete ban on tests above either 1 kiloton- or 10 kilotons-
yield pose serious risks and will almost certainly not prove
to be compatible with our overall security interests. As the
companion reports by the Departments of Defense and Energy
make clear, such limitations have exceptionally severe
effects on U.S. programs. In addition, we do not know how to
verify such yield limitations.''

The Bottom Line

The Reagan Administration report declared in closing that
``A comprehensive test ban remains a long-term objective of
the United States.'' It makes clear, however, that the
circumstances under which such a ban might be acceptable are
very different from those that applied at the time, or today:
``We believe such a ban must be viewed in the context of a
time when we do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to
ensure international security and stability, and when we
have achieved broad, deep, and effectively verifiable arms
reductions, substantially improved verification
capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and
greater balance in conventional forces.''
Senators being asked to consider postponing a final vote on
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should understand that the
practical effect of doing so would effectively be to agree
that--despite its incompatibility with U.S. national security
interests and its consistency with the sort of woolly-headed,
radical disarmament notions Ronald Reagan eschewed--the
CTBT's restraints would continue to bind the United States.
For, under international legal practice, unless and until a
nation formally gives notice of its intention not to ratify a
treaty, it is obliged to refrain from actions that would
undercut its object and purpose. Such notice should be given,
and promptly.
____

Decision Brief No. 99-D 111

c.t.b.t. truth or consequences #5: opposition to a zero-yield,
permanent test ban is rooted in substance, not politics

(Washington, D.C.).--Advocates for the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) have recently engaged in a form of
political contortionism that would impress Houdini. Having
insisted on the Senate's immediate consideration of this
accord in time for a CTBT review conference held last week in
Vienna, they were initially surprised, then seemingly pleased
when Senate Republicans agreed two weeks ago to a fixed
period for debate and a near-term vote. Accordingly, every
single Democratic Senator and those relatively few
Republicans who have declared their support for the CTBT
agreed--obviously with the Clinton White House's blessing--to
a ``unanimous consent'' agreement designed to do just that.
In other words, when they thought they had (or could get) the
necessary votes, the CTBT's proponents were quite content
with this arrangement.
As it became clear that the treaty's opponents had easily
the 34 votes needed to defeat President Clinton's permanent,
zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban, however, the
Administration and its allies began to complain that the
arrangement they had agreed to was no longer satisfactory.
Suddenly, they claimed the CTBT was in danger of falling
victim to ``partisan politics'' and that only by delaying the
vote would that accord receive the deliberate consideration
due it.

[[Page S12386]]

Unfortunately for the pro-CTBT contortionists, the
announcement on 7 October by Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) of
his adamant opposition to the present Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty makes such arguments untenable. Sen. Lugar is, after
all, a man with a record of unwavering support for arms
control and unfailing willingness to pursue bipartisan
approaches to foreign policy issues. His closely reasoned and
well-researched grounds for his declared intention to vote
against this CTBT makes it clear that he and other like-
minded Senators will do so for legitimate, substantive
reasons.
Reduced to its essence, Sen. Lugar's critique--which is
likely to prove highly influential with other centrist
Senators--reads as follows:
``The goal of the CTBT is to ban all nuclear explosions
worldwide: I do not believe it can succeed. I have little
confidence that the verification and enforcement provisions
will dissuade other nations from nuclear testing.
Furthermore, I am concerned about our country's ability to
maintain the integrity and safety of our own nuclear arsenal
under the conditions of the treaty.
``. . . While affirming our desire for international peace
and stability, the U.S. Senate is charged with the
constitutional responsibility of making hard judgments about
the likely outcomes of treaties. This requires that we
examine the treaties in close detail and calculate the
consequences of ratification for the present and the future.
Viewed in this context, I cannot support the treaty's
ratification.''
Highlights of Senator Lugar's critique should be required
reading for Senators and their constituents alike:
Bad Arms Control: ``I do not believe that the CTBT is of
the same caliber as the arms control treaties that have come
before the Senate in recent decades. Its usefulness to the
goal of non-proliferation is highly questionable. Its likely
ineffectuality will risk undermining support and confidence
in the concept of multi-lateral arms control. Even as a
symbolic statement of our desire for a safer world, it is
problematic because it would exacerbate risks and
uncertainties related to the safety of our nuclear
stockpile.''
No Safety Net on the SSP: ``At present our nuclear
capability provides a deterrent that is crucial to the safety
of the American people and is relied upon as a safety
umbrella by most countries around the world. One of the most
critical issues under the CTBT would be that of ensuring the
safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile
without testing. The safe maintenance and storage of these
weapons is a crucial concern. We cannot allow them to fall
into disrepair or permit their safety to be called into
question.
``. . . Unfortunately, the jury is still out on the
Stockpile Stewardship Program. The last nine years have seen
improvements, but the bottom line is that the Senate is being
asked to trust the security of our country to a program that
is unproven and unlikely to be fully operational until
perhaps 2010.
``. . . The Congressional Research Service reported last
year that: `A problem with one warhead type can affect
hundreds of thousands of individually deployed warheads; with
only 9 types of warheads expected to be in the stockpile in
2000, compared to 30 in 1985, a single problem could affect a
large fraction of the U.S. nuclear force.' If we are to put
our faith in a program other than testing to ensure the
safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent and thus our
security, we must have complete faith in its efficacy. The
Stockpile Stewardship Program falls well short of that
standard.
``. . . I am concerned further by the fact that some of the
weapons in our arsenal are not as safe as we could make them.
Of the nine weapon designs currently in our arsenal, only one
employs all of the most modern safety and security measures.
Our nuclear weapons laboratories are unable to provide the
American people with these protections because of the
inability of the Stockpile Stewardship Program to completely
mimic testing.
``At present, I am not convinced the Stockpile Stewardship
Program will permit our experts to maintain a credible
deterrent in the absence of testing. Without a complete,
effective, and proven Stockpile Stewardship program, the CTBT
could erode our ability to discover and fix problems with the
nuclear stockpile and to make safety improvements.''
An Unverifiable CTBT: ``The U.S. must be confident of its
ability to detect cheating among member states. While the
exact thresholds are classified, it is commonly understood
that the United States cannot detect nuclear explosions below
a few kilotons of yield. The Treaty's verification regime,
which includes an international monitoring system and on-site
inspections, was designed to fill the gaps in our national
technical means. Unfortunately, the CTBT's verification
regime will not be up to that task even if it is ever
fully deployed.''
``The verification regime is further bedeviled by the lack
of a common definition of a nuclear test. Russia believes
hydro-nuclear activities and sub-critical experiments are
permitted under the treaty. The U.S. believes sub-critical
experiments are permitted but hydro-nuclear tests are not.
Other states believe both are illegal. A common understanding
or definition of what is and what is not permitted under the
treaty has not been established.''
``The CTBT's verification regime seems to be the embodiment
of everything the United States has been fighting against in
the UNSCOM inspection process in Iraq. We have rejected
Iraq's position of choosing and approving the national origin
of inspectors. In addition, the 50 square kilometer
inspection-free zones could become analogous to the
controversy over the inspections of Iraqi presidential
palaces. The UNSCOM experience is one that is best not
repeated under a CTBT.''
Mission Impossible--Enforcement of the CTBT: ``Even if the
United States were successful in utilizing the laborious
verification regime and non-compliance was detected, the
Treaty is almost powerless to respond. This treaty simply has
no teeth. Arms control advocates need to reflect on the
possible damage to the concept of arms control if we embrace
a treaty that comes to be perceived as ineffectual. Arms
control based only on a symbolic purpose can breed cynicism
in the process and undercut support for more substantive and
proven arms control measures.
``The CTBT's answer to illegal nuclear testing is the
possible implementation of sanctions. It is clear that this
will not prove particularly compelling in the decision-making
processes of foreign states intent on building nuclear
weapons. For those countries seeking nuclear weapons, the
perceived benefits in international stature and deterrence
generally far outweigh the concern about sanctions that could
be brought to bear by the international community.''
Fraudulent ``Norm'': ``I believe the enforcement mechanisms
of the CTBT provide little reason for countries to forego
nuclear testing. Some of my friends respond to this charge by
pointing out that even if the enforcement provisions of the
treaty are ineffective, the treaty will impose new
international norms for behavior. In this case, we have
observed that ``norms'' have not been persuasive for North
Korea, Iraq, Iran, India and Pakistan, the very countries
whose actions we seek to influence through a CTBT.
``If a country breaks the international norm embodied in
the CTBT, that country has already broken the norm associated
with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Countries other than
the recognized nuclear powers who attempt to test a weapon
must first manufacture or obtain a weapon, which would
constitute a violation of the NPT. I fail to see how an
additional norm will deter a motivated nation from developing
nuclear weapons after violating the long-standing norm of the
NPT.''

The Bottom Line

The Clinton Administration's transparent intent to use the
CTBT as a political weapon against its critics makes Senator
Lugar's statesmanship and courage in opposing this treaty as
a matter of principle all the more commendable. Although the
Indiana Senator has made clear his preference not to vote on
the CTBT in the coming days, the substantive case he has made
against this accord should be dispositive to his colleagues
in deciding to reject the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty now,
rather than be subjected to endless political attacks until
such time as the Treaty is once again placed on the Senate
calendar.
____

Decision Brief No. 99-D 112

c.t.b.t. truth or consequences #6: Heed Past and Present Military
Opposition to a Zero-Yield, Permanent Test Ban

(Washington, D.C.): As the prospects for Senate rejection
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on its merits
have grown in recent days, the Treaty's proponents have
become more reliant than ever on celebrity endorsements--
especially those it has received for retired and serving
senior military officers. Indeed, few advocates for the
present, zero-yield, permanent test ban make their case for
the CTBT without referring to the support it enjoys from past
and present members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including a
number of former JCS Chairmen (notably, Gen. Colin Powell).
Most recently, President Clinton declared in his Saturday
radio address: ``So I say to the Senators who haven't
endorsed [the CTBT], heed the best national security advice
of our military leaders.'' The trouble is, the best national
security advice of our military leaders is to reject this
permanent, all-inclusive test ban, not approve it.

Which Advice?

Setting aside the singularly unimpressive job the serving
Chairman, Gen. Hugh Shelton, has done in his advocacy for the
CTBT--at his reconfirmation hearing a few weeks ago, his
endorsement was unintelligible; on NBC's Meet the press on 10
October, he gave a statement of support for the Treaty that
was more articulate, but wholly inappropriate to the question
he was asked, not once but twice--fans of the CTBT should be
careful in relying too heavily upon their favorite officers
to sell this Treaty.
Consider, for example, statements that three of the most
prominent of these officers--General Powell, Admiral William
Crowe and General David Jones--during their respective stints
as chairmen of the Joint Chief of Staff
General Colin Powell, 30 September 1991: [In response to a
question by Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wy) as to how Gen.
Powell would respond to a Soviet proposal to halt testing.] I
would recommend to the Secretary and the President [that]
it's a condition we couldn't meet. I would recommend against
it. We need nuclear testing to ensure the safety, [and]
surety of our nuclear stockpile. As long as one has nuclear
weapons, you have to know what it is they will do, and so I
would recommend continued testing.''

[[Page S12387]]

Gen. Powell, 1 December 1992: ``With respect to a
comprehensive test ban, that has always been a fundamental
policy goal of ours, but as long as we have nuclear weapons
we have a responsibility for making sure that our stockpile
remains safe. And to keep that stockpile safe, we have to
conduct a limited number of nuclear tests to make sure we
know what a nuclear weapon will actually do and how it is
aging and to find out a lot of other physical characteristics
with respect to nuclear phenomenon.
``So I would like ultimately to go to a comprehensive test
ban, but I don't think we'll get there safely and reliably
until we also get rid of nuclear weapons. As long as we have
to conduct testing.''
Admiral William Crowe, 8 May 1986: [According to a
contemporary press report] ``Admiral William Crow, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said a comprehensive test ban--
which many members of Congress have urged President Reagan to
negotiate with Moscow--would `introduce elements of
uncertainty that would be dangerous for all concerned.
``Given the pressure from lawmakers for conventional
weapons testing, `I frankly do not understand why Congress
would want to suspend testing on one of the most critical and
sophisticated elements of our nuclear deterrent--namely the
warhead's he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.''
General David Jones per an Aviation Week article dated 29
May 1978: ``General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chief
of Staff, told a Senate Armed Services Committee meeting last
week that he could not recommend an indefinite zero-yield
test ban.
``He added that it is not verifiable, and that the U.S.
stockpile reliability could not be assured. Gen. Jones said
he is concerned over asymmetries that could develop through
an unverifiable agreement with the USSR. He told Senators he
is not convinced by the safeguards he has seen to date, and
that it would not be difficult to overcome them.''
Gen. Jones, according to a 27 May 1978 Washington Post
article: Air Force Gen. David Jones, selected by [President]
Carter to be chairman of the Joints chiefs, told the Senate
Armed Services Committee at his recent confirmation hearing
that ``I would have difficulty recommending a zero[-yield]
test ban for an extended period.''
It falls to these individuals and those who are interested
in their views to establish which position--their former ones
opposing an open-ended, zero-yield test ban or their present
ones endorsing it--actually reflect their ``best national
security advice.'' Suffice it to say that when they actually
held positions of responsibility, all three went on record in
favor of continued testing. Will their serving counterpart
and his fellow members of the JCS undergo a reverse
transformation after leaving office, in which capacity they
have endorsed the CTBT? If so, which view will represent
their best professional military advice (i.e., advice not
influenced by political judgments or considerations)?

Leading Retired Military Officers Oppose the CTBT

Senators would do well to consider the views of other
distinguished retired military officers. For example, in an
open letter to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott dated 9
September, ten retired four-star combat commanders (Marine
Corps Commandant Gen. Louis H. Wilson and Assistant
Commandants Gens. Raymond G. Davis and Joseph J. Went;
Commander-in-Chief Strategic Air Command Gen. Russell E.
Dougherty; Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic Adm. Wesley
McDonald; Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe Gen.
Frederick J. Kroesen; Commander of U.S. Air Combat Command
Gen. John M. Loh; Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Lawrence
A. Skantze; Commander-in-Chief, Army Readiness Command Gen.
Donn A. Starry; Commanding General, Army Material Command
Gen. Louis C. Wagner, Jr.) joined more than forty other
experienced civilian and retired military policy
practitioners in opposition to the CTBT. They wrote, in
part:
``We consider the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signed by
President Clinton in 1996 to be inconsistent with vital U.S.
national interests. We believe the Senate must reject the
permanent ban on testing that this treaty would impose so
long as the Nation depends upon nuclear deterrence to
safeguard its security.''
Importantly, in a 5 October letter to Senate Armed Services
Committee Chairman John Warner, one of the most highly
regarded JCS Chairman in history, Gen. John Vessey,
forcefully urged the Senate to reject the present CTBT.
Highlight of Gen. Vessey's letter include the following:
``Supporters of the CTBT argue that it reduces the chances
for nuclear proliferation. I applaud efforts to reduce the
proliferation of nuclear weapons but I do not believe that
the test ban will reduce the ability of rogue states to
acquire nuclear weapons in sufficient quantities to upset
regional stability in various parts of the world.''
``If the United States is to remain the preeminent nuclear
power and maintain a modern, safe, secure, reliable and
useable nuclear deterrent force, I believe we need to
continue to develop new nuclear weapons designed to
incorporate the latest in technology and to meet the changing
security situation in the world. . . . The United States, the
one nation most of the world looks to for securing peace in
the world, should not deny itself the opportunity to test the
bedrock building block of its security, its nuclear
deterrence force, if conditions require testing.''
``I . . . believe that the more demonstrably modern and
useable is our nuclear deterrent force, the less likely are
we to need to use it, but we must have modern weapons, and we
ought not deny ourselves the opportunity to test if we deem
it necessary.

The Bottom Line

The case for the Clinton Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
fundamentally comes down to a question of ``confidence''--in
the judgments of those who say that they are ``confident'' in
the future viability of the U.S. deterrent or, alternatively,
in the judgment of those who warn that history suggests such
confidence is unwarranted in the absence of periodic,
realistic underground testing.
It should, at a minimum, shake the confidence of Senators
whose support for the Treaty rests substantially upon the
endorsement of prominent retired military leaders that those
leaders previously held a far more dire (not to say,
realistic) view of the implications of such an accord for the
U.S. deterrent and security.
____

[From the Center for Security Policy, Oct. 12, 1999]

Decision Brief No. 99-D 112

C.T.B.T. Truth or Consequences #7: Realistic Explosive Testing is
Required to `remanufacture' Existing Nuclear Weapons

(Washington, D.C.): One of the most pernicious
misrepresentations being served up in recent days by the
proponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is the
claim that the U.S. deterrent stockpile can be maintained for
the indefinite future without further underground tests.
Since they explicitly rule out modernization of the nuclear
arsenal, however, the only way a stockpile comprised of
weapons having the highest average age in history could
possibly be preserved in a safe and reliable condition would
be if existing weapons types were to be substantially (if not
virtually completely) remanufactured.
While advocates of the zero-yield, permanent CTBT deny it,
neither historical experience and common sense support the
proposition that U.S. nuclear weapons--comprised as they are
of as many as 6,000 exactingly manufactured parts, made of
exotic and often dangerous materials and constantly exposed
for years to high levels of radiation--will not undergo
substantial changes over time. In fact as a result of such
factors, former Assistant Secretary of Energy Victor Reis
declared in congressional testimony in October 1997 that:
``Just about all the parts [of those obsolescing devices] are
going to have to be remade.''

Why `Remaking' of the Arsenal Cannot be Effected Without Testing

There a numerous, serious problems with undertaking such a
program in the absence of nuclear testing. First, the
production lines for building the stockpile's existing bombs
and warheads were disassembled long ago. Reconstitution and
recertifying them would take quite some time, would be very
costly and probably won't be possible to effect with
confidence absent realistic, explosive nuclear testing.
Second, it will not be possible to replicate some of the
ingredients in weapons designed two decades or more ago; key
components are technologically obsolete and no one would
recommend using them when smaller, lighter, cheaper, more
reliable and carcinogenic materials are now the state-of-the-
art. In addition, federal safety and health guidelines
prohibit the use of some of the materials utilized in the
original designs.
Third, virtually everybody who was involved in designing
and proving the original designs has left the industrial and
laboratory complex, taking with them irreplaceable corporate
memory that may spell the difference between success and
failure in reproducing their handiwork.

An Authoritative Historical Review

These points were underscored in an authoritative report to
Congress issued by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
in 1987. Among its relevant highlights are the following
(emphasis added throughout):
``It has frequently been stated that non-nuclear and very-
low yield (i.e., less than 1 kiloton) testing and computer
stimulation would be adequate for maintaining a viable
nuclear deterrent. A recent variant of this argument asserts
that while such testing and computer stimulation may be
insufficient for the development of new warheads, they would
be adequate for indefinite maintenance of a stockpile of
existing weapons. We believe that neither of these assertions
can be substantiated.
``The major problem is that a nuclear explosive includes
such a wide range of processes and scales that it is
impossible to include all the relevant physics and
engineering in sufficient detail to provide an accurate
representation of the real world.''
``A final proof test at the specified low-temperature
extreme of the W80 (Air-Launched Cruise Missile) was done as
the weapon was ready for deployment. The test results were a
complete surprise. The primary gave only a small fraction of
its expected yield, insufficient to ignite the secondary.

[[Page S12388]]

``Our experience with the W80 illustrates the inadequacy of
non-nuclear and low-yield testing and the need for full-scale
nuclear tests to judge the effects of small changes. Even
though it has been argued that such a ``thorough'' test
should have occurred earlier, the critical point is that
computer simulation, non-nuclear testing, and less-than-full-
scale nuclear testing are not always sufficient to assess the
effects of deterioration, changes in packaging, or
environmental conditions on weapons performance.''
``Testing of newly produced stockpiled systems has shown a
continuing need for nuclear tests. Even an ``identical''
rebuild should be checked in a nuclear test if we are to have
confidence that all the inevitable, small and subtle
differences from one production run to the other have not
affected the nuclear performance. The current stockpile is
extremely reliable, but only because continued nuclear
testing at adequate yields has enabled us to properly assess
and correct problems as they occur.''
``Although tests of a complex system are expensive and
time-consuming, one is hard-put to find an example anywhere
in U.S. industry where a major production line was reopened
and requalified without tests. Exact replication, especially
of older systems, is impossible. Material batches are never
quite the same, some materials become unavailable, and
equivalent materials are never exactly equivalent. Different
people--not those who did the initial work--do the
remanufacturing.
``Documentation has never been sufficiently exact to ensure
replication. A perfect specification has never yet been
written. We have never known enough about every detail to
specify everything that may be important.
``Tests, even with the limitations of small numbers and
possibly equivocal interpretation of results, are the final
arbiters of the tradeoffs and judgments that have been made.
We are concerned that, if responsible engineers and
scientists were to refuse to certify a remanufactured weapon,
pressures could produce individuals who would. The Challenger
accident resulted from such a situation and highlights an
all-too-common tendency of human nature to override judgment
in favor of expediency.''
``Remanufacture of a nuclear warhead is often asserted to
be a straightforward exercise in engineering and material
science, and simply involves following well-established
specifications to make identical copies. In the real world,
however, there are many examples where weapon parts cannot be
duplicated because of outmoded technologies, health hazards,
unprofitable operations, out-of-business vendors,
reproducible materials, lack of documentation, and myriad
other reasons. . . . Not only must remanufacturing attempt to
replicate the construction of the original weapon, it must
also duplicate the performance of the original weapon.''
``It is important to emphasize that in weapon remanufacture
we are dealing with a practical problem. Idealized proposals
and statements that we `should be able to remanufacture
without testing because expertise is not essential' are a
prescription for failure.''

The Bottom Line

Senators concerned about the Nation's ability to perform
the needed modifications essential to any effort to
``remanufacture'' stockpiled weapon types should bear in mind
a comment by one of the prominent scientists usually cited by
CTBT proponents: Dr. Richard Garwin. In testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week, Dr. Garwin
declared: ``I oppose modifying our nuclear weapons under the
moratorium or under the CTBT.''
Given historical experience and the scientific insights
gleaned from it, no one who is serious about maintaining the
U.S. deterrent for the indefinite future would argue that the
existing inventory can be perpetuated without nuclear
testing. Remanufactured weapons will have to be realistically
tested, at least at low-yield levels, if we--and those we
hope to deter--are to have confidence in their effectiveness.
____

[From the Center for Security Policy, Oct. 7, 1999]

Security Forum No. 99-F 23

six secretaries of defense urge defeat of c.t.b.t.

(Washington, D.C.): In an unprecedented public statement of
opposition to a signed arms control agreement, six former
Secretaries of Defense--one of whom, Dr. James R. Schlesinger
was also (among other things) a Secretary of Energy in the
Carter Administration--have written the Republican and
Democratic leaders of the U.S. Senate urging the defeat of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
This authoritative description of the CTBT's defects and
the deleterious repercussions its ratification would have for
America's nuclear deterrent should be required reading for
every Senator and every other participant in what is shaping
up to be a momentous debate over the Nation's future security
posture. In particular, this letter--which clearly benefits
from Dr. Schlesinger's vast experience as a former Chairman
of the Atomic Energy Commission, former Director of Central
Intelligence as well as a former Secretary of Defense and
Energy (in the latter capacity, he was instrumental in
dissuading President Carter from pursuing the sort of
permanent, zero-yield CTBT that the incumbent President hopes
to ratify)--does much to rebut the putative ``military''
arguments being made on behalf of this accord.

October 6, 1999.
Dear Senators Lott and Daschle: As the Senate weighs
whether to approve the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
we believe Senators will be obliged to focus on one dominant,
inescapable result were it to be ratified: over the decades
ahead, confidence in the reliability of our nuclear weapons
stockpile would inevitably decline, thereby reducing the
credibility of America's nuclear deterrent. Unlike previous
efforts at a CTBT, this Treaty is intended to be of unlimited
duration, and though ``nuclear weapon test explosion'' is
undefined in the Treaty, by America's unilateral declaration
the accord is ``zero-yield,'' meaning that all nuclear tests,
even of the lowest yield, are permanently prohibited.
The nuclear weapons in our nation's arsenal are
sophisticated devices, whose thousands of components must
function together with split-second timing and scant margin
for error. A nuclear weapon contains radioactive material,
which in itself decays, and also changes the properties of
other materials within the weapon. Over time, the components
of our weapons corrode and deteriorate, and we lack
experience predicting the effects of such aging on the safety
and reliability of the weapons. The shelf life of U.S.
nuclear weapons was expected to be some 20 years. In the
past, the constant process of replacement and testing of new
designs have some assurance that weapons in the arsenal would
be both new and reliable. But under the CTBT, we would be
vulnerable to the effects of aging because we could not test
``fixes'' of problems with existing warheads.
Remanufacturing components of existing weapons that have
deteriorated also poses significant problems. Manufacturers
go out of business, materials and production processes
change, certain chemicals previously used in production are
now forbidden under new environmental regulations, and so on.
It is a certainty that new processes and materials--
untested--will be used. Even more important, ultimately the
nuclear ``pits'' will need to be replaced--and we will not
be able to test those replacements. The upshot is that new
defects may be introduced into the stockpile through
remanufacture, and without testing we can never be certain
that these replacement components will work as their
predecessors did.
Another implication of the CTBT of unlimited duration is
that over time we would gradually lose our pool of
knowledgeable people with experience in nuclear weapons
design and testing. Consider what would occur if the United
States halted nuclear testing for 30 years. We would then be
dependent on the judgment of personnel with no personal
experience either in designing or testing nuclear weapons. In
place of a learning curve, we would experience an extended
unlearning curve.
Furthermore, major gaps exist in our scientific
understanding of nuclear explosives. As President Bush noted
in a report to Congress in January 1993, ``Of all U.S.
nuclear weapons designs fielded since 1958, approximately
one-third have required nuclear testing to resolve problems
arising after deployment.'' We were discovering defects in
our arsenal up until the moment when the current moratorium
on U.S. testing was imposed in 1992. While we have uncovered
similar defects since 1992, which in the past would gave let
to testing, in the absence of testing, we are not able to
test whether the ``fixes'' indeed work.
Indeed, the history of maintaining complex military
hardware without testing demonstrates the pitfalls of such an
approach. Prior to World War II, the Navy's torpedoes had not
been adequately tested because of insufficient funds. It took
nearly two years of war before we fully solved the problems
that caused our torpedoes to routinely pass harmlessly under
the target or to fail to explode on contact. For example, at
the Battle of Midway, the U.S. launched 47 torpedo aircraft,
without damaging a single Japanese ship. If not for our dive
bombers, the U.S. would have lost the crucial naval battle of
the Pacific war.
The Department of Energy has structured a program of
experiments and computer simulations called the Stockpile
Stewardship Program, that it hopes will allow our weapons to
be maintained without testing. This program, which will not
be mature for at least 10 years, will improve our scientific
understanding of nuclear weapons and would likely mitigate
the decline in our confidence in the safety and reliability
of our arsenal. We will never know whether we should trust
Stockpile Stewardship if we cannot conduct nuclear tests to
calibrate the unproven new techniques. Mitigation is, of
course, not the same as prevention. Over the decades, the
erosion of confidence inevitably would be substantial.
The decline in confidence in our nuclear deterrent is
particularly troublesome in light of the unique geopolitical
role of the United States. The U.S. has a far-reaching
foreign policy agenda and our forces are stationed around the
globe. In addition, we have pledged to hold a nuclear
umbrella over our NATO allies and Japan. Though we have
abandoned chemical and biological weapons, we have threatened
to retaliate with nuclear weapons to such an attack. In the
Gulf War, such a threat was apparently sufficient to deter
Iraq from using chemical weapons against American troops.
We also do not believe the CTBT will do much to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons. The motivation of rogue nations
like

[[Page S12389]]

North Korea and Iraq to acquire nuclear weapons will not be
affected by whether the U.S. tests. Similarly, the possession
of nuclear weapons by nations like India, Pakistan, and
Israel depends on the security environment in the region not
by whether or not the U.S. tests. If confidence in the U.S.
nuclear deterrent were to decline, countries that have relied
on our protection could well feel compelled to seek nuclear
capabilities of their own. Thus, ironically, the CTBT might
cause additional nations to seek nuclear weapons.
Finally, it is impossible to verify a ban that extends to
very low yields. The likelihood of cheating is high. ``Trust
but verify'' should remain our guide. Tests with yields below
1 kiloton can both go undetected and be militarily useful to
the testing state. Furthermore, a significantly larger
explosion can go undetected--or mistaken for a conventional
explosion used for mining or an earthquake--if the test if
``decoupled.'' Decoupling involves conducing the test in a
large underground cavity and has been shown to dampen an
explosion's seismic signature by a factor of up to 70. The
U.S. demonstrated this capability in 1966 in two tests
conducted in salt domes at Chilton, Mississippi.
We believe that these considerations render a permanent,
zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty incompatible with
the Nation's international commitments and vital security
interests and believe it does not deserve the Senate's advice
and consent. Accordingly, we respectfully urge you and your
colleagues to preserve the right of this nation to conduct
nuclear tests necessary to the future of our nuclear
deterrent by rejecting approval of the present CTBT.
Respectfully,
James R. Schlesinger.
Richard B. Cheney.
Frank C. Carlucci.
Caspar W. Weinberger.
Donald H. Rumsfeld.
Melvin R. Laird.
____

[From the Center for Security Policy, Oct. 7, 1999]

Security Forum

senator lugar delivers kiss-of-death to ctbt

(Washington, DC): As the Senate prepares to open debate on
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), arms control's
preeminent Republican champion in the Senate, Sen. Richard
Lugar (R-IN) has delivered what is surely the kiss-of-death
for this accord. In a lengthy and detailed memorandum
released today, Sen. Lugar declared ``I will vote against the
ratification of the CTBT.''
The Senator's reasons for reaching what was clearly a
wrenching decision are characteristically thoughtful and
powerful explained in the following excerpts of his
memorandum. The Center applauds Senator Lugar for his
courageous leadership in this matter and commends his
arguments to his colleagues--and to the American people on
behalf of whose security they are made.

[Press Release from U.S. Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, a Senior
Member of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees and
the Senate's National Security Working Group]

The Senate is poised to begin consideration of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty under a unanimous consent
agreement that will provide for 14 hours of general debate,
debate on two amendments, and a final vote on ratification. .
. . In anticipation of the general debate, I will state my
reasons for opposing ratification of the CTBT.
The goal of the CTBT is to ban all nuclear explosions
worldwide: I do not believe it can succeed. I have little
confidence that the verification and enforcement provisions
will dissuade other nations from nuclear testing.
Furthermore, I am concerned about our country's ability to
maintain the integrity and safety of our own nuclear arsenal
under the conditions of the treaty.
I am a strong advocate of effective and verifiable arms
control agreements. As a former Vice-Chairman of the Senate
Arms Control Observer Group and a member of the Foreign
Relations Committee, I have had the privilege of managing
Senate consideration of many arms control treaties and
agreements.

* * * * *

I understand the impulse of the proponents of the CTBT to
express U.S. leadership in another area of arms control.
Inevitably, arms control treaties are accompanied by
idealistic principles that envision a future in which
international norms prevail over the threat of conflict
between nations. However, while affirming our desire for
international peace and stability, the U.S. Senate is charged
with the constitutional responsibility of making hard
judgments about the likely outcomes of treaties. This
requires that we examine the treaties in close detail and
calculate the consequences of ratification for the present
and the future. Viewed in this context, I cannot support the
treaty's ratification.
I do not believe that the CTBT is of the same caliber as
the arms control treaties that have come before the Senate in
recent decades. Its usefulness to the goal of non-
proliferation is highly questionable. Its likely
ineffectuality will risk undermining support and confidence
in the concept of multi-lateral arms control. Even as
a symbolic statement of our desire for a safer world, it
is problematic because it would exacerbate risks and
uncertainties related to the safety of our nuclear
stockpile.

Stockpile Stewardship

The United States must maintain a reliable nuclear
deterrent for the foreseeable future. Although the Cold War
is over, significant threats to our country still exist. At
present our nuclear capability provides a deterrent that is
crucial to the safety of the American people and is relied
upon as a safety umbrella by most countries around the world.
One of the most critical issues under the CTBT would be that
of ensuring the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons
stockpile without testing. The safe maintenance and storage
of these weapons is a crucial concern. We cannot allow them
to fall into disrepair or permit their safety to be called
into question.
The Administration has proposed an ambitious program that
would verify the safety and reliability of our weapons
through computer modeling and simulations. Unfortuantely, the
jury is still out on the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The
last nine years have seen improvements, but the bottom line
is that the Senate is being asked to trust the security of
our country to a program that is unproven and unlikely to be
fully operational until perhaps 2010. I believe a National
Journal article, by James Kitfield, summed it up best by
quoting a nuclear scientist who likens the challenge of
maintaining the viability of our stockpile without testing to
``walking an obstacle course in the dark when your last
glimpse of light was a flash of lightning back in 1992.''
The most likely problems facing our stockpile are a result
of aging. This is a threat because nuclear materials and
components degrade in unpredictable ways, in some cases
causing weapons to fail. This is compounded by the fact that
the U.S. currently has the oldest inventory in the history of
our nuclear weapons programs.
Over the last forty years, a large percentage of the weapon
designs in our stockpile have required post-deployment tests
to resolve problems. Without these tests, not only would the
problems have remained undetected, but they also would have
gone unprepaired. The Congressional Research Service reported
last year that: ``A problem with one warhead type can affect
hundreds of thousands of individually deployed warheads; with
only 9 types of warheads expected to be in the stockpile in
2000, compared to 30 in 1985, a single problem could affect a
large fraction of the U.S. nuclear force.'' If we are to put
our faith in a program other than testing to ensure the
safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent and thus our
security, we must have complete faith in its efficacy. The
Stockpile Stewardship Program falls well short of that
standard.
The United States has chosen to re-manufacture our aging
stockpile rather than creating and building new weapon
designs. This could be a potential problem because many of
the components and procedures used in original weapon designs
no longer exist. New production procedures need to be
developed and substituted for the originals, but we must
ensure that the remanufactured weapons will work as designed.
I am concerned further by the fact that some of the weapons
in our arsenal are not as safe as we could make them. Of the
nine weapons designs currently in our arsenal, only one
employs all of the most modern safety and security measures.
Our nuclear weapons laboratories are unable to provide the
American people with these protections because of the
inability of the Stockpile Stewardship Program to completely
mimic testing.
At present, I am not convinced the Stockpile Stewardship
Program will permit our experts to maintain a credible
deterrent in the absence of testing. Without a complete,
effective, and proven Stockpile Stewardship program, the CTBT
could erode our ability to discover and fix problems with the
nuclear stockpile and to make safety improvements.
In fact, the most important debate on this issue may be an
honest discussion of whether we should commence limited
testing and continue such a program with consistency and
certainty.

Verification

[[Page S12390]]

nuclear test. Russia believes hydro-nuclear activities and
sub-critical experiments are permitted under the treaty. The
U.S. believes sub-critical experiments are permitted but
hydro-nuclear tests are not. Other states believe both are
illegal. A common understanding or definition of what is and
what is not permitted under the treaty has not been
established.
Proponents point out that if the U.S. needs additional
evidence to detect violations, on-site inspections can be
requested. Unfortunately, the CTBT will utilize a red-light
inspection process. Requests for on-site inspections must be
approved by at least 30 affirmative votes of members of the
Treaty's 51-member Executive Council. In other words, If the
United States accused another country of carrying out a
nuclear test, we could only get an inspection if 29 other
nations concurred with our request. In addition, each country
can declare a 50 square kilometer area of its territory as
off limits to any inspections that are approved.
The CTBT stands in stark contrast to the Chemical Weapons
Convention in the area of verifiability. Whereas the CTBT
requires an affirmative vote of the Executive Council for an
inspection to be approved, the CWC requires an affirmative
vote to stop an inspection from proceeding. Furthermore, the
CWC did not exclude large tracts of land from the inspection
regime, as does the CTBT.
The CTBT's verification regime seems to be the embodiment
of everything the United States has been fighting against in
the UNSCOM inspection process in Iraq. We have rejected
Iraq's position of choosing and approving the national origin
of inspectors. In addition, the 50 square kilometer
inspection-free zones could become analogous to the
controversy over the inspections of Iraqi presidential
palaces. The UNSCOM experience is one that is best not
repeated under a CTBT.

Enforcement

Let me turn some enforcement concerns. Even if the United
States were successful in utilizing the laborious
verification regime and non-compliance was detected, the
Treaty is almost powerless to respond. This treaty simply has
no teeth. Arms control advocates need to reflect on the
possible damage to the concept of arms control if we
embrace a treaty that comes to be perceived as
ineffectual. Arms control based only on a symbolic purpose
can breed cynicism in the process and undercut support for
more substantive and proven arms control measures.
The CTBT's answer to illegal nuclear testing is the
possible implementation of sanctions. It is clear that this
will not prove particularly compelling in the decision-making
processes of foreign states intent on building nuclear
weapons. For those countries seeking nuclear weapons, the
perceived benefits in international stature and deterrence
generally far outweigh the concern about sanctions that could
be brought to bear by the international community.
Further, recent experience has demonstrated that enforcing
effective multilateral sanctions against a country is
extraordinarily difficult. Currently, the United States is
struggling to maintain multilateral sanctions on Iraq, a
country that openly seeks weapons of mass destruction and
blatantly invaded and looted a neighboring nation, among
other transgressions. If it is difficult to maintain the
international will behind sanctions on an outlaw nation, how
would we enforce sanctions against more responsible nations
of greater commercial importance like India and Pakistan?
In particularly grave cases, the CTBT Executive Council can
bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations.
Unfortunately, this too would most likely prove ineffective,
given that permanent members of the Security Council could
veto any efforts to punish CTBT violators. Chances of a
better result in the General Assembly are remote at best.
I believe the enforcement mechanisms of the CTBT provide
little reason for countries to forego nuclear testing. Some
of my friends respond to this charge by pointing out that
even if the enforcement provisions of the treaty are
ineffective, the treaty will impose new international norms
for behavior. In this case, we have observed that ``norms''
have not been persuasive for North Korea, Iraq, Iran, India
and Pakistan, the very countries whose actions we seek to
influence through a CTBT.
If a country breaks the international norm embodied in the
CTBT, that country has already broken the norm associated
with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Countries other than
the recognized nuclear powers who attempt to test a weapon
must first manufacture or obtain a weapon, which would
constitute a violation of the NPT. I fail to see how an
additional norm will deter a motivated nation from developing
nuclear weapons after violating the long-standing norm of the
NPT.

Conclusion

On Tuesday the Senate is scheduled to vote on the
ratification of the CTBT. If this vote takes place, I believe
the treaty should be defeated. The Administration has failed
to make a case on why this treaty is in our national security
interests.
The Senate is being asked to rely on an unfinished and
unproven Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program might
meet our needs in the future, but as yet, it is not close to
doing so. The treaty is flawed with an ineffective
verification regime and a practically nonexistent enforcement
process.
For these reasons, I will vote against ratification of the
CTBT.
____

[From the Center for Security Policy, Oct. 12, 1999]

Security Forum No. 99-F25

richard Perle Discounts Allies' Objections to Senate Rejection of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

(Washington, D.C.): In an op.ed. article slated for
publication in a major British daily newspaper tomorrow,
former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle puts in
perspective recommendations made last week by the leaders of
Britain, France and Germany that the Senate agree to the
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Mr.
Perle--an accomplished security policy practitioner widely
respected on both sides of the Atlantic and, indeed, around
the world--powerfully argues that the objections heard from
Messrs. Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder in
an op.ed. article published in the New York Times on 8
October should not dissuade the United States Senate for
doing what American national security and interests dictate:
defeating the CTBT.

Passion's Slave and the CTBT

(By Richard Perle)

Always generous with advice, a chorus of European officials
has been urging the United States Senate to ratify the
``Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.'' Last Friday, Tony Blair,
Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder (BC&S for short) issued
what Will Hutton, writing in the Observer, called ``a
passionate appeal'' to the American Senator whose votes will
decide whether the United States signs up to the fanciful
conceit that the CTBT will halt the testing of nuclear
weapons.
Advice giving is contagious, and Hutton has some of his
own: to encourage the U.S. to ratify the CTBT, he urged
Britain and France to phase out their nuclear weapons
entirely--a suggestion they will passionately reject.
Now, the prospect of crowning the Western victory in the
Cold War with a piece of international legislation that will
stop the spread of nuclear weapons is certainly appealing.
After all, a signature on a piece of paper would be a
remarkably cheap and efficient way to keep nuclear weapons
out of the hands of Kim Jong-il, Saddam Hussein and the other
44 regimes now deemed capable of developing nuclear weapons.
So what explains the need for passionate appeals from
politicians and strident comment from leader writers? Why
doesn't the Senate congratulate its friends on their wise and
timely counsel and vote to ratify the treaty?
I suspect that one reason is the Senators--or at least the
more responsible among them--have actually read the treaty
and understand how deeply flawed it is, how unlikely it is to
stop nuclear proliferation or even nuclear testing, and how
it has the potential to leave the United States with an
unsafe, unreliable nuclear deterrent.
Arms control agreements--especially ones affecting matters
as sensitive as nuclear weapons--must be judged both in broad
concept and in the details of their implementation. As a
device for ending all nuclear tests, the CTBT fails on both
counts.
It is characteristic of global agreements like the CTBT
that they lump together, under a single set of constraints,
states that can be counted upon to comply and those which
intend either to find and use loopholes--the CTBT is full of
them--or to cheat to defeat the constraints of the agreement.
To make matters worse, states joining global conventions,
even if they do so in bad faith, obtain the same treatment
as those who join in order to advance the proper purposes
of the agreement.
There can be little doubt that Indian participation in the
``atoms for peace program'' facilitated New Dehli's
acquisition of nuclear weapons by legitimating the
construction of a Canadian designed reactor from which India
extracted the nuclear material to make its first bomb. We now
know that Saddam Hussein made full use of the information
provided by Iraqi inspectors on the staff of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (set up to police the Non-
Proliferation Treaty) to conceal his clandestine nuclear
weapons program. With knowledge of the sources and methods by
which the IAEA attempts to ferret out cheating, Iraqis
ensconced there (by virtue of Iraq's having signed the NPT)
were better able to circumvent treaty's essential purpose.
In domestic affairs, no one would seriously propose that
the police and criminals come together and sign agreements
according to which they accept the same set of constraints on
their freedom of action. Yet that is the underlying logic of
the CTBT: a compact among nation states, some of which are
current or likely criminals, others--the majority--respectful
of international law and their treaty obligations. Because
there can be no realistic hope of verifying compliance with
the DTBT, this fundamental flaw, which is characteristic of
global agreements, is greatly magnified. The net result of
ratification of the CTBT would be (a) American compliance,
which could leave the U.S. uncertain about the safety and
reliability of its nuclear deterrent; and (b) almost certain
cheating by one or more rogue states determined to acquire
nuclear weapons.
Among the leaders in Congress who have taken a keen
interest in arms control is Senator Richard Lugar from
Indiana, a senior

[[Page S12391]]

member of the Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees.
A frequent floor manager in favor of arms control
legislation, he has supported every arms control treaty to
come before the Senate and has often led the proponents in
debate. Last week he announced that he would vote against
ratification of the CTBT.
I would be willing to bet that Senator Lugar has spent more
time studying this treaty than Blair, Chirac, Schroeder and
Hutton combined--which may explain why his view of the treaty
is one of reason and not passion. Senator Lugar opposes
ratification--not because he shares my view that the treaty
is conceptually flawed--but because he believes it cannot
achieve its intended purpose but it could ``risk undermining
support and confidence in the concept of multi-lateral arms
control.''
Arguing that the CTBT is ``not of the same caliber as the
arms control treaties that have come before the Senate in
recent decades.'' Lugar concludes that the treaty's
usefulness is ``highly questionable,'' and that it would
``exacerbate risks and uncertainties related to the safety of
our nuclear stockpile.'' He rightly points to the treaty's
``ineffective verification regime'' and ``practically
nonexistent enforcement process.''
Senator Lugar's careful, detailed assessment of the treaty
contrasts sharply with the rugby cheering section coming from
the London, Paris and Berlin offices of BC&S. Do BC&S know
that the treaty actually lacks a definition of the term
``nuclear test?'' Rushed to completion before the 1996
Presidential election, Clinton abandoned in mid-stream an
effort to negotiate a binding definition. Do they know that
advances in mining technology permit tests to be smothered so
they cannot be detected? Do they understand the composition
and complexities of the U.S. nuclear stockpile or the
importance of future testing to overcome any potential
problems? Can they get beyond their passion?
``Give me that man/That is not passion's slave, and I will
wear him/In my heart's core . . .'' Sound advice from Will
(Shakespeare, not Hutton).
____

[From the Washington Times, Sept. 14, 1999]

The Company You Keep

(By Frank Gaffney Jr.)

Today has been designated by proponents of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to be the ``CTBT Day of
Action.'' The plan apparently is to use this occasion to flex
the muscles of the unreconstructed anti-nuclear movement with
phone calls barraging the Capitol Hill switchboard, a
demonstration on the Capitol grounds, Senate speeches and
other agitation aimed at intimidating Majority Leader Trend
Lott and Foreign Relations Chairman Jesse Helms into clearing
the way for this treaty's ratification.
An insight into the strategy was offered last Friday by
Sen. Byron Dorgan, North Dakota Democrat, who suggested in
the colloquy with Mr. Lott that he intended to tie the Senate
into knots if hearings and action on the CTBT's resolution of
ratification were not promptly scheduled. The Majority leader
responded by indicating he had already spoke to Sen. Helms
about scheduling such hearings. He added portentously,
however, that ``I cannot wait to hear how Jim Schlesinger
describes the CTBT treaty. When he gets through damning it,
they may not want more hearings.''
Mr. Dorgan responded: ``Mr. Schlesinger will be standing in
a mighty small crowd. Most of the folks who are supporting
this treaty are the folks who Sen. Lott and I have the
greatest respect for who have served this country as
Republicans and Democrats, and military policy analysts for
three or four decades, going back to President Dwight D.
Eisenhower.''
This, then, is how the fight over the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty is shaping up. It will be one in which the pivotal
block of senators--mostly Republicans but possibly including
a number of ``New Democtats''--decide how they will vote less
on the basis of the merits of this accord than on the company
they will be keeping when they choose sides.
This is not an unreasonable response to a treaty that deals
with a matter as complex as nuclear testing. Such testing is,
after all, an exceedingly esoteric field, mostly science but
with a fair measure of art thrown in. For the best part of
the past 55 years, it has been recognized to be an
indispensable methodology for ensuring the reliability,
safety and effectiveness of America's nuclear deterrent.
Now, though, the Clinton administration would have us
accept that it is no longer necessary, that our nuclear
arsenal can continue to meet these exacting standards even if
none of its weapons are tested via underground explosions
ever again. This represents a stunning leap of logic (if not
of faith), given the contrary argument made by many CTBT
advocates in other contexts--notably, with respect to the F-
22 and missile defenses. These weapons, we are told, cannot
be tested enough; they should not be procured, let alone
relied upon, the party line goes, unless and until the most
exacting test requirements have been satisfied.
Whom is a senator to believe? The answer will not only
determine his or her stance on the CTBT. It will also say a
lot about the senator is question.
My guess--like Sen. Lott's--is that, at the end of the day,
sufficient numbers of senators will be guided by James
Schlesinger on a matter that threatens to propel the United
States inexorably toward unilateral nuclear disarmament. Few
people in the nation have more authority and credibility on
this topic than he, the only man in history to have held the
positions of chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
director of central intelligence, secretary of defense and
secretary of energy. Mr. Schlesinger's career has been made
even more influential in the Senate by virtue of his service
in both Republican and Democratic Cabinets.
Then there are the 50 or so senior security policy
practitioners who last week wrote Mr. Lott an open letter
advising him that ``the nation must retain an arsenal
comprising modern, safe and reliable nuclear weapons, and the
scientific and industrial base necessary to ensure the
availability of such weapons over the long term. In our
professional judgment, the zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty is incompatible with these requirements and,
therefore, is inconsistent with America's national security
interests.
Among the many distinguished signatories of this letter
are: former U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick; two of
President Reagan's National Security Advisers (Richard Allen
and William Clark); former Attorney General Edwin Meese; and
10 retired four-star generals and admirals (including the
former commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Louis Wilson).
When these sorts of men and women challenge the zero-yield
CTBT, as Mr. Schlesinger has done, on the grounds it will
contribute to the steady erosion of our deterrent, will be
impossible to verify and will make no appreciable
contribution to slowing proliferation, responsible senators
cannot help but be concerned.
To be sure, the Clinton administration and its arms control
allies have generated their own letters offering
``celebrity'' endorsements of the CTBT. Senators weighing
these endorsements, however, would be well-advised to
consider the following, obviously unrehearsed statement of
support for the Treaty given by one such prominent figure--
the serving chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Hugh
Shelton. It came last week in a congressional hearing in
response to a softball question from Sen. Carl Levin,
Michigan Democrat, about why Gen. Shelton thought the CTBT is
in our national interest. The chairman responded by saying:
``Sir, I think from the standpoint of the holding back on
the development of the testing which leads to wanting a
better system, developing new capabilities, which then leads
you into arms sales or into proliferation. Stopping that as
early as we can, I think, is in the best interest of the
international community in general, and specifically in the
best interest of the United States.''
Stripped of the veneer of this sort of support, the zero-
yield Comprehensive Test Ban can be seen for what it is: the
product primarily of the decades-long agitation of the looney
left who, in their efforts to ``disarm the ones they're
with,'' have made themselves the kind of company few
thoughtful senators should want to keep--on CTBT Day of
Action or when the votes on this treaty ultimately get
counted.
____

[From the Investor's Business Daily, Sept. 13, 1999]

Test Ban or Unilateral Disarmament Treaty?

(By Frank J. Gaffney Jr.)

The utopians in the Clinton camp have set their sights on
another nuclear weapons treaty. It's not designed to preserve
U.S. military capability, but rather to disarm it.
A major campaign is on to press the U.S. Senate to approve
ratification of the controversial arms control accord, the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It's intended to ban
permanently all nuclear weapons tests.
For the better part of 50 years, such testing has been
relied upon by successive Republican and Democratic
administrations to assure the safety, reliability and
effectiveness of the nation's nuclear deterrent.
Now we are told by the Clinton team and its allies that our
arsenal will be able to continue to meet this exacting
standard for the indefinite future without conducting another
underground detonation.
What is extraordinary is that the claim is being made by
many of the same people who regularly rail that the Pentagon
is not doing enough to test its weapons systems to ensure
that they will perform as advertised.
For example, such critics challenge the realism of the two
successful intercepts recently achieved by the Theater High
Altitude Area Defense missile defense system. Then there is
the complaint that too much computer modeling and too little
rigorous pre-production testing has been done to permit
further procurement of the Air Force's impressive next-
generation fighter, the F-22.
So one might ask of CTBT proponents: Which is it going to
be? Can we settle for computer modeling and simulations? Or
is realistic testing essential if we are to trust our
security and tax dollars to sophisticated weaponry?
Their answer? It depends: As long as the CTBT remains
unratified, the administration position seems likely to
remain that we can rely upon the current nuclear inventory,
and simulations will assure their reliability. But
simulations won't allow us to develop new weapons.
Thus, it would be hard to modernize the inventory as
strategic circumstances change.

[[Page S12392]]

For instance, how could we know if a new, deep-penetrating
warhead will take out a hardened underground bunker if we
can't test it?
Should the Senate give its advice and consent to this
accord, however, that line seems sure to change. Then the
CTBT's proponents will revert to form, free to acknowledge
the obvious: The existing stockpile--comprised increasingly
obsolescing weapons--cannot be maintained without testing,
either. So by their logic, the next move would be to just
retire all the weapons.
Consider the October 1997 congressional testimony of then-
Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs Victor
Reis: ``Just about all the parts of our present nuclear
weapons) are going to have to be remade.'' No responsible
scientists could promise, in the absence of explosive
testing, that completely remanufactured thermonuclear devices
will work as advertised. And no one will be arguing that
point more vociferously than the antinuclear activists who
are pushing the CTBT.
When challenged on this score, the White House blithely
asserts it is pursuing a $40 billion Stockpile Stewardship
Program (SSP) to address such quality-control issues down the
road.
Unfortunately, this capability will materialize--if at
all--a long way down the road. It will take some 10 years to
construct new facilities to house the various exotic
experimental diagnostic technologies that are supposed to
provide the same confidence about the performance of our
nuclear stockpile as does nuclear testing.
Plus, no one knows for sure whether the SSP will actually
pan out. Even before the CTBT is ratified, many of the
treaty's supporters are urging Congress to delete the
billions being sought each year for Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory's National Ignition Facility and its counterpart
facilities at the other nuclear labs.
Even if properly funded and brought on line as scheduled,
though, it is unclear that the simulations provided by these
experimental devices will be as accurate as underground
detonations. And, of course, a test ban will preclude the one
scientifically rigorous way of proving the simulations'
accuracy.
The bottom line is that U.S. national security demands that
we filed nothing but systematically and rigorously tested
military systems, both conventional and nuclear. To be sure,
computer simulations can contribute significantly to reducing
the cost and the length of time it takes to develop and
deploy such weapons. But we cannot afford to let any weapon--
least of all the most important ones in our arsenal, our
nuclear deterrent--go untested and unproven.
____

[From the Worldwide Weekly Defense News, Sept. 27, 1999]

Truth About Nuclear Testing Would Sink Test Ban Treaty

(By Frank Gaffney)

In the course of a Sept. 9 hearing before the U.S. Senate
Armed Services Committee called to consider the nomination of
Gen. Hugh Shelton to a second term as chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) asked the general
to explain why the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was
in the national interest.
He responded in a halting, almost tortured fashion, saying:
``Sir, I think from the standpoint of the holding back on the
development of the testing which leads to wanting a better
system, developing new capabilities, which then leads you
into arms sales or into proliferation. Stopping that as early
as we can, I think, is in the best interest of the
international community in general, and specifically in the
best interest of the United States.''
Translation: Unless my staff gives me a written text, I
can't begin to explain the logic of this arms control
agreement, which would make it permanently illegal to test
any U.S. nuclear weapons, even though we are going to rely
upon such arms as the ultimate guarantor of our security for
the foreseeable future. Still, the party line is that we
support this treaty and I am going to do so, no matter what.
The administration of President Bill Clinton established in
1993, long before Shelton became Joint Chiefs chairman, that
there would be no further testing of U.S. nuclear weapons,
with or without a CTBT.
The general inherited a position adopted on his
predecessor's watch and with the latter's support that would
be politically costly at this late date to repudiate. The
fact remains, however, that the idea of trying to ban all
nuclear tests (the so-called zero-yield test ban) was opposed
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among other relevant U.S.
government agencies, before Clinton decided to embrace it.
The reason the U.S. military counseled against such an
accord was elementary: It is widely understood that a zero-
yield treaty cannot be verified. Other countries can, and
must be expected to, exploit the inability of U.S. national
technical means and international seismic monitors to detect
covert, low-yield underground tests.
Since the United States would scrupulously adhere to a
zero-yield ban, it would be enjoined from conducting
experimental detonations necessary to maintaining the safety
and reliability of its nuclear deterrent.
U.S. military leaders are not expected to be experts on
nuclear nonproliferation or arms control. The government
hires lots of other people to do those jobs. Unfortunately,
many of the policy-makers responsible for those portfolios
lack the integrity or common sense one expects of men and
women in uniform, hence their claims that the CTBT will
contribute to curbing the spread of nuclear weapons.
This is, of course, fatuous nonsense in a world in which a
number of countries have acquired such weaponry without
conducting known nuclear tests, and others seek to buy proven
nuclear devices or the necessary know-how and equipment from
willing sellers in Russia, China and Pakistan.
Neither should the leadership of the American armed forces
be seen as adjuncts to an administration's political
operation. Rather, what is expected from such leaders is
their best professional military judgment, the unvarnished
truth, no matter how politically incorrect or inconvenient it
may be.
The United States cannot afford to allow its nuclear
arsenal to continue to go untested (it has already been seven
years since the last underground detonation occurred) any
more than it could permit its national security to depend on
untested conventional planes, tanks, missiles or ships.

* * * * *

____

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 10, 1999]

A Test Ban That Disarms Us

When it comes to nuclear testing, nations will act in their
perceived self-interest.

(By Charles Krauthammer)

Some debates just never go away. The Clinton administration
is back again pressing Congress for passage of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This is part of a
final-legacy push that includes a Middle East peace for just-
in-time delivery by September 2000.
The argument for the test ban is that it will prevent
nuclear proliferation. If countries cannot test nukes, they
will not build them because they won't know if they work.
Ratifying the CTBT is supposed to close the testing option
for would-be nuclear powers.
We sign. They desist, How exactly does this work?
As a Washington Post editorial explains, one of the ways to
``induce would-be proliferators to get off the nuclear
track'' is ``if the nuclear powers showed themselves ready to
accept some increasing part of the discipline they are
calling on non-nuclear others to accept.'' The power of
example of the greatest nuclear country is expected to induce
other countries to follow suit.
History has not been kind to this argument. The most
dramatic counterexamples, of course, are rogue states such as
North Korea, Iraq and Iran. They don't sign treaties and,
even when they do, they set out to break them clandestinely
from the first day. Moral suasion does not sway them.
More interesting is the case of friendly countries such as
India and Pakistan. They are exactly the kind of countries
whose nuclear ambitions the American example of restraint is
supposed to mollify.
Well, then. The United States has not exploded a nuclear
bomb either above or below ground since 1992. In 1993,
President Clinton made it official by declaring a total
moratorium on U.S. testing. Then last year, India and
Pakistan went ahead and exploded a series of nuclear bombs.
So much for moral suasion. Why did they do it? Because of
this obvious, if inconvenient, truth: Nuclear weapons are the
supreme military asset. Not that they necessarily will be
used in warfare. But their very possession transforms the
geopolitical status of the possessor. The possessor acquires
not just aggressive power but, even more important, a
deterrent capacity as well.
Ask yourself: Would we have launched the Persian Gulf War
if Iraq had been bristling with nukes?
This truth is easy for Americans to forget because we have
so much conventional strength that our nuclear forces appear
superfluous, even vestigial. Lesser countries, however,
recognize the political and diplomatic power conveyed by
nuclear weapons.
They want the nuclear option. For good reason. And they
will not forgo it because they are moved by the moral example
of the United States. Nations follow their interests, not
norms.
Okay, say the test ban advocates. If not swayed by American
example, they will be swayed by the penalties for breaking an
international norm.
What penalties? China exploded test after test until it had
satisfied itself that its arsenal was in good shape, then
quit in 1996. India and Pakistan broke the norm on nuclear
testing and nonproliferation. North Korea openly flouted the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Were any of these countries sanctioned? North Korea was
actually rewarded with enormous diplomatic and financial
inducements--including billions of dollars in fuel and food
aid--to act nice. India and Pakistan got slapped on the wrist
for a couple of months.
That's it. Why? Because these countries are either too
important (India) or too scary (North Korea). Despite our
pretensions, for America too, interests trump norms.
Whether the United States signs a ban on nuclear testing
will not affect the course of proliferation. But it will
affect the nuclear status of the United States.
In the absence of testing, the American nuclear arsenal,
the most sophisticated on the globe and thus the most in need
of testing to

[[Page S12393]]

ensure its safety and reliability, will degrade over time. As
its reliability declines, it becomes unusable. For the United
States, the unintended effect of a test ban is gradual
disarmament.
Well, maybe not so unintended. For the more extreme
advocates of the test ban, nonproliferation is the ostensible
argument, but disarmament is the real objective. The Ban the
Bomb and Nuclear Freeze movements have been discredited by
history, but their adherents have found a back door. A
nuclear test ban is that door. For them, the test ban is part
of a larger movement: the war against weapons. It finds
expression in such touching and useless exercises as the land
mine convention, the biological weapons convention, etc.

* * * * *

____

[From the Washington Post, June 7, 1998]

Paper Defense

(By George F. Will)

In the meadow of the president's mind, in the untended
portion where foreign policy thoughts sprout randomly, this
flower recently bloomed concerning the Indian and Pakistani
nuclear tests: ``I cannot believe that we are about to start
the 21st century by having the Indian subcontinent repeat the
worst mistakes of the 20th century.''
What mistakes did he mean? Having nuclear weapons? Were it
not for them, scores of thousands of Americans would have
died in 1945 ending the fighting in the Pacific. And nuclear
weapons were indispensable ingredients of the containment of
the Soviet Union and its enormous conventional forces.
Perhaps the president meant that arms competitions were the
``mistakes.'' But that thought does not rise to the level of
adult commentary on the real historical contingencies and
choices of nations.
This president's utterances on foreign policy often are
audible chaff, and not even his glandular activities are as
embarrassing as his sub-sophomoric pronouncement to India and
Pakistan that ``two wrongs don't make a right.'' That bromide
was offered to nations weighing what they consider questions
of national life and death.
U.S. policy regarding such tests has been put on automatic
pilot by Congress's itch to micromanage and to mandate
cathartic gestures, so the United States will now
evenhandedly punish with economic sanctions India for its
provocation and Pakistan for responding to it. Because India
is stronger economically, the sanctions will be
disproportionately injurious to Pakistan.
India has an enormous advantage over Pakistan in
conventional military forces. (It has the world's fourth
largest military establishment, although China's army is
three times larger than India's.) That is one reason Pakistan
believes it needs nuclear weapons. Economic sanctions will
further weaken Pakistan's ability to rely on non-nuclear
means of defense.
This should be a moment for Republicans to reassert their
interest in national security issues, one of the few areas in
which the public still regards them as more reassuring than
Democrats. But the Republican who could be particularly
exemplary, isn't. Arizona Sen. John McCain says the first
thing to do is impose ``sanctions which hurt'' and the second
is ``to get agreements that they will not test again.''
So, automatic sanctions having failed to deter either
nation, Washington's attention turns, robotically, to an even
more futile ritual--the superstition of arms control,
specifically the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the
United States signed in 1996, but which the Senate has
prudently not ratified. The designation ``superstition'' fits
because the faith of believers in arms control is more than
impervious to evidence; their faith is strengthened even by
evidence that actually refutes it.
Far from demonstrating the urgency of ratification, India's
and Pakistan's tests demonstrate the CTBT's irrelevance.
India had not tested since 1974. Pakistan evidently had never
tested. Yet both had sufficient stockpiles to perform
multiple tests. So the tests did not create new sabers, they
were the rattling of sabers known to have existed for years.
Indeed, in 1990, when fighting in the disputed territory of
Kashmir coincided with Indian military exercises, the Bush
administration assumed that both Pakistan and India had built
weapons with their nuclear technologies and worried about a
possible nuclear exchange.
The nonproliferation treaty authorizes international
inspections only at sites declared to be nuclear facilities.
Nations have been known to fib. The CTBT sets such a low-
yield standard of what constitutes a test of a nuclear
device, that verification is impossible.
Various of the president's policies, whether shaped by
corruption, in competence of naivete, have enabled China to
increase the lethality of its ICBMs. The president and his
party are committed to keeping America vulnerable to such
weapons: 41 senators, all Democrats, have filibustered
legislation sponsored by Sens. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) and
Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii) declaring it U.S. policy ``to deploy
effective anti-missile defenses of the territory of the
United States as soon as technologically possible.''
Instead, the administration would defend the nation with
parchment--gestures like the CTBT, which is a distillation of
liberalism's foreign policy of let's pretend. Let's pretend
that if we forever forswear tests, other nations' admiration
will move them to emulation. Diagnostic tests are
indispensable for maintaining the safety and reliability of
the aging U.S. deterrent inventory. So the CTBT is a recipe
for slow-motion denuclearization. But let's pretend that if
we become weaker, other nations will not want to become
stronger.
Seeking a safer world by means of a weaker America and
seeking to make America safe behind the parchment walls of
arms control agreements, is to start the 21st century by
repeating the worst fallacies of the 20th century.

[From the Wall Street Journal, Oct. 12, 1999]

. . . Would Be Even Worse if It Succeeded

(By Kathleen Bailey)

It appears the Senate will either vote down the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or postpone a vote
indefinitely. The treaty's supporters, led by President
Clinton, argue that the CTBT is necessary to constrain
nations that seek to acquire a workable nuclear weapons
design. But the treaty would accomplish none of its
proponents' nonproliferation goals. It would, however,
seriously degrade the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
No treaty can stop a nation from designing and building a
simple nuclear weapon with confidence that it will work. To
do so doesn't require testing. One of the U.S. bombs dropped
on Japan in 1945 was of a design that had never been tested,
and South Africa built six nuclear weapons without testing.
By contrast, the U.S. today needs to test its nuclear
weapons because they are more complex. They are designed to
make pinpoint strikes against small targets such as silos.
This dictates high-performance delivery systems, which, in
turn, requires tight parameters on the allowable weight,
size, shape, safety measures and yield.
Today's would-be proliferators are likely to target cities,
not silos. The delivery vehicles may be ships, barges, trucks
or Scud-type missiles. The exact yield of the weapon will not
matter, and there will be no tight restrictions imposed by
advanced delivery systems. Safety standards will not be a
crucial issue.
CTBT proponents also contend that the treaty will promote
nonproliferation by creating an international norm against
nuclear weapons. But there is already a norm against
additional nations acquiring nuclear weapons: the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, signed by every major country except
India, Israel and Pakistan.
The NPT norm against the pursuit of nuclear weapons,
established when the treaty went into effect in 1970, has
been broken repeatedly, and not just by the three countries
that refused to sign it. The list of states that have broken
or are thought to have broken the norm includes Argentina,
Brazil, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, South Africa, South Korea
and Taiwan.
It is true, as treaty proponents argue, that the CTBT will
inhibit nuclear-weapons modernization. But this is not a
plus. It would keep the U.S. from modernizing its nuclear
arsenal to make it as safe as possible. Already there are new
safety measures that could be incorporated into the American
stockpile, making it less likely that weapons will explode
accidentally--but the U.S. is not incorporating these new
safety technologies because they would require low-yield
nuclear testing.
Modernization is also needed to make U.S. weapons more
effective against the ever-evolving countermeasures by
opponents. We know that deeply buried targets are a new
problem, as are biological weapons. America may need to
tailor its arsenal to a totally different type of targets in
the future, which would require nuclear testing.
While the treaty would inhibit U.S. modernization, it would
not affect those that choose to cheat. It would be easy for
Russia, China, and others to conduct nuclear tests without
being detected. This is because the CTBT is not even
minimally verifiable.
Effective verification entails having high confidence that
militarily significant cheating will be detected in a timely
manner. In the case of the CTBT, we need to know the answers
to two questions: What yield nuclear test can provide
militarily significant information? Can the CTBT verification
system detect to that level?
Five hundred tons of yield is a very useful testing level,
although not sufficient to gain full confidence in all
aspects of an existing weapon's performance or to develop
sophisticated new nuclear weapons. The latter goals could be
achieved for most designs with tests at yields between one
and 10 kilotons. Tests at levels as low as 500 tons may be
militarily significant.
The International Monitoring System of the CTBT is expected
to provide the ability to detect, locate and identify non
evasive nuclear testing of one kiloton or greater. But most
cheaters are likely to be evasive. By taking some relatively
simple measures, they could test several kilotons with little
risks of detection. One method by which they may do so is
through energy decoupling--detonation of the device
underground--that can reduce the seismic signal by as much as
a factor of 70. Thus, a fully decoupled one-kiloton explosion
would look seismically like at 14-ton explosion, or a 10-
kiloton explosion like a 140-ton one.
On-site inspection will not solve the verification problem.
Even if we knew that a test would conducted, we almost
certainly would not know exactly where it took place. Without
knowing the precise location, the search area would be too
large for a meaningful inspection.

[[Page S12394]]

If the Senate ratified the CTBT, it's certain that the U.S.
would comply with it, foreclosing America's ability to
modernize its nuclear forces. But other nations have a
history of noncompliance with arms-control treaties. Thus the
limited political benefits of the CTBT are not worth the high
cost to America's national security.
____

[From The New Republic, October 25, 1999]

The Flawed Test Ban Treaty--Poor Pact

(By Frank J. Gaffney Jr.)

If current vote-counts prove accurate and no last-minute
postponement is agreed to, the Senate will not provide the
two-thirds support necessary to ratify the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although the Clinton administration acts
as if this would be disastrous for the struggle against
nuclear proliferation, defeat of the CTBT would actually be a
victory for American national security.
As the administration has implicitly conceded by sending
Energy Secretary Bill Richardson on a last-minute trip to
Russia to negotiate better verification procedures, many
senators harbor deep concerns about the treaty's
verifiability. They are right to do so. U.S. intelligence
suspects (but cannot prove) that both the Russians and the
Chinese have conducted covert nuclear tests in recent months.
In fact, it is impossible to verify a total, or ``zero-
yield,'' ban on all nuclear testing, since foreign monitors
cannot reliably differentiate covert low-yield explosions
from earthquakes or conventional explosions.
This would be true even if the sort of worldwide seismic
monitoring system to be established under the CTBT (thanks
largely to the administration's decision to put U.S.
intelligence assets at the service of a multilateral
organization) were in place. For political, if not technical,
reasons, the data compiled by the ``international community''
will probably be even less conducive to a finding of
noncompliance than the iffy information the United States
often gets on its own.
Treaty proponents point to the CTBT's provision for on-site
inspections. Such inspections are far from automatic and can
be stymied by U.N. Security Council members determined to
block them. If nations exploit well-understood techniques for
muffling the seismic shocks that such events
precipitate (``decoupling''), they can increase the yield
of their tests without getting caught--as the United
States proved in its own 1960 experiment.
Even if the CTBT were fully verifiable, it would be
irrelevant to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Explosive
testing is simply no longer the sine qua non of a nuclear
development and acquisition program. From Israel to North
Korea, countries have acquired atomic devices without
conducting identified nuclear tests. (Pakistan and India
conducted their recent tests for political, not
technological, reasons, and the tests took place years after
each of them had gotten the bomb.) Even Clinton's CTBT point
man, National Security Council staffer Steve Andreason, has
publicly stated that this treaty will not prevent countries
from obtaining ``simple'' weapons--which can be all too
useful for terrorism and blackmail.
While the CTBT will not have the benefits the
administration claims, it will cost the United States dearly
by making it impossible to maintain the U.S. nuclear
deterrent over time. That will be the practical and
ineluctable effect of denying those responsible for ensuring
the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of this deterrent
the tool that they have relied upon for the vast majority of
the past 55 years: realistic, explosive testing. The
exceedingly sophisticated nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal
cannot prudently be kept ``on the shelf'' indefinitely. The
current average age of these weapons is 14 years; they were
only designed to be in service for 20. And none were planned
or manufactured to remain viable in a no-test environment.
Indeed, experience suggests that problems with the nuclear
deterrent probably exist already, going undetected ever since
Congress voted to adopt a testing cutoff in 1992. On his last
day in office, President Bush formally appealed for relief
from this legislation, warning that ``the requirement to
maintain and improve the safety of our nuclear stockpile and
to evaluate and maintain the reliability of the U.S. forces
necessitates continued nuclear testing for those purposes,
albeit at a modest level, for the foreseeable future.''
Although President Clinton tends to dissemble on this point,
every administration until his recognized that periodic
underground testing--at least at low levels of explosive
``yield''--was necessary to detect and fix problems that
unexpectedly, but chronically, appear even in relatively new
weapons. Hence, no other president since World War II was
prepared to accept the sort of permanent, zero-yield ban
Clinton has embraced.
Moreover, the older the weapon, the more problematic it
becomes to certify its safety and reliability through
computer simulations alone. As complex nuclear arms age,
their exotic metals, chemicals, and highly radioactive
materials undergo changes that are exceedingly difficult to
predict and model via computer methods. At a minimum, if such
weapons are to be retained for the foreseeable future, they
must be updated. As then-Assistant Secretary of Energy for
Defense Programs Victor Reis told Congress in October 1997,
``Just about all the parts [of the current arsenal's weapons]
are going to have to be remade.''
There are serious challenges to such a wholesale
refurbishing program that even new experimental devices such
as those being developed under the administration's more than
$45 billion Stockpile Stewardship Program will not be able to
address with certainty, at least not for the next decade or
so. First, the production lines for building the stockpile's
existing bombs and warheads were dismantled long ago.
Reconstituting them would require a lot of time and money.
And, even if the original designs could be faithfully
replicated, one could never be certain they would work
according to their specifications without realistic,
explosive testing to validate the product.
Second, it is impossible to replicate some of the
ingredients in weapons designed two decades ago or earlier;
key components have become technologically obsolete, and no
one would recommend using them when smaller, lighter,
cheaper, and more reliable materials and equipment are now
readily available. In addition, federal safety and health
guidelines now prohibit the use of some of the components
utilized in the original designs.
Third, most of those who were involved in designing and
proving these weapons have left the industrial and laboratory
complex, taking with them irreplaceable corporate memory.
With continuing nuclear testing, all these problems could
presumably be overcome. Without such testing, the United
States will be able neither to modernize its nuclear arsenal
to meet future deterrent requirements nor to retain the high
confidence it requires in the older weapons upon which it
would then have to rely for the foreseeable future.
It is precisely for these reasons that the CTBT has been,
to use Clinton's phrase, the ``longest-sought, hardest-
fought'' goal of the anti-nuclear movement. Fortunately, more
than 34 senators have figured out that, were it to be
ratified, the CTBT would set the United States on the
slippery slope to unilateral nuclear disarmament. Whenever
the votes are finally tallied on this accord, will the
``nays'' include any of the Senate's self-described New
Democrats--whose partisans brought Clinton and Al Gore to
power on a platform that prominently featured a more tough-
minded approach to national security and defense issues?
____

[From the Washington Times, Oct. 12, 1999]

Time for a CTBT Vote

(By Frank Gaffney, Jr.)

In 23 years of working on nuclear weapons policy and
related arms control matters, I have never seen anything like
what happened last Thursday. That was the day Sen. Richard
Lugar, Indiana Republican, released a six-page press release
detailing the myriad and compelling reasons that would cause
him to vote against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
What makes this development so extraordinary, of course, is
that Dick Lugar has an unparalleled reputation in Washington
for his commitment to arms control in particular and his
willingness more generally to rise above politics in the
interest of lending bipartisan heft to foreign policy
initiatives he believes to be in the national interest. With
apologies to the Smith Barney marketeers, when Mr. Lugar
speaks on treaties, people listen.
Rarely has it been more important that his Senate
colleagues do so. Indeed, the Indiana senator has offered a
critique of the CTBT that should be required reading for
anyone being asked to vote on this treaty. He summarizes the
reasons why he will vote against this treaty as follows:
The goal of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is to ban all
nuclear explosions worldwide: I do not believe it can
succeed. I have little confidence that the verification and
enforcement provisions will dissuade other nations from
nuclear testing. Furthermore, I am concerned about our
country's ability to maintain the integrity and safety of our
own nuclear arsenal under the conditions of the treaty.
The impact of so withering an assessment--backed up by
pages of painstaking analysis--was evident on Sunday as
syndicated columnist George Will accomplished the
intellectual equivalent of rope-a-dope in an interview with
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on ABC News' ``This
Week'' program. Mrs. Albright was reduced to sputtering as
Mr. Will read from one section of Sen. Lugar's indictment
after another, unable either to challenge the authority of
the indicter or effectively to rebut his damning conclusions.
Instead, she worked rather tendentiously and unconvincingly
through her talking points about how Senate opposition to the
CTBT signals that ``We are not as serious about controlling
nuclear weapons as we should be.'' Nonsense. To the contrary,
the opposition to this treaty can be justified as much on its
adverse impact on ``serious'' efforts to control nuclear
weapons as on the fact it will undermine the U.S. nuclear
deterrent. As Sen. Lugar put it:
``I do not believe that the CTBT is of the same caliber as
the arms control treaties that have come before the Senate in
recent decades. Its usefulness to the goal of non-
proliferation is highly questionable. Its likely
ineffectuality will risk undermining support [for] and
confidence in the concept of multilateral arms control. Even
as a symbolic statement of our desire for a safer world, it
is problematic because it would exacerbate risks and
uncertainties related to the safety of our nuclear
stockpile.''

[[Page S12395]]

In short, by making it clear the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty is incompatible with U.S. national security
requirements and bad for arms control, Richard Lugar has
delivered the kiss-of-death to the CTBT. Without his support,
it is inconceivable that a two-thirds majority could be found
in the Senate to permit ratification of this accord.
The question that occurs now is: Since the CTBT is so
fatally flawed and so injurious, will the Senate's Republican
majority agree to let it continue to bind the United
States for the foreseeable future? That would be the
practical effect of exercising the option a number of GOP
senators (including, it must be noted, Mr. Lugar) hope
President Clinton will allow them to exercise--
unscheduling the vote this week and deferring further
Senate action on the Comprehensive Test Ban until after
the 2000 elections, at the earliest.
Under international law, that would mean only one thing:
Until such time as our government makes it clear the CTBT
will not be ratified, the United States will be obligated to
take no action that would defeat the ``object and purpose''
of the CTBT. This would mean not only no resumption of
testing. Under the Clinton administration, there will
certainly be no preparations to conduct explosive tests
either--or even actions to stop the steady, lethal erosion of
the nation's technical and human capabilities needed to do
so.
If national security considerations alone were not
sufficiently compelling to prompt the Senate leadership to
stay the course and defeat the treaty, the conduct of the
president and his surrogates should be sufficient inducement.
After all, administration spokesmen are using every available
platform to denounce Republicans for playing ``political''
games with this treaty. (Never mind that the president and
every one of his allies on CTBT in the Senate had a chance to
reject the time-agreement that scheduled the vote. As long as
they thought their side would prevail, the 14 hours of debate
were considered to be sufficient; only when more accurate,
and ominous, tallies were taken did the proponents begin to
whine there was too little time for hearings and floor
deliberation.)
Moreover, in refusing to date to commit not to push for a
vote in an even more politically charged environment next
year, the CTBT's champions are behaving in a manner that can
only encourage GOP speculation that the president and his
partisans have every intention of using whatever deferral
they are granted to campaign against the Republican
majority--with the hope not only of changing minds, but
changing senators and even control of the Senate in the
upcoming election.
With Dick Lugar arguing that the zero-yield, permanent
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty must be defeated, Senate
Republicans can safely do what is right without fear of
serious domestic political repercussions. And, while there
will be much bellyaching around the world if the CTBT is
rejected by the U.S. Senate, the real, lasting impact will
not be to precipitate nuclear proliferation; it is happening
now and will intensify no matter what happens on this treaty.
Neither will it be to inflict mortal harm or
``embarrassment'' on the presidency. No one could do more to
demean that office than the incumbent.
Rather, the most important--and altogether desirable--
effect will be to re-establish the U.S. Senate as the Framers
of the Constitution intended it to be: a co-equal with the
president in the making of international treaties; a quality-
control agent pursuant to the sacred principles of checks-
and-balances on executive authority, one that if exercised
stands to strengthen the leverage of U.S. diplomats in the
future and assure that the arms control and other treaties
they negotiate more closely conform to American security
interests. Mr. Lugar put it very well in his formidable press
release of last Thursday:
``While affirming our desire for international peace and
stability, the U.S. Senate is charged with the constitutional
responsibility of making hard judgments about the likely
outcomes of treaties. This requires that we examine the
treaties in close detail and calculate the consequences of
ratification for the present and the future. Viewed in this
context, I cannot support the [CTBT's] ratification.''

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.