[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 136 (Friday, October 8, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12307-S12316]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Steve Shope 
be granted floor privileges in the proceedings today.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I want to share a few additional thoughts.
  Earlier today I discussed my belief that if the United States is 
going to be a leader for peace, it needs to be a leader militarily in 
the world. It has fallen uniquely to be our responsibility, our burden, 
our role to do that. I think if we fail to do that, history will record 
that we abdicated a responsibility. That is critically important.
  Presiding in the chair is the chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee. We have had a number of days of hearings--some top-secret, 
code-word briefings and hearings. Some have been public.
  I want to share a few things, as I interpret what occurred in those 
hearings. It is consistent with the headline as has been cited earlier 
in the New York Times: ``Experts Say Test Ban Could Impair Nuclear Arms 
Safety.'' That is the way it was interpreted by a New York Times 
reporter. That is the way I believe it is fair to be concluded.
  The lab Directors were pressed aggressively by Senator Levin, one of 
the finer questioners that I have ever observed in this body. He asked 
them firmly and consistently: Were they on board? They maneuvered 
around a bit, but they eventually did say they were on board. But 
Senator Robert Byrd astutely noted they were ``uneasy'' with those 
answers. In fact, they indicated they were on board only after a good 
deal of insistence and debate about signing on to the CTBT 
concept. They indicated that they would sign on and be on board, if the 
six safeguards could be included. These are employees of the executive 
branch of the United States Government. They work for the President. 
They know the Secretary of Energy was testifying there at the same 
time.

  The chairman of the committee noted that their testimony was 
inconsistent with the testimony of the Secretary of Energy at the same 
hearing on the same day. The Secretary of Energy is a fine person, but 
he is not a nuclear engineer. He has not been given the responsibility 
to monitor the safety and security of our weapons. He says they are OK. 
The President says they are OK. But the experts didn't quite say that. 
In fact, they said it could impair nuclear arms safety. I think that is 
important. We do not have one voice about this matter.
  They talked about the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and they were 
not nearly so confident in that program as some would suggest. In fact, 
it almost seemed, I suggest, that they were saying that the President, 
in 1993, just unilaterally said: We are not going to test, so they are 
not doing that. This apparently gave them some belief that they could 
have some other kind of testing, so that is better than nothing. I may 
be misinterpreting those comments, but I don't think so. I think they 
basically said stockpile stewardship was not a guaranteed thing, but 
that they would do their best with it, as patriotic Americans. They 
said they could not be sure the Stockpile Stewardship Program would 
work, and they admitted there would be no way to validate the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program other than through live-fire tests--tests of 
explosions, nuclear explosions.
  I ask, is this, indeed, in the best interest of the United States to 
tie our invaluable deterrent responsibility to an undeveloped, 
untested, and unvalidated simulation regime?
  The preamble to the treaty states that cessation of testing is an 
effective measure of nuclear disarmament. Dr. Robinson, Director of the 
Sandia Lab, testified that nonnuclear components in today's weapons 
will ultimately become obsolete and irreproducible--they cannot be 
reproduced. That is, without testing, our nuclear capability will 
vanish. If it does, it is a distinct possibility that other states will 
find the world's situation having changed significantly, and they may 
decide to determine to expand their own capability. It will, in fact, 
be, and these words irritate a number of people, but it has a ring of 
truth to it. It will be a form of unilateral disarmament, we, being the 
world leader, signing a piece of paper that ultimately leads us to a 
point where we cannot continue to be the world leader.
  We know a test ban can't prevent nations from acquiring nuclear 
weapons. Tests by India and Pakistan showed that. The Sandia Lab 
Director further testified that, ``[t]hose who claim that by ending 
nuclear testing, we will close off the threat of terrorist development 
and use of nuclear explosives mislead themselves.'' And Congress should 
not accept such arguments as a basis for endorsing a test ban treaty.
  I hope, Mr. President, we can develop a way to continue to reduce the 
presence of nuclear weapons. This Congress, this Senate has supported 
massive reductions in the number of weapons we possess. We have 
continued to explore other treaties and agreements.
  I like limited, bilateral agreements with nations such as Russia or 
China or England or France, where we know what we are doing and it has 
an end time. We have an agreement. We have a precise understanding of 
the benefits and risks involved. These broad treaties, to which we are 
committing with the whole world of nations, many of whom are not going 
to comply with them, make me nervous. It is not necessarily good for a 
great nation to do that. A great nation has to be cautious. A great 
nation can't blithely go out and start signing up to a bunch of 
treaties and thinking that it will all work out sometime in the future. 
It is a serious matter.

  I am glad the chairman and others, Senator Kyl, Senator Helms, have 
taken such a lead in this. I am glad to see Chairman Helms here. 
Chairman Helms has said consistently, this treaty is not good for 
America. He has refused to endorse it. He opposes it. Now we have had 
hearings and debate, and a growing number in this Senate are agreeing 
with him. I don't believe there are votes sufficient to pass it, 
because I do not believe that it is good for the country. I think the 
opinion of Senator Helms on that is being validated daily by the 
experts, as well as Members of this body.
  Mr. President, I thank the chairman for his leadership. I appreciate 
Senator Biden's ability to articulate and to advocate. It makes us all 
think carefully about what we are doing. I think it has been a good 
debate. I think we have learned a lot. In the end, I think this Senate 
will conclude this is not the time to ratify this treaty.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am going to take about 5 minutes to 
respond to my friend from Alabama. He may have to catch a plane or 
something. I hope he will understand that, if he is not on the floor.
  First of all, I find it fascinating. I think he may want to amend the 
record--I am being a bit facetious, a little tongue in cheek--amend the 
record by suggesting that he has greater faith in headline writers and 
reporters than he does in the transcript I am about to read.
  I don't know whether he has ever been bitten by a headline. We all 
know headline writers read--and no one

[[Page S12308]]

knows this better than my friend from North Carolina--the part of the 
copy that is given to them, and they get to write the headline they 
want. Sometimes it bears little resemblance to what happened. I hope we 
don't put any faith in a headline. I am not suggesting we shouldn't put 
faith in what is written by reporters sometimes. What was said in this 
article is accurate, but it is not complete. As my friend from Alabama 
said, we do not have one voice speaking on this, but we do have one 
record, one record from the hearing. I have a copy of the record from 
the hearing conducted in the Armed Services Committee yesterday, page 
59. I will read the whole thing. It will take a minute.

       Senator Levin. Therefore, what you are telling us is that 
     if this safeguard [the Strategic Stockpile Program] and other 
     safeguards are part of this process that you can rely upon, 
     that in your words, Dr. Robinson, you are on board in terms 
     of this treaty; is that correct?
       Dr. Robinson. I am on board that science-based stockpile 
     stewardship has a much higher chance of success and I will 
     accept it as a substitute.

  Going on to page 60.

       Dr. Robinson. As a substitute for requiring yield tests for 
     certification.

  The tests he is referring to are nuclear tests. Then further on down, 
Dr. Tarter says:

       I can only testify to the ability of stockpile stewardship 
     to do the job. It is your job, about the treaty.
       Senator Levin. Are you able to say that, providing you can 
     rely on safeguard F--

  My description: Safeguard F is the safeguard that allows the 
President to get out of the treaty if the lab Director certifies that 
he is not able to certify the safety and reliability.

       Senator Levin. Are you able to say that, providing you can 
     rely on safeguard F and at some point decide that you cannot 
     certify it, that you are willing under that condition to rely 
     on this stewardship program as a substitute for actual 
     testing?
       Dr. Tarter. Yes.

  Further down, same page:

       Dr. Brown. Senator Levin, if the government [the 
     laboratories] provides us with the sustained resources, the 
     answer is yes, and if safeguard F is there, yes.
  Now I am not suggesting all else that is quoted is not accurate. But 
it is useful to have a punchline at the end of the quotes. It may be 
viewed as tortuous; it may be viewed in any way you want. I don't think 
my friend from Alabama means that because these renowned scientists 
happen to work for the Federal Government--they also, by the way, are 
in the employ, if I am not mistaken, of outside laboratories and 
industries as well, or at least on loan from them--I hope nobody is 
suggesting--and I am sure he is not--that they would alter their 
testimony because the President of the United States or the Secretary 
of Energy takes a position that is consistent with theirs, and that is 
why they are taking it.
  I know my friend from Virginia will want to respond to this today, or 
Tuesday, or whenever he wants to do it. We will have plenty of time. I 
did not want there to be a hiatus between the comments of my friend 
from Alabama and my responding. I will conclude, I say to my friend 
from North Carolina. I think we should be--and believe me, I need this 
admonition for myself as well--a little careful about some of the words 
we use, such as ``unilateral disarmament.'' I don't think anybody is 
arguing we are unilaterally disarming.
  At any rate, I see my friend from Virginia has come down from on high 
and I assume wants to respond.
  I yield the floor.
  (Mr. Inhofe assumed the Chair.)
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am anxious to receive the remarks of our 
distinguished chairman. But I was right there when Senator Levin asked 
the questions. I will put in the Record my edification of their 
replies.
  We have to understand, this Stockpile Stewardship Program, SSP, is 
basically a computer and other adjuncts, scientific devices that we are 
going to put in place--that is the key, ``put in place''--at the 
minimum, 5 or 6 years from now, but more likely 10 years from now. In 
the opinion of the Director of Sandia Laboratories, it could be 20 
years. That is all in the Record in response to my question.
  These Directors carefully said: Yes, we are meeting the current 
milestones in putting together this computer and other high-tech test 
programs, but we are a long way away. It could be as much as 20 years. 
So we could go to a period of, at a minimum, 8 to 10 years without any 
testing of the type that is a substitute for actual testing. Today, the 
stockpile is safe. Tomorrow, it is credible and safe. But as the years 
go on--and Senator Byrd used the words, as the years go on--the natural 
degrading under the law of physics of metallic parts, of chemical 
parts, and other parts takes place.
  Therefore, this hope for SSP, in sum, is almost a dream, but these 
men conscientiously are working on it day and night. Hopefully, in a 
period of anywhere from 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, maybe 20 years, it will be on 
line for that type of database which actual testing will give.
  In the meantime, we are going through with part of the SSP program, 
but not all of it--bits and pieces of it--largely relying on the test 
data of a bank of information we have in this country developed over 
the period of 50 years in which we did actual tests.
  I thank my colleague.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will pursue this more on Tuesday. I 
respectfully suggest that argument was based on a fallacy, and that is, 
the Stockpile Stewardship Program will not stay at zero until it is 
completed. We began this years ago. It is already working. We already 
use testing methods that do not require nuclear explosions.
  The Senator will remember the chart James Schlesinger had with the 
arrows going up and down, and I quote from Dr. Sig Hecker, the Director 
of Los Alamos in 1997, whom everybody quotes these days, wrote a letter 
to the Senator from Arizona and said:

       . . . there have been several instances since the cessation 
     of nuclear testing in September 1992, where we have found 
     problems . . . for which in the past we would have turned to 
     a nuclear test in the kiloton range to resolve. In the 
     absence of testing, we have used the methodology of 
     [Stockpile Stewardship] to evaluate the problem and suggest 
     fixes if required.
       This has included more extensive calculations, non-nuclear 
     laboratory experiments, comparison to previous nuclear test 
     data, and the extensive experience of our designers and 
     engineers. Moreover, our assessment has been checked against 
     the rigors of peer review by the Lawrence Livermore National 
     Laboratory. We have examined several problems of this nature 
     during this year's certification cycle.
       At this time, we have sufficient confidence in our 
     solutions to certify the stockpile without a resumption of 
     nuclear testing. If our confidence in the fixes were not 
     sufficiently high, we would not certify the stockpile.

  He is no longer the lab Director, but I assume my colleagues all 
believe him to be an honorable man. When they say testing is not needed 
at this time--that is, the Directors--I ask my colleagues whether or 
not they agree with Jim Schlesinger, who said it is not needed at this 
time and he doubts it will be needed in the future.
  Let me explain. We are using data from 1,000 past nuclear tests--as 
my friend says, from nonnuclear subcritical experiments and from high-
tech simulations to understand what is happening and what may happen in 
the weapons stockpile.
  Four facilities that will not be ready until 2005 are--they are 
called the National Ignition Facilities--a contained firing facility, 
dual-access radiographic hydrodynamics test facility, and the Atlas 
Plus power facilities. These facilities--and this is important--are all 
logical successors to older, less capable facilities. Our scientists 
are pushing the envelope but are not engaging in flights of fancy. That 
is why our labs and the Department of Energy are confident the National 
Ignition Facility will work, even though it has cost overruns. These 
facilities will serve several purposes and increase knowledge of basic 
physics of nuclear weapons. That new knowledge will lead to more 
accurate and precise computer simulations. The facilities can also be 
used to test the particular weapons problems. That is why I say our 
weapons will still be tested, even without full-scale nuclear weapons 
testing.
  Another key tool we are developing is this advanced supercomputing 
accelerated strategic computing initiative, another generation of 
supercomputers that will be able to synthesize test data from the past, 
and all of the testing done on weapons components, to provide three-
dimensional simulations of all aspects of nuclear weapons and how they 
react. Already, our scientists and engineers are working with industry 
and several universities to develop

[[Page S12309]]

computers that are capable of running more than 3 trillion operations 
per second. That is a new record level of computing power, and it gives 
us new safety.
  Our goal, admittedly, over the next 5 years is for those 
supercomputers to be able to do 100 trillion operations per second. 
That is not something we need in our stockpile today. In fact, it 
represents a 100,000-fold increase in today's computational ability, 
and everybody says today's computational ability is sufficient to 
guarantee the stockpile. But when our weapons reach their so-called 
shelf life, then it is going to be needed, and we anticipate needing 
that sophisticated modeling. No one thinks that sophisticated modeling 
is needed now.
  Finally, I have real questions about my colleagues' concern that the 
stockpile stewardship cannot work. Our scientists are the best in the 
world. They know what they are doing. They define scientific challenges 
that must meet the military performance and reliability standards. 
After defining these challenges, they believe they can meet them. I 
believe they know what they are talking about. But I see one problem. 
The one problem the Stockpile Stewardship Program faces now and in the 
future is that some may not fund it. That is what our colleagues at the 
laboratories are talking about.
  Let me quote and conclude from a news release released today by the 
Department of Energy. I will submit it for the Record. It is ``For 
Immediate Release,'' dated October 8, 1999, and is a joint statement by 
Directors of three nuclear weapons laboratories--I note parenthetically 
that my guess is they probably read the New York Times article--C. Paul 
Robinson, Sandia; John C. Browne, Los Alamos; C. Bruce Tarter, Lawrence 
Livermore National Lab.
  I will read only from the fourth paragraph:

       While there can never be a guarantee that the stockpile 
     will remain safe and reliable indefinitely without nuclear 
     testing, we have stated that we are confident that a fully 
     supported and sustained stockpile stewardship program will 
     enable us to continue to maintain America's nuclear deterrent 
     without nuclear testing.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire statement be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                  [From the DOE News, October 8, 1999]

     Joint Statement by Three Nuclear Weapons Laboratory Directors

 (C. Paul Robinson, Sandia National Laboratories; John C. Browne, Los 
  Alamos National Laboratory; and C. Bruce Tarter, Lawrence Livermore 
                          National Laboratory)

       ``We, the three nuclear weapons laboratory directors, have 
     been consistent in our view that the stockpile remains safe 
     and reliable today.
       ``For the last three year, we have advised the Secretaries 
     of Energy and Defense through the formal annual certification 
     process that the stockpile remains safe and reliable and that 
     there is no need to return to nuclear testing at this time.
       ``We have just forwarded our fourth set of certification 
     letters to the Energy and Defense Secretaries confirming our 
     judgment that once again the stockpile is safe and reliable 
     without nuclear testing.
       ``While there can never be a guarantee that the stockpile 
     will remain safe and reliable indefinitely without nuclear 
     testing, we have stated that we are confident that a fully 
     supported and sustained stockpile stewardship program will 
     enable us to continue to maintain America's nuclear deterrent 
     without nuclear testing.
       ``If that turns out not to be the case, Safeguard F--which 
     is a condition for entry into the Test Ban Treaty by the 
     U.S.--provides for the President, in consultation with the 
     Congress, to withdraw from the Treaty under the standard 
     ``supreme national interest'' clause in order to conduct 
     whatever testing might be required.''

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me conclude by pointing out that I find 
it kind of interesting. The very people who stand up here and say, as I 
happen to believe, that they have confidence that our scientists in the 
future are going to be able to shoot out of the sky like a bullet 
meeting a bullet incoming nuclear weapons over the ocean traveling at 
multithousand miles per hour and do it with certainty and accuracy--
they have faith in the ability of that to occur, but they don't have 
faith in the ability of our scientists at the three laboratories, who 
say they are well on their way to doing that, to be able to say what 
they need.
  I find it kind of interesting. I must admit it is a double-edged 
sword. I find my Democratic colleagues who do not support any national 
defense initiative--because they say this star wars notion can't work, 
it is too far out--I do not know how they come and rely so easily upon 
the likelihood that a $45 billion investment is going to guarantee 
these supercomputers will function to the degree they are needed to 
when these weapons reach their shelf life. But let's be fair. You can't 
have it both ways. I would respectfully submit that the ability to 
guarantee MIRV nuclear warheads fired in the hundreds or the thousands 
at the United States could be blown out of the sky with impunity by a 
missile defense initiative on our part is a mildly greater scientific 
feat than what the stockpile requires.
  As someone said: ``The faith of our father''--``the faith of our 
father''--has always been that if we put our mind to it, if we invest 
the money, we have the intelligence, the ingenuity, and the know-how to 
get it done. I would respectfully suggest our three present laboratory 
Directors and all the doubts they express are primarily related to 
whether or not safeguard F and funding of $45 billion for the stockpile 
would be forthcoming.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the best deterrent from keeping those 
thousands of missiles coming in is precisely what we have had these 50-
plus years--a credible safe deterrent in our stockpile. And the person 
whose finger is on the button firing those missiles knows that.
  I am reading from yesterday's proceedings of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee on page 50 where the chairman, myself, asked the 
following questions. This is one of the laboratory Directors 
testifying:
  ``We moved this year toward the development of the SSP, and last year 
toward putting in place the supercomputers on a path that we think we 
need to have. We are on a path that by 2004 we will have a 
supercomputer in place that begins''--begins--``to get us into the 
realm of what we need to do this job''--namely certifying the 
stockpiling.
  ``The issue that I think you are trying to address''--this is the 
hardest point I think as a scientist--``is that we cannot predict that 
by such and such a date we will know everything we need to know.''
  ``It is an evolving process. Each year we learn something else.''
  Bit by bit, year by year.
  I then asked: ``My time is running out.''
  And it is running out. We want to control time.
  ``Give us your best estimate, doctor,'' Senator Warner said.
  ``Dr. Brown: I think we are going to be in the best position sometime 
between 2005 and 2010.''
  ``Chairman Warner: Dr. Tarter.''
  ``Dr. Tarter: I agree with Dr. Brown.''
  ``Dr. Robinson: My guess is somewhere in the 10 years hence to 20 
years hence period.''
  There it is, short answers directed to the question.
  Mr. BIDEN. Would my friend yield for a question? From what page of 
the record was he reading?
  Mr. WARNER. Page 50 of the official transcript of the Armed Services 
Committee.
  Mr. BIDEN. I don't doubt it. I read from page 59 to get the 
significance?
  Do you get the significance?
  That was stated on 50 and 51 and 52. This is 59. After all is said 
and done, the question was asked: Do you believe with the safeguards 
you can rely upon the stockpile, the strategic stockpile, approach as 
opposed to nuclear testing?
  They said yes.
  It follows. Page 59 and 60, I am reading from. Maybe there is 
something after page 61 in the testimony that would undermine what I 
have just said. I respectfully suggest I am unaware of it if it is. I 
stand ready to hear it if it has been.
  It is one of those deals, folks. You have to go to the end. It 
``ain't over until the fat lady sings.'' It ain't over until you read 
the whole transcript. The last thing stated was: We have confidence.
  Then, after the testimony, after the testimony and after the New York

[[Page S12310]]

Times article, the Department of Energy and in the name of the three 
scientists quoted--and I will read it again.
  ``While there can be no guarantee''--the point he is making on page 
50--``that the stockpile remains safe and reliable indefinitely without 
nuclear testing, we have stated that we are confident that a fully 
supported and sustained stockpile stewardship program will enable us to 
continue to maintain America's nuclear deterrent without nuclear 
testing.''
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is 117 pages. I sat there for 5 hours 
10 minutes. How well I know the various parts of this system. I was 
weary after 3 days of testimony. But it is all here for all Senators to 
read. I invite them to spend as much time as they can on the record.
  It comes down to honest men, well-intentioned individuals--men and 
women on both sides of the issue--cannot agree, and should we move 
forward with a treaty that will vitally affect our security interests, 
unless the preponderance of the evidence is overwhelming, and beyond a 
reasonable doubt? Give us the certainty to make that step.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Warner). The Senator from Oklahoma is 
recognized.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I have a few brief comments to make in 
response to the very eloquent remarks from the Senator from West 
Virginia, in which I thought he covered it quite well. He had a concern 
for whether the intelligence estimate was going to be forthcoming.
  I would suggest, and get into the Record at this time, that back in 
December of 1995 we were waiting for the NEI report to come out. And it 
came out.
  That report said we would not have to defend ourselves in the United 
States of America for a limited attack in terms of--the discussion, of 
course, was the national missile defense--until approximately 15 years, 
not any less than 15 years.
  We found out later that was actually imminent at that time.
  I can recall so well writing the Chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Shelton, on the 24th of August of this last year--1998--and 
asking him to be specific in terms of taking the national intelligence 
estimate and all the information that he could garner and tell me at 
approximately what date North Korea would be able to fire a missile, a 
multiple-stage rocket. He came back and said it would be more than 5 
years.
  Seven days later--on the 31st of August, 1998--they fired one.
  I think we all know right now that they have another type of missile 
that can reach Washington, DC, from anyplace in the world in about 35 
minutes, and we don't have any defense against that.
  I don't think, if we are going to rely on the NEI information, we are 
relying on something that is going to be in the best interests of 
defending our country.
  The Senator from West Virginia also talked about the ratification 
process and about needing more time.
  We hear over and over again from every single person who stood up to 
defend the CTBT we need more time, we have to have more time. Yet if 
one reads what those same individuals are saying, the President of the 
United States said on the 16th of May, 1998:

       Now it's all the more important that the Senate act 
     quickly, this year, so we can increase the pressure on, and 
     isolation of, other nations that may be considering their own 
     nuclear test explosions.

  Also the President said:

       . . . I ask the Senate to approve it [CTBT] this year.

  That was 1998--last year; here it is 1999.
  Vice President Al Gore said the same thing:

       The U.S. Congress should act now to ratify the 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

  That is July of 1998.
  Secretary Albright said:

       We need this Treaty now.

  That was on September 23, a few days ago, this year.
  She said, further:

       For American leadership, for our future, the time has come 
     to ratify CTBT--this year, this session, now.

  I could go on and on; the leaders have said we have to do it now.
  As far as taking up this treaty, knowing what is in it, the treaty 
has been there for 2 years. We have all had an opportunity. Have I read 
the entire treaty? No, but I read the areas that concern me on 
verification, on zero-yield thresholds, things where I know we cannot 
verify what would be done. Verification is not there.
  I remind Members, every Senator, including the illustrious Senator 
from Delaware, had the opportunity to object to the unanimous consent 
request propounded and agreed to a few days ago calling for the vote to 
take place after the 14 hours of debate which should be some time on 
Tuesday or Wednesday.
  The only Senator from that side who is not openly supporting this yet 
is the Senator from West Virginia who said, by his own mistake, he was 
not able to get down in time to object to the unanimous consent 
request.
  We had an opportunity for every Senator to have slowed this train 
down so they wouldn't have to vote on it and they elected not to do it.
  I think it is very important we all keep that in mind. This is 
significant. It is something we have reviewed over a long period of 
time. It is something we understand. We have heard the professional 
testimony. We have attended many meetings. I along with the Presiding 
Officer, have sat through hours of committee meetings and subcommittee 
meetings that I have held in my committee on this very subject. I think 
we understand it and I agree with the statements of all of those, 
including the President, Vice President, and the Secretary of State, 
who I quoted. We need to do it now.
  I will be here to object to any unanimous consent that would in some 
way vitiate the vote that we believe should be imminent next week.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President I will take 1 minute.
  The President doesn't need any more time; he read it and negotiated 
it. I don't need any more time; I spent over 100 hours on that. It is 
my job on the committee of responsibility. The Senator presiding 
doesn't need more time; he spent hundreds of hours. The Senator from 
Oklahoma doesn't need more time because he spent hundreds of hours on 
it. I defy anyone to find five other Members of the Senate who have 
spent as much time.
  Usually what happens is we take on the responsibility to inform our 
colleagues based on our committees because we have more expertise when 
assigned the job. When it is tax policy, I don't know what the Tax Code 
says on major changes, but I rely upon the committee headed on the 
Democratic side by my friend from New York to tell me what is in it 
from spending hundreds of hours going through the detail.
  This is a different way to do business. I don't ever remember Members 
having voted on a treaty without there being a significant report from 
the relevant committees on the floor.
  The President doesn't need any more time. I don't need any more time. 
Senator Byrd says he needs more time, and I don't know anybody more 
conscientious than Senator Byrd. But the reason for more time is there 
haven't been any hearings.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs 
Committee, the Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I assure my friend from Delaware, the 
ranking Democrat on the Foreign Affairs Committee, I enjoy hearing him 
and hearing him and hearing him.
  I guess it is sort of similar to what the President said in one of 
his strong moments not long ago: I guess it depends on what the 
definition of ``is'' is.
  This afternoon in Canada, President Clinton held a press conference 
in which he explicitly rejected the offer I made along with a number of 
other Republican Senators that the Senate would put off a vote on the 
CTBT if the President requested in writing (a) that the treaty be 
withdrawn and (b) that it not be considered for the duration of his 
presidency.
  Considering that the President acknowledged he does not have the 
votes to ratify the treaty, this seemed to many of us a generous offer 
which the President rejected with a strange rhetorical outburst.
  When asked about our offer today, he said:


[[Page S12311]]


       They want me to give them a letter to cover the political 
     decision they have made that does severe damage to the 
     interest of the United States and the interest of 
     nonproliferation in the world? I don't think so.

  The Mr. President further suggested, strangely and absurdly, that the 
reason we made the offer in the first place was because, as he put it, 
Republicans are afraid to go though with a vote. He said:

       . . . they want to [kill the treaty] and don't want to get 
     up and defend it before the American people in an election 
     year. . . . [They think] that some letter from me will 
     somehow obscure [that fact] . . . 

  Mr. President, among those who are urging that the Senate kill this 
dangerous treaty are: six former Secretaries of Defense, four former 
National Security Advisors, four former Directors of Central 
Intelligence, and two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  Yet, Mr. Clinton suggests that Republicans are afraid to vote? The 
fact is, the President and his advisors have done everything possible 
to discourage a solution.
  Let's make it clear so the President can get his confusing rhetoric 
straightened out: Since he has rejected our offer, I will object, along 
with many of my Republican colleagues, to any effort to put off next 
week's vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  This is a dangerous treaty, contrary to the national security 
interests of the American people. The Senate should go on record as 
planned: The Senate should vote this treaty down.
  Mr. President, may I make an inquiry how much time has expired on 
each side since this morning when the Senate convened?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the distinguished chairman 
of a remarkable coincidence: The opponents have used 204 minutes, the 
proponents, 208 minutes.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, pursuant to the unanimous-consent agreement 
by the Senate, consideration has begun regarding an arms control treaty 
that has been the longest-sought, hardest-fought item on the unilateral 
nuclear disarmament agenda. Strangely, the Clinton administration has 
used every fanciful reasoning in its attempt to portray the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as an agreement long pursued by 
every administration since President Eisenhower, a claim that is 
bewilderingly untrue. Even the administration's own negotiator 
acknowledged that the administration's claims are ``hyperbole.''
  You see, Mr. President, the truth of the matter is that not one 
administration (prior to the current one) ever proposed a zero-yield, 
unverifiable, permanent duration test ban. Indeed, as Ambassador 
Ledogar admitted, even the Clinton administration itself did not want 
such a treaty initially.
  Someone has commented that the CTBT now before the Senate is the 
clearest case of ``parchment worship'' ever seen. It was neither 
carefully negotiated nor well-thought through. It does not even define 
exactly what it bans.
  Instead, the CTBT is the product of a mad scramble to: (1) Create an 
arms control ``legacy'' for the Clinton-Gore administration; or (2) 
provide an excuse for this administration's lack of any 
nonproliferation policy; or (3) obscure the fact that this 
administration presided over the collapse of the single-most 
significant reduction in nuclear weapons with Russia ever negotiated--
the START II Treaty--which would have eliminated all MIRVed ICBMs and 
the SS-18 missile. (The likelihood is that all three played a major 
role in the administration's decision to try to ram through this Senate 
this unwise and dangerous treaty.)
  Unfortunately, in the race to fashion a last-minute rickety 
``legacy'', the Clinton administration abandoned longstanding United 
States policy on nuclear testing and signed up to a ``zero yield,'' 
unverifiable, permanent duration test ban. As several of us have noted, 
for a number of reasons relating to verification and U.S. nuclear 
weapons requirements, this is something to which no other 
administration ever agreed. For instance, President Eisenhower--who has 
been repeatedly and mistakenly blamed with authorship of the CTBT--
insisted that nuclear tests with a seismic magnitude of less than 4.75 
be permitted.
  The reason that the United States historically has refused to sign on 
to a zero yield test ban is that five problems are created by such a 
prohibition. First, confidence in the safety and the reliability of the 
weapons stockpile will erode. Second, warheads cannot be 
``remanufactured'' to capitalize upon modern technologies. Third, no 
further designs or capabilities can be added to the nuclear stockpile. 
Fourth, critical infrastructure and hardware cannot be thoroughly 
``hardened'' against nuclear weapons effects. Fifth, the U.S. can have 
no confidence that other countries are abiding by the CTBT because a 
zero yield ban cannot be verified.
  By preventing the United States from testing, the CTBT will erode our 
ability to discover and fix problems with the nuclear stockpile and to 
make safety improvements. Confidence that the weapons will perform as 
needed will erode. Already, leaders of our own nuclear weapons design 
laboratories have stated that problems with the stockpile have arisen 
that formerly would have prompted nuclear tests.
  Further, several of the weapons are not as safe as they could be. As 
this chart demonstrates, only one warhead of the nine in the stockpile 
is equipped with all of the modern surety features available. One 
weapon--the W62--does not have any safety features at all, and three of 
the weapons--the W76, W78, and W88--are only equipped with ``enhanced 
detonator safety'' measures.
  Mr. President, several important safety improvements cannot be made 
to these weapons unless subsequent nuclear testing is allowed to ensure 
that modified devices will function properly with these changes. I will 
underscore that for Senators. The CTBT will prevent the United States 
from making critical safety improvements to its warheads. I, for one, 
agree with the Governor of North Dakota who wrote to me opposing the 
CTBT stating:

       As a governor of a state that hosts a sizable percentage of 
     our nation's nuclear weapons, I have an obligation to the 
     people of North Dakota to ensure that these warheads are as 
     safe and reliable as they can be made. It troubles me that 
     several U.S. warheads do not contain the most modern safety 
     features available, such as fire-resistant pits and 
     insensitive high explosives. Yet these warheads cannot 
     capitalize upon such improvements without nuclear testing.

  I hope Senators will understand that the CTBT will gradually 
undermine the safety of the U.S. deterrent by precluding the 
incorporation of modern safety features.
  Moreover, nuclear testing is essential if the United States is to 
discover and fix problems with the stockpile. These problems usually 
are associated with aging. The materials and components of weapons can 
degrade in unpredictable ways and can cause the weapon to fail. Many 
weapons believed to be reliable and thoroughly tested nevertheless 
developed problems which were only discovered, and could only be fixed, 
through nuclear testing. In fact, one-third of all the weapon designs 
placed in the stockpile since 1958 have required and received post-
deployment nuclear tests to resolve problems.
  In three quarters of these cases, the problems were identified and 
assessed only as a result of nuclear testing, and only could be fixed 
through testing.
  The United States has chosen to remanufacture aging weapons in the 
enduring stockpile rather than designing and building new ones. This 
presents problems because many of the materials and processes used in 
producing the original weapon are no longer available. New materials 
and processes need to be substituted, but they can only be validated to 
assure that the remanufactured weapon works as intended through nuclear 
testing.
  Exact replication, especially of older systems, is impossible without 
testing. In part, this is because documentation has never been 
sufficiently exact to ensure replication. Nuclear testing is the most 
important step in product certification; it provides the data for valid 
certification. As a case in point, the United States attempted to 
remanufacture both the W52 and W68 warheads on the basis of 
simulations. However, when actually tested, both weapons had a measured 
yield well short of what test-experienced weapons designers predicted. 
This is a lesson that the administration, in supporting the CTBT, seems 
willing to forget.
  The CTBT also will prevent the United States from developing new 
weapons to counter new technological advances by adversaries. Nuclear 
testing is essential to such modernization.

[[Page S12312]]

Without it, the nuclear triad will become obsolete.
  I fail to see the logic behind the argument that the United States 
has no need to modernize its deterrent if Russia, China, and others are 
similarly constrained. Such a claim just won't fly; in fact, given the 
demonstrable inability to verify a total test ban, I am persuaded that 
such assertions are founded upon the mistaken presumption that nuclear 
weapons modernization is driven by the evolution of other nuclear 
deterrents. Historically, this simply has not been the case.
  Indeed, nuclear weapons modernization is generally driven either by 
new mission requirements, or by non-nuclear technological evolution in 
defensive systems. For instance, during the cold war, advances in air 
defense and anti-submarine warfare created needs for new weapons. 
Nuclear testing was needed to create the B83 bomb, a gravity bomb--a 
``laydown weapon'' because it enabled the B-1B to drop its payload, at 
low altitude and high speed, and thereby escape the resulting 
explosion.
  This weapon was needed in response to advances in air defense 
capability. For the same reason, the U.S. developed the nuclear air-
launched cruise missile, which allows U.S. bombers to fulfill their 
mission outside of air defense ranges.
  Nuclear testing was needed for the Trident II missile's warheads, W76 
and W88. Testing was essential to optimize the system, giving the 
missile, and thus the submarine as well, increased striking range. This 
was needed in response to advances in anti-submarine warfare. Without 
the ability to test and modernize, the airmen and sailors aboard our 
bombers and submarines will be put at increased risk as they try to 
perform their duties with obsolete technology. Senators should think 
carefully about the implications of the CTBT, and the risk it poses--
not just to the nuclear weapons themselves--but to our servicemen.
  Our clear, future need facing the United States is the requirement to 
develop new or modified warheads to respond to developments in missile 
defense--particularly in the area of directed energy. It would be 
impossible to adapt to such developments under a complete test ban.
  Further, without the ability to design new weapons, such as a warhead 
optimized to kill biological plagues or to destroy deeply-buried 
targets, the U.S. will be unable to respond to serious emerging 
threats to our security. I could not agree more with one of the former 
Directors of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Dr. Roger Batzel, 
who warned that; ``A nuclear arsenal which is unable to keep pace with 
a changing security environment is unlikely, in the long run, to prove 
much of a deterrent.''

  Fourth, the CTBT would make the United States increasingly vulnerable 
to foreign nuclear programs. Critical systems such as satellites cannot 
be hardened and thoroughly protected against electro-magnetic pulse 
attack without nuclear testing. Computers cannot simulate a nuclear 
environment. Neither can controlled radiation sources. It takes a 
nuclear explosion to create the heat and complex interplay of radiation 
needed to evaluate the resistance of systems to these nuclear effects.
  Historically, the United States often has been surprised by how 
systems which seemingly performed as needed during non-nuclear 
simulations then failed to function properly in an actual nuclear 
environment. Indeed, surprises have been found in the vulnerability to 
nuclear effects of all U.S. strategic nuclear systems except the 
Minuteman II. The CTBT will allow counties to exploit a growing U.S. 
vulnerability brought about by an increasing reliance on high-tech 
weaponry and a decision not to test in order to harden systems.
  Finally, a ``zero yield'' test ban is not verifiable. While the exact 
thresholds are classified, it is commonly understood that the United 
States cannot detect nuclear explosions below a few kilotons of yield. 
Countries are able to resort to a number of techniques, ranging from 
``unattended detonations'' to seismic decoupling, that will enable them 
to conduct significant nuclear explosions with little chance of being 
detected.
  The proposed verification regime under the CTBT offers scant 
reassurance in this matter. The seismic detection thresholds of the 
International Monitoring System are sufficiently high that a large 
amount of clandestine testing could occur without fear of seismic 
detection. Moreover, the on-site inspection regime is riddled with 
loopholes and deficiencies.
  The bottom line is that if the Senate were to make the mistake of 
approving this treaty, the United States would scrupulously adhere to 
the CTBT, thereby losing confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Other 
nations, however, most likely would violate the treaty and escape 
detection, building new weapons to capitalize upon the U.S. 
deficiencies and vulnerabilities created by the CTBT. For these 
reasons, I oppose the CTBT and I am gratified that more and more 
Senators are making clear their opposition to ratification of an 
unwise, even dangerous, proposal to deprive the American people of the 
protection they need and deserve.
  Mr. President, for just a moment I suggest the absence of a quorum 
and then I will resume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order for me to 
suggest the absence of a quorum and the time be divided equally from 
both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the senior Senator from 
New York.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I rise simply to express the thanks of 
this Senator to the eminent chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations for the careful discourse he has presented to us, for the 
facts, they are complex. No one understands complexity better than he 
or is more willing to live with it. If we do not come to the same 
conclusions, it is not for lack of respect and, indeed, a reverence.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I do thank my friend from New York--our 
friend from New York--whom we will sorely miss before very long.
  I thank the Senator and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Hearing no objection to the unanimous consent 
request from the Senator from North Carolina, without objection, it is 
so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Helms). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, the Senate will soon exercise its 
constitutional duty of ``advice and consent'' for international 
treaties. This is a solemn task. And the treaty before us, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or ``CTBT,'' relates to an issue of 
utmost importance, the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  As I have evaluated this treaty, I have kept one question first and 
foremost in my mind: Will ratification of this treaty by the United 
States serve to protect the national security of the United States? And 
after careful consideration, my position is that the CTBT weakens the 
national security of the United States, and I will therefore oppose 
ratification.
  Although I support the lofty goals of the Test Ban Treaty--preventing 
the spread of nuclear weapons--I think only the good guys will play by 
the rules. Test ban advocates argue that setting a good example will 
lead others to play by the rules. The United States has not tested a 
bomb since 1992, but India and Pakistan went ahead with testing bombs, 
despite U.S. sanctions and condemnation.
  Test Ban advocates also argue that the threat of sanctions will keep 
countries in line. As my colleagues will recall, North Korea violated 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--in fact, are still violating the 
NPT--and the Clinton Administration has rewarded the

[[Page S12313]]

DPRK with aid, and more recently, with the removal of sanctions. I 
suspect the same pattern if rogue nations like North Korea even ratify 
the CTBT.
  But even more fundamentally, I believe this zero-yield treaty of 
unlimited duration fundamentally threatens the United States' nuclear 
deterrent by preventing nuclear testing essential to maintaining the 
safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile. Our nuclear weapons 
are the most sophisticated designs in the world, yet over time, the 
nuclear materials and high explosives triggers deteriorate, and we lack 
the experience in predicting the effects of these changes.
  According to expert testimony, one-third of all weapons designs 
introduced into the nuclear weapons stockpile since 1985 have required 
and received post-deployment nuclear tests to resolve problems. In 
three-fourths of these cases, the problems were discovered only because 
of on-going nuclear tests. In each case, the weapons were thought to be 
reliable and thoroughly tested.
  How confident can we be in the reliability of our nuclear stockpile 
if we are unable to test these weapons to determine the degradation 
effects of aging? If we cannot be confident in our own weapons' 
effectiveness, what do you suppose other nations will conclude? The use 
of nuclear weapons as a deterrent is only effective when other parties 
believe in their capability as well.
  Although the Stockpile Stewardship Program should be pursued, we must 
remember that the Program is in its infancy. Deciding in 1999 to rely 
on an untested program that will be operational in 2010 is reckless. In 
the future, I hope that nuclear tests can be replaced by computer 
simulations and laboratory-based experiments. But I am not willing to 
bet my grandchildren's security on it.
  In light of hearings this past year before the Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee on Chinese espionage allegations, I also am not 
comfortable placing the results of our nuclear testing in the memory 
banks of the National Labs' computers which are vulnerable to espionage 
or sabotage.
  Finally, I would like to address the problem of verifying other 
nations' compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Recent 
reports from the intelligence community indicate that we are unable to 
monitor low- level nuclear tests precisely enough to distinguish 
between a conventional explosion, a low-level nuclear test, or even 
natural seismic activity. The United States cannot now, and may not in 
the foreseeable future, be able to confidently detect and identify 
militarily significant nuclear tests of one kiloton or less. That is 
roughly 500 times the size of the blast which destroyed the Murrah 
Building in Oklahoma City.
  Twice last month Russia carried out what might have been nuclear 
explosions at its Novaya Zemlya testing site in the Arctic. It was 
reported that U.S. surveillance satellites have repeatedly observed the 
kind of activity that usually precedes and follows a low-level nuclear 
test. Yet, data from the CIA's seismic sensors and other monitoring 
equipment were reportedly insufficient to reach a firm conclusion as to 
the true nature of the explosions. If it is not possible to confirm 
tests such as these, how are we going to verify that countries such as 
Russia and China are complying with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?
  Mr. President, this Treaty is not in the national interest and I urge 
my colleagues to reject its ratification.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the Senate has begun consideration of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I regret that the Senate is taking up 
the treaty in an abrupt and truncated manner that is so highly 
politicized. Admittedly, the CTBT is not a new subject for the Senate. 
Those of us who over the years have sat on the Foreign Relations, Armed 
Services, or Intelligence Committees are familiar with it. The Senate 
has held hearings and briefings on the treaty in the past.
  But for a treaty of this complexity and importance a more sustained 
and focused effort is important. Senators must have a sufficient 
opportunity to examine the treaty in detail, ask questions of our 
military and the administration, consider the possible implications, 
and debate at length in committee and on the floor. Under the current 
agreement, a process that normally would take many months has been 
reduced to a few days. Many Senators know little about this treaty. 
Even for those of us on national security committees, this has been an 
issue floating on the periphery of our concerns.
  Presidential leadership has been almost entirely absent on the issue. 
Despite having several years to make a case for ratification, the 
administration has declined to initiate the type of advocacy campaign 
that should accompany any treaty of this magnitude.
  Nevertheless, the Senate has adopted an agreement on procedure. So 
long as that agreement remains in force, Senators must move forward as 
best they can to express their views and reach informed conclusions 
about the treaty.
  In anticipation of the general debate, I will state my reasons for 
opposing ratification of the CTBT.
  The goal of the CTBT is to ban all nuclear explosions worldwide: I do 
not believe it can succeed. I have little confidence that the 
verification and enforcement provisions will dissuade other nations 
from nuclear testing. Furthermore, I am concerned about our country's 
ability to maintain the integrity and safety of our own nuclear arsenal 
under the conditions of the treaty.
  I am a strong advocate of effective and verifiable arms control 
agreements. As a former Vice-Chairman of the Senate Arms Control 
Observer Group and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I have 
had the privilege of managing Senate consideration of many arms control 
treaties and agreements.
  I fought for Senate consent to ratification of the INF Treaty, which 
banned intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe; the Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty, which created limits on the number of tanks, 
helicopters, and armored personnel carriers in Europe; the START I 
Treaty, which limited the United States and the Soviet Union to 6,500 
nuclear weapons; the START II Treaty, which limited the U.S. and the 
former Soviet Union to 3,500 nuclear weapons; and the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, which outlawed poison gas.
  These treaties, while not ensuring U.S. security, have made us safer. 
They have greatly reduced the amount of weaponry threatening the United 
States, provided extensive verification measures, and served as a 
powerful statement of the intent of the United States to curtail the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction.
  I understand the impulse of the proponents of the CTBT to express 
U.S. leadership in another area of arms control. Inevitably, arms 
control treaties are accompanied by idealistic principles that envision 
a future in which international norms prevail over the threat of 
conflict between nations. However, while affirming our desire for 
international peace and stability, the U.S. Senate is charged with the 
constitutional responsibility of making hard judgments about the likely 
outcomes of treaties. This requires that we examine the treaties in 
close detail and calculate the consequences of ratification for the 
present and the future. Viewed in this context, I cannot support the 
treaty's ratification.
  I do not believe that the CTBT is of the same caliber as the arms 
control treaties that have come before the Senate in recent decades. 
Its usefulness to the goal of non-proliferation is highly questionable. 
Its likely ineffectuality will risk undermining support and confidence 
in the concept of multi-lateral arms control. Even as a symbolic 
statement of our desire for a safer world, it is problematic because it 
would exacerbate risks and uncertainties related to the safety of our 
nuclear stockpile.
  The United States must maintain a reliable nuclear deterrent for the 
foreseeable future. Although the cold war is over, significant threats 
to our country still exist. At present our nuclear capability provides 
a deterrent that is crucial to the safety of the American people and is 
relied upon as a safety umbrella by most countries around the world. 
One of the most critical issues under the CTBT would be that of 
ensuring the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile 
without testing. The safe maintenance and storage of these weapons is a 
crucial concern. We cannot allow them to fall

[[Page S12314]]

into disrepair or permit their safety to be called into question.
  The Administration has proposed an ambitious program that would 
verify the safety and reliability of our weapons through computer 
modeling and simulations. Unfortunately, the jury is still out on the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program. The last nine years have seen 
improvements, but the bottom line is that the Senate is being asked to 
trust the security of our country to a program that is unproven and 
unlikely to be fully operational until perhaps 2010. I believe a 
National Journal article, by James Kitfield, summed it up best by 
quoting a nuclear scientist who likens the challenge of maintaining the 
viability of our stockpile without testing to ``walking an obstacle 
course in the dark when your last glimpse of light was a flash of 
lightning back in 1992.''
  The most likely problems facing our stockpile are a result of aging. 
This is a threat because nuclear materials and components degrade in 
unpredictable ways, in some cases causing weapons to fail. This is 
compounded by the fact that the U.S. currently has the oldest inventory 
in the history of our nuclear weapons programs.
  Over the last forty years, a large percentage of the weapon designs 
in our stockpile have required post-deployment tests to resolve 
problems. Without these tests, not only would the problems have 
remained undetected, but they also would have gone unrepaired.
  The Congressional Research Service reported last year that: ``A 
problem with one warhead type can affect hundreds of thousands of 
individually deployed warheads; with only 9 types of warheads expected 
to be in the stockpile in 2000, compared to 30 in 1985, a single 
problem could affect a large fraction of the U.S. nuclear force.'' If 
we are to put our faith in a program other than testing to ensure the 
safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent and thus our security, 
we must have complete faith in its efficacy. The Stockpile Stewardship 
Program falls well short of that standard.
  The United States has chosen to re-manufacture our aging stockpile 
rather than creating and building new weapon designs. This could be a 
potential problem because many of the components and procedures used in 
original weapon designs no longer exist. New production procedures need 
to be developed and substituted for the originals, but we must ensure 
that the remanufactured weapons will work as designed.
  I am concerned further by the fact that some of the weapons in our 
arsenal are not as safe as we could make them. Of the nine weapon 
designs currently in our arsenal, only one employs all of the most 
modern safety and security measures. Our nuclear weapons laboratories 
are unable to provide the American people with these protections 
because of the inability of the Stockpile Stewardship Program to 
completely mimic testing.
  At present, I am not convinced the Stockpile Stewardship Program will 
permit our experts to maintain a credible deterrent in the absence of 
testing. Without a complete, effective, and proven Stockpile 
Stewardship program, the CTBT could erode our ability to discover and 
fix problems with the nuclear stockpile and to make safety 
improvements.
  In fact, the most important debate on this issue may be an honest 
discussion of whether we should commence limited testing and continue 
such a program with consistency and certainty.
  President Reagan's words ``trust but verify'' remain an important 
measuring stick of whether a treaty serves the national security 
interests of the United States. The U.S. must be confident of its 
ability to detect cheating among member states. While the exact 
thresholds are classified, it is commonly understood that the United 
States cannot detect nuclear explosions below a few kilotons of yield. 
The Treaty's verification regime, which includes an international 
monitoring system and on-site inspections, was designed to fill the 
gaps in our national technical means. Unfortunately, the CTBT's 
verification regime will not be up to that task even if it is ever 
fully deployed.
  Advances in mining technologies have enabled nations to smother 
nuclear tests, allowing them to conduct tests with little chance of 
being detected. Similarly, countries can utilize existing geologic 
formations to decouple their nuclear tests, thereby dramatically 
reducing the seismic signal produced and rendering the test 
undetectable. A recent Washington Post article points out that part of 
the problem of detecting suspected Russian tests at Novaya Zemlya is 
that the incidents take place in a large granite cave that has proven 
effective in muffling tests.
  The verification regime is further bedeviled by the lack of a common 
definition of a nuclear test. Russia believes hydro-nuclear activities 
and sub-critical experiments are permitted under the treaty. The U.S. 
believes sub-critical experiments are permitted but hydro-nuclear tests 
are not. Other states believe both are illegal. A common understanding 
or definition of what is and what is not permitted under the treaty has 
not been established.
  Proponents point out that if the U.S. needs additional evidence to 
detect violations, on-site inspections can be requested. Unfortunately, 
the CTBT will utilize a red-light inspection process. Requests for on-
site inspections must be approved by at least 30 affirmative votes of 
members of the Treaty's 51-member Executive Council. In other words, if 
the United States accused another country of carrying out a nuclear 
test, we could only get an inspection if 29 other nations concurred 
with our request. In addition, each country can declare a 50 square 
kilometer area of its territory as off limits to any inspections that 
are approved.
  The CTBT stands in stark contrast to the Chemical Weapons Convention 
in the area of verifiability. Whereas the CTBT requires an affirmative 
vote of the Executive Council for an inspection to be approved, the CWC 
requires an affirmative vote to stop an inspection from proceeding. 
Furthermore, the CWC did not exclude large tracts of land from the 
inspection regime, as does the CTBT.
  The CTBT's verification regime seems to be the embodiment of 
everything the United States has been fighting against in the UNSCOM 
inspection process in Iraq. We have rejected Iraq's position of 
choosing and approving the national origin of inspectors. In addition, 
the 50 square kilomater inspection-free zones could become analogous to 
the controversy over the inspections of Iraqi presidential palaces. The 
UNSCOM experience is one that is best not repeated under a CTBT.
  Let me turn to some enforcement concerns. Even if the United States 
were successful in utilizing the laborious verification regime and non-
compliance was detected, the Treaty is almost powerless to respond. 
This treaty simply has no teeth. Arms control advocates need to reflect 
on the possible damage to the concept of arms control if we embrace a 
treaty that comes to be perceived as ineffectual. Arms control based 
only on a symbolic purpose can breed cynicism in the process and 
undercut for more substantive and proven arms control measures.
  The CTBT's answer to illegal testing is the possible implementation 
of sanctions. It is clear that this will not prove particularly 
compelling in the decision-making processes of foreign states intent on 
building nuclear weapons. For those countries seeking nuclear weapons, 
the perceived benefits in international stature and deterrence 
generally far outweigh the concern about sanctions that could be 
brought to bear by the international community.
  Further, recent experience has demonstrated that enforcing effective 
multilateral sanctions against a country is extraordinarily difficult. 
Currently, the United States is struggling to maintain multilateral 
sanctions on Iraq, a country that openly seeks weapons of mass 
destruction and blatantly invaded and looted a neighboring nation, 
among other transgressions. If it is difficult to maintain the 
international will behind sanctions on an outlaw nation, how would we 
enforce sanctions against more responsible nations of greater 
commercial importance like India and Pakistan?
  In particularly grave cases, the CTBT Executive Council can bring the 
issue to the attention of the United Nations. Unfortunately, this too 
would most likely prove ineffective, given that permanent members of 
the Security Council could veto any efforts to punish

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CTBT violators. Chances of a better result in the General Assembly are 
remote at best.
  I believe the enforcement mechanisms of the CTBT provide little 
reason for countries to forego nuclear testing. Some of my friends 
respond to this charge by pointing out that even if the enforcement 
provisions of the treaty are ineffective, the treaty will impose new 
international norms for behavior. In this case, we have observed that 
``norms'' have not been persuasive for North Korea, Iraq, Iran, India, 
and Pakistan, the very countries whose actions we seek to influence 
through a CTBT.
  If a country breaks the international norm embodied in the CTBT, that 
country has already broken the norm associated with the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Countries other than the recognized nuclear 
powers who attempt to test a weapon must first manufacture or obtain a 
weapon, which would constitute a violation of the NPT. I fail to see 
how an additional norm will deter a motivated nation from developing 
nuclear weapons after violating the longstanding norm of the NPT.
  On Tuesday the Senate is scheduled to vote on the ratification of the 
CTBT. If this vote takes place, I believe the treaty should be 
defeated. The Administration has failed to make a case on why this 
treaty is in our national security interests.
  The Senate is being asked to rely on an unfinished and unproven 
Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program might meet our needs in the 
future, but as yet, it is not close to doing so. The treaty is flawed 
with an ineffective verification regime and a practically nonexistent 
enforcement process.
  For these reasons, I will vote against ratification of the CTBT.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, today the Senate formally begins 
consideration of whether to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty, CTBT. Each party to this treaty pledges not to carry out any 
nuclear weapons tests and to refrain from helping others to carry out 
such tests. CTBT has been signed by over 150 nations, 51 of which have 
already ratified the treaty. The question before the Senate now is 
whether we should join this group in an international effort to limit 
the spread of nuclear weapons.
  Although I will have more extensive remarks on the substance of the 
treaty shortly before the Senate votes, I would like to say a few words 
now about why I believe the Senate should ratify this important treaty. 
As in the case of previous arms control agreements, each Senator must 
ask himself or herself the following series of questions: Is U.S. 
national security enhanced by Senate ratification of the CTBT? Is this 
nation better off with the CTBT? Will Senate ratification of CTBT lead 
to a safer world for our children?
  In my view Mr. President, the answer to each of these questions is an 
unequivocal, unqualified yes for one simple, straightforward reason: a 
world with fewer countries possessing nuclear weapons is a safer, more 
secure world for our national security interests, our nation and our 
children. Senate ratification of CTBT will help us achieve just such a 
world.
  Opponents of the treaty raise two issues: can we verify that other 
nations are complying with the treaty and would U.S. compliance with 
the treaty permit this nation to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear 
deterrent? On the first issue, opponents assert that it is impossible 
to verify a prohibition of all nuclear tests. Mr. President, let me 
state now that they are absolutely correct on that point. The 
intelligence community has confirmed that neither the United States nor 
the International Monitoring System that would be established under 
CTBT would ensure the detection of every single nuclear explosion, 
regardless of size and location.
  However, this feature is not unique to CTBT. No arms control treaty 
is 100 percent verifiable. In just the last two decades, the Senate has 
ratified numerous treaties knowing full well at the time that it would 
be possible for a country to successfully skirt one provision or 
another for some period of time or another. The standard for the Senate 
on previous treaties and the standard we should apply to this treaty is 
``effective'' verification. In the case of CTBT, effective verification 
means we will be able to detect, with a high degree of confidence, any 
tests that could undermine our nuclear deterrent. After examining the 
information and analysis provided by our intelligence community, our 
senior military leaders have testified that we can effectively verify 
this treaty.
  Furthermore, with or without CTBT, we need to monitor the nuclear 
testing activities of other countries and will face the exact same 
problems people are assigning exclusively to CTBT --with one major 
difference. In a world of CTBT, the United States would have additional 
tools at its disposal to determine what has happened. The treaty would 
permit us to have access to data collected at any of the 321 monitoring 
sites established as part of the CTBT's International Monitoring 
System. Under the treaty, we will also be able to conduct on-site 
inspections of facilities when we suspect questionable activity has 
occurred. These are resources available to us only if we ratify CTBT.
  As for the safety and reliability of our existing nuclear weapons, I 
am convinced that the science-based stockpile stewardship program will 
permit us to preserve our nuclear deterrent without testing. I 
acknowledge up front that this program, for which we are spending $4.5 
billion annually, is still evolving and it will be a few more years 
before we will know for certain its effectiveness. However, critics 
must also acknowledge three other facts. First, our nuclear weapons are 
safe and reliable today and are likely to remain so for another 
decade--with or without a stockpile program. Second, although not fully 
up and running, the stockpile stewardship program has already 
demonstrated its viability. Although we stopped testing nuclear weapons 
seven years ago, for the past four years the Department of Energy has 
been able to certify that our nuclear stockpile is safe and reliable. 
In order to make this certification, the Department has relied in part 
on data generated by the early phases of the stockpile stewardship 
program. Third, the President submitted, and I strongly support, a 
condition to the treaty that would permit the United States to withdraw 
from the treaty and resume nuclear testing if we have anything other 
than the highest confidence in the safety and reliability of our 
nuclear weapons.
  Having said all of this, I would like to raise another important 
issue today. Regardless of where members stand on the merits of the 
CTBT, I think there are two things every member of this body should 
agree upon. The process of treaty ratification is one of the most 
important responsibilities our founding fathers vested in the United 
States Senate. In the course of this nation's history, the Senate has 
never taken this responsibility lightly. It would be a mistake to do so 
now. Second, it is hard to imagine a treaty with more significant 
ramifications for our national security for decades to come than the 
treaty before the Senate today. In the few brief days that this issue 
has been before us, I have heard senior Senators, members who have cast 
thousands of votes, state that their vote on CTBT could well be one of 
the most consequential of their Senate careers. I agree with that 
assessment.
  Unfortunately, we are on the verge of ignoring these two truths. For 
some unknown reason, the CTBT has become a political football in a high 
stakes, highly partisan debate. It appears that some are seeking to 
score political points instead of carefully weighing this nation's 
national security interests and our role and responsibilities in the 
world. If politics should stop at the waters' edge, so too should it 
stop at the door to this chamber when we are deliberating treaties with 
such tremendous national and international ramifications.
  Instead, after over 2 years of inaction, the Senate now finds itself 
locked in a sprint to a vote that is equally unfair to both the 
opponents and proponents of this treaty. No member of this body can 
truly believe he or she has all the information needed to render such a 
momentous decision. No member can truly state that the Senate has lived 
up to the founding fathers' expectations of how this chamber should 
conduct itself when giving its advice and consent on treaties. No 
member can really assert with a clear conscience that this was a fair 
and thorough process for dealing with any issue, let alone one of this 
magnitude.

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  Proceeding before we have given full airing to the numerous and 
complex issues surrounding the CTBT is unfair to the Senate, unfair to 
our national security and unfair to the American people. Before we 
begin the calling of the roll asking where we stand on this treaty, we 
should all take a step back and give ourselves time to study these 
issues. For the good of our nation's security and Americans for 
generations to come, I ask members on both sides of the aisle to join 
me in this effort.

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