[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 131 (Friday, October 1, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11790-S11791]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    U.S. POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I thank the majority leader for the time 
and also my chairman from Alaska, Senator Murkowski, for permitting me 
to speak during this time.
  I rise to address an issue of critical importance to our national 
security: containing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
by North Korea. As ranking member of the Subcommittee on International 
Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, I see this as one of the 
most pressing security issues facing America. The Clinton 
administration has been working hard at containing and countering this 
threat, holding important discussions with the North Koreans, most 
recently in Berlin. Last Friday, a North Korean spokesman stated that 
North Korea would ``not launch a missile while the talks are underway 
with a view to creating an atmosphere more favorable for the talks'' 
with the United States.
  This, I believe, is a very positive step. North Korea's development 
and August 1998 testing of a long-range missile drew America's 
attention to this emerging threat to our national security. Even more 
directly, it raised concerns about Hawaii's security. Following this 
test, the North Koreans began preparing to launch a second missile, 
which our intelligence analysts believe could deliver a several-hundred 
kilogram payload to Hawaii and to Alaska. North Korean preparations to 
test launch a much larger missile prompted the administration to take 
multilateral efforts to persuade the North Koreans not to launch and to 
restrict their missile development.
  Following negotiations in Berlin between the United States and the 
North Koreans last week, the President announced his decision to ease 
some sanctions against North Korea administered under the Trading with 
the Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Department of 
Commerce's Export Administration regulations. So far these efforts have 
been partially successful, and the North Koreans have agreed to a 
moratorium on missile launches during this series of talks with the 
United States. The administration is to be congratulated for the 
intensity with which it has pursued a solution to this dangerous 
problem.
  There has been some criticism of the administration's approach, with 
a few critics arguing that the administration is rewarding bad behavior 
or giving in to extortion demands. I do not believe this is the case. 
The formal announcement by the North Korean Government stating there 
would be no missile tests while talks are underway with the United 
States is a clear indication that North Koreans have accepted the new 
approach in relations outlined by Secretary Perry. There is no doubt 
that the North Koreans have an active missile export program which is 
dependent upon imports of foreign technology and exports of cruise 
missiles.
  Therefore, it is in our national security interest to limit North 
Korean missile development and especially North Korean missile exports 
toward which the Berlin agreement takes a firm step. By lifting some 
economic sanctions, holding out the possibility of lifting additional 
sanctions, and suggesting to the North Koreans that the United States 
is willing to normalize relations with North Korea, the North Koreans 
have been given a powerful incentive towards agreeing to a permanent 
moratorium on missile development. Reimposing sanctions would send such 
a strong signal of distrust with North Korean actions that it could 
well set back North Korean efforts to achieve international 
respectability to lower levels than those today.

  This is not a sanctions relief for moratorium deal. It leads, 
instead, to a

[[Page S11791]]

normalization of relations for a reduction in threat. Normalization is 
predicated upon North Korean willingness to change their behavior in 
terms of terrorism, drug dealing, and proliferation, including a 
verifiable end to their nuclear warhead and missile programs. We are 
not looking at an immediate end to the hostile atmosphere that has 
worsened tensions on the Korean peninsula. We must determine what our 
long-term objectives are on the Korean peninsula. If our ultimate goal 
is the peaceful unification of the Koreas as one democratic state, we 
need to assess more effectively how our current strategy will lead us 
in that direction.
  I look forward to the administration's elaborating its next steps 
towards North Korea. So far, the administration has worked hard and 
well at containing tensions on the peninsula. It is not a success which 
must come easily, given the difficulty of dealing with the North 
Koreans. More hard work and the support of Congress will be needed to 
make a lasting peace possible.
  I yield the floor and thank the Senator from Alaska for granting me 
this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I thank the Chair, and I thank my good 
friend and colleague from Hawaii with whom I have a great rapport. I 
very much appreciate his statement and the meaningful application of 
both Hawaii and my State of Alaska, as we look at the potential threat 
from some of the rogue nations of the world.

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