[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 130 (Thursday, September 30, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11670-S11681]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I said a moment ago, and I repeat for
emphasis, I am absolutely astonished our friends across the aisle
refuse to agree to the majority leader's unanimous consent agreement to
bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Senate floor for debate
and vote on October 7.
I think this refusal is significant because of the incessant
grandstanding that has been going on by the administration and some
Senators and, of course, the liberal media that are not going to tell
the facts about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--all clamoring that
there is such an urgent need for immediate Senate action on the CTBT.
It has been proclaimed constantly that the Senate absolutely must
ratify the treaty so the United States can participate in the October 6
through 8 conference in Vienna. Yet when the majority leader offered a
unanimous consent agreement to bring the treaty to a vote in time for
that conference, the same people clamored for more action, running for
the hills and demanding more time and making other demands.
If it were not so pitiful, this behavior would be amusing. I am not
going to let Senators have it both ways. The same people who have been
criticizing the Foreign Relations Committee for inaction on the CTBT
are now refusing to a date certain, and a timely vote on the CTBT.
Of course, some are hiding behind the idea that more hearings are
needed for a full Senate vote. Hogwash. For the record, the Committee
on Foreign Relations has held in the past 2 years alone 14 hearings in
which the CTBT was extensively discussed. Most folks don't show up for
the hearings--the train was too late or whatever. This number of 14
does not include an even larger number of hearings held by the Armed
Services Committee and the Intelligence Committee on CTBT relevant
issues, nor does this include three hearings by the Governmental
Affairs Committee on the CTBT and relevant issues.
I ask unanimous consent this list documenting each Foreign Relations
Committee hearing be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Foreign Relations Committee Hearings During Which the CTBT Was
Discussed
February 10, 1998--(Full Committee/Helms), 1998 Foreign
Policy Overview and the President's Fiscal Year 1999 Budget
Request. (S. Hrg. 105-443.)
May 13, 1998--(Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs/Brownback), Crisis in South Asia: India's Nuclear
Tests. (S. Hrg. 105-620.)
June 3, 1998--(Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs/Brownback), Crisis in South Asia, Part 2: Pakistan's
Nuclear Tests. (S. Hrg. 105-620.)
June 18, 1998--(Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), Congressional Views of the U.S.-China
Relationship.
July 13, 1998--(Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs/Brownback), India and Pakistan: What Next? (S.
Hrg. 105-620.)
February 24, 1999--(Full Committee/Helms), 1999 Foreign
Policy Overview and the President's Fiscal year 2000 Foreign
Affairs Budget Request.
March 23, 1999--(Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), U.S. China Policy: A Critical Reexamination.
April 20, 1999--(Full Committee/Hagel), Current and Growing
Missile Threats to the U.S.
April 27, 1999--(Full Committee/Helms), Nonproliferation,
Arms Control and Political Military Issues.
May 5, 1999--(Full Committee/Hagel), Does the ABM Treaty
Still Serve U.S. Strategic and Arms Control Objectives in a
Changed World?
May 25, 1999--(Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs/Brownback), Political/Military Developments in India.
May 26, 1999--(Full Committee/Helms), Cornerstone of Our
Security?: Should the Senate Reject a Protocol to
Reconstitute the ABM Treaty with Four New Partners?
June 28, 1999--(Full Committee/Hagel), Nomination (Holum).
September 28, 1999--(Full Committee/Helms), Facing Saddam's
Iraq: Disarray in the International Community.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at least 17 respected witnesses have
discussed their views on both sides of the CTBT question in the past 2
years. The administration itself has included this treaty in testimony
on five occasions. More than 113 pages of committee transcript text are
devoted to this subject. I have a stack of papers here that are CTBT
testimony and debate within the committee. A record can be made of how
this has been delayed and by whom.
Mr. President, I find it puzzling that some in the Senate are
objecting to the unanimous-consent request of the majority leader. The
Foreign Relations Committee has thoroughly examined this matter. We
have heard from experts on this very treaty. Let me share this with the
Senate, the people listening, and the news media--that have not covered
hearings on this matter but whose editors have said it is a disgrace
that a vote has not been allowed on the CTBT treaty. Here are the
people who have discussed the CTBT before the Foreign Relations
Committee.
Let me point out, we have hearings fairly early in the morning, maybe
too early for some to come. But I look on both sides of the aisle, and
I have seen, sometimes, nobody on one side. Anyway, here is a list of
the people I recall having discussed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
with the Committee on Foreign Relations:
The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State;
The Honorable Karl F. Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of
State for South Asian Affairs;
Mr. Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation;
The Honorable R. James Woolsey, Former Director, Central
Intelligence Agency;
Dr. Fred Ikle, Former Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency;
The Honorable Stephen J. Solarz, Former U.S. Representative
from New York;
The Honorable William J. Schneider, Former Under Secretary
of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology;
Dr. Richard Haass, Former Senior Director, Near East and
South Asia, National Security Council;
The Honorable Stanely O. Roth, Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs;
The Honorable James R. Schlesinger, Former Secretary of
Defense;
The Honorable Eric D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State
for Political-Military Affairs;
The Honorable Ronald F. Lehman, Former Director, Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
Parenthetically, I might say, not one word, as I recall, has been
published by the same newspapers that have been piously declaring there
must be action on the CTBT.
To continue the list:
General Eugene Habiger, Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
Strategic Command;
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The Honorable Frank G. Wisner, Vice Chairman, External
Affairs, American International Group;
Dr. Stephen Cohen, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies,
The Brookings Institution;
The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Former Secretary of
State; and
The Honorable Richard Butler, Former Executive Chairman
United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM).
I think this record will show--it should--that the Foreign Relations
Committee has thoroughly examined this matter. We have pleaded for
members of the committee, several of them, to come to a meeting once in
a while. I have done everything I could to get this thing orderly
presented to the Senate. All I have received are communications from
Senators with a veiled threat if I did not proceed in some other way.
We have certainly talked about this treaty in more depth than many
other treaties, to my knowledge.
Those who are objecting, and objected to the majority leader's
proposition this morning, don't want more hearings; what they want is
more delay. You see, until a few minutes ago, until the majority leader
offered his unanimous consent request, the same people who are now
demanding more hearings were ready to dispense with further debate and
go to a vote. Let me tell you what I mean.
The American people may recall, if they were watching C-SPAN, that
President Clinton, in his State of the Union Address on January 27,
1998, declared: ``I ask the Senate to approve it" --the CTBT--and he
said ``this year'' in mournful tones.
In other words, the President was ready for a vote in 1998. Then a
year later, the President said:
I ask the Senate to take this vital step: Approve the
Treaty now.
``Approve it now,'' he said. He did not say approve the CTBT after
more hearings.
On July 23, 1998, the Vice President, Mr. Gore, asked the Senate to
``act now'' on the CTBT, and all the while the New York Times and the
Washington Post, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, have been saying that
Helms is holding up this treaty.
In February, Secretary Albright asked for approval of the CTBT ``this
session.'' And in April she said:
. . . the time has come to ratify the CTBT this year, this
session, now.
On January 12, 1999, the National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger,
declared:
. . . it would be a terrible tragedy if our Senate failed
to ratify the CTBT this year.
The point I am making is that the list goes on and on.
Mr. President, 45 Democratic Senators wrote to me asking me to allow
a vote:
. . . with sufficient time to allow the United States to
actively participate [sic] in the Treaty's inaugural
Conference of Ratifying States. . . .
That conference begins next week.
At a recent press conference for the cameras, Senator Specter, my
friend, declared:
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was submitted to the
Senate months ago, and it is high time the Senate acted on
it.
Senator Murray called for:
. . . immediate consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty.
Senator Dorgan said that:
. . . we must get this done at least by the first of
October.
I must observe that the distinguished Democratic leader, Senator
Daschle, also had very strong words on this matter. Just 6 days ago, he
proclaimed:
Senate Republicans have permitted a small number of Members
from within their ranks to manipulate Senate rules--
I wonder how we did that when I was not looking. No rules have been
manipulated, and I resent the inference. But to continue his quote--
from within their ranks to manipulate Senate rules and
procedures to prevent the Senate from acting on the CTBT. . .
. I would hope we would soon see some leadership on the
Republican side of the aisle to break the current impasse and
allow the full Senate to act on the CTBT . . . That effort
must begin today.
Mr. President, I hope when we get to the debate, however long it
lasts, that we will not have the spectacle of Senator Kennedy again and
again offering his minimum wage amendment. He keeps it in his hip
pocket all the time and pulls it out anytime he can stick it up, and he
will debate it for an hour or 2. We have to have some understanding
about what we are going to debate, when we do debate, and I hope we
will debate on the terms the Senator from Mississippi, the majority
leader, offered.
I think all this speaks well of the majority leader, and I
congratulate him.
I congratulate him for having the will to do this because this has
been insulting on many occasions as a political issue, which it is not.
I hope the Senate Democrats will reconsider their refusal to agree to
a CTBT vote after having demanded it so often.
Let me go back in time a little bit. I have been waiting for the
President of the United States to follow up on his written commitment
to me that he will send up the ABM Treaty, and I have been hoping to
see a treaty on two or three other things.
I am not in the mood to leave the American people naked against a
very possible missile attack, and that has been my problem. The
President of the United States has insisted on keeping the ABM Treaty
alive when that would forbid anything happening in terms of defending
the security of the American people. I was unwilling to do that until
he followed through on his written guarantee to me that he would send
the ABM Treaty to me and to the Senate.
I trust in the future that the media will, for once, acknowledge some
of their statements regarding the CTBT for what they have really said
because it is inaccurate and misleading to the American people.
I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I say to my colleague from North Carolina,
for whom I have great respect, it is not and will never be my intention
to prevent him from speaking on the floor. That was not the purpose of
the unanimous consent request or the objections.
I have talked to him personally about this issue. He feels very
strongly about it, as the Senator from Delaware indicated. The Senator,
who is the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has a right to
feel very strongly about his position. I respect that very much. This
is an issue that is very important to this country and, in my judgment,
to the world.
We have a circumstance where 154 countries have become signatories to
something called the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Forty-seven
countries have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This
country has not.
Mr. President, 737 days ago or so, this treaty was sent to the Senate
by this administration; 737 days later we have not acted on this
treaty. Some feel very strongly this treaty is not good for our
country. The majority leader made that case. The chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, the Senator from North Carolina, makes
that case. They have strong feelings about it. I respect that. Other
people have strong feelings on the other side, including myself.
I believe strongly this country has a moral responsibility in the
world to lead on the question of the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons. Not many countries have access to nuclear weapons or possess
nuclear weapons. Many would like to. How do we prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons in this world, at a time when the shadow of nuclear
tests recently made by India and Pakistan suggest there is an appetite
for acquisition of nuclear weapons and testing of nuclear weapons? Two
countries that do not like each other and share a common border explode
nuclear weapons literally under each other's chins. Shouldn't that tell
us there are serious challenges ahead with respect to nuclear weapons
and the spread of nuclear weapons? I think so.
A unanimous consent request was propounded by the majority leader to
bring up the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty next week. As far as I am
concerned, it is all right with me. I have been suggesting it ought to
be brought up for a debate. It probably would be better if there was a
hearing first and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and other respected
folks came and set out their views and then, a couple of days later,
debate it and vote on it. That would probably be a better course.
Even in the absence of that, as far as I am concerned, bring it up.
The Democratic leader said he thought 10 hours was probably not enough
time. The majority leader said in response we can
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perhaps lengthen that. Maybe, based on that discussion, there can be an
agreement today. I hope so. This ought to be brought up for a vote. I
do not think the objection by the Democratic leader was an objection to
say it ought not be brought up. He was concerned about time. It
occurred to me from the response of the majority leader that can be
worked out. In any event, as far as I am concerned, bring it up next
week. Let's have a debate next week and a vote next week.
Twenty-one nations have ratified this treaty since the beginning of
this year. Most of our allies have ratified this treaty, but we have
not. Some say it is dangerous, as the majority leader alleged today,
using the term ``dangerous'' for this country. Others say it is not in
this country's interest, that it will weaken this country, leave us
unprotected.
Let me describe some of the support for this treaty, going back to
President Eisenhower who pushed very hard in the final term of his
Presidency to get a treaty of this type. General Shelton, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supports this treaty and testified
recently again in support of the treaty. Four previous Chairmen of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff--General Shalikashvili, Gen. Colin Powell,
Admiral Crowe, and Gen. David Jones--also endorse that same position,
that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is good for this country
and ought to be ratified by this Senate.
Does anyone really feel Gen. Colin Powell, General Shalikashvili, and
General Shelton would take a position that they think will weaken this
country? Are they the extreme left? Are they the folks who, on the
extreme of politics in this country, believe we ought to disarm? I do
not think so. The Secretary of Defense supports this treaty and
believes it ought to be ratified. I would not expect that he and Colin
Powell and Admiral Crowe and all of those folks would do so unless they
felt very strongly that this treaty is in this country's interest.
A former Member of this body, Senator Hatfield, someone for whom I
have the greatest respect, offered some sound advice on this subject.
Senator Hatfield, incidentally, was one of the first servicemen to walk
in the streets of Hiroshima after the nuclear strike on that city. I
want to read what former Senator Hatfield said to us. He said:
It is clear to me that ratifying this treaty would be in
the national interest, and it is equally clear that Senators
have a responsibility to the world, to the Nation and their
constituents to put partisan politics aside and allow the
Senate to consider this treaty.
He, perhaps better than anybody in this body, understands the horror
of nuclear weapons, having walked the streets of Hiroshima after the
strike on that city.
I quoted the other day Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union who
warned that in a nuclear war the living would envy the dead.
The question for this country is, Will we stand and provide world
leadership on the issue of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons or
will we decide it is not our country's responsibility; it is someone
else's responsibility? Let England do it. Let France do it. Let Germany
do it. Let Canada do it.
We are the only country in the world with the capability of providing
significant leadership in this area. We must, in my judgment, ratify
this treaty.
There are safeguards in this treaty. I will not spend much more time
discussing it right now because we are on another piece of legislation,
and that is important, too. But I make these comments because the
safeguards in this treaty are quite clear.
This is not a case where this country will ratify a treaty that, in
effect, disarms us. We are not conducting explosive tests of nuclear
weapons now. We have unilaterally decided--7 years ago--we are not
exploding nuclear weapons.
What contribution would be made by a test ban treaty? Simply this: If
you cannot test your weaponry, you have no notion and no certainty that
any weapons you develop are weapons that work. We have known for 30 and
40 years that the ability to suppress the testing of nuclear weapons
will be the first step, albeit a moderate step, in halting the spread
of nuclear weapons. This, in my judgment, in fact, is not a moderate
step--this is a baby step.
If we cannot take this baby step on this important treaty, how on
Earth are we going to do the heavy lifting that is necessary following
this that will lead to the mutual reduction in the stockpile of nuclear
arms? Tens of thousands of nuclear arms--30,000 nuclear weapons between
us and Russia alone.
How are we going to reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons and halt
the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and reduce the threat
that comes from the nuclear weapons tests that occurred in Pakistan and
India? How on Earth are we going to provide the leadership that is
necessary, the tough leadership that is necessary in these areas if we
cannot take this small step to ratify a treaty that has been signed by
154 countries now, and that makes so much sense, and that our Joint
Chiefs of Staff have said represents this country's interests? How on
Earth are we going to do the tough work if we cannot take this first
step?
I have a lot more to say on this subject. I have expressed to the
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, it is not my intention to
be an irritant to anybody in this Chamber personally. I do not ever
intend to suggest that someone who believes differently than I do is
taking that position for any other reason except for the passion they
have about this country and the policies they think will strengthen it.
But we have a very significant disagreement about this issue. It is a
very significant and important issue. I believe in my heart very
strongly this country has a responsibility to lead in the right way on
this matter.
My hope is the unanimous consent request propounded by the majority
leader--if there is more time needed; and the majority leader indicated
that he was agreeable to that--my hope is that before the end of today
we will have an agreement on when it will be brought to the floor, and
then let's have a robust, aggressive, thoughtful debate so the country
can understand what this means. Then let's have a vote and decide
whether this country decides to ratify this important treaty that has
been discussed for some 40 years--whether this country will take the
first step that will help halt the spread of nuclear weapons around the
world.
Mr. WARNER. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. DORGAN. Of course I will yield.
Mr. WARNER. First, I wish to commend our colleague for the very
forthright way in which he has, for some period of time, expressed his
strong views, the need for this treaty to be considered by the Senate.
I strongly support the request of the majority leader, and I share with
you the hope that our leadership can work this out and we can move
expeditiously.
I assure my colleague, I have just had the opportunity to speak with
my distinguished ranking member, Senator Levin. The Armed Services
Committee will promptly conduct hearings regarding that area for which
we have oversight responsibility.
The point I wish to make to my colleague is, it is going to require
the most careful consideration by all Senators to reach this vote. Much
of the relative material that convinces this Senator to oppose the
treaty simply cannot be disclosed in open. I am going to urge our
colleagues, and I am sure with the assistance of our leadership, we can
provide more than one opportunity for each Senator to learn the full
range of facts regarding this treaty and its implications for this
Nation.
Yes, I want to see America lead, but I want to make certain that
leadership role that exists today can exist a decade hence, 15 years,
20 years hence. That is the absolute heart of this debate: What steps
do we take now to ensure that our country can maintain its position of
world leadership in the decades to come?
We shall develop the facts, those of us who are most respectful of
your viewpoint, as I am sure you are of mine. It will be a historic
vote for this Chamber.
I yield the floor.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the Senator
from Virginia. One of my deep regrets is that he does not support this
treaty because I have great respect for him and have worked with him on
a number of matters. He truly knows this area and studies this area.
There is room for disagreement.
[[Page S11673]]
But I say, again, that Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen, former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell, General Shalikashvili,
General Shelton, and so many others have reviewed all of the same
material--much of it secret material, secret documents--and have come
to a different conclusion, believing that this treaty is very important
for this country and that it is very important to ratify this treaty.
But my hope mirrors that of Senator Warner, that when we have this
debate, we will have a debate about ideas and about the kind of public
policy that will benefit this country and the world, the kind of public
policy that will allow us to continue to be strong, to have the
capability to defend our liberty and freedom, but the kind of policy
that will also provide leadership so this country can help prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons in the years ahead.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. DURBIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. President.
I first acknowledge the leadership of my colleague from North Dakota,
Senator Dorgan, who has called the attention of this Congress and this
Senate to this important issue. I hope his efforts will prevail in
bringing this issue to the floor of the Senate.
In my lifetime, it is interesting to look back and reflect on things
which were so commonplace and now are so rare. I can recall, as a child
in the 1950's, in my classroom when we were being instructed about the
need to ``duck and cover,'' the possibility that there might be an
attack on the United States of America. That was generated by the fact
that the Soviets had detonated a nuclear weapon. We were technically
emerging into a cold war, and there was a belief that we had to be
prepared for the possibility of an attack.
In my hometown of Springfield, IL, when my wife and I bought a little
house, the first house we ever owned--1600 South Lincoln Avenue; an
appropriate name in Springfield, IL--we moved into the house and went
in the basement and were startled to find a fallout shelter that had
been built to specifications. Someone had believed in the 1960s this
was an appropriate thing to put in a house in Springfield, IL, because
of the possibility that we may face some sort of attack, a nuclear
attack on the United States.
You can remember the monthly air raid sirens that used to call our
attention to the fact that we had a system to warn all of America of a
potential attack. You may remember, not that many years ago, movies on
television and long debates about a ``nuclear winter,'' what would
happen with a nuclear holocaust.
That conversation was part of daily life in America for decades. Then
with the end of the cold war, and the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, and the Warsaw Pact nations not only leaving the Soviet
domination but gravitating toward the West--with countries such as
Poland and Hungary and Czechoslovakia coming to join NATO--many of us
have been lulled into a false sense of security that the threat of
nuclear weapons is no longer something we should take seriously. In
fact, we should.
In fact, we are reminded, from time to time, that the so-called
nuclear club--the nations which have nuclear capability--continues to
grow. That is why this particular treaty and this debate are so
important.
One of the most compelling threats we in this country face today is
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Threat assessments
regularly warn us of the possibility that North Korea, Iran, Iraq, or
some other nation may acquire or develop nuclear weapons. Our most
basic interest in relations with Russia today is to see that it
controls its nuclear weapons and technology and that Russian scientists
do not come to the aid of would-be nuclear proliferators. In other
words, in a desperate state of affairs, with the Russian economy, we
are concerned that some people will decide they have a marketable idea,
that they can go to some rogue nation and sell the idea of developing a
nuclear weapon, adding another member to the nuclear club, increasing
the instability in this world.
Congress spends millions of dollars to fight nuclear proliferation,
to stop the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide, and to support the
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
For the past several years, I have been involved in an Aspen
Institute exchange, which has opened my eyes to the need for our
concern in this area. Senator Lugar is a regular participant as well,
and Senator Nunn has been there in the past, when we have met with
members of the Russian Duma and leaders from that country and have
learned of the very real concern they have of the stockpile of nuclear
weapons still sitting in the old Soviet Union, a stockpile of weapons
which, unfortunately for us, has to be minded all the time for fear
that the surveillance, the inspection, and the safety would degrade to
the point that there might be an accidental detonation. Those are the
very real problems we face, and we vote on these regularly.
Yet we in the Senate, despite all of these realities, have had
languished in the committee one of the most effective tools for
fighting nuclear proliferation--the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a
treaty which, as the Senator from North Dakota indicated, has been
ratified by over 130 nations but not by the United States of America.
The idea of banning nuclear tests is not a new one. It is one of the
oldest items on the nuclear arms control agenda. Test bans were called
for by both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. Steps were taken toward
a ban in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, but other incremental
steps were eschewed in favor of a comprehensive treaty.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a key piece of the broader
picture of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control. Consider this:
When nonnuclear countries--those that don't have nuclear weapons--agree
they are not going to have a nuclear arsenal and sign the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, an essential part of that bargain for the smaller
nations, the nonnuclear powers, and those that have it, was that
nuclear countries were going to control and reduce the number of
nuclear weapons.
An integral part of that effort is this treaty. It is virtually
impossible to make qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons or
develop them for the first time without testing. Just a few months ago,
the Senate overwhelmingly voted to reorganize the Department of Energy
because of our deep concern about what secrets may have been stolen
from our nuclear labs. The potential damage from this espionage is
disturbing.
In the case of China, the entry into force of this treaty could help
mitigate the effect of the loss of our nuclear secrets. More than old
computer codes and blueprints would be needed to deploy more advanced
nuclear weapons. Extensive testing would be required. In the cases of
India and Pakistan, U.S. ratification of this treaty would pressure
both countries to sign the treaty, as they pledged to do following
their nuclear test last year.
In fact, the leadership role of the United States is essential to
encourage the ratification of the treaty by many other nations. If the
leading nuclear power in the world, the United States of America, fails
to ratify this treaty to stop nuclear testing, why should any other
country? The United States has a responsibility of moral leadership.
Many who take such pride in our Nation and its role and voice in the
world tremble when faced with the burden of leadership. The burden of
leadership comes down to our facing squarely the need to ratify this
treaty.
The United States has declared that its own nuclear testing program
has been discontinued, but it is still absolutely in our national
interest to be part of a multinational monitoring and verification
regime. That way we can shape and benefit from that same regime. The
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty says if the treaty has not been entered
into force 3 years after its being open for signing, the states that
have ratified it may convene a special conference to decide by
consensus what measures consistent with international law can be taken
to facilitate its entry into force.
Only those states that have ratified it would be given full voting
privileges. The special conference is going to take place this fall. It
will set up monitoring and verification of nuclear testing worldwide so
the components will
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be operating by the time the treaty does enter into force. This regime
will include the International Data Center and many other elements that
are important for success.
The United States should be part of that process, but it will not be,
because the Senate has not voted on this treaty. This country certainly
conducts its own monitoring for nuclear tests, but if we participate in
an international regime, our country can benefit from a comprehensive
international system. It is important to recall that if China or Russia
were to resume testing, the United States, under this treaty, would
have the right to withdraw and resume our own, if that is necessary for
our national defense.
If the United States does not ratify the treaty in the first place,
however, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty may never enter into force.
We would be faced with the prospect, once again, of a major nuclear
power's resuming nuclear testing. When President Eisenhower and
President Kennedy called for a nuclear test ban, a major impetus was
the public outcry over environmental damage caused by these tests.
I ask unanimous consent to print in the Congressional Record at this
point a letter I received from major national environmental
organizations supporting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and decrying
the environmental damage to both our national security and our planet
if the treaty is not ratified.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
Washington, DC, June 30, 1999.
Hon. Richard Durbin,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Re: Major national environmental organizations' support of
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Dear Senator Durbin: We urge the Senate to give its consent
to ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty this year. The
timing is critical so that the United States can participate
in this fall's special international conference of Treaty
ratifiers.
We support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) because
it is a valuable instrument in stemming the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and reducing the environmental and security
threats posed by nuclear arms races. Under the CTBT, non-
nuclear weapons states will be barred from carrying out the
nuclear explosions needed to develop compact, high-yield
nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles and confidently
certify nuclear explosive performance. The Treaty is
therefore vital to preventing the spread of nuclear missile
capability to additional states. In addition, the Treaty will
limit the ability of the existing nuclear weapons states to
build new and destabilizing types of nuclear weapons.
Since 1945, seven nations have conducted over 2,050 nuclear
test explosions--an average of one test every 10 days.
Atmospheric tests spread dangerous levels of radioactive
fallout downwind and into the global atmosphere. Underground
nuclear blasts spread highly radioactive material into the
earth and each one creates a permanent nuclear waste site.
This contamination presents long-term hazards to nearby water
sources and surrounding communities. Also, many underground
tests have vented radioactive gases into the atmosphere,
including some of those conducted by the United States. Of
course, the ultimate threat to the environment posed by
nuclear testing is the continuing and possibly increasing
risk of nuclear war posed by proliferating nuclear arsenals.
In addition to protecting the environment, the CTBT will
enhance U.S. security with its extensive monitoring system
and short-notice, on-site inspections. These will improve our
ability to discourage all states from engaging in the testing
of nuclear weapons.
Ending nuclear testing has been a goal of governments,
scientists, and ordinary citizens from all walks of life for
over forty years. The CTBT has already been ratified by many
other nations, including France, the United Kingdom, and
Japan. The vast majority of Americans support approval of the
CTBT. The effort in this country to stop nuclear testing that
began with public outrage about nuclear fallout and has been
pursued by American Presidents since Dwight Eisenhower can
now be achieved. With U.S. leadership on the CTBT, entry into
force is within reach. It is vital that the U.S. set the
example on this important environmental and security issue;
with your leadership and support, the CTBT can finally be
realized.
Yours sincerely,
Rodger Schlickeisen, President, Defenders of Wildlife;
Mike Casey, Vice-President for Public Affairs,
Environmental Working Group; Matt Petersen, Executive
Director, Global Green USA; John Adams, Executive
Director, Natural Resources Defense Counsel; Amy Coen,
President Population Action International; James K.
Wyerman, Executive Director, 20/20 Vision; Brian Dixon,
Director of Government Relations, Zero Population
Growth; Fred D. Krupp, Executive Director,
Environmental Defense Fund; Brent Blackwelder,
President, Friends of the Earth; Phil Clapp, President,
National Environmental Trust; Robert K. Musil,
Executive Director, Physicians for Social
Responsibility; Carl Pope, Executive Director, Sierra
Club; Bud Ris, Executive Director, Union of Concerned
Scientists.
This is a letter that has been circulated and signed by the leaders
of at least a dozen major environmental groups. I note in the letter it
states that since 1945, the last 54 years, seven nations in this world
have conducted 2,050 nuclear test explosions, an average of 1 test
every 10 days, leaving nuclear fallout, radioactive gases, in many
instances, in our atmosphere. We certainly never want to return to that
day again. Unless the United States is a full partner in this
international effort to reduce nuclear testing, that is a possibility
looming on the horizon.
Senator Helms, who spoke on the floor earlier, has said he puts this
treaty in line behind amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
and the Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. convention on global climate change,
both of which the President has not yet submitted to the Senate. My
colleague says that ABM changes are essential for the national missile
defense to move forward, which is true. But national missile defense
does not yet work. We don't have this technology to build an umbrella
of protection over the United States so that any nuclear missile fired
on us can somehow be stopped in the atmosphere without danger to the
people living in this country.
If we decide to deploy such a defense, we will need to negotiate more
ABM Treaty changes. That is something in the future. We have time to
address that. But we also need to accept the immediate responsibility
of ratifying this treaty. Not too many months ago in this Chamber, we
passed a resolution which says if the national missile defense system
or so-called star wars system should become technologically possible,
we will spend whatever it takes to build it. I have to tell you that I
voted against it. I thought it was not wise policy.
Quite honestly, the idea that we are somehow going to insulate the
United States by building this umbrella and therefore don't have to
deal with the world and its problems in nuclear proliferation, in my
mind, is the wrong way to go. We should be working diplomatically as
well as militarily for the defense of the United States. When we have
the support of the commanders of the Nation, of course, and those who
are in charge, the Joint Chiefs, time and again for this treaty, it is
evidence to me that it is sound military policy.
In short, Mr. President, I conclude by saying, we must not delay any
longer. We must ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I yield the
floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I know my colleagues are anxious to get to
the business at hand. I assure the floor I will take only 5 minutes. If
the clerk will let me know when I am headed towards 5 minutes, I would
appreciate it.
I will refrain from responding and speaking to the Test Ban Treaty at
length at this moment.
The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is not only a
colleague, but he is a personal friend. We have strong disagreements on
this issue.
I don't mean to nickel and dime this, but we haven't had any hearings
on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
At the outset, I send to the desk a list of all the hearings the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee had for the 105th and 106th
Congress's since submission of the CTBT.
I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Activities
January 8, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
January 27, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy, Export, and Trade Promotion/Hagel), IMF Reform and
the Global Financial Crisis.
January 29, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
February 5, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
[[Page S11675]]
February 24, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), 1999 Foreign
Policy Overview and the President's Fiscal Year 2000 Foreign
Affairs Budget Request.
February 24, 1999 (Subcommittee on European Affairs/Smith),
Anti-Semitism in Russia. (S. Hrg. 106-6.)
February 25, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), Asian Trade Barriers to U.S. Soda Ash
Exports.
March 2, 1999 (Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace
Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism/Coverdell), U.S. Relief
Efforts In Response to Hurricane Mitch. (S. Hrg. 106-5.)
March 3, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), Commercial
Viability of a Caspian Sea Main Export Energy Pipeline.
March 4, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Operations/
Grams), FY 2000 Administration of Foreign Affairs Budget.
March 9, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), Post Election Cambodia: What Next?
March 9, 1999 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs/Brownback), U.S. Policy Toward Iraq. (S. Hrg. 106-
41.)
March 10, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Castro's Crackdown
in Cuba: Human Rights on Trial. (S. Hrg. 106-52.)
March 11, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Embassy Security for
a New Millennium.
March 12, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
March 17, 1999 (Full Committee, jointly with Energy and
Natural Resources Committee/Helms and Murkowski), New
Proposals to Expand Iraqi Oil for Food: The End of Sanctions?
(S. Hrg. 106-86.)
March 17, 1999 (Full Committee/Coverdell), The Convention
on Nuclear Safety.
March 17, 1999 (Full Committee/Grams), Nomination (Seiple).
March 18, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), Indonesia: Countdown to Elections. (S. Hrg.
106-76.)
March 23, 1999 (Subcommittee on African Affairs/Frist),
Sudan's Humanitarian Crisis and the U.S. Response.
March 23, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), U.S. China Policy: A Critical Reexamination.
March 23, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
March 24, 1999 (Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace
Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism/Coverdell), Colombia: The
Threat to U.S. Interests and Regional Security.
March 24, 1999 (Subcommittee on European Affairs/Smith),
The European Union: Internal Reform, Enlargement, and the
Common Foreign and Security Policy. (S. Hrg. 106-48.)
March 25, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), U.S. Taiwan
Relations: The 20th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act.
(S. Hrg. 106-43.)
April 13, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Trade vs. Aid: NAFTA
Five years Later. (S. Hrg. 106-80.)
April 14, 1999 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs/Brownback), The Continuing Crisis in
Afghanistan.
April 15, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), U.S. Vulnerability
to Ballistic Missile Attack.
April 16, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
April 19, 1999 (Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace
Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism/Coverdell, closed session),
Targeting Assets of Drug Kingpins.
April 20, 1999 (Full Committee/Hagel), Current and Growing
Missile Threats to the U.S.
April 20, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), The War in Kosovo.
April 21, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Markup of Foreign
Relations Authorization Act FY 00-01.
April 21, 1999 (Full Committee/Smith), NATO's 50th
Anniversary Summit. (S. Hrg. 106-144.)
April 22, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), The Forgotten Gulag: A Look Inside North
Korea's Prison Camps.
April 27, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Nonproliferation,
Arms Control and Political Military Issues.
April 29, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), International
Software Piracy: Impact on the Software Industry and the
American Economy.
April 30, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
(S.J. Res. 20.)
May 4, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Ballistic Missile
Defense Technology: Is the United States Ready for a Decision
to Deploy?
May 5, 1999 (Full Committee/Hagel), Does the ABM Treaty
Still Serve U.S. Strategic and Arms Control Objectives in a
Changed World?
May 6, 1999 (Full Committee/Coverdell and Frist, closed
session), The Growing Threat of Biological Weapons.
May 7, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
May 11, 1999 (Full Committee/Ashcroft), U.S. Agriculture
Sanctions Policy for the 21st Century.
May 12, 1999 (Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace
Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism/Coverdell), The State of
Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Americas.
May 13, 1999 (Full Committee/Hagel), ABM Treaty, START II
and Missile Defense.
May 25, 1999 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs/Brownback), Political/Military Developments in India.
May 25, 1999 (Full Committee/Ashcroft), The Legal Status of
the ABM Treaty.
May 26, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Cornerstone of Our
Security?: Should the Senate Reject a Protocol to
Reconstitute the ABM Treaty with Four New Partners?
May 27, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), The Chinese Embassy Bombing and Its Effects
on U.S.-China Relations.
May 27, 1999 (Full Committee/Hagel), Nominations (Sandalow
and Harrington).
June 8, 1999 (Subcommittee on African Affairs/Frist), The
Central African Wars and the Future of U.S.-Africa Policy.
June 9, 1999 (Full Committee/Smith), Nominations (Bandler,
Einik, Keyser, Limprecht, Morningstar, Napper, Miller and
Pressley).
June 9, 1999 (Full Committee/Coverdell), Nominations
(Garza, Almaguer, Hamilton and Bushnell).
June 11, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
June 16, 1999 (Full Committee/Frist), Nominations (Carson,
Dunn, Erwin, Goldthwait, Leader, Metelits and Myrick).
June 17, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Nomination
(Holbrooke).
June 22, 1999 (Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace
Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism/Coverdell), Confronting
Threats to Security in the Americas.
June 22, 1999 (Full Committee/Coverdell), Nomination
(Clare).
June 22, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Nomination
(Holbrooke).
June 23, 1999 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs/Brownback), U.S. Policy Toward Iraq: Mobilizing the
Opposition.
June 23, 1999 (Full Committee/Hagel), Nomination
(Sandalow).
June 24, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Nomination
(Holbrooke).
June 24, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), U.S. Satellite
Export Controls and the Domestic Production/Launch
Capability.
June 28, 1999 (Full Committee/Hagel), Nomination (Holum).
June 30, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
July 1, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), The Role of Sanctions
in U.S. National Security Policy.
July 1, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), Hong Kong Two Years After Reversion: Staying
the Course, Or Changing Course?
July 16, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
July 20, 1999 (Full Committee/Thomas), Nominations
(Burleigh, Gelbard, Siddique and Stanfield).
July 20, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Operations/
Grams, closed session), U.N. International Criminal Court:
Prospects for Dramatic Renegotiation.
July 21, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), Recent Strains in Taiwan-China Relations.
July 21, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), The Role of Sanctions
in U.S. National Security Policy, Part 2.
July 21, 1999 (Full Committee/Smith), Nominations
(Fredericks, Griffiths, Miles, Spielvogel and Taylor).
July 22, 1999 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asia
Affairs/Brownback), Iran: Limits to Rapprochement.
July 22, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Nomination
(Anderson).
July 23, 1999 (Full Committee/Coverdell), Nomination
(Sheehan).
July 26, 1999 (Full Committee/Grams), Nomination
(Lieberman).
July 27, 1999 (Subcommittee on African Affairs/Frist),
Barriers to Trade and Investment in Africa.
July 28, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
July 28, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), The Agency for
International Development and U.S. Climate Change Policy.
July 29, 1999 (Subcommittee on European Affairs/Smith),
Prospects for Democracy in Yugoslavia.
July 30, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Operations/
Grams), U.S. Policy Towards Victims of Torture.
August 4, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), S. 693: The Taiwan
Security Enhancement Act.
August 4, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, jointly with Subcommittee
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs/Hagel and Thomas), Economic
Reform and Trade Opportunities in Vietnam.
August 5, 1999 (Full Committee/Frist), Nominations (Bader,
Brennan, Elam, Johnson, Kaeuper, Kolker, Lewis, Nagy and
Owens-Kirkpatrick).
August 6, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
September 8, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms, closed session),
Proliferation Activities of a Certain Russian Company.
September 9, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, jointly with House Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific/Thomas and Bereuter), The Political Futures of
Indonesia and East Timor.
September 10, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
September 14, 1999 (Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism/Coverdell), An Overview
of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy and President Clinton's
Decision to Grant Clemency to FALN Terrorists.
September 16, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Foreign Missile
Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United
States Through 2015.
[[Page S11676]]
September 23, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Corruption in
Russia and Recent U.S. Policy.
September 27, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Business
Meeting.
September 28, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Facing Saddam's
Iraq: Disarray in the International Community.
September 28, 1999 (Full Committee/Smith), U.S.-Kosovo
Diplomacy: February 1998-March 1999.
September 30, 1999 (Full Committee/Smith), Corruption in
Russia and Future U.S. Policy.
September 24, 1997 (Full Committee/Thomas), Nominations
(Foley, LaPorta and Bosworth).
September 24, 1997 (Full Committee/Helms), Business
Meeting.
September 25, 1997 (Subcommittee on African Affairs/
Ashcroft), Religious Persecution in Sudan. (S. Hrg. 105-280.)
September 25, 1997 (Full Committee/Hagel), Maritime
Boundaries Treaty with Mexico (EX. F, 96-1); Protocol
Amending Migratory Birds Convention with Canada (Treaty Doc.
104-28); and Protocol Amending Migratory Birds and Game
Mammals Convention with Mexico (Treaty Doc. 105-26). (Printed
in Exec. Rept. 105-5.)
October 1, 1997 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs/Brownback), Events in Algeria.
October 7, 1997 (Full Committee/Helms), Strategic Rationale
for NATO Enlargement. (S. Hrg. 105-285.)
October 7, 1997 (Full Committee/Hagel), Bilateral Tax
Treaties and Protocol (Turkey/TDoc. 104-30; Austria/TDoc.
104-31; Luxembourg/TDoc. 104-33; Thailand/TDoc. 105-2;
Switzerland/TDoc. 105-8; South Africa/TDoc. 105-9; Canada/
TDoc. 105-29; and Ireland/TDoc. 105-31). (S. Hrg. 105-354.)
October 8, 1997 (Full Committee/Brownback), Proliferation
Threats Through the Year 2000. (S. Hrg. 105-359.)
October 8, 1997 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
October 9, 1997 (Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), The Road to Kyoto:
Outlook and Consequences of a New U.N. Climate Change Treaty.
October 9, 1997 (Full Committee/Helms), Pros and Cons of
NATO Enlargement. (S. Hrg. 105-285.)
October 10, 1997, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
October 21, 1997 (Full Committee/Thomas), Nomination
(Green).
October 21, 1997 (Full Committee/Ashcroft), Nominations
(Schermerhorn, Schoonover and Twaddell).
October 22, 1997 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs/Brownback), The Situation in Afghanistan.
October 23, 1997 (Full Committee/Smith), Nominations
(Fried, Tufo, Rosapepe, Vershbow, Miller, Johnson and Hall).
October 23, 1997 (Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), U.S. Economic and
Strategic Interests in the Caspian Sea Region: Policies and
Implications. (S. Hrg. 105-361.)
October 24, 1997 (Full Committee/Coverdell), Nominations
(Ashby, Carney, Curiel, McLelland and Marrero).
October 28, 1997 (Full Committee/Helms), Costs, Benefits,
Burdensharing and Military Implications of NATO Enlargement.
(S. Hrg. 105-285).
October 28, 1997 (Full Committee/Brownback), Nominations
(Celeste, Donnelly, Gabriel, Hume, Kurtzer, Larocco and
Walker).
October 29, 1997 (Full Committee/Hagel), Nominations
(Babbitt, Bondurant, Brown, Fox and Robertson).
October 29, 1997 (Full Committee/Smith), Nominations
(Montgomery, Pifer, Proffitt, Olson, Hormel, Hermelin,
Presel, Escudero and Pascoe).
October 29, 1997 (Full Committee & Senate Caucus on
International Narcotics Control/Coverdell & Grassley), U.S.
and Mexico Counterdrug Efforts Since Certification. (S. Hrg.
105-376.)
October 30, 1997 (Full Committee/Helms), NATO/Russia
Relationship, Part 1, (S. Hrg. 105-285.)
October 30, 1997 (Full Committee/Hagel), NATO/Russia
Relationship, Part 2, (S. Hrg. 105-285.)
October 31, 1997 (Full Committee/Grams), Nominations
(French, King, Moose, Oakley, Rubin and Taft).
November 4, 1997 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
November 5, 1997 (Full Committee/Smith), Public Views on
NATO Enlargement. (S. Hrg. 105-285.)
November 6, 1997 (Full Committee/Helms), Commercial
Activities of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). (S.
Hrg. 105-332.)
November 6, 1997 (Subcommittee on International Operations/
Grams), The United Nations at a Crossroads: Efforts Toward
Reform. (S. Hrg. 105-386.)
November 7, 1997, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
December 9, 1997, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
January 9, 1998, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
February 3, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), the Military
Implications of the Ottawa Land Mine Treaty. (Protocol II to
Treaty Doc. 105-1.)
February 6, 1998, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
February 10, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), 1998 Foreign
Policy Overview and the President's Fiscal Year 1999 Budget
Request. (S. Hrg. 105-443.)
February 11, 1998 (Full Committee/Hagel), Implications of
the Kyoto Protocol on climate Change. (S. Hrg. 105-457.)
February 12, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), International
Monetary Fund's Role in the Asia Financial Crisis.
February 24, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Administration
Views on the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on
Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. (S.
Hrg. 105-421.)
February 25, 1998, (Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel) Implementation of
U.S. Policy on Construction of a Western Caspian Sea Oil
Pipeline.
February 25, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Nomination
(Grey).
February 26, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), Are U.S. Unilateral Trade Sanctions an
Effective Tool of U.S. Asia Policy?
February 26, 1998 (Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and
Peace Corps Affairs/Coverdell), Drug Trafficking and
Certification.
March 2, 1998 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs/Brownback), Iraq: Can Saddam Be Overthrown? (S. Hrg.
105-444.)
March 3, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
March 4, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), The WTO Film Case and Its Ramifications for
U.S.-Japan Relations.
March 6, 1998, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
March 10 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), The Plight of the
Montagnards. (S. Hrg. 105-465.)
March 11, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
March 11, 1998 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs/Brownback), Developments in the Middle East.
March 12, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms, closed session),
Chinese Nuclear Cooperation with Various Countries.
March 12, 1998 (Subcommittee on African Affairs/Ashcroft),
Democracy in Africa: The New Generation of African Leaders.
(S. Hrg. 105-559.)
March 18, 1998 (Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy and Trade Promotion/Hagel), The Role of the IMF in
Supporting U.S. Agricultural Exports to Asia.
March 24, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affaris/Thomas), the Present Economic and Political Turmoil
in Indonesia: Causes and Solutions.
March 25, 1998 (Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), S. 1413, the
Enhancement of Trade, Security, and Human Rights Through
Sanctions Reform Act.
April 3, 1998, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
May 6, 1998 (Subcommittee on European Affairs/Smith), the
Crisis in Kosovo. (S. Hrg. 105-649.)
May 7, 1998 (Full Committee/Brownback), Nominations (Burns
and Crocker).
May 7. 1998 (Subcommittee on International Economic Policy,
Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), Oversight of the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation.
May 8, 1998, Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
May 12, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), S. 1868, The
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. (S. Hrg. 105-
591.)
May 13, 1998 (Full Committee/Hagel), EX. B, 95-1, Montreal
Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Pertaining to International Carriage by Air;
Treaty Doc. 104-17, International Convention for the
Protection of New Varieties of Plants; Treaty Doc. 105-4,
Grains Trade Convention and Food Aid Convention; Treaty Doc.
104-36, Convention on the International Maritime
Organization; and Treaty Doc. 105-35, Trademark Law Treaty.
(Hearing on EX. B, 95-1 Printed in Exec. Rept. 105-20.)
May 13, 1998 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs/Brownback), Crisis in South Asia: India's Nuclear
Tests. (S. Hrg. 105-620.)
May 14, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), U.S. Interest at the
June U.S.-China Summit. (S. Hrg. 105-568.)
May 14, 1998(Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs/Brownback), U.S. Policy Toward Iran. (S. Hrg. 105-
611.)
May 18, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), Present Political in Indonesia.
May 19, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
May 20, 1998 (Subcommittee on European Affairs/Smith),
Overview of Russian Foreign Policy and Domestic Policy.
May 20, 1998 (Subcommittee on International Operations/
Grams), The Secretary's Certification of a U.N. Reform Budget
of $2.533 Billion. (S. Hrg. 105-682.)
May 21, 1998 (Full Committee, jointly with Energy and
Natural Resources Committee/Helms and Murkowski), Iraq: Are
Sanctions Collapsing? (S. Hrg. 105-650.)
May 21, 1998. (Full Committee/Coverdell), Nomination
(Davidow).
June 3, 1998 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs/Brownback), Crisis in South Asia, part 2: Pakistan's
Nuclear Tests. (S. Hrg. 105-620.)
June 5, 1998 Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
June 9, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign
[[Page S11677]]
Public Officials in International Business Transactions
(Treaty Doc. 105-43). (Printed in Exec. Rept. 105-19.)
June 10, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas) U.S. Policy Strategy on Democracy in
Cambodia.
June 11, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Chinese Missile
Proliferation, (S. Hrg. 105-841.)
June 11, 1998 (Full Committee/Coverdell), Nominations
(Crotty, O'Leary and Schechter).
June 16, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), The Panama Canal and
U.S. Interests. (S. Hrg. 105-672)
June 16, 1998 (Full Committee/Ashcroft), Nominations
(Barnes, Clarke, Derryck, Haley, Peterson, Stith and Swing).
June 16, 1998 (Full Committee/Smith), Nominations (Cejas,
Edelman, Ely-Raphel, Lemmon, Perina, Romero, Schneider and
Yalowitz).
June 17, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), S. 1868, The
International Religious Freedom Act: Views from the Religious
Community. (S. Hrg. 105-591.)
June 18, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), Congressional Views of the U.S.-China
Relationship.
June 23, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
June 24, 1998 (Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), The Asian
Financial Crisis: New Dangers Ahead?
June 24, 1998 (Subcommittee on European Affairs/Smith),
U.S. Policy in Kosovo. (S. Hrg. 105-649.)
June 25, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms, closed session),
Chinese Missile Proliferation.
July 8, 1998 (Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), Implementation of
U.S. Policy on Caspian Sea Oil Exports. (S. Hrg. 105-683.)
July 10, 1998 Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
July 13, 1998 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs/Brownback), India and Pakistan: What Next? (S. Hrg.
105-620.)
July 14, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), KEDO and the Korean Agreed Nuclear
Framework: Problems and Prospects. (S. Hrg. 105-652.)
July 15, 1998 (Subcommittee on European Affairs/Smith),
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and United States Baltic
Policy. (S. Hrg. 105-651.)
July 16, 1998 (Full Committee/Hagel), Nominations (Parmer
and West).
July 16, 1998 (Full Committee/Brownback), Nominations
(Craig, Kattouf, McKune, Satterfield and Milam).
July 16, 1998 (Full Committee/Smith), Nominations (Homes,
Mann, Swett and Wells).
July 20, 1998 (Full Committee/Thomas), Nominations
(Hecklinger, Kartman and Wiedemann).
July 22, 1998 (Full Committee/Grams), Nominations
(Carpenter, Edwards and Spalter).
July 23, 1998 (Subcommittee on International Operations/
Grams), Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S.
National Interest? (S. Hrg. 105-724.)
July 23, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
July 23, 1998 (Full Committee/Ashcroft), Nominations
(Felder, Ledesma, Melrose, Mu, Perry, Robinson, Staples,
Sullivan, Swing and Yates). (S. Hrg. 105-674.)
August 7, 1998 Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
September 3, 1998 (Full Committee, jointly with Armed
Services Committee/Lugar and Thurmond), U.N. Weapons
Inspections in Iraq: UNSCOM At Risk.
September 9, 1998 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs/Brownback), U.S. Policy in Iraq: Public
Diplomacy and Private Policy. (S. Hrg. 105-725.)
September 10, 1998 (Full Committee/Hagel), World
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and World
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and
Phonograms Treaty (Treaty Doc. 105-17). (Printed in Exec.
Rept. 105-25.)
September 10, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), Recent Developments Concerning North Korea.
(S. Hrg. 105-842.)
September 11, 1998 Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
September 15, 1998 (Full Committee/Grams), Extradition,
Mutual Legal Assistance and Prisoner Transfer Treaties. (S.
Hrg. 105-730.)
September 15, 1998 (Subcommittee on European Affairs/
Smith), Crisis in Russia: Policy Options for the United
States.
September 16, 1998 (Full Committee, jointly with Caucus on
International Narcotics Control/Coverdell and Grassley), U.S.
Anti-Drug Interdiction Efforts and the Western Hemisphere
Drug Elimination Act. (S. Hrg. 105-844.)
September 17, 1998 (Subcommittee on International
Operations, jointly with International Affairs Task Force of
the Senate Budget Committee/Grams and Smith), Examination of
Major Management and Budget Issues Facing the Department of
State. (S. Hrg. 105-806.)
September 23, 1998 (Full Committee/Smith), Nominations
(Jones, Finn, Shattuck and Sullivan).
September 25, 1998 (Full Committee/Thomas and Brownback),
Nomination (Randolph).
September 25, 1998 (Full Committee/Thomas), Nominations
(Pascoe and Watson).
September 25, 1998 Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
September 29, 1998 (Full Committee/Coverdell), Nominations
(Beers and Ferro).
October 1, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), United States
Responses to International Parental Abduction. (S. Hrg. 105-
845.)
October 2, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs/Thomas), Cambodia: Post Elections and U.S. Policy
Options. (S. Hrg. 105-846.)
October 2, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Nomination
(Johnson).
October 2, 1998 (Full Committee/Hagel), Nomination (Loy).
October 5, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms, closed session),
START Treaty Compliance Issues.
October 6, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), The Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States. (S. Hrg. 105-847.)
October 7, 1998 (Full Committee/Grams), Nominations (Bader,
Koh and Welch).
October 8, 1998 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs/Brownback), Events in Afghanistan.
November 6, 1998 Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
December 4, 1998 Informal State Department Briefing on
Peacekeeping.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I can understand why the Senator may think
we have had hearings because we have had hearings on other subjects
that implicate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is mentioned by
witnesses. But we have never had a hearing on the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty--a treaty of great consequence to the United States and the
world--conducted in the traditional way. We never had a hearing where
we said this is what we are going to talk about. We need a hearing
where we bring up the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Defense, or major voices in America who oppose this
treaty--fortunately, I think there are not that many--or significant
figures and scientists who have spoken and know about this issue. We
haven't had one of those hearings at all.
I submit for the Record, again, a letter from the chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee sent to the President of the United States
on January 21, 1998, with a concluding paragraph, which reads as
follows:
Mr. President, let me be clear. I will be prepared to
schedule Committee consideration of the CTBT only after the
Senate has had an opportunity to consider and vote on the
Kyoto Protocol and the amendments to the ABM Treaty.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in
the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, January 21, 1998.
The President,
The White House, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: As congress prepares to reconvene
shortly, I am convinced that it is important to share with
you the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's agenda relating
to consideration of treaties during the second year of the
105th Congress.
There are a number of important treaties which the
Committee intends to take up during 1998, and we must be
assured of your Administration's cooperation in making
certain that these treaties receive a comprehensive
examination by the Senate.
Mr. President, the Committee's first priority when Congress
reconvenes will be to work with you and Secretary Albright to
secure Senate ratification of NATO expansion. The expansion
of the Atlantic Alliance to include Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic is of critical importance, and we have come a
long way in resolving some of the concerns that I, and other
Senators, had raised about various details of this expansion
(e.g., ensuring an equitable distribution of costs, limiting
Russian influence in NATO decision making, et al.)
While much work remains to be done, I am confident that if
we continue to work together, the Senate will vote to approve
the expansion of the Atlantic Alliance early this Spring.
Following the vote on NATO expansion, the Committee will
turn its attention to several other critical treaties which
could affect both the security of the American people and the
health of the United States' economy. Chief among these are
the agreements on Multilateralization and Demarcation of the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the Kyoto
Protocol to the UN Convention on Climate Change.
Mr. President, I feel obliged to make clear to you my
concern that your Administration has been unwisely and
unnecessarily engaged in delay in submitting these treaties
to the Senate for its advice and consent.
Despite your commitment, made nearly eight months ago, to
submit the amendments to the ABM Treaty to the Senate, we
have yet to see them. As our current stand-off with Iraq
clearly demonstrates, the danger posed by rogue states
possessing weapons
[[Page S11678]]
of mass destruction is growing--and, with it, the need for a
robust ballistic missile defense.
The Senate has not had an opportunity to consider the
rationale behind the ABM Treaty since that treaty was
ratified nearly 26 years ago, in the midst of the Cold War.
The world has changed a great deal since then. It is vital
that the Senate conduct a thorough review of the ABM Treaty
this year when it considers and votes on the ABM
Multilateralization and Demarcation agreements.
Similarly, the Senate is forced to continue to wait for any
indication that your Administration intends to submit the
Kyoto Protocol for the Senate's advice and consent. Indeed, I
have heard a great deal of discussion from supporters of this
treaty indicating that the Administration may attempt to
circumvent both the Senate--and the American people--by
simply imposing the treaty's requirements on U.S. businesses
by executive order. Mr. President, I must respectfully
counsel this would be extremely unwise.
This treaty clearly requires the advice and consent of the
Senate. further, because the potential impact of the Kyoto
Protocol on the American economy is so enormous, we owe it to
the American people to let them know sooner, rather than
later, whether they will be subject to the terms of this
treaty.
Ironically, while the Administration has delayed in
submitting these vital treaties to the Senate, some in your
Administration have indicated that the White House will press
the Senate for swift ratification of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) immediately following the vote on NATO
expansion.
Such a deliberate confrontation would be exceedingly unwise
because, Mr. President, the CTBT is very low on the
Committee's list of priorities. The treaty has no chance of
entering into force for a decade or more. Article 14 of the
CTBT explicitly prevents the treaty's entry into force until
it has been ratified by 44 specific nations. One of those 44
nations is North Korea, which is unlikely to ever ratify the
treaty. Another of the 44 nations--India--has sought to block
the CTBT at every step: vetoing it in the Conference on
Disarmament so that it could not be submitted as a Conference
document. India has opposed it in the United Nations. And,
India has declared that it will not even sign the treaty.
By contrast, the issues surrounding the ABM Treaty and the
Kyoto Protocol are far more pressing (e.g., the growing
threat posed by nuclear, biological, or chemical tipped
missiles, and the potential impact of the Kyoto Protocol on
the U.S. economy).
Mr. President, let me be clear: I will be prepared to
schedule Committee consideration of the CTBT only after the
Senate has had the opportunity to consider and vote on the
Kyoto Protocol and the amendments to the ABM Treaty.
When the Administration has submitted these treaties, and
when the Senate has completed its consideration of them,
then, and only then, will the Foreign Relations Committee
consider the CTBT.
Mr. President, please let's work together, beginning with
the effort to secure Senate ratification of NATO expansion
this Spring, and then with your timely transmittal of these
treaties.
Sincerely and respectfully,
Jesse Helms.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the chairman has been true to his word. He
has had no hearings because that has not been done yet.
I think I understand how the Senator from North Carolina connects the
rationale of these treaties, and he thinks the orderly way to do it is
to do it only after we do other things, but that makes the point. We
have had no hearings on this treaty.
I think the public may be surprised to know this treaty calls for no
more nuclear testing by the United States and other nations. We haven't
been testing. There is a moratorium on nuclear testing. That occurred
in 1992 in the Bush administration.
What we are talking about doing that my friends are talking about is
so dangerous and damaging to U.S. interests; that is, to sign a treaty
to say we will not test, we are not testing now. The United States made
a unilateral decision not to test.
Now we have the rest of the world ready to sign up, and we are saying
we are not going to ratify, or up to now we are saying we are not even
going to have a hearing on this subject.
Again, I will get into the merits of the treaty later because I am
confident the leadership of the Senate will come up now with the
proposal as to how to proceed.
But I urge my friend from North Carolina, and I urge my colleagues to
urge my friend from North Carolina, to hold hearings. Bring the experts
up. Bring the military up.
By the way, one last substantive thing I will say about the treaty is
that we are the only nation in the world that has spent billions of
dollars and committed billions in the future to a method by which we
can take our existing stockpile of nuclear weapons and test them for
their continued utility without ever exploding them. I will explain in
detail later what I mean by the stockpiling program we have.
We, of all nations in the world, are the one best prepared and best
suited for taking the last chance of any nation in the world to promise
not to test because we are one of the few nations in the world with
certainty that can guarantee that even if we don't test weapons we can
test, by exploding them, their continued utility by very complicated,
very sophisticated scientific computer models that we have designed. We
have committed that we will continue in the future to fund to the tune
of billions of dollars this program.
In a strange way, if you went out to the public at large and said: By
the way, do you think we should sign a treaty that says we can't test
nuclear weapons if the rest of the world signs a treaty that says you
can't test nuclear weapons, knowing that we can detect all but those
kinds of explosions that will not have any impact on another nuclear
capability, when we have already decided not to test unilaterally, and
we are the only nation in the world that has the sophistication and
capacity to test by means other than exploding our nuclear arsenal;
what do you think the public would say?
I conclude by saying this: We have had no hearings. There is a
legitimate debate about whether or not we should do this.
This is a thing for which the Senate was conceived--to make big
decisions such as this.
This is the reason the founders wrote in a provision in the U.S.
Constitution that said a treaty can be negotiated by a President, but
it can only come into effect after the Senate has ratified it. It
didn't say the House. It didn't say a referendum. It didn't say the
American people. It said the Senate. Other than the Supreme Court of
the United States, in a decision of who should sit on it, there is no
other function that is of greater consequence that the Senate performs
than determining whether to ratify or reject a treaty with the United
States of America.
It seems to me that when we exercise that function, we should do it
responsibly and thoroughly.
We have never done it on a matter of grave consequence without
thoroughly investigating it through the hearing process and through one
of the oldest committees that exists in the Senate--the Foreign
Relations Committee--the unique function of which is to recommend to
this body what our bipartisan considered opinion is after hearing the
details of the treaty.
I look forward to the debate.
I have urged the President of the United States--I will urge him
personally--and have urged the administration, if this date is set,
that the President take this case directly to the American people on a
nationally televised broadcast and lay out for them what the stakes
are.
This is no small decision. This is a vote that I promise you, whether
you are for it or against it, your children and your grandchildren and
history will know how you cast it. I am not so smart to know exactly
what the outcome will be in history's judgment, but I am certain of one
thing: You are not going to be in a position where you can say at a
later date this was a vote of little consequence.
Mr. President, as folks back home in Delaware say, this is what we
get paid the big bucks for. This is why we are here. This is the
purpose of our being here.
It is true. The amendments we are going to discuss on legislation
that is before us are important. It is true that some of it will affect
the lives of hundreds or thousands of Americans. But I can't think of
anything we will do in this entire Congress or have done in the
previous Congress that has the potential to have as much impact on the
fate of the world as this treaty. I cannot think of anything. I defy
anyone to tell me, whether they are for or against this treaty, what we
could be discussing of greater consequence than how to deal with the
prospect of an accidental or intentional nuclear holocaust.
Tell me if there is anything more important to discuss than whether
or not over the next days, weeks, months,
[[Page S11679]]
years, and decades we should make a judgment from both a survival as
well as environmental standpoint that we will or will not continue to
blow up, in the atmosphere or underground, nuclear weapons. I defy
anyone to tell me what is more important to discuss.
That is not to suggest that those who think this treaty is a bad idea
are motivated by anything other than good intentions. As my dear mother
would say and as the nuns used to make me write on the blackboard after
school when I misbehaved: The road to hell is paved with good
intentions.
Failure to ratify this treaty, I firmly believe, paves the road to
hell--to nuclear hell. I don't know whether it will work, but I am
virtually certain in my mind--just Joe Biden, my mind--that if we do
not ratify this treaty, we virtually lose any ability to control the
proliferation of nuclear capability.
They talked about when the Russians detonated their first hydrogen
bomb. I am not sure, but I think it was Edward Teller who said: Now we
have two scorpions in the bottle. I am here to tell my colleagues what
they already know. We have many more than two scorpions in that bottle
now. If we do not begin to take a chance, a very small chance, on a
treaty that says no more detonation of nuclear weapons, we will have
dozens of scorpions in that bottle with not nearly as much to lose as
the former Soviet empire and the United States.
There was one advantage when there was a Soviet empire: They had as
much to lose as they had to gain. The only person I worry about in a
contest of any kind--athletic, political, or as a representative of the
Federal Government of the United States of America with another
country--I don't like dealing with someone else who has little to lose
but has significant capacity to inflict a vast amount of damage.
While I have the floor, I thank my friend from Pennsylvania, Senator
Specter. My friend from Pennsylvania has been one of the most outspoken
proponents of bringing up this treaty. I am sure it will be before the
Senate because of his advocacy.
I yield the floor.
Mr. SPECTER. If I may have the attention of the Senator from
Delaware, I do believe it is important for the Senate to consider the
treaty. I support it. I believe it is very difficult for the United
States to use moral suasion on India and Pakistan not to have nuclear
tests if we have not moved forward on the ratification process.
However, I ask my colleague from Delaware about the problems of
considering the treaty on this state of the record where we have been
looking for some expert guidance on some questions which are
outstanding as to whether there can be an adequate determination of our
preparedness without having tests.
One thing we have to consider very carefully is whether the interests
of disarmament will be promoted by pressing to bring the treaty now,
which may result without the two-thirds ratification, as opposed to
trying to clear up some concerns which some have expressed.
I am prepared to vote in favor of the treaty.
Mr. BIDEN. If I may respond to the Senator, he raised the $64
question. He and I have been discussing how to get this up for a long
time, over 2 years. He will recall, last year, I was of the view I did
not want to take a chance of having the treaty up for fear it could be
defeated before we had the ability to get all the data before the
Senate that I believed would persuade Senators to overwhelmingly
support the treaty.
I changed my mind. The reason I changed my mind is--I have great
respect for my friend from North Carolina, Senator Helms--I have
learned one thing: When he says something ain't going to happen, it
ain't going to happen on his watch. He made it very clear, there will
be no hearings on this treaty. I have been with him for 27 years. We
are truly personal friends. I know when he says it, he means it, which
means I have lost any hope that he will be persuaded, or be persuaded
by his Republican colleagues in the caucus, to have hearings.
I then reached the second conclusion: We are hurtling toward a
disaster on the subcontinent with India and Pakistan, and with Korea.
As the Senator knows, if they arm, if they deploy, we will see China
making a judgment to increase its nuclear arsenal and we will see the
likelihood that Korea will not be able to be leveraged.
Here is the point. I have made the judgment, for me--and I may be
wrong--if we don't agree to this proposal, we will get no vote on this
treaty for 2 years and the effect will be the same.
I am being very blunt. I believe I am looking for the political God's
will to have people have a little bit of an altar call. It is one thing
to say privately you are against the treaty or to say you are for it
but there is no vote on it. It is another thing to be the man or woman
who walks up in that well and casts the 34th vote against the treaty
and kills the treaty. They will have on their head--and they may turn
out to be right--and they will be determining by their vote the single
most significant decision made relative to arms, nuclear arms, that has
been made since the ABM Treaty. I think they may begin to see the Lord.
If they don't, then I think the American public will make a judgment
about it. The next President--whether it be Bush, Gore, or McCain--will
be more likely to send back another treaty.
I am at a point where it is time to bring in the sheep. Let's count
them, and let's hold people responsible. That is as blunt as I can be
with my friend.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Senator from Delaware for responding, and I
will not ask another question because I want to move on to the next
amendment.
Mr. President, it is my hope that whatever technical information is
available on some of the outstanding questions will be made available
to the Senators before the vote so we can have that determination made
with all the facts available.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, it is appalling that our Republican
friends will use any means necessary to kill the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. We need time to debate this Treaty in a responsible manner,
especially since the Foreign Relations Committee has still not held a
single hearing devoted solely to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
On September 24, 1996, President Clinton became the first world
leader to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. On that day,
President Clinton praised the treaty as the ``longest-sought, hardest--
fought prize in the history of arms control.''
Today, we stand on the verge of losing this valuable prize. For
almost two years, the Treaty has languished in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee--with no action, no debate, and no results. Now,
with the September 23 already passed, the United States may well
forfeit its voice on the treaty if the Senate does not act quickly, and
in a responsible way, to ratify it.
We have a unique opportunity in the Senate to help end nuclear
testing once and for all. Other nations look to the United States for
international leadership. President Clinton has done his part, in
signing the Treaty and submitting it to the Senate for ratification, as
the Constitution requires. Now the Senate should do its part, and
ratify the Treaty. Ratification is the single most important step we
can take today to reduce the danger of nuclear war.
Withholding action on this treaty is irresponsible and unacceptable.
The Treaty is in the best interest of the United States and the global
community. Ratification of this agreement will increase the safety and
security of people in the United States, and across the world. But,
until the Senate ratifies this treaty, it cannot go into force for any
nation, anywhere.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is in the interest of the American
people and it has widespread public support. Recent bipartisan polls
found that over 8 out of 10 Americans support its ratification. These
statistics cut across party lines and are consistent in all geographic
regions. The Treaty also has the strong support of present and past
military leaders, including four former Joint Chiefs of Staff--David
Jones, William Crowe, Colin Powell, and John Shalikashvili--and the
current JCS, Hugh Shelton.
The United States has already stopped testing nuclear weapons.
Ensuring that other nations follow suit is critical for our national
and international security. Particularly in the wake of recent
allegations of Chinese nuclear espionage, it is essential that
[[Page S11680]]
we act promptly to ratify this agreement. China is a signatory of the
Treaty, but like the United States, China has not yet ratified it.
Prompt Senate ratification of the Treaty will encourage China to
ratify, and discourage China from creating new weapons from stolen
nuclear secrets.
In 1963, after President Kennedy had negotiated the landmark Limited
Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union to ban tests in the atmosphere,
he spoke of his vision of a broader treaty in his commencement address
at American University that year. As he said:
The conclusion of such a treaty, so near and yet so far,
would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most
dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a
position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest
hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of
nuclear arms. It would increase our security--it would
decrease the prospects of war. Surely this goal is
sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit,
yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole
effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital
and responsible safeguards.
In 1999, those words are truer than ever.
I commend President Clinton and my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle who have joined together to speak out on this issue, and I urge
the Senate to act responsibly on this very important treaty.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to join a number of our
colleagues in support of prompt Senate consideration of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty the CTBT.
The issue of arms proliferation is at the heart of our national--and
international--security. In the post-cold war world we are no longer
faced with a military threat posed by the Soviet Union, but in some
ways the world now is a more dangerous place than it was just a decade
ago, with many smaller, unpredictable threats taking the place of a
single large one. U.S. and international security are now threatened by
transfers of nuclear, conventional and non-conventional materials among
numerous states. Nuclear testing last year by India and Pakistan, the
attempts of other states to obtain nuclear and ballistic missile
technology, and the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction
reinforce the need for a comprehensive international effort to end
nuclear testing and curb the illicit transfer and sale of nuclear,
ballistic, and other dangerous technology.
I have been a strong supporter of prompt Senate action on the CTBT
since President Clinton submitted the treaty to the Senate for its
advice and consent on September 22, 1997--2 years ago last week. As a
member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, I continue to feel
strongly that the committee should have thorough hearings specifically
on this important treaty at the earliest possible date. I know that the
chairman of the committee and I do not agree on the importance of the
CTBT, but I hope he will agree that the Senate must fulfill its advice
and consent obligations with respect to this treaty.
I continue to hear from numerous Wisconsin residents who favor prompt
Senate action on--and ratification of--the CTBT.
The CTBT, which has been signed by more than 150 nations, prohibits
the explosion of any type of nuclear device, no matter the intended
purpose. India and Pakistan's nuclear tests only underscore the
importance of the CTBT, and serve as a reminder that we should redouble
our efforts to bring the entire community of nations into this treaty.
While I am pleased that both of those countries have agreed to sign the
treaty, I regret that they did so only after intense international
pressure, and only after they conducted the tests they needed to become
declared nuclear states.
We must do more to ensure that no further tests take place.
The United States must lead the world in reducing the nuclear threat,
and to do that we must become a full participant in the treaty we
helped to craft. I am deeply concerned that the third anniversary of
the date the CTBT opened for signature, September 24, 1996, passed last
week without Senate advice and consent to ratification. This failure to
act by the United States Senate means that, according to the treaty's
provisions, the United States will not be able to participate actively
in the upcoming conference, which is reserved for only those countries
who have deposited their instruments of ratification. That conference
is currently scheduled to begin on October 6, 1999. Because we cannot
participate, the United States will be at a severe disadvantage when it
comes to influencing the future of the treaty and encouraging other
countries to sign or ratify.
Mr. President, I again urge the Senate to act on this important
treaty at the earliest possible date. The credibility and leadership of
the United States in the arms control arena is at stake.
I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I wish to take a few moments today to
offer some remarks on a matter of extreme importance to this Nation and
to the world--the matter of preventing the further proliferation of
nuclear weapons among the nations of the world through ratification and
implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Two weeks ago--September 10--was the third anniversary of the United
Nation's overwhelming vote to approve a treaty banning the testing of
nuclear weapons. The General Assembly voted 158 for to 3 against the
treaty, with a handful of abstentions.
Last week, on September 24, the United States observed the third
anniversary of signing that treaty and, on September 22, marked the
second anniversary of its receipt by the Senate for our advice and
consent.
In accordance with article 14 of the treaty, preparations are now
underway to convene an international conference of states which have
ratified the treaty to negotiate measures to facilitate its
implementation. I'm sorry to say, Mr. President, that unless the Senate
acts immediately to ratify this treaty, the United States--an original
signatory to the treaty and a leader in the global movement to stop the
testing of nuclear weapons--will not take part in that conference.
Our absence sends a troubling message to the international community
looking for our leadership.
Mr. President, I am very sorry to say that essentially nothing has
happened since President Clinton signed the treaty on behalf of the
United States on September 24, 1996, and sent it to the Senate for
consideration on September 22, 1997.
There have been no hearings, there has been no debate on the Senate
floor, there has been no vote on ratification. This is an extremely
important treaty that I believe, and the great majority of Americans
agree, would help to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons
during the coming millennium. And yet the Senate has not even begun the
debate.
Mr. President, I believe the United States and the nations of the
world have come to a historic crossroads--a crossroads that symbolizes
America's view of the future and the potential direction of the
international system regarding the control and eventual eradication of
nuclear weapons.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty lies at the center of the
crossroads, and provides us with two basic options.
We could elect to ratify the treaty and seek its broadest
implementation in order to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear
weapons;
Or, we could elect not to ratify the treaty, having decided as a body
that permitting the testing of nuclear weapons by all current and
future nuclear powers is in the interest of safety and security of the
United States and the world.
If we chose not to ratify the treaty, that choice would permit us to
pursue future avenues for nuclear superiority in response to nuclear
weapons developed by our real or potential adversaries.
Mr. President, I believe that our Nation has already been down that
road. It was called the nuclear arms race. It cost the Nation over a
trillion dollars according to a recent study by the Brookings
Institution. And that's just money. It doesn't include the opportunity
cost of brainpower and skills not used to address other national
problems such as medical and environment science or education.
The fact is, Mr. President, that the way things stand, we are not
being permitted to make either choice. Despite repeated requests by
Members of the Senate to address this vital national and international
security issue, the
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Senate has done nothing to move this treaty forward and debate it.
The Foreign Relations Committee has taken no action with respect to
the treaty and is preventing the Senate from debating and voting in
this most critical issue to the future of world peace. By his actions,
the chairman of the committee is preventing the Senate from carrying
out its constitutional duties and obligations to give advice and
consent regarding the CTBT.
Mr. President, I support the call to hold hearings and bring this
treaty to the floor for a debate and a vote. The American people
strongly support this treaty and deserve to have that view represented
and debated in the Halls of Congress.
Will the treaty be an effective means to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons? Let's debate the point.
Will the treaty be verifiable? Let's hear from the experts on that
crucial issue.
Will the CTBT serve America's national security interest? Let's
examine that from every angle.
As I mentioned at the outset of my remarks today, Mr. President, I
believe the Nation and the world stand at a historic crossroads with
respect to the spread of nuclear weapons. I believe it is our duty and
obligation to the American people to choose the proper road to take.
The key word, Mr. President, is ``Choose.'' The Senate is currently
being prevented from making a choice--and in so doing, a choice is
being made for us--by a few individuals seeking to advance an unrelated
political agenda.
I'm certain I share an abiding faith in our democratic system with
the Members of this body. If that's so, a debate, discussion, and vote
on perhaps the most critical security issue facing our Nation today
should be placed before the Senate as soon as possible. Failure to
permit such a debate and vote suggests to me either a lack of faith in
the democratic process or a disdain for its importance or validity.
Mr. President, I strongly urge my colleagues to support efforts to
bring the CTBT to the floor.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I would like to add a few thoughts for
today's debate regarding consideration of the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty.
I strongly believe that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--or C-T-B-
T--is in our Nation's national security interests. But before I discuss
my reasons for supporting the treaty, let me first say why the Senate--
even those who are unsure of the treaty-should support its
consideration by the Senate.
The Senate should hold hearings and consider and debate the treaty.
The Senate should vote on the treaty by March of next year.
Let me now mention some history of this issue and mention some of the
major milestone along the road to ending nuclear weapons testing. In
fact, next month, the month of October, is the anniversary of many
important events.
On October 11, 1963, the Limited Test Ban Treaty entered into force
after being ratified by the Senate in an overwhelming, bipartisan vote
of 80-14 just a few weeks earlier. This treaty paved the way for future
nuclear weapons testing agreements by prohibiting tests in the
atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. It was signed by 108
countries.
Our nation's agreement to the Limited Test Ban Treaty marked the end
of our above ground testing of nuclear weapons, including those at the
U.S. test site in Nevada. We now know, all too well, the terrible
impact of exploding nuclear weapons over the Nevada desert. Among other
consequences, these tests in the 1950's exposed millions of Americans
to large amounts of radioactive Iodine-131, which accumulates in the
thyroid gland and has been linked to thyroid cancer. ``Hot Sports,''
where the Iodine-131 fallout was the greatest, were identified by a
National Cancer Institute report as receiving 5-16 rads of Iodine-131.
The ``Hot Spots'' included many areas far away from Nevada, including
New York, Massachusetts and Iowa. Outside reviewers have shown that the
5-16 rad level is only an average, with many people having been exposed
to much higher levels, especially those who were children at the time.
To put that in perspective Federal standards for nuclear power plants
require that protective action be taken for 15 rads. To further
understand the enormity of the potential exposure, consider this: 150
million curies of Iodine-131 were released by the above ground nuclear
weapons testing in the United States, above three times more than from
the Chernobyl nuclear power plants disaster in the former Soviet Union.
Mr. President, it is all too clear that outlawing above-ground tests
were in the interest of our nation. I strongly believe that banning all
nuclear test is also in our interests.
October also marked some key steps for the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. On October 2, 1992, President Bush signed into law the U.S.
moratorium on all nuclear tests. The moratorium was internationalized
when, just a few years later, on September 24, 1996, a second step was
taken--the CTBT, was opened for signature. The United States was the
first to sign this landmark treaty.
President Clinton took a third important step in abolishing nuclear
weapons tests by transmitting the CTBT to the Senate for ratification.
Unfortunately, the Senate has yet to take the additional step of
ratifying the CTBT. I am hopeful that we in the Senate will debate and
vote on ratification of the Treaty, and continue the momentum toward
the important goals of a worldwide ban on nuclear weapons testing.
Many believed we had conquered the dangerous specter of nuclear was
after the Cold War came to an end and many former Soviet states became
our allies Unfortunately, recent developments in South Asia remind us
that we need to be vigilant in our cooperative international efforts to
reduce the dangers of nuclear weapons.
The CTBT is a major milestone in the effort to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would establish a permanent ban on
all nuclear explosions in all environments for any purpose. Its
``zero--yield'' prohibition on nuclear tests would help to halt the
development amd development of new nuclear weapons. The treaty would
also establish a far reaching verification regime that includes a
global network of sophisticated seismic, hydro-acoustic and
radionuclide monitoring stations, as well as on-site inspection of test
sites to deter and detect violations.
It is vital to our national security for the nuclear arms race to
come to an end, and the American people recognize this. In a recent
poll, more than 80% percent of voters supported the CTBT.
It is heartening to know that the American people understand the
risks of a world with nuclear weapons. It is now time for policymakers
to recognize this as well. There is no better way to honor the hard
work and dedication of those who developed the LTBT and the CTBT than
for the Senate to immediately ratify the CTBT.
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