[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 126 (Friday, September 24, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11424-S11426]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND GENERAL SHORT

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss an important--a 
historically important--vote taken in the course of our recent 
deliberations on defense policy. I am speaking of the rollcall vote 
this Chamber took on May 25 requesting the long-overdue, posthumous 
advancement of two fine World War II officers, Adm. Husband Kimmel and 
Gen. Walter Short. The Senate voted in support of the Kimmel-Short 
resolution, and I wish to take a moment to underscore the historic 
import of that vote.
  As you may recall, Admiral Kimmel and General Short were publicly and 
wrongly accused of dereliction of duty and unfairly scapegoated with 
singular responsibility for the success of the fateful December 1941 
attack on Pearl Harbor.
  After the end of World War II, this scapegoating was given a 
painfully unjust and enduring veneer when Admiral Kimmel and General 
Short were not advanced on the retired lists to their highest ranks of 
war-time command--an honor that was given to every other senior 
commander who served in war-time positions above his regular grade.
  After over 50 years, this injustice remains a prominent, painful spur 
in the integrity of our Nation's military honor. After numerous 
official investigations totaling well over 30 volumes of thick text 
absolved these officers of dereliction of duty and highlighted gross 
negligence and ineptitude on the part of their superiors as predominant 
factors in the Pearl Harbor disaster, these officers still remain 
unfairly treated.
  For those of you who are interested, I will shortly send to the desk 
for placement in the Congressional Record a set of excerpts from these 
investigations. This is a short document, but it poignantly highlights 
how unjust treatment endured by Kimmel and Short just does not 
correlate with the official history--the official documented history--
of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

[[Page S11425]]

  Anyone who looks over these few pages cannot but feel uncomfortable 
with how our Nation has so unfairly turned its back on these two 
officers who dedicated their lives to our own freedoms.
  Mr. President, a great step, indeed an historic step was taken toward 
the correction of this injustice last May, on May 25 to be exact. This 
Chamber, the U.S. Senate, the legislative body our Constitution deems 
responsible for providing advice and consent in the promotion of 
military officers, voted and passed an amendment to the Senate Defense 
authorization bill that stated:

       This singular exclusion from advancement of Rear Admiral 
     (retired) Kimmel and Major General (retired) Short from the 
     Navy retired list and the Army retired list, respectively, 
     serves only to perpetuate the myth that the senior commanders 
     in Hawaii were derelict in their duty and responsible for the 
     success of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and is a distinct and 
     unacceptable expression of dishonor toward two of the finest 
     officers who have served in the Armed Forces of the United 
     States.

  This resolution then requested the President to advance the late Rear 
Adm. Husband Kimmel to the grade of admiral on the retired list of the 
Navy and the late Maj. Gen. Walter Short to the grade of lieutenant 
general on the retired list of the Army.
  Mr. President, the injustice suffered by Admiral Kimmel and General 
Short remains a flaw in the integrity of our Nation's chain of command 
and its unparalleled military honor.
  In this regard, the Senate's vote on the Kimmel-Short resolution was 
of great historic importance. The Senate has every right to be proud of 
this vote. This Chamber, which under the Constitution is responsible 
for promotion of military officers of our Armed Forces, deemed the 
treatment of Kimmel and Short to be unfair and unjust and inconsistent 
with our national sense of honor.
  That vote gave formal and official recognition to this injustice and 
highlighted it as a pernicious inconsistency in the application of our 
national understanding of military accountability.
  It demonstrated that no wrong, no matter how distant in the past will 
be ignored by this Chamber. it correctly called upon the President to 
correct this injustice by advancing these two fine officers on the 
retired lists.
  It is now up to the President to take this corrective action. I hope 
that he will not heed the contradictory conclusions of his advisors on 
this matter. While the Pentagon opposes the advancement of Kimmel and 
Short, they nonetheless recognize that, and I quote their own 1995 
report, ``responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall 
solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short, 
it should be broadly shared.''
  How they square this conclusion with the reality that today Kimmel 
and Short are the only two officials to suffer from official sanction 
is beyond me.
  I hope that the President of the United States will use his wisdom to 
listen beyond this contradictory and unjust advice. I hope that he will 
look at the official record compiled by over eight official 
investigations.
  I hope that he will listen to the studied voice of the Senate and 
take the final step necessary to correct this injustice by advancing 
these two fine officers to their highest grade of World War II command 
on the retired lists.
  Mr. President, the Senate has once again ably demonstrated that it is 
never too late to correct an injustice. I urge the President of the 
United States to do the same and advance Kimmel and Short to their 
highest grade of command as was done for their peers who served in 
World War II.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have an attachment printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

           Key Excerpts From the Pearl Harbor Investigations


                         the dorn report (1995)

       ``Responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not 
     fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General 
     Short; it should be broadly shared.''
       ``It is clear today, as it should have been since 1946 to 
     any serious reader of the JCC (Joint Congressional Committee) 
     hearing record, that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were 
     not solely responsible for the defeat at Pearl Harbor.''
       ``. . . the evidence of the handling of these 
     (intelligence) messages in Washington reveals some 
     ineptitude, some unwarranted assumptions and misestimates, 
     limited coordination, ambiguous language, and lack of 
     clarification and follow-up at higher levels.''
       ``The `pilot', `fourteen-point' and `one o'clock' messages 
     point, by the evening of December 6th, to war at dawn 
     (Hawaiian time) on the 7th--not to an attack on Hawaii--but 
     officials in Washington were neither energetic nor effective 
     in getting that warning to the Hawaiian commanders.''


      The Army Board for the Correction of Military Records (1991)

       ``The Army Pearl Harbor Board (of 1944), held that General 
     Marshall and the Chief of War Plans Division of the War 
     Department shared in the responsibility for the disaster.''
       ``The applicant in this case . . . must show . . . that the 
     FSM (in this case Major General Short) was unjustly treated 
     by the Army . . . the majority found evidence of injustice.''
       ``In this regard, the majority was of the opinion that the 
     FSM, singularly or with the Naval commander, was unjustly 
     held responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster.''
       ``Considering the passage of time as well as the burden and 
     stigma carried until his untimely death in 1949, it would be 
     equitable and just to restore the FSM to his former rank of 
     lieutenant general on the retired list.''
       ``Recommendation.--That all of the Department of the Army 
     records, related to this case be corrected by advancing the 
     individual concerned to the rank of lieutenant general on the 
     retired list.''


               the army pearl harbor board inquiry (1944)

       ``The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. 
     Marshall, failed in his relations with the Hawaiian 
     Department in the following particulars:
       (a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian 
     Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the 
     Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity 
     for better preparation for war, of which information he had 
     an abundance and Short had little.
       (b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding 
     General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when 
     evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short's 
     reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly that General 
     Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of 
     November 27 and had not adequately alerted his command for 
     war.
       (c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th 
     and the early morning of December 7th, the critical 
     information indicating an almost imminent break with Japan, 
     though there was ample time to have accomplished this.''
       ``Chief of War Plans Division War Department General Staff, 
     Major General Leonard T. Gerow, failed in his duties in the 
     following respects:
       (a) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian 
     Department on November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive; 
     on the contrary, he approved the message of November 27, 
     1941, which contained the confusing statements.
       (b) To realize that the state of readiness reported in 
     Short's reply to the November 27th message was not a state of 
     war readiness, and he failed to take corrective action.''


                   the naval court of inquiry (1944)

       ``It is a prime obligation of Command to keep subordinate 
     commanders, particularly those in distant areas, constantly 
     supplied with information. To fail to meet this obligation is 
     to commit a military error.''
       ``It is a fact that Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval 
     Operations and responsible for the operation of the Pacific 
     Fleet, and having important information in his possession 
     during this critical period, especially on the morning of 7 
     December, failed to transmit this information to Admiral 
     Kimmel, this depriving the latter of a clear picture of the 
     existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington.''
       ``The Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies in 
     personnel and materiel which existed in 1941, had a direct 
     adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of 
     Pearl Harbor on and prior to 7 December.''
       ``The Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's 
     decision, made after the dispatch of 24 November, to continue 
     preparations of the Pacific Fleet for war, was sound in light 
     of the information then available to him.''
       ``The Court is of the opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark, 
     U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations . . . failed to display the 
     sound judgement expected of him in that he did not transmit 
     to Admiral Kimmel . . . during the very critical period 26 
     November to 7 December, important information which he had 
     regarding the Japanese situation, and especially on the 
     morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately 
     the fact that a message had been received which appeared to 
     indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, 
     and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected 
     soon.''


            the joint congressional committee report (1946)

       ``The errors made by the Hawaiian commanders were errors of 
     judgment and not derelictions of duty.''
       ``The War Plans Divisions of the War and Navy Departments 
     failed:
       ``(a) To give careful and thoughtful consideration to the 
     intercepted messages from Tokyo to Honolulu of September 24, 
     November 15, and November 20 (the harbor berth plan and 
     related dispatches) and to raise a

[[Page S11426]]

     question as to their significance. Since they indicated a 
     particular interest in the Pacific Fleet's base, this 
     intelligence should have been appreciated and supplied to the 
     Hawaiian commanders for their assistance, along with other 
     information available to them, in making their estimate of 
     the situation.
       ``(b) To be properly on the qui vive to receive the `one 
     o'clock' intercept and to recognize in the message that the 
     fact that some Japanese military action would very possibly 
     occur somewhere at 1 p.m., December 7. If properly 
     appreciated this intelligence should have suggested a 
     dispatch to all Pacific outpost commanders supplying this 
     information, as General Marshall attempted to do immediately 
     upon seeing it.''

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