[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 125 (Thursday, September 23, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H8568-H8595]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            INTERSTATE CLASS ACTION JURISDICTION ACT OF 1999

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 295 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 1875.
  The Chair designates the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Hansen) as chairman 
of the Committee of the Whole, and requests the gentleman from Colorado 
(Mr. Hefley) to assume the chair temporarily.

                              {time}  1138


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 1875) to amend title 28, United States Code, to allow the 
application of the principles of Federal diversity jurisdiction to 
interstate class actions, with Mr. Hefley (Chairman pro tempore) in the 
chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is 
considered as having been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) and the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte).
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this much-needed bipartisan legislation corrects a 
serious flaw in our Federal jurisdiction statutes. At present, those 
statutes forbid our Federal courts from hearing most interstate class 
actions, the lawsuits that involve more money and touch more Americans 
than virtually any other litigation pending in our legal system.
  Mr. Chairman, the class action device is a necessary and important 
part of our legal system. It promotes efficiency by allowing plaintiffs 
with similar claims to adjudicate their cases in one proceeding. It 
also allows claims to be heard in cases where there are small harms to 
a large number of people, which would go otherwise unaddressed because 
the cost to the individuals suing could far exceed the benefit to the 
individual. However, class actions have been used with an increasing 
frequency and in ways that do not promote the interests they were 
intended to serve.
  In recent years, State courts have been flooded with class actions. 
As a result of the adoption of different class action certification 
standards in the various States, the same class might be certifiable in 
one State and not another or certifiable in State court but not in 
Federal court. This creates the potential for abuse of the class action 
device, particularly when the class involves parties from multiple 
States or requires the application of the laws of many States.
  For example, some State courts routinely certify classes before the 
defendant is even served with a complaint and given a chance to defend. 
Other State courts employ very lax class certification criteria 
rendering virtually any controversy subject to class action treatment.
  There are instances where a State court, in order to certify a class, 
has determined that the law of that State applies to all claims, 
including those of purported class members who live in other 
jurisdictions. This has the effect of making the law of that State 
applicable nationwide.
  The existence of State courts which broadly apply class certification 
rules encourages plaintiffs to forum shop for the court which is most 
likely to certify a purported class. In addition to forum shopping, 
parties frequently exploit major loopholes in the Federal jurisdiction 
statutes to block the removal of class actions that belong in Federal 
court.
  For example, plaintiffs' counsel may name parties that are not really 
relevant to the class claims in an effort to destroy diversity. In 
other cases, counsel may waive Federal law claims or shave the amount 
of damages claimed to ensure that the action will remain in State 
court.
  Another problem created by the ability of State courts to certify 
class actions which adjudicate the right of citizens of many States is 
that oftentimes more than one case involving the same class is 
certified at the same time. In the Federal court system, these cases 
involving common questions of fact may be transferred to one district 
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.
  When these class actions are pending in State courts, however, there 
is no corresponding mechanism for consolidating the competing suits. 
Instead, a settlement or judgment in any of the cases make the other 
class actions moot. This creates an incentive for each class counsel to 
obtain a quick settlement of the case and an opportunity for the 
defendant to play the various class counsel against each other and 
drive the settlement value down. The loser in this system is the class 
member whose claim is extinguished by the settlement at the expense of 
counsel seeking to be the one entitled to recovery of fees.
  Our bill is designed to prevent these abuses by allowing large 
interstate class action cases to be heard in Federal court. It would 
expand the statutory diversity jurisdiction of the Federal courts to 
allow class action cases involving minimal diversity. That is when any 
plaintiff and any defendant are citizens of different States to be 
brought in or removed to Federal court.
  Article 3 of the Constitution empowers Congress to establish Federal 
jurisdiction over diversity cases, cases between citizens of different 
States. The grant of Federal diversity jurisdiction was premised on 
concerns that State courts might discriminate against out-of-state 
defendants.
  In a class action, only the citizenship of the named plaintiff is 
considered for determining diversity, which means that Federal 
diversity jurisdiction will not exist if the named plaintiff is a 
citizen of the same State as the defendant regardless of the 
citizenship of the rest of the class.

                              {time}  1145

  Congress also imposes a monetary threshold, now $75,000, for Federal 
diversity claims. However the amount in controversy requirement is 
satisfied in a class action only if all of the class members are 
seeking damages in excess of the minimum required by the statute.
  These jurisdictional statutes were originally enacted years ago, well 
before the modern class action arose, and they now lead to perverse 
results. For example, under current law a citizen of

[[Page H8569]]

one State may bring in Federal court a simple $75,001 slip-and-fall 
claim against a party from another State. However, if a class of 25 
million product owners, each having a claim of $10,000 living in all 50 
States, brings claims collectively worth $250 billion against the 
manufacturer, the lawsuit cannot be heard in Federal court.
  This result is certainly not what the framers had in mind when they 
established Federal diversity jurisdiction. Our bill offers a solution 
by making it easier for plaintiff class members and defendants to 
remove class actions to Federal court where cases involving multiple 
State laws are more appropriately heard. Under our bill, if a removed 
class action is found not to meet the requirements for proceeding on a 
class basis, the Federal court would dismiss the action without 
prejudice, and the action could be refiled in the State court.
  This legislation does not limit the ability of anyone to file a class 
action lawsuit. It does not change anybody's rights to recovery. Our 
bill specifically provides that it will not alter the substantive law 
governing any claims as to which jurisdiction is conferred. Our 
legislation merely closes the loophole allowing Federal courts to hear 
big lawsuits involving truly interstate issues while ensuring that 
purely local controversies remain in State courts. That is exactly what 
the framers of the Constitution had in mind when they established 
Federal diversity jurisdiction.
  I urge each of my colleagues to support this very important 
bipartisan legislation.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a measure, H.R. 1875, that will remove class 
actions involving State law issues from State courts, the forum most 
convenient for victims of wrongdoing to litigate and most familiar with 
the substantive law involved, to the Federal courts where the class is 
less likely to be certified and the case will take longer to resolve.
  Now why is this being done in the face of all the arguments for 
States rights, the concern about the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution that reminds us that all powers not explicitly delegated 
to the Federal system is reserved to the States? Why are we here with a 
bill that would now take this power from the State courts and subject 
it to Federal rule?
  Although this bill is described by its proponents as a simple 
procedural fix, in actuality it rewrites a major rewrite of the class 
action rules that would bar most forms of State class actions. That is 
right; it would bar most forms of State class actions. H.R. 1875 is 
appropriately opposed by the Department of Justice, both the State and 
Federal courts, by consumer interest groups, and public interest groups 
as well.
  Now class action procedures offer a valuable mechanism for 
aggregating small claims that otherwise might not warrant individual 
litigation. This legislation will undercut that important principle by 
making it far more burdensome, expensive and time consuming for injured 
persons to obtain access to justice in the State courts.
  In doing so, it will make it more difficult to protect our citizens 
against violations of consumer health, safety and environmental laws, 
to name but a few important ones. Thus, the bill will benefit only one 
class of litigants, corporate wrongdoers. The most obvious examples of 
corporate defendants that have been susceptible to State class actions 
are, as we know, tobacco, gun, and managed care industries.
  H.R. 1875 will also damage both the Federal and State courts. As a 
result of Congress' increasing propensity to federalize State crimes 
and the Senate, the United States Senate's, unwillingness to confirm 
judges, the Federal courts are already facing a dangerous work-load 
crisis. By forcing resource-intensive class actions into Federal court, 
H.R. 1875 will effectively further aggravate those problems and cause 
victims to wait in line even longer, as much as 3 years or more, to 
obtain trial. Moreover, to the extent class actions are remanded to 
State court, the legislation effectively only permits case-by-case 
adjudications, potentially draining away precious State court resources 
as well.
  Now finally, the legislation raises constitutional issues because 
H.R. 1875 does not merely operate to preempt an area of State law, 
which is onerous enough, but rather it unilaterally strips the State 
courts of their ability to use class actions' procedural device to 
resolve State law disputes. The courts have previously indicated that 
efforts by the Congress to dictate such State court procedures 
implicate important Tenth Amendment issues and should be avoided. These 
powers that are not explicitly granted the Federal system are reserved 
to the States, and we are taking this very important judicial tool away 
from the States.
  So H.R. 1875's incursion into State court prerogatives is no less 
dangerous to the public than many of the radical forms of tort reform 
that were rejected of court stripping that was rejected by both the 
Congress and the administration, and thus I urge that H.R. 1875, 
Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1995, likewise be rejected.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Boucher), one of the lead cosponsors of this legislation, 
a member of the Committee on the Judiciary and my friend.
  (Mr. BOUCHER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 
1875, which I am pleased to be co-authoring with my friend and Virginia 
colleague, the gentleman from Roanoke (Mr. Goodlatte). Our measure 
makes a much needed reform in an area that has been subjected to 
substantial abuse.
  Increasingly, lawsuits that are truly national in scope are being 
filed as State class actions, and a range of problems attends this 
growing practice. Some State judges employ an almost anything-goes 
approach that renders virtually any controversy subject to 
certification as a State class action.
  Some State courts routinely engage in a practice that is best 
described as drive-by class certifications in which the decision to 
certify the class is made before the defendant is even served with the 
complaint and given an opportunity to contest the class certification. 
In such an environment, defendants and even plaintiffs are being denied 
the most routine of rights as there is a rush to certify classes and a 
rush to settle the cases.
  For example, in order to prevent removal of cases to Federal courts, 
the amount that is sued for is sometimes kept artificially below the 
$75,000 jurisdictional threshold for Federal court actions, and that is 
done even though in many of these instances the plaintiffs would be 
entitled to recover more than $75,000. In the same vein, class action 
complaints in many cases will not raise Federal causes of action that 
could legitimately be raised; also, for the purpose of denying the 
defendants the opportunity to remove the cases to Federal court.
  These practices are clearly not in the interests of the plaintiffs on 
whose behalf the class actions have been filed, and neither are the 
quick settlements that often follow and that yield large fees for the 
plaintiff's attorneys and negligible returns for the plaintiffs 
themselves.
  Another major problem arises from the inability of States to 
consolidate class action proceedings that often are filed in more than 
one State and that involve the same issues of law and fact, that 
involve the same causes of action, and that involve the same class 
members on both the plaintiff's side and also the same defendants.
  Frequently, these parallel cases proceed in numerous States at the 
same time to the disadvantage of all parties concerned. This 
circumstance sometimes leads to competition among the States in order 
to get the certification first and to achieve the first settlement, 
whatever the cost of that settlement to the plaintiffs on whose behalf 
the class action has been filed. In the Federal courts, of course, 
multidistrict litigation can be consolidated, thereby eliminating and 
avoiding all of these problems.
  The legislation that is before the House today seeks to address these 
concerns by permitting cases that are truly national in scope to be 
removed to Federal court even if the traditional

[[Page H8570]]

diversity requirements are not met. Today, the target defendant is 
almost always a large out-of-state corporation. To prevent removal 
under current rules an in-state defendant, such as a retailer or 
distributor of the product that is the subject of the action against 
whom recovery is generally not sought, will be joined as a party 
defendant simply to prevent there being complete diversity and to 
prevent the removal of the case to Federal court.
  Our legislation would permit removal in that instance if the center 
of gravity of the case is truly national in scope. The legislation is 
carefully drafted to provide that cases which are local, and we refer 
to these as interstate cases, will not be entertained in the Federal 
courts unless the traditional removal rules are met. If the defendant 
and the majority of the plaintiffs are in-state parties, and if the law 
of that State will govern disposition of the proceedings, then the 
Federal judge will be required to remand that case for proceedings in 
State court.
  Some of the opponents of this legislation claim that it essentially 
federalizes all class actions. That simply is not the case. If the case 
is local in nature, if the majority of the plaintiffs, if the defendant 
are residents of the State in which the class action is filed, and if 
the law of that State would be dispositive of the proceeding, then the 
Federal judge under this legislation would be required to return that 
case as a class action to the State courts, and so State class actions 
can proceed under those arrangements where the cases are, in fact, 
purely local.
  The legislation sensibly improves our legal system without limiting 
anyone's right to file a class action or to receive recovery; and I am 
pleased to be joined in co-authoring this measure with the gentleman 
from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte), the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran), 
the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Bryant). And this morning I am 
pleased to strongly urge its adoption by the House.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute before yielding to 
the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) because both the previous 
speakers supporting the bill have talked about the ability of courts to 
allow the certifying of class actions before the defendants have had an 
opportunity to respond, and I would like to point out that not only is 
this barred by the Constitution, that there is a Supreme Court case on 
it preventing it; and the two Alabama State court cases have both held 
that classes may not be certified without notice and full opportunity 
for defendants to respond, and the class certification criteria must be 
rigorously applied.
  So I just want to lay that chestnut to rest as the debate goes on.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Kucinich).
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Conyers) for yielding this time to me.

                              {time}  1200

  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 1875, the Interstate Class 
Action Jurisdiction Act. As someone who has served as a State Senator 
in Ohio, I am here to confirm that the purpose of State courts should 
not be diminished. State courts exist to assure the people of the State 
access to justice, equal protection under the law, right to due process 
and right to redress for injuries.
  Now, I represent the people of the United States through being a 
Member of this Congress, but I also represent the people of the State 
of Ohio. The people of my State will not yield their legal rights to 
H.R. 1875. The fact that a legal issue may have national implications 
should not and does not mean that the State does not have an abiding 
interest in the legal architecture which has been set up to provide the 
people of a State with access to the justice system, and this 
legislation constitutes an attack on the legal right, not only of the 
people of the State but of the State itself.
  It protects the makers of dangerous products by taking away the 
rights of consumers to get their day in court. It will give the makers 
of dangerous products the special right to shop for a court they 
believe will favor them.
  How many other accused can choose the judge that will judge them? We 
should not give those who make dangerous products advantage over our 
constituents in that way. It will delay justice for injured consumers. 
Makers of dangerous products will be able to choose courts that are 
seriously backlogged. We should not delay justice for injured 
consumers. It would deprive consumers of the right to have their case 
heard by State court judges and, as such, represents a manipulation of 
the jurisdictions and a depriving of people the right of due process at 
a State level.
  I believe that economic rights and the right to justice are 
interconnected. This law would be an attempt to deconstruct those 
rights simultaneously and individually. This legislation ought to be 
defeated, and I urge my colleagues to vote against H.R. 1875.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Moran), another of our lead cosponsors on this 
legislation.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I thank my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte), for yielding me 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, this is good legislation. It is needed legislation. So 
I rise in strong support of this legislation, because it will correct a 
statutory anomaly that conflicts with the original intent of the 
Framers of our Constitution. When the Framers drafted the Constitution, 
they created so-called diversity jurisdiction to protect parties 
against bias in State courts and to allow interstate lawsuits to be 
heard in Federal court. Diversity jurisdiction was codified in statute 
with individual lawsuits in mind.
  Mr. Chairman, I am a strong supporter of the class action device, and 
I believe that it is an important tool in our legal system to provide 
justice for injured parties. Class actions improve the efficiency of 
our legal system and are often the best way to fairly adjudicate 
claims.
  With that said, though, we must also recognize the jurisdictional 
flaw in our system and the abuses that stem from it. We have a 
responsibility to ensure that plaintiff's and defendant's rights are 
both fairly protected.
  In 1966, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules created rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It allowed similar claims to be heard 
together. No one at that time considered the unique nature of class 
actions and that the diversity jurisdiction statute did not make sense 
for class actions.
  The result of all of this is an historical anomaly that prevents 
interstate class actions, exactly the type of cases that should be 
heard in Federal court, from being heard in Federal court where they 
belong. It was never intended that State court justices in one State 
should be able to overturn the laws of other States. That does not make 
sense. It was never intended that that be the case by the Framers of 
the Constitution.
  Under current law, though, most interstate class action lawsuits 
cannot be heard in Federal court because they do not meet the technical 
requirements of diversity jurisdiction, or too often due to gaming of 
the system by plaintiffs' attorneys oftentimes. A plaintiff's attorney 
will find someone in a State where the defendant is located and as soon 
as they can do that it goes right into State court. That was not the 
original intent of the Framers. A case may be worth billions of dollars 
but a Federal court cannot hear it if each plaintiff's damages are not 
at least $75,000. It may involve millions of plaintiff class members 
across the country, but if there is one named plaintiff from the same 
State as one defendant then that case cannot be heard in Federal court.
  Recently, there was a case in Alabama and the attorney for the 
plaintiff said if anybody wants to claim more than $75,000 then they 
have to opt out.
  They are gaming the system. If somebody has a claim worth more than 
that then they should be able to get that claim and not be used as 
pawns to manipulate class action lawsuits.
  Most of the recent class action lawsuits filed in State courts are 
not single State cases. Plaintiffs' attorneys generally file these as 
nationwide actions, to create the most leverage to force defendants to 
settle, and that is what the game is all about, forcing large 
settlements because they know they have nationwide costly implications.

[[Page H8571]]

  The result of all of this is that one State or county court judge in 
a forum hand picked by plaintiff's counsel ends up dictating what the 
law is for the other 49 States.
  I do not want Virginia to have its laws decided by a judge in Texas 
or California or Illinois or New York. My colleagues should not want a 
State or county court judge in some other State adjudicating their 
constituents' rights without any accountability to the people of their 
own State, but that is what is happening today.
  This year in a House Committee on the Judiciary hearing, former 
Clinton administration Solicitor General, and the famous Duke Law 
School constitutional scholar Walter Dellinger, described what is going 
on as false federalism, because instead of having a Federal judge 
decide for all 50 States, a judge of one State is deciding for the 
other 49 States.
  It does not make sense. This false federalism is made worse by the 
rampant abuses that have been going on in some State courts and the lax 
certification standards that those courts apply.
  It is not right. It should not continue. We need to change it. It is 
important to recognize this is not a radical change to our legal 
system. This is only to correct an anomaly that should have been 
corrected and that until it is corrected will lead to wide scale abuse 
that is not acceptable.
  I strongly urge support for this contrustive corrective legislation.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Chairman, I would point out to my distinguished friend, the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran), that the limit was raised from 
$50,000 to $75,000 for diversity jurisdiction by the Federal court 
system itself. They were trying to make it a higher level to prevent 
gaming, not to encourage gaming.
  Then I should point out to the gentleman that the Judicial Conference 
of the United States, the chief justice himself presiding, pointed out 
that 1875 creates a couple of problems. One is that, in effect, they do 
not have the ability to deal with increased caseload. And they 
expressed opposition to these class action provisions and also the 
conflict between these provisions of the bills and longest recognized 
principles of federalism, and they encourage further deliberate study 
of the complicated issues raised.
  So although the gentleman thinks this is new material, it has been 
very carefully considered by the Federal judiciary.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. 
Schakowsky).
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Conyers) yielding me the time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise to voice my strong opposition to H.R. 1875. This 
is a classic example of a solution looking for a problem. Worse, it is 
an ill-conceived solution that actually creates a problem. Class action 
suits are not clogging State courts as proponents assert, but H.R. 1875 
would virtually assure that Federal courts get clogged.
  The real problem is that children, families, communities, and small 
businesses are being injured by dangerous, even reckless, corporate 
behavior. They need access to our civil justice system. While most 
businesses take care to sell safe products, some do not. Consider 
families whose children became ill or died after eating E. coli tainted 
hamburgers, small businesses and consumers who were overcharged on 
electric rates, communities whose drinking water was contaminated by 
pesticides, drivers whose auto insurance policies were unfairly 
canceled. All of them joined together in class action suits. If H.R. 
1875 had been in effect, they would have all found it far more 
difficult, if not impossible, to get their fair day in court.
  I join with consumer groups and senior groups in opposing this 
legislation.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Davis).
  (Mr. DAVIS of Virginia asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, let me just address some of the 
comments my colleagues made. Contrary to the assertion that H.R. 1875 
would not take away any authority from State courts or otherwise offend 
well-established principles of federalism, this particular legislation, 
I think, recognizes that the expansion of Federal diversity 
jurisdiction over interstate class actions envisioned in this 
legislation is entirely consistent with the current concept of such 
jurisdiction.
  At present, the statutory gatekeeper for Federal diversity 
jurisdictions is 28 U.S.C. 1332, which essentially allows Federal 
courts to hear cases that are large in terms of the amounts in 
controversy and that have interstate implications in terms of involving 
citizens from multiple jurisdictions.
  By their nature, though, these class actions typically fulfill these 
requirements. Class actions normally involve so many people and so many 
claims, that they invariably put huge dollar sums into dispute and 
implicate parties from multiple jurisdictions. Yet, because section 
1332 was originally enacted before the rise of the modern day class 
actions, it does not take account of the unique circumstances presented 
by class actions.
  As a result, as interpreted by Federal courts, that section has 
served to potentially exclude class actions from Federal courts while 
allowing Federal courts much smaller cases having few, if any, 
interstate ramifications.
  That technical problem would be corrected by this legislation. I 
think it was put together by former solicitor general Walter Dellinger, 
as he testified before the House Committee on the Judiciary hearing on 
the bill that if Congress were to rewrite completely the Federal 
diversity legislation statute, there would be really little legitimate 
debate that interstate class actions should be the first and foremost 
type of case to be included within the scope of this statute. So I 
think the implication there is clear.
  I want to thank my friend, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
Goodlatte), for introducing this legislation. We have worked together 
on so many legal reforms and technology-related pieces and to bring it 
to where it is today, where I think it is on the verge of passage.
  This particular legislation implements procedural reforms for 
interstate class action lawsuits. I think it reduces costs to 
consumers. It solidifies the rights of plaintiffs, of plaintiffs, by 
ensuring that they and not their lawyers receive the majority of 
compensation when they have proven their claims in the court.
  Now, what does this bill do? It is intended to correct a technical 
flaw in the current Federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction which 
tends to prevent interstate class actions from being adjudicated in 
Federal courts. Federal courts will be able to handle class action 
lawsuits that truly involve interstate issues. This legislation makes 
it easier for plaintiff class members and defendants to remove cases to 
Federal court where multiple State laws are more appropriately heard.
  Interstate class actions filed in State court could be removed to 
Federal court using existing removal procedures with three new 
features. Unnamed class members who are plaintiffs may remove to 
Federal court class actions in which their claims are being asserted 
within 30 days after formal notice. Any party, any party whose name can 
be removed, the consent of the other parties is not required. So 
plaintiffs' rights are protected in this case and the bar on removing 
cases to Federal court after one year would not apply to class actions, 
although removal would still be required within 30 days of the first 
notice.
  If a removed class action is found to not meet the requirements for 
proceeding on a class basis, the Federal court would dismiss the action 
without prejudice. Plaintiffs could then refile their claims in the 
State court, and the statute of limitations on individual class 
members' claims in such a dismissed class action will not run during 
the period of action that it was pending in the Federal court.
  What could be fairer to all concerned? The act applies only to claims 
that are filed after the date of enactment.
  I think this is good legislation. I think when we look back at the 
history, that most interstate class actions cannot be heard in Federal 
court today due to the Federal diversity jurisdiction statutes that 
allow attorneys to

[[Page H8572]]

literally, as my friend, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran) said, 
game the system, or making statements about the amounts in controversy 
and then reversing those statements later on.
  This legislation is needed. I hope my colleagues will vote to adopt 
it.

                              {time}  1215

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee), who serves on the Committee on the Judiciary 
and who has worked very vigorously on this subject.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me this time, and I thank him for his leadership. I thank the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte), my good friend, Mr. Chairman, 
who has offered this legislation in good faith and good intentions.
  The previous speaker and I have shared a common training in law 
school, and so it certainly causes me stress to rise in opposition to 
his position. However, I would argue vigorously that rather than ease 
the burden of litigants going into the court system, in fact, Mr. 
Chairman, this represents a sealed, locked, closed and forever 
impenetrable door to justice in the United States. I say that with a 
good deal of documentation.
  First of all, albeit the testimony in our hearings, there is no 
concrete evidence that State courts are not doing justice in class 
action lawsuits; that there is no bias toward the defendant or bias 
against the defendant, or bias for the plaintiff, or bias against the 
plaintiff.
  We realize that class actions were initially created in State courts 
based on equity and common law, and I certainly do not want to drain 
our interests in defining both of those, but it simply means that one 
comes into a court of equity and we balance the rights and try to be 
fair for those who would petition the court for justice. It was a way 
for the common person, common law, to get inside the courthouse and to 
find justice.
  With this legislation that creates partial diversity, what we are 
saying is, one is blocked from going into the courthouse. Any iota of 
diversity, that means if one has a class action that inquires or 
incorporates thousands of Texans, and by the way, the Texas State 
courts have handled class action lawsuits very ably. But if one has a 
diversity case or a class action case, this particular statute allows 
one lone person, a citizen of a State different from the defendant, to 
add or confuse the mix, if you will, and move this case immediately to 
the Federal court.
  What a shock to those plaintiffs who have organized around an issue, 
and more importantly, Mr. Chairman, what a shock to the Federal courts 
who, more often than not, do not certify class action cases and have 
already indicated to us that they are overwhelmed and overworked with 
not enough Federal courts, not enough Federal judges, and not enough 
opportunity to do justice to the cases that they are already in.
  Might I say that many of us who have joined in this overload of the 
Federal courts, many times who have federalized drug laws, and some are 
very much concerned about the overload, we federalize any number of 
cases, and now we find, particularly in the State of Texas, I will tell 
my colleagues that our Federal courts, particularly in the southern 
district, are overwhelmed with drug cases.
  They do drug cases maybe 80 percent of the time, criminal drug cases. 
We may disagree with the fact that those cases are there and we are 
criminalizing the smallest amount of drug cases; we are not getting the 
kingpins, we are just throwing any Tom, Dick and Harry in jail and not 
solving the problem, but these courts are overwhelmed.
  Now, this particular statute offering itself as a justice statute is 
everything but that. What it does is, it takes the class action 
lawsuits like a tobacco case lawsuit that is smoothly running through 
the courts in the State system and throws it into the deadlock of the 
Federal system; one, they might not have even gotten there, but more 
importantly, more importantly, most of these cases will not be 
certified.
  This statute would also diversify or throw it to the Federal courts 
if a citizen of a State is different from any defendant, a foreign 
state or citizen of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a 
state, or a citizen of a state and any defendant is a citizen or 
subject of a foreign state. So this is seeking to implode the class 
action litigation. It is seeking to imbalance the rights of an 
individual citizen who would join in a class action against a 
conglomerate, Mr. Chairman.
  I would simply say to my colleagues that this particular Interstate 
Class Action Jurisdiction Act should not be supported. The President 
intends to veto this particular statute, and I would hope that we would 
find a better compromise to serve the scales of justice in the United 
States.
  Mr. Speaker, I have had the privilege to listen to the testimony of 
many distinguished witnesses when this measure came before the full 
Committee on the Judiciary. I had hoped that the supporters of this 
bill in its present form could have persuaded me otherwise, but I 
simply cannot approve of this measure in its present form as it 
contains too many potential problems. I am sympathetic to the 
proponents of this legislation's desire to ensure that class actions 
are used for their intended purposes. This bill, H.R. 1875, the 
``Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999,'' as drafted goes 
too far.
  As you may well be aware, class action suits were initially created 
in State courts based on equity and common law. In 1849, class action 
suits became statutory under the Field Code. In 1938, a Federal class 
action rule was first enacted in the form of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23, and in 1966, Rule 23 was amended to grant more 
flexibility with regard to class actions, particularly with respect to 
actions seeking monetary damages.
  Thirty-six States have adopted the amended Federal Rule 23. Seven 
States still use class action rules modeled on the original Federal 
Rule 23. Four States use the Field Code-based class rules. Three States 
still permit class action suits at common law have no formal class 
rules.
  Article III of Constitution provides for ``limited federal court 
jurisdiction court based upon diversity.'' Currently, disputes may 
reach Federal court where the plaintiffs and defendants are residents 
of different States and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The 
status quo allows action suits only if every plaintiff is diverse with 
respect to the defendant. Given the sheer number of plaintiffs in a 
class action suit, diversity often cannot be achieved.
  By amending 28 U.S.C. 1332 (the diversity statute), this bill 
provides Federal jurisdiction as long as any member of a proposed 
plaintiff class is (1) a citizen of a State different from any 
defendant; (2) a foreign state or citizen of a foreign state and any 
defendant is a citizen of a State; or (3) a citizen of a State and any 
defendant is a citizen or subject of a foreign state.
  This creation of partial diversity, then, drastically changes the 
nature of Federal jurisdiction. While this measure would provide some 
sense of uniformity to class actions, I am afraid that this contravenes 
the Supreme Court's requirement of complete diversity between all named 
plaintiffs and defendants as articulated in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 
Cranch 267 (1806).
  I am concerned that this measure is not driven by the desire to 
streamline the Federal justice system, but instead by the want to 
protect large corporations. Corporations want Federal jurisdiction as 
they perceive this arena as more favorable. This bill would funnel 
class action suits into Federal courts, which has the potential to 
permit corporations to avoid more stringent State laws.
  As currently drafted, the bill's partial diversity standard that 
likely would result in an explosion in the number of civil cases 
extending well beyond the capacity of the Federal courts. Congress has 
been increasingly federalizing State law in general, and State criminal 
law in particular. In 1997, alone, 22,603 civil cases were pending for 
3 years or more. More importantly, the Senate has failed to fill a 
number of Federal vacancies (over 10 percent of the Federal judicial 
positions remain vacant).
  In addition, H.R. 1875 could result in less efficient litigation. 
Since Federal courts would still require complete diversity in all 
other Federal diversity cases, plaintiffs likely would seek to 
formulate class action suits simply to satisfy the partial diversity 
requirement created for class action claims. Again, this situation 
likely would drive more cases into Federal court and increase the 
burden on the courts.
  This legislation simply raises too many questions and presents too 
many quandaries. Unless these problems are rectified, I cannot support 
this measure.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute to respond to a 
couple of points.
  First of all, the President has not indicated that he intends to veto 
this

[[Page H8573]]

legislation. There have been communications from his representatives 
that they might recommend that to him, but that is not the same thing 
as a veto threat.
  Secondly, I would point out to my colleague from Michigan that while 
the diversity amount, the amount in controversy was raised from $50,000 
to $75,000 by the Federal judiciary, the purpose of that is to screen 
out small lawsuits from going into Federal court. But that is not the 
case here at all. This is about bringing large lawsuits to Federal 
court.
  The legislation requires a minimum of $1 million in controversy to 
bring a diversity case class action into Federal court, so we eliminate 
the anomaly of a situation where somebody with a $75,000 claim can get 
into Federal court, but somebody who has a class action suit with 
100,000 plaintiffs and an amount in controversy of $10,000 each, or a 
$1 billion claim, cannot get into Federal court today because they do 
not meet that diversity requirement. This changes that discrepancy in 
the law and allows big, diverse cases to come into Federal court.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Scott), who is opposed to the bill and who serves on the 
Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a radical response to a handful of court 
decisions that some disagree with. The response is to use political 
clout just to change the system.
  Now, this is not the first time that we have changed the system when 
we disagree with a court decision. Even pending cases, for example, in 
the Oklahoma bombing case, we changed the law right in the middle of 
the case and forced the judge to reverse a preliminary ruling. After an 
airline case just a couple of years ago, we changed the law after the 
crash to enable some plaintiffs to get increased damages. The Committee 
on Education and the Workforce, Mr. Chairman, has already reported a 
bill which will have the effect of reversing a lower court decision. 
The case is now on appeal. That bill, if passed, would reverse the 
lower court decision. We even enacted legislation about a year or two 
ago which had the effect of entering final judgment in a child custody 
case that was pending.
  So, Mr. Chairman, if one has the political clout, one can come to 
Congress and change the system to one's advantage and receive special 
treatment, rather than being relegated to going through the regular 
court process. That is not fair.
  This is also a bad bill, Mr. Chairman, because it is not good policy 
to continually federalize court proceedings. The Federal judiciary has 
already complained, the Chief Justice has complained about cases being 
transferred to Federal court. We have even now street crimes, juvenile 
crimes being more and more handled by Federal courts. Those are 
supposed to be handled by the State courts and here we are again 
federalizing cases.
  Now, the proponents complain that the State courts rule on interests 
of out-of-state parties. That has always been the case and it will 
always be the case, and this bill does not change it. In fact, if one 
has multiple defendants of large corporations, multiple plaintiffs, but 
not technically a class, State courts can continually hear these cases. 
One can have billion dollar cases, complex, multi-State, but if one has 
a plaintiff and a defendant both from the same State, the Federal court 
will not hear that case, but the State court will rule on other State 
laws, other State interests.
  Mr. Chairman, the only people that will be denied the access to State 
courts will be those who are consumers that need the procedure of a 
class action to actually hear their cases. Those are cases which are 
small and cannot be brought as individual cases, so the consumers will 
be denied, but the large corporations will not.
  This bill does not reform; it just transfers the cases of consumers 
into Federal courts and denies them State access. For those consumers 
who are affected, this bill will cause confusion, because if a State 
case is filed, this bill allows anybody who alleges that they are 
affected by the case to start filing motions. The person is not a 
plaintiff; the person is not a defendant, just a stranger, so that if 
one is talking about gaming the system, let us have a defendant that 
does not like being in State court, finds a friend from out of State, 
brings them in, and starts filing motions in Federal court.
  Now, the person who is filing, if they do not like being in the 
class, they can opt out of the class, so they have no legitimate 
purpose other than to add confusion to the case. So rather than having 
the plaintiff and the defendant proceeding with the trial or with 
settlement, this bill allows strangers to come in and delay the 
proceedings, adding expense and making it less likely that the merits 
of the case will ever be considered.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill is unneeded and it is unfair to consumers. It 
only benefits corporate wrongdoers who want to delay and complicate the 
cases and, therefore, should be defeated.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Tennessee (Mr. Bryant), another lead cosponsor of the legislation.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to join with a bipartisan group of Members 
of this House to sponsor this change in this law that is very much 
needed. As my predecessor, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott) 
said, sometimes it is necessary to change a law, and that is what we 
are doing here.
  Over the past several years there has been an outburst of the filing 
of a number of class action lawsuits in State courts. Now, this is 
proper under law, but the system is also being gamed in doing that by 
using the principle of diversity and defeating that principle of 
diversity to end up in State court and prevent the proper removal or 
possibility of removal to a Federal court. This bill simply corrects 
this.
  Because of the amount of exposure that sometimes these defendants 
face in a class action lawsuit, the economics of the situation, the 
expense of having to go through a lengthy trial, the number of 
claimants involved, very often the defendants have to settle the case 
out of court. The trial lawyers know this and that is why they file the 
case like they do, and they do this.
  In many of those cases, unfortunately, these class action lawsuits, 
the plaintiffs, the people who have actually sustained the injuries 
that the lawsuit is all about, receive very little. I know we have 
heard a lot about that already, anything from certificates to actually, 
in some cases, owing money back, whereas the lawyers are the main ones 
that benefit from this system in terms of receiving enormous fee 
awards.
  That is simply not right. That is part of the gaming of the system 
where they go out and forum shop and select, rather than a Federal 
court which is better prepared to handle these types of cases. They 
select a particular State court around the country that probably is 
lacking in many ways the ability to handle these lawsuits.
  The Federal judges, I understand, will complain that they are 
overburdened already, and unquestionably, they are. But we hear those 
same comments from the State judges in the State courts. Everybody in 
the judicial system today is overburdened. That is because there are an 
awful lot of criminal cases out there, and there are an awful lot of 
civil cases out there. So it is not a question of who is the busiest. 
But I would say that the Federal judges have United States magistrate 
judges that help them dispose of cases; they have a number of law 
clerks that help them that do research and help them, but in most cases 
where we are talking about a State judge, these are simply not assets 
that are available to a State judge.
  In most cases, State judges lack the experience in handling complex, 
complicated class-action lawsuits, so in terms of actually getting a 
forum that is best suited, that is most appropriate to give fair 
justice, there is no question that the Federal courts are better suited 
to handle these class-action lawsuits.

                              {time}  1230

  But again, because of the current law that deals with diversity, that 
it can easily be affected by adding one party to that to defeat that 
diversity, this is not occurring, the fact that the Federal courts are 
not hearing the class

[[Page H8574]]

action lawsuits as they should because they are being sent to the State 
courts and being kept there.
  Under our bill, nothing changes about the substantive law, the law 
that will govern this case. The law that whatever judge that hears this 
case will apply is still the same. This is simply a matter of 
correcting the venue, the forum, the place that the trial would be 
held.
  In terms of dealing with a company that perhaps does business across 
the country, in terms of dealing with plaintiffs, alleged victims of 
this company or these companies that live in all 50 States that could 
very well make up the members of that class, it simply is unfair that 
one State court, whether it is Tennessee, that I represent, or Alabama, 
or Oregon, should be able to hear that type of case.
  Originally, I believe the forefathers put this in our Constitution in 
terms of setting up the trial system, and our law evolved over the 
years to create a diversity, so when we had citizens from different 
States, that we could avoid the home cooking that sometimes occurs when 
one does not belong to that State, they are sued there, and they have 
to go in and defend themselves.
  The courts recognized that. The Congress has recognized that by 
creating this diversity so they can have a level playing field, they 
can be treated fairly. In some cases that was not always the situation 
because, again, they went into a home cooking environment.
  I would suggest that is happening in some of these cases. That is 
basically the reason that we are here. We are trying to ensure that 
fair justice is there for all parties. Even though they might be 
tobacco, firearms, or big corporations, we are all entitled to equal 
justice, and I think this is a big first step to ensure that occurs.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5\1/2\ minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt).
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, let me make several points, as many points as my time 
will allow me to make, about this bill, and encourage my colleagues to 
vote against this proposal.
  First of all, I practiced law for a number of years before I ever 
thought about running for Congress. There is just a basic fairness 
argument that I think we all need to be aware of.
  If a plaintiff is injured, he goes and hires a lawyer, they 
cultivate, research, put together a case, decide where the appropriate 
place is to litigate that case, spend months and months preparing for 
the case, file the case. Two days later somebody who has done 
absolutely nothing to get that case to trial under this bill has the 
ability to walk in and move that case to another forum. There is 
something patently unfair about that. I just want us to focus on that.
  The second point I would make is that in 1994, when my Republican 
colleagues came riding into the House, one of the principles that they 
gave major lip service to was the whole notion that there was too much 
going on at the Federal level, that we needed to decentralize 
government, that our whole system of Federalism was in jeopardy, and we 
needed to return power to the States.
  Time after time after time since 1994 we have seen our Republican 
colleagues say, well, we do not like the result that we got at the 
State level, so let us federalize this and let us just take it over, an 
absolute erosion of States' rights in the criminal law area.
  In the area of tort reform they have tried to do it, in the area of 
juvenile law they have tried to do it. We do not even have a juvenile 
court, a juvenile judge, a juvenile counselor, and yet, we have tried 
to federalize juvenile law, and the people who are behind that are the 
very same people who in 1994 were railing and rhetorically saying, this 
is terrible, to federalize all this stuff. We need to be returning 
rights and responsibilities to the most local level, to the State 
level, the local level, the individual level. Here we are again in this 
matter trying to bring something else into a Federal court.
  The third point I want to make, the Federal courts are hopelessly 
backlogged. They cannot handle the business that they are doing now. We 
cannot get the Senate to confirm enough people to fill the vacancies 
that exist on the Federal bench. Even if they did fill them, there 
would not be enough judicial power to handle all of these cases.
  Yet, here we are in our infinite wisdom saying that the Federal 
courts know better; the State law, the Federal law, we know everything 
at this level. This is absolutely contrary to the horse that my 
colleagues rode into this House on, the States' rights horse. We should 
not sanction this. It is just a bad idea.
  The final point I want to make, and I will talk about this a little 
bit more in the context of an amendment that I have to offer, is that 
even if this were a good idea, this bill is so badly drafted, there are 
some irrationalities in the drafting of the bill, that we are going to 
try to correct some of them during the course of the debate, and 
hopefully we will get some of those things worked out.
  But there are some just severe unintended, or maybe they are 
intended. I never know whether my colleagues are accomplishing things 
that they intend or accomplishing things they do not intend, since they 
told me they intended to preserve States' rights, and they keep cutting 
the legs from under it.
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Sherman).
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise against this bill because it is 
part of a two-part pincers movement aimed at the heart of impartial 
justice.
  Part one, represented by this bill, shifts to the Federal bench most 
important class action lawsuits. Part two, the other part of the 
pincer, is to make sure those Federal benches are empty or overburdened 
with other work.
  We know that additional work has been shifted to the Federal 
judiciary. We know most of the judicial appointments of the President 
have been held up. But we had a right to think that the other body 
would in due time act on those judicial appointments. Now I want to 
commend the chairman of the Committee on Rules for revealing the 
previously secret part of the Republican plan. It is to keep the 
Federal judicial benches empty until such time as there is a Republican 
president.
  So what does this bill do? It says you cannot go to a State judge, 
and you cannot have a Federal judge, unless appointed by a Republican 
president. So the only judges that can hear class action lawsuits are 
those that pass a Republican litmus test, and they have the gall to 
complain about forum shopping.
  This takes forum shopping to a new level, because the second part of 
this pincers movement is nationwide forum tampering, politicizing the 
Federal courts. The least we could do in this body is to suspend action 
on this bill until the other body acts upon the President's judicial 
appointments, confirming those who are qualified, rejecting those who 
are not qualified, not on the basis of a political litmus test but on 
the basis of judicial qualifications.
  The small in our society will be able to demand justice from the 
powerful only if we defeat this bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I get all wound up on this and then I realize it is 
time to calm down, because we are not really legislating here. This 
bill, if it passes both bodies, is going to be vetoed by the President. 
This is never going to become law. This is political pontificating. 
This is not real legislating. We are simply here wasting time in the 
guise of addressing a serious problem.
  I look forward to the day when we work out a genuine bipartisan 
solution that has wide support, not narrow support, wide support on 
both sides of the aisle, and deal with tort reform.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, in that regard, it is my pleasure to 
yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer), yet another 
Member from the other side.
  Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, I join with my colleagues on this side of the aisle and 
rise in support of H.R. 1875, the Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction 
Act of 1999.
  I will repeat some of the things that have already been said today. I 
bring to this debate maybe a unique perspective. I am a lawyer and I am 
from Alabama. My State has been the butt of many class action jokes. We 
have seen the proliferation of class actions, frivolous actions, in our 
State courts.

[[Page H8575]]

  We have all heard about drive-by certifications, in which classes 
were certified on the same day that classes were filed, sometimes even 
before the defendants were notified about the lawsuits. People have 
heard about the judge who certified I think in a 2-year period of time 
more class actions than all of the Federal judiciary combined.
  Some say if Alabama has a problem, Alabama ought to settle that 
problem or deal with that problem. We in fact have. The Alabama Supreme 
Court, the Alabama legislature, they have taken actions to end same-day 
certifications. We have now made clear that we follow Federal rule 
XXIII.
  It is a good step, but that does not end the problem. These 
interstate class action lawsuits do not belong in State and county 
courts in the first place. I do not want a judge in New York 
determining the rights of citizens in Alabama, and I do not think 
judges in Alabama should do the same thing for people who live in New 
York.
  There is an important constitutional issue at stake here. I think 
interstate class actions are meant for the Federal diversity 
jurisdiction. The Framers of the Constitution intended for large 
interstate lawsuits to be heard in Federal court.
  Members have heard a lot today about what the bill does do. I want to 
close with what it does not do. This is not a broad tort reform bill. 
It does not preempt any State laws or change the laws under which a 
claim will be heard. It does not prevent any claim from being heard, or 
close the courthouse doors.
  This in fact makes sense, and we should pass H.R. 1875, the 
Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999.
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  We have many points that will be made during the amendments, Mr. 
Chairman. I would just respond to the suggestion that this will clear 
up the situation where complex cases will have to be heard in Federal 
court.
  Mr. Chairman, if we have 10 corporations suing 18 different 
corporations from a number of States, if one plaintiff corporation and 
one defendant corporation are from the same State, that case involving 
many different States, involving many different State laws, would be 
heard in State court.
  However, if there is a corporation that is systematically ripping off 
consumers, a simple systematic theft, not complicated, they cannot use 
the State court. They are relegated to Federal court by this bill.

                              {time}  1245

  Now, it would only serve to complicate the litigation for the 
consumers trying to get justice against a wrongdoing corporation.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill is a bad bill. It serves no constructive 
purpose. There is no need for it. It is unfair to consumers and, 
therefore, should be defeated.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remaining time.
  Mr. Chairman, this is very good legislation that serves very good 
practical purposes, and let me point out two of them.
  First of all, it ends the abuse of nationwide forum shopping to find 
the one judge in the one court in the one State that thinks that 
anything goes with regard to class actions. We have seen those abuses.
  The gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer) cited the fact that his State 
has seen class action abuse in the past. There are 4,700 different 
court jurisdictions in this country. When one has a class action, it is 
unlike a case where an individual might have two or three different 
jurisdictions where they can bring their own personal injury suit or 
contract action. In a nationwide class action suit, they can often 
choose from all 4,700 different jurisdictions. They should not have the 
opportunity to do that. There should be more standardized procedures, 
and we accomplish that by allowing the removal of truly nationwide 
class action suits to Federal court.
  Secondly, the most diverse cases in this country involving millions 
and even billions of dollars are currently unable to be brought in the 
court that can best handle them, the Federal courts. This legislation 
cures this.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation and 
oppose the amendments.
  Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in reluctant opposition to H.R. 
1875, the Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999. I believe 
strongly that action must be taken to address the widespread abuse of 
class action rules. This legislation, however, would have the effect of 
removing the vast majority of class action lawsuits to the already 
overburdened federal courts and denying plaintiffs in legitimate class 
actions their right to due process.
  There is little dispute that in recent years the class action device 
has resulted in serious and rampant abuses of our legal system. Federal 
rules of civil procedure currently make it exceedingly difficult for 
defendants to remove a class action case to federal court, even when a 
case is clearly interstate in nature. Federal ``complete diversity'' 
rules have allowed endless forum shopping to keep class action cases 
out of the federal courts. In some cases, plaintiffs are named in class 
action cases based only on their state of residence, simply to destroy 
complete diversity.
  Such legal maneuvers have even been conducted at the expense of 
plaintiffs involved. In one recent state court class action settlement, 
consumer class members actually ended up losing money--each one was 
required to pay $91.13--while the lawyers who brought the lawsuit made 
$8.5 million. Other such examples abound in which class members 
received virtually no compensation. Action must be taken to protect 
both consumers and corporations from such abuses of the legal system.
  Although I believe strongly in the need for class action tort reform, 
I reluctantly oppose H.R. 1875 in its current form. By establishing 
``minimal diversity'' rules of jurisdiction, H.R. 1875 would shift 
jurisdiction of most class action lawsuits from state court to federal 
court. This would have the practical effect of overburdening the 
already understaffed federal courts, while further delaying and 
possibly denying justice for injured plaintiffs.
  Mr. Chairman, although I do not support this particular vehicle for 
class action tort reform, I remain committed to correcting the abuses 
of our legal system. I am hopeful that my concerns with H.R. 1875 can 
be resolved as the bill moves through the Senate, so that I may support 
the conference report for this legislation.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 1875, the 
Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999. This so-called ``tort 
reform'' measure proposes to create a huge new roadblock to justice for 
class action litigants.
  If enacted, H.R. 1875 will harm consumers and benefit corporate 
defendants--among them managed care plans, gun manufacturers and 
tobacco companies. Although ERISA does not permit injured enrollees to 
sue their HMO under state malpractice laws, recently some class actions 
have been successfully filed alleging violations of state consumer 
fraud and unfair trade practice laws. These class actions are being 
used to require HMOs to provide needed treatments, access to 
specialists, and continuity of care.
  Yet H.R. 1875 would reverse these gains by making it far easier for 
managed care plans to force removal of cases filed under state consumer 
fraud laws to federal court--where outcomes could be inconsistent and 
unfair.
  Currently, most class actions are brought under state law with state 
court judges interpreting and applying the standards litigants must 
meet. H.R. 1875 would divest state courts of many of these cases, 
requiring federal judges to interpret and apply state law. This opens 
the door to inconsistent interpretation by judges not familiar with 
state law.
  Our current class action system is a win-win-win--for the courts, for 
litigants, and for society. Class actions are now heard by judges 
knowledgeable in the area and familiar with the law. The federal bench 
lacks the resources to handle these cases in its already overburdened 
docket.
  Under present guidelines, class actions may be heard by federal 
judges when the damage amount involved is more than $75,000 per 
plaintiff and other requirements are met. In state courts, class 
actions can be brought when the amount of damage per plaintiff is 
modest.
  H.R. 1875 eliminates the $75,000 figure and the other requirements. 
Thus, corporate defendants could easily request removal of many state 
class actions to federal court--over the objections of all plaintiffs 
or co-defendants.
  If this bill is enacted, it will essentially deny a forum to 
thousands who have been injured by exposure to tobacco products, 
asbestos and other unsafe products, and thwart reforms that benefit 
society as a whole. In effect, the class action device itself would be 
destroyed.
  If H.R. 1875 becomes law, dozens of class action lawsuits that could 
help thousands will simply never be heard. Consumers will again become 
victims--this time, of a massive federal judicial logjam.
  Tobacco companies, asbestos makers, drug manufacturers, and HMOs are 
lobbying

[[Page H8576]]

strongly for H.R. 1875. The Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 
1999 gives them relief at the expense of justice that consumers 
deserve.
  A ``yes'' vote for H.R. 1875 is fundamentally a vote against 
consumers' rights. It should be quickly rejected.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Burr of North Carolina). All time for 
general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute printed in the bill shall be considered by section as an 
original bill for the purpose of amendment, and each section is 
considered read.
  No amendment to that amendment shall be in order except those printed 
in the portion of the Congressional Record designated for that purpose 
and pro forma amendments for the purpose of debate. Amendments printed 
in the Record may be offered only by the Member who caused it to be 
printed or his designee and shall be considered as read.
  The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone a request for 
a recorded vote on any amendment and may reduce to a minimum of 5 
minutes the time for voting on any postponed question that immediately 
follows another vote, provided that the time for voting on the first 
question shall be a minimum of 15 minutes.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute be printed in the 
Record and open to amendment at any point.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Virginia?
  There was no objection.
  The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is 
as follows:

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND REFERENCE.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Interstate 
     Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999''.
       (b) Reference.--Whenever in this Act reference is made to 
     an amendment to, or repeal of, a section or other provision, 
     the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or 
     other provision of title 28, United States Code.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds that--
       (1) as recently noted by the United States Court of Appeals 
     for the Third Circuit, interstate class actions are ``the 
     paradigm for Federal diversity jurisdiction because, in a 
     constitutional sense, they implicate interstate commerce, 
     invite discrimination by a local State, and tend to attract 
     bias against business enterprises'';
       (2) most such cases, however, fall outside the scope of 
     current Federal diversity jurisdiction statutes;
       (3) that exclusion is an unintended technicality, inasmuch 
     as those statutes were enacted by Congress before the rise of 
     the modern class action and therefore without recognition 
     that interstate class actions typically are substantial 
     controversies of the type for which diversity jurisdiction 
     was designed;
       (4) Congress is constitutionally empowered to amend the 
     current Federal diversity jurisdiction statutes to permit 
     most interstate class actions to be brought in or removed to 
     Federal district courts; and
       (5) in order to ensure that interstate class actions are 
     adjudicated in a fair, consistent, and efficient manner and 
     to correct the unintended, technical exclusion of such cases 
     from the scope of Federal diversity jurisdiction, it is 
     appropriate for Congress to amend the Federal diversity 
     jurisdiction and related statutes to allow more interstate 
     class actions to be brought in or removed to Federal court.

     SEC. 3. JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS.

       (a) Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction.--Section 1332 is 
     amended by redesignating subsections (b), (c), and (d) as 
     subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively, and by inserting 
     after subsection (a) the following:
       ``(b)(1) The district courts shall have original 
     jurisdiction of any civil action which is brought as a class 
     action and in which--
       ``(A) any member of a proposed plaintiff class is a citizen 
     of a State different from any defendant;
       ``(B) any member of a proposed plaintiff class is a foreign 
     state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or
       ``(C) any member of a proposed plaintiff class is a citizen 
     of a State and any defendant is a citizen or subject of a 
     foreign state.
     As used in this paragraph, the term `foreign state' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 1603(a).
       ``(2)(A) The district courts shall not exercise 
     jurisdiction over a civil action described in paragraph (1) 
     if the action is--
       ``(i) an intrastate case,
       ``(ii) a limited scope case, or
       ``(iii) a State action case.
       ``(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A)--
       ``(i) the term `intrastate case' means a class action in 
     which the record indicates that--
       ``(I) the claims asserted therein will be governed 
     primarily by the laws of the State in which the action was 
     originally filed; and
       ``(II) the substantial majority of the members of all 
     proposed plaintiff classes, and the primary defendants, are 
     citizens of the State in which the action was originally 
     filed;
       ``(ii) the term `limited scope case' means a class action 
     in which the record indicates that all matters in controversy 
     asserted by all members of all proposed plaintiff classes do 
     not in the aggregate exceed the sum or value of $1,000,000, 
     exclusive of interest and costs, or a class action in which 
     the number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes in 
     the aggregate is less than 100; and
       ``(iii) the term `State action case' means a class action 
     in which the primary defendants are States, State officials, 
     or other governmental entities against whom the district 
     court may be foreclosed from ordering relief.
       ``(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any claim concerning 
     a covered security as that term is defined in section 
     16(f)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 
     28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
       ``(4) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any class action 
     solely involving a claim that relates to--
       ``(A) the internal affairs or governance of a corporation 
     or other form of business enterprise and that arises under or 
     by virtue of the laws of the State in which such corporation 
     or business enterprise is incorporated or organized; or
       ``(B) the rights, duties (including fiduciary duties), and 
     obligations relating to or created by or pursuant to any 
     security (as defined under section 2(a)(1) of the Securities 
     Act of 1933 and the regulations issued thereunder).''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 1332(c) (as redesignated 
     by this section) is amended by inserting after ``Federal 
     courts'' the following: ``pursuant to subsection (a) of this 
     section''.
       (c) Determination of Diversity.--Section 1332, as amended 
     by this section, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(f) For purposes of subsection (b), a member of a 
     proposed class shall be deemed to be a citizen of a State 
     different from a defendant corporation only if that member is 
     a citizen of a State different from all States of which the 
     defendant corporation is deemed a citizen.''.

     SEC. 4. REMOVAL OF CLASS ACTIONS.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 89 is amended by adding after 
     section 1452 the following:

     ``Sec. 1453. Removal of class actions

       ``(a) In General.--A class action may be removed to a 
     district court of the United States in accordance with this 
     chapter, but without regard to whether any defendant is a 
     citizen of the State in which the action is brought, except 
     that such action may be removed--
       ``(1) by any defendant without the consent of all 
     defendants; or
       ``(2) by any plaintiff class member who is not a named or 
     representative class member of the action for which removal 
     is sought, without the consent of all members of such class.
       ``(b) When Removable.--This section shall apply to any 
     class action before or after the entry of any order 
     certifying a class.
       ``(c) Procedure for Removal.--The provisions of section 
     1446(a) relating to a defendant removing a case shall apply 
     to a plaintiff removing a case under this section. With 
     respect to the application of subsection (b) of such section, 
     the requirement relating to the 30-day filing period shall be 
     met if a plaintiff class member who is not a named or 
     representative class member of the action for which removal 
     is sought files notice of removal no later than 30 days after 
     receipt by such class member, through service or otherwise, 
     of the initial written notice of the class action provided at 
     the court's direction.
       ``(d) Exceptions.--
       ``(1) Covered securities.--This section shall not apply to 
     any claim concerning a covered security as that term is 
     defined in section 16(f)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 and 
     section 28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
       ``(2) Internal governance of business entities.--This 
     section shall not apply to any class action solely involving 
     a claim that relates to--
       ``(A) the internal affairs or governance of a corporation 
     or other form of business enterprise and that arises under or 
     by virtue of the laws of the State in which such corporation 
     or business enterprise is incorporated or organized; or
       ``(B) the rights, duties (including fiduciary duties), and 
     obligations relating to or created by or pursuant to any 
     security (as defined under section 2(a)(1) of the Securities 
     Act of 1933 and the regulations issued thereunder).''.
       (b) Removal Limitations.--Section 1446(b) is amended in the 
     second sentence--
       (1) by inserting ``, by exercising due diligence,'' after 
     ``ascertained''; and
       (2) by inserting ``(a)'' after ``section 1332''.
       (c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--The table of 
     sections for chapter 89 is amended by adding after the item 
     relating to section 1452 the following:

``1453. Removal of class actions.''.

       (d) Application of Substantive State Law.--Nothing in this 
     section or the amendments made by this section shall alter 
     the substantive law applicable to an action to which the 
     amendments made by section 3 of this Act apply.
       (e) Procedure After Removal.--Section 1447 is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(f) If, after removal, the court determines that no 
     aspect of an action that is subject to its jurisdiction 
     solely under the provisions of section 1332(b) may be 
     maintained as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal 
     Rules of Civil Procedure, it shall dismiss the action. An 
     action dismissed pursuant to this subsection may be amended 
     and filed again in a State court, but any such refiled action 
     may be removed again if

[[Page H8577]]

     it is an action of which the district courts of the United 
     States have original jurisdiction. In any action that is 
     dismissed pursuant to this subsection and that is refiled by 
     any of the named plaintiffs therein in the same State court 
     venue in which the dismissed action was originally filed, the 
     limitations periods on all reasserted claims shall be deemed 
     tolled for the period during which the dismissed class action 
     was pending. The limitations periods on any claims that were 
     asserted in a class action dismissed pursuant to this 
     subsection that are subsequently asserted in an individual 
     action shall be deemed tolled for the period during which the 
     dismissed class action was pending.''.

     SEC. 5. APPLICABILITY.

       The amendments made by this Act shall apply to any action 
     commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 6. GAO STUDY.

       The Comptroller General of the United States shall, by not 
     later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, conduct a study of the impact of the amendments made by 
     this Act on the workload of the Federal courts and report to 
     the Congress on the results of the study.


                 Amendment No. 4 Offered By Mr. Nadler

  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Nadler:
       Page 6, line 5, strike the quotation marks and second 
     period.
       Page 6, insert the following after line 5:
       ``(5)(A) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any class action 
     that is brought for harm caused by a firearm or ammunition.
       ``(B) As used in this paragraph, the term `firearm'--
       ``(i) has the meaning given that term in section 921(3) of 
     title 18; and
       ``(ii) includes any firearm as defined in section 5845 of 
     the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.''.
       Page 8, line 16, strike the quotation marks and second 
     period.
       Page 8, insert the following after line 16:
       ``(3) Firearms or ammunition.--(A) This section shall not 
     apply to any class action that is brought for harm caused by 
     a firearm or ammunition.
       ``(B) As used in this paragraph, the term `firearm'--
       ``(i) has the meaning given that term in section 921(3) of 
     title 18; and
       ``(ii) includes any firearm as defined in section 5845 of 
     the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.''.

  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would, in effect, exempt 
from this bill and allow the existing laws governing class action 
lawsuits to continue to apply to cases brought against gun and 
ammunition manufacturers.
  We have spent months in this House debating how best to combat the 
rising tide of gun violence in this country, and we still have nothing 
to show for it. Week after week after week after week we hear horror 
stories from all over the country of mass murderers, of people walking 
into schools and churches and shops and opening fire on innocent 
people.
  How does the leadership of this House propose to address this 
problem? With this legislation that will actually protect gun makers 
from the consequences of their actions and will not protect the victims 
of gun violence.
  Mr. Chairman, guns kill almost twice as many Americans every year, as 
all other household and recreational products combined. Despite this 
grim fact, the gun industry is the last unregulated manufacturer of a 
consumer product. All other manufacturers are regulated, not the gun 
manufacturers.
  Currently, citizen lawsuits serve as practically the only safety 
regulation, if we can call it that, of the firearms industries. 
Lawsuits have been the only way to force manufacturers to make their 
guns safer. A 1995 class action suit against Remington Arms, which 
settled for $31.5 million, led to the implementation of greater safety 
protections for owners of shotguns.
  Look at what is happening all across the country. The victims of gun 
violence are beginning to sue gun manufacturers for their injuries as a 
consequence of the negligence of the gun manufacturers. Over 20 
American cities, as well as the NAACP, have filed lawsuits against gun 
manufacturers to hold them accountable for the millions of dollars that 
the public sector must spend coping with the consequences of gun 
violence.
  Gun plaintiffs, like tobacco plaintiffs and others, must sue the gun 
manufacturers in class action lawsuits because suing as single 
plaintiffs is almost invariably prohibitively expensive. We should not 
handicap these important civil suits just as they are beginning.
  As my colleagues know, in addition to expanding Federal jurisdiction 
over class actions, this bill would give gun manufacturers a tremendous 
advantage in these cases by allowing them to remove these cases to 
Federal court.
  These cases are, of course, determined on the basis of State tort 
law. The Federal courts that would decide these cases are bound by 
Federal law to apply, not Federal law, but the State law. But the 
Federal courts are always going to be much more hesitant to expand the 
State law from previous decisions than the State courts will, because 
their expertise is Federal law, not State law.
  So by taking these cases from the State forum, where the States can 
apply and interpret their own laws, to a Federal forum, which are going 
to be more hesitant to interpret them in new ways and to realize the 
full implications of the law, we are saying to the defendants they have 
a much easier forum. To the plaintiffs, to the victims of gun violence, 
we are going to stack the decks against them.
  Now, I think this is a terrible bill in general for a lot of 
different reasons. But even assuming we want to pass this bill, why not 
just allow victims of gun violence to continue to bring their cases in 
State courts? Why bring them before a Federal judge who will have less 
expertise on the State law, will have to divert his or her attention 
from cases involving, for example, violence against women or access to 
clinic or multijurisdiction interstate cases? Are not our Federal 
judges busy enough?
  We know that the average case, if removed to Federal court, will take 
6 to 8 years to reach trial; whereas, in most State courts, it will get 
there in a year or two. Gun victims often cannot wait that extra time. 
Do we really need the Federal courts to take on thousands of new cases 
for their dockets?
  We should support the victims of gun violence in their efforts to 
hold the firearms industry accountable when its products cause injury 
or death and when they are responsible through their negligence, 
because that obviously is something that has to be proven, when they 
were negligent and who they sell the guns to and making unsafe products 
and not putting safety standards or guns or whatever. When that can be 
proven, we should not stack the decks against the victims of gun 
violence by pushing this out of the local courts and into the Federal 
courts.
  Victims of gun violence, the American people, deserve comprehensive 
legislation to get the guns off the streets and protect our children in 
the schools and protect our people in our churches and day-care 
centers.
  They do not deserve this almost contemptuous treatment in which we 
say we are not doing anything to protect them, but we are going to make 
it harder for them if they are injured to prove the negligence of the 
gun manufacturers. We are going to make it more expensive. We are going 
to make it farther in time. We are going to make it farther in 
distance. We do not trust the State courts. We do not believe in States 
rights. We do not believe in local government despite the rhetoric on 
this floor. We think State courts are too generous to people. They know 
the people, the situation a little better than some far-off Federal 
court. So, therefore, let us move it to a far-off Federal court to make 
it harder for the plaintiffs in gun violence cases.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues, if we are going to pass this 
malevolent bill, at least let us exempt from it cases alleging 
negligence resulting in violence to victims of gun violence. We should 
not make it easier for the malefactors of the gun industry. We should 
make it harder. I urge the adoption of this amendment.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I am strongly opposed to this amendment and what may 
prove to be a series of so-called carve-out amendments. Principled 
Members, whether they support the underlying legislation or not, will 
oppose this amendment and other amendments that attempt to pour their 
views about any particular issue that faces this Congress or any 
particular litigation that may go before our courts into this 
procedural debate about how all litigation should be considered in the 
form of class actions and whether or not one believes they should be 
removed to Federal court or not, my colleagues

[[Page H8578]]

should not support carving out individual sectors of our economy or 
individual types of lawsuits.
  That is exactly how this amendment was treated in a bipartisan 
fashion by the Committee on the Judiciary in the markup of this bill 
when this particular amendment or one very like it was defeated by a 
bipartisan 16 to 6 vote. There are good reasons why it was rejected 
there, and there are good reasons why it should be rejected here.
  This industry-specific exemption from Federal jurisdiction makes no 
sense. It is like a bill of attainder. It irrationally singles out one 
industry and slams the Federal courthouse door in its face.
  All of us strive to be sure that justice is blind. But when one 
identifies one group of people and says they are not entitled to the 
same treatment under the law that everyone else is, justice is not 
blind.
  The amendment is wholly inconsistent with what the Framers had in 
mind in establishing diversity jurisdiction in Article III of our 
Constitution. They wanted to allow interstate businesses to have claims 
against them heard in Federal court so as to avoid local biases. 
Nowhere in this concept is the idea that certain industries should be 
exempted from this right, that certain kinds of businesses are less 
entitled to Federal court protection.
  One may not like gun manufacturers, but think of the things that one 
does like and consider whether if a similar amendment were offered to 
single out something that is important to one and say that those who 
promote and support that particular idea, that particular industry, 
whatever the case might be, that they are not entitled to sit in the 
same forum of justice that everyone else in this country is entitled 
to.
  The amendment clearly is designed to single out the firearms industry 
because, in some quarters, it is unpopular. But that is exactly what 
the Framers of the Constitution were trying to avoid. They are trying 
to ensure a fair, evenhanded Federal court forum for defendants that 
may otherwise be hailed into a local court less concerned about 
protecting the rights of an out-of-State company.
  It is very interesting that in the committee report, the additional 
dissenting views submitted by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) 
and others on the gun issue, makes a big point of the fact that the 
NAACP has filed a class action against the gun industry, seeking to 
recover for money that the public sector must pay for the consequences 
of gun violence.
  The report goes on to say that we should not handicap such important 
civil suits before they have even begun.
  What I find very interesting about that point is that the NAACP filed 
their lawsuit in Federal court, not State court. That choice presumably 
was made because the lawyers filing the NAACP suit know that the 
Federal courts are more appropriate for dealing with these interstate 
issues presented by these cases.
  This bill would make it easier for groups like the NAACP to bring 
such cases in Federal court because it works both ways. It expands the 
rights of plaintiffs to bring interstate cases in Federal court as well 
as expanding the ability of defendants to remove interstate cases to 
Federal court.
  For all of these reasons, I urge my colleagues to oppose this 
amendment.
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, it is a bad policy to carve out exceptions in a bill 
like this because it creates one system for those that are popular with 
political clout, another system for those without political support 
that are unpopular.
  As the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) pointed out, the 
constitutional principle of equal protection is violated when we have 
those that get one system and those in another. That principle of equal 
protection and constitutional protection is particularly needed when we 
have unpopular individuals. Those are the ones that really need the 
constitutional protection.
  Whatever reason that this carve-out might make sense, those arguments 
should have been made to the bill in general. But to carve out and have 
a special exemption I think is wrong, and the carve-out and the 
amendment, therefore, should be defeated.

                              {time}  1300

  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SCOTT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, this is a bad bill. Now, as a general idea, 
I do not think it is a good idea to have specific carve-outs from 
legislation. But if we are going to enact egregious legislation, then 
we can mitigate the damages in the most obvious situations.
  And for the gentleman on the other side who got up and said it is 
terrible, we should not carve out, let me read some of the carve-outs 
supported by the Republicans for similar legislation. The Biomaterials 
Access Insurance Act of 1997 passed into law and carves out an 
exception for breast implant lawsuits. It also carves out an exception 
for lawsuits by health care providers.
  In the 104th Congress, the Common Sense Product Liability Legal 
Reform Act carved out an exception from the bill's provisions for 
lawsuits for commercial losses. This very bill carves out an exception 
from the bill's provisions for lawsuits for commercial losses.
  The Senate version of a similar bill, S. 2236, had specific carve-
outs for negligence actions involving firearms or ammunitions in 
negative entrustment actions.
  So, Mr. Chairman, the real issue is not should there be carve-outs, 
because the people on the other side sponsoring this legislation have 
supported carve-outs. Indeed, this bill contains a carve-out. The 
question is which carve-outs.
  And I would submit that if this bill is going to carve out an 
exception for lawsuits brought under the Securities Act of 1933, or the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as well as corporate government 
actions, all of which are carved out of this bill, we can carve out an 
exception so as not to rip the lawsuits started by States and local 
governments and individuals in class actions out of the State courts 
into Federal courts for gun manufacturers and ammunition manufacturers 
when they can prove negligence resulting in death or injury.
  The question, as I said, is not are carve-outs a good idea. The 
question is, as long as we are going to have carve-outs and pass 
legislation in this bill, should gun manufacturers be subject to carve-
outs they do not want, or should we only carve out protections for 
people accused of violations of securities laws.
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I would agree with my 
colleague that there should not have been carve-outs in those previous 
bills, there should not have been carve-outs in this bill; and, 
therefore, this amendment should be defeated.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Burr of North Carolina). The question 
is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Nadler).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 295, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Nadler) will be postponed.


          Amendment No. 3 Offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas

  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment that has 
been made in order by the rule.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 3 offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas:
       Page 6, line 5, strike the quotation marks and second 
     period.
       Page 6, insert the following after line 5:
       ``(5)(A) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any class action 
     that is brought for harm caused by a tobacco product.
       ``(B) As used in this paragraph, the term `tobacco product' 
     means--
       ``(i) a cigarette, as defined in section 3 of the Federal 
     Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (15 U.S.C. 1332);
       ``(ii) a little cigar, as defined in section 3 of the 
     Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (15 U.S.C. 
     1332);
       ``(iii) a cigar, as defined in section 5702(a), of the 
     Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
       ``(iv) pipe tobacco;
       ``(v) loose rolling tobacco and papers used to contain that 
     tobacco;
       ``(vi) a product referred to as smokeless tobacco, as 
     defined in section 9 of the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco 
     Health Education Act of 1986 (15 U.S.C. 4408); and

[[Page H8579]]

       ``(vii) any other form of tobacco intended for human 
     consumption.''.
       Page 8, line 16, strike the quotation marks and second 
     period.
       Page 8, insert the following after line 16:
       ``(3) Tobacco products.--(A) This section shall not apply 
     to any class action that is brought for harm caused by a 
     tobacco product.
       ``(B) As used in this paragraph, the term `tobacco product' 
     means--
       ``(i) a cigarette, as defined in section 3 of the Federal 
     Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (15 U.S.C. 1332);
       ``(ii) a little cigar, as defined in section 3 of the 
     Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (15 U.S.C. 
     1332);
       ``(iii) a cigar, as defined in section 5702(a) of the 
     Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
       ``(iv) pipe tobacco;
       ``(v) loose rolling tobacco and papers used to contain that 
     tobacco;
       ``(vi) a product referred to as smokeless tobacco, as 
     defined in section 9 of the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco 
     Health Education Act of 1986 (15 U.S.C. 4408); and
       ``(vii) any other form of tobacco intended for human 
     consumption.''.

  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I started this debate by 
acknowledging that the class-action procedure had begun historically 
with a desire to give equity and justice to the people of the United 
States of America. I am delighted that over the years we have kept that 
promise to the American people. We have provided them State courts that 
have given us equity, given us justice, and provided the opportunity 
for the individual, the less-of-a-giant person, to go against the giant 
and prevail.
  And, Mr. Chairman, whether it has been in improving car safety in 
America; whether it has been in providing greater assistance for 
efforts against manufacturers who would make defective products that 
would injure large numbers of people; whether it has been in health 
care, to improve health policy in America, the individual has been 
protected by the vehicle of a class action and allowing that individual 
to go into the State court.
  Today, I offer an amendment to protect that individual again. Because 
I am concerned that if this bill is left unamended, it would, for the 
first time, give Federal courts jurisdiction over all of the State 
class-action claims, even those involving primarily interstate disputes 
over State law.
  This bill will allow tobacco companies to take State class-action 
claims away from State courts and put them into Federal courts over the 
objection of plaintiffs. And, Mr. Chairman, let me tell my colleagues 
why that is a problem. All of the class-action lawsuits that we have 
heard of, and that the American people have participated in and have 
welcomed in getting relief for the heinousness of tobacco and its 
impact on health in America, would not have been allowed into the 
Federal courts because the Federal courts had the opportunity to 
certify class-action tobacco cases and they refused.
  Now, in giving some deference to the Federal courts, I have already 
said they are overwhelmed and oversaturated. In fact, let me tell my 
colleagues that the Judicial Conference of the United States, Federal 
judges themselves, have written and said,

       I want to inform you that the executive committee of the 
     conference voted to express its opposition to class action 
     provisions in H.R. 1875, the Interstate Class Action 
     Jurisdiction of 1999.

  These are the Federal judges.
  Mr. Chairman, they do that because they too believe in justice, and 
they realize that they are overwhelmed and understaffed. There are not 
enough judges and not enough courts. So by permitting the transfer from 
State courts to the Federal courts, this legislation will cause 
indeterminable delay for class-action cases against the tobacco 
industry, both increasing the cost of suing the industry and in 
delaying justice for the individual plaintiffs.
  This amendment, offered by myself and the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Waxman), would ensure that this bill does not apply to any class 
action that is brought for harm caused by a tobacco product. And let me 
say that this effort is not new. Members of Congress, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Waxman) and others have been working on this fight 
for years. And out of their efforts we have seen the opportunity for 
the individual victim to come forward, and we have seen the tobacco 
industry exposed for its efforts toward promoting its product, knowing 
that it was dangerous to our health.
  This legislation, as currently worded, would allow tobacco companies 
to remove class actions involving State causes of action to Federal 
Court involving tobacco cases, it seems. In fact, since the tobacco 
companies are principally domiciled in States where class actions are 
not being brought, minimal diversity, as defined by this bill, will 
always exist between the plaintiffs and the tobacco companies. And 
unlike the Florida case, which was rendered by the State court, which 
showed the devastation to those plaintiffs there, those plaintiffs' 
rights would be violated by moving them to a Federal Court who might 
ultimately not certify the case. Mr. Chairman, is this justice?
  So I urge my colleagues to look seriously at the facts and to 
understand that the President has indicated that this is an unbalanced 
law; to understand that Save Lives and Not Tobacco, an organization 
that has worked with the victims of tobacco, has indicated that this is 
a bad bill; and the American Heart Association has said this is a bad 
bill. The Conference of Chief Justices have said this, Mr. Chairman.
  These are the State court chief justices:

       With regular communication and cooperative effort, State 
     and Federal courts have developed a delicate, complimentary 
     role in class action jurisprudence. H.R. 1875 would radically 
     alter this relationship.

  I tell my business friends that they have relief. I would ask that we 
work together between the State and the Federal system to find relief 
for them, but I would ask my colleagues to support this amendment and 
not to extinguish the rights of the victims of all of these tragedies 
in America. I ask my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to this amendment, as I did 
to the previous amendment that was offered. This is another carve-out 
amendment. It is wrong for the same reasons I cited previously. It 
singles out a particular group of people, a particular industry, for 
unfair treatment under our judicial system, and we should not establish 
that type of principle.
  The principal position, whether we are in favor of this legislation 
or we are opposed to this legislation, is to oppose this amendment 
because we should not carve out individual groups of people.
  It is true that Congress has expanded Federal jurisdiction to 
encompass cases involving certain subject matters, civil rights, 
antitrust, environmental, consumer warranty, but those are exercises of 
Federal question jurisdiction. There is no basis and no precedent for 
carving out an industry from diversity jurisdiction and extinguishing 
its right to have cases subject to Federal jurisdiction heard in 
Federal Court.
  Contrary to the premise of this amendment, H.R. 1875 would not turn 
tobacco litigation upside down. Most money obtained through tobacco 
litigation has come in State attorneys general cases. These are not 
class actions and will not be affected by this legislation. Most other 
tobacco cases are individual actions which, likewise, are unaffected by 
this legislation.
  H.R. 1875 is also prospective only. It would not affect any pending 
cases, be they class action or otherwise.
  Contrary to another premise of this amendment, there is no evidence 
that tobacco cases are less likely to succeed in Federal Court. Tobacco 
classes have been certified by both Federal and State courts. Tobacco 
classes have been rejected by both Federal and State courts.
  There is no evidence that class members will get better treatment in 
State court. Indeed, the evidence is to the contrary. In the only 
tobacco class action to reach conclusion, the Broin case, that case 
ultimately settled in State court. But the class members received no 
money at all. Under the terms of the settlement, they obtained only a 
right to sue individually. Meanwhile, the class counsel, the lawyers, 
were awarded $49 million. One law professor assessed the settlement as 
follows: ``Is the system just when it allows the plaintiffs' lawyers to 
make $49 million for making the class worse off?''
  There is no evidence that tobacco cases would get tried more quickly 
in State courts. It took 6 years to get the first tobacco class action 
to trial in

[[Page H8580]]

State court; the second took over 4 years. The average time to trial in 
Federal Court is shorter.
  No matter where we may stand on the tobacco issue, we should strongly 
oppose this amendment. And for all the reasons I just cited, I urge my 
colleagues to defeat this amendment.
  Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, in opposing the amendment, I would make the broad point 
that industry-specific denials of access to the judicial process at 
either the State or the Federal levels are simply not appropriate. Over 
the entrance to the United States Supreme Court are words which, in a 
phrase, define our basic belief in the rule of law. That phrase says, 
``Equal justice under the law.'' To honor that principle, any attempt 
to close the courthouse door to any specific litigant, whether an 
individual, a specific corporation, or an entire industry should be 
defeated.
  The amendment would close the door to the courthouse to any company 
within the tobacco industry that seeks to use the removal provisions of 
this legislation. That simply is not the American way. That approach 
violates our basic principles of fairness and our principles of equal 
justice. By a wide bipartisan majority the amendment was rejected by 
the House Committee on the Judiciary, and I strongly urge the committee 
here on the floor of the House today to reject this amendment as well.
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, for the same reasons that the last carve-out was bad 
policy, this carve-out is a bad policy. It sets up one system for the 
popular, another for the unpopular. It violates the principle of equal 
protection.
  And whatever arguments are being made for why this carve-out makes 
sense should have been made against the bill. The carve-outs, all of 
the carve-outs, should be defeated, and the bill should be defeated.
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words, and I rise in support of the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, if this legislation is enacted, it will provide the 
tobacco industry with unprecedented legal protection. It is nothing 
less than a back door immunity from class-action lawsuits, the Holy 
Grail of the tobacco industry.

                              {time}  1315

  This bill reminds me of the attempt last Congress to give the tobacco 
industry a $50-billion tax break. This motion, which was slipped into a 
massive budget bill, was only repealed when Democrats discovered the 
provision and the public outcry began. This legislation, too, is a gift 
for the big tobacco.
  Today, most tobacco class action litigation occurs in State courts, 
but this bill would allow tobacco companies to remove these cases from 
the State courthouses all over the country. This is exactly what the 
industry has long sought to do. The industry knows that the rules for 
certifying and maintaining class actions are far more favorable to 
corporate defendants in Federal courts. They know that they have been 
able to defeat class action cases in Federal courts on procedural 
grounds.
  This legislation will make it virtually impossible for Americans to 
successfully bring class action lawsuits against the tobacco companies. 
It is designed to create barriers, to raise hurdles, to wear down 
plaintiffs so that they will give up in frustration and despair.
  All across America, people know about the outrageous behavior of 
tobacco companies. They now know how the companies target our kids, try 
to addict our teenagers, and have lied to the American people for 4 
decades. And this House, in light of all this information, has 
repeatedly failed to respond to the public health crisis from cigarette 
smoking in this Nation.
  This Congress has failed to pass comprehensive tobacco control 
legislation. It has failed to pass even narrow tobacco control 
legislation. It has turned over billions of Federal dollars to the 
States, dollars recovered from the tobacco settlements, without 
insisting that even a small portion be spent to protect our kids from 
tobacco. Instead, this Congress has done nothing. But now it is 
considering passing legislation that will actually give the tobacco 
companies special liability protection.
  This legislation is a gift to the tobacco industry rendered at the 
expense of those who wish to hold that industry accountable.
  Now, some will argue and have argued that this legislation simply 
treats tobacco like any other business in America. But it is important 
to remember three facts.
  First, tobacco companies are selling a lethal and addictive drug. 
Second, the product sold by the tobacco companies are the only consumer 
product in America that kills when used as directed. And third, the 
tobacco companies have lied to and deceived the public for over 40 
years. These companies have operated for decades with utter disregard 
to the hundreds of thousands of Americans that are killed each year.
  We should put public health first and not make it more difficult to 
hold the tobacco companies accountable for their actions. They deserve 
no reward. This is a public health issue. It is about fairness for the 
victims of tobacco. It is time for Congress to protect our children and 
public health, not big tobacco.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Jackson-Lee amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Burr of North Carolina). The time of 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Waxman was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. 
Jackson-Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
joining me on this amendment.
  I wanted to add to the statement of the gentleman that there have 
been a number of carve-outs. In fact, we will find that there is a 
corporate governance carve-out that was requested. I think my colleague 
raised the issue that some of these were dealing with Federal 
questions, but some of these were dealing with the fact that the 
individual State interests wanted a carve-out.
  In particular, in Delaware, the corporate governance was carved out 
because they like what is going on in State courts in Delaware.
  It seems to me, with so many carve-outs, like the securities, this 
begs the question on a Federal issue. This is life or death. These 
lawsuits are life or death.
  The Castano case would have never come if it had not come to the 
State court system. People are dying. It is important that this 
legislation, if passed, does not affect the ability of people who have 
died or are dying their day in court.
  I ask my colleagues to accept this amendment because we are dealing 
with life or death.
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, a lot of people are for 
States' rights in this House. Except when it comes to the question of 
whether tobacco companies say they do not want States' rights, they 
want it to be a Federal issue, and then they are willing to go along 
with big tobacco against the chance of people who have a legitimate 
lawsuit to bring their case on a class action basis.
  I, too, urge support for the amendment.
  Mr. GOODE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to this amendment. I do not think that we 
should exempt our carve-out to tobacco industry from other business, 
corporations, and industries across this country. They should be 
treated just like any other entity under the provisions of 1875.
  It is going to impact tobacco companies negatively if this carve-out 
is allowed. Tobacco growers in my area have already suffered greatly. 
In the flue-cured tobacco country, we have had a quota cut of 35 
percent over the last 2 years. What does that mean? That means that 
they have a reduction of 35 percent of their gross income and their 
expenses stay about the same.
  This year prices are down all across the old belt tobacco market, and 
growers are suffering. Many tobacco farmers are going out of business. 
They cannot continue along the course that has been thrust upon them.
  If we single out the tobacco industry for different treatment than 
the rest of the businesses and companies in this

[[Page H8581]]

country, we will be driving a further nail in the coffin of the tobacco 
companies. If we do not have them, we will not have buyers. Then the 
tobacco that is utilized in this country by those adults who choose to 
use it will come from China, it will come from Zimbabwe, it will come 
from Brazil.
  I want us to be fair to the American tobacco grower, be fair to the 
American tobacco industry. And I hope that those that want to utilize 
tobacco in this country will have the opportunity to always purchase 
American tobacco instead of foreign tobacco. We do not need this unfair 
treatment for American businesses.
  Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Jackson-Lee amendment. If 
passed and enacted, the class action bill is going to provide 
significant protections to corporate defendants against class action 
lawsuits and no industry will benefit more than the tobacco industry.
  I think it is somewhat ironic that here we are today and the Justice 
Department has announced that they are filing a civil lawsuit seeking 
billions and billions of dollars' worth of damage for the taxpayers of 
this country, the attorneys general from around the States have 
negotiated a settlement worth another $250 billion, the courts are 
going in the direction of holding the tobacco companies accountable for 
decades of duplicity; and what are we doing in this House? We are going 
in the opposite direction. We are saying, that is okay when it comes to 
big tobacco.
  The tobacco companies win whenever there is a debate in this House, 
but the people in America lose. And when we go into the courts, the 
only place where we have been able to level the playing field, the 
sponsors of this legislation want to give a special carve-out to the 
tobacco industry.
  Currently, most tobacco class action litigation occur in State court 
since the plaintiffs' claims against the industry typically involve 
State law claims. However, this bill would allow the tobacco companies 
to remove these cases from State courthouses all across the country, 
giving the industry back-door immunity from lawsuits.
  Not surprisingly, the tobacco industry has long sought to remove 
State class actions from Federal court. The industry knows the rules of 
the games of certifying classes and maintaining class actions are more 
favorable to corporate defendants in Federal courts than in State 
courts. So the tobacco companies want to have their way. They want to 
be able to go into Federal court and defeat class actions on procedural 
grounds.
  Now, in the last Congress, the tobacco industry sought a complete ban 
on class actions and these provisions were widely criticized by the 
public health community and rejected in the Senate. By severely 
limiting State class actions, this bill will provide the tobacco 
industry with special protection from civil class action liability, 
which is exactly what the Congress and the health community has already 
rejected. Even if we support the changes to the class action laws that 
are in this bill, it makes sense to make sure that the tobacco industry 
is held accountable.
  We are at a pivotal point in time in our history in terms of holding 
the tobacco company accountable. It is the leading preventable cause of 
death in the United States. Over 400,000 people a year die as a result 
of tobacco-related illnesses. The least we can do, the least we can do, 
is give the American people who have been victims through negligence of 
the tobacco companies their opportunity to join together and fight big 
tobacco.
  The fight against big tobacco is not going to be won, unfortunately, 
on the floor of this House. But Americans across this country, at a 
minimum, should have the ability and the right to go into court and 
State class actions to hold these tobacco companies accountable.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-
Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very 
much for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize another case. I thank the gentleman 
for recounting this whole problem of getting into courts. If we had not 
had the opportunity to go into State courts, cases like Engle versus 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, a successful class action case in 
Florida, as I mentioned, would not have had the opportunity for trial. 
Broin versus Philip Morris, which considered the claims of some 60,000 
flight attendants harmed by secondhand smoke, would not have been 
allowed into the courthouse.
  So I want to see a balance between business interests and individual 
interests, but in this instance the scales of justice are weighed 
heavily in the opposite direction without this carve-out.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. MEEHAN. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, before coming to this body, I served as a 
justice on the Texas Supreme Court; and I know that on our courthouse 
and courthouses across Texas, and I expect in the State of my 
colleague, as well, there are the scales of justice. We expect that 
every litigant will be treated fairly and that those scales will be in 
balance.
  When we apply those scales of justice in this body on this Jackson-
Lee amendment, on one side we have every public health organization, 
some 70 consumer groups, State judges, Federal judges, the State 
attorneys general, I am sure other law enforcement groups, and on the 
other side of that scale we have got the big tobacco lobby.
  Would not my colleague say it is easy to draw the appropriate balance 
as between the opponents and supporters of the Jackson-Lee amendment?
  Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I would say that that 
is very easy.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, for the last several years, this Republican Congress 
has stood idle as each day some 3,000 of our children across America 
have had the opportunity to be introduced to nicotine. Many of them, 
perhaps as many as a thousand per day, will die prematurely because of 
their nicotine addiction.
  Secret tobacco documents discovered in the course of class action 
litigation indicate that these tobacco giants targeted children as 
young as 12 years old with their propaganda about the joys of smoking.
  Before Congress grants this tobacco industry special protection, we 
need to weigh the heavy consequences of the deplorable history of 
targeting our youngest Americans to take up smoking, proven in industry 
documents discovered in these class action suits in State court.
  I believe that we must place a high priority on the deadly 
relationship between children and nicotine. We have to protect our 
children from the tobacco companies that spend over $5 billion a year, 
almost $14 million every single day of every single year, to promote 
their products because they need to replace the thousands of smokers 
that die off from using their products with new young victims.
  This legislation is truly back-door immunity for the tobacco 
industry. I commend my colleague from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) for her 
courage in taking on that industry and declining to give them that 
back-door immunity.

                              {time}  1330

  These are the same tobacco giants that sought to ban class actions in 
1997, that have known about the deadly consequences of their product 
for decades, and that are now back here again asking for special 
treatment.
  As my colleagues know, the relationship between the Republicans in 
this Congress and the tobacco industry runs very deep and constant. The 
only thing this House has ever done in response to this vital public 
health issue in the last two sessions was to approve a $50 billion tax 
loophole for the tobacco industry.
  And when people discovered it tucked in under a title called ``Small 
Business Protection'', the House Republican leadership got so 
embarrassed, Mr. Chairman, that they withdrew the whole matter. Just 
when we thought perhaps the Republican leadership had learned the 
lesson of that misdeed, they again have stood with the tobacco industry 
to offer them this major break from responsibility.
  Oh, yes, the Republican leadership talks about personal 
responsibility, but

[[Page H8582]]

they do not mean personal responsibility for those who have produced 
the leading cause of preventable death in this country today, the 
tobacco industry. The victories that have been won in so many of these 
important States have occurred in our State courts. The States' 
attorneys general have played a critical role in exposing tobacco 
industry wrongdoing. In their pursuit of cases at the State level, they 
have been invaluable allies of the public health community.
  If this bill had been law, we would still be waiting for an answer 
because our Federal courts are overwhelmed and backlogged in too much 
of the country. Florida citizens would not know as they learned through 
the litigation that, ``tobacco companies have engaged in a persistent 
pattern of fraud, of conspiracy to commit fraud and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.''
  If this bill had been law, Minnesota State courts would never have 
had the chance to tell Americans around the country that the tobacco 
companies set out, ``get smokers as young as possible'' and that our 
own children were purposefully targeted for nicotine addiction. For 
these tobacco companies children ``represent tomorrow's cigarette 
business . . . and will account for the key share of total cigarette 
volume for at least the next 25 years.'' Those are the words right out 
of the secret tobacco documents discovered in state court proceedings.
  The Congress is not the only body, of course, that has considered 
changing its class action procedures. The same forces, the tobacco 
industry and its allies, that are attempting to destroy this useful 
remedy in this Congress came before the State capitol in the city I 
represent in Austin, Texas. They sought through other devices, along 
with their allies--the health maintenance organization and the 
insurance companies--to bar the doors of the courthouses of the State 
of Texas. Fortunately, the Texas Legislature had the wisdom to reject 
their entreaties, and I hope this Congress will do the same thing.
  As my colleagues know, a Federal civil lawsuit in too many 
jurisdictions is little more than a ticket to delay.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Burr of North Carolina). The time of 
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Doggett) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Doggett was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. DOGGETT. Should this bill pass, Mr. Chairman, the delay will not 
only be for those involved in tobacco class-action suits. Certainly 
they will be damaged, but every litigant, be it corporate, individual, 
governmental, that has a claim pending, a legitimate claim in our 
Federal court system throughout this country, will find the already 
overwhelmed Federal courts to be logjammed even more.
  There are over 4,000 State courts that can handle State class actions 
compared to a much smaller number of our Federal district courts. If 
Congress today adds to these cases, the noise we will hear in the 
background will be the wheels of justice coming to a screeching halt. 
Tobacco companies will have successfully avoided any real threat of 
being held accountable, of being personally responsible for the damages 
resulting from their purposeful deceit.
  This Congress failed the American people by failing to approve 
comprehensive tobacco legislation. Let us not fail the American people 
once again by trampling on their rights to turn to the courthouse in 
their own State, in their own locality, when the Congress would not 
respond.
  Mr. Chairman, I would add one further note to my colleagues. Because 
of the stranglehold, and it is a strong stranglehold, that results from 
their having well oiled the machinery of Government here in Washington, 
the tobacco companies really face little threat in this Congress. We 
will not be able to get to the floor of this Congress meaningful 
legislation to reduce youth smoking; and my colleagues need to know 
that this vote on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Texas 
will probably be the only vote this year by which the American people 
and the constituency in each district of the Members of Congress will 
have an opportunity to judge them as to whether they stand with big 
tobacco and its wrongdoing or they stand with the children and the 
public health organizations of America to have an effective remedy for 
such wrongdoing.
  I urge approval of the Jackson-Lee amendment.
  Mr. ETHERIDGE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  (Mr. ETHERIDGE asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. ETHERIDGE. Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose this amendment. I do 
not understand why we are considering carving out tobacco when this 
legislation simply ensures that the Federal courts are available to 
parties involved in massive and complex class-action lawsuits. This 
amendment, by singling out the tobacco industry, I think establishes a 
very dangerous precedent. What politically incorrect industry will be 
singled out next? Will it be alcohol? Fatty foods? Or will it be big 
oil? Such a precedent, that threatens all legal businesses whose 
products may be considered controversial by some person or political 
parties.
  But let me make my point very clear today. My main concern lies not 
necessarily with the manufacturers, but they are important because last 
time I checked, they are the only people who buy any tobacco from our 
farmers. It really lies with the tobacco farmers.
  Mr. Chairman, farmers in my district have born the brunt of this 
nationwide campaign against tobacco. Sharecroppers, not shareholders. 
Let me repeat that. Sharecroppers, not shareholders, are the ones who 
are paying the heavy price, and they continue to pay. The shareholders 
are getting their money; the sharecroppers are being punished. Tobacco 
families, tobacco farmers and their communities have been severely 
harmed by the ongoing campaign. Over the past 2 years these farmers 
have lost 35 percent of their gross income. My colleagues can imagine 
what that has done to their net income, and their communities are 
suffering.
  A recent study by VPI and NC State University in North Carolina 
clearly demonstrates that the tobacco farmers are bearing the burden of 
the anti-campaign. The study concluded that these lawsuits are 
particularly punishing to farmers because they are unable to recoup the 
losses through price increases, as the manufacturers have done. Instead 
of punishing manufacturers, we are punishing the very people that we 
want to help, the farmers, and their communities and their families. If 
we adopt this amendment and single out tobacco industry, tobacco 
farmers, Mr. Chairman, not the manufacturers, will continue to carry 
the heaviest load that we are talking about.
  And people stand here and say they want to help. They are punishing 
the people they want to help. The people in my district, Mr. Chairman, 
are on their backs right now from a hurricane. They cannot stand any 
more help from this Congress. They need real help in funding that will 
go to help them get back on their feet. I oppose this amendment, and I 
urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, it is interesting to stand here on the floor of this 
House and listen to the debate and especially on an issue like this 
that should be dwelling on the issue of fairness versus the very 
emotional issue on the political incorrectness of tobacco; and some 
would say, I have heard repeated several times today, that some here on 
this side of the aisle came to Washington to talk about moving many of 
the rights back to the States and how this is just the opposite of 
that. But many of those very same people believe in bigger government, 
and yet today they are saying that, well, we do not think the Federal 
Government ought to have a role in this, that it ought to be back in 
the States.
  Mr. Chairman, I say this simply to point out to the public that no 
one has a monopoly on hypocrisy, if that is what we are talking about 
here. I think each case has to be decided by its merits, and this case, 
given the history of our law on diversity and given the statute on 
class-action lawsuits, and that concept that even big businesses and 
even big unpopular businesses ought to be treated fairly, and 
especially if they are interstate, they ought to have that right to 
avoid the local biases that often come out in local courts, and

[[Page H8583]]

they have been able to go into court, into Federal court and Federal 
courts are scattered all throughout the country, it is almost like 
somehow we are talking about we are denying anyone the right to go to 
court.
  We are not doing that. The Federal courts are open; the State courts 
remain open, and if they are removed to Federal court, it is a local 
court in their State, every State has Federal courts; and as I point 
out in my opening statement, they are probably better equipped to 
handle these class-action lawsuits because they have law clerks; they 
have U.S. magistrate judges and all kinds of assistance; they have the 
experience in complex litigation.
  But in the end what we are talking about on this amendment is a carve 
out, and some have said, Well, you've carved out for securities 
litigation. Well, the reason we carved out for securities litigation 
was that we enacted a bill in this Congress a year or two ago that 
reformed that, that made those changes, so there is no reason to bring 
this into play as to that subject and cause conflict.
  But the last speaker, I want to close my remarks by saying he was 
familiar with the courthouse, and how the scales of justice is there 
and how it should be balanced; but I think the key of the lady of 
justice holding the scales of justice is that she is wearing a 
blindfold, not that the scales are balanced, and if my colleagues vote 
for this amendment and carve out a politically unpopular entity such as 
tobacco and treat them unfairly, different than the rest of them, you 
have got that lady of justice peeking out from that blindfold, and no 
longer is justice blind, no longer is justice fair.
  Vote against this amendment.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BRYANT. I yield to the gentlewoman from Texas.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from 
Tennessee, and I appreciate both his tone and his work, but I think 
that if my colleagues might, let me cite for them again from the 
Conference of Chief Justices who have indicated there is a very fine 
balance of relationship that they have developed between the Federal 
court system and the State court system on class actions, and we are 
not here to try to create an imbalance between large companies or 
unpopular industries. Frankly my colleagues have already carved out a 
carve-out for the securities industry, and what we are saying is we do 
not want to implode the opportunities of victims who have been the 
victims of tobacco usage and tobacco companies.
  Mr. BRYANT. Reclaiming my time, as I explained earlier, we carved out 
the securities litigation because we have already acted on that. There 
is no sense in passing something that would be inconsistent or cause 
any problems.
  But, again, I think the point we have got to look at here we are 
making exception, we are singling out something that is not popular; 
and again under our system of justice, under our lady of justice, 
justice should be blind. Even though it is tobacco, even though it is 
firearms, it should be treated the same as any other company; and we 
certainly are not closing the doors to the courthouse.
  In fact, I have complete confidence in the Federal court system to 
adjudicate this type of litigation and, in fact, would prefer this type 
of litigation if this type of court venue, if it is a complex case like 
a class-action lawsuit.
  Mr. Chairman, I think both the plaintiffs and defendants deserve this 
type of treatment.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Jackson-Lee amendment, but 
both the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-
Lee) and Mr. Nadler's amendment really point up the problem with this 
legislation and what happens when we do not have a central principle 
that controls when you are going to be in Federal court and when you 
are going to be in State court and opens you up to efforts to try to 
pick out one industry or the other and exempt them or not exempt them.
  The problem is that there is no central core principle here. We have 
left the central core principle that our constitutional framework gave 
to us.

                              {time}  1345

  That principle says if there is not something in the Constitution 
that gives a matter to the Federal Government, that matter is reserved 
to the States. That is what the constitutional principle is. Once we 
start to stray away from that constitutional principle, then we do not 
have a central principle that we are operating from anymore and then we 
get subjected to this kind of let us make this exception because we do 
not like this industry or make that exception because we do not like 
that industry. And we end up with a hodgepodge of jurisdictional 
standards for when one can get in the State court and when one can get 
in the Federal court.
  Now we have had a long-standing diversity jurisdiction principle that 
has been at play for years and years and years. It says when someone 
can get into Federal court; and because the supporters of this 
legislation do not like that, they start to make exceptions to that 
principle. And because then people who do not like particular 
industries do not like that exception then they start making exceptions 
to the exception, and that is what we are engaged in right now.
  The underlying bill is an exception to a long-standing principle. The 
amendments of the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) and the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) want to make an exception to the 
exception, and none of it makes sense. So what we ought to do is reject 
the exception to the exception, the Jackson-Lee and the Nadler 
amendments and any other carve-outs that somebody comes to the floor 
with during the course of this debate.
  More importantly, we ought to reject the underlying bill which is an 
exception to the generally-accepted rules that we are operating under 
because then we do not have a central principle if we do not reject the 
underlying bill.
  That is really where we ought to end up on this piece of legislation. 
So that is why I am rising in opposition to the exception to the 
exception, but I am also rising in opposition to the bill which is an 
exception to the rule, and that rule is that if we did not give it to 
the Federal Government then it is reserved to the State governments, 
and that is the principle that we ought to be controlled by.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to 
strike the requisite number of words.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Burr of North Carolina). Is there 
objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I know this debate is coming 
to a close. I could not agree more with my colleague from North 
Carolina on opposition to the underlying bill, and as well I think it 
is important to note that this is not a popularity contest. There is no 
attempt here to select unpopular industries.
  I would have hoped that my colleagues had not carved out originally 
the securities carve-out. I would have hoped they had not carved out 
the corporate governance carve-out because representatives from the 
State of Delaware were interested in making sure that those actions 
stayed in State courts in Delaware developing the massive corporate law 
of America.
  I think in this instance we have a situation where we need to be 
aware that one-third of high school age adolescents in the United 
States smoke or use smokeless tobacco, and smoking prevalence still 
exists among our teenagers. We need to realize that children are being 
attracted to smoking. What we are simply saying here is not to create 
an imbalance between unpopular industries and popular, or to create an 
imbalance between any litigant going into the court of justice, but 
what we are saying is this legislation will allow one diverse litigant, 
one, to move a massive class action that has been filed in a State 
court to a Federal court of which the Conference of Judges in the 
Federal system have indicated we cannot take it.
  In fact, Mr. Chairman, it literally locks the courthouse door because 
our Federal courts are overwhelmed and understaffed, and we have 
already seen where tobacco cases have not been certified in the Federal 
court. And we would not have had the cases that we

[[Page H8584]]

have had that were filed in Florida and the one filed on behalf of the 
airline stewards for secondhand smoke. We would have been in an abyss 
or a crisis or a limbo or a bottomless hole where individual litigants 
who get their strength from a class action to allow themselves to be 
able to access, the equity court, the court of justice in State courts, 
would be denied.
  So I would ask my colleagues to consider this not as a bias toward an 
unpopular industry but a creating of a balance of the scales of justice 
for those victims who have been closed out of the Court system because 
they are alone, they are by themselves, they are frail, they have less 
money and they are not able to access justice.
  Class actions are the access for that and this amendment would help 
those victims of tobacco usage, and I ask my colleagues to support it 
and to vote against the underlying bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I am offering the following amendment to H.R. 1875, The 
Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999. I am concerned that 
this bill if left unamended would for the first time, give federal 
courts jurisdiction over almost all state class action claims, even 
those involving primarily intra-state disputes over state law. This 
bill will allow tobacco companies to take state class action claims 
away from state courts and put them into federal courts over the 
objections of plaintiffs.
  By permitting the transfer from state courts to the federal courts, 
this legislation will cause indeterminable delay for class action cases 
against the tobacco industry, both increasing the costs of suing the 
industry and delaying justice.
  My amendment would ensure that this bill does not apply to any class 
action that is brought for harm caused by a tobacco product. This 
legislation as currently worded would allow tobacco companies to remove 
class actions involving state causes of action to federal court. In 
fact, since the major tobacco companies are principally domiciled in 
states where class actions are not being brought, ``minimal diversity'' 
as defined by this bill will always exist between the plaintiffs and 
the tobacco companies.
  The legislation, therefore, can be said to effectively grant the 
tobacco industry a free pass to federal court where it will be more 
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in class action cases.
  My amendment responds to the concerns that many of us have and I urge 
my colleagues to support this measure.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 295, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. 
Jackson-Lee) will be postponed.


         Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Watt of North Carolina

  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 7 offered by Mr. Watt of North Carolina:
       Page 7, line 10, strike ``before or''.

  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I have already expressed my 
opposition to this bill for a number of reasons, and in the opening 
debate I also alluded to some internal drafting concerns that I have 
about the bill. One of those drafting concerns is that the bill allows 
someone who purports to be a member of a class to come in and remove a 
case to Federal court before that person is even determined to be a 
member of the class; before there is a class certification.
  The purpose of this amendment is simply to strike two words from the 
bill. The relevant provision in the bill says this section shall apply 
to any class action before or after the entry of any order certifying a 
class. All my amendment would seek to do is to strike two words, 
``before or,'' so that at least a person would have to be determined to 
be a member of the class before that person could pick the lawsuit up 
and move it to the Federal court.
  I am not sure what the objective was to give somebody who is not even 
determined to be a party to the litigation the right to pick a lawsuit 
up and move it when they have not even had any role in the case up to 
that point. So I would encourage my colleagues to support this 
amendment, although I understand that there may be a substitute for it 
which I hope I can be supportive of.


 Amendment Offered by Mr. Boucher as a Substitute for Amendment No. 7 
                 Offered by Mr. Watt of North Carolina

  Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment as a substitute for 
the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment offered 
as a substitute for the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment Offered by Mr. Boucher as a substitute for 
     Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Watt of North Carolina:
       Page 7, line 11, insert ``, except that a plaintiff class 
     member who is not a named or representative class member of 
     the action may not seek removal of the action before an order 
     certifying a class of which the plaintiff is a class member 
     has been entered'' before the period.

  Mr. BOUCHER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the substitute amendment be considered as read and printed 
in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Virginia?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Chairman, the amendment of the gentleman from North 
Carolina (Mr. Watt) would permit a plaintiff to remove a State-filed 
class action to Federal court only after the State court had entered an 
order certifying the class.
  In my view, the removal opportunity should arise at an earlier time 
for plaintiffs who are named or representative class members. These 
plaintiffs should be able to remove at some point before the State 
court actually enters the certification order.
  The substitute to the gentleman's amendment that I am offering would 
permit named or representative class members to remove prior to the 
State order certifying the class. Other plaintiff class members could 
remove only after the certification order is entered.
  I want to thank the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt) for his 
work with the sponsors of the legislation on this aspect of the removal 
process. I am hoping that the substitute that we are offering will be 
acceptable to the gentleman in addressing his concerns, and I would be 
happy to yield to him for his comments.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BOUCHER. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Boucher) for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to tell the gentleman from Virginia how much of 
a pleasure it has been to try to work toward something that 
accommodates his concerns and accommodates my concerns. I believe that 
this amendment, while it does not go all the way to the point that I 
was trying to get us to, reaches a reasonable balance between the two 
approaches. It at least does not allow somebody to walk in off the 
street, unknown to the litigation, and pick it up and move it. One has 
to be a named class representative or a named plaintiff to move it 
before they have the right to remove, and I think this accomplishes 
that purpose.
  I would encourage my colleagues to support the substitute; and if the 
substitute passes, then obviously that would take precedence over the 
underlying amendment which I have offered.
  Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from North Carolina 
(Mr. Watt) for his remarks. I would be pleased to yield to the prime 
sponsor of the underlying bill, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
Goodlatte).
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BOUCHER. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
Boucher) for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
Boucher) for what I think is a very appropriate secondary amendment to 
the amendment of the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), and 
commend both gentlemen for working this out. We can certainly accept 
this amendment, and we urge our colleagues to vote for it.
  Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Virginia

[[Page H8585]]

(Mr. Goodlatte) for his support, and I would encourage the committee to 
approve the substitute.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) as a substitute for the 
amendment offered the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt).
  The amendment offered as a substitute for the amendment was agreed 
to.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), as amended.
  The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.


         Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts:
       Page 9, strike line 6 and all that follows through page 10, 
     line 2, and insert the following:
       (e) Procedure After Removal.--Section 1447 is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(f) If, after removal, the court determines that any 
     aspect of an action that is subject to its jurisdiction 
     solely under the provisions of section 1332(b) may not be 
     maintained as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal 
     Rules of Civil Procedure, it shall remand that aspect of the 
     action to the State court from which it was removed. In such 
     event, that State court may certify the action or any part 
     thereof as a class action pursuant to its State law and such 
     action cannot be removed to Federal court unless it meets the 
     requirements of section 1332(a).''.

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, this is the truth in 
labeling amendment. This bill was originally presented to me in the 
previous Congress as an effort to have more rationality as to whether 
or not a particular action ought to be tried at the Federal or the 
State level, and I agreed with that.
  Indeed if this amendment were adopted, I could be supportive of the 
bill, would be supportive of the bill. I had been a sponsor before, 
until this particular piece of it evolved. I am not sure where it came 
in, but here is the problem: We now have very technical rules about 
what gets someone in a Federal court and what gets someone in a State 
court. I think it makes sense to change that so that where the bulk of 
the plaintiffs and the bulk of the defendants and the bulk of the 
issues are in one State it stays in the State court, and where there is 
genuine factual diversity it goes to Federal court. That was the 
legislation I was prepared to support.
  There is a piece of this, however, that I think is, to many of the 
sponsors, a central part of the legislation and it says this: If a 
class action is filed in State court and can be, under the terms of 
this bill, removed, even though it did not meet the old technical terms 
for removal but would meet our new more substantive test for going into 
Federal court, if a Federal judge found that this particular class 
action did not meet the rules for class action under the Federal rules 
it could not be brought as a class action.

                              {time}  1400

  It could then be returned to the State, but not as a class action. In 
other words, this piece of the bill is not to see that certain class 
actions are litigated at the Federal level rather than the State level. 
I am aiming at a piece of the bill that seeks to prevent certain class 
actions from being heard at all.
  What came out of the debate is this: some Members of the majority are 
disappointed in some States. I guess they are kind of like parents 
whose kids have gone bad. I know they are all for States' right. I know 
they talk about how much they support States' rights and do not want to 
see a Federal override. But the problem is, those darn States will not 
always do what they are told. Some of those States actually allow 
class-action suits that some businesses do not like, and there is 
unhappiness over the willingness of some States to do this.
  Mr. Chairman, I will say this. There is a certain delicacy on the 
part of my colleagues, they do not like to mention the States. It is 
one thing to condemn the States; it is another thing to actually 
mention which ones. So you probably will not hear during the course of 
the debate any actual States mentioned. There are a few. Off the floor 
maybe we can whisper some names.
  But the problem they have is, they believe some States are too lax 
and too willing to allow class actions, so part of the purpose of this 
bill is not simply to get class actions litigated in Federal court 
rather than State court, but to keep them from being litigated as class 
actions at all. That seems to me to be a grave error.
  This amendment is very simple. This amendment says that if one gets 
it removed under the general provisions of this bill, and this bill 
will make it easier to remove from State to Federal court, and I 
support that part of it, the amendment says if one gets it removed and 
a Federal judge says, no, one cannot have it as a class action, then 
one can go back to State court and have it as a class action in State 
court. In other words, one's choice is one wants it to be a Federal 
class action or a State class action, and that I think the bill 
addresses correctly. But using this as a way to prevent class actions 
at all is an error, and only this amendment will keep this from 
happening.
  What the amendment says is that if a Federal judge rules that it 
cannot be a class action, one has the opportunity of going back to the 
State from which it was removed and maintaining it as a class action. I 
do not think it is appropriate for us to simply say, as this bill 
otherwise will after this amendment, hey, some of you States have not 
gotten it right and you States are allowing class actions that should 
not be class actions and we, the Federal Government will step in.
  This is a proposal to substitute the wisdom and discretion of the 
Federal courts for State courts as to whether or not class actions 
ought to be maintained at all.
  As I said, and I want to be very clear, to a bill whose purpose it is 
to have certain actions tried in the Federal rather than a State court 
because it makes more sense for the class action to be tried there, I 
am supportive. But a bill whose purpose it is to prevent any class 
action at all, and that is part of the purpose of this bill, that, I 
think, is in error.
  This amendment would return the bill to what it was advertised as to 
me: an effort to put class actions where they ought to be, but it would 
remove from the bill that provision that says, some States have been 
imprudent in allowing class actions that should not be allowed. I do 
not think that is a wise decision for the Federal Government to make. 
We certainly have had no record for it and if, in fact, we are going to 
have legislation passed that rules that some States have been 
imprudent, let us have hearings. Let us give those States a chance to 
defend themselves.
  This is a gravely mistaken assault on States who have not been given 
a chance to defend themselves.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment would defeat the whole purpose of H.R. 
1875. I must strongly disagree with the gentleman from Massachusetts 
(Mr. Frank), with regard to the issue of States' rights. It is not a 
States' rights issue to allow one State court judge to determine the 
law in 20 or 30 or 40 other States, and that is what happens now when 
nationwide class-action lawsuits with tens or hundreds of thousands of 
plaintiffs cannot be removed to Federal court because of this flaw that 
has existed in our diversity rules that says that a $75,000 slip and 
fall involving parties between two States can be removed to Federal 
court, but a multimillion dollar or multibillion dollar lawsuit 
involving tens of thousands of parties cannot be removed to Federal 
court.
  To allow one State court judge in one county in one State to 
determine the laws of a multitude of other States; to allow a judge in 
the State of Alabama to interpret the laws of New York and New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania and California and Texas is wrong, and that is what 
this bill is designed to do.
  If the gentleman's amendment passes, the effect will be to say, once 
the matter is removed to Federal court, if the Federal court does not 
believe that the legislation constitutes a class action and refuses to 
certify it as a class action, then it would go right back to the State 
court and they could

[[Page H8586]]

proceed with their lawsuit just as if nothing had ever happened. It 
would defeat the entire purpose of eliminating forum shopping and it 
would defeat the entire purpose of making sure that State court judges 
do not interpret the laws of a multitude of other States.
  The whole purpose is to allow the removal of more interstate class 
actions to Federal courts where they are most appropriately heard. This 
amendment would make that change worthless.
  The amendment would constitute a full endorsement, not a correction, 
of the rampant class-action abuse that is occurring in State courts. 
When a Federal court denies class certification in a case, it is 
typically because litigating the case on a class basis would likely 
result in a denial of a class member's or a defendant's due process 
rights or basic fairness principles. This amendment would invite State 
courts to overrule such Federal court determinations; it would invite 
State courts to advance class actions that a Federal court has 
determined would deny due process rights or be unfair to unnamed class 
members.
  The amendment is based on the myth that most States have class-action 
rules radically different from the Federal class-action rule, and that 
if a Federal judge judges that a class case may not proceed as a class 
action under the Federal rule, counsel should be able to take their 
case back to State court and try their luck under the State rule. In 
reality, the vast majority of States have class action rules that track 
the Federal court class-action rule, or have held that the Federal 
court precedence should guide State courts in making class 
certification determinations. The problem is that when the rules are 
largely the same, local judges in many States do not rigorously follow 
these rules, and their misguided class certification determinations are 
not readily subject to proper review.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
that statement, because I think that makes it clear what we are talking 
about.
  The gentleman has just said that the problem is that the rules are 
the same but a lot of local, i.e. State, judges, are misguided. So this 
is not a statement that the Federal judges have superior wisdom; and it 
is, as the gentleman said, an effort to prevent the misguided actions 
of State judges who cannot be trusted to carry out their own State 
laws.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, the legislation does 
not make any distinction between the wisdom of State court judges in 
general or Federal court judges in general; it says that State court 
judges should not be determining the law of other States.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would 
continue to yield, the gentleman just referred to misguided State 
judges. He acknowledges that the rules are largely the same, and what 
he is saying is, the Federal judges will be guided and they will have 
to guide those misguided State judges. It is okay to think that.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, again reclaiming my time, all I am 
saying to the gentleman is that we should not allow anybody to have two 
bites of the apple, and that is what the gentleman's amendment provides 
for.
  The amendment would create enormous inefficiencies and a parade of 
abuses. In particular, if a defendant fights to defeat class 
certification and wins in Federal court, it will have to turn around 
and mount the fight all over again.
  The amendment is premised on the false assumption that class 
proponents will not get a full opportunity to obtain class 
certification under the current bill. They will. As presently drafted, 
the legislation will allow litigants multiple chances to obtain 
certification of proposed classes after removal to Federal court. If 
the first class proposal in a removed action fails, nothing in this 
bill precludes the class representatives from making revised class 
proposals to the Federal court.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Goodlatte was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, even after the case is dismissed in 
Federal court, it can be refiled in State court. After the class 
certification fails, it would not preclude the plaintiff from offering 
additional class proposals. They just cannot go back in with the same 
class proposal, because that class has not been certified in Federal 
court.
  Suggestions that H.R. 1875 would federalize all class action rules 
ignore the current situation, and it ignores the situation that I 
referred to earlier. It has been suggested that this amendment would 
prevent H.R. 1875 from federalizing class action rules. In reality, the 
amendment would perpetuate the federalization of class action rules 
that is occurring now. At present, a handful of State courts dictate 
Federal class action policy.
  By taking an ``anything goes'' approach to class actions, those few 
State courts have become a magnet for class actions. Such courts hear a 
disproportionate number of multi-State and nationwide class actions 
because they are very lax about what they will certify for class 
treatment. Passing this bill will standardize the process and make sure 
that no one State court drives the policy.
  Oppose this amendment and support the bill.
  Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I will be brief in stating my opposition to this 
amendment. If the amendment is adopted, the basic reform that we are 
seeking in this legislation simply would not be achieved. Some cases 
simply should not be certified as class actions, either in State or in 
Federal courts. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is narrowly drawn so 
as to protect the normal rights of both plaintiffs and defendants. 
Under rule 23, cases that are overly broad will not be certified as 
class actions.
  When cases are denied class action status, all of the individual 
members of the purported class are then free to file their individual 
actions for damages. And so, in the failure of class certification, 
absolutely no one is denied the opportunity to seek recovery for 
whatever damages they may have incurred.
  If the amendment of the gentleman from Massachusetts is adopted, any 
case which, because of its broad scope, fails to meet the class 
certification requirements of rule 23 of the Federal rules, and 
therefore, is dismissed as a class action in Federal court, could then 
be certified as a class action in the State that has looser 
certification standards. That State would then be the final arbiter of 
whether or not the class would be certified, because removal to the 
Federal court would then no longer be allowed.
  The national cases that involve the residents of many States that are 
our concern and that underlie this legislation would, under this 
amendment, still be heard in State courts, and so our basic purpose 
would not be achieved. The reform that we are seeking would not be put 
into effect, and for that reason, I urge the defeat of the amendment.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BOUCHER. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding, because I want to straighten something out now.
  The previous speaker said that some of us were operating under a 
myth, but the myth was just propagated by my friend from Virginia, not 
by us. I would say to my other friend from Virginia, he accused the 
sponsor of this amendment of holding the view that there were different 
State and Federal standards for certifying, and he said that was not 
the case, it is just that the Federal Government is better at this than 
the State judges. But as the gentleman from Virginia now standing who 
graciously yielded to me just said that some of the States have looser 
standards.
  So I do want to point out that there appears to be some difference 
between the two gentlemen from Virginia here.
  Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, let me say that it is 
true that most of the States have standards that are roughly coincident 
with rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but there are 
some

[[Page H8587]]

 States that have not adopted that rule. There are some States that, in 
fact, do have broader and looser standards than Federal rule 23; and in 
many of the instances where abuses have arisen, it is because of those 
somewhat broader standards.
  We have a whole series of cases that the gentleman and I discussed 
when this matter was in the committee where the State that is 
certifying a class will be applying its law in such a way as to bind 
all of the Members of the class and make sure that that particular 
State's law dominates the decision, notwithstanding the fact that in 
the State of the residents of many of those individuals, the law is 
very different. That reversed federalism, which does enormous damages 
to our traditional principles of federalism is yet another abuse that 
we are seeking to remedy.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will again 
yield, I just wanted to point out that that argument, that there are 
some States with different standards, is contrary to the argument given 
by our other colleague from Virginia. I just wanted to point that out. 
He said we were operating under the myth that there were these States 
with different standards, and that, in fact, the standards detract from 
each other.
  The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Boucher) is now acknowledging that 
there are some States with different standards, and I think that is 
frankly a better way to go than to have the argument that we previously 
heard that there were these misguided State judges who were misapplying 
the rules.
  In any case, I would say this. I would like to have a hearing and 
call forward officials from those States; I think it would be useful. 
Which States are we talking about? Which are the States that are 
abusive? We ought to be able to know which States we are talking about, 
and I think we ought to give those States, because I do not remember 
hearing where we asked those States to come and justify their loose 
procedures.

                              {time}  1415

  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BOUCHER. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. I thank the gentleman for yielding, Mr. Chairman.
  Would it not be possible that both facts are true; that in some 
States the certification process is different than the standards 
followed in the Federal courts and followed by most of the other 
States, and it could also be true that in some States some judges do 
not follow standards that are loosely applied?
  Mr. BOUCHER. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman 
from Virginia is precisely right. Even in those States that have 
standards that approximate Federal rule XXIII, there is a divergence 
oftentimes in the courts of that very State in terms of how those 
standards are applied.
  Oftentimes, the States do not offer the right of interlocutory appeal 
on the pure question of class certification. So for the defendants to 
have an opportunity to challenge the application of that particular 
State's certification rules, the entire process of the trial has to be 
undertaken, has to be concluded. That is a waste of time, resources, 
and money for all parties concerned.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield 
further, I agree that intellectually both can be true.
  I would simply point out to the gentleman from Virginia, he is one 
who referred to one of those truths as a myth. The gentleman from 
Virginia first declared it was a myth, and then announced it was true. 
I am willing to wait for his judgment as to which he means.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that as we weigh the 
intelligence and ability of the Federal judges versus the State judges, 
it is the Federal judges and the Judicial Conference of the United 
States that do not want this bill.
  They have used the most delicate language imaginable: ``Concern was 
also expressed about the conflict between these provisions of the bill 
and long-recognized principles of Federalism.'' Get it? That is what 
they are saying: Please do not give us this. They demean the State 
court judges, but the Federal judges to whom they are giving this do 
not want it.
  But since they insist on giving it to them, the Frank-Conyers-Berman-
Meehan amendment, this amendment, merely gives the State court the 
opportunity to reject or accept a class certification determination.
  The debate that has been going on here assumes that anything that 
comes back to the State court is going to automatically be certified as 
a class action. The State court has the option of determining whether 
there will be a certification. They may well turn it down. What it does 
do, this amendment, is to stop the merry-go-round effect of always 
allowing any State court determination to be removed to the State 
court.
  So this amendment provides simply that if, after removal, the Federal 
court determines that no aspect of an action that is subject to its 
jurisdiction may be maintained as a class action under rule 23, the 
court shall remand the class action to the State court, without the 
opportunity to be removed again to the Federal court. The State could 
then proceed with a class certification determination.
  After the determination, if the district court determines that the 
action subject to its jurisdiction does not satisfy the rule 23 
requirements, then the court must dismiss the action. This has the 
effect of striking the class action claim. While the class action claim 
may be refiled again, any such refiled action may be remanded again if 
the district court has original jurisdiction.
  Therefore, even if a State court would subsequently certify the 
class, it could be removed again, creating a revolving door between the 
Federal and State court.
  Mr. Chairman, all we are doing is stopping the revolving door action. 
It is a modest improvement to a measure that is likely not to be kindly 
received by the administration. This would make it a little bit better.
  This provision unfairly prohibits class action lawsuits from being 
certified by State courts under the State class action rules, which 
could be more lenient than Federal rule 23. As a result, individual 
actions could be the only recourse for the plaintiff, and this will 
eliminate the benefits of a class action in the first place. This is 
why class actions were created, to seek compensation as a class from 
the industry because individual lawsuits are too costly.
  I urge my colleagues to support the amendment, which will allow the 
Federal courts the first opportunity to review a class action, but not 
cut off other class action rights in the State courts.
  Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I think this amendment addresses, really, the central 
point of this debate: Is this a bill about banning all kinds of class 
actions, or is this debate really about making a change in the 
diversity rules?
  The proponents of this bill argue that this bill represents a minor 
change in the rules of civil procedure and has no impact on the 
meritorious class action lawsuits. The way the bill is drafted, 
however, belies that claim. Instead, it would prohibit the formation of 
almost all State class actions.
  This amendment would correct that problem by only permitting the 
defendant to remove a class action suit to Federal court once. If it is 
removed and does not receive Federal certification, then the class can 
go forward with their class action on the State level if and only if 
they succeed in receiving certification under the rules of that 
particular State.
  By ending the possibility of repeated removals, this amendment ends 
the merry-go-round of removals and preserves meritorious State claims 
actions. Without this amendment, almost no class actions would be able 
to form on the State level without defendants being able to repeatedly 
whisk them away to Federal court.
  The goal of this legislation is supposed to be a technical change to 
the diversity jurisdiction rules, not a preclusion of all class action 
lawsuits. Unfortunately, the way this bill is drafted clearly 
demonstrates that it intends to preclude class actions, not simply 
correct diversity jurisdiction problems.

[[Page H8588]]

  Mr. Chairman, I urge support for this amendment.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, on the face of it, this may seem to be a corrective 
measure. The problem is that this is a classic loophole. There are a 
handful of States that have lax certification standards.
  Some might argue that that is what this legislation is all about, 
that there are certain States that are havens for frivolous class 
action lawsuits. What this does is to say, you play by the rules, you 
go to the Federal court, the Federal court finds that your suit is 
without sufficient merit, and then if you lose, you have the recourse 
to go right back to the States with the most lax certification 
standards and start the case over again.
  That is the problem with this. If we were talking about having an 
opportunity to appeal to a Federal court, that would be a more 
legitimate alternative and one that I think would have merit, 
personally. I cannot speak for the other sponsors, but I think that 
might have had merit. This, what this does is to open up a loophole. It 
is a loophole that in fact will become the standard course of action on 
the part of plaintiff's attorneys who have figured out how to best 
abuse the existing system.
  So that is why I have to oppose this legislation. Even though my very 
good friends and people whose judgment I highly respect have offered 
this amendment, I am afraid that perhaps unwittingly, I am sure 
unwittingly, they are offering legislation that will open up a loophole 
that will really nullify the intent of this corrective reform 
legislation. For that reason, I really think our colleagues should 
oppose it.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I would just ask my friend, 
in his experience, has he ever heard himself or any other Member refer 
flatteringly to a Member whose amendment he intended to support?
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Actually, not. We offer the most ungenuine 
flattery to those who we intend to oppose most vigorously. But that 
does not mean that I did not mean it when I say that the gentleman is a 
friend and a very credible and respected colleague, I say to the 
gentleman from Massachusetts. It is just that the gentleman's 
legislation does not make sense.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. In the future, I would trade three 
compliments for one vote.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. The gentleman will not get that. He will have 
all the compliments he wants, but I certainly would not vote for this 
legislation. I would not encourage any of my colleagues to vote for it, 
either.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 295, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Frank) will be postponed.


                 Amendment No. 6 Offered by Ms. Waters

  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 6 offered by Ms. Waters:
       Page 10, line 4, strike ``The'' and insert ``(a) In 
     General.--The''.
       Page 10, lines 5 and 6, strike ``date of the enactment of 
     this Act'' and insert ``date certified by the Judicial 
     Conference under subsection (b)''.
       Page 10, insert the following after line 6:
       (b) Certification by Judicial Conference.--The Judicial 
     Conference of the United States shall certify in writing to 
     the Congress the first date on or after the date of the 
     enactment of this Action which the number of vacancies of 
     judgeships authorized for the United States courts of 
     appeals, the United States district courts, and the United 
     States Court of Federal Claims, is less than 3 percent of all 
     such judgeships.

  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment provides that this bill, 
H.R. 1875, would take effect only once the Judicial Conference of the 
United States has certified in writing that fewer than 3 percent of 
Federal judgeships remain unfilled.
  I remain firm in my opposition to H.R. 1875 because the bill as 
designed will dramatically increase the workload of the Federal 
judiciary. The bill's very purpose is to transfer to the Federal courts 
a large portion of class action lawsuits currently handled by State 
courts.
  The current workload of the Federal judiciary is already hampered by 
the backlog of cases, largely due in part because of low-level drug 
crimes prosecuted under the ill-conceived mandatory minimum drug 
sentence. The over-federalization of crimes, coupled with the judicial 
vacancies on the Federal bench, results in meritorious civil claims not 
being heard.
  I come from a people who are all too familiar with the maxim, 
``Justice delayed is justice denied.'' On May 11, 1998, the 
conservative Supreme Court Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the 
Senate is ``moving too slowly in filling the vacancies on the Federal 
bench.'' He also criticized the Congress and the President for ``their 
propensity to enact more and more legislation, which brings more cases 
into the Federal court system.''
  He said, ``We need more vacancies to deal with the cases arising 
under existing laws, but if Congress enacts and the President signs new 
laws allowing more cases to be brought into Federal courts, just 
filling the vacancies will not be enough. We need additional 
judgeships.''
  Mr. Chairman, allow me to detail the judicial vacancy crisis. 
Currently, there are 68 Federal judicial vacancies, or approximately 
8.5 percent of the Federal judicial positions. On average, Federal 
District Court judges have 398 civil filings pending.
  The Senate in 1999 has confirmed only seven judges. Forty more await 
action, either on the floor or in the Committee on the Judiciary. Yet, 
Mr. Chairman, Senator Trent Lott has clearly indicated that filling 
judicial vacancies is not a priority. Last week, in regard to the 
nomination of a judiciary candidate, the Senator stated, ``There are 
not a lot of people saying, give us more Federal judges.'' He further 
said, ``I am trying to move this thing along, but getting more Federal 
judges is not what I came here to do.''
  Meanwhile, 23 vacancies are categorized by the Judicial Conference as 
judicial emergencies, meaning either that the court in question is 
facing a burdensome caseload, or that the slot has been vacant for 18 
months. As of June 1, fully one-fourth of the positions on the Ninth 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals had not been filled. The Third Circuit 
has a whopping 20.3 percent judicial vacancy.
  Mr. Chairman, the failure of movement on the judicial nominations to 
the Federal court borders on malpractice.

                              {time}  1430

  Clearly, the majority has decided to play political football with the 
President's nominees at the expense of the American people who have 
cases that are in need of resolution.
  I understand that this body does not have the power to order the 
other body to confirm the judicial nominees. However, this amendment 
would provide that the judiciary not undertake additional cases unless 
there are enough judges to address the suits before the courts.
  This amendment is reasonable and is one that should be supported. Mr. 
Chairman, these numbers speak for themselves. I urge my colleagues to 
support this amendment.
  Let me just conclude by saying I do not have to make a further case. 
We all know this. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) on the 
other side of the aisle is even smiling because the case is so clear.
  Here we are talking about putting an additional burden on our Federal 
courts, and we cannot fill the vacancies, and we have no movement from 
the very people who claim that this must be done in the interest of 
fairness.
  Well, I do not think they can make a case for this. I do not think 
anybody believes this. They do not even believe it. They know that the 
courts are backed up, and they know that even those in their own party 
have spoken

[[Page H8589]]

 about this terrible problem that we have with these vacancies.
  Do not try and overburden these courts even more and back up the 
cases. If they really want to do something, they will get in their 
conference, and they will urge Senator Lott and the others on the other 
side of the aisle to move these judgeships so we can take care of the 
cases that are already there.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I must say to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Waters) the reason I was smiling is because, to state it kindly, this 
amendment is sort of a sneak attack on the bill, because it has the 
effect of gutting the bill.
  What her amendment provides for is the bill does not go into effect 
until the Federal court vacancies are below 3 percent. Well, guess 
what? In the last 15 years, the Federal court vacancies have never been 
below 3 percent, including a number of instances where there have been 
Democratically controlled U.S. Senates and Republican Presidents.
  So I do not think we should inject ourselves into that debate going 
on over in the Senate. In fact, the time that the vacancy rate was the 
highest was just before when President Bush went out in 1991. Instead 
of the over 8 percent vacancy rate that the gentlewoman cited that 
exists today, the vacancy rate in 1991 was 16.4 percent.
  So there is no doubt that the purpose of this amendment is simply to 
defeat the legislation; and, therefore, I strongly oppose it.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. I am delighted to yield to the gentlewoman from 
California.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman from Virginia like to 
substitute the 3 percent for any number that he thinks is fair and 
reasonable?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. No, Mr. Chairman. Reclaiming my time, I must say that 
I do not want to inject us into that dispute going on between the 
Senate and the President for this legislation or any other legislation 
we have on the floor. This legislation should stand on its own merits, 
and it does.
  One of the concerns addressed is that somehow we are overloading the 
Federal judiciary. But let me point out that the concern fails to look 
at our judicial system as a whole.
  One of the reasons we need this bill is that many of our State courts 
are not equipped to deal with these massive complicated class action 
cases. Indeed, many State courts have crushing case loads and far less 
staffing, such as magistrate judges and law clerks and other staff, 
available to manage such cases.
  Civil filings in State courts of general jurisdiction have increased 
28 percent since 1984 versus only 4 percent increase in our Federal 
courts. By barring interstate class actions from Federal court one is 
not solving any problem. One is just keeping these cases before courts 
that cannot deal with them effectively and fairly.
  This concern also ignores the fact that the number of diversity 
jurisdiction cases being filed in Federal court is going down 
dramatically. During the 12-month period ending March 31, 1998, 
diversity jurisdiction case filings in Federal courts fell 6 percent. 
Through the end of 1998, the decrease is even more dramatic.
  This concern also ignores the fact that, since 1990, the number of 
Federal district court judgeships that Congress has authorized to deal 
with the workload has increased 12.3 percent to 646 judgeships and that 
the number of senior judges with staff who are now assisting with the 
case load is up 64 percent, now 276 judges since 1985.
  This concern also fails to take account of the fact that this bill 
actually has the potential to reduce judicial workload. At present, 
when identical class actions are filed in Federal and State courts all 
over the country, as often occurs, there is no mechanism for 
consolidating those cases before one judge for efficient uniform 
treatment. So numerous different judges are dealing with the same 
cases, processing the same issues, and all dealing with the same 
problems.
  However, if these cases were in Federal court, all of those cases 
would be consolidated before one judge who could deal with the issues 
once and be done with it.
  The opponents' arguments also do not take account of the fact that 
many completely frivolous lawsuits are being filed because attorneys 
know they can get away with it before certain State courts. I doubt 
that many of these wasteful suits would be filed if the attorneys know 
that they will be facing a Federal district court judge.
  Finally, I note that this amendment effectively states that we will 
let interstate class actions into Federal court if they have the time. 
That is horrible policy.
  What we are talking about here is a right conferred to those engaged 
in interstate commerce by Article III of the Constitution to have 
access to our Federal courts to avoid the biases that might be 
encountered in State courts.
  When it comes to criminal rights issues, we do not say to defendants 
they can have them if the court has time. When it comes to civil rights 
cases, we do not say that plaintiffs can have access to Federal courts 
if they have time. Why should this be any different?
  Mr. Chairman, I urge opposition to this amendment.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, the problem with this legislation, and it is not a 
problem with the intent whatsoever, and I respect the intent that we do 
not want to overburden Federal judges so that they cannot judiciously 
consider every case before them, but the problem is that we are passing 
legislation that is intended to pass the test of time. We are passing 
it presumably for generations to come.
  So we can very well have a situation where we might double, triple, 
quadruple the number of Federal judges. We could have more Federal 
judges than we would ever need. But if 97 percent of those judges are 
the maximum slots that we can fill, if at any time we have a 3 percent 
vacancy, no matter what the total number of judges is, then we would 
say no class actions can be filed at the Federal court in terms of the 
class actions that we are trying to deal with. It has no set number.
  So we could deal with the situation where we could have twice, three 
times the number of Federal judges we have today, and still this 
amendment would be operable, and one would not be able to implement 
this amendment because one did not have 97 percent of the slots filled 
even though many of those slots might one day be in excess of the need 
that was actually required.
  That is the problem with the legislation, not the intent, but the 
possibility that this might create a situation that, in fact, was 
irrational and that, in fact, would undermine the intent of the 
legislation.
  Ms. DeGETTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. I am happy to yield to the gentlewoman from 
Colorado.
  Ms. DeGETTE. Mr. Chairman, does the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
Moran) ever know of a situation where we have added more Federal judges 
when we did not need them in our Federal system? Have we ever actually 
added Federal judges when the case loads did not warrant it?
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentlewoman 
from Colorado that we are not passing legislation to serve the 
interests of the past. We are passing legislation to serve the 
interests of the future. So what has been the case in the past is not 
as relevant as what might be the case in the future.
  It is very well possible that we may substantially increase the 
number of Federal judges and then, just because we have a 3 percent 
vacancy, the intent of this legislation is essentially null and void. 
That is not a situation that I am sure my colleague would want to 
create.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. I am happy to yield to the gentlewoman from 
California.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, the question was asked, but let me just 
frame it a little bit differently. Has there ever been a time in the 
history of this Nation that the gentleman from Virginia can identify 
when we were overstaffed in the Federal court?
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, again, I would say to the 
gentlewoman from California, my friend and

[[Page H8590]]

respected colleague, that what has happened in the past, while it might 
be precedent, is not as relevant to this legislation as what will 
happen in the future. We are not passing legislation to apply to the 
past. We are passing legislation to apply to the future.
  I would hope that this Congress, in concert with the Senate, would in 
fact increase the number of Federal judiciary slots to meet the need. 
Even if it exceeded the need, if in fact it was a 3 percent vacancy 
which might be rational at some point in time, then it would nullify 
this legislation. That is not a situation I am sure that my colleague 
would want to create.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, certainly the gentleman does not believe 
that we are attempting to pass legislation for the past.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. That is right.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, we refer to the history of the court, the 
fact that it has never been overstaffed, that the vacancy problem has 
grown because we have the documentation that shows that we need more 
and more judges to take care of the case loads that they are now 
confronted with.
  So the idea of the legislation is not to legislate for the past, but 
certainly documentation and information that indicate the path that it 
has traveled in the past would be relevant to the legislation that we 
are attempting to pass today.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, if the 
gentlewoman wants to propose legislation to substantially increase the 
number of Federal judiciary positions, I would cosponsor that 
legislation in a New York minute or a Los Angeles minute. I certainly 
think we ought to increase the number of Federal judges, but I do not 
think we should pass this legislation.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, rather than legislation that would increase 
the number of judgeships, could the gentleman kindly say to the people 
he is supporting on this legislation to urge the Senate and the 
Republican leadership to simply do their job.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I represent the people of the 
United States presumably. I appreciate the gentlewoman's comments.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. I think it is 
not a good idea to tie the receipt by the Federal court of cases based 
on the number of judges that they have.
  It has been pointed out just in some discussions about this here 
that, what happens if we have pending cases and the percent rises above 
the 3 percent, is that then that we have to move those cases out? It 
just is very complicated and most unusual.
  But what I would like to do at this point is simply bring some 
context to this debate on Federal judges. The United States district 
judges are the judges that these cases first come to. We have appellate 
judges beyond that up to the Supreme Court.
  But we are talking about the district court judges that would hear 
these cases. Currently, there are 636 United States district judges 
across the country generally broken down among 93, I think it is 93 
districts. We have 93 U.S. attorneys. It is 93 or 94, somewhere in that 
number. We have 636 district judges of which there are 30 district 
judges pending in the Senate. There are 12 vacancies where the 
President has not submitted any names. So roughly 42 pending and 636 in 
place.
  If we average that out, again this is purely an average over the 93 
districts, we see somewhere between six and seven judges per district, 
and something less than one-half a judge short in each district.
  So the numbers are not quite as dramatic as one might argue here. We 
are at roughly 95 percent right now. It looks like there is enough 
blame to go around on both sides, with the President not submitting 
names and the Congress not acting to account for the 42 different 
judges.
  But, again, the underlying law, the underlying amendment itself is 
not good, and I urge my colleagues to vote against that.
  Ms. DeGETTE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, the legislation before us would take another step in 
overwhelming our Federal court system. The legislation will also serve 
to weaken the ability of consumers to enforce consumer health and 
safety, environmental, and civil rights laws.

                              {time}  1445

  For these reasons and others, I will oppose the legislation. But if 
we are going to pass the legislation, the very least we can do is pass 
this important amendment to protect the Federal court system from being 
further taxed.
  Congress' responsibility vis-a-vis the courts is funding the 
judiciary, creating the appropriate number of Federal courts, and 
filling Federal vacancies, and maintaining a delicate balance between 
what should be a Federal issue and what should properly be addressed in 
the State courts. Now, how are we doing on these issues? Contrary to 
what we have just heard, the House, for example, provided the Federal 
court system with around $240 million less than that requested by the 
administration. With reduced funding, the court certainly cannot handle 
additional caseloads, as this bill calls for.
  What happens in the Federal courts, as someone who was just 
practicing in them as recently as 3 years ago, and rightly so because 
of speedy trial concerns, criminal cases take precedence to civil 
cases. So all of these civil cases we are moving to the Federal courts 
will simply languish if we do not have Federal judges to hear them.
  As we have heard, the Federal court system has 64 vacancies currently 
and anticipates 17 more vacancies shortly. Regrettably, many of these 
vacancies are concentrated in districts where, as my colleagues have 
also heard, we have judicial emergencies. What does this mean? At its 
March 1999 session, the Judicial Conference of the United States said 
that judicial emergency means as follows: any vacancy in a district 
court where the waited filings are in excess of 600 per judgeship, or 
any vacancy in existence more than 18 months where the waited filings 
are between 430 to 600 per judgeship. And it goes on.
  Six hundred per judgeship. And all of the proponents of this bill are 
saying, well, we need to move the more complex cases to Federal Court 
because the judges will have time to hear them. If we do not fill these 
open judgeships, we will not have time to hear these complex cases.
  In my own district of Colorado, not the largest judicial district in 
this country, we have one open judgeship that has been open for almost 
2 years. We have two more coming up, and we have another coming up in 
the 10th Circuit. This is in a very small judicial district. And this 
plays havoc with the ability to hear any case whatsoever.
  We can put the blame on whoever we want. We can put the blame on the 
White House. We can put the blame on the Senate or whoever, but the 
point is the people who are constitutionally required in this country 
to appoint judges need to do so before we can have true justice for 
anybody in either a civil or a criminal case, but most especially in 
the civil cases that are languishing now in our courts, the civil 
rights cases, the consumer cases, the complex environmental cases. We 
need to fill these judgeships before we can put even more cases into 
those courts.
  So I urge my colleagues, let us put some impetus into filling these 
vacancies. Let us pass this amendment, at the very least, if we are 
going to pass this legislation.
  Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words, and I rise in support of the amendment by the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Waters) and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Delahunt).
  We have heard in this discussion that the vacancy rate in Federal 
courts is approximately 9 percent today. And of course when that 
happens, we end up with a stacking of cases. So what we have here is 
the Republicans blocking appointments to fill the vacancies, to lessen 
the burden of the workload. And as a result of that blocking, we have 
stacking. We have blocking and stacking, blocking and stacking.

[[Page H8591]]

  And now, on top of all of that, the proposal in the bill seeks to 
stack even further against those who need a place where they can raise 
their issues of social conscience, of economic justice, of 
environmental concerns, and consumer concerns.
  Mr. Chairman, some years ago, hundreds of people in the State of 
Washington fell ill, seriously ill. Many of them began to convulse 
uncontrollably, others suffered from kidney failure and, in fact, three 
children died. The public health officials searched frantically to find 
the cause of this epidemic, and they soon found it. The culprit, of 
course, was deadly E. Coli bacteria in undercooked hamburger that was 
sold at the Jack in the Box restaurants.
  Well, I do not think there is anybody in this chamber or watching who 
would argue with the fact that the giant corporation that runs this 
chain should be held responsible, should be held accountable for what 
happened here. They should be responsible for their negligence because 
of what happened to these people and because of the death of these 
three children. Under current American law, those who have been wronged 
or have been injured have a right to seek restitution. That is the way 
the system works. And under the current law they can join together to 
seek this justice. And in the case of the contaminated hamburgers, they 
did just that. Unfortunately, under this legislation that we are 
considering today, these victims would have little recourse.
  Under this legislation, they would have had no choice but to choke 
down this toxic meat. And under this legislation, consumers would find 
it much, much harder to come together, to join together as a group to 
fight some of the most powerful, strongest institutions or 
organizations in this country. That is what class action is all about, 
organizations that sometimes, unfortunately, abuse their trust, our 
trust, rip consumers off, or put, in this case of the E. Coli bacteria, 
put their lives at risk.
  The current tort system may have its flaws, Mr. Chairman, but at its 
core it still offers Americans the best and, in many cases, their only 
shot at justice. So I want to urge my colleagues to support the 
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California and the gentleman 
from Massachusetts. I want to urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on 
that amendment and to cast a vote for accountability, a vote for 
justice, a vote for environmental concerns, a vote for economic justice 
concerns and consumer concerns, and vote ``no'' on this legislation.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, among the many benefits of this procedure of clustering 
votes after the debate on a number of amendments, in addition to the 
far better use of a Member's time, is the fact that a Member who comes 
in too late to debate the amendment he wanted to debate, gets a chance 
to debate that amendment on the next amendment. So I rise in support of 
the Waters amendment but also in support and speaking on behalf of the 
Frank amendment.
  We have heard a lot about the problems of judicial vacancies in the 
context of this particular amendment. I think it cannot be disputed 
that as a result of what this bill seeks to do, with its very open and 
permissive abilities to remove class-action suits to Federal court, the 
vast majority of class action suits, which raise State law issues and 
only State law issues, will end up being heard in the Federal courts. 
This in a system bogged down with large backlogs; bogged down with a 
number of judicial vacancies.
  I am sure no one could have put it better than the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Frank), whom I missed in terms of his debate on his 
amendment, the relative absurdity of the situation where now, with very 
permissive removal rules, a class-action case involving a State law is 
removed to a Federal court, and the Federal judge determines that, 
applying his notions of the law, that that class is not appropriately 
certified. At that particular point one would normally expect that it 
could be remanded back to the State level for a determination by the 
State courts of whether under State law it is appropriate to certify 
the class. Without the Frank amendment, such an action will then again, 
with the new lawsuit, be removed back to Federal Court. And we will 
never get out of this revolving door.
  So the amendment of the gentleman from Massachusetts, which makes it 
clear that once a Federal judge has refused to certify the class, that 
action may be brought in State court, cannot be removed, and it will be 
up to the State justice system to decide whether there is an 
appropriate class to certify makes a little bit of sense out of this 
otherwise both, I think, damaging and somewhat senseless proposal that, 
in effect, will deprive huge numbers of people of class action remedies 
in State courts or in Federal courts on matters that are essentially 
matters of State law.
  I support the Frank amendment; I support the Waters amendment. If 
those amendments do not pass, I urge this bill be defeated.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, let me echo the words expressed by the gentlewoman from 
Colorado. This is not about blame. This is not about blaming the Senate 
or blaming the White House. This is really about justice for the 
American people. I do not think there is any debate that justice 
delayed is justice denied. And that is happening now. That is happening 
every day in our court system now.
  Now, this amendment provides that the bill would take effect only 
once the judicial conference of the United States has certified in 
writing that fewer than 3 percent of the Federal judgeships remain 
unfulfilled. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that the 
depleted ranks of the Federal branch are restored to their full 
strength before the courts are asked to take on a new massive workload 
that this bill would generate.
  There should be no doubt that 1875 will have a dramatic impact on the 
workload of the Federal courts, because its very purpose is to transfer 
to the Federal system a large proportion of the class-action cases that 
are currently handled at the State level. The Federal courts, if the 
underlying bill should pass, will be swamped at a moment when they are 
already overwhelmed by mounting caseloads.
  Since 1990, the number of civil cases filed in Federal court have 
increased by 22 percent, criminal cases by 25 percent, and appeals by 
more than 30 percent. In response to this judicial crisis, the Judicial 
Conference has asked Congress to authorize an additional 69 judgeships, 
yet not one new judgeship has been authorized or created since 1990, 
for almost 10 years. And of the 843 judgeships that currently exist, 
65, more than 8 percent, are currently vacant. Many have remained 
unfulfilled for more than a year and a half.
  Last year, the Chief Justice himself took the unprecedented step of 
publicly chastising the Senate for its failure to act on pending 
nominations and warned of the consequences if Congress continues to 
enact legislation, exactly like the bill that is before us now, that 
expands the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. His concerns have been 
echoed by the Justice Department, the American Bar Association, and the 
Judicial Conference. Let us listen to those who have to deal with the 
problem every day. Every day.
  Just yesterday, a nonpartisan organization known as Citizens for 
Independent Courts issued a report which found that the average time it 
takes to nominate and confirm a Federal judge has increased 
dramatically over the past 20 years. And at the same time, here we are 
considering a bill that would impose a major new burden on the 
Judiciary without regard to its impact on that branch of Government, 
and without giving our courts the resources they need to do the job.
  I daresay, Mr. Chairman, if there was an impact statement that was 
mandated to be filed with this legislation, it would never be here on 
the floor of the House. It would not happen.

                              {time}  1500

  I believe and suggest and submit that this is irresponsible on those 
grounds alone. I urge support for the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters).

[[Page H8592]]

  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 295, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Waters) will be postponed.


          Sequential Votes Postponed in Committee of the Whole

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 295, proceedings will now 
resume on those amendments on which further proceedings were postponed 
in the following order: Amendment No. 4 offered by the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Nadler), Amendment No. 3 offered by the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee), Amendment No. 2 offered by the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Frank), and Amendment No. 6 offered by the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters).
  The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for any electronic vote 
after the first vote in this series.


                 Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Nadler

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on Amendment No. 4 offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) 
on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes 
prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 152, 
noes 277, not voting 4, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 439]

                               AYES--152

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holt
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Klink
     Kucinich
     Lantos
     Larson
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Moran (VA)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stupak
     Tauscher
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                               NOES--277

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dingell
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (IN)
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hooley
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     Mascara
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Obey
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Schaffer
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Turner
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Coble
     Holden
     Jefferson
     Scarborough

                              {time}  1523

  Messrs. UPTON, KNOLLENBERG and GILMAN changed their vote from ``aye'' 
to ``no.''
  Mr. ENGEL, Mrs. JONES of Ohio and Mr. CLYBURN changed their vote from 
``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                      Announcement by the Chairman

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 295, the Chair announces 
that he will reduce to a minimum of 5 minutes the period of time within 
which a vote by electronic device will be taken on each amendment on 
which the Chair has postponed further proceedings.


          Amendment No. 3 Offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on Amendment No. 3 offered by the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-
Lee) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes 
prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 162, 
noes 266, not voting 5, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 440]

                               AYES--162

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Bilbray
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Clay
     Clement
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frost
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (FL)
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holt
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson, E. B.

[[Page H8593]]


     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Klink
     Kucinich
     Lantos
     Larson
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Moran (VA)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Shows
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stupak
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Traficant
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                               NOES--266

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (IN)
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hooley
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Obey
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Schaffer
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Turner
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Coble
     Holden
     Jefferson
     Roukema
     Scarborough

                              {time}  1531

  Mr. LoBiondo changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. ROEMER changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


         amendment no. 2 offered by mr. frank of massachusetts

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on Amendment No. 2 offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Frank) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the 
noes prevailed by a voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             recorded vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 202, 
noes 225, not voting 6, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 441]

                               AYES--202

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Campbell
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Ehrlich
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Greenwood
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holt
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pease
     Pelosi
     Phelps
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Shows
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                               NOES--225

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (WI)
     Gutknecht
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (IN)
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kasich
     Kelly
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton

[[Page H8594]]


     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--6

     Coble
     Holden
     Jefferson
     Miller, George
     Murtha
     Scarborough

                              {time}  1538

  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                 Amendment No. 6 Offered by Ms. Waters

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on Amendment No. 6 offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Waters) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the 
noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 185, 
noes 241, not voting 7, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 442]

                               AYES--185

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Carson
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Green (TX)
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holt
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Moore
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Phelps
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Shows
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tauscher
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                               NOES--241

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kasich
     Kelly
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paul
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Coble
     Emerson
     Gutierrez
     Holden
     Jefferson
     Radanovich
     Scarborough

                              {time}  1546

  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

                              {time}  1545

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there other amendments?
  If not, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as amended.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, 
was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Accordingly, under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
LaHood) having assumed the chair, Mr. Hansen, Chairman of the Committee 
of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that 
Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1875) to amend 
title 28, United States Code, to allow the application of the 
principles of Federal diversity jurisdiction to interstate class 
actions, pursuant to House Resolution 295, he reported the bill back to 
the House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on the amendment to the committee 
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the 
Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 222, 
noes 207, not voting 4, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 443]

                               AYES--222

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boucher

[[Page H8595]]


     Boyd
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Dickey
     Dooley
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Granger
     Green (WI)
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Myrick
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--207

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Campbell
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Chenoweth
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Graham
     Green (TX)
     Greenwood
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holt
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Phelps
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Shows
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tauscher
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Coble
     Holden
     Jefferson
     Scarborough

                              {time}  1604

  Mr. TAYLOR of North Carolina changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________