[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 119 (Tuesday, September 14, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H8166-H8177]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                   IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1999

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 1883) to provide for the application of measures to foreign 
persons who transfer to Iran certain goods, services, or technology and 
for other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                               H.R. 1883

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Nonproliferation Act of 
     1999''.

     SEC. 2. REPORTS ON PROLIFERATION TO IRAN.

       (a) Reports.--The President shall, at the times specified 
     in subsection (b), submit to the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report identifying every 
     foreign person with respect to whom there is credible 
     information indicating that that person, on or after January 
     1, 1999, transferred to Iran--
       (1) goods, services, or technology listed on--
       (A) the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for the Export 
     of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology (published by 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information 
     Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.3/Part 1, and subsequent revisions) 
     and Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use 
     Equipment, Material, and Related Technology (published by the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular 
     INFCIRC/254/Rev.3/Part 2, and subsequent revisions);
       (B) the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and 
     Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and subsequent revisions;
       (C) the lists of items and substances relating to 
     biological and chemical weapons the export of which is 
     controlled by the Australia Group;
       (D) the Schedule One or Schedule Two list of toxic 
     chemicals and precursors the export of which is controlled 
     pursuant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
     Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
     Weapons and on Their Destruction; or
       (E) the Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use Goods and 
     Technologies and Munitions list of July 12, 1996, and 
     subsequent revisions; or
       (2) goods, services, or technology not listed on any list 
     identified in paragraph (1) but which nevertheless would be, 
     if they were United States goods, services, or technology, 
     prohibited for export to Iran because of their potential to 
     make a material contribution to the development of nuclear, 
     biological, or chemical weapons, or of ballistic or cruise 
     missile systems.
       (b) Timing of Reports.--The reports under subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, not later than 6 months after such 
     date of enactment, and not later than the end of each 6-month 
     period thereafter.
       (c) Exceptions.--Any foreign person who--
       (1) was identified in a previous report submitted under 
     subsection (a) on account of a particular transfer, or
       (2) has engaged in a transfer on behalf of, or in concert 
     with, the Government of the United States,
      is not required to be identified on account of that same 
     transfer in any report submitted thereafter under this 
     section, except to the degree that new information has 
     emerged indicating that the particular transfer may have 
     continued, or been larger, more significant, or different in 
     nature than previously reported under this section.
       (d) Submission in Classified Form.--When the President 
     considers it appropriate, reports submitted under subsection 
     (a), or appropriate parts thereof, may be submitted in 
     classified form.

     SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF MEASURES TO CERTAIN FOREIGN PERSONS.

       (a) Application of Measures.--Subject to sections 4 and 5, 
     the President is authorized to apply with respect to each 
     foreign person identified in a report submitted pursuant to 
     section 2(a), for such period of time as he may determine, 
     any or all of the measures described in subsection (b).
       (b) Description of Measures.--The measures referred to in 
     subsections (a) are the following:
       (1) Executive order 12938 prohibitions.--The measures set 
     forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 4 of Executive 
     Order 12938 shall be applied with respect to that person.
       (2) Arms export prohibition.--The United States Government 
     shall not sell to that foreign person any item on the United 
     States Munitions List as in effect on August 8, 1995, and 
     shall terminate sales to that person of any defense articles, 
     defense services, or design and construction services under 
     the Arms Export Control Act.
       (3) Dual use export prohibition.--The President shall deny 
     licenses and suspend existing licenses for the transfer to 
     that person of items the export of which is controlled under 
     the Export Administration Act of 1979 or the Export 
     Administration Regulations.
       (c) Effective Date of Measures.--Measures applied pursuant 
     to subsection (a) shall be effective with respect to a 
     foreign person no later than--
       (1) 90 days after the report identifying the foreign person 
     is submitted, if the report is submitted on or before the 
     date required by section 2(b);
       (2) 90 days after the date required by section 2(b) for 
     submitting the report, if the report identifying the foreign 
     person is submitted within 60 days after that date; or
       (3) on the date that the report identifying the foreign 
     person is submitted, if that report is submitted more than 60 
     days after the date required by section 2(b).
       (d) Publication in Federal Register.--The application of 
     measures to a foreign person pursuant to subsection (a) shall 
     be announced by notice published in the Federal Register.

     SEC. 4. PROCEDURES IF MEASURES ARE NOT APPLIED.

       (a) Requirement To Notify Congress.--Should the President 
     not exercise the authority of section 3(a) to apply any or 
     all of the measures described in section 3(b) with respect to 
     a foreign person identified in a report submitted pursuant to 
     section 2(a), he shall so notify the Committee on 
     International Relations of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate no later 
     than the effective date under section 3(c) for measures with 
     respect to that person.
       (b) Written Justification.--Any notification submitted by 
     the President under subsection (a) shall include a written 
     justification describing in detail the facts and 
     circumstances relating specifically to the foreign person 
     identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a) 
     that support the President's decision not to exercise the 
     authority of section 3(a) with respect to that person.
       (c) Submission in Classified Form.--When the President 
     considers it appropriate, the notification of the President 
     under subsection (a), and the written justification under 
     subsection (b), or appropriate parts thereof, may be 
     submitted in classified form.

     SEC. 5. DETERMINATION EXEMPTING FOREIGN PERSON FROM SECTIONS 
                   3 AND 4.

       (a) In General.--Sections 3 and 4 shall not apply to a 
     foreign person 15 days after the President reports to the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate that the President has determined, on the basis of 
     information provided by that person, or otherwise obtained by 
     the President, that--
       (1) the person did not, on or after January 1, 1999, 
     knowingly transfer to Iran the goods, services, or technology 
     the apparent transfer of which caused that person to be 
     identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a);
       (2) the goods, services, or technology the transfer of 
     which caused that person to be identified in a report 
     submitted pursuant to section 2(a) did not materially 
     contribute to Iran's efforts to develop nuclear, biological, 
     or chemical weapons, or ballistic or cruise missile systems;
       (3) the person is subject to the primary jurisdiction of a 
     government that is an adherent to one or more relevant 
     nonproliferation regimes, the person was identified in a 
     report submitted pursuant to section 2(a) with respect to a 
     transfer of goods, services, or technology described in 
     section 2(a)(1), and such transfer was made consistent with 
     the guidelines and parameters of all such relevant regimes of 
     which such government is an adherent; or
       (4) the government with primary jurisdiction over the 
     person has imposed meaningful penalties on that person on 
     account of the transfer of the goods, services, or technology 
     which caused that person to be identified in a report 
     submitted pursuant to section 2(a).
       (b) Submission in Classified Form.--When the President 
     considers it appropriate, the determination and report of the 
     President under subsection (a), or appropriate parts thereof, 
     may be submitted in classified form.

     SEC. 6. RESTRICTION ON EXTRAORDINARY PAYMENTS IN CONNECTION 
                   WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION.

       (a) Restriction on Extraordinary Payments in Connection 
     With the International Space Station.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, no agency of the United States 
     Government may make extraordinary payments in connection with 
     the International Space Station to the Russian Space Agency, 
     any organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control 
     of the Russian Space Agency, or any other organization, 
     entity, or element of the Government of the Russian 
     Federation, unless, during the fiscal year in which the 
     extraordinary payments in connection with the International 
     Space Station are to be made, the President has made the 
     determination described in subsection (b), and reported such 
     determination to the Committee on International Relations and 
     the Committee on Science of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
       (b) Determination Regarding Russian Cooperation in 
     Preventing Proliferation to

[[Page H8167]]

     Iran.--The determination referred to in subsection (a) is a 
     determination by the President that--
       (1) it is the policy of the Government of the Russian 
     Federation to oppose the proliferation to Iran of weapons of 
     mass destruction and missile systems capable of delivering 
     such weapons;
       (2) the Government of the Russian Federation (including the 
     law enforcement, export promotion, export control, and 
     intelligence agencies of such government) has demonstrated 
     and continues to demonstrate through the implementation of 
     concrete steps a sustained commitment to seek out and prevent 
     the transfer to Iran of goods, services, and technology that 
     could make a material contribution to the development of 
     nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or of ballistic or 
     cruise missile systems, including through the imposition of 
     meaningful penalties on persons who make such transfers; and
       (3) neither the Russian Space Agency, nor any organization 
     or entity under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian 
     Space Agency, has, during the 1-year period prior to the date 
     of the determination pursuant to this subsection, made 
     transfers to Iran reportable under section 2(a) of this Act 
     (other than transfers with respect to which a determination 
     pursuant to section 5 has been or will be made).
       (c) Prior Notification.--Not less than 5 days before making 
     a determination under subsection (b), the President shall 
     notify the Committee on International Relations and the 
     Committee on Science of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce, 
     Science, and Transportation of the Senate of his intention to 
     make such determination.
       (d) Written Justification.--A determination of the 
     President under subsection (b) shall include a written 
     justification describing in detail the facts and 
     circumstances supporting the President's conclusion.
       (e) Submission in Classified Form.--When the President 
     considers it appropriate, a determination of the President 
     under subsection (b), a prior notification under subsection 
     (c), and a written justification under subsection (d), or 
     appropriate parts thereof, may be submitted in classified 
     form.
       (f) Exception for Crew Safety.--
       (1) Exception.--The National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration may make extraordinary payments that would 
     otherwise be prohibited under this section to the Russian 
     Space Agency or any organization or entity under the 
     jurisdiction or control of the Russian Space Agency if the 
     President has notified the Congress in writing that such 
     payments are necessary to prevent the imminent loss of life 
     by or grievous injury to individuals aboard the International 
     Space Station.
       (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after notifying 
     Congress that the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration will make extraordinary payments under 
     paragraph (1), the President shall submit to Congress a 
     report describing--
       (A) the extent to which the provisions of subsection (b) 
     had been met as of the date of notification; and
       (B) the measures that the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration is taking to ensure that--
       (i) the conditions posing a threat of imminent loss of life 
     by or grievous injury to individuals aboard the International 
     Space Station necessitating the extraordinary payments are 
     not repeated; and
       (ii) it is no longer necessary to make extraordinary 
     payments in order to prevent imminent loss of life by or 
     grievous injury to individuals aboard the International Space 
     Station.
       (g) Service Module Exception.--(1) The National Aeronautics 
     and Space Administration may make extraordinary payments that 
     would otherwise be prohibited under this section to the 
     Russian Space Agency, any organization or entity under the 
     jurisdiction or control of the Russian Space Agency, or any 
     subcontractor thereof for the construction, testing, 
     preparation, delivery, launch, or maintenance of the Service 
     Module if--
       (A) the President has notified Congress at least 5 days 
     before making such payments;
       (B) no report has been made under section 2 with respect to 
     an activity of the entity to receive such payment, and the 
     President has no information of any activity that would 
     require such a report; and
       (C) the United States will receive goods or services of 
     value to the United States commensurate with the value of the 
     extraordinary payments made.
       (2) For purposes of this subsection, the term 
     ``maintenance'' means activities which cannot be performed by 
     the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and which 
     must be performed in order for the Service Module to provide 
     environmental control, life support, and orbital maintenance 
     functions which cannot be performed by an alternative means 
     at the time of payment.
       (3) This subsection shall cease to be effective 60 days 
     after a United States propulsion module is in place at the 
     International Space Station.
       (h) Exception.--Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), no 
     agency of the United States Government may make extraordinary 
     payments in connection with the International Space Station 
     to any foreign person subject to measures applied pursuant 
     to--
       (1) section 3 of this Act; or
       (2) section 4 of Executive Order 12938 (November 14, 1994), 
     as amended by Executive Order 13094 (July 28, 1998).
     Such payments shall also not be made to any other entity if 
     the agency of the United States Government anticipates that 
     such payments will be passed on to such a foreign person.

     SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.

       For purposes of this Act, the following terms have the 
     following meanings:
       (1) Extraordinary payments in connection with the 
     international space station.--The term ``extraordinary 
     payments in connection with the International Space Station'' 
     means payments in cash or in kind made or to be made by the 
     United States Government--
       (A) for work on the International Space Station which the 
     Russian Government pledged at any time to provide at its 
     expense; or
       (B) for work on the International Space Station, or for the 
     purchase of goods or services relating to human space flight, 
     that are not required to be made under the terms of a 
     contract or other agreement that was in effect on January 1, 
     1999, as those terms were in effect on such date.
       (2) Foreign person; person.--The terms ``foreign person'' 
     and ``person'' mean--
       (A) a natural person that is an alien;
       (B) a corporation, business association, partnership, 
     society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, 
     organization, or group, that is organized under the laws of a 
     foreign country or has its principal place of business in a 
     foreign country;
       (C) any foreign governmental entity operating as a business 
     enterprise; and
       (D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any entity 
     described in subparagraph (B) or (C).
       (3) Executive order 12938.--The term ``Executive Order 
     12938'' means Executive Order 12938 as in effect on January 
     1, 1999.
       (4) Adherent to relevant nonproliferation regime.--A 
     government is an ``adherent'' to a ``relevant 
     nonproliferation regime'' if that government--
       (A) is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group with respect 
     to a transfer of goods, services, or technology described in 
     section 2(a)(1)(A);
       (B) is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
     with respect to a transfer of goods, services, or technology 
     described in section 2(a)(1)(B), or is a party to a binding 
     international agreement with the United States that was in 
     effect on January 1, 1999, to control the transfer of such 
     goods, services, or technology in accordance with the 
     criteria and standards set forth in the Missile Technology 
     Control Regime;
       (C) is a member of the Australia Group with respect to a 
     transfer of goods, services, or technology described in 
     section 2(a)(1)(C);
       (D) is a party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
     Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
     Weapons and on Their Destruction with respect to a transfer 
     of goods, services, or technology described in section 
     2(a)(1)(D); or
       (E) is a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement with respect 
     to a transfer of goods, services, or technology described in 
     section 2(a)(1)(E).
       (5) Organization or entity under the jurisdiction or 
     control of the russian space agency.--(A) The term 
     ``organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of 
     the Russian Space Agency'' means an organization or entity 
     that--
       (i) was made part of the Russian Space Agency upon its 
     establishment on February 25, 1992;
       (ii) was transferred to the Russian Space Agency by decree 
     of the Russian Government on July 25, 1994, or May 12, 1998;
       (iii) was or is transferred to the Russian Space Agency by 
     decree of the Russian Government at any other time before, 
     on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act; or
       (iv) is a joint stock company in which the Russian Space 
     Agency has at any time held controlling interest.
     (B) Any organization or entity described in subparagraph (A) 
     shall be deemed to be under the jurisdiction or control of 
     the Russian Space Agency regardless of whether--
       (i) such organization or entity, after being part of or 
     transferred to the Russian Space Agency, is removed from or 
     transferred out of the Russian Space Agency; or
       (ii) the Russian Space Agency, after holding a controlling 
     interest in such organization or entity, divests its 
     controlling interest.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) 
each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).


                             General Leave

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
on the bill under consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)

[[Page H8168]]

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, today we consider the Iran Nonproliferation 
Act of 1999, H.R. 1883, which the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. 
Gejdenson), the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman), and I introduced on May 20 of 
this year.
  This bipartisan legislation currently has almost 230 cosponsors and 
just last week it was reported unanimously by both our Committee on 
International Relations and our Committee on Science.
  The purpose of our legislation is to reverse the very dangerous 
situation confronting us today in which firms in Russia, in China, in 
North Korea and elsewhere are transferring to Iran goods, services, and 
technology that will assist in the development of weapons of mass 
destruction and missiles capable of delivering such weapons.
  In the hands of a rogue state like Iran, these weapons pose a clear 
and present danger, not only to our friends and allies in the region 
but also to the tens of thousands of our military personnel in the 
Persian Gulf and in adjacent areas.
  The proliferation of these technologies to Iran has been going on for 
a number of years. And to its credit, the administration has worked to 
try to stop this kind of proliferation, but all available evidence 
indicates that to date their efforts have failed.
  The proliferation is as bad today as it has ever been. With support 
from key supplier nations, Iran has now started work on a medium- to 
long-range missile, with a range of 3,000 to 5,000 kilometers. Many 
analysts believe that the volume and pattern of continued transfers 
from Russia could not exist without their acquiescence, if not 
encouragement, of at least some elements in the Russian Government.
  The purpose of our legislation is to give the administration new 
tools in which to address this problem, the countries that are 
transferring these items to Iran powerful new reasons to stop 
proliferating, and Congress greater insight into just what is 
happening.
  Our legislation picks up where we left off at the end of the last 
session of Congress. My colleagues will recall that during the 105th 
Congress we passed a similar bill entitled the Iran Missile 
Proliferation Sanctions Act. That measure passed both the House and 
Senate by overwhelming margins but regrettably was vetoed by the 
President.
  The President pleaded with us not to override his veto assuring us 
that with more time he would be able to resolve the problem 
diplomatically, and we bowed to his wishes and decided not to seek an 
override of that veto.
  The verdict is now in on that decision. Clearly, the President 
overestimated his ability to handle this problem diplomatically; and 
Congress erred in not forcing a vote on that issue. We have learned 
from that mistake, and we do not intend to repeat it.
  This bill contains many important improvements over the legislation 
that we passed 2 years ago. It takes into account many of the 
administration's objections to the prior bill, and it refines our 
approach to the problem.
  Mr. Speaker, this is an important measure that will make a vital 
contribution to our Nation's efforts to reverse the proliferation of 
dangerous weapons technology to Iran. Accordingly, I urge my colleagues 
to support this measure, H.R. 1883.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to join the gentleman from New York (Chairman 
Gilman) in supporting this legislation and commending him for his 
actions. Clearly, there is great frustration here and at the White 
House over the failure of the Russian Government to get to a point 
where it can control the proliferation of serious weapons of mass 
destruction.
  We have been hopeful, frankly, that under Prime Minister Stepashin 
that we would see some progress in Russia. And there have been a number 
of promises made; but with the rate that the Russian governments have 
been changing, we have been seeing very little progress in an area that 
is critical to our national security and many of our allies throughout 
the world.
  Proliferation is an issue not just in Russia. The Chinese Government 
has proliferated a number of its most critical technologies and this 
Congress needs to address all of these issues, but today we focus on 
Russia. And we should have a policy that both engages Russia and 
provides penalties when they fail to live up to the agreements that we 
have reached with them.
  The Russians have a significant portion of the world's technology of 
weapons of mass destruction, and there has been leakage of these 
systems and these technologies to the Iranians.
  The United States has been in this kind of situation before. At the 
end of World War II, America moved into Germany hiring many of the 
scientists that had worked for the Nazis to prevent them from working 
for countries who were our adversaries. Today we find ourselves in a 
similar situation. The talent and the brain power in Russia can be a 
great opportunity to move us forward in many areas of peaceful uses of 
these technologies, but they can also provide a great danger. Whether 
it is fissionable material or rocket technology, the United States has 
to take every effort possible to make sure that proliferation is 
halted.
  I join with the chairman and many others in this House in offering 
this legislation, which we hope will send a very strong message to the 
Russian Government that as difficult as these times are for them, this 
is an area where they can allow no seepage, where they have to make the 
effort to stop the loss of these technologies to dangerous countries 
around the globe.
  So I commend the chairman for moving this legislation today.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), the distinguished 
chairman of the Committee on Science.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Gilman) for yielding me this time, and rise in support of this 
bill, which will assist the administration's efforts to prevent the 
spread of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction to Iran.
  H.R. 1883 contains several provisions that require the administration 
to report any credible information it receives about the entities 
transferring technology to Iran.
  The bill's teeth, however, are in section 6, over which the Committee 
on Science has jurisdiction and which the committee unanimously 
endorsed last week. Section 6 prohibits the administration from 
transferring any funds to the Russian Government for the International 
Space Station unless the President determines that it is the policy of 
the Russian Government to actively oppose proliferation to Iran, that 
the Russian Government is carrying out that policy, and that the 
Russian Space Agency and the organizations under its jurisdictions have 
not transferred technology to Iran.
  Some question linking the International Space Station and 
proliferation arguing that they are separate issues. Using the space 
program as a nonproliferation tool follows the path the White House 
laid out in 1993 when it invited Russia into the International Space 
Station partnership. The White House explicitly linked Russian 
participation in the Space Station to its goal of discouraging Russia 
from engaging in proliferation activities, and numerous administration 
witnesses since then before the Committee on Science and its 
subcommittees have stated that if Russia proliferates to Iran that is a 
deal breaker as far as the Space Station goes.
  So, H.R. 1883 is consistent with the administration's policies 
regarding both the Space Station and nonproliferation.
  Unfortunately, we have received consistent reports since 1993 that 
Russia is assisting Iran's efforts to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction and ballistic missiles. The CIA and the State Department 
conceded as much in open hearings over the last 2 years.
  Faced with such evidence, H.R. 1883 is an appropriate and measured 
step that Congress can and must take to halt such proliferation. The 
bill does not change Russia's rights or obligations as a partner in the 
International Space Station. It does not prohibit NASA from making 
payments to the Russian Space Agency if the Russian

[[Page H8169]]

Government is doing what it promises, namely stopping the flow of 
technology to Iran. It only prohibits NASA from making such payments if 
Russia is increasing the threat to our friends, allies, and troops in 
the Middle East and in Europe.
  Congress must not look the other way in the face of proliferation or 
one day it will come back to haunt us. We must do our part to promote 
international peace and security. H.R. 1883 is a good first step, and I 
urge my colleagues to vote in favor of this bill.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Tennessee (Mr. Gordon).
  Mr. GORDON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1883, the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act of 1999.
  I have been a cosponsor of this bill because I feel very strongly 
about the need to control proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
The end of the Cold War did not mean that we have escaped the threat 
posed by those who would do harm to us or to our allies in the world. 
There is a very real threat posed by the proliferation of dangerous 
weapons technologies into the hand of our enemies. We must do all we 
can to see that they do not succeed in getting those harmful 
technologies.
  I see H.R. 1883 as one of the ways in which we can help to control 
proliferation. It sends a strong message to those who would proliferate 
that the United States will not stand idly by.
  This bill is not intended to take away from the efforts currently 
being made by the administration to control proliferation. Neither is 
the bill intended to slap in the face those in the Russian Government 
who are trying to stem proliferation. In fact, I want to note the 
progress that has been made over the past year by the administration 
and the Russian Government. There have been positive steps taken. These 
include the Russian enactment of the federal law of export controls; 
the Russian adoption as official policy of the Gallucci-Koptev action 
plan, which is designed to stop all contact between Russian aerospace 
entities and Iran; the joint Russian-U.S. establishment of export 
control list; and a number of other substantive actions.
  I am encouraged by these initiatives. At the same time, it is 
important for Congress to signal to those who would proliferate that 
their actions will have consequences.
  I believe that H.R. 1883 sends such a signal. Therefore, I support 
H.R. 1883, and I urge Members to vote to suspend the rules and pass 
this important bill.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton), a member of the committee.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from 
Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, we had a hearing not long ago involving some 
whistleblowers from various agencies of government and one of the 
people we had testify before our committee was a man named Jonathan 
Fox. Mr. Fox is a defense security analyst at the Department of 
Defense; and in October of 1997, he was asked to write a national 
security assessment about Communist China and about the agreement for 
cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy between China and the 
United States.
  Now, Mr. Fox was told that he had to have this national security 
assessment done by October 25, 1997, because the administration wanted 
to have everything ready before the state visit of Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin.
  The day after Mr. Fox submitted his memo, he was called by a man who 
was one of his superiors named Michael Jackson.
  He said, okay, how bad is it, about his memo, meaning the reaction to 
his candid memo? And Mr. Jackson answered, you will be lucky if you 
still have a job by the end of the day.

                              {time}  1200

  Fox indicated he did not think Johnson was joking. Johnson told him 
people were upset by the memo and it had to be revised and say that the 
agreement was not a threat to national security.
  Now, I hope everybody gets this straight. He wrote a national 
security assessment which said that giving any additional nuclear 
technology or anything that would help them with their nuclear program 
would be a threat not only to the United States, but to the allies of 
the United States as well. And just before President Jiang Zemin came 
over, he got a call from his superior saying, if you do not change this 
memo to say that they are not a threat, then you are going to be fired.
  Now, Mr. Fox said to one of his colleagues he was so concerned about 
his job because he had a wife and kids and he had been at the Defense 
Department for a long time that he did change that national security 
assessment because of the threat to his employment. He said China was 
not only a threat to the United States of America, but to our allies as 
well. And because President Jiang Zemin was coming over to meet with 
President Clinton, he got orders from above to tell him to change that 
national security assessment 180 degrees to say that China was no 
threat, or he might lose his job.
  Now, I think everybody in this country ought to be concerned about 
that. If an expert at the Defense Department says there is a national 
security threat to this country if we continue to give nuclear 
technology to Communist China and he is ordered by the White House to 
change that or somebody above him, and the guy said it was high above 
my pay grade that this order came from, indicating it was way up the 
chain of command, if people are being told to change national security 
assessments that threaten our national security, then somebody ought to 
be hung out to dry.
  I came down here today to talk about this because we really do need 
to impose economic sanctions on those who are proliferating nuclear 
weapons because it is a threat to everybody in the world; but in 
particular, we ought to really be going after Communist China because 
they have been giving nuclear technology that those countries can use, 
to Iran and to North Korea, and to others; and they are a threat to the 
security of the United States and to our allies, as Mr. Fox has stated.
  I think it is reprehensible that somebody above Mr. Fox's pay grade, 
and they said it was way above his pay grade, ordered them to change 
his national security assessment simply because President Jiang Zemin 
from Communist China was coming over to meet with the President of the 
United States and they wanted everything to be cool, everything to be 
on an even keel. It is unbelievable this happened.
  This was brought out before my committee, and none of the national 
media reported it, and I thought it was a shame that they did not. I 
called ABC, NBC, CBS, and CNN; and I said why would you not think this 
was a major story, because a national security assessment was made 
regarding the security of America and our allies and whether or not 
China was selling nuclear weapons to potential enemies, and they told 
him that if he did not change it 180 degrees to where it looked like 
they were not a nuclear proliferator and there was no threat to 
America, he was going to lose his job, and not one of the networks 
picked that up. All I can say is shame on them. Shame on them. The 
American people need to know the truth. At least they got this much of 
it today.

               [From the Committee on Government Reform]

       Jonathan Fox Arms Control Specialist Department of Defense


                        professional background

       Fox is an Arms Control Specialist in the Defense Threat 
     Reduction Agency (formerly known as Defense Technology 
     Security Agency). Fox's wife also works at the agency as a 
     photographer. Fox fears both he and his wife will be 
     retaliated against for speaking to Congress.


                             Fox's Concerns

       In October 1997, Fox was asked to write a memo regarding 
     the implementation of a 1985 ``Agreement for Cooperation in 
     the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy'' between China and the 
     U.S. The terms of the reciprocal agreement allowed annual 
     opportunities between the U.S. and China to:
       Send technical experts to each others' civil reactor sites; 
     observe operations and reactor fueling; exchange and share 
     technical information in the operation and maintenance of 
     nuclear power generative and associated facilities; exchange 
     detailed confidence-building and transparency information on 
     transfer, storage and disposition of fissionable fuels 
     utilized for peaceful purposes; and disclose detailed reactor 
     site operational data, to include energy generated and 
     loading.
       In his initial memo, Fox concluded that count ``this 
     assessment concludes that the proposed arrangement presents 
     real and substantial risk to the common defense and security 
     of both the United States and allied

[[Page H8170]]

     countries.'' Fox pointed out that Chinese past practices as a 
     proliferant presented considerable risks to national 
     security.
       Fox said he was told that the memo had to be done by 
     October 25, 1997 because the Administration wanted to have 
     everything ready before the state visit of Jiang Zemin.
       The day after Fox submitted the memo, he was called by 
     Michael Johnson. When Fox asked him ``OK how bad is it?'' 
     [meaning the reaction to his candid memo], Johnson answered: 
     ``You'll be lucky if you still have a job by the end of the 
     day.'' Fox indicated he didn't think Johnson was joking. 
     Johnson told him people were upset by the memo and it had to 
     be revised and say that the agreement is not inimical to U.S. 
     national security. Fox said he told Johnson that everything 
     in the memo was true and Johnson responded, ``I know, but 
     that doesn't matter the issue has already been decided far 
     above our pay grade.'' Johnson said the changes had to be 
     made by 11:30 a.m. that morning. Fox said Johnson also said 
     if he didn't change the opinion, he would have to explain to 
     his Director why a GS-14 was blocking a Presidential summit.
       Fox returned to his meeting and discussed the matter with 
     his colleagues (including Peter Leitner). They told him it 
     was a done deal and there was no point in him falling on his 
     sword and fighting this.
       Fox called Johnson back to ask what would make him happy 
     and Johnson sent over the revisions that Fox then had a 
     secretary incorporate. Johnson told him to have someone else 
     sign the memo because it would look too obvious if he signed 
     it after having done a memo that was initially so different. 
     The memo was signed out by his boss, who signed it to help 
     him out of a difficult situation.


                    retaliation and/or intimidation

       When these matters became subject of an investigation by 
     the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Fox spoke with 
     Senate investigators and believes he has been blacklisted 
     since then for telling the truth. He was in line to get a 
     position in DTRA which came to a stop allegedly when David 
     Tarbell heard ``things'' about Fox.
                                  ____


  Jonathan D. Fox, Arms Control Specialist, Defense Threat Reduction 
                                 Agency


                       i. professional background

       Jonathan Fox is currently an Arms Control Specialist at the 
     Defense Threat Reduction Agency (``DTRA'') at the Department 
     of Defense (formerly known as the Defense Technology Security 
     Agency or ``DTSA''). A lawyer, he was hired by the Department 
     of Defense in 1990, and in 1993 he was detailed to handle 
     counter proliferation duties. In 1997 he was the export 
     control coordinator. He was relieved of those duties in 
     October of 1998 and transferred back to arms control.
       He has received ``Outstanding'' ratings in every category 
     of job performance for the last three evaluations given 
     (1995, 1996 and 1997). Cash bonuses for his job performance 
     have also been recommended. He has not, however, received an 
     evaluation since concerns over retaliation have arisen.


                           ii. fox's concerns

       In late October of 1997, Fox received an urgent request to 
     review a proposed state-to-state agreement regarding transfer 
     of nuclear technologies from the United States to China. Fox 
     was asked to write an analysis regarding implementation of a 
     1985 ``Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of 
     Atomic Energy'' between China and the United States. The 
     terms of this proposed reciprocal agreement allowed annual 
     opportunities for China and the U.S. to:
       Send technical experts to each others' civil reactor sites; 
     Observe operations and reactor fueling; Exchange and share 
     technical information in the operation and maintenance of 
     nuclear power generative and associated facilities; Exchange 
     detailed confidence-building and transparency information on 
     transfer, storage and disposition of fissionable fuels 
     utilized for peaceful purposes; and Disclose detailed reactor 
     site operational data, to include energy generated and 
     loaded.
       The request came from Mike Johnson, the Deputy Director of 
     Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of Threat Reduction 
     Policy.\1\ Fox was told that he had to complete his review by 
     Friday, October 25, 1999. Fox also believes that the document 
     indicated that the deadline was tied to the arrival of 
     Chinese President Jemin that weekend.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       On Thursday, October 24, 1997, Fox sent Johnson a fax of 
     his analysis. The document was transmitted at about 8:30 or 
     9:00 p.m. Fox stated:
       ``This assessment concludes that the proposed arrangement 
     presents real and substantial risk to the common defense and 
     security of both the United States and allied countries. It 
     is further found that the contemplated action can result in a 
     significant increase of the risk of nuclear weapons 
     technology proliferation. This assessment similarly concludes 
     that the environment surrounding these exchange measures 
     cannot guarantee timely warnings of willful diversion of 
     otherwise confidential information to non-nuclear states for 
     nuclear weapons development. Concurrently, the agreement, as 
     presented, cannot ensure that whatever is provided under this 
     reciprocal arrangement will be utilized solely for intended 
     peaceful purposes.''

                           *   *   *   *   *

       ``[U]nless there exist definite, meaningful verification 
     provisions engrafted upon this diplomatic agreement, there is 
     no practicable way of determining or enforcing adherence to 
     the admittedly peaceful goals enumerated within the proposed 
     reciprocal agreement. Without such bilateral undertakings or 
     unilateral safeguards, the proposed measure presents such 
     significant degree of risk as to be clearly inimical to the 
     common defense and security.''
       He thought that his analysis might raise concerns, but he 
     felt that he had to be honest.
       The next morning, while on his way to a meeting at the 
     State Department, he checked his messages and found that 
     Michael Johnson had called at approximately 8:30-8:45 a.m. He 
     got a beeper notification that Johnson had called and was 
     told that it was urgent. He called from State and couldn't 
     get through. He left his number at the meeting and was pulled 
     out of the meeting at 9:30-9:45 a.m. He was told it was 
     Johnson, and that it was urgent.
       Fox began the conversation by asking ``Okay, how bad is 
     it?'' Johnson responded ``You'll be lucky if you still have a 
     job at the end of the day.'' Fox said Johnson did not sound 
     like he was joking. Fox asked what the problem was and 
     Johnson said: ``It's your opinion. People read it. This has 
     got to be revised. It cannot go.''
       Fox said that the analysis was true. Johnson said: ``Yes. 
     It's well written. Too well written. It doesn't matter. The 
     matter has already been decided far above us.'' Johnson did 
     not elaborate, but Fox got the impression that the decision 
     had been made above Johnson and that Johnson was under the 
     gun. [DoD brought Michael Johnson before Committee 
     investigators to give his side of the story. He maintains 
     that Fox's work was substandard because it included political 
     and historical observations and was not limited to technical 
     considerations. He claims that he told Fox that the analysis 
     was substandard. Fox states that Johnson did not call his 
     analysis substandard--to the contrary, he says Johnson said 
     ``you're right and it doesn't matter.'' Fox also says that 
     all similar analyses had elements of politics and history 
     included and that Johnson did not reject those analyses.]
       Johnson told Fox that if he didn't have a clean technical 
     opinion (an approval) by 11:30, the next call would be to 
     Fox's Director--``he can explain why a GS-14 is blocking a 
     summit.'' Fox asked Johnson for 15-20 minutes to think about 
     what he had been told. Johnson responded: ``clock's 
     ticking.'' Fox went back into his meeting and discussed what 
     had happened with a number of people (Peter Leitner, Benson, 
     Mihnovets). Benson took him aside and said that the work was 
     good, but that the ``fix was in.'' He was told that he should 
     not be ashamed to give in, and that the matter had been 
     decided at a higher level--that there was no use falling on 
     his sword for this issue. (Fox noted that Leitner incorrectly 
     thought that Fox's immediate superiors were in on the threat. 
     Fox denies this.)
       After talking to his colleagues at the State Department 
     meeting, Fox called Johnson back and asked for Johnson to 
     send suggested changes. Johnson faxed him the analysis 
     prepared by Fox with suggested changes. (ATTACHED) Johnson 
     also said that he wanted someone else to sign the analysis 
     because it would be too obvious that Fox had been pressured 
     to change his conclusions if he signed it. Johnson went 
     through a list of types of people who might sign, including 
     Presidential appointees and SESs. Fox said that there were no 
     such people in his immediate section and Fox suggested Dr. 
     Gallaway, a GS-15. [Johnson has a different explanation for 
     the request for a different person to sign the analysis. He 
     now says that it would be routine in an inter-office squabble 
     to have a higher ranking official sign.]
       Fox called Gallaway, who was already aware that there was 
     some ``excitement'' over Fox's analysis. Fox asked for 
     Gallaway's assistance (``ya gotta help me out''). They had a 
     short discussion over whether it would be improper for 
     Gallaway to sign, and whether he would get into trouble. 
     Gallaway said he would help out and sign.
       Fox had his secretary transmit a copy of the changed 
     analysis to Gallaway, who reviewed it and signed. Gallaway 
     sent the reworked analysis to Johnson about 12:15 p.m.


                  iii. intimidation and/or retaliation

     The threat by Johnson
       When Johnson said ``You'll be lucky if you have a job at 
     the end of the day,'' Fox became worried. He had only been on 
     the assignment that he was on for 4-5 months. When Johnson 
     threatened to call Fox's Director if a revised opinion was 
     not sent within two hours, and when he said ``he can explain 
     why a GS-14 is blocking a summit,'' Fox was concerned. His 
     director had a fierce reputation. A number of personal 
     factors also combined to make it critical that he not lose 
     his paycheck. In short, he was worried about the worst case 
     scenario of Johnson's criticism leading to him getting fired. 
     [In its briefing to the Committee, DoD lawyers argued that 
     Johnson and Fox were in different chains of command, and that 
     Fox could not have been threatened by Johnson. Johnson, 
     however, certainly appears to be on a higher employment level 
     than Fox. To this end, DoD appears to be misleading the 
     Committee.

[[Page H8171]]

     Subsequent call from Johnson
       In February of 1999, as Senate investigators prepared to 
     question Fox, Johnson called Fox and gave a different version 
     of what had transpired. Fox said that ``it didn't happen that 
     way.'' He told Johnson ``you know you threatened my job.'' 
     That was the end of the conversation. After this 
     conversation, Johnson gave Fox some more responsibility by 
     making Fox the DoD representative to the Zangger Commission. 
     Johnson was responsible for getting Fox on a delegation that 
     went to Vienna.
     Blacklisting from export control issues
       Fox states that he has been blacklisted from any 
     involvement with export control matters. Michael Maloof told 
     Technology Security Directorate Director Dave Tarbell that 
     Fox wanted to do more on export control matters. Tarbell 
     agreed to endorse Fox for a job that would enable him to do 
     this. Fox was to be moved to a temporary position that would 
     become permanent.
       Shortly thereafter, it became clear that Congressional 
     investigators wanted to talk to Fox. Fox notified DoD General 
     Counsel that he had been contacted by Senate investigators. 
     On a Monday in late February he was interviewed by Eliana 
     Davidson from Pentagon General Counsel's office. On Friday of 
     that same week Fox was interviewed by Senate investigators. 
     Within days Tarbell told Maloof that not only was Fox not 
     welcome to the position that had been under consideration, he 
     was not welcome to any job in export control. Maloof asked 
     ``Why?'' and was told by Tarbell that he had ``heard 
     things.'' Tarbell declined to be specific.
       Fox filed an IG complaint, but the IG was unable to resolve 
     the issue because Tarbell has declined to be specific about 
     what happen. Fox filed an EEO complaint and the investigator 
     who interviewed Tarbell was told that Tarbell received 
     unsolicited information about Fox's capability. Tarbell said 
     he didn't remember who the person was.
     Service of subpoena
       On June 21, 1999, a Committee staff member went to Mr. 
     Fox's place of employment to serve a subpoena to testify. She 
     was told by the head security guard: ``Mr. Fox talked to the 
     public and we don't do that here. He doesn't work here any 
     longer.'' The subpoena was ultimately served, but the odd 
     exchange prompted Mr. Fox to ask rhetorically whether we 
     think it odd that he is concerned for his job. (See Attached 
     Memo)


                               Footnotes

     \1\ Fox was shown a copy of the request when interviewed by 
     Senate investigators. Thus, DoD was able to produce the 
     document to the Senate. We asked DoD for this document 
     specifically on June 21 and had not received it as of June 
     23.
     \2\ Conversations are recounted to the best of Mr. Fox's 
     recollection.
                                  ____



                               Defense Special Weapons Agency,

                                 Alexandria, VA, October 23, 1997.


                               memorandum

     To: OSD/ISP/N&I (Mr. Michael Johnson).
     Subject: Review of Reciprocal Arrangement with People's 
       Republic of China.

       In 1985, the U.S. and China negotiated an Agreement for 
     Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. As part of 
     the implementation of this agreement, Congress mandates that 
     the President must certify that any reciprocal arrangements 
     concluded thereunder must be designed to effectively ensure 
     that any nuclear materials, facilities or components provided 
     under this agreement be utilized solely for peaceful 
     purposes. Congress has also determined that arrangements 
     concerning information exchanges and visits negotiated under 
     this agreement will be deemed ``subsequent arrangements'' 
     pursuant to section 131a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
     amended, and subject to the required findings and 
     determinations defined therein. as the parties to this 
     agreement are both nuclear weapon states, diplomatic channels 
     establishing mutually acceptable information exchange and 
     visit arrangements are utilized in lieu of bilateral 
     safeguard provisions.
       The United States and China have negotiated an information 
     exchange and technical cooperation reciprocal arrangement 
     which conforms to the definition of a ``subsequent 
     arrangement''. Pursuant to section 131 of the Atomic Energy 
     Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2160), the Department of Enegy has 
     requested consultative review of this proposed implementing 
     arrangement in compliance with the provisions of the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. This memo is provided in 
     accordance with the provisions of DSWA Instruction 5100.40 
     (which governs the agency response to such requests), and 
     details the results of our technical assessment to the Office 
     of Secretary of Defense.
       The terms of the reciprocal agreement are relatively simple 
     and direct. The U.S. and China will be afforded annual 
     opportunities to: send technical experts to each others' 
     civil reactor sites; observe operations and reactor fueling; 
     exchange and share technical information in the operation and 
     maintenance of nuclear power generative and associated 
     facilities; exchange detailed confidence-building and 
     transparency information on transfer, storage and disposition 
     of fissionable fuels utilized for peaceful purposes; and 
     disclose detailed reactor site operational data, to include 
     energy generated and loading.
       Section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act and related 
     legislation requires a thorough inquiry into such 
     arrangements. The inquiry must address whether the 
     contemplated state action will result in a significant 
     increase of the risk of nuclear weapons technology 
     proliferation. It must also consider whether the information 
     and expertise shared under the proposed reciprocal 
     arrangement could be diverted to a non-nuclear state for use 
     in the development of a nuclear explosive device, and whether 
     the U.S. can maintain an environment where it will obtain 
     timely warning of the imminence of such diversion.
       Given that the 1987 MOU between the United States and China 
     on this subject provides for:
       1. The right to obtain information required to maintain an 
     invent of all U.S. supplied items, and of material used in or 
     produced through the use of such items;
       2. The right to confirm periodically, on-site, the accuracy 
     of the inventory and the specified peaceful use of all items 
     on this inventory;
       3. The right to obtain this information, and to conduct on-
     site confirmation of this information, for as long as any 
     such invent items remain in China or under its control.
       The Defense Special Weapons Agency determines that the 
     proposed Agreement is not inimical to the common defense or 
     the security of the United States.
     Dr. Gallaway.
                                  ____


Opening Statement of Jonathan D. Fox Before the United States House of 
Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Thursday, June 24, 1999

       Mr. Chairman, Members of this honorable House:
       I am obliged to appear before you today by order of 
     subpoena. I have neither sought nor solicited this honor. It 
     is an obligation on my part which has arisen through 
     disclosures of a public and independent nature offer which I 
     have had no control or influence. It is an obligation not 
     without risk, and I would be less than honest if I did not 
     admit that it is undertaken with no small concern for my 
     personal and professional future prospects.
       Duty compels me to be here today. It is a duty enforced by 
     the oath I took as an attorney, and as a member of the public 
     service. In its simplest form, it is the duty to obey the 
     law. It is the obligation to afford the workings of the law, 
     and that of a duly constituted legislative inquiry, the 
     utmost respect. And it is the duty to execute those 
     responsibilities entrusted to me without fear or favor.
       It is incumbent upon me to tell the truth. It is a key 
     responsibility of public service. I am prepared to answer 
     whatever questions you may have with candor and honesty. My 
     answers will be grounded upon direct knowledge, information 
     and belief. I cannot speculate upon things of which I have no 
     knowledge, and will respectfully decline to do so if called 
     upon. Unfounded speculation will only hinder the progress and 
     credibility of this inquiry, and my respect for this House is 
     too great to engage in such conduct.
       Two hundreds years ago, President John Adams advised his 
     son John Quincy to ``Never let the institutions of polite 
     society substitute for honesty, integrity and character.'' My 
     father, a concentration camp survivor, memorized that phrase 
     and taught it to me when I was very young. I have always 
     tried to comport my career in public service according to 
     that standard. Whether I have succeeded will be determined, 
     to no small extent, by the impressions you carry away from 
     today's proceedings.
       Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, this concludes my 
     opening statement. Thank you for your kind indulgence. I am 
     prepared to answer any questions you may have.
                                  ____



                               memorandum

     To: Memo to the Jonathan Fox file.
     From: Kimberly Reed.
     Date: June 21, 1999.
     Re Service of Jonathan Fox subpoena.

       On June 21, 1999, I served Jonathan Fox a subpoena to 
     testify at a June 24, 1999 hearing on the flow of dual-use 
     technology to China and whistleblowers.
       For service, Mr. Fox gave me the DTRA address of 45045 
     Aviation drive, Dulles, VA 20766-7515. He told me to notify 
     the front desk security guard that I had a congressional 
     subpoena and that he phone the DTRA general counsel's office 
     and Mr. Fox. The rationale for this action was to give the 
     DTRA general counsel's office notice of the subpoena and 
     allow them the opportunity to accept service on behalf of Mr. 
     Fox if this was the normal protocol.
       Arriving at DTRA at 1:30, I did as Mr. Fox instructed. The 
     front desk security guard phoned Mr. Fox and then the general 
     counsel's office. After talking to a staff member in the 
     general counsel's office, the security guard told me they 
     were unable to determine the general counsel's protocol for 
     subpoenas (the chief general counsel was away on vacation). 
     While waiting for an answer, the head security guard 
     approached me and asked that I follow her into a room away 
     from the public (the vending machine room), where others 
     could not overhear our conversation. I believe her initials 
     were T.P., but would recognize her name in a list or her by 
     appearance.
       The head security guard questioned my actions and I told 
     her ``I was to serve a subpoena on Mr. Fox to testify before 
     Congress and wanted to see the appropriate person to serve, 
     whether it be the general counsel or Mr. Fox.'' She 
     approximately replied: ``Mr. Fox talked to the public and we 
     don't do

[[Page H8172]]

     that here. He doesn't work here any longer.'' She seemed 
     inquisitive and perplexed by my presence.
       I told her that I spoke with Mr. Fox earlier in the day and 
     he was expecting the subpoena and showed her his telephone 
     number. She returned to the front desk, where she was 
     informed that the general counsel didn't need to see the 
     subpoena. She phoned Mr. Fox (who was listed in their phone 
     directory) and arranged to have me serve him at his 
     building--44965 Aviation Drive. I served Mr. Fox at 1:55 pm.
                                  ____


             [From the Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1999]

           The Administration Quashes Truth Tellers on China

(By Michael Ledeen)

                           *   *   *   *   *


       Despite pressure from the White House, Jonathan Fox, an 
     attorney on the arms-control staff of the Defense Special 
     Weapons Agency, wrote a memo stating with certainty that 
     China was a nuclear proliferator and that the proposed 
     arrangement was ``a technology transfer agreement swaddled in 
     the comforting yet misleading terminology of a confidence-
     building measure.'' Mr. Fox's memo argued against the 
     agreement on these grounds:
       It ``presents real and substantial risk to the common 
     defense and security of both the United States and allied 
     countries.''
       It ``can result in a significant increase of the risk of 
     nuclear weapons technology proliferation.''
       ``The environment surrounding these exchange measures 
     cannot guarantee timely warning of willful diversion of 
     otherwise confidential information to non-nuclear states for 
     nuclear weapons development.''
       There was no guarantee that the nuclear information would 
     be limited to non-military applications in China itself.
       Mr. Fox noted that the Chinese chafed at their inferiority 
     to the West and ``now [seek] to redress that balance through 
     industrial, academic and military espionage. China routinely, 
     both overtly and covertly, subverts national and multilateral 
     trade controls on militarily critical items.'' (Those who 
     have been lured into the deceptive debate over when we knew 
     about Chinese espionage should note that civil servants like 
     Mr. Fox, well below the pay grade of National Security 
     Adviser Samuel Berger and Secretary of State Madeleine 
     Albright, were well aware of the general phenomenon).
       On Oct. 24, 1997, Mr. Fox was called out of an interagency 
     meeting to receive an urgent telephone call. According to 
     three people to whom he gave a contemporaneous account of the 
     phone conversation, he was given an ultimatum from superiors 
     in the Office of Non-Proliferation Policy in the Department 
     of Defense: either revise the memo and recommend in favor of 
     the agreement, or look elsewhere for employment. (Mr. Fox 
     himself declined to comment on the matter.)
       Within an hour, all the critical language had been deleted, 
     and the memo now simply concluded that the agreement ``is not 
     inimical to the common defense or the security of the United 
     States.'' Worried that his earlier draft might fall into 
     unfriendly hands, Mr. Fox's superiors insisted that somebody 
     else sign the new memo.
       The arrangement was in place in time for the summit with 
     the Chinese ruler, who was no doubt quite satisfied that his 
     American friends had given him a good-conduct certificate, 
     even though he, Mr. Clinton and the entire American national-
     security team knew full well that China was spreading 
     militarily useful nuclear technology to such nations as Iran 
     and Pakistan. Indeed, it was precisely this knowledge, and 
     the fear that somebody in the media or Congress might 
     enunciate it at an embarrassing moment, that drove the 
     administration to silence potential truth-tellers.
       Mr. Fox is not the only weapons expert in the government to 
     have been instructed to lie or remain silent about the true 
     consequences of sending military technology to China. Notra 
     Trulock and his colleagues were told by their superiors at 
     the Department of Energy that they should stop annoying 
     people with accounts of Chinese espionage at Los Alamos. 
     Similarly, professionals in the Pentagon such as Michael 
     Maloof and Peter Leitner were told to keep quiet about the 
     approval of high-tech licenses that would strengthen Chinese 
     military power. Both of them spoke out; others remain silent.
       But even when the professionals stick by their principles, 
     their superiors have chosen to substitute facts with 
     politically expedient disinformation. On at least two 
     occasions, military experts who argued against high-tech 
     exports to China later discovered that their recommendations 
     had been altered in the Pentagon's computerized data base.
       Had President Reagan's appointees attempted such heavy-
     handed censorship, the Democrats in Congress, constantly on 
     the lookout for cooperative whistle-blowers, would have cried 
     bloody murder. Yet despite being well aware of the level of 
     internal censorship, Republican leaders from Rep. Dick Armey 
     to Sen. Fred Thompson have all but remained silent. Mr. 
     Thompson's Governmental Affairs Committee asked the 
     Pentagon's Inspector General to investigate this matter last 
     August. With the lightning speed that has characterized 
     Republican investigations, the Inspector General's report is 
     due to arrive on June 18, nearly a year later.
       Congress's behavior is thus the reverse of what it was 
     during the Reagan years, which is one reason the president 
     has breezed through revelations that would have threatened 
     the tenure of his predecessors. Republicans have yet to 
     present a coherent challenge to the administration's China 
     policy, and for several years have largely ignored the cries 
     of alarm from the professionals who have spent their lives 
     protecting our security.
       We don't yet know why Mr. Clinton chose to help arm China 
     and why Congress has been slow to stop it. But one thing 
     ought to be clear: The blame for this scandal lies not in the 
     distant past with the Reagan administration, which tried to 
     prevent our military technology from falling into the hands 
     of real and potential enemies, but with Mr. Clinton, who has 
     consciously and systematically done the opposite. On this 
     point, there must be neither doubt nor silence.

  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume 
to say to the gentleman from Indiana that I would hope he would share 
the documentation of his charges with the members of the committee who 
are all very interested in seeing it. I have no question of the 
gentleman, but I would just hope he would share it with other members 
of the committee.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GEJDENSON. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
  Mr. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, I would be happy to share them with anyone 
who would like to see these documents, all of them.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, we would be happy to see them.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Wexler) control the time that I am in charge of.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). Is there 
objection to the request of the gentleman from Connecticut?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, before I do that, I yield 4 minutes to 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos).
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the legislation we are 
considering, but I want to broaden my comments to deal for a few 
moments with our overall relations with Russia.
  Last week I was in Moscow for a lengthy and substantive discussion 
with the foreign minister of Russia and for a meeting with the 
Diplomatic University, which trains the future diplomats of Russia. I 
think it would be a very serious mistake if we would engage over the 
course of the next few months in bashing Russia which, in point of 
fact, with all of their problems, they have made enormous achievements 
since the collapse of the Soviet Empire.
  Now, all of us wish that the evolution of Russia that we have seen 
this past decade would have been more smooth, would have been more 
democratic, would have been more friendly to our interests. But I think 
the fact remains that Russia is about to have free and open 
parliamentary elections; next year, free and open presidential 
elections. Every Russian has a passport, they are anxious for American 
investment, and they are along many lines working with us as a country 
ready to share with us some international responsibilities as they did 
in Kosovo.
  Now, I think it is extremely appropriate that this piece of 
legislation deal with placing penalties on Russian institutions that 
engage in proliferation of weapons and mass destruction technology. But 
I think it is equally important to keep the problem in perspective. 
There is an enormous amount of anti-Americanism that permeates Russian 
society today. This was a society which, 15 years ago, was one of the 
two super powers on the face of this planet. It is now a destitute, 
chaotic, Mafia-infested society with enormous material and 
psychological problems; and I think it is extremely critical that in 
properly criticizing them for things that they do wrong, and they have 
done wrong by not controlling the proliferation of weapons, we do not 
draw the general conclusion that we are going back again to an era of 
confrontation with Moscow.
  There are powerful democratic forces in Moscow. There are important 
political figures who share our values, and it is important to 
strengthen the democratic forces in Russia. It is extremely important 
that we continue strengthening the democratic forces in Russia, because 
I predict in 10, 15, or 20 years, Russia will again be a great power. 
Their resources are unlimited. They are a highly talented, well-
educated,

[[Page H8173]]

impressive quality of people, and I think it is absolutely in our 
national interests to recognize our overriding concern in developing 
more cordial, more friendly, more ongoing relations with the people of 
Russia.
  We should also not forget that the Russian Government is facing 
terrorism from Islamic fundamentalists. In the last 10 days, there were 
four explosions, taking the lives of hundreds of innocent Russian 
civilians in the heart of Moscow, in the very heart of Moscow. These 
people deserve our support, our friendship, and our cooperation; and I 
call on my colleagues to give it to them.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 7 minutes to the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), the distinguished chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Committee on Armed 
Services and a member of the Cox Committee.
  (Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of 
this legislation, and I thank my good friend and colleague for yielding 
to me, and I rise as a good and long-term friend of the Russian people.
  Mr. Speaker, I have had the pleasure of traveling to Russia some 19 
times. I will be leading another delegation to Russia within the next 
30 days. I have over 150 members of the Federation Duma who are 
personal friends of mine, and I am working on initiatives like 
developing a housing mortgage financing system for the Russian people, 
helping them deal with the problem of nuclear waste, helping them 
encourage more economic investment, helping to strengthen the regions 
and regional leaders; and right now in fact I have 20 young Russian 
leaders coming to my district as a part of an exchange program that we 
started this past summer where 2,000 young Russians are coming to 
America; and I just initiated a new program to have staff members in 
this Congress engage and participate with exchanges with staff members 
of the Russian Duma.
  All that being said, this legislation is necessary not because we 
have a problem with the Russian people, but in my opinion because of 
the policies of this administration, which have helped cause the 
instability in Russia, both economically and politically.
  Mr. Speaker, proliferation is out of control in Russia, not just in 
words or rhetoric. I have here, Mr. Speaker, a Russian accelerometer 
and a Russian gyroscope. These were clipped off of Russian SSM-19 
missiles. We caught them, Mr. Speaker, not once, not twice, but three 
times, being transferred from Russia to Iraq. In fact, Mr. Speaker, we 
have over 100 sets of these devices.
  We did nothing about the transfer, Mr. Speaker. We did not impose the 
required sanctions under the missile technology control regime. We 
basically allowed Yeltsin to tell President Clinton, do not worry, we 
will conduct a criminal investigation, and nothing happened. So why 
should we be surprised, Mr. Speaker, if Russia cannot control 
proliferation?
  I did a floor speech last June, which I will include in the Record 
again, at least the study done by the Congressional Research Service. 
Mr. Speaker, I documented 37 violations of arms control agreements in 
the last 6 years by Russia and China. Thirty-seven violations. We 
imposed the required sanctions twice, and that was when we caught China 
transferring M-11 missiles and ring magnets to Pakistan, and what did 
we do? After 2 years we waived the sanctions. We saw technology flow to 
Iran, to Iraq, to Syria, to Libya and North Korea from China and 
Russia. I was not surprised when India and Pakistan's saber rattled, 
because we saw Russia transferring technology to India and China 
transferring technology to Pakistan.
  Mr. Speaker, the problems that are inherent here are in many cases 
our own doing, an administration that has been so preoccupied with not 
embarrassing the relationship between Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton 
that it does not want to call into question, when we have solid 
evidence that technology is being sent abroad illegally, and the same 
problem with the IMF funding. We did not want to embarrass Yeltsin 
because his crony friends were ripping off billions of dollars of IMF 
money, and we wonder why Russia is a basket case.
  The policies of this Government are turning their head the other way, 
are ignoring obvious violations of arms control regime violations. An 
obvious turning of our head when billions of dollars of IMF money is 
going to the failed oligarchs who corrupted the Russian banking system 
are many of the reasons why Russia today is a basket case economically 
and politically.
  We passed the Iran missile sanctions bill in the last session with 
395 votes in this body, and 96 votes in the Senate, in spite of Vice 
President Gore lobbying 12 of us personally. The gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Gilman) was there, Mr. Hamilton of Indiana was there, Senator 
Levin was there, I was there, twice not to pass that bill, because the 
Congress has lost confidence that this administration can stop 
proliferation.
  And this is not a Republican issue. Democrats and Republicans have 
joined together and said to this administration, we cannot keep 
bolstering up Yeltsin when it is obvious the system around him is 
corrupt and all we have done is reinforce Yeltsin's leadership, and now 
we are paying the price.
  The Russian people and the members of the Duma look at us and they 
say, where were you, America, when you basically turned the other cheek 
and pretended these transfers were not taking place? Where were you, 
America, when Yeltsin's cronies were siphoning off billions of dollars 
of IMF funding? Why did you not call into question what Yeltsin's 
cronies were doing? Why did you not call into question Yuri Koptev in 
the space agency when these transfers were taking place? Is it any 
wonder, Mr. Speaker, that the Russian people have lost their confidence 
in America as a friend and partner?
  The 95 percent of the Russian people, Mr. Speaker, who are good and 
decent people, who are not members of the Communist oligarchy, many of 
whom took over the reigns of the Yeltsin administration, they see 
through this charade in Russia. These people saw the IMF money being 
bilked away, these people saw this kind of technology being sold abroad 
time and again, and they saw this country and this President ignoring 
the realities of the instability just so that Yeltsin could be 
reelected again.
  We have a terrible crisis on our hands, Mr. Speaker. I agree with the 
last individual who spoke. This should not be a time to bash Russia as 
a nation, nor the Russian people, nor the emerging Russian leaders; and 
they know my position very clearly on these issues.

                              {time}  1215

  This is a time where we have to call into question our administration 
for helping to foster and encourage this kind of instability in Russia 
today.
  We need to pass this legislation, not to create the feeling in Russia 
that somehow they are our enemy, because they are not. We need to pass 
this legislation because we need to let Russia know that we will no 
longer tolerate incompetence, gross abuse, and tolerate the illegal 
activities that the Yeltzin government foisted on the Russian people 
for the past 7 years while we turned our heads, pretending that these 
situations were not real.
  I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, as they did 2 years 
ago. In fact, Mr. Speaker, when President Clinton vetoed the bill that 
the distinguished chairman and the distinguished gentlewoman from 
California, Ms. Harman, introduced in the House, we could have 
overridden that veto. But it was the Speaker of the House, a month 
before the congressional elections, who said that we would not be 
allowed to vote to override the President's veto.
  I am convinced had we had that vote, with the support of AIPAC, and 
they were in the room when we met with the Speaker, with the support of 
those people concerned with proliferation, we would have sent this 
administration this signal 2 years ago.
  Here we are 2 years later. Technology is still flowing. The fat cat 
oligarchs are still getting richer and the Russian people are still 
suffering. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
  Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Rothman).

[[Page H8174]]

  (Mr. ROTHMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman for yielding 
time to me.
  Let me see if I can remind my friends in this body that we are 
talking today about the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999. We are 
talking about the Iran Nonproliferation Act.
  We live in a hostile and dangerous world. One of the reasons why the 
world is so hostile and dangerous is because there are nations like 
Iran who are committed to wreaking havoc in their region and literally 
all over the globe. If Iran were to be successful in its intended 
desire to send weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical, and 
nuclear devices, not only to our friends and allies in the Middle East 
but to our friends and allies in Europe, they also would love to 
develop and have intended to develop the technology to send those 
weapons of mass destruction to the United States of America. That is 
why I support the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999.
  So it is important for us to keep our eye on the ball here in 
Congress, and note that with regard to this law that we are proposing, 
we want to remind everyone that it is Iran, as well as Iraq and North 
Korea, who make this world dangerous, but this bill has to do with 
Iran.
  I would also like to say it is a reminder to nations like Russia and 
China that the Congress of the United States will not forgive their 
assisting Iran in developing these weapons of mass destruction and the 
technology to deliver these weapons to not only the United States but 
to our allies around the world.
  There is a great deal of wishful thinking with regard to our enemies. 
We in America would like to believe that people around the world have 
as good intentions, as warm hearts, as we do. Not everyone is like us.
  The people of Iran need to create a government in Iran which will 
stop threatening the peace of the world. That is not the case yet. Iran 
is a danger to the world. It must be isolated, it must be stopped, 
until they are ready to join the family of nations in peace. This 
legislation will help.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bonilla). The gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Wexler) has 8 minutes remaining and the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Gilman) has 2 minutes remaining, so the Chair will continue to 
recognize the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Wexler) to yield time.
  Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lee).
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, as a cosponsor of this legislation and one who 
has strongly supported and will continue to support disarmament and 
peace initiatives throughout the world, I rise in strong support of 
H.R. 1883. It is my belief that this legislation will move us one step 
closer to nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle 
East and throughout the world by taking actions to stop foreign 
companies from exporting goods, services, and technology that can make 
a material contribution to Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs.
  I believe we must take any and all actions to stop the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and throughout the 
world.
  The statistics of weapons of mass destruction are terrifying, to say 
the least. In terms of nuclear weapons, for example, we know that over 
36,000 nuclear warheads exist between the nuclear powers.
  I have just returned from a visit to Israel with several of my 
colleagues. The security concerns of the entire region are great, but 
so are the prospects for peace. This bill, the Iran Nonproliferation 
Act, moves us toward both, peace and security.
  Foreign companies, just as any company, are in the business of making 
profits. Exporting goods, services, and technology that contribute to 
Iran's weapons of mass destruction program allows billions of dollars 
to be made to create a more hostile region and a more hostile world. 
This bill is a serious effort to tailor sanctions to foreign companies 
that are the true wrongdoers.
  As we move into the next millenium, we need to work with Russia, our 
friend in the Middle East, and those who are not our friends to find 
ways to create security and a lasting peace for our children. Selling 
technology that would destroy the world certainly takes us in the wrong 
direction.
  I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) of the Committee on 
International Relations, and the ranking member, the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), for moving forward with this legislation 
in a bipartisan manner. I join and urge my colleagues to support H.R. 
1883.
  Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Berman).
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend, the gentleman from 
Florida, for yielding me the time.
  First, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the 
gentleman from New York (Chairman Gilman) for introducing the 
legislation, for allowing me to be a participant in the development of 
the legislation and its cosponsorship, and to the Republican leadership 
for putting the bill over until after the recess to deal with some of 
the concerns and misunderstandings that I think would have existed 
which would have impeded the progress of this bill, had we rushed to a 
markup the last week before the recess. I do appreciate that delay.
  I rise in very strong support of the bill. The purpose of this 
legislation is not to bash Russia. It is not to kill the Space Station. 
It is not even to bash Iran.
  One thing we know, it has been reported everywhere and we all know 
it, Iran is on a program to develop nuclear, chemical, biological 
weapons and the ballistic missiles to deliver those weapons. Iran has 
determined that that is in their national interests.
  A recent CIA report estimates that in the next few years Iran could 
test a long-range missile capable of delivering a small payload to many 
parts of the United States. Within a decade, Iran could test a more 
advanced nuclear-capable ICBM.
  Again, my goal is not to demonize Iran. I would welcome improved U.S. 
ties with Iran. If they would simply stop supporting Hamas and other 
terrorist groups who seek to disrupt the Middle East peace process, 
release the 13 Jews currently in detention, and otherwise moderate 
their behavior, I would like to have our relationship with Iran 
improve.
  But no matter what the status of our bilateral relationship, it will 
always be in our clear interest to prevent or delay Iran's acquisition 
of weapons of mass destruction. I doubt we will ever convince the 
Iranians to halt their weapons programs. Therefore, the next best thing 
we can do is to do everything in our power to cut off the flow of 
technology and expertise from other countries to Iran.
  This legislation will do several things. First, it will help us get a 
more complete picture of which foreign entities are transferring 
technology to Iran, and authorize, he already has the power, but 
authorize, it will authorize even more clearly, but not require, the 
President to impose sanctions on those entities.
  Congress has a right to know and understand the full extent of the 
proliferation to Iran. This bill helps to provide that information to 
the Congress. The bill will also limit extraordinary payments to Russia 
for the international Space Station. Certain exemptions have been made, 
but it will limit the extraordinary payments and new programs on the 
Space Station; in other words, payments for work that Russia already 
pledged to do at their own expense, unless the President certifies that 
the Russian Government is taking concrete steps to stop proliferation 
and that the Russian space agency and the entities under its 
jurisdiction or control have stopped making unauthorized transfers.
  I do not want to bash Russia. I am not interested in playing the 
blame game, as some of my colleagues are right now, for this situation 
in Russia and the U.S. policy towards Russia.
  I believe, particularly in the last couple of years, that this 
administration has made great efforts to try and persuade the Russians 
to do more to stop the proliferation. I believe Russia and its top 
leadership understand that proliferation to Iran is no more in their 
interest than it is in our interest.
  But the fact is that if, in a program that we are participating in 
through

[[Page H8175]]

the Russian space agency, they allow their own subsidiaries and 
subordinate agencies that they can control to proliferate and to 
continue that technology, they should not expect to be partners with us 
in new programs. They have to make a choice.
  The entity that is a joint venture, the entity that is a joint 
venture with us, with Lockheed on the launches, has understood that and 
has made that choice, and has resisted any temptations to proliferate. 
We want the Russian space agency to do the same thing with all their 
agencies. That is why this legislation, prospective in nature, is being 
introduced.
  I congratulate the chairman, again, and the other cosponsors, and 
urge its adoption.
  Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge my colleagues to think twice before 
believing recent rumors that the Iranian government has moderated its 
hardline policies towards the United States and our allies in the 
Middle East. The so-called moderate Iranian government has not ended 
its program to build weapons of mass destruction, and it continues to 
support terrorist groups that commit up conscionable acts of death and 
destruction.
  The Iranian government also remains adamantly opposed to the Middle 
East peace process. Make no mistake about it, an unstable Iranian 
regime with weapons of mass destruction is a threat to the entire world 
and to the fragile peace evolving in the Middle East.
  Since the end of the Cold War, missile and weapons technology has 
flowed unhindered from foreign companies to Iran. The United States 
must lead the fight to stop foreign companies from exporting their 
services and technologies to Iran. H.R. 1883 allows the United States 
to sanction foreign companies contributing to Iran's weapons buildup.
  Russian companies in particular have been guilty of providing the 
Iranian government with weapons technology. The Iran Nonproliferation 
Act holds the Russian government and Russian companies accountable for 
the flow of technology and services reportedly transferred to Iran.
  The greatest threat to the security of the United States in the next 
century will be posed by nations that are governed by unstable regimes 
like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea that are developing weapons of mass 
destruction. Our own intelligence agencies have warned us that in a 
short time these nations may have the capability to strike cities in 
the United States.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to support this legislation and send a 
strong message that the United States will not tolerate individuals and 
companies aiding rogue regimes in their deadly efforts.
  Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman on the other side for 
making this a strong bipartisan appeal to stop this kind of action in 
supporting Iran's development of long-range missiles. 5
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise to support this bill. 
Initially, I was hesitant to support the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 
1999. But this bill has undergone many changes in the International 
Relations Committee and in the Science Committee, of which I am a 
Member, and I am hopeful that this bill will adequately prevent nuclear 
proliferation while providing fair treatment to our Russian 
counterparts.
  I am cognizant of the continuing United States concerns with nuclear 
proliferation, and clearly we all understand the significance and 
importance of the proliferation issue. We must keep ever vigilant for 
the leakage of our military secrets, and I have been an ardent 
supporter of nonproliferation policies. I realize from my briefings on 
the subject that Iran seems determined to develop a nuclear weapons 
program. Their ballistic missile arsenal already contains the Shahab 4 
and the Shahab 3 missile and there is an apparent effort to develop a 
new missile called the Kosar. It is even more evident from the nuclear 
race between India and Pakistan that the United States has a vested 
interest in seeing further proliferation halted. As we strive towards 
our goal we must ensure that our good intentions are not misdirected.
  I appreciate Representative Weldon's amendment to this bill in the 
Science Committee, and this amendment has done much to clarify the 
definition of ``maintenance'' in regards to the Service Module. I must 
acknowledge my disappointment in the fact that I was unable to add 
``safety functions'' to this amendment. Considering that the amendment 
included environmental control, life support, and orbital maintenance 
under the definition of activities under maintenance, it seems to me 
that ``safety functions'' logically should be included in this list. It 
is my hope that the intent of the bill will incorporate this notion.
  The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999 creates Congressional oversight 
of proliferation to Iran by requiring the President to report to 
Congress every six months regarding all foreign entities and any 
transfers of goods, services, or technologies to Iran. The bill also 
authorizes the President to apply punitive measures to those entities 
that permit the proliferation to Iran.
  This piece of legislation does not require the President to apply 
punitive measures; instead it simply gives him the option to do so. We 
do not want to implement procedures that are too harsh, nor do we want 
to diminish the authority of the President.
  This bill comes under the jurisdiction of Committee on Science 
because of Section 6. This legislation could prohibit our Nation from 
making ``extraordinary payments in connection with the International 
Space Station'' to the Russian Space Agency or entities under the 
Russian Space Station jurisdiction unless the President determines that 
it is the policy of the Russian government to oppose proliferation to 
Iran.
  While we want to preserve our country's military secrets, we must 
also remain fair to our Russian partners. It is worth noting that the 
administration has already moved to curb the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction and is also committed to imposing trade sanctions 
on those who violate the Missile Technology Control Regime. A year ago, 
the administration sanctioned seven Russian aerospace enterprises for 
possible violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime. 
Potentially lost in this issue is the fact that Russian Space Agency 
has attempted to make the transition from military technology to 
civilian and space related technology. One reason that this transition 
has been slow is because Russia simply cannot pay its scientists to 
complete the transition. As confirmed by NASA the subsidies to the 
Russian Space Agency coupled with the work that they perform on the 
International Space Station help America's non-proliferation policy.
  This bill has come a long way. I am glad that we have done much to 
improve it, for we do not want to alienate our Russian partners, nor do 
we want to undermine the efforts of NASA. While I can appreciate the 
national security interests that have guided this bill to us, I am 
fully aware of the concerns expressed by NASA. NASA seems concerned 
about Russian reaction to the passage of this bill. A negative reaction 
by the Russians could erode away the sense of goodwill that has been 
forged by the International Space Station.
  I am hopeful that this bill will have the desired effect on the 
proliferation of our country's secrets, and for that reason, I support 
his bill.
  Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 
1883, the Iran Nonproliferation Act. As a cosponsor of this measure, it 
is my hope that the House will adopt this bill. As a member of the 
International Relations Committee and a strong supporter of Israel, I 
believe that we must send a strong signal to Iran that we will not 
tolerate nuclear proliferation. We must not tolerate countries 
supplying military technology to Iran which has flight tested a missile 
capable of hitting Israel.
  The threat of nuclear proliferation is not only a serious 
destabilizing force in the Middle East, but it endangers American 
interests as well. Maintaining and enhancing the political and economic 
stability of our allies in the region and supporting the Middle East 
peace process must be two of our top foreign policy goals for this part 
of the world.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bill and send a clear signal 
that we will not tolerate nuclear proliferation and that we are 
determined to do what is necessary to bring peace to this troubled 
region.
  Mr. NETHERCUTT. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this legislation and 
am proud to be a cosponsor. We send a clear message to Russia with this 
legislation that any assistance to Iran with weapons of mass 
destruction or missile systems will be grounds for ending fruitful 
scientific relationships with the United States. We are forcing Russian 
scientists and government entities to choose between a symbol of 
international peace, the space station, and the proliferation of deadly 
technologies.
  When the Science Committee considered this legislation last week, it 
accepted an amendment I offered that tightens the bill slightly. The 
Government of Russia has consistently argued that ``rogue'' elements 
within the scientific and military establishment are exporting deadly 
technologies to Iran. It is

[[Page H8176]]

conceivable that this fiction could be maintained, and private labs or 
independent agencies could continue to proliferate to Iran, even as 
they receive taxpayer funding for work on the ISS. This legislation 
ensures that this would not be the case, as the bill now prohibits 
extraordinary payments for the ISS to any foreign person or entity that 
Secretary of State finds has materially contributed or attempted to 
contribute to the proliferation of WMD or missile technology. The 
legislation also prohibits the indirect financing of such proliferators 
through another entity. For example, NASA could not make a payment to 
the RSA if it knew that a subcontractor for the work was involved 
previously with proliferation.
  This is consistent with Executive orders 12938 and 13094 which 
prescribe procurement, assistance, and import bans for proliferating 
entities or countries. The current legislating essentially codifies 
these Executive Orders, raising their profile and raising the stakes 
for Russian entities that choose to engage in proliferative activities.
  With this bill, we demonstrate to Russian entities that there is a 
long-term consequence to cooperating with Iran on missile or WMD 
programs. H.R. 1883 terminates ISS funding for these Russian labs if 
they have been designated as proliferators subject to the executive 
orders.
  As the President said in his statement on EO 13094, ``being able to 
offer both incentives and disincentives enhances our capacity to deal 
with these threats.'' Clearly, this bill also allows for incentives and 
disincentives. Russian entities are encouraged to work with NASA on 
space station issues and are firmly discouraged from working with Iran. 
In a statement on the same Executive Order, Vice President Gore said 
that ``today's Executive Order . . . will explicitly bar assistance to 
and imports from entities now being investigated by Russia.'' Again, we 
are going no further than the Administration's stated intent of barring 
assistance to proliferative entities. This is an important bill and I 
urge my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 
1883, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999.
  Everyone in this Congress is aware that Iran has continually 
threatened the peace and security of the Middle East. Even today, Iran 
is still committed to the destruction of Israel, opposes the Middle 
East peace process and supports terrorist groups such as Hamas. In 
fact, Iran remains the world's leading sponsor of international 
terrorism.
  Despite these very real security concerns, cash strapped Russia has 
supported the $800 million Bushehr project, a 1000-megawatt light-water 
reactor, in southern Iran.
  Why Iran needs such a reactor remains an open question because Iran 
has one of the world's largest oil and natural gas reserves. However, 
many security experts believe that such projects provide good cover to 
a nuclear weapons program and provide Iranian technicians with 
expertise in the development of nuclear weapons.
  These developments, along with Iran's successful test of the Shahab-3 
missile, with a range of 800 miles, pose the greatest risk to Middle 
Eastern stability in history.
  Mr. Speaker, the results of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons are 
almost too horrifying to imagine. But, if current trends continue, it 
may become an all too real nightmare for the United States and our 
Middle Eastern allies.
  Former Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu put it best when he 
stated, ``The building of a nuclear reactor in Iran only makes it 
likelier that Iran will equip its ballistic missiles with nuclear 
warheads . . . Such a development threatens peace, the whole region and 
in the end, the Russians themselves.''
  Given the potential threat of a nuclear-armed Iran, I believe it 
appropriate to withhold the $590 million in U.S. assistance for the 
Russian contribution to the International Space Station.
  If Russian policymakers see the danger of their activities, they can 
certify that they are not transferring technology that would help 
develop weapons of mass destruction and aid will resume.
  Mr. Speaker, the House took similar action when we passed H.R. 1477, 
the Iran Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1999 by a vote of 383 
to 1. H.R. 1477 withholds the U.S. voluntary contributions from 
programs and projects of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Iran 
unless the Secretary of State makes a determination that they will not 
provide Iran with training or expertise relevant to nuclear programs' 
development.
  I was proud to be an original cosponsor of the Iran Nuclear 
Proliferation Act, and I am proud to be a cosponsor of the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1883 passed the International Relations Committee, 
on which I am proud to serve, by a vote of 33 to 0. I urge my fellow 
Members to give this legislation the same overwhelming support on the 
floor, that we gave it in Committee.
  Mr. LAMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I listened very carefully to Chairman 
Sensenbrenner's opening remarks during the hearing on this bill a 
couple of months ago. He stated that ``We must ensure that the Russian 
government is not facilitating the proliferation of missile technology 
* * * If the President finds that Russia is contributing to Iran's 
attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, 
then the bill prohibits NASA from transferring U.S. tax dollars to the 
Russian Space Agency and any enterprise under its jurisdiction.'' I 
can't agree more with the intent of this statement.
  During Committee markup, I had planned on offering an amendment to 
this bill that I believe would have clarified and honored the original 
intent of the bill by changing the nature of Section 6 to one that 
would have prohibited payments if proliferation was to occur, but 
wouldn't require advance certification that it hasn't. No one will 
disagree, I believe, that we should punish cheating, and this amendment 
would have achieved that goal in a less burdensome manner than the 
existing provision.
  However, I decided against offering this amendment. While I still 
have major concerns that Section 6 will not materially improve the 
effectiveness of this legislation in discouraging weapons technology 
transfer to Iran, and will cast a shadow over the greatest example of 
international cooperation in the peaceful use of space, I will 
reluctantly support H.R. 1883. That being said, I will diligently work 
to have the section relating to Space Station removed as soon as 
possible. I continue to believe that singling out Space Station is not 
the answer to stopping proliferation--Russian contributions to the 
International Space Station, a permanently inhabited research facility 
in space, in fact are not close to the weapons technologies that are of 
so much concern to us, and we should encourage the Russians to continue 
on with us in the peaceful exploration of space.
  In addition, the reporting requirements of Section 6 unnecessarily 
duplicate other sections of the bill. Section 2 already requires that 
the President identify every Russian against whom ``credible 
information'' exists regarding tech transfers to Iran. This is, in 
fact, a harder test than the requirement for a ``policy'' certification 
from the President. I support this bill with the hope that my concerns 
will be addressed by all parties involved, at a later date.
  Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I would like to speak in support of 
H.R. 1883. As you know, I am a cosponsor of H.R. 1883. I think that it 
is a useful bill, and one which I believe has been improved by an 
amendment that I offered at the Science Committee's markup of the bill 
last week. I am pleased to see that my language has been included in 
the bill that is before the House today. Basically, my amendment 
shortened the notification requirements in order to avoid unnecessary 
bureaucratic delays and costs that do nothing to enhance our security.
  In addition, it corrected a problem that had arisen when an amendment 
was adopted by the Science Committee's Space Subcommittee in its markup 
of the bill. That Subcommittee markup had included an amendment 
requiring partial transfer of Service Module ownership to the United 
States in the event of any extraordinary payments. My amendment changed 
that to ``goods and services''. The issue of transferring ownership of 
the Service Module is a complicated one in light of the existing 
international agreements. And I don't think that we'd really want to 
own part of the Service Module in any event.
  Most members would agree with me, I think, that controlling the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the most 
important challenges facing our nation. I think that this bill helps 
address that challenge, and I urge Members to vote to suspend the rules 
and pass H.R. 1883.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, H.R. 1883, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This 15-minute vote on H.R. 1883 will be 
followed by a 5-minute vote on the motion to instruct conferees offered 
by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi).
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 419, 
nays 0, not voting 14, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 409]

                               YEAS--419

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baird

[[Page H8177]]


     Baker
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Ballenger
     Barcia
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     Jenkins
     John
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     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
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     Kildee
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     Kind (WI)
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     Kleczka
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     Petri
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     Quinn
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     Smith (MI)
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     Snyder
     Souder
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     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--14

     Becerra
     Bonilla
     Deal
     Fattah
     Hastings (FL)
     Jefferson
     Jones (NC)
     Kaptur
     Kingston
     McDermott
     Porter
     Pryce (OH)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Shaw

                              {time}  1250

  So (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were 
suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated for:
  Mr. JONES of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 409, I was 
unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

                          ____________________