[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 119 (Tuesday, September 14, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H8166-H8177]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 1999
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the
bill (H.R. 1883) to provide for the application of measures to foreign
persons who transfer to Iran certain goods, services, or technology and
for other purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read as follows:
H.R. 1883
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Nonproliferation Act of
1999''.
SEC. 2. REPORTS ON PROLIFERATION TO IRAN.
(a) Reports.--The President shall, at the times specified
in subsection (b), submit to the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report identifying every
foreign person with respect to whom there is credible
information indicating that that person, on or after January
1, 1999, transferred to Iran--
(1) goods, services, or technology listed on--
(A) the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for the Export
of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology (published by
the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information
Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.3/Part 1, and subsequent revisions)
and Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use
Equipment, Material, and Related Technology (published by the
International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular
INFCIRC/254/Rev.3/Part 2, and subsequent revisions);
(B) the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment and
Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and subsequent revisions;
(C) the lists of items and substances relating to
biological and chemical weapons the export of which is
controlled by the Australia Group;
(D) the Schedule One or Schedule Two list of toxic
chemicals and precursors the export of which is controlled
pursuant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction; or
(E) the Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use Goods and
Technologies and Munitions list of July 12, 1996, and
subsequent revisions; or
(2) goods, services, or technology not listed on any list
identified in paragraph (1) but which nevertheless would be,
if they were United States goods, services, or technology,
prohibited for export to Iran because of their potential to
make a material contribution to the development of nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons, or of ballistic or cruise
missile systems.
(b) Timing of Reports.--The reports under subsection (a)
shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, not later than 6 months after such
date of enactment, and not later than the end of each 6-month
period thereafter.
(c) Exceptions.--Any foreign person who--
(1) was identified in a previous report submitted under
subsection (a) on account of a particular transfer, or
(2) has engaged in a transfer on behalf of, or in concert
with, the Government of the United States,
is not required to be identified on account of that same
transfer in any report submitted thereafter under this
section, except to the degree that new information has
emerged indicating that the particular transfer may have
continued, or been larger, more significant, or different in
nature than previously reported under this section.
(d) Submission in Classified Form.--When the President
considers it appropriate, reports submitted under subsection
(a), or appropriate parts thereof, may be submitted in
classified form.
SEC. 3. APPLICATION OF MEASURES TO CERTAIN FOREIGN PERSONS.
(a) Application of Measures.--Subject to sections 4 and 5,
the President is authorized to apply with respect to each
foreign person identified in a report submitted pursuant to
section 2(a), for such period of time as he may determine,
any or all of the measures described in subsection (b).
(b) Description of Measures.--The measures referred to in
subsections (a) are the following:
(1) Executive order 12938 prohibitions.--The measures set
forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 4 of Executive
Order 12938 shall be applied with respect to that person.
(2) Arms export prohibition.--The United States Government
shall not sell to that foreign person any item on the United
States Munitions List as in effect on August 8, 1995, and
shall terminate sales to that person of any defense articles,
defense services, or design and construction services under
the Arms Export Control Act.
(3) Dual use export prohibition.--The President shall deny
licenses and suspend existing licenses for the transfer to
that person of items the export of which is controlled under
the Export Administration Act of 1979 or the Export
Administration Regulations.
(c) Effective Date of Measures.--Measures applied pursuant
to subsection (a) shall be effective with respect to a
foreign person no later than--
(1) 90 days after the report identifying the foreign person
is submitted, if the report is submitted on or before the
date required by section 2(b);
(2) 90 days after the date required by section 2(b) for
submitting the report, if the report identifying the foreign
person is submitted within 60 days after that date; or
(3) on the date that the report identifying the foreign
person is submitted, if that report is submitted more than 60
days after the date required by section 2(b).
(d) Publication in Federal Register.--The application of
measures to a foreign person pursuant to subsection (a) shall
be announced by notice published in the Federal Register.
SEC. 4. PROCEDURES IF MEASURES ARE NOT APPLIED.
(a) Requirement To Notify Congress.--Should the President
not exercise the authority of section 3(a) to apply any or
all of the measures described in section 3(b) with respect to
a foreign person identified in a report submitted pursuant to
section 2(a), he shall so notify the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate no later
than the effective date under section 3(c) for measures with
respect to that person.
(b) Written Justification.--Any notification submitted by
the President under subsection (a) shall include a written
justification describing in detail the facts and
circumstances relating specifically to the foreign person
identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a)
that support the President's decision not to exercise the
authority of section 3(a) with respect to that person.
(c) Submission in Classified Form.--When the President
considers it appropriate, the notification of the President
under subsection (a), and the written justification under
subsection (b), or appropriate parts thereof, may be
submitted in classified form.
SEC. 5. DETERMINATION EXEMPTING FOREIGN PERSON FROM SECTIONS
3 AND 4.
(a) In General.--Sections 3 and 4 shall not apply to a
foreign person 15 days after the President reports to the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate that the President has determined, on the basis of
information provided by that person, or otherwise obtained by
the President, that--
(1) the person did not, on or after January 1, 1999,
knowingly transfer to Iran the goods, services, or technology
the apparent transfer of which caused that person to be
identified in a report submitted pursuant to section 2(a);
(2) the goods, services, or technology the transfer of
which caused that person to be identified in a report
submitted pursuant to section 2(a) did not materially
contribute to Iran's efforts to develop nuclear, biological,
or chemical weapons, or ballistic or cruise missile systems;
(3) the person is subject to the primary jurisdiction of a
government that is an adherent to one or more relevant
nonproliferation regimes, the person was identified in a
report submitted pursuant to section 2(a) with respect to a
transfer of goods, services, or technology described in
section 2(a)(1), and such transfer was made consistent with
the guidelines and parameters of all such relevant regimes of
which such government is an adherent; or
(4) the government with primary jurisdiction over the
person has imposed meaningful penalties on that person on
account of the transfer of the goods, services, or technology
which caused that person to be identified in a report
submitted pursuant to section 2(a).
(b) Submission in Classified Form.--When the President
considers it appropriate, the determination and report of the
President under subsection (a), or appropriate parts thereof,
may be submitted in classified form.
SEC. 6. RESTRICTION ON EXTRAORDINARY PAYMENTS IN CONNECTION
WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION.
(a) Restriction on Extraordinary Payments in Connection
With the International Space Station.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, no agency of the United States
Government may make extraordinary payments in connection with
the International Space Station to the Russian Space Agency,
any organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control
of the Russian Space Agency, or any other organization,
entity, or element of the Government of the Russian
Federation, unless, during the fiscal year in which the
extraordinary payments in connection with the International
Space Station are to be made, the President has made the
determination described in subsection (b), and reported such
determination to the Committee on International Relations and
the Committee on Science of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
(b) Determination Regarding Russian Cooperation in
Preventing Proliferation to
[[Page H8167]]
Iran.--The determination referred to in subsection (a) is a
determination by the President that--
(1) it is the policy of the Government of the Russian
Federation to oppose the proliferation to Iran of weapons of
mass destruction and missile systems capable of delivering
such weapons;
(2) the Government of the Russian Federation (including the
law enforcement, export promotion, export control, and
intelligence agencies of such government) has demonstrated
and continues to demonstrate through the implementation of
concrete steps a sustained commitment to seek out and prevent
the transfer to Iran of goods, services, and technology that
could make a material contribution to the development of
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or of ballistic or
cruise missile systems, including through the imposition of
meaningful penalties on persons who make such transfers; and
(3) neither the Russian Space Agency, nor any organization
or entity under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian
Space Agency, has, during the 1-year period prior to the date
of the determination pursuant to this subsection, made
transfers to Iran reportable under section 2(a) of this Act
(other than transfers with respect to which a determination
pursuant to section 5 has been or will be made).
(c) Prior Notification.--Not less than 5 days before making
a determination under subsection (b), the President shall
notify the Committee on International Relations and the
Committee on Science of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation of the Senate of his intention to
make such determination.
(d) Written Justification.--A determination of the
President under subsection (b) shall include a written
justification describing in detail the facts and
circumstances supporting the President's conclusion.
(e) Submission in Classified Form.--When the President
considers it appropriate, a determination of the President
under subsection (b), a prior notification under subsection
(c), and a written justification under subsection (d), or
appropriate parts thereof, may be submitted in classified
form.
(f) Exception for Crew Safety.--
(1) Exception.--The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration may make extraordinary payments that would
otherwise be prohibited under this section to the Russian
Space Agency or any organization or entity under the
jurisdiction or control of the Russian Space Agency if the
President has notified the Congress in writing that such
payments are necessary to prevent the imminent loss of life
by or grievous injury to individuals aboard the International
Space Station.
(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after notifying
Congress that the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration will make extraordinary payments under
paragraph (1), the President shall submit to Congress a
report describing--
(A) the extent to which the provisions of subsection (b)
had been met as of the date of notification; and
(B) the measures that the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration is taking to ensure that--
(i) the conditions posing a threat of imminent loss of life
by or grievous injury to individuals aboard the International
Space Station necessitating the extraordinary payments are
not repeated; and
(ii) it is no longer necessary to make extraordinary
payments in order to prevent imminent loss of life by or
grievous injury to individuals aboard the International Space
Station.
(g) Service Module Exception.--(1) The National Aeronautics
and Space Administration may make extraordinary payments that
would otherwise be prohibited under this section to the
Russian Space Agency, any organization or entity under the
jurisdiction or control of the Russian Space Agency, or any
subcontractor thereof for the construction, testing,
preparation, delivery, launch, or maintenance of the Service
Module if--
(A) the President has notified Congress at least 5 days
before making such payments;
(B) no report has been made under section 2 with respect to
an activity of the entity to receive such payment, and the
President has no information of any activity that would
require such a report; and
(C) the United States will receive goods or services of
value to the United States commensurate with the value of the
extraordinary payments made.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term
``maintenance'' means activities which cannot be performed by
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and which
must be performed in order for the Service Module to provide
environmental control, life support, and orbital maintenance
functions which cannot be performed by an alternative means
at the time of payment.
(3) This subsection shall cease to be effective 60 days
after a United States propulsion module is in place at the
International Space Station.
(h) Exception.--Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), no
agency of the United States Government may make extraordinary
payments in connection with the International Space Station
to any foreign person subject to measures applied pursuant
to--
(1) section 3 of this Act; or
(2) section 4 of Executive Order 12938 (November 14, 1994),
as amended by Executive Order 13094 (July 28, 1998).
Such payments shall also not be made to any other entity if
the agency of the United States Government anticipates that
such payments will be passed on to such a foreign person.
SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this Act, the following terms have the
following meanings:
(1) Extraordinary payments in connection with the
international space station.--The term ``extraordinary
payments in connection with the International Space Station''
means payments in cash or in kind made or to be made by the
United States Government--
(A) for work on the International Space Station which the
Russian Government pledged at any time to provide at its
expense; or
(B) for work on the International Space Station, or for the
purchase of goods or services relating to human space flight,
that are not required to be made under the terms of a
contract or other agreement that was in effect on January 1,
1999, as those terms were in effect on such date.
(2) Foreign person; person.--The terms ``foreign person''
and ``person'' mean--
(A) a natural person that is an alien;
(B) a corporation, business association, partnership,
society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity,
organization, or group, that is organized under the laws of a
foreign country or has its principal place of business in a
foreign country;
(C) any foreign governmental entity operating as a business
enterprise; and
(D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any entity
described in subparagraph (B) or (C).
(3) Executive order 12938.--The term ``Executive Order
12938'' means Executive Order 12938 as in effect on January
1, 1999.
(4) Adherent to relevant nonproliferation regime.--A
government is an ``adherent'' to a ``relevant
nonproliferation regime'' if that government--
(A) is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group with respect
to a transfer of goods, services, or technology described in
section 2(a)(1)(A);
(B) is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime
with respect to a transfer of goods, services, or technology
described in section 2(a)(1)(B), or is a party to a binding
international agreement with the United States that was in
effect on January 1, 1999, to control the transfer of such
goods, services, or technology in accordance with the
criteria and standards set forth in the Missile Technology
Control Regime;
(C) is a member of the Australia Group with respect to a
transfer of goods, services, or technology described in
section 2(a)(1)(C);
(D) is a party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction with respect to a transfer
of goods, services, or technology described in section
2(a)(1)(D); or
(E) is a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement with respect
to a transfer of goods, services, or technology described in
section 2(a)(1)(E).
(5) Organization or entity under the jurisdiction or
control of the russian space agency.--(A) The term
``organization or entity under the jurisdiction or control of
the Russian Space Agency'' means an organization or entity
that--
(i) was made part of the Russian Space Agency upon its
establishment on February 25, 1992;
(ii) was transferred to the Russian Space Agency by decree
of the Russian Government on July 25, 1994, or May 12, 1998;
(iii) was or is transferred to the Russian Space Agency by
decree of the Russian Government at any other time before,
on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act; or
(iv) is a joint stock company in which the Russian Space
Agency has at any time held controlling interest.
(B) Any organization or entity described in subparagraph (A)
shall be deemed to be under the jurisdiction or control of
the Russian Space Agency regardless of whether--
(i) such organization or entity, after being part of or
transferred to the Russian Space Agency, is removed from or
transferred out of the Russian Space Agency; or
(ii) the Russian Space Agency, after holding a controlling
interest in such organization or entity, divests its
controlling interest.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson)
each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
General Leave
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks
on the bill under consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
[[Page H8168]]
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, today we consider the Iran Nonproliferation
Act of 1999, H.R. 1883, which the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr.
Gejdenson), the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), the
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman), and I introduced on May 20 of
this year.
This bipartisan legislation currently has almost 230 cosponsors and
just last week it was reported unanimously by both our Committee on
International Relations and our Committee on Science.
The purpose of our legislation is to reverse the very dangerous
situation confronting us today in which firms in Russia, in China, in
North Korea and elsewhere are transferring to Iran goods, services, and
technology that will assist in the development of weapons of mass
destruction and missiles capable of delivering such weapons.
In the hands of a rogue state like Iran, these weapons pose a clear
and present danger, not only to our friends and allies in the region
but also to the tens of thousands of our military personnel in the
Persian Gulf and in adjacent areas.
The proliferation of these technologies to Iran has been going on for
a number of years. And to its credit, the administration has worked to
try to stop this kind of proliferation, but all available evidence
indicates that to date their efforts have failed.
The proliferation is as bad today as it has ever been. With support
from key supplier nations, Iran has now started work on a medium- to
long-range missile, with a range of 3,000 to 5,000 kilometers. Many
analysts believe that the volume and pattern of continued transfers
from Russia could not exist without their acquiescence, if not
encouragement, of at least some elements in the Russian Government.
The purpose of our legislation is to give the administration new
tools in which to address this problem, the countries that are
transferring these items to Iran powerful new reasons to stop
proliferating, and Congress greater insight into just what is
happening.
Our legislation picks up where we left off at the end of the last
session of Congress. My colleagues will recall that during the 105th
Congress we passed a similar bill entitled the Iran Missile
Proliferation Sanctions Act. That measure passed both the House and
Senate by overwhelming margins but regrettably was vetoed by the
President.
The President pleaded with us not to override his veto assuring us
that with more time he would be able to resolve the problem
diplomatically, and we bowed to his wishes and decided not to seek an
override of that veto.
The verdict is now in on that decision. Clearly, the President
overestimated his ability to handle this problem diplomatically; and
Congress erred in not forcing a vote on that issue. We have learned
from that mistake, and we do not intend to repeat it.
This bill contains many important improvements over the legislation
that we passed 2 years ago. It takes into account many of the
administration's objections to the prior bill, and it refines our
approach to the problem.
Mr. Speaker, this is an important measure that will make a vital
contribution to our Nation's efforts to reverse the proliferation of
dangerous weapons technology to Iran. Accordingly, I urge my colleagues
to support this measure, H.R. 1883.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I want to join the gentleman from New York (Chairman
Gilman) in supporting this legislation and commending him for his
actions. Clearly, there is great frustration here and at the White
House over the failure of the Russian Government to get to a point
where it can control the proliferation of serious weapons of mass
destruction.
We have been hopeful, frankly, that under Prime Minister Stepashin
that we would see some progress in Russia. And there have been a number
of promises made; but with the rate that the Russian governments have
been changing, we have been seeing very little progress in an area that
is critical to our national security and many of our allies throughout
the world.
Proliferation is an issue not just in Russia. The Chinese Government
has proliferated a number of its most critical technologies and this
Congress needs to address all of these issues, but today we focus on
Russia. And we should have a policy that both engages Russia and
provides penalties when they fail to live up to the agreements that we
have reached with them.
The Russians have a significant portion of the world's technology of
weapons of mass destruction, and there has been leakage of these
systems and these technologies to the Iranians.
The United States has been in this kind of situation before. At the
end of World War II, America moved into Germany hiring many of the
scientists that had worked for the Nazis to prevent them from working
for countries who were our adversaries. Today we find ourselves in a
similar situation. The talent and the brain power in Russia can be a
great opportunity to move us forward in many areas of peaceful uses of
these technologies, but they can also provide a great danger. Whether
it is fissionable material or rocket technology, the United States has
to take every effort possible to make sure that proliferation is
halted.
I join with the chairman and many others in this House in offering
this legislation, which we hope will send a very strong message to the
Russian Government that as difficult as these times are for them, this
is an area where they can allow no seepage, where they have to make the
effort to stop the loss of these technologies to dangerous countries
around the globe.
So I commend the chairman for moving this legislation today.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), the distinguished
chairman of the Committee on Science.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Gilman) for yielding me this time, and rise in support of this
bill, which will assist the administration's efforts to prevent the
spread of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction to Iran.
H.R. 1883 contains several provisions that require the administration
to report any credible information it receives about the entities
transferring technology to Iran.
The bill's teeth, however, are in section 6, over which the Committee
on Science has jurisdiction and which the committee unanimously
endorsed last week. Section 6 prohibits the administration from
transferring any funds to the Russian Government for the International
Space Station unless the President determines that it is the policy of
the Russian Government to actively oppose proliferation to Iran, that
the Russian Government is carrying out that policy, and that the
Russian Space Agency and the organizations under its jurisdictions have
not transferred technology to Iran.
Some question linking the International Space Station and
proliferation arguing that they are separate issues. Using the space
program as a nonproliferation tool follows the path the White House
laid out in 1993 when it invited Russia into the International Space
Station partnership. The White House explicitly linked Russian
participation in the Space Station to its goal of discouraging Russia
from engaging in proliferation activities, and numerous administration
witnesses since then before the Committee on Science and its
subcommittees have stated that if Russia proliferates to Iran that is a
deal breaker as far as the Space Station goes.
So, H.R. 1883 is consistent with the administration's policies
regarding both the Space Station and nonproliferation.
Unfortunately, we have received consistent reports since 1993 that
Russia is assisting Iran's efforts to acquire weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missiles. The CIA and the State Department
conceded as much in open hearings over the last 2 years.
Faced with such evidence, H.R. 1883 is an appropriate and measured
step that Congress can and must take to halt such proliferation. The
bill does not change Russia's rights or obligations as a partner in the
International Space Station. It does not prohibit NASA from making
payments to the Russian Space Agency if the Russian
[[Page H8169]]
Government is doing what it promises, namely stopping the flow of
technology to Iran. It only prohibits NASA from making such payments if
Russia is increasing the threat to our friends, allies, and troops in
the Middle East and in Europe.
Congress must not look the other way in the face of proliferation or
one day it will come back to haunt us. We must do our part to promote
international peace and security. H.R. 1883 is a good first step, and I
urge my colleagues to vote in favor of this bill.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Tennessee (Mr. Gordon).
Mr. GORDON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1883, the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 1999.
I have been a cosponsor of this bill because I feel very strongly
about the need to control proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The end of the Cold War did not mean that we have escaped the threat
posed by those who would do harm to us or to our allies in the world.
There is a very real threat posed by the proliferation of dangerous
weapons technologies into the hand of our enemies. We must do all we
can to see that they do not succeed in getting those harmful
technologies.
I see H.R. 1883 as one of the ways in which we can help to control
proliferation. It sends a strong message to those who would proliferate
that the United States will not stand idly by.
This bill is not intended to take away from the efforts currently
being made by the administration to control proliferation. Neither is
the bill intended to slap in the face those in the Russian Government
who are trying to stem proliferation. In fact, I want to note the
progress that has been made over the past year by the administration
and the Russian Government. There have been positive steps taken. These
include the Russian enactment of the federal law of export controls;
the Russian adoption as official policy of the Gallucci-Koptev action
plan, which is designed to stop all contact between Russian aerospace
entities and Iran; the joint Russian-U.S. establishment of export
control list; and a number of other substantive actions.
I am encouraged by these initiatives. At the same time, it is
important for Congress to signal to those who would proliferate that
their actions will have consequences.
I believe that H.R. 1883 sends such a signal. Therefore, I support
H.R. 1883, and I urge Members to vote to suspend the rules and pass
this important bill.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton), a member of the committee.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from
Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) for yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, we had a hearing not long ago involving some
whistleblowers from various agencies of government and one of the
people we had testify before our committee was a man named Jonathan
Fox. Mr. Fox is a defense security analyst at the Department of
Defense; and in October of 1997, he was asked to write a national
security assessment about Communist China and about the agreement for
cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy between China and the
United States.
Now, Mr. Fox was told that he had to have this national security
assessment done by October 25, 1997, because the administration wanted
to have everything ready before the state visit of Chinese President
Jiang Zemin.
The day after Mr. Fox submitted his memo, he was called by a man who
was one of his superiors named Michael Jackson.
He said, okay, how bad is it, about his memo, meaning the reaction to
his candid memo? And Mr. Jackson answered, you will be lucky if you
still have a job by the end of the day.
{time} 1200
Fox indicated he did not think Johnson was joking. Johnson told him
people were upset by the memo and it had to be revised and say that the
agreement was not a threat to national security.
Now, I hope everybody gets this straight. He wrote a national
security assessment which said that giving any additional nuclear
technology or anything that would help them with their nuclear program
would be a threat not only to the United States, but to the allies of
the United States as well. And just before President Jiang Zemin came
over, he got a call from his superior saying, if you do not change this
memo to say that they are not a threat, then you are going to be fired.
Now, Mr. Fox said to one of his colleagues he was so concerned about
his job because he had a wife and kids and he had been at the Defense
Department for a long time that he did change that national security
assessment because of the threat to his employment. He said China was
not only a threat to the United States of America, but to our allies as
well. And because President Jiang Zemin was coming over to meet with
President Clinton, he got orders from above to tell him to change that
national security assessment 180 degrees to say that China was no
threat, or he might lose his job.
Now, I think everybody in this country ought to be concerned about
that. If an expert at the Defense Department says there is a national
security threat to this country if we continue to give nuclear
technology to Communist China and he is ordered by the White House to
change that or somebody above him, and the guy said it was high above
my pay grade that this order came from, indicating it was way up the
chain of command, if people are being told to change national security
assessments that threaten our national security, then somebody ought to
be hung out to dry.
I came down here today to talk about this because we really do need
to impose economic sanctions on those who are proliferating nuclear
weapons because it is a threat to everybody in the world; but in
particular, we ought to really be going after Communist China because
they have been giving nuclear technology that those countries can use,
to Iran and to North Korea, and to others; and they are a threat to the
security of the United States and to our allies, as Mr. Fox has stated.
I think it is reprehensible that somebody above Mr. Fox's pay grade,
and they said it was way above his pay grade, ordered them to change
his national security assessment simply because President Jiang Zemin
from Communist China was coming over to meet with the President of the
United States and they wanted everything to be cool, everything to be
on an even keel. It is unbelievable this happened.
This was brought out before my committee, and none of the national
media reported it, and I thought it was a shame that they did not. I
called ABC, NBC, CBS, and CNN; and I said why would you not think this
was a major story, because a national security assessment was made
regarding the security of America and our allies and whether or not
China was selling nuclear weapons to potential enemies, and they told
him that if he did not change it 180 degrees to where it looked like
they were not a nuclear proliferator and there was no threat to
America, he was going to lose his job, and not one of the networks
picked that up. All I can say is shame on them. Shame on them. The
American people need to know the truth. At least they got this much of
it today.
[From the Committee on Government Reform]
Jonathan Fox Arms Control Specialist Department of Defense
professional background
Fox is an Arms Control Specialist in the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (formerly known as Defense Technology
Security Agency). Fox's wife also works at the agency as a
photographer. Fox fears both he and his wife will be
retaliated against for speaking to Congress.
Fox's Concerns
In October 1997, Fox was asked to write a memo regarding
the implementation of a 1985 ``Agreement for Cooperation in
the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy'' between China and the
U.S. The terms of the reciprocal agreement allowed annual
opportunities between the U.S. and China to:
Send technical experts to each others' civil reactor sites;
observe operations and reactor fueling; exchange and share
technical information in the operation and maintenance of
nuclear power generative and associated facilities; exchange
detailed confidence-building and transparency information on
transfer, storage and disposition of fissionable fuels
utilized for peaceful purposes; and disclose detailed reactor
site operational data, to include energy generated and
loading.
In his initial memo, Fox concluded that count ``this
assessment concludes that the proposed arrangement presents
real and substantial risk to the common defense and security
of both the United States and allied
[[Page H8170]]
countries.'' Fox pointed out that Chinese past practices as a
proliferant presented considerable risks to national
security.
Fox said he was told that the memo had to be done by
October 25, 1997 because the Administration wanted to have
everything ready before the state visit of Jiang Zemin.
The day after Fox submitted the memo, he was called by
Michael Johnson. When Fox asked him ``OK how bad is it?''
[meaning the reaction to his candid memo], Johnson answered:
``You'll be lucky if you still have a job by the end of the
day.'' Fox indicated he didn't think Johnson was joking.
Johnson told him people were upset by the memo and it had to
be revised and say that the agreement is not inimical to U.S.
national security. Fox said he told Johnson that everything
in the memo was true and Johnson responded, ``I know, but
that doesn't matter the issue has already been decided far
above our pay grade.'' Johnson said the changes had to be
made by 11:30 a.m. that morning. Fox said Johnson also said
if he didn't change the opinion, he would have to explain to
his Director why a GS-14 was blocking a Presidential summit.
Fox returned to his meeting and discussed the matter with
his colleagues (including Peter Leitner). They told him it
was a done deal and there was no point in him falling on his
sword and fighting this.
Fox called Johnson back to ask what would make him happy
and Johnson sent over the revisions that Fox then had a
secretary incorporate. Johnson told him to have someone else
sign the memo because it would look too obvious if he signed
it after having done a memo that was initially so different.
The memo was signed out by his boss, who signed it to help
him out of a difficult situation.
retaliation and/or intimidation
When these matters became subject of an investigation by
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Fox spoke with
Senate investigators and believes he has been blacklisted
since then for telling the truth. He was in line to get a
position in DTRA which came to a stop allegedly when David
Tarbell heard ``things'' about Fox.
____
Jonathan D. Fox, Arms Control Specialist, Defense Threat Reduction
Agency
i. professional background
Jonathan Fox is currently an Arms Control Specialist at the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (``DTRA'') at the Department
of Defense (formerly known as the Defense Technology Security
Agency or ``DTSA''). A lawyer, he was hired by the Department
of Defense in 1990, and in 1993 he was detailed to handle
counter proliferation duties. In 1997 he was the export
control coordinator. He was relieved of those duties in
October of 1998 and transferred back to arms control.
He has received ``Outstanding'' ratings in every category
of job performance for the last three evaluations given
(1995, 1996 and 1997). Cash bonuses for his job performance
have also been recommended. He has not, however, received an
evaluation since concerns over retaliation have arisen.
ii. fox's concerns
In late October of 1997, Fox received an urgent request to
review a proposed state-to-state agreement regarding transfer
of nuclear technologies from the United States to China. Fox
was asked to write an analysis regarding implementation of a
1985 ``Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy'' between China and the United States. The
terms of this proposed reciprocal agreement allowed annual
opportunities for China and the U.S. to:
Send technical experts to each others' civil reactor sites;
Observe operations and reactor fueling; Exchange and share
technical information in the operation and maintenance of
nuclear power generative and associated facilities; Exchange
detailed confidence-building and transparency information on
transfer, storage and disposition of fissionable fuels
utilized for peaceful purposes; and Disclose detailed reactor
site operational data, to include energy generated and
loaded.
The request came from Mike Johnson, the Deputy Director of
Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of Threat Reduction
Policy.\1\ Fox was told that he had to complete his review by
Friday, October 25, 1999. Fox also believes that the document
indicated that the deadline was tied to the arrival of
Chinese President Jemin that weekend.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Thursday, October 24, 1997, Fox sent Johnson a fax of
his analysis. The document was transmitted at about 8:30 or
9:00 p.m. Fox stated:
``This assessment concludes that the proposed arrangement
presents real and substantial risk to the common defense and
security of both the United States and allied countries. It
is further found that the contemplated action can result in a
significant increase of the risk of nuclear weapons
technology proliferation. This assessment similarly concludes
that the environment surrounding these exchange measures
cannot guarantee timely warnings of willful diversion of
otherwise confidential information to non-nuclear states for
nuclear weapons development. Concurrently, the agreement, as
presented, cannot ensure that whatever is provided under this
reciprocal arrangement will be utilized solely for intended
peaceful purposes.''
* * * * *
``[U]nless there exist definite, meaningful verification
provisions engrafted upon this diplomatic agreement, there is
no practicable way of determining or enforcing adherence to
the admittedly peaceful goals enumerated within the proposed
reciprocal agreement. Without such bilateral undertakings or
unilateral safeguards, the proposed measure presents such
significant degree of risk as to be clearly inimical to the
common defense and security.''
He thought that his analysis might raise concerns, but he
felt that he had to be honest.
The next morning, while on his way to a meeting at the
State Department, he checked his messages and found that
Michael Johnson had called at approximately 8:30-8:45 a.m. He
got a beeper notification that Johnson had called and was
told that it was urgent. He called from State and couldn't
get through. He left his number at the meeting and was pulled
out of the meeting at 9:30-9:45 a.m. He was told it was
Johnson, and that it was urgent.
Fox began the conversation by asking ``Okay, how bad is
it?'' Johnson responded ``You'll be lucky if you still have a
job at the end of the day.'' Fox said Johnson did not sound
like he was joking. Fox asked what the problem was and
Johnson said: ``It's your opinion. People read it. This has
got to be revised. It cannot go.''
Fox said that the analysis was true. Johnson said: ``Yes.
It's well written. Too well written. It doesn't matter. The
matter has already been decided far above us.'' Johnson did
not elaborate, but Fox got the impression that the decision
had been made above Johnson and that Johnson was under the
gun. [DoD brought Michael Johnson before Committee
investigators to give his side of the story. He maintains
that Fox's work was substandard because it included political
and historical observations and was not limited to technical
considerations. He claims that he told Fox that the analysis
was substandard. Fox states that Johnson did not call his
analysis substandard--to the contrary, he says Johnson said
``you're right and it doesn't matter.'' Fox also says that
all similar analyses had elements of politics and history
included and that Johnson did not reject those analyses.]
Johnson told Fox that if he didn't have a clean technical
opinion (an approval) by 11:30, the next call would be to
Fox's Director--``he can explain why a GS-14 is blocking a
summit.'' Fox asked Johnson for 15-20 minutes to think about
what he had been told. Johnson responded: ``clock's
ticking.'' Fox went back into his meeting and discussed what
had happened with a number of people (Peter Leitner, Benson,
Mihnovets). Benson took him aside and said that the work was
good, but that the ``fix was in.'' He was told that he should
not be ashamed to give in, and that the matter had been
decided at a higher level--that there was no use falling on
his sword for this issue. (Fox noted that Leitner incorrectly
thought that Fox's immediate superiors were in on the threat.
Fox denies this.)
After talking to his colleagues at the State Department
meeting, Fox called Johnson back and asked for Johnson to
send suggested changes. Johnson faxed him the analysis
prepared by Fox with suggested changes. (ATTACHED) Johnson
also said that he wanted someone else to sign the analysis
because it would be too obvious that Fox had been pressured
to change his conclusions if he signed it. Johnson went
through a list of types of people who might sign, including
Presidential appointees and SESs. Fox said that there were no
such people in his immediate section and Fox suggested Dr.
Gallaway, a GS-15. [Johnson has a different explanation for
the request for a different person to sign the analysis. He
now says that it would be routine in an inter-office squabble
to have a higher ranking official sign.]
Fox called Gallaway, who was already aware that there was
some ``excitement'' over Fox's analysis. Fox asked for
Gallaway's assistance (``ya gotta help me out''). They had a
short discussion over whether it would be improper for
Gallaway to sign, and whether he would get into trouble.
Gallaway said he would help out and sign.
Fox had his secretary transmit a copy of the changed
analysis to Gallaway, who reviewed it and signed. Gallaway
sent the reworked analysis to Johnson about 12:15 p.m.
iii. intimidation and/or retaliation
The threat by Johnson
When Johnson said ``You'll be lucky if you have a job at
the end of the day,'' Fox became worried. He had only been on
the assignment that he was on for 4-5 months. When Johnson
threatened to call Fox's Director if a revised opinion was
not sent within two hours, and when he said ``he can explain
why a GS-14 is blocking a summit,'' Fox was concerned. His
director had a fierce reputation. A number of personal
factors also combined to make it critical that he not lose
his paycheck. In short, he was worried about the worst case
scenario of Johnson's criticism leading to him getting fired.
[In its briefing to the Committee, DoD lawyers argued that
Johnson and Fox were in different chains of command, and that
Fox could not have been threatened by Johnson. Johnson,
however, certainly appears to be on a higher employment level
than Fox. To this end, DoD appears to be misleading the
Committee.
[[Page H8171]]
Subsequent call from Johnson
In February of 1999, as Senate investigators prepared to
question Fox, Johnson called Fox and gave a different version
of what had transpired. Fox said that ``it didn't happen that
way.'' He told Johnson ``you know you threatened my job.''
That was the end of the conversation. After this
conversation, Johnson gave Fox some more responsibility by
making Fox the DoD representative to the Zangger Commission.
Johnson was responsible for getting Fox on a delegation that
went to Vienna.
Blacklisting from export control issues
Fox states that he has been blacklisted from any
involvement with export control matters. Michael Maloof told
Technology Security Directorate Director Dave Tarbell that
Fox wanted to do more on export control matters. Tarbell
agreed to endorse Fox for a job that would enable him to do
this. Fox was to be moved to a temporary position that would
become permanent.
Shortly thereafter, it became clear that Congressional
investigators wanted to talk to Fox. Fox notified DoD General
Counsel that he had been contacted by Senate investigators.
On a Monday in late February he was interviewed by Eliana
Davidson from Pentagon General Counsel's office. On Friday of
that same week Fox was interviewed by Senate investigators.
Within days Tarbell told Maloof that not only was Fox not
welcome to the position that had been under consideration, he
was not welcome to any job in export control. Maloof asked
``Why?'' and was told by Tarbell that he had ``heard
things.'' Tarbell declined to be specific.
Fox filed an IG complaint, but the IG was unable to resolve
the issue because Tarbell has declined to be specific about
what happen. Fox filed an EEO complaint and the investigator
who interviewed Tarbell was told that Tarbell received
unsolicited information about Fox's capability. Tarbell said
he didn't remember who the person was.
Service of subpoena
On June 21, 1999, a Committee staff member went to Mr.
Fox's place of employment to serve a subpoena to testify. She
was told by the head security guard: ``Mr. Fox talked to the
public and we don't do that here. He doesn't work here any
longer.'' The subpoena was ultimately served, but the odd
exchange prompted Mr. Fox to ask rhetorically whether we
think it odd that he is concerned for his job. (See Attached
Memo)
Footnotes
\1\ Fox was shown a copy of the request when interviewed by
Senate investigators. Thus, DoD was able to produce the
document to the Senate. We asked DoD for this document
specifically on June 21 and had not received it as of June
23.
\2\ Conversations are recounted to the best of Mr. Fox's
recollection.
____
Defense Special Weapons Agency,
Alexandria, VA, October 23, 1997.
memorandum
To: OSD/ISP/N&I (Mr. Michael Johnson).
Subject: Review of Reciprocal Arrangement with People's
Republic of China.
In 1985, the U.S. and China negotiated an Agreement for
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. As part of
the implementation of this agreement, Congress mandates that
the President must certify that any reciprocal arrangements
concluded thereunder must be designed to effectively ensure
that any nuclear materials, facilities or components provided
under this agreement be utilized solely for peaceful
purposes. Congress has also determined that arrangements
concerning information exchanges and visits negotiated under
this agreement will be deemed ``subsequent arrangements''
pursuant to section 131a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, and subject to the required findings and
determinations defined therein. as the parties to this
agreement are both nuclear weapon states, diplomatic channels
establishing mutually acceptable information exchange and
visit arrangements are utilized in lieu of bilateral
safeguard provisions.
The United States and China have negotiated an information
exchange and technical cooperation reciprocal arrangement
which conforms to the definition of a ``subsequent
arrangement''. Pursuant to section 131 of the Atomic Energy
Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2160), the Department of Enegy has
requested consultative review of this proposed implementing
arrangement in compliance with the provisions of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. This memo is provided in
accordance with the provisions of DSWA Instruction 5100.40
(which governs the agency response to such requests), and
details the results of our technical assessment to the Office
of Secretary of Defense.
The terms of the reciprocal agreement are relatively simple
and direct. The U.S. and China will be afforded annual
opportunities to: send technical experts to each others'
civil reactor sites; observe operations and reactor fueling;
exchange and share technical information in the operation and
maintenance of nuclear power generative and associated
facilities; exchange detailed confidence-building and
transparency information on transfer, storage and disposition
of fissionable fuels utilized for peaceful purposes; and
disclose detailed reactor site operational data, to include
energy generated and loading.
Section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act and related
legislation requires a thorough inquiry into such
arrangements. The inquiry must address whether the
contemplated state action will result in a significant
increase of the risk of nuclear weapons technology
proliferation. It must also consider whether the information
and expertise shared under the proposed reciprocal
arrangement could be diverted to a non-nuclear state for use
in the development of a nuclear explosive device, and whether
the U.S. can maintain an environment where it will obtain
timely warning of the imminence of such diversion.
Given that the 1987 MOU between the United States and China
on this subject provides for:
1. The right to obtain information required to maintain an
invent of all U.S. supplied items, and of material used in or
produced through the use of such items;
2. The right to confirm periodically, on-site, the accuracy
of the inventory and the specified peaceful use of all items
on this inventory;
3. The right to obtain this information, and to conduct on-
site confirmation of this information, for as long as any
such invent items remain in China or under its control.
The Defense Special Weapons Agency determines that the
proposed Agreement is not inimical to the common defense or
the security of the United States.
Dr. Gallaway.
____
Opening Statement of Jonathan D. Fox Before the United States House of
Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Thursday, June 24, 1999
Mr. Chairman, Members of this honorable House:
I am obliged to appear before you today by order of
subpoena. I have neither sought nor solicited this honor. It
is an obligation on my part which has arisen through
disclosures of a public and independent nature offer which I
have had no control or influence. It is an obligation not
without risk, and I would be less than honest if I did not
admit that it is undertaken with no small concern for my
personal and professional future prospects.
Duty compels me to be here today. It is a duty enforced by
the oath I took as an attorney, and as a member of the public
service. In its simplest form, it is the duty to obey the
law. It is the obligation to afford the workings of the law,
and that of a duly constituted legislative inquiry, the
utmost respect. And it is the duty to execute those
responsibilities entrusted to me without fear or favor.
It is incumbent upon me to tell the truth. It is a key
responsibility of public service. I am prepared to answer
whatever questions you may have with candor and honesty. My
answers will be grounded upon direct knowledge, information
and belief. I cannot speculate upon things of which I have no
knowledge, and will respectfully decline to do so if called
upon. Unfounded speculation will only hinder the progress and
credibility of this inquiry, and my respect for this House is
too great to engage in such conduct.
Two hundreds years ago, President John Adams advised his
son John Quincy to ``Never let the institutions of polite
society substitute for honesty, integrity and character.'' My
father, a concentration camp survivor, memorized that phrase
and taught it to me when I was very young. I have always
tried to comport my career in public service according to
that standard. Whether I have succeeded will be determined,
to no small extent, by the impressions you carry away from
today's proceedings.
Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, this concludes my
opening statement. Thank you for your kind indulgence. I am
prepared to answer any questions you may have.
____
memorandum
To: Memo to the Jonathan Fox file.
From: Kimberly Reed.
Date: June 21, 1999.
Re Service of Jonathan Fox subpoena.
On June 21, 1999, I served Jonathan Fox a subpoena to
testify at a June 24, 1999 hearing on the flow of dual-use
technology to China and whistleblowers.
For service, Mr. Fox gave me the DTRA address of 45045
Aviation drive, Dulles, VA 20766-7515. He told me to notify
the front desk security guard that I had a congressional
subpoena and that he phone the DTRA general counsel's office
and Mr. Fox. The rationale for this action was to give the
DTRA general counsel's office notice of the subpoena and
allow them the opportunity to accept service on behalf of Mr.
Fox if this was the normal protocol.
Arriving at DTRA at 1:30, I did as Mr. Fox instructed. The
front desk security guard phoned Mr. Fox and then the general
counsel's office. After talking to a staff member in the
general counsel's office, the security guard told me they
were unable to determine the general counsel's protocol for
subpoenas (the chief general counsel was away on vacation).
While waiting for an answer, the head security guard
approached me and asked that I follow her into a room away
from the public (the vending machine room), where others
could not overhear our conversation. I believe her initials
were T.P., but would recognize her name in a list or her by
appearance.
The head security guard questioned my actions and I told
her ``I was to serve a subpoena on Mr. Fox to testify before
Congress and wanted to see the appropriate person to serve,
whether it be the general counsel or Mr. Fox.'' She
approximately replied: ``Mr. Fox talked to the public and we
don't do
[[Page H8172]]
that here. He doesn't work here any longer.'' She seemed
inquisitive and perplexed by my presence.
I told her that I spoke with Mr. Fox earlier in the day and
he was expecting the subpoena and showed her his telephone
number. She returned to the front desk, where she was
informed that the general counsel didn't need to see the
subpoena. She phoned Mr. Fox (who was listed in their phone
directory) and arranged to have me serve him at his
building--44965 Aviation Drive. I served Mr. Fox at 1:55 pm.
____
[From the Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1999]
The Administration Quashes Truth Tellers on China
(By Michael Ledeen)
* * * * *
Despite pressure from the White House, Jonathan Fox, an
attorney on the arms-control staff of the Defense Special
Weapons Agency, wrote a memo stating with certainty that
China was a nuclear proliferator and that the proposed
arrangement was ``a technology transfer agreement swaddled in
the comforting yet misleading terminology of a confidence-
building measure.'' Mr. Fox's memo argued against the
agreement on these grounds:
It ``presents real and substantial risk to the common
defense and security of both the United States and allied
countries.''
It ``can result in a significant increase of the risk of
nuclear weapons technology proliferation.''
``The environment surrounding these exchange measures
cannot guarantee timely warning of willful diversion of
otherwise confidential information to non-nuclear states for
nuclear weapons development.''
There was no guarantee that the nuclear information would
be limited to non-military applications in China itself.
Mr. Fox noted that the Chinese chafed at their inferiority
to the West and ``now [seek] to redress that balance through
industrial, academic and military espionage. China routinely,
both overtly and covertly, subverts national and multilateral
trade controls on militarily critical items.'' (Those who
have been lured into the deceptive debate over when we knew
about Chinese espionage should note that civil servants like
Mr. Fox, well below the pay grade of National Security
Adviser Samuel Berger and Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, were well aware of the general phenomenon).
On Oct. 24, 1997, Mr. Fox was called out of an interagency
meeting to receive an urgent telephone call. According to
three people to whom he gave a contemporaneous account of the
phone conversation, he was given an ultimatum from superiors
in the Office of Non-Proliferation Policy in the Department
of Defense: either revise the memo and recommend in favor of
the agreement, or look elsewhere for employment. (Mr. Fox
himself declined to comment on the matter.)
Within an hour, all the critical language had been deleted,
and the memo now simply concluded that the agreement ``is not
inimical to the common defense or the security of the United
States.'' Worried that his earlier draft might fall into
unfriendly hands, Mr. Fox's superiors insisted that somebody
else sign the new memo.
The arrangement was in place in time for the summit with
the Chinese ruler, who was no doubt quite satisfied that his
American friends had given him a good-conduct certificate,
even though he, Mr. Clinton and the entire American national-
security team knew full well that China was spreading
militarily useful nuclear technology to such nations as Iran
and Pakistan. Indeed, it was precisely this knowledge, and
the fear that somebody in the media or Congress might
enunciate it at an embarrassing moment, that drove the
administration to silence potential truth-tellers.
Mr. Fox is not the only weapons expert in the government to
have been instructed to lie or remain silent about the true
consequences of sending military technology to China. Notra
Trulock and his colleagues were told by their superiors at
the Department of Energy that they should stop annoying
people with accounts of Chinese espionage at Los Alamos.
Similarly, professionals in the Pentagon such as Michael
Maloof and Peter Leitner were told to keep quiet about the
approval of high-tech licenses that would strengthen Chinese
military power. Both of them spoke out; others remain silent.
But even when the professionals stick by their principles,
their superiors have chosen to substitute facts with
politically expedient disinformation. On at least two
occasions, military experts who argued against high-tech
exports to China later discovered that their recommendations
had been altered in the Pentagon's computerized data base.
Had President Reagan's appointees attempted such heavy-
handed censorship, the Democrats in Congress, constantly on
the lookout for cooperative whistle-blowers, would have cried
bloody murder. Yet despite being well aware of the level of
internal censorship, Republican leaders from Rep. Dick Armey
to Sen. Fred Thompson have all but remained silent. Mr.
Thompson's Governmental Affairs Committee asked the
Pentagon's Inspector General to investigate this matter last
August. With the lightning speed that has characterized
Republican investigations, the Inspector General's report is
due to arrive on June 18, nearly a year later.
Congress's behavior is thus the reverse of what it was
during the Reagan years, which is one reason the president
has breezed through revelations that would have threatened
the tenure of his predecessors. Republicans have yet to
present a coherent challenge to the administration's China
policy, and for several years have largely ignored the cries
of alarm from the professionals who have spent their lives
protecting our security.
We don't yet know why Mr. Clinton chose to help arm China
and why Congress has been slow to stop it. But one thing
ought to be clear: The blame for this scandal lies not in the
distant past with the Reagan administration, which tried to
prevent our military technology from falling into the hands
of real and potential enemies, but with Mr. Clinton, who has
consciously and systematically done the opposite. On this
point, there must be neither doubt nor silence.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume
to say to the gentleman from Indiana that I would hope he would share
the documentation of his charges with the members of the committee who
are all very interested in seeing it. I have no question of the
gentleman, but I would just hope he would share it with other members
of the committee.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEJDENSON. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, I would be happy to share them with anyone
who would like to see these documents, all of them.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, we would be happy to see them.
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Wexler) control the time that I am in charge of.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). Is there
objection to the request of the gentleman from Connecticut?
There was no objection.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, before I do that, I yield 4 minutes to
the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos).
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the legislation we are
considering, but I want to broaden my comments to deal for a few
moments with our overall relations with Russia.
Last week I was in Moscow for a lengthy and substantive discussion
with the foreign minister of Russia and for a meeting with the
Diplomatic University, which trains the future diplomats of Russia. I
think it would be a very serious mistake if we would engage over the
course of the next few months in bashing Russia which, in point of
fact, with all of their problems, they have made enormous achievements
since the collapse of the Soviet Empire.
Now, all of us wish that the evolution of Russia that we have seen
this past decade would have been more smooth, would have been more
democratic, would have been more friendly to our interests. But I think
the fact remains that Russia is about to have free and open
parliamentary elections; next year, free and open presidential
elections. Every Russian has a passport, they are anxious for American
investment, and they are along many lines working with us as a country
ready to share with us some international responsibilities as they did
in Kosovo.
Now, I think it is extremely appropriate that this piece of
legislation deal with placing penalties on Russian institutions that
engage in proliferation of weapons and mass destruction technology. But
I think it is equally important to keep the problem in perspective.
There is an enormous amount of anti-Americanism that permeates Russian
society today. This was a society which, 15 years ago, was one of the
two super powers on the face of this planet. It is now a destitute,
chaotic, Mafia-infested society with enormous material and
psychological problems; and I think it is extremely critical that in
properly criticizing them for things that they do wrong, and they have
done wrong by not controlling the proliferation of weapons, we do not
draw the general conclusion that we are going back again to an era of
confrontation with Moscow.
There are powerful democratic forces in Moscow. There are important
political figures who share our values, and it is important to
strengthen the democratic forces in Russia. It is extremely important
that we continue strengthening the democratic forces in Russia, because
I predict in 10, 15, or 20 years, Russia will again be a great power.
Their resources are unlimited. They are a highly talented, well-
educated,
[[Page H8173]]
impressive quality of people, and I think it is absolutely in our
national interests to recognize our overriding concern in developing
more cordial, more friendly, more ongoing relations with the people of
Russia.
We should also not forget that the Russian Government is facing
terrorism from Islamic fundamentalists. In the last 10 days, there were
four explosions, taking the lives of hundreds of innocent Russian
civilians in the heart of Moscow, in the very heart of Moscow. These
people deserve our support, our friendship, and our cooperation; and I
call on my colleagues to give it to them.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 7 minutes to the
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), the distinguished chairman of
the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Committee on Armed
Services and a member of the Cox Committee.
(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of
this legislation, and I thank my good friend and colleague for yielding
to me, and I rise as a good and long-term friend of the Russian people.
Mr. Speaker, I have had the pleasure of traveling to Russia some 19
times. I will be leading another delegation to Russia within the next
30 days. I have over 150 members of the Federation Duma who are
personal friends of mine, and I am working on initiatives like
developing a housing mortgage financing system for the Russian people,
helping them deal with the problem of nuclear waste, helping them
encourage more economic investment, helping to strengthen the regions
and regional leaders; and right now in fact I have 20 young Russian
leaders coming to my district as a part of an exchange program that we
started this past summer where 2,000 young Russians are coming to
America; and I just initiated a new program to have staff members in
this Congress engage and participate with exchanges with staff members
of the Russian Duma.
All that being said, this legislation is necessary not because we
have a problem with the Russian people, but in my opinion because of
the policies of this administration, which have helped cause the
instability in Russia, both economically and politically.
Mr. Speaker, proliferation is out of control in Russia, not just in
words or rhetoric. I have here, Mr. Speaker, a Russian accelerometer
and a Russian gyroscope. These were clipped off of Russian SSM-19
missiles. We caught them, Mr. Speaker, not once, not twice, but three
times, being transferred from Russia to Iraq. In fact, Mr. Speaker, we
have over 100 sets of these devices.
We did nothing about the transfer, Mr. Speaker. We did not impose the
required sanctions under the missile technology control regime. We
basically allowed Yeltsin to tell President Clinton, do not worry, we
will conduct a criminal investigation, and nothing happened. So why
should we be surprised, Mr. Speaker, if Russia cannot control
proliferation?
I did a floor speech last June, which I will include in the Record
again, at least the study done by the Congressional Research Service.
Mr. Speaker, I documented 37 violations of arms control agreements in
the last 6 years by Russia and China. Thirty-seven violations. We
imposed the required sanctions twice, and that was when we caught China
transferring M-11 missiles and ring magnets to Pakistan, and what did
we do? After 2 years we waived the sanctions. We saw technology flow to
Iran, to Iraq, to Syria, to Libya and North Korea from China and
Russia. I was not surprised when India and Pakistan's saber rattled,
because we saw Russia transferring technology to India and China
transferring technology to Pakistan.
Mr. Speaker, the problems that are inherent here are in many cases
our own doing, an administration that has been so preoccupied with not
embarrassing the relationship between Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton
that it does not want to call into question, when we have solid
evidence that technology is being sent abroad illegally, and the same
problem with the IMF funding. We did not want to embarrass Yeltsin
because his crony friends were ripping off billions of dollars of IMF
money, and we wonder why Russia is a basket case.
The policies of this Government are turning their head the other way,
are ignoring obvious violations of arms control regime violations. An
obvious turning of our head when billions of dollars of IMF money is
going to the failed oligarchs who corrupted the Russian banking system
are many of the reasons why Russia today is a basket case economically
and politically.
We passed the Iran missile sanctions bill in the last session with
395 votes in this body, and 96 votes in the Senate, in spite of Vice
President Gore lobbying 12 of us personally. The gentleman from New
York (Mr. Gilman) was there, Mr. Hamilton of Indiana was there, Senator
Levin was there, I was there, twice not to pass that bill, because the
Congress has lost confidence that this administration can stop
proliferation.
And this is not a Republican issue. Democrats and Republicans have
joined together and said to this administration, we cannot keep
bolstering up Yeltsin when it is obvious the system around him is
corrupt and all we have done is reinforce Yeltsin's leadership, and now
we are paying the price.
The Russian people and the members of the Duma look at us and they
say, where were you, America, when you basically turned the other cheek
and pretended these transfers were not taking place? Where were you,
America, when Yeltsin's cronies were siphoning off billions of dollars
of IMF funding? Why did you not call into question what Yeltsin's
cronies were doing? Why did you not call into question Yuri Koptev in
the space agency when these transfers were taking place? Is it any
wonder, Mr. Speaker, that the Russian people have lost their confidence
in America as a friend and partner?
The 95 percent of the Russian people, Mr. Speaker, who are good and
decent people, who are not members of the Communist oligarchy, many of
whom took over the reigns of the Yeltsin administration, they see
through this charade in Russia. These people saw the IMF money being
bilked away, these people saw this kind of technology being sold abroad
time and again, and they saw this country and this President ignoring
the realities of the instability just so that Yeltsin could be
reelected again.
We have a terrible crisis on our hands, Mr. Speaker. I agree with the
last individual who spoke. This should not be a time to bash Russia as
a nation, nor the Russian people, nor the emerging Russian leaders; and
they know my position very clearly on these issues.
{time} 1215
This is a time where we have to call into question our administration
for helping to foster and encourage this kind of instability in Russia
today.
We need to pass this legislation, not to create the feeling in Russia
that somehow they are our enemy, because they are not. We need to pass
this legislation because we need to let Russia know that we will no
longer tolerate incompetence, gross abuse, and tolerate the illegal
activities that the Yeltzin government foisted on the Russian people
for the past 7 years while we turned our heads, pretending that these
situations were not real.
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, as they did 2 years
ago. In fact, Mr. Speaker, when President Clinton vetoed the bill that
the distinguished chairman and the distinguished gentlewoman from
California, Ms. Harman, introduced in the House, we could have
overridden that veto. But it was the Speaker of the House, a month
before the congressional elections, who said that we would not be
allowed to vote to override the President's veto.
I am convinced had we had that vote, with the support of AIPAC, and
they were in the room when we met with the Speaker, with the support of
those people concerned with proliferation, we would have sent this
administration this signal 2 years ago.
Here we are 2 years later. Technology is still flowing. The fat cat
oligarchs are still getting richer and the Russian people are still
suffering. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Rothman).
[[Page H8174]]
(Mr. ROTHMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman for yielding
time to me.
Let me see if I can remind my friends in this body that we are
talking today about the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999. We are
talking about the Iran Nonproliferation Act.
We live in a hostile and dangerous world. One of the reasons why the
world is so hostile and dangerous is because there are nations like
Iran who are committed to wreaking havoc in their region and literally
all over the globe. If Iran were to be successful in its intended
desire to send weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical, and
nuclear devices, not only to our friends and allies in the Middle East
but to our friends and allies in Europe, they also would love to
develop and have intended to develop the technology to send those
weapons of mass destruction to the United States of America. That is
why I support the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999.
So it is important for us to keep our eye on the ball here in
Congress, and note that with regard to this law that we are proposing,
we want to remind everyone that it is Iran, as well as Iraq and North
Korea, who make this world dangerous, but this bill has to do with
Iran.
I would also like to say it is a reminder to nations like Russia and
China that the Congress of the United States will not forgive their
assisting Iran in developing these weapons of mass destruction and the
technology to deliver these weapons to not only the United States but
to our allies around the world.
There is a great deal of wishful thinking with regard to our enemies.
We in America would like to believe that people around the world have
as good intentions, as warm hearts, as we do. Not everyone is like us.
The people of Iran need to create a government in Iran which will
stop threatening the peace of the world. That is not the case yet. Iran
is a danger to the world. It must be isolated, it must be stopped,
until they are ready to join the family of nations in peace. This
legislation will help.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bonilla). The gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Wexler) has 8 minutes remaining and the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Gilman) has 2 minutes remaining, so the Chair will continue to
recognize the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Wexler) to yield time.
Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Lee).
Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, as a cosponsor of this legislation and one who
has strongly supported and will continue to support disarmament and
peace initiatives throughout the world, I rise in strong support of
H.R. 1883. It is my belief that this legislation will move us one step
closer to nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle
East and throughout the world by taking actions to stop foreign
companies from exporting goods, services, and technology that can make
a material contribution to Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs.
I believe we must take any and all actions to stop the spread of
weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and throughout the
world.
The statistics of weapons of mass destruction are terrifying, to say
the least. In terms of nuclear weapons, for example, we know that over
36,000 nuclear warheads exist between the nuclear powers.
I have just returned from a visit to Israel with several of my
colleagues. The security concerns of the entire region are great, but
so are the prospects for peace. This bill, the Iran Nonproliferation
Act, moves us toward both, peace and security.
Foreign companies, just as any company, are in the business of making
profits. Exporting goods, services, and technology that contribute to
Iran's weapons of mass destruction program allows billions of dollars
to be made to create a more hostile region and a more hostile world.
This bill is a serious effort to tailor sanctions to foreign companies
that are the true wrongdoers.
As we move into the next millenium, we need to work with Russia, our
friend in the Middle East, and those who are not our friends to find
ways to create security and a lasting peace for our children. Selling
technology that would destroy the world certainly takes us in the wrong
direction.
I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) of the Committee on
International Relations, and the ranking member, the gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), for moving forward with this legislation
in a bipartisan manner. I join and urge my colleagues to support H.R.
1883.
Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Berman).
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend, the gentleman from
Florida, for yielding me the time.
First, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the
gentleman from New York (Chairman Gilman) for introducing the
legislation, for allowing me to be a participant in the development of
the legislation and its cosponsorship, and to the Republican leadership
for putting the bill over until after the recess to deal with some of
the concerns and misunderstandings that I think would have existed
which would have impeded the progress of this bill, had we rushed to a
markup the last week before the recess. I do appreciate that delay.
I rise in very strong support of the bill. The purpose of this
legislation is not to bash Russia. It is not to kill the Space Station.
It is not even to bash Iran.
One thing we know, it has been reported everywhere and we all know
it, Iran is on a program to develop nuclear, chemical, biological
weapons and the ballistic missiles to deliver those weapons. Iran has
determined that that is in their national interests.
A recent CIA report estimates that in the next few years Iran could
test a long-range missile capable of delivering a small payload to many
parts of the United States. Within a decade, Iran could test a more
advanced nuclear-capable ICBM.
Again, my goal is not to demonize Iran. I would welcome improved U.S.
ties with Iran. If they would simply stop supporting Hamas and other
terrorist groups who seek to disrupt the Middle East peace process,
release the 13 Jews currently in detention, and otherwise moderate
their behavior, I would like to have our relationship with Iran
improve.
But no matter what the status of our bilateral relationship, it will
always be in our clear interest to prevent or delay Iran's acquisition
of weapons of mass destruction. I doubt we will ever convince the
Iranians to halt their weapons programs. Therefore, the next best thing
we can do is to do everything in our power to cut off the flow of
technology and expertise from other countries to Iran.
This legislation will do several things. First, it will help us get a
more complete picture of which foreign entities are transferring
technology to Iran, and authorize, he already has the power, but
authorize, it will authorize even more clearly, but not require, the
President to impose sanctions on those entities.
Congress has a right to know and understand the full extent of the
proliferation to Iran. This bill helps to provide that information to
the Congress. The bill will also limit extraordinary payments to Russia
for the international Space Station. Certain exemptions have been made,
but it will limit the extraordinary payments and new programs on the
Space Station; in other words, payments for work that Russia already
pledged to do at their own expense, unless the President certifies that
the Russian Government is taking concrete steps to stop proliferation
and that the Russian space agency and the entities under its
jurisdiction or control have stopped making unauthorized transfers.
I do not want to bash Russia. I am not interested in playing the
blame game, as some of my colleagues are right now, for this situation
in Russia and the U.S. policy towards Russia.
I believe, particularly in the last couple of years, that this
administration has made great efforts to try and persuade the Russians
to do more to stop the proliferation. I believe Russia and its top
leadership understand that proliferation to Iran is no more in their
interest than it is in our interest.
But the fact is that if, in a program that we are participating in
through
[[Page H8175]]
the Russian space agency, they allow their own subsidiaries and
subordinate agencies that they can control to proliferate and to
continue that technology, they should not expect to be partners with us
in new programs. They have to make a choice.
The entity that is a joint venture, the entity that is a joint
venture with us, with Lockheed on the launches, has understood that and
has made that choice, and has resisted any temptations to proliferate.
We want the Russian space agency to do the same thing with all their
agencies. That is why this legislation, prospective in nature, is being
introduced.
I congratulate the chairman, again, and the other cosponsors, and
urge its adoption.
Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge my colleagues to think twice before
believing recent rumors that the Iranian government has moderated its
hardline policies towards the United States and our allies in the
Middle East. The so-called moderate Iranian government has not ended
its program to build weapons of mass destruction, and it continues to
support terrorist groups that commit up conscionable acts of death and
destruction.
The Iranian government also remains adamantly opposed to the Middle
East peace process. Make no mistake about it, an unstable Iranian
regime with weapons of mass destruction is a threat to the entire world
and to the fragile peace evolving in the Middle East.
Since the end of the Cold War, missile and weapons technology has
flowed unhindered from foreign companies to Iran. The United States
must lead the fight to stop foreign companies from exporting their
services and technologies to Iran. H.R. 1883 allows the United States
to sanction foreign companies contributing to Iran's weapons buildup.
Russian companies in particular have been guilty of providing the
Iranian government with weapons technology. The Iran Nonproliferation
Act holds the Russian government and Russian companies accountable for
the flow of technology and services reportedly transferred to Iran.
The greatest threat to the security of the United States in the next
century will be posed by nations that are governed by unstable regimes
like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea that are developing weapons of mass
destruction. Our own intelligence agencies have warned us that in a
short time these nations may have the capability to strike cities in
the United States.
I strongly urge my colleagues to support this legislation and send a
strong message that the United States will not tolerate individuals and
companies aiding rogue regimes in their deadly efforts.
Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman on the other side for
making this a strong bipartisan appeal to stop this kind of action in
supporting Iran's development of long-range missiles. 5
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise to support this bill.
Initially, I was hesitant to support the Iran Nonproliferation Act of
1999. But this bill has undergone many changes in the International
Relations Committee and in the Science Committee, of which I am a
Member, and I am hopeful that this bill will adequately prevent nuclear
proliferation while providing fair treatment to our Russian
counterparts.
I am cognizant of the continuing United States concerns with nuclear
proliferation, and clearly we all understand the significance and
importance of the proliferation issue. We must keep ever vigilant for
the leakage of our military secrets, and I have been an ardent
supporter of nonproliferation policies. I realize from my briefings on
the subject that Iran seems determined to develop a nuclear weapons
program. Their ballistic missile arsenal already contains the Shahab 4
and the Shahab 3 missile and there is an apparent effort to develop a
new missile called the Kosar. It is even more evident from the nuclear
race between India and Pakistan that the United States has a vested
interest in seeing further proliferation halted. As we strive towards
our goal we must ensure that our good intentions are not misdirected.
I appreciate Representative Weldon's amendment to this bill in the
Science Committee, and this amendment has done much to clarify the
definition of ``maintenance'' in regards to the Service Module. I must
acknowledge my disappointment in the fact that I was unable to add
``safety functions'' to this amendment. Considering that the amendment
included environmental control, life support, and orbital maintenance
under the definition of activities under maintenance, it seems to me
that ``safety functions'' logically should be included in this list. It
is my hope that the intent of the bill will incorporate this notion.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999 creates Congressional oversight
of proliferation to Iran by requiring the President to report to
Congress every six months regarding all foreign entities and any
transfers of goods, services, or technologies to Iran. The bill also
authorizes the President to apply punitive measures to those entities
that permit the proliferation to Iran.
This piece of legislation does not require the President to apply
punitive measures; instead it simply gives him the option to do so. We
do not want to implement procedures that are too harsh, nor do we want
to diminish the authority of the President.
This bill comes under the jurisdiction of Committee on Science
because of Section 6. This legislation could prohibit our Nation from
making ``extraordinary payments in connection with the International
Space Station'' to the Russian Space Agency or entities under the
Russian Space Station jurisdiction unless the President determines that
it is the policy of the Russian government to oppose proliferation to
Iran.
While we want to preserve our country's military secrets, we must
also remain fair to our Russian partners. It is worth noting that the
administration has already moved to curb the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and is also committed to imposing trade sanctions
on those who violate the Missile Technology Control Regime. A year ago,
the administration sanctioned seven Russian aerospace enterprises for
possible violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime.
Potentially lost in this issue is the fact that Russian Space Agency
has attempted to make the transition from military technology to
civilian and space related technology. One reason that this transition
has been slow is because Russia simply cannot pay its scientists to
complete the transition. As confirmed by NASA the subsidies to the
Russian Space Agency coupled with the work that they perform on the
International Space Station help America's non-proliferation policy.
This bill has come a long way. I am glad that we have done much to
improve it, for we do not want to alienate our Russian partners, nor do
we want to undermine the efforts of NASA. While I can appreciate the
national security interests that have guided this bill to us, I am
fully aware of the concerns expressed by NASA. NASA seems concerned
about Russian reaction to the passage of this bill. A negative reaction
by the Russians could erode away the sense of goodwill that has been
forged by the International Space Station.
I am hopeful that this bill will have the desired effect on the
proliferation of our country's secrets, and for that reason, I support
his bill.
Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R.
1883, the Iran Nonproliferation Act. As a cosponsor of this measure, it
is my hope that the House will adopt this bill. As a member of the
International Relations Committee and a strong supporter of Israel, I
believe that we must send a strong signal to Iran that we will not
tolerate nuclear proliferation. We must not tolerate countries
supplying military technology to Iran which has flight tested a missile
capable of hitting Israel.
The threat of nuclear proliferation is not only a serious
destabilizing force in the Middle East, but it endangers American
interests as well. Maintaining and enhancing the political and economic
stability of our allies in the region and supporting the Middle East
peace process must be two of our top foreign policy goals for this part
of the world.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill and send a clear signal
that we will not tolerate nuclear proliferation and that we are
determined to do what is necessary to bring peace to this troubled
region.
Mr. NETHERCUTT. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this legislation and
am proud to be a cosponsor. We send a clear message to Russia with this
legislation that any assistance to Iran with weapons of mass
destruction or missile systems will be grounds for ending fruitful
scientific relationships with the United States. We are forcing Russian
scientists and government entities to choose between a symbol of
international peace, the space station, and the proliferation of deadly
technologies.
When the Science Committee considered this legislation last week, it
accepted an amendment I offered that tightens the bill slightly. The
Government of Russia has consistently argued that ``rogue'' elements
within the scientific and military establishment are exporting deadly
technologies to Iran. It is
[[Page H8176]]
conceivable that this fiction could be maintained, and private labs or
independent agencies could continue to proliferate to Iran, even as
they receive taxpayer funding for work on the ISS. This legislation
ensures that this would not be the case, as the bill now prohibits
extraordinary payments for the ISS to any foreign person or entity that
Secretary of State finds has materially contributed or attempted to
contribute to the proliferation of WMD or missile technology. The
legislation also prohibits the indirect financing of such proliferators
through another entity. For example, NASA could not make a payment to
the RSA if it knew that a subcontractor for the work was involved
previously with proliferation.
This is consistent with Executive orders 12938 and 13094 which
prescribe procurement, assistance, and import bans for proliferating
entities or countries. The current legislating essentially codifies
these Executive Orders, raising their profile and raising the stakes
for Russian entities that choose to engage in proliferative activities.
With this bill, we demonstrate to Russian entities that there is a
long-term consequence to cooperating with Iran on missile or WMD
programs. H.R. 1883 terminates ISS funding for these Russian labs if
they have been designated as proliferators subject to the executive
orders.
As the President said in his statement on EO 13094, ``being able to
offer both incentives and disincentives enhances our capacity to deal
with these threats.'' Clearly, this bill also allows for incentives and
disincentives. Russian entities are encouraged to work with NASA on
space station issues and are firmly discouraged from working with Iran.
In a statement on the same Executive Order, Vice President Gore said
that ``today's Executive Order . . . will explicitly bar assistance to
and imports from entities now being investigated by Russia.'' Again, we
are going no further than the Administration's stated intent of barring
assistance to proliferative entities. This is an important bill and I
urge my colleagues to support it.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R.
1883, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999.
Everyone in this Congress is aware that Iran has continually
threatened the peace and security of the Middle East. Even today, Iran
is still committed to the destruction of Israel, opposes the Middle
East peace process and supports terrorist groups such as Hamas. In
fact, Iran remains the world's leading sponsor of international
terrorism.
Despite these very real security concerns, cash strapped Russia has
supported the $800 million Bushehr project, a 1000-megawatt light-water
reactor, in southern Iran.
Why Iran needs such a reactor remains an open question because Iran
has one of the world's largest oil and natural gas reserves. However,
many security experts believe that such projects provide good cover to
a nuclear weapons program and provide Iranian technicians with
expertise in the development of nuclear weapons.
These developments, along with Iran's successful test of the Shahab-3
missile, with a range of 800 miles, pose the greatest risk to Middle
Eastern stability in history.
Mr. Speaker, the results of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons are
almost too horrifying to imagine. But, if current trends continue, it
may become an all too real nightmare for the United States and our
Middle Eastern allies.
Former Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu put it best when he
stated, ``The building of a nuclear reactor in Iran only makes it
likelier that Iran will equip its ballistic missiles with nuclear
warheads . . . Such a development threatens peace, the whole region and
in the end, the Russians themselves.''
Given the potential threat of a nuclear-armed Iran, I believe it
appropriate to withhold the $590 million in U.S. assistance for the
Russian contribution to the International Space Station.
If Russian policymakers see the danger of their activities, they can
certify that they are not transferring technology that would help
develop weapons of mass destruction and aid will resume.
Mr. Speaker, the House took similar action when we passed H.R. 1477,
the Iran Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1999 by a vote of 383
to 1. H.R. 1477 withholds the U.S. voluntary contributions from
programs and projects of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Iran
unless the Secretary of State makes a determination that they will not
provide Iran with training or expertise relevant to nuclear programs'
development.
I was proud to be an original cosponsor of the Iran Nuclear
Proliferation Act, and I am proud to be a cosponsor of the Iran
Nonproliferation Act.
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1883 passed the International Relations Committee,
on which I am proud to serve, by a vote of 33 to 0. I urge my fellow
Members to give this legislation the same overwhelming support on the
floor, that we gave it in Committee.
Mr. LAMPSON. Mr. Speaker, I listened very carefully to Chairman
Sensenbrenner's opening remarks during the hearing on this bill a
couple of months ago. He stated that ``We must ensure that the Russian
government is not facilitating the proliferation of missile technology
* * * If the President finds that Russia is contributing to Iran's
attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles,
then the bill prohibits NASA from transferring U.S. tax dollars to the
Russian Space Agency and any enterprise under its jurisdiction.'' I
can't agree more with the intent of this statement.
During Committee markup, I had planned on offering an amendment to
this bill that I believe would have clarified and honored the original
intent of the bill by changing the nature of Section 6 to one that
would have prohibited payments if proliferation was to occur, but
wouldn't require advance certification that it hasn't. No one will
disagree, I believe, that we should punish cheating, and this amendment
would have achieved that goal in a less burdensome manner than the
existing provision.
However, I decided against offering this amendment. While I still
have major concerns that Section 6 will not materially improve the
effectiveness of this legislation in discouraging weapons technology
transfer to Iran, and will cast a shadow over the greatest example of
international cooperation in the peaceful use of space, I will
reluctantly support H.R. 1883. That being said, I will diligently work
to have the section relating to Space Station removed as soon as
possible. I continue to believe that singling out Space Station is not
the answer to stopping proliferation--Russian contributions to the
International Space Station, a permanently inhabited research facility
in space, in fact are not close to the weapons technologies that are of
so much concern to us, and we should encourage the Russians to continue
on with us in the peaceful exploration of space.
In addition, the reporting requirements of Section 6 unnecessarily
duplicate other sections of the bill. Section 2 already requires that
the President identify every Russian against whom ``credible
information'' exists regarding tech transfers to Iran. This is, in
fact, a harder test than the requirement for a ``policy'' certification
from the President. I support this bill with the hope that my concerns
will be addressed by all parties involved, at a later date.
Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I would like to speak in support of
H.R. 1883. As you know, I am a cosponsor of H.R. 1883. I think that it
is a useful bill, and one which I believe has been improved by an
amendment that I offered at the Science Committee's markup of the bill
last week. I am pleased to see that my language has been included in
the bill that is before the House today. Basically, my amendment
shortened the notification requirements in order to avoid unnecessary
bureaucratic delays and costs that do nothing to enhance our security.
In addition, it corrected a problem that had arisen when an amendment
was adopted by the Science Committee's Space Subcommittee in its markup
of the bill. That Subcommittee markup had included an amendment
requiring partial transfer of Service Module ownership to the United
States in the event of any extraordinary payments. My amendment changed
that to ``goods and services''. The issue of transferring ownership of
the Service Module is a complicated one in light of the existing
international agreements. And I don't think that we'd really want to
own part of the Service Module in any event.
Most members would agree with me, I think, that controlling the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the most
important challenges facing our nation. I think that this bill helps
address that challenge, and I urge Members to vote to suspend the rules
and pass H.R. 1883.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill, H.R. 1883, as amended.
The question was taken.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This 15-minute vote on H.R. 1883 will be
followed by a 5-minute vote on the motion to instruct conferees offered
by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi).
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 419,
nays 0, not voting 14, as follows:
[Roll No. 409]
YEAS--419
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Allen
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baird
[[Page H8177]]
Baker
Baldacci
Baldwin
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Barrett (WI)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blagojevich
Bliley
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonior
Bono
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Condit
Conyers
Cook
Cooksey
Costello
Cox
Coyne
Cramer
Crane
Crowley
Cubin
Cummings
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (VA)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Farr
Filner
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Fowler
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Ganske
Gejdenson
Gekas
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill (IN)
Hill (MT)
Hilleary
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Hooley
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inslee
Isakson
Istook
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kleczka
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kucinich
Kuykendall
LaFalce
LaHood
Lampson
Lantos
Largent
Larson
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manzullo
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCrery
McGovern
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Metcalf
Mica
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Ose
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pease
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Phelps
Pickering
Pickett
Pitts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Portman
Price (NC)
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Regula
Reyes
Reynolds
Riley
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Rothman
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Rush
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Salmon
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaffer
Schakowsky
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shows
Shuster
Simpson
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sununu
Sweeney
Talent
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Thune
Thurman
Tiahrt
Tierney
Toomey
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Vitter
Walden
Walsh
Wamp
Waters
Watkins
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Weygand
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--14
Becerra
Bonilla
Deal
Fattah
Hastings (FL)
Jefferson
Jones (NC)
Kaptur
Kingston
McDermott
Porter
Pryce (OH)
Ros-Lehtinen
Shaw
{time} 1250
So (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were
suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated for:
Mr. JONES of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 409, I was
unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''
____________________