[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 112 (Tuesday, August 3, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H6856-H6887]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  1130
                 TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT ACT

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call 
up House Resolution 272 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 272

       Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule 
     XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 
     Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of 
     the bill (H.R. 2031) to provide for injunctive relief in 
     Federal district court to enforce State laws relating to the 
     interstate transportation of intoxicating liquor. The first 
     reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. General debate 
     shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour 
     equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking 
     minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary. After 
     general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment 
     under the five-minute rule for a period not to exceed two 
     hours. It shall be in order to consider as an original bill 
     for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule the 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the 
     Committee on the Judiciary now printed in the bill. The 
     committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be 
     considered as read. During consideration of the bill for 
     amendment,

[[Page H6857]]

     the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may accord 
     priority in recognition on the basis of whether the Member 
     offering an amendment has caused it to be printed in the 
     portion of the Congressional Record designated for that 
     purpose in clause 8 of rule XVIII. Amendments so printed 
     shall be considered as read. The Chairman of the Committee of 
     the Whole may: (1) postpone until a time during further 
     consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request for a 
     recorded vote on any amendment; and (2) reduce to five 
     minutes the minimum time for electronic voting on any 
     postponed question that follows another electronic vote 
     without intervening business, provided that the minimum time 
     for electronic voting on the first in any series of questions 
     shall be 15 minutes. At the conclusion of consideration of 
     the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report 
     the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been 
     adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote in the House 
     on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the 
     bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a 
     substitute. The previous question shall be considered as 
     ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage 
     without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with 
     or without instructions.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hansen). The gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss) is recognized for one hour.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the 
customary 30 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley), my friend and colleague, 
pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During 
consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purposes 
of debate only.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a fair rule. It provides for adequate and 
appropriate consideration of H.R. 2031, the Twenty-First Amendment 
Enforcement Act. It is a modified open rule that will accommodate 
Member interests in the amendment process while keeping us on track to 
meet our Friday deadline for August recess, a deadline that many 
Members, including the minority leader, have urged the Speaker, in 
writing, to keep.
  While the lack of time may argue for a more closed structure, the 
Committee on Rules has erred on the side of openness and provided an 
open rule with a 2-hour limit on amendments. Of course, the rule also 
provides for a motion to recommit, with or without instructions.
  Introduced by my colleague, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Scarborough), H.R. 2031 was reported favorably by the Committee on the 
Judiciary on July 20 by voice vote. I understand that while hearings 
were not held in this Congress, the Subcommittee on Courts and 
Intellectual Property did convene hearings in the 105th Congress on 
nearly an identical bill.
  I would like to commend the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Scarborough) 
for his continued efforts on behalf of American children, particularly 
when it comes to the tricky business of alcohol access. It is clearly a 
difficult question to resolve. However, it is encouraging to see the 
major players, the beer and wine distributors, as well as the vintners, 
the growers, fully engaged in the deliberative process.
  Mr. Speaker, while the underlying legislation may engender some 
debate, this rule should receive unanimous support. It is certainly an 
open and fair rule.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank my dear friend, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss), for yielding me the customary half-hour.
  Mr. Speaker, as most people know, the Twenty-First Amendment to the 
Constitution ended prohibition. It also bestowed upon the States the 
authority to write their own liquor laws. The problem, Mr. Speaker, is 
there is no interstate enforcement mechanism. The way the law is 
written, States have virtually no way to enforce the liquor laws when 
they are violated by distributors in other States, especially now that 
there are so many ways to buy alcohol.
  People can call a 1-800 number, they can order over the Internet, 
they can do all sorts of things to buy alcohol, and with the limited 
judicial options available to them now, State attorneys general are 
having a very hard time making sure that people abide by the law.
  This bill will give the State attorneys general another option. If 
they believe someone is in violation of their State's liquor laws, this 
bill will enable them to file suit in Federal Court to get them to 
stop. It says you cannot ship alcohol into a State in violation of that 
State's liquor laws. It is that simple.
  It is not a new Federal law, it is not a new State law, it is not a 
threat to anyone who sells alcohol legally. It is just a way for State 
attorneys general to get people who sell alcohol illegally to stop.
  Mr. Speaker, in my home State of Massachusetts, Massachusetts is 
considered a limited personal importation State. We allow Massachusetts 
residents to buy alcohol from outside of Massachusetts but only for 
their own consumption and only in limited quantities.
  The Commonwealth of Massachusetts determined how alcohol could cross 
its borders. If a liquor distributor outside of Massachusetts breaks 
that law, our attorney general should be able to get them to stop.
  This bill will help stop the illegal interstate shipments of alcohol 
by giving State attorneys general the power to enforce State laws. In 
particular, Mr. Speaker, it takes us a step closer to stopping the sale 
of alcohol to minors over the Internet. But I still believe we can do 
more to stop underage drinking, especially underage drinking and 
driving.
  This is a good bill, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, we have no requests for time, and I do not anticipate 
any. Again, the purpose of this hour of debate is to discuss the rule, 
which is an open and fair rule. I would prefer that we not engage in 
the debate on the substance of the bill until we get to the time 
carefully set aside. I have not encouraged any speakers to come 
forward.
  Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, I yield back the 
balance of my time, and I move the previous questions on the 
resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The resolution was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Goss). Pursuant to House Resolution 272 
and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the 
bill, H.R. 2031.

                              {time}  1139


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 2031) to provide for injunctive relief in Federal district court 
to enforce State laws relating to the interstate transportation of 
intoxicating liquor, with Mr. Hansen in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having 
been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Scarborough) and the 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) each will control 30 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Scarborough).
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin my testimony by reading Section 2 
of the Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution: ``The transportation 
or importation into any State, Territory or possession of the United 
States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in 
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.''
  Mr. Chairman, the Twenty-First Amendment's import is clear. States 
have been given the right to stop interstate bootlegging. This right 
was reaffirmed by Congress in the Webb-Kenyon Act 65 years ago, by 6 
decades of Supreme Court case law, and by subsequent Congressional 
acts. Yet, today, some modern-day bootleggers still seek refuge from 
the Twenty-First Amendment.

[[Page H6858]]

  They seek to avoid State laws and constitutional amendments so they 
can sell their liquor more profitably than small businesses who dare to 
play by the rules. Bootleggers sell liquors to minors over the 
Internet, again avoiding State laws given preeminence by the Twenty-
First Amendment.
  Shamed by the countless media stories detailing how young children 
are buying liquor from these modern-day bootleggers over the Internet, 
they have shrugged off such media stories, calling them nothing more 
than stings by their economic enemies. But the only sting here comes 
from the harsh reality that too many young children can buy alcohol 
over the Internet.
  Selling liquor to minors, or anyone, illegally, is simply wrong. It 
is bootlegging, and bootlegging is not protected by the commerce 
clause. Bootlegging is not cleansed by full page ads or media campaigns 
or by hiring public relations firms. You can dress it stylistically, 
but, in the end, just like Fitzgerald's Jay Gatsby, a bootlegger is a 
bootlegger.
  Mr. Speaker, our bill allows States simply to protect themselves from 
illegal alcohol sales. It also allows States to protect children, like 
my 11- and 8-year-old boys, from interstate bootleggers over the 
Internet, and it allows States to enforce the laws that they passed 
because of direction given them by the Twenty-First Amendment.
  With that in mind, this bill allows State attorneys general to seek 
injunctive relief in Federal court to stop illegal direct shipments of 
alcohol into their respective States. Nothing more, nothing less. This 
bill only affects those people who break liquor laws.
  Now, you will have people coming up here today, saying some of these 
laws are not fair and saying some of these laws do not allow wineries 
to sell to this State or that State.
  The bottom line is if you do not break the law, then this bill will 
not apply to you. If you play by the rules, you have nothing to worry 
about. Yet we are going to have red herrings piled high on this floor 
today, like we had in the Committee on the Judiciary. Opponents will 
distract. They will talk about fairness. They will talk about the 
commerce clause. They will talk about the Internet, trying to claim 
that this bill will destroy E-commerce in the 21st Century.
  And get, the only E-commerce this will destroy in the 21st Century is 
illegal E-commerce. You can make the same arguments if you want to 
import pot from Amsterdam and say nobody can stop me from importing pot 
from Amsterdam, because doing so will compromise the future of E-
commerce.

                              {time}  1145

  That is laughable. If someone imports wine or alcohol legally, our 
bill is inapplicable. If they do it illegally, then all this does is 
allow States Attorneys General to bring the person to court, to get 
injunctive relief to stop illegal shipments.
  Some people do not like that. They say it will destroy some wineries 
in California. We are going to have a lot of people from California 
talking today on the floor, talking about how small wineries are going 
to be destroyed.
  Let me tell the Members something, small wineries will only be 
destroyed if small wineries' existence depends on the illegal sale of 
alcohol to minors and adults.
  What needs to be understood is that this narrowly focused bill 
assures States that they have a course of action against bootleggers. 
They need to enforce their own alcohol laws to control out-of-State 
companies, many of whom have shown no interest in preventing the sales 
of alcohol to minors.
  It would make clear that States have the right once again, under 
Webb-Kenyon that was passed 60 years ago, under the 21st amendment that 
was passed 56 years ago, under existing Supreme Court case law that has 
been ruled on over the past six decades, it will simply allow them to 
enforce these laws in the Constitution, and to use Federal courts to 
enforce their laws against individuals, against modern-day bootleggers 
who are illegally shipping alcohol products into States from other 
jurisdictions.
  These direct shipments bypass a key part of the States' control 
method, the face-to-face transaction, in order to sell their products 
at the highest possible profit margin.
  This new black market in alcohol is dangerous. It is dangerous 
because, if left unchecked, it will ultimately frustrate the ability of 
States to regulate and control the shipment of alcoholic products, a 
responsibility mandated under the 21st amendment to the Constitution. 
It will also cut off their regulation, it will cut off any fees they 
collect, it will cut off tax revenue that States depend on to regulate 
alcohol inside their own border. That is the way we have set this up. 
That is the way we have set it up.
  Mr. Speaker, it is very important today to ask those coming to the 
floor and opposing this bill, to ask the simple question: How does the 
bill affect people that play by the rules, that abide by the law, and 
that understand the Constitution and the constitutional amendments?
  I think if we ask those direct questions, we will understand that 
this is something that needs to be passed to stop illegal interstate 
bootlegging, and to protect not only minors but to protect everybody 
from the scourge of illegal alcohol shipping across State lines.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the bill. As my friend, the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Scarborough) indicated, this bill is very 
simple, Mr. Chairman. It does nothing more than to confer upon a State 
the right to go to Federal court to stop someone from outside the State 
from violating its liquor laws. It is nothing more, it is nothing less. 
It in no way changes substantive law at the State or Federal level.
  The bill is necessary not only to prevent illegal shipments to 
minors, but to enable States to police licensing standards, track 
sales, and collect taxes on those sales.
  Last year, illegal alcohol shipments cost States some $600 million in 
lost revenues. State taxes on alcohol are an important source of 
support for State programs, and protecting that funding stream is a 
legitimate State objective.
  Some who are opposed to this legislation argue that it would impede 
the development of electronic commerce by taxing the Internet, or 
chilling direct sales of wine and spirits over the Internet. Well, 
whatever the merits of chilled wine are, Mr. Chairman, there is no 
merit whatsoever to these arguments.
  As my friend, the gentleman from Florida, pointed out, lawful sales 
of alcohol over the Internet are thriving. Such online enterprises as 
wineshopper.com, sendwine.com, and virtualvineyard.com, generated 
hundreds of millions of dollars in lawful online sales last year alone.
  Just last month, Geerlings & Wade of Massachusetts, which has 
endorsed this bill and is the Nation's largest direct marketer of 
wines, announced another new website called winebins.com, which will 
sell thousands of labels in the 27 States in which the company is 
operating, is licensed to operate. No doubt it will continue to add new 
labels.
  Let us be clear, the bill would impose no new taxes on any of these 
electronic transactions, nor would it make them illegal. The State laws 
we seek to defend were put into place to regulate alcohol sales after 
the failure of Prohibition. In effect, they were the instrument by 
which an illegal enterprise, bootlegging, was turned into a lawful and 
regulated activity.
  Some will argue that now these laws are an anachronism. Well, maybe 
they are correct. Maybe there is a better way for States to protect 
minors, track sales, ensure quality control, and to raise taxes. But 
that is an argument better addressed by State legislatures, which have 
the power to rewrite those laws. Until they do so, they have a right to 
expect that the laws on the books will be enforced.
  That is really what the legislation is all about. If we permit States 
to pass laws but deny them a remedy when those laws are broken, we 
encourage disrespect for the law. It is really that simple. That is why 
attorneys general from across the country support this legislation.
  I include for the Record, Mr. Chairman, letters of support from the 
chief law enforcement officers of Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New

[[Page H6859]]

Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Virginia, West 
Virginia, Wyoming, and my own Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
  The letters referred to are as follows:
                                         Commonwealth of Virginia,


                               Office of the Attorney General,

                                      Richmond, VA, July 29, 1999.
     Hon. Lee Terry,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Terry: As the chief law enforcement officers of 
     our respective states, we are pleased that on July 20 the 
     Judiciary Committee voted overwhelmingly in favor H.R. 2031, 
     the 21st Amendment Enforcement Act, and understand that the 
     House is expected to vote on this important legislation soon.
       We are very concerned by media reports that opponents of 
     this common sense, law and order legislation are raising 
     superfluous issues and misrepresenting the facts in an effort 
     to defeat it, and would like to underscore the following 
     points:
       This is not anti-Internet legislation. There is no language 
     or intent in the bill that could even be remotely construed 
     to impede lawful Internet commerce in wine or any other 
     consumer product. This bill does not even mention online 
     sales. H.R. 2031 merely seeks to stop illegal alcohol 
     distribution, regardless of how the order was placed--by 
     computer, toll-free number, or by mail.
       We strongly support online commerce for all legal products 
     and want to encourage its growth to improve consumer choice 
     and convenience. This goal is actually harmed, however, by 
     those who distribute their products illegally. H.R. 2031 
     would not impose a burden on any manufacturer, wholesaler or 
     retailer of alcohol beverages that is operating lawfully. In 
     fact, it would still be possible to purchase alcohol over the 
     Internet and have it shipped to a licensed distributor, where 
     it could then be obtained.
       This is a states' rights issue. The 21st Amendment 
     recognizes the right of each state to structure its laws 
     accordingly, and as law enforcement officials we have an 
     obligation to stand in strong opposition to businesses that 
     ignore them. We are not asking for any new federal laws 
     regarding the transportation or distribution of alcohol; we 
     are merely asking for the power to enforce our own state laws 
     already on the books.
       None of us has a vested interest in the alcohol beverage 
     industry beyond making sure that our alcohol-related laws are 
     obeyed and that we have adequate enforcement authority. H.R. 
     2031 will give us access to federal courts, thereby 
     simplifying the legal process for prosecuting those who are 
     distributing in our states illegally.
           Sincerely,
     Mark L. Earley,
       Attorney General of Virginia.
     Bill Pryor,
       Attorney General of Alabama
     Bruce M. Botelho,
       Attorney General of Alaska.
     Mark Pryor,
       Attorney General of Arkansas.
     Ken Salazar,
       Attorney General of Colorado.
     Thurbert E. Baker,
       Attorney General of Georgia.
     Jim Ryan,
       Attorney General of Illinois.
     Jeffrey A. Modisett,
       Attorney General of Indiana,
     Tom Miller,
       Attorney General of Iowa.
     Carla J. Stovall,
       Attorney General of Kansas.
     Jennifer Granholm,
       Attorney General of Michigan.
     Joseph P. Mazurek,
       Attorney General of Montana.
     Don Stenberg,
       Attorney General of Nebraska.
     Frankie Sue Del Papa,
       Attorney General of Nevada.
     Philip T. McLaughlin,
       Attorney General of New Hampshire.
     Michael F. Easley,
       Attorney General of North Carolina.
     Heidi Heikamp,
       Attorney General of North Dakota.
     Hardy Myers,
       Attorney General of Oregon.
     Jan Graham,
       Attorney General of Utah.
     Darrell V. McGraw, Jr.,
       Attorney General of West Virginia.
     Gay Woodhouse,
       Attorney General of Wyoming.
                                  ____

                                                State of Michigan,


                               Department of Attorney General,

                                        Detroit, MI, July 2, 1999.
     Hon. John Conyers,
     House of Representatives, Longworth House O.B., Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Congressman Conyers: I am writing to ask that you 
     support and co-sponsor H.R. 2031, a bill introduced by 
     Congressman Scarborough, which will give my office the 
     ability to better enforce our laws against underage access to 
     alcohol, excise and sales tax collection and other 
     restrictions on alcoholic beverage distribution and sale.
       H.R. 2031 will allow states to file for federal court 
     injunctions against out-of-state wineries and retailers who 
     illegally bypass our state system and ship alcohol directly 
     to consumers. These clandestine shipments make it easier for 
     young people to obtain alcohol and make a mockery of our 
     other alcoholic beverage laws. Recent court decisions in Utah 
     and Florida make it clear that all states need this federal 
     court access to ensure their ability to enforce their 
     alcoholic beverage laws.
       H.R. 2031 is common sense legislation that makes no change 
     in current state law and makes no restrictions on Internet or 
     catalogue sales. H.R. 2031 simply gives my office the tools 
     we need to take against out-so-state interests that bypass 
     our existing regulations and controls with immunity. As you 
     may know, H.R. 2031 may be brought to the House floor in the 
     next few days. I would appreciate your support of this bill.
           Very truly yours,
                                             Jennifer M. Granholm,
     Attorney General.
                                  ____

                                         Commonwealth of Virginia,


                               Office of the Attorney General,

                                      Richmond, VA, June 14, 1999.
     Hon. Dennis Hastert,
     Office of the Speaker,
     The Capitol, Washington, DC.
       Dear Speaker Hastert: The Violent and Repeat Juvenile 
     Offender Accountability and Rehabilitation Act passed in the 
     U.S. Senate recently, and the U.S. House of Representatives 
     plans to vote on similar legislation next week. The 
     legislation contains an amendment to help stop the illegal 
     shipment of alcohol to minors and other violations of state 
     alcohol laws.
       The amendment was first introduced last March as S. 577 by 
     Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) in response to dozens of 
     television station investigative reports showing how 
     teenagers can have alcohol sent directly to them by ordering 
     it through the mail, over the Internet, through toll-free 
     phone services, and by other means. The amendment was offered 
     to the juvenile justice bill by Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) 
     and passed by an overwhelming 80-17 bipartisan vote.
       The amendment gives state attorneys general access to 
     federal courts to seek injunctive relief against those who 
     are violating our state laws and shipping alcohol directly to 
     minors. States have difficulty detecting these illegal 
     shipments, which also evade our state tax systems. Because of 
     jurisdictional issues, prosecuting violators is a very 
     uncertain process in state courts. Access to federal courts 
     is needed to handle these cases expeditiously and in a manner 
     consistent with the alcohol laws and regulations in Virginia 
     and other states.
       This amendment would not restrict legitimate commerce in 
     alcohol or any other product, or impose a burden on any 
     manufacturer, wholesaler or retailer of alcohol beverages 
     that is operating lawfully. As things now stand, those 
     companies that are doing business in a manner that respects 
     the law are at a competitive disadvantage to those who are 
     engaged in illegal tactics.
       This amendment is not an attempt to change or revise any 
     alcohol law; rather, it would simply give attorneys general 
     the ability to enforce their state laws, whatever those laws 
     may be. If an individual or entity can flout our states' 
     alcohol laws without consequence, it erodes the very 
     integrity of our states' legislative authority.
       In the fall of 1997, five Virginia college students died 
     due to binge drinking related accidents. In response, my 
     Office launched a statewide task force to address the subject 
     of college binge drinking. After speaking with students and 
     parents who have been affected by alcohol abuse, I have made 
     a personal commitment to fighting binge drinking among our 
     young people, and I am convinced that curbing the direct 
     shipment of alcohol to minors is an important part of that 
     effort.
       Beyond college alcohol abuse, there are many other health 
     and safety issues related to underage drinking. These 
     concerns are shared by parents across the nation, in every 
     state of the union. Attorneys general must have the 
     enforcement tools needed to help combat this problem
       I urge you to support this important amendment, H.R. 2031, 
     introduced by Congressmen Scarborough (R-FL), Delahunt (D-
     MA), and Sensenbrenner (R-WI). It will give attorneys general 
     the option to use the federal court system for injunctive 
     relief to stop the direct shipment of alcohol to minors and 
     other violations of state law regarding the importation and 
     transportation of alcohol.
       In addition to contacting my own state's Congressional 
     delegation in support of this amendment, I have written other 
     attorneys general encouraging them to do the same.
       If anyone in your office has questions about this 
     legislation, they can call Jonathan Amacker in my officer at 
     804-786-4596. Thank you for your consideration of this 
     matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Mark L. Earley,
     Attorney General.
                                  ____


[[Page H6860]]

                                    Commonwealth of Massachusetts,


                               Office of the Attorney General,

                                        Boston, MA, July 15, 1999.
     Senator Edward M. Kennedy,
     Russell Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Ed Kennedy: I am writing to enlist your support for 
     H.R. 2031, a bill introduced by Congressmen Scarborough, 
     Delahunt, Sensenbrenner and Cannon, to provide State 
     Attorneys General with the ability to seek federal injunctive 
     relief against out-of-state alcohol beverage distributors 
     which ship alcohol directly to minors in contravention of 
     state laws and regulations.
       Specifically, H.R. 2031 allows states to file for federal 
     injunction relief where the Attorney General has reasonable 
     cause to believe that an out-of-state entity is engaging in, 
     or about to engage in, an act that would constitute a 
     violation of a state law regulating the importation or 
     transportation of alcohol. Shipments by alcohol distributors 
     to minors provide our youth with the opportunity to obtain 
     alcohol in direct contravention of state laws. By giving 
     State Attorneys General access to federal courts to seek 
     injunctive relief against those who are violating our state 
     laws, we can hopefully prevent such direct shipment of 
     alcohol to minors.
       This bill is important and will provide my office with the 
     tools we need to take action against out-of-state businesses 
     that bypass our existing laws and regulations, and in so 
     doing, jeopardize the health and welfare of our children. On 
     behalf of the citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
     particularly our young people, I ask for your vote of support 
     for this important legislation.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Tom Reilly,
     Attorney General.
                                  ____

                                                    State of Utah,


                               Office of the Attorney General,

                                Salt Lake City, UT, June 14, 1999.
     Congressmember James V. Hansen,
     House of Representatives, Rayburn Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Jim Hansen: I am writing to encourage you to support a 
     bill that will be voted upon this week. H.R. 2031, introduced 
     by Congressmen Scarborough, Delahunt, and Sensenbrenner, 
     contains an amendment to help stop the illegal shipment of 
     alcohol to minors and other violations of state alcohol law.
       The amendment was first introduced last March by Senator 
     Hatch, days after Utah secured a significant ruling in the 
     Court of Appeals which asserted state jurisdiction of all 
     liquor sales that cause unlawful results in Utah and enables 
     the State to criminally prosecute businesses that violate 
     Utah's liquor laws.
       Utah must have the authority to enforce its state laws 
     governing the sale and distribution of alcohol, and this 
     amendment does just that. By giving state attorneys general 
     access to federal courts to seek injunctive relief against 
     those who are violating our state laws, we can prevent the 
     direct shipment of alcohol to minors.
       I hope you support this important piece of legislation; it 
     will enhance Utah's ability to enforce its laws and will 
     contribute greatly to the safety and welfare of Utah's 
     children.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Jan Graham,
     Attorney General.
                                  ____

                                     Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,


                                   Office of Attorney General,

                                    Harrisburg, PA, June 29, 1999.
     Hon. Arlen Specter,
     U.S. Senate, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Specter: I am writing to urge your support for 
     H.R. 2031, the proposed ``Twenty-First Amendment Enforcement 
     Act.'' This legislation, introduced by Congressmen 
     Scarborough (R-FL), Delahunt (D-MA) and Sonsenbrenner (R-WI), 
     will help prevent illegal shipments of alcohol to minors, and 
     the evasion of state tax laws.
       The ``Twenty-First Amendment Enforcement Act'' would give 
     state attorneys general access to federal courts to seek 
     injunctive relief against individuals and businesses who 
     violate state liquor laws by shipping alcohol directly to 
     consumers. These transactions, usually completed over the 
     Internet, allow purchases to be made without adequate proof 
     of age, giving minors easy access to alcohol.
       It is important to note that this measure will have no 
     impact on legitimate sales of alcoholic beverages by 
     manufacturers, wholesalers, or retailers who operate within 
     the parameters set by law. House Resolution 2031 merely gives 
     the states a better opportunity to enforce their current 
     liquor and tax laws.
       The problem of underage drinking has been exacerbated by 
     the explosion of Internet liquor sales. Passage of H.R. 2031 
     would provide a valuable tool with which state attorneys 
     general can work to prevent the direct shipment of alcohol to 
     minors. Again, I urge you to support this important 
     legislation.
           Very truly yours,
                                                      Mike Fisher,
     Attorney General.
                                  ____

                                                State of Nebraska,


                               Office of the Attorney General,

                                       Lincoln, NE, June 17, 1999.
     Congressman Bil Barrett,
     Rayburn House Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman Barrett: H.R 2031 would give states access 
     to federal courts to enforce their laws against illegal, 
     direct shipping of alcoholic beverages. I urge you to support 
     this bill.
       Illegal, direct shipping of alcoholic beverages into the 
     State of Nebraska undermines Nebraska's Liquor Control Act, 
     creates unfair competition for Nebraska liquor wholesalers 
     and retailers who are complying with the Liquor Control Act 
     and who are paying applicable taxes, and creates a risk of 
     alcohol shipment of under-age persons.
       A copy of H.R. 2031 is enclosed for your quick reference. 
     As you can see it is a simple, common sense approach to a 
     rapidly growing problem.
           Yours truly,
                                                     Don Stenberg,
     Attorney General.
                                  ____

                                                  State of Kansas,


                               Office of the Attorney General,

                                        Topeka, KS, June 15, 1999.
     Hon. Jerry Moran,
     House of Representatives, Longworth House O.B., Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Congressman Moran: I am writing to ask that your 
     support and co-sponsor H.R. 2031, a bill introduced by 
     Congressman Scarborough that will give my office the ability 
     to better enforce our laws against underage access to 
     alcohol, excise and sales tax collection and other 
     restrictions on alcoholic beverage distribution and sale.
       H.R. 2031 will allow states to file for federal court 
     injunctions against out-of-state wineries and retailers who 
     illegally bypass our state system and ship alcohol directly 
     to consumers. These clandestine shipments make it easier for 
     young people to obtain alcohol and make a mockery of our 
     other alcoholic beverage laws. recent court decisions in Utah 
     and Florida make it clear that all states need this federal 
     court access to ensure their ability to enforce their 
     alcoholic beverage laws.
       H.R. 2031 is common sense legislation that makes no change 
     in current state law and makes no restrictions on Internet or 
     catalogue sales. H.R. 2031 simply gives my office the tools 
     we need to take action against out-of-state interests that 
     bypass our existing regulations and controls with impunity. 
     As you may know, H.R. 2031 may be brought to the House floor 
     in the next few days. I would appreciate your prompt co-
     sponsorship of this important legislation and your vote of 
     support if it should be offered as an amendment to the 
     Juvenile Justice bill.
           Very truly yours,
                                                 Carla J. Stovall,
                                                 Attorney General.

  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, let us make no mistake, the online 
bootleggers who evade State alcohol control laws are hopefully not the 
future of electronic commerce. They are a throwback to a bygone era.
  Let us embrace E commerce and do all we can to encourage it, but let 
us do it in a manner that respects the rule of law.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner).
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chairman, this legislation will allow State 
Attorneys General to seek Federal court injunctions against any out-of-
State companies that illegally direct ship alcohol to consumers. These 
illegal direct shippers are bypassing State excise and sales taxes, 
operating without required licenses, and most appallingly, illegally 
selling alcohol to underage persons.
  It is important to note what H.R. 2031 does not do. It does not 
change existing State laws, and makes no restrictions on legal Internet 
or catalog sales. It does not open the door to Internet taxation. In 
fact, the word ``Internet'' does not appear anywhere in the text. It 
does not create a new Internet E commerce policy. It only deals with 
direct shipments of alcohol.
  The legislation has bipartisan support. It was adopted overwhelmingly 
as an amendment to the other body's juvenile justice bill. Attorneys 
General from 23 States have signed a letter of support on this bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of States' rights, and urge my 
colleagues to allow States to enforce their own alcohol laws by voting 
in favor of this much needed legislation.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Deutsch).
  Mr. DEUTSCH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2031, the 21st 
Amendment Enforcement Act. The rational for this bill is simple and 
straightforward. State laws governing alcohol shipping and distribution 
must be followed and enforced. This bill ensures that States have the 
tools needed to fully enforce their laws, especially those governing 
the distribution of alcohol to minors.
  This bill will ensure that States have legal recourse against alcohol 
distributors who deliberately seek to violate State laws. Any vintner, 
retailer, or

[[Page H6861]]

 marketer who ships alcohol to adults in compliance with laws governing 
the shipments's destination should support this legislation. H.R. 2031 
will simply allow States to take legal action in Federal courts against 
illegal business practices which often jeopardize the welfare of 
children.
  Just as law enforcement officials need the proper tools to fight 
crime, and drug enforcement officials need the proper tools to fight 
the war on drugs, liquor enforcement officials need the tools to 
enforce State liquor laws. These laws keep alcohol out of the hands of 
minors, and ensure that consumers receive safe products from people who 
sell these products.
  I urge my colleagues to support the 21st Amendment Enforcement Act.
  I would just quickly add that I served 10 years in the Florida 
legislature, Mr. Chairman, and was involved in legislating areas of 
enforcement of the structure that Florida has for alcohol sales in 
Florida.
  What is going on today, I do not think there will be any speaker here 
today who would question it, is absolutely in violation not just of 
Florida laws, but laws in the 50 States and the District of Columbia.
  Essentially, people have created a way to evade systems that 
legislatures have in place for the sale of alcoholic beverage, which 
are different in the 50 States, but these systems literally violate 
those laws in the 50 States and the District of Columbia.
  Again, it has been made clear that this is not against E commerce in 
any way, but in fact what the Internet has done is allow a new way of 
bootlegging. I, as one of many millions, tens of millions of Americans, 
have purchased products through the Internet. I encourage that.
  But as I sat with my son, and my son, who is 8 years old, has the 
ability, he remembers credit card numbers and access numbers pretty 
well, and has the ability today or tomorrow to, in his own way, 
perhaps, purchase things through the Internet. Obviously, that is not 
what we want to see happen. On top of that, there are legal ways to 
purchase these products through the Internet today.
  Again, I urge my colleagues to close a loophole. This is not an issue 
of trying to stop commerce on the Internet, it is an issue of 
enforcement of State liquor laws which have existed in the 50 States, 
with a great deal of authority for that enforcement.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
from Georgia (Mr. Barr).
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida 
for yielding time to me, and I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts 
and the gentleman from Florida for their leadership on this very 
important issue.
  Mr. Chairman, as the previous speaker from Florida said, this is an 
issue about States' rights. It is not anti-commerce, it is not anti-
free enterprise. What we must keep in mind is that there are legitimate 
areas where States have carved out the responsibility in support of 
their constituents to regulate certain types of activity, whether it be 
illicit drugs or sale of alcohol to minors.
  We must constantly try and balance the rights of States, the powers 
of States, to exercise legitimate supervision in those particular areas 
which, if not properly supervised, would be harmful to the citizens of 
that State against what we all here believe in, and that is free 
enterprise and the capitalist system.
  But we must ask ourselves, in that regard, at what price is free 
enterprise allowed to reign? We have witnessed in recent weeks 
tremendous damage to our national security, information on that damage 
coming forward, where secrets and very important military national 
security information was disclosed and made available to China, 
including information made available to China by companies seeking to 
exercise so-called free enterprise.

                              {time}  1200

  Free enterprise does not mean that corporations and companies in 
America can do whatever they want whenever they want with whom they 
want. They have to act responsibly, and they have to subject themselves 
to legitimate exercises of State authority.
  The sale of alcohol to minors in particular States, and other laws 
within those States regarding the regulation of the sale of alcoholic 
beverages, is a long-standing authority recognized by the courts and by 
this Congress. As a matter of fact, in the Constitution itself, as the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Scarborough) indicated, is a legitimate 
area where there are going to be placed and have been placed some 
restrictions.
  But that power is hollow if, in fact, companies are allowed, as they 
are doing now, to circumvent State law by Internet sales of alcohol in 
circumvention of and derogation of and flouting State laws.
  This legislation that the gentleman from Florida has proposed, 
supported by the gentleman from Massachusetts, mandates nothing. It 
simply empowers those States who wish to exercise the power through 
their attorneys general, duly elected by the people of the several 
States, to enforce laws against the sale of alcoholic beverages in 
their State which are in violation of State laws. It does nothing more. 
It does nothing less.
  We hope to keep the debate focused, Mr. Chairman, with regard to 
amendments that might be opposed on that fundamental power of States' 
rights.
  One certainly will see, as amendments are proposed, we suspect that 
it is commercial interests that are behind the amendments. Again, while 
all of us are very, very strong proponents of free enterprise, we also 
are proponents of States rights and to protect American families.
  In an age where we are seeing far too much youth violence, for 
example, Mr. Chairman, I think we need to be especially mindful that 
our families all across America need to be empowered and need to be 
able to rely on the legitimate authorities that they have elected in 
their States, such as the attorneys general, to protect their children 
in those legitimate areas where State exercise of authority can, 
indeed, do so in regulation of alcohol; and sales of alcoholic 
beverages is one such area.
  We must enact this legislation. It is a very specific, very narrow, 
very limited response to a problem that has developed in recent years 
that is a very real problem. Again, to emphasize Mr. Chairman, while we 
are in favor of Internet sales, we are in favor of commerce generally 
between the States, this is a legitimate area long recognized by the 
Congress, by the courts, and by the legislatures of the several States 
for State regulation.
  In order for that State regulation to be meaningful, the State 
attorneys general must have the power to enforce the interstate sale of 
alcoholic beverages in derogation of State laws. I urge support of this 
bill.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I yield as much time as he may consume to 
the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Thompson).
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. Mr. Speaker, it is unfortunate that this 
bill is on the floor today. This bill is no more than an attempt to 
advantage one industry group over another. It comes at a time when we 
should be working to find a solution to the problem, the problem of 
consumers not having access to the wines of their choice because 
distributors are unable to service the growth in small wineries.
  In 1963, there were 375 wineries. Today, in 1999, there are 2,000 
wineries. In 1963, we had 10,900 distributors. Today, we have 300 
distributors. This is the problem. This is why small wineries and 
consumers who want to buy premium wine from small wineries are looking 
for other available places in order to purchase it.
  There is an Amador Foothill grower in California that was interviewed 
by the press; and he said, ``A lot of large distributors look on 
wineries of our size as a nuisance. They cannot sell much of our wine. 
And the larger wineries are banking on them to sell 10 percent more 
each year, so they do not have time to sell small premium wines.''
  That is the problem. This problem is not about kids buying wine in 
cyberspace. As a matter of fact, that argument does not even pass the 
giggle test. The fact of the matter is, teenage kids across this Nation 
are not going to be purchasing premium Cabernet wine from my district, 
from anywhere from $40 to $150 a bottle.
  Everyone has been able to see through this clever cover. As a matter 
of fact, two of the original supporters of this idea, the Mothers 
Against

[[Page H6862]]

Drunk Driving and the Emergency Room Nurses have withdrawn their 
support. The Mothers Against Drunk Driving stated that, in fact, this 
is a battle between various elements within the alcohol beverage 
industry. They go on to say that they are dismayed that the industry 
would go this far or go to such lengths to misrepresent their views.
  Even the National Council on State legislatures is opposed to this 
measure. They have been working on this issue for the past couple of 
years, and they see some progress being made. Last week, they voted 41 
to 7 in opposition to this legislation. They, too, understand it is a 
turf issue and have asked this Congress not to interfere.
  The Wall Street Journal just editorialized against this, citing it as 
``an obstacle to interstate commerce of precisely the type the Founders 
intended to prohibit.'' The Journal goes on to say and to warn that 
``Today wine; tomorrow any out-of-State competition that some local 
interest with campaign money did not want to deal with.''
  I also want to point out that this bill deals with all liquor 
violations, not just the ones that were mentioned by the supporters of 
the bill.
  Attorneys General across this Nation could take all and any liquor 
violation regarding importation and transportation to the Federal 
courts. This is true even in States that allow direct shipment of wine.
  Oklahoma, for example, has a limited personal importation. However, 
they disallow any transaction on Memorial Day, Labor Day, or Election 
Day. So if one transports an alcoholic beverage in Oklahoma on the day 
of a special election to pass a school bond, one could find oneself in 
Federal court.
  Wyoming has a law that prohibits the sale of private labeled wines. 
So if one sells or transports private labeled wines in Wyoming, it 
could be Federal court.
  Now, the supporters will tell us that this is farfetched; that an 
Attorney General would not do that. I want to tell my colleagues that 
it is no more farfetched than the supporters' claims that kids are 
buying high-priced premium wine over the Internet.
  Most troubling, Mr. Chairman, is the fact that one of the coauthors 
of this bill has informed me that small wineries and consumers are not 
going to be disenfranchised because, in the end, the distributors will 
go online and sell online themselves.
  I cannot understand why direct sales can be harmful to one industry, 
the small wineries, but then be good in their eyes for the distributors 
who are trying to sell these wines.
  Finally, I want to point out that this bill has had no public input. 
It was rushed to the floor. It was a markup in the Committee on the 
Judiciary. The public has not been able to speak. Small wineries have 
not been able to speak. Consumers have not been able to speak. That is 
particularly troubling, given the long list of amendments that we are 
looking at today on the bill.
  One of the amendments, I understand, is going to provide immunity for 
Internet service providers. What does this mean, that Yahoo can go 
online and sell direct in States that prohibit the direct sale of 
alcoholic beverages? I think this is a huge loophole, and it is one 
that the supporters of this bill were not counting on.
  There was also a great deal of discussion about the loss of tax 
revenue. I can tell my colleagues that, without an analysis of this 
bill, I do not know how one can ascertain what the impact, the economic 
impact of this bill would be one way or the other.
  I also want to point out that there are a couple of local laws that 
could end up landing their constituents in Federal court. Indiana 
allows a person to bring one bottle of wine home per trip every time 
they come back to Indiana. If one brings back two bottles of wine, it 
could be Federal court.
  Maryland allows one bottle at a time, but not more than two bottles 
per calendar month. What if someone visits the Virginia wine country 
three times over the course of the month and brings back three bottles 
of wine? They are subject to Federal court.
  Right here in D.C., you can bring back four bottles of wine. If one 
visits Virginia wine country or my district in California, and one 
comes back with a six-pack of premium wine, the little six-pack 
containers that are so common for people to carry on the airplanes, one 
can be in violation of this district's laws, and one can be prosecuted 
in Federal court.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill should be defeated, and this issue should be 
left up to the States to decide without the heavy hand of the Federal 
Government's interference.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, I would just like to ask if the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Thompson) would be open to a few questions about some 
statements he made.
  The gentleman from California criticized selected State laws.
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I have not criticized any 
State laws. I am just pointing out that this measure could put 
violation of something, of a law such as the Oklahoma measure that 
allows transportation of an alcoholic beverage product, into Federal 
court. I do not think that is what the gentleman's intention is.
  I do not think it is the intention of the gentleman's supporters 
that, if the Internet service provider does direct sales, that they 
could sell wine in Florida, which makes it a felony to directly ship to 
Florida. It is completely at odds with the State law that you claim 
that the gentleman is trying to protect.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time for a question, I 
need to ask the gentleman from California this question. Does the 
gentleman from California understand that all this provides is Federal 
injunctive relief for attorneys general towards businesses that 
continually ship in alcohol illegally; since it provides for injunctive 
relief, nobody is going to be thrown into Federal court and then thrown 
into prison? Does the gentleman understand that?
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I understand that. I also 
understand that the Federal court is not the place to determine how 
much wine one can bring back if one decides to go to the vineyards of 
Virginia over the course of a weekend that one spends here in D.C.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman said it is his 
position that minors are not purchasing alcohol over the Internet. Is 
that the gentleman's position?
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I think it is a clever 
cover for what the gentleman from Florida is trying to do, and that is 
advantage one industry player. I believe that the gentleman was privy 
to the same tape that I saw in Mr. Hatch's committee hearing that 
showed a 14-year-old girl accessing the Internet, trying to buy an 
alcoholic beverage. But the thing that was not talked much about in 
that hearing was the fact that her older brother or father was standing 
right there next to the television camera operator and filming this 
using his credit card. It is a far stretch from leading us to believe 
that some youngster is going to plan weeks ahead to purchase some 
alcoholic beverage and, in the case that impacts my district, a bottle 
of Cabernet.
  I do not think the teenagers of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Scarborough) are going to buy Opus Cabernet over the Internet with 
their parents' credit card.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, if they did try to 
use my credit card, it would not go through for the type of wine that 
the gentleman sells in his district.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Georgia (Mr. Barr).
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, one might ask the opponents of 
this very measured legislation why they think the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police is endorsing it. The International 
Association of Chiefs of Police certainly has no problem with the 
legitimate sale of alcohol. They are not beholden to the wine industry, 
large or small. They are not beholden to the beer industry, large or 
microbrew. Yet, they are very strongly in support of this legislation.
  The reason they are very strongly in support of this legislation is 
they

[[Page H6863]]

know, as I suspect the opponents do also but will not admit it, that 
there are in fact numerous documented instances of minors purchasing 
alcoholic beverages over the Internet. For anybody to claim otherwise, 
they are simply misleading this debate or cannot make that argument 
with a straight face.
  There is a case, a documented case just recently reported in Alabama, 
of a 17-year-old boy able to buy alcoholic beverages over the Internet 
according to some plan where they will send it periodically, once a 
month.
  There is also, documented through Americans for Responsible Alcohol 
Access, a documentary that shows teenagers in various States, including 
Mississippi, buying alcoholic beverages.
  Also for the opponents of this very measured legislation, also to 
make the speechless argument that there has been no public input, that 
is absolutely wrong. There have been debates on this issue in the 
Congress. There have been hearings on this, two hearings. This passed 
overwhelmingly in the United States Senate. Every one of those Senators 
who voted in support of this, I would presume maybe the opponents of 
this measured bill know otherwise, but I would certainly presume that 
those Senators were speaking for their constituents, the citizens of 
the State.

                              {time}  1215

  So there are plenty of documented instances of minors using the 
internet in violation of State law to purchase or receive alcoholic 
beverages.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a very measured response to a real problem. I 
urge support of the legislation.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Woolsey).
  (Ms. WOOLSEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to this 
legislation that would criminalize the efforts of the small wineries in 
my district in responding to their consumers.
  This bill is a wolf in sheep's clothing. It is not about State's 
rights, it is not about combating the problem of underage drinking. 
Instead, this bill is about wholesalers and distributors that do not 
want small wineries to move into their turf.
  Make no mistake, I firmly believe that we have a national obligation 
to take care of our children and protect them from threats to their 
health and safety. Nobody speaks more to that than I do. Too many young 
people are starting to drink at an early age leading to alcohol and 
other substance abuse problems. That is why I have fought so strongly 
in this Congress to support the passage of zero tolerance legislation 
for underage drinking and driving.
  But this legislation does not address that pressing issue. In fact, 
Mothers Against Drunk Driving, MADD, will not even endorse this bill. 
That is because they recognize this bill for what it is: A power grab 
by wholesalers and distributors.
  This power grab involves a 65-year-old regulatory scheme that grew 
out of prohibition and stands on three legs: Politics, policy, and 
profits. Through the three-tier system, manufacturers are required to 
sell their beer, wine, and liquor to licensed wholesalers who are the 
sole suppliers for stores, bars and restaurants, sports arenas, and 
other retailers. They have got it all tied up and they do not want to 
give any of that up.
  But guess what, this distribution system does not work for consumers 
who want to access hard-to-find good wines from small wineries. The 
wineries in my district in Sonoma and Marin Counties, just north of the 
Golden Gate Bridge, produce some of the world's finest wines, and we 
will have to say Napa too, because that is where my colleague, the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Thompson) is from, but many of them 
cannot get their products to markets the traditional ways.
  Wholesalers and distributors will not carry their products because 
the wineries are not big enough. These winemakers now are joining the 
point-and-click-world of Internet commerce to get their products 
directly to the consumers. So, do not inhibit their ability to sell 
their product.
  At another time support efforts to ensure that children and teenagers 
do not buy alcoholic beverages, but today is not the day to address 
that. Vote against H.R. 2031.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 minutes.
  The statement has been made that alcohol sales to minors over the 
internet is not a real problem. In fact, one individual stood up and 
said that I was clever in using this as a front. I thank him for 
calling me clever, but I am not clever enough to have about 30 news 
stations across the country running stories specifically on minors 
purchasing alcohol over the Internet.
  WBRC-TV in Birmingham; WIAT-TV in Birmingham; KPMO in Phoenix, 
Arizona; KEYT-ABC in Santa Barbara; WUSA-CBS in Washington; WPEC in 
West Palm Beach; WPLG in Miami; WWSB in Sarasota, Florida; WICS in 
Springfield, Illinois, a three-part series; WEVV-TV in Evansville, 
Indiana, a two-part series; WBFF in Baltimore; stations also in Boston; 
Lansing, Michigan; Greenville, Mississippi; Syracuse, New York; 
Charlotte, North Carolina; Columbus, Ohio; Cleveland, Ohio; Oklahoma 
City; Philadelphia; Lancaster, Pennsylvania; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; 
Providence, Rhode Island; Spartanburg, South Carolina; Amarillo, Texas, 
a three-part series; San Antonio; Salt Lake City; Norfolk; Seattle; 
Green Bay; WISC, Wisconsin; WMTV, Wisconsin; CNN Morning News, Hard 
Copy; NWCN-TV cable news in Seattle; and ZDTV cable news have all done 
stories on illegal sales of alcohol to minors over the Internet.
  While I thank the gentleman for saying I am clever and suggesting 
that I would be resourceful enough to set up such a media explosion on 
this happening from coast to coast, but regretfully I would have to 
disagree with the gentleman and say I am not quite that clever.
  Also, regarding the question of no public input, I sat through the 
Committee on the Judiciary hearings and can report we heard all the 
input we could get for about 6 or 7 hours. There have been 2 other days 
and two other committee hearings over the past several years where this 
issue has been debated over and over and over again.
  In the end, again, all it comes down to is the fact that there are 
some people that want to allow small businesses to sell wine illegally 
over the Internet. I want to be able to have my rich Republican 
supporters to be able to purchase the finest wine from Napa valley, or 
purchase the finest wine from Sausalito, a beautiful region I recently 
visited. I have nothing against that. It just has to be legal.
  And it does not matter how small the winery is, it does not matter 
how fine the wine is, it does not matter how strong these businesses 
may support my colleagues in their districts, or how strong my wine 
lovers in my district may support me. If it is illegal, it is illegal. 
If it is bootlegging, it is bootlegging. The only thing this bill does 
is stop the illegal shipment of alcohol into States, and it does it by 
allowing the State's attorney general to file an injunction. Nothing 
more, nothing less.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume 
to concur with my friend from Florida. I too want my middle class 
Democrats to have availability on the Internet to purchase the wines 
out in Sausalito, California.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Rangel).
  (Mr. RANGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, I would have to agree that the gentleman 
from Florida is clever, and I do hope we can use his ingenuity as 
relates to the interstate sale of guns. Because, clearly, we ought to 
have as much concern about these dangerous weapons as we do about our 
children consuming wine.
  Now, in the old days, when I was a kid, kids did not wait 2, 3, 4 
days in order to get wine. They used to get outside the liquor store 
and get someone to go there and buy wine for them. So if they are 
clever enough to use the Internet to do it, I do not really think that 
this law is going to catch too many of them.
  It seems to me, coming from a State that has wineries, that we have a 
major problem here, and that is whether or not some of my Republican 
friends want to throw the baby out

[[Page H6864]]

with the bathwater. We want to be able to have as much competition in 
this great Republic of ours that we can. I do not think it can be 
challenged that we have some 1700 small wineries that are unable to 
penetrate the larger distributors that we have in this country. They 
have fine products, but they do not have the money and the know-how to 
get it into the stores.
  Finally, technology has given them the opportunity to break through 
these barriers and to be able to sell their products, subject to State 
law. Now, we know that one of the things that Congress wants to do is 
to get government out of the lives of people, especially the Federal 
Government, and we do not have a lot of attorneys general pleading, 
knocking down our doors and saying, for God's sake come in here and 
provide oversight for us.
  If we are going to start doing this with wine, there is no reason why 
we do not start controlling competition in books and recordings and in 
clothing, and taking away the very same technology that is pumping up 
our economy and allowing people to be able to get their wares to the 
marketplace.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds just to 
respond.
  There is a big difference between books and liquor. Amazon.com can 
still continue to sell books. There is nothing in the Constitution 
regarding the importance of books. There is nothing in the Constitution 
regarding sweaters from J. Crew. There is something in the Constitution 
regarding the twenty-First Amendment, which says it is going to be the 
province of the States to regulate alcohol sales. So there is a big 
difference.
  Regarding guns, guns can also be shipped, they just have to be 
shipped legally.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Radanovich). We violently disagree on this issue, but he is a good 
friend, nonetheless.
  (Mr. RADANOVICH asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. RADANOVICH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time on this issue, even though I oppose this legislation.
  I am not a lawyer, I am a small winery owner. I am one of more than 
2,000 wineries in about 47 States, however, only 50 wines are available 
in a typical retail marketplace. More specifically, about 20 wineries 
produce 90 percent of all the wine produced. Despite this, sales of 
regional or limited availability of wine, of which there are perhaps 
over 10,000 labels, have grown. Unfortunately, at the same time the 
traditional distribution avenues have decreased from over 20,000 
wholesalers to fewer than 400.
  These wholesalers are not sufficient to handle the shipment and 
delivery of wines from numerous small producers. Direct mail and the 
Internet, on the other hand, have helped these small wineries stay 
afloat, while at the same time helping to satisfy a growing consumer 
demand for smaller, lesser-known wines produced in this country.
  The reason H.R. 2031 is proposed is to stop these alternative avenues 
to market in favor of existing monopolistic wholesalers. The Twenty-
First Amendment to the Constitution is not an absolute divestment of 
Federal power of the States. The U.S. Supreme Court has long 
established that the amendment has its limits and must be considered in 
the context of the constitutional provisions, including Congress' 
exclusive right to regulate interstate commerce.
  Proponents of this legislation claim that it is necessary to curb the 
delivery of alcohol products to underage purchasers. I believe that 
there are few more important causes than to stem the tide of underage 
drinking in this country, however, I am convinced that direct shipment 
of wine, beer, and spirits does not contribute to the problem.
  The two States with the highest consumption of wines, California and 
New York, have long permitted interstate shipments over the phone or by 
mail. Surely if these mechanisms were inherently open to abuse, the 
authorities in those States would have discovered that by now, but they 
have not.
  I am sure we can all remember when we were kids, when we were 
teenagers in high school and we stole our dad's credit card to order a 
$200 case of premium wine over the phone to have parties with our 
friends 30 days down the line. And in the meantime, 38 percent of those 
kids who go into retail stores in the District of Columbia to purchase 
beer over the counter succeed. So my advice to those that are so 
concerned about underage purchasers is to focus their direction where 
the problem really is. The issue is not an issue under this piece of 
legislation.
  The National Conference of State Legislatures recently passed a 
resolution that opposed legislation which allowed Federal interference 
in the purchase and delivery of wine across State borders. Forty-one 
States joined in the passing of the resolution, with only 7 States 
supporting this attempt to Federalize the laws. The Federal Government 
should not empower States to engage in this kind of activity. This is 
monopoly protection at its best. And even those wineries can ship into 
approximately 12 States now, they will, through the support of the 
attorneys general, limit that as well.
  I am a California farmer. In 1982, I established a small vineyard and 
winery in the Sierra foothill community of Mariposa, my hometown. The 
Radanovich Winery, which produces Sauvignon blanc, Chardonnay, Merlot, 
Zinfandel and Cabernet Sauvignon, has grown to over 4,000 cases 
annually.
  Like most wineries, mine is small. Of the more than 2,000 wineries in 
this country, only 50 are available in a typical retail marketplace. 
More specifically, about 20 wineries produce 90% of all the wine 
produced. Despite this, sales of regional or limited availability 
wine--of which there are perhaps over ten thousand labels--have grown. 
Unfortunately, traditional distribution avenues are insufficient for 
the shipment and delivery of wines from these numerous small producers. 
Direct mail, the Internet and other alternative forms of distribution 
have helped these small wineries stay afloat, while at the same time 
helping to satisfy the growing consumer demand for smaller, lesser 
known wines produced in this country.
  Grape growing is a very important agricultural crop, the largest crop 
in California and the sixth largest crop in the nation. Over 60% of the 
grape crop is used in the production of wine. The resulting wine 
industry in total annually contributes over $45 billion to the American 
economy; provides 556,000 jobs, accounting for $12.8 billion in wages; 
and pays $3.3 billion in state and local tax revenues. In addition, 
wine is our third largest horticultural export. Wine is commercially 
produced in 47 states.
  Consumers in every state should be able to obtain access to a wide 
variety of wines, especially the wines of small producers who lack the 
distribution channels of the major wine producers in this nation. To 
meet these consumer needs, I point to the 20 states which have chosen 
to enact limited interstate shipments directly from winery to consumer 
or retailer to consumer. Intrastate direct shipments are legal in 30 
states. I also direct your attention to recently passed ``shipper 
permit'' legislation in New Hampshire and Louisiana and to the special 
order system developed and implemented by the Pennsylvania state liquor 
monopoly.
  I am concerned that passage of the proposed legislation would have a 
chilling effect on efforts underway to craft creative state-by-state 
solutions such as these.
  Legislation to allow states to bring to Federal court an action to 
enjoin shipment or transportation of liquor in violation of the laws of 
a particular state would have the unintended consequence of crippling 
small wineries in this country. The proposed legislation does much more 
than simply providing a remedy for a violation of the Webb-Kenyon 
statute that generally governs states authority over interstate 
shipments. I fear that it will authorize a state to erect 
discriminatory barriers to interstate commerce, which will be used to 
favor in-state commercial interests to the detriment of out-of-state 
wine producers. The Commerce Clause protects against state imposed 
barriers to free trade. That protection should apply to wineries as 
well as all other businesses.
  The twenty-first amendment to the Constitution is not an absolute 
divestment of Federal power to the States. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
long established that the amendment has its limits and must be 
considered in the context of other constitutional provisions, including 
Congresses exclusive right to regulate interstate commerce.
  Further, existing remedies are available for violations of liquor 
laws. In the case of wine (as with harder liquors) there is an 
underlying federal permit which is required to operate a winery. That 
permit is subject to oversight by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms, and requires conformance to applicable laws. There have been 
successful compliance actions through this mechanism. An additional 
mechanism is not necessary.

[[Page H6865]]

  Professor Jesse H. Choper, a distinguished scholar in the field of 
constitutional law from the University of California has written 
expressing his concerns about the possible consequences of Federal 
legislation in this arena. Professor Choper concludes that the proposed 
legislation would violate the Commerce Clause protection against 
barriers to free trade among the states, by allowing states, rather 
than the Congress, to establish those barriers.
  I am also concerned that the thrust of this legislation is to allow 
states to use the Federal courts to obtain direct jurisdiction over 
small businesses located in other states in a manner which invites 
abuse of the court system and a trampling of the rights of out-of-state 
citizens in order to satisfy the demands of politically powerful local 
interests. Allowing the federal courts to be used as enforcement 
machinery for state action seems to me a huge expansion of federalism 
and a very dangerous precedent.
  Proponents of this legislation claim it is necessary to curb the 
delivery of alcohol product to underage purchasers. I believe that 
there are few more important causes than to stem the tide of underage 
drinking in this country. A Health and Human Services survey reflects 
that more than half of 18-20 year olds were drinking alcohol in the 
month prior to the survey, and an astonishing quarter of that age group 
have engaged in binge drinking during the same period.
  However, I am convinced that direct shipment of wine, beer or spirits 
does not contribute to the problem. The two states with the highest 
consumption of wines--California and New York--have long permitted 
Intrastate shipments ordered by phone or mail. Surely, if such 
mechanisms were inherently open to abuse the authorities in those 
states would have discovered that by now. But they have not.
  Manuel Espinoza, Chief Deputy Director of the California Alcoholic 
Beverage Control agency has written to Congressman Thompson and myself 
that as a result of remote sales of alcohol in California, a practice 
that has been legal for almost fifty years, the state has experienced 
no enforcement problems or impediments in its ability to enforce laws 
related to sales to minors. California has only received one complaint 
about the delivery of alcohol to underage recipients via interstate 
mail orders. That complaint originated from a privately organized 
``sting'' and subsequent investigation determined that the actual 
delivery, though left at the door, was accepted by the minor's mother.
  Another concern raised by proponents is the avoidance of state excise 
taxes by interstate shippers. There is no indication that taxes avoided 
by shippers constitute a significant loss of revenue to any state. It 
is estimate that interstate direct shipments consist primarily of ultra 
premium wine and never constitute more than one-half of one percent of 
a state's total wine volume. For the entire country, a tax loss of that 
magnitude would be $2 million annually. For the State of Maryland, even 
if it were to allow direct shipment of wine, annual tax losses at full 
volume would be less than $20,000 per year.
  To address even this minuscule problem, forty-one members of 
California's Congressional delegation have written to the Advisory 
Commission on Electronic Commerce requesting that the Commission 
address this problem when it examines means to ensure the fair 
imposition of consumption, sales and use taxes arising from remote 
sales of all products, a far more significant revenue problem estimated 
to involve many billions of dollars in lost revenue. Congress 
established this Commission for just such a purpose, and this member 
suggests that we wait for the report we requested of them.
  Legislation which preempts the Advisory Commission on Electronic 
Commerce regarding wine will have the effect of setting a precedent in 
regulation of the Internet before the Commission has done its' work. We 
are moving into an arena that all of us have not had the opportunity to 
think through, and our narrow attempts with wine may end up with far-
reaching impacts on the sale of anything through the Internet. That is 
why Andy Sernovitz, the President of the Association for Interactive 
Media (AIM) a 300 member Internet trade group, said; ``If they can stop 
you from selling wine on the Internet, books and music are next.''
  Mr. Chairman, the National Conference on State Legislatures recently 
passed a resolution that opposed legislation which allowed federal 
interference in the purchase and delivery of wine across state 
borders.'' Forty-one states joined in passing that resolution, with 
only 7 states supporting this bodies attempt to federalize state laws.
  Mr. Chairman, I am not convinced there is an urgent national problem 
which needs to be solved by allowing virtually unprecedented use of 
federal courts to solve state problems which can be addressed by state 
legislative and judicial means. States can make it a crime for a person 
under 21 to attempt to purchase alcohol. Most have. Why don't the 
Attorneys general in the states prosecute their own citizens when they 
violate state laws?
  Rather than the proposed legislation, alternatives include 
legislation which would encourage the development of open markets so 
that consumers can have access to the products which they wish to 
purchase.
  I close by quoting for you from a letter by Florida Attorney General 
Robert Butterworth urging the veto of a bill making direct interstate 
shipment of wine to a Florida consumer a felony: ``[The bill] is the 
perfect tool for the vested interests who seek additional control over 
the marketplace, at the expense of competition and consumer choice.''
  The federal government should not empower states to engage in anti-
competitive actions favoring their in-state businesses. The federal 
government should not use the power of the courts to suppress 
competition. The federal government should not expand its reach into 
the private purchases of consumers, or the activities of the small 
businesses, which make up the largest part of the wine business.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman once again for yielding me this 
time, but I must ask my colleagues to join me in opposing the bill.

                              {time}  1230

  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Barrett.)
  Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from 
Massachusetts for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 21st Amendment Enforcement 
Act, which will help States such as my home State of Wisconsin crack 
down on the illegal shipment of alcoholic beverages.
  But I am concerned that today's debate is being framed as an effort 
to restrict E-commerce.
  Ironically, this bill does not even mention Internet and would have 
no effect on the direct shipment of alcohol and other products just as 
long as those shipments comply with State law.
  The issue today is whether a State should have the right to take 
action against a company that violates the law of that State by 
shipping alcohol directly to the customer.
  The 21st Amendment to the Constitution repealed prohibition but gave 
each State the right to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages. 
Direct sales, whether over the Internet, by phone, or through the mail, 
violate the laws of certain States, make it easier for children to 
obtain alcohol, and drain needed tax revenue. This bill merely gives 
these States an additional tool to stop a practice that is already 
illegal.
  Commerce over the Internet continues to grow at an incredible rate, 
and Congress should do nothing to discourage fair growth. But companies 
in one State should not be able to disregard the laws of another State 
in an effort to reach new customers.
  I urge my colleagues to cast a vote for fair Internet commerce and 
for States' rights by passing the 21st Amendment Endorsement Act.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Washington (Mr. Nethercutt) another friend and classmate with whom 
I disagree today.
  Mr. NETHERCUTT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida for 
his gracious yielding of time even though we disagree on this.
  My colleagues, I think this is a legislation that is ill-advised. And 
I commend to the sponsors and the managers today, the gentlemen from 
Florida, Massachusetts, and Georgia, to the National Conference of 
State Legislatures vote which occurred on July 29, just a few days ago, 
by a vote of 41-7.
  Forty-one States oppose H.R. 2031, including Massachusetts, Georgia, 
and Florida. These State legislators who made this judgment believe 
that the direct shipping issue should be resolved at the State and 
local levels of government. And so I think there is a disconnection 
here between a perceived problem, as I see it, by the sponsors and an 
actual problem.
  I come from a State and represent a district, Washington State, and 
the Fifth Congressional District, where we have emerging small wineries 
who do direct customer transfers and shipments. They are not trying or 
do not violate the law. But there is a chilling effect that this 
legislation would have on it on this emerging business.

[[Page H6866]]

  It is clear to me that this is a job loser to the extent that there 
is a restriction on these emerging companies over the Internet. What 
they do and what they have explained to me very clearly is there is a 
very complicated process they must go through in order to ship a bottle 
of wine or a case of wine from manufacturer A to customer B in another 
State.
  The Federal Express transfer company has to make sure there is a 
signature on the other end from an adult over the age of 18 able to buy 
this kind of product. And if not, it has to be sent back. So it is the 
shipper and the shipping company that is the most at risk.
  So I urge my colleagues to reject this bill.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Tennessee (Mr. Gordon).
  Mr. GORDON. Mr. Chairman, as I have listened to the debate this 
morning, I have discovered that there has been an abundance of debate 
on pros and cons of this legislation, contradictory pros and cons.
  However, there has been one common denominator. That common 
denominator is that no one wants to see the Internet used to encourage 
alcohol abuse by minors. So the real question before us today is how 
can we stop the Internet from using or being used as a vehicle for 
alcohol abuse by minors?
  After reviewing this legislation, it seems to me that there is a 
better way, that this legislation simply oversteps and that a better 
approach would be requiring sellers and shippers to clearly label 
packages as containing alcohol and that they obtain proof that the 
recipient is of legal drinking age.
  I am co-sponsoring legislation to do that and would suggest that is a 
better approach.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Scarborough) has 3 
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) has 
7\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Mrs. Capps).
  Mrs. CAPPS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 2031. This 
legislation would restrict interstate commerce and limit consumers' 
choices throughout the country. It would also seriously harm the small 
vintners in my district and around this Nation.
  Let me explain how some people from our States and districts like to 
buy wine. They come to places like the central coast of California and 
spend a few days touring the vineyards and tasting the wines of my 
district and maybe they buy some to take home.
  After they get home, they will discover they cannot find any wine 
from these lovely vineyards in Paso Robles or the Santa Maria Valley 
that they like so much. So they try to order some over the phone or 
through the Internet, until the vineyard tells them, ``No, sorry, but 
your State will not let us ship to you. You're out of luck.''
  Right now a number of States have adopted laws that restrict the 
rights of their citizens to order wine from out-of-state wineries. This 
bill would encourage more State legislatures to adopt these anti-
consumer laws.
  Is that really what the authors of this legislation want to do, 
restrict the choices of law-abiding adult consumers?
  Let me quote from the Wall Street Journal. ``Shutting down shipments 
of $300 cases of wine is not a reasonable regulation of intoxicating 
beverages; it is an obstacle to interstate commerce of precisely the 
type the Founders intended to prohibit.''
  What this legislation will do is harm the little guy, the small 
family vintners and wineries. I have heard from so many vintners in my 
district who would like to be able to reach more consumers throughout 
the country. However, this is not possible without going through a 
large distributor who simply will not ship small quantities of wine. 
And besides, retailers only have so much shelf space and certainly not 
enough for the wine productioned by 1,600 small wineries throughout the 
United States.
  So vintners seek to expand their businesses and serve their loyal 
customers through phone orders or through the Internet. This bill will 
seek to shut down that avenue of commerce.
  The authors of this legislation claim that its purpose is to cut down 
on underage drinking, and that is a noble goal.
  As a school nurse for 20 years, I have worked very hard to fight 
underaged drinking. But this bill is not about stopping kids from 
drinking. If it were, we would think Mothers Against Drunk Driving 
would be in favor of it. They are not.
  California has allowed direct sales for over 20 years, and it has had 
no measurable effect on underage drinking. If we really want to 
discourage underage drinking, we should support programs like Fighting 
Back in my district, which works through public awareness initiatives 
and provides youth services, or we should challenge the drug czar to 
include anti-youth drinking ads as part of the government's anti-drug 
ad campaign.
  If this were a bill to cut down on underage drinking, I would be for 
it. But it is not. It is an attack on our small vintners.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to join me in opposition to this 
misguided legislation.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds to respond 
to something that the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Capps) said.
  She said that this would restrict choices of legal purchases of wine. 
That is just not the case. If they sell alcohol legally, this does not 
apply to them. If they sell alcohol illegally, it applies to them.
  Because all this language says is, if they sell alcohol illegally, 
that States' attorneys general will be able to go to court and stop 
them from selling alcohol illegally and stopping interstate 
bootlegging.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Missouri (Mr. Hulshof).
  Mr. HULSHOF. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time, especially as time is drawing short.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the bill of the gentleman and 
in the interest of full and complete disclosure.
  I have got to tell my colleagues that I am an avid wine enthusiast 
and that my wife and I took our honeymoon vacation to the wineries of 
California, and we have enjoyed our subsequent visits there. But I will 
tell my colleagues, Mr. Chairman, this is not just an issue that 
affects California but one that impacts Texas, Oregon, Washington, 
Virginia, New York. And my own beloved State of Missouri is home to 
many family-run wineries whose intentions are not criminal.
  Instead, these small businesses attempt to satisfy long-time repeat 
customers and cultivate new ones, those who have left those well-worn 
tourist paths and have chosen to adventure to experience the adventure 
and hospitality of a small but friendly winery.
  These long-time family businesses in my district, one dating back to 
1855, nonetheless depend on E-commerce, a way to attract new business 
and survive alongside the large wholesalers.
  Mr. Chairman, this law, in my belief, is unnecessary. I have listened 
and I have accepted the invitation of my friend from Florida, and I 
have listened to the debate; and I have got to tell my colleagues that 
I am unmoved by arguments offered by the proponents that massive 
numbers of underage drinkers are searching the Internet for basement 
bargains of bottles of Bordeaux to binge with their friends on their 
parents' next night out. I am struck, however, by the apparent 
inconsistency demonstrated by some of those who are leading the charge 
in favor of this measure.
  A few weeks ago, the gentleman from Georgia, we were leading the 
charge, a very emotional debate, about the availability of and access 
to firearms and whether further restrictions were needed. Many argued 
against further intrusions claiming appropriately, in my view, that 
additional gun laws were in violation of the rights of law-abiding 
citizens.
  Here is my question: If gun manufacturers are immune from civil 
liability in the case of criminal conduct committed by a violent felon 
who has purchased a firearm, and I support that immunity, then how can 
we hold vintners responsible for the unlawful purchases of wine?
  I urge the defeat.
  The CHAIRMAN. Both gentlemen have 2\1/2\ minutes remaining. The 
manager of the bill has the right to close.

[[Page H6867]]

  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Barr).
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding 
me the time.
  Mr. Chairman, this particular analogy just put forth by the gentleman 
from Missouri (Mr. Hulshof) with gun liability is completely misplaced.
  We are not saying that anybody should or should not be immune from 
ultimate illegal use of the alcohol, such as the drunk driver. This 
bill simply goes to the shipping into the State in violation of an 
existing State law.
  Now, if those States, and we have heard from a number of Members that 
are speaking for the wineries, if those States have a disagreement with 
a particular alcoholic restrictive law of a particular State, then 
their remedy should be to go to those State legislators and change the 
State laws that relate to how liquor can be brought into and 
distributed within that State.
  But again, to make perfectly clear, and let us remove the clouds of 
the gun debate and the commerce debate here, this is a bill that simply 
empowers attorneys general of the States to seek injunctive relief to 
stop shippers, large or small, from shipping into their State in 
violation of State laws. It does not affect the legal shipper.
  I urge support of the bill.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Oregon (Mr. DeFazio).
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the generous 
grant of time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the bill. Where in this bill do 
we target or state explicitly that what we are doing is going after 
underage purchasers of wine over the Internet or microbrew over the 
Internet?
  This is a very broad bill. The target is much larger than underaged 
drinking and access to alcohol. They are still going to go down to the 
concern and give the guy an extra couple of bucks who is a bad guy to 
go into the store and buy the stuff. They are not going to do it over 
the Internet and buy an expensive case of wine. That is not what we are 
after here. We are trying to close down the small wineries and 
breweries.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Scarborough) has 1\1/2\ 
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) has 
2 minutes remaining.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I think the point has been made again and again that 
this particular proposal has nothing whatsoever to do with impeding the 
growth of E-commerce in terms of the sales of wine or any spirits or 
alcohols.
  What it has to do is with respect to State laws. The fact and the 
reality is that we should be here to respect and provide an opportunity 
to States that find themselves with limited capacity and ability to 
enforce their own laws.
  Now, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) spoke to the issue of 
guns. Now, I know I have a disagreement with my friends from Georgia 
and Florida. But let me say, when it comes to that particular issue, I 
want the laws in Massachusetts relative to guns respected and honored 
anywhere in this Nation.

                              {time}  1245

  I do not want the shipment of firearms into Massachusetts from 
Georgia, Florida or California. I want to ensure that my Attorney 
General has the right to go to court and have the firearm laws of 
Massachusetts respected, initially.
  Another item here, Mr. Chairman. This is from the New York Times. 
``Officials Struggle to Regulate On-Line Sale of Prescription Drugs.'' 
I am just going to quote:

       The Food and Drug Administration announced steps today to 
     curb the illegitimate sale of prescription drugs over the 
     Internet. Now doctors are prescribing pills on-line to 
     patients they have never met in States where they are not 
     authorized to work. Pharmacies are shipping pills across 
     State lines without the requisite license.

  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Delahunt) has expired.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume. I would just like to say in closing, again bringing up what I 
brought up at the very beginning of the debate. We can talk about a lot 
of different things, we can throw red herrings in front of the people 
in this Chamber, but in the end the dividing line of this bill is 
between legal alcohol sales and illegal alcoholic sales.
  We have had some people who are angry because they say we are trying 
to destroy local wineries. Again, the only local wineries that will be 
destroyed will be the local wineries whose very existence depends on 
illegal sales, because their legal sales will not be affected. We have 
people that are angry because we are not limiting this to merely people 
under 21 years of age. Their argument seems to be that if you are 21 
years old and 1 day, then illegal bootlegging to you is okay while it 
is not okay to minors. That is just not right.
  We have had the argument that this is a made-up issue. Again, I do 
not know how many times we have to read the 30 plus television stations 
that have run stings on this thing.
  Also, one thing, going back to what my good friend the gentleman from 
Missouri said about gun sales. That is just not relevant. I will say to 
the gentleman right now, I, too, oppose illegal gun sales across State 
lines, and I think it is very courageous that you do that, also. Now I 
am asking you and everybody in this House to join with me and support 
the banning of illegal alcoholic sales.
  Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2031, 
the 21st Amendment Enforcement Act.
  H.R. 2031's proponents contend that it will address the problem of 
illegal sales to minors over the Internet. I strongly support cracking 
down on underage drinking, but this bill does nothing to address this 
serious problem. Rather, H.R. 2031 is nothing more than an intra-
industry battle between liquor wholesalers and Internet liquor 
retailers. Under the guise of protecting minors from Internet alcohol 
sales, this bill's true intent is to tie up Internet liquor retailers 
in federal litigation.
  Supporters of this legislation have failed to provide evidence of any 
wide-spread problem with illegal, under-age Internet alcohol sales. In 
fact, in California, we have had telephone and mail-ordered wine 
deliveries since 1963 and our law enforcement agencies report they have 
not encountered problems with these deliveries. Moreover, legitimate 
concerns over underage Internet purchases of alcohol have been 
adequately addressed by the industry's practice of visibly labeling 
shipping packages as containing alcohol and requiring the signature of 
persons over the age of 21 for receipt. Finally, state and federal 
enforcement mechanisms already exist to address illegal alcohol sales. 
H.R. 2031 will add a duplicative and unnecessary layer to already 
existing law.
  I find it ironic that one of the chief proponents of this bill, the 
National Beer Wholesalers Association, actively opposed my efforts to 
include language in the Treasury-Postal Appropriations Bill to include 
underage drinking in the billion-dollar anti-drug media campaign 
administered by the Office of National Drug Control Policy. If the 
National Beer Wholesalers are so devoted to fighting underage drinking, 
you would think they would have joined forces with me. Instead, they 
fought tooth and nail against establishing an effective effort to 
combat illegal alcohol use by teenagers.
  Not only is this bill bad policy, it's also anti-business. As small 
vintners in California and across the nation seek innovative ways to 
promote their quality product, they are naturally looking at the 
marketing opportunities presented by the Internet. This bill would work 
directly against such marketing and trade opportunities.
  Direct access has been a long-standing problem for the 1,600 family-
owned wineries who compete with the 10 mega-wineries that produce 90% 
of the wine in the United States. Wholesalers cannot supply all of the 
unique wines available from smaller wineries to the majority of 
consumers and thus, these small wineries are excluded from the national 
market. The Internet is a vital sales tool for the small wineries to 
directly promote their wines to consumers.
  H.R. 2031's true design is simple: it would protect wholesalers of 
wine, beer and distilled spirits from Internet competition. I urge my 
colleagues to defeat this proposal and work instead to promote 
interstate trade. Let's support the 1,600 small wineries in California 
and across the United States who are using their good business sense to 
expand markets and create jobs in their communities.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute printed in the bill is considered

[[Page H6868]]

 as an original bill for the purpose of amendment and is considered 
read.
  The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is 
as follows:

                               H.R. 2031

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Twenty-First Amendment 
     Enforcement Act''.

     SEC. 2. SHIPMENT OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR INTO STATE IN 
                   VIOLATION OF STATE LAW.

       The Act entitled ``An Act divesting intoxicating liquors of 
     their interstate character in certain cases'', approved March 
     1, 1913 (commonly known as the ``Webb-Kenyon Act'') (27 
     U.S.C. 122) is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 2. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT.

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section--
       ``(1) the term `attorney general' means the attorney 
     general or other chief law enforcement officer of a State, or 
     the designee thereof;
       ``(2) the term `intoxicating liquor' means any spirituous, 
     vinous, malted, fermented, or other intoxicating liquor of 
     any kind;
       ``(3) the term `person' means any individual and any 
     partnership, corporation, company, firm, society, 
     association, joint stock company, trust, or other entity 
     capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in 
     property, but does not include a State or agency thereof; and
       ``(4) the term `State' means any State of the United 
     States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
     Rico, or any territory or possession of the United States.
       ``(b) Action by State Attorney General.--If the attorney 
     general has reasonable cause to believe that a person is 
     engaged in, or has engaged in, any act that would constitute 
     a violation of a State law regulating the importation or 
     transportation of any intoxicating liquor, the attorney 
     general may bring a civil action in accordance with this 
     section for injunctive relief (including a preliminary or 
     permanent injunction or other order) against the person, as 
     the attorney general determines to be necessary to--
       ``(1) restrain the person from engaging, or continuing to 
     engage, in the violation; and
       ``(2) enforce compliance with the State law.
       ``(c) Federal Jurisdiction.--
       ``(1) In general.--The district courts of the United States 
     shall have jurisdiction over any action brought under this 
     section by an attorney general against any person, except one 
     licensed or otherwise authorized to produce, sell, or store 
     intoxicating liquor in such State.
       ``(2) Venue.--An action under this section may be brought 
     only in accordance with section 1391 of title 28, United 
     States Code, or in the district in which the recipient of the 
     intoxicating liquor resides or is found.
       ``(d) Requirements for Injunctions and Orders.--
       ``(1) In general.--In any action brought under this 
     section, upon a proper showing by the attorney general of the 
     State, the court may issue a preliminary or permanent 
     injunction or other order to restrain a violation of this 
     section. A proper showing under this paragraph shall require 
     clear and convincing evidence that a violation of State law 
     as described in subsection (b) has taken place. In addition, 
     no temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction may 
     be granted except upon--
       ``(A) evidence demonstrating the probability of irreparable 
     injury if injunctive relief is not granted; and
       ``(B) evidence supporting the probability of success on the 
     merits.
       ``(2) Notice.--No preliminary injunction or permanent 
     injunction or other order may be issued under paragraph (1) 
     without notice to the adverse party and an opportunity for a 
     hearing.
       ``(3) Form and scope of order.--Any preliminary or 
     permanent injunction or other order entered in an action 
     brought under this section shall--
       ``(A) set forth the reasons for the issuance of the order;
       ``(B) be specific in its terms;
       ``(C) describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference 
     to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to 
     be restrained;
       ``(D) be binding upon--
       ``(i) the parties to the action and the officers, agents, 
     employees, and attorneys of those parties; and
       ``(ii) persons in active concert or participation with the 
     parties to the action who receive actual notice of the order 
     by personal service or otherwise.
       ``(e) Additional Remedies.--
       ``(1) In general.--A remedy under this section is in 
     addition to any other remedies provided by law.
       ``(2) State court proceedings.--Nothing in this section may 
     be construed to prohibit an authorized State official from 
     proceeding in State court on the basis of an alleged 
     violation of any State law.''.

     SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT.

       (a) Effective Date.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
     this Act and the amendment made by this Act shall take effect 
     on the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Application of Amendment.--The amendment made by this 
     Act shall apply only with respect to the importation or 
     transportation of any intoxicating liquor occurring after--
       (1) October 31, 1999, or the expiration of the 90-day 
     period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     whichever is earlier, if this Act is enacted before November 
     1, 1999; or
       (2) the date of the enactment of this Act if this Act is 
     enacted after October 31, 1999.

  The CHAIRMAN. The bill shall be considered under the 5-minute rule 
for a period not to exceed 2 hours.
  During consideration of the bill for amendment, the Chair may accord 
priority in recognition to a Member offering an amendment that he has 
printed in the designated place in the Congressional Record. Those 
amendments will be considered read.
  The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone a request for 
a recorded vote on any amendment and may reduce to a minimum of 5 
minutes the time for voting on any postponed question that immediately 
follows another vote, provided that the time for voting on the first 
question shall be a minimum of 15 minutes.


                   Amendment Offered by Mr. Goodlatte

  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Goodlatte:
       Page 6, line 9, strike the close quotation marks and the 
     period at the end.
       Page 6, after line 9, insert the following:

     ``SEC. 3. GENERAL PROVISIONS.

       ``(a) Effect on Internet Tax Freedom Act.--Nothing in this 
     Act may be construed to modify or supersede the operation of 
     the Internet Tax Freedom Act (47 U.S.C. 151 note).
       ``(b) Enforcement of Twenty-First Amendment.--It is the 
     purpose of this Act to assist the States in the enforcement 
     of section 2 of the twenty-first article of amendment to the 
     Constitution of the United States, and not to impose an 
     unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce in violation 
     of in article I, section 8, of the Constitution of the United 
     States. No State may enforce under this Act a law regulating 
     the importation or transportation of any intoxicating liquor 
     that unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate 
     commerce by out-of-State sellers by favoring local 
     industries, thus erecting barriers to competition and 
     constituting mere economic protectionism.
       ``(c) Support for Internet and Other Interstate Commerce.--
     Nothing in this Act may be construed--
       ``(1) to permit state regulation or taxation of Internet 
     services or any other related interstate telecommunications 
     services
       ``(2) to authorize any injunction against--
       ``(A) an interactive computer service (as defined in 
     section 230(f) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 
     230(f)); or
       ``(B) electronic communication service (a defined in 
     section 2510(15) of title 18 of the United States Code).

  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment along with the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from Michigan 
(Mr. Conyers) and with the support of the gentleman from Florida who 
has offered the underlying legislation.
  The amendment to H.R. 2031 clarifies that this bill is not meant to 
interfere with legitimate electronic commerce on the Internet. First, 
the amendment clarifies that the bill in no way supersedes the recently 
enacted Internet Tax Freedom Act which placed a 3-year moratorium on 
new multiple and discriminatory Internet taxes. I strongly supported 
passage of that act and do not wish to see it compromised.
  Second, our amendment clarifies that this bill in no way extends the 
powers of States to interfere with electronic commerce. It includes 
language that clarifies that the authority granted to States under this 
bill is limited to the enforcement of State laws regarding the 
transportation of alcohol within its borders, not to the legal 
advertisement or sale of alcohol on-line.
  Third, our amendment ensures that injunctive relief is available 
against the entity shipping alcohol in violation of applicable laws, 
not against communications companies used by these third parties' 
activities for advertising and other communication purposes.
  Mr. Chairman, it is important as we craft laws that apply to the 
Internet and other communications services that we avoid imposing 
liability on these service providers for the actions of third parties. 
The approach of this amendment is fully consistent with the approach we 
have adopted in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which has played a 
very beneficial role in the growth of the Internet over the last 3\1/2\ 
years.
  Mr. Chairman, aiming injunctive relief at the individual engaged in 
the commercial activity we are concerned about, not the communications 
company, is a common-sense solution. Unlike the seller or transporter 
engaged in an illegal transaction, the communications company has no 
idea what

[[Page H6869]]

States the transaction affects and is not in a position to tailor the 
transaction to comply with the different laws of 50 States. 
Furthermore, Internet service providers and other communications 
companies are in no position to monitor the conduct of their users or 
to prevent transactions. Indeed, enforcement approaches such as 
injunction to block Internet sites can seriously disrupt lawful 
Internet communications and slow the operations of a service provider's 
network for all users.
  Mr. Chairman, if we do not adopt this amendment, we risk needless 
legal uncertainty and pointless litigation against Internet service 
providers and other communications companies. The amendment has the 
support of groups such as America Online, the Commercial Internet 
Exchange, Prodigy, PSI Net, BellSouth and Bell Atlantic.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to adopt the tech-friendly, 
common-sense solution and pass this amendment.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.
  I want to applaud the gentleman from Virginia and the gentleman from 
California. I concur that this is an amendment that is needed and it 
addresses a problem. I support the amendment.
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank the author of the bill the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Scarborough) and the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
Goodlatte) who just offered this amendment for their excellent work in 
support not only of the main purpose of the law but also in another 
area, and, that is, Internet freedom, Internet freedom from regulation 
and Internet freedom from taxation so that that dynamic medium can 
continue to grow and prosper.
  The amendment's language makes it clear that search engines, Internet 
service providers, web hosting services and other interactive computer 
services will not be adversely affected by this bill. In addition, the 
bill makes it clear, as presently written with this amendment, that it 
is for the enforcement of the 21st amendment that we are granting State 
attorneys general the power to enter Federal court. This is not the 
beginning of a slippery slope in which new laws can be written to 
regulate and tax the Internet under the guise of regulating alcoholic 
beverage transactions. To the contrary, it is the 21st amendment which 
will control, and the Supreme Court has told us that the 21st amendment 
did not have the effect of repealing the interstate commerce clause. 
Rather, States are free to regulate within their boundaries the sale, 
distribution and production of alcoholic beverages and the importation 
of alcoholic beverages produced and sold elsewhere in order to promote 
temperance, in order to maintain their status as dry States or even 
counties to be dry counties, to promote those social purposes behind 
the 21st amendment. But in doing so, in vindicating the purposes of the 
21st amendment, a State cannot discriminate as mere economic 
protectionism against other sellers, other producers in the rest of the 
United States. I think that this language that is agreed upon all 
around makes it clear so that today what we are talking about is 
alcohol, we are talking about the 21st amendment. We are not talking 
about newfound powers of the parochial, of the municipality, the 
county, the State, to tax or regulate either instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, particularly the Internet and other 
telecommunications, and neither are we talking about new opportunities 
to tax and regulate the things that move across it. We are limiting 
ourselves, as properly we should, to those things that are covered by 
the 21st amendment and nothing else.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. COX. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would engage in a 
brief colloquy. It is, then, with the language that the gentleman is 
proposing here, if in fact hypothetically, if you have the recipient 
State which prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages to anyone under 
the age of 21 and you have a seller winery in another State and there 
is a transaction made over the Internet to sell the alcoholic beverage 
to somebody in the recipient State who is in fact under 21, the 
language that the gentleman is proposing here, which is really 
clarifying language, would not prohibit the attorney general of the 
recipient State from seeking injunctive relief if they can otherwise 
meet the burdens of the legislation, is that correct?
  Mr. COX. Yes. That is true if the underlying State legislation is 
itself consistent with the 21st amendment and the interstate commerce 
clause.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. In other words, if a State, as many States do, 
have a flat out prohibition on the sale of alcoholic beverages to a 
person under the age of 21, then the language that the gentleman is 
proposing here would not prohibit the recipient State from seeking 
injunctive relief from an out-of-State seller using the Internet to 
sell the alcohol to somebody under 21 in the recipient State?
  Mr. COX. Yes. The State law itself is authorized, to the extent it is 
authorized, by the 21st amendment to the Constitution. And because the 
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the 21st amendment to mean 
that it does not empower States to pass laws that favor local liquor 
industries by erecting barriers to competition and that State laws that 
constitute mere economic protectionism are not entitled to the same 
deference as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an 
unrestricted traffic in liquor. We are simply restating those 
constitutional principles in the statute.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. In other words, so long as there is the basis 
for the recipient State's prohibition on the sale of alcoholic 
beverages to somebody under 21.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) has 
expired.
  (On request of Mr. Barr of Georgia, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Cox 
was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I continue to yield to the gentleman from 
Georgia.

                              {time}  1300

  Mr. BARR of Georgia. In other words, just to clarify this point, I 
appreciate the indulgence of the gentleman from California. If in fact 
the law prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages to anyone under the 
age of 21 in the recipient State is based on a legitimate public 
interest and public safety, not on economic protectionism, then under 
the scenario that I indicated, the attorney general of the recipient 
State could, under this legislation as proposed to be amended by the 
gentleman from California, seek injunctive relief.
  Mr. COX. That is correct. What we are trying to do is restate in 
simple, easy to understand language the balance that the courts, I 
think, have properly struck between vindicating the purpose of the 21st 
amendment and at the same time making sure that we do not subtract in 
any way from the interstate commerce clause. They are both parts of the 
Constitution, both read together. I think that the current case law 
that we have cited and that we repeat in the statute expresses it as 
elegantly and simply as it can be expressed.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I do want to comment briefly on the amendment offered 
by the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox).
  I will support this amendment. It does clarify issues relative to 
Internet service providers and to the Net itself. However, I do want 
Members to know that, although this amendment should be supported and I 
intend to vote for it, it does not cure other problems that we find 
troubling in the underlying bill.
  The issues relate to the commerce clause and to the conflict between 
that clause and the 21st amendment. This conflict continues to be 
problematic. As we discussed at some length in the Committee on the 
Judiciary when the bill was considered, the 21st amendment did not 
repeal the commerce clause. So even though this amendment does 
accommodate the Internet--and I credit the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Cox) for bringing this forward and commend the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) 
for their considerable effort on Internet issues--the problem in the 
underlying bill persists. If this bill becomes

[[Page H6870]]

law, State AG's shall be able to burden impermissibly interstate 
commerce using the cover of the 21st amendment.
  Thus, even with this fine amendment, the underlying bill continues to 
be overbroad. We can't seem to agree to limit it to the one issue that 
we all agree is significant, namely that we should not permit or 
facilitate underage drinking. By contrast, this bill would allow a 
variety of arcane blue laws that have nothing whatsoever to do with 
underage drinking or any other legitimate concern of the Federal 
Government to be enforced by a State attorney general in a Federal 
court.
  I will wholeheartedly support this amendment, and I sincerely hope it 
is approved, but I intend, even if it is adopted, to oppose the 
underlying bill because of the other problems I've enumerated.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into a colloquy with the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) briefly just to clarify a few 
things.
  The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr) was asking the gentleman if a 
State would still be able to enforce their alcohol laws, and the 
gentleman said they could. If he can explain the purpose of this 
clarifying language regarding economic protectionism and a bill a State 
legislature passes for the mere purposes of economic protectionism.
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. COX. Yes, the language in section 1 is now written as section 
3(b) on Line 17 of the amendment, as reported, states that no State may 
enforce under this act a law regulating the importation or 
transportation of any intoxicating liquor and with some additional 
language interpolated that constitutes mere economic protectionism, and 
that is the existing Supreme Court test, and we wish simply to conform 
our statute with that Supreme Court test.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, let me ask the 
gentleman another question.
  We go to support for Internet and other interstate commerce, and it 
says nothing in this act may be construed to permit State regulation or 
taxation of Internet services or any other related interstate 
telecommunications, and it is important for us to differentiate here 
that we are talking about the actual Internet service itself or the 
telecommunication service and not the goods that are sold over the 
Internet.
  Mr. COX. Yes, I think that that is correct.
  In addition, when combined with the preceding section, we make it 
clear that the goods that we are talking about letting States regulate 
and tax are alcoholic beverages and those things covered by the 21st 
amendment, so that it is also true what we are not doing in this 
legislation today is opening up new vistas of taxation and regulation 
of products that move across the Internet. We are restricting ourselves 
only to the four corners of the power that States have under the 21st 
amendment.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. And the gentleman's actual language, the language 
that we have all agreed to, goes again to the Internet service and not 
the goods, and the goods here being alcohol.
  Mr. COX. Yes, and the reason we hope that this is a belt-and-
suspenders operation, that this is surplusage, but perhaps not because 
States and localities have been very aggressive about taxation and 
regulation of the Internet. We want to make sure that no State confuses 
its power to tax or regulate alcoholic beverages with a new one found 
in this statute or anywhere else to tax or regulate the Internet or the 
means of interstate communication or sale.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. And reclaiming my time, I just like to say I agree 
with the gentleman and the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) 100 
percent, and it is very important that we allow E-commerce to flourish 
without new regulations or tax burdens, and I believe this language 
does so while still allowing the State to enforce its alcohol laws as 
it was given the right in the 21st amendment some 60 or 65 years ago.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make it clear that it is 
my intention and I believe the intention of the gentleman from 
California, and he may want to speak for himself, that if there is an 
existing State law that taxes the sale of alcohol in that State and the 
sale happens to come into the State from out of State and the original 
purchase was made over the Internet, that that taxation still applies 
as it does with the Internet Tax Freedom Act. The Internet Tax Freedom 
Act does not overturn existing State laws on the sale of products from 
one State to another, just like it does not with a catalogue sale or 
any other type of sale. It simply imposes a moratorium on new taxes on 
Internet services.
  Is that a correct statement?
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. COX of California. It is certainly correct as far as the 
gentleman has taken it. I would add to that the following:
  Some State laws are unconstitutionally and impermissibly 
discriminatory, as for example the Hawaii tax that exempted pineapple 
wine. The Supreme Court properly said that that was an unconstitutional 
impermissible discrimination in favor of instate and against out-of-
state producers, and all of these laws not having been tested under the 
commerce clause, we cannot say that we are trying to grandfather them 
here against that.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Scarborough) has expired.
  (On request of Mr. Goodlatte, and by unanimous consent, Mr. 
Scarborough was allowed to proceed for an additional 2 minutes.)
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. What the gentleman is saying is that if there is a law 
existing out there or one that may be proposed in the future that is 
unconstitutional, we do not want this act, whether it could or could 
not, we do not want it to be read as encouraging anybody in that 
direction. We want to make sure that unconstitutional laws are 
discouraged because they are unconstitutional whether we pass this 
amendment or not.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. I think it is very important because during the course 
of the general debate, mention was made that this proposal could lead 
to new taxation, taxation on the Internet; and I think that the 
colloquy that has occurred here has clarified that. In fact, it was the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) who during the 105th session of 
Congress was the key sponsor that led to the enactment of the 
moratorium on taxation on the Internet; but that did not, that did not 
extinguish the right of States to tax on the Internet according to 
their preexisting taxation scheme.
  Am I correct, Mr. Chairman?
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. COX. Yes, the purpose of the Internet Tax Freedom Act was to 
prevent new taxes on the Internet and discriminatory taxes that prayed 
upon the Internet.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. And if the gentleman yield, nothing that this bill 
proposes in any way impacts that moratorium.
  Mr. COX. Again, Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman from Florida will 
yield?
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman. That is correct.


   Amendment Offered by Mr. Conyers to the Amendment Offered By Mr. 
                               Goodlatte

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer a perfecting amendment to the 
amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Conyers to the amendment offered 
     by Mr. Goodlatte:
       At the end of the matter proposed to be inserted, strike 
     the period and insert a semicolon and add the following text: 
     ``used by

[[Page H6871]]

     another person to engage in any activity that is subject to 
     this Act.''.

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my friends who have 
introduced this. I had an amendment quite similar to it, and I do not 
think it will be necessary to offer it now. But the perfecting 
amendment I am offering will clarify that Internet service providers 
and electronic communication services will be exempted only where they 
are used by another person to engage in activity covered by the act. 
Thus, for example, if Yahoo or another Internet provider goes into the 
business of selling or shipping liquor, they would not be exempted from 
liability.
  Now, Mr. Chairman, Internet commerce has opened new doors of 
opportunities for entrepreneurs around the country as well as provided 
consumers with a vast array of new choices of goods and services; and 
with the expansion of commerce over the Internet comes the added 
benefit of greater competition which will lead to lower prices for 
consumers.
  Of course, we do not want people to use Internet to violate the law, 
but we also do not want to create unnecessary and burdensome 
regulations that will hinder this emerging new marketplace, nor do we 
want to hinder the types of commercial transactions that permit direct 
contact between producers and consumers.
  The best marketplace is one that promotes robust competition, and 
therefore we want to encourage new entrants to the market and not erect 
barriers blocking them.
  As is currently written, the legislation could have negative 
repercussions for the emerging Internet marketplace. State alcohol laws 
often target liquor sold over the Internet, and therefore I urge that 
we proceed cautiously when we grant a Federal forum for these types of 
State actions to ensure the Internet service providers and other 
telecommunication services do not bear the brunt of the liability.

                              {time}  1315

  Another problem is that the bill gives and encourages the imposition 
of new Internet taxes by giving States another forum in which to 
collect those taxes from out-of-State defendants. This is a bipartisan 
and non-controversial improvement, and I hope that my perfecting 
amendment will be accepted, which remedies these problems.
  What we are doing here, I believe, is clarifying that this measure 
cannot be used as a tool to bring actions against Internet providers 
and other wired telecommunications services.
  It seems to me we can all agree that we do not want Internet carriers 
to be the targets of State attorney general actions to enforce our 
State alcohol laws. The amendment also clarifies that the legislation 
does not modify or supersede the Internet Tax Freedom Act, in which 
Congress placed a moratorium on new Internet taxes. We do not want to 
undermine Congress' prior legislation and permit selective carveouts to 
that important commitment.
  This amendment is supported by many groups and organizations, America 
Online, Bell Atlantic, Bell South, the Commercial Internet Exchange 
Association, Prodigy and PSInet. Whether or not one ultimately supports 
2031, this very important amendment deserves your vote. Although these 
changes do not address all of my concerns, this is an important 
improvement to the legislation, and I urge that the perfecting 
amendment be accepted and the amendment be supported.
  Among other things the Cox amendment makes it clear that neither this 
act nor Webb Kenyon are in anyway designed to supersede any other 
provision of the Constitution, such as the first amendment or the 
Commerce clause (including the so-called ``dormant'' Commerce clause). 
In this regard, the amendment reaffirms the Supreme Court's 1984 
decision in Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984), which held 
that a state law which imposed an excise tax on sales of liquor but 
exempted certain locally produced alcoholic beverages violated the 
Commerce clause. The Court concluded that this state legislative scheme 
was clearly discriminatory legislation and constituted ``economic 
protectionism.'' The Court noted that ``one thing is certain: The 
central purpose of the [Twenty-First Amendment] was not to empower 
States to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to 
competition.'' The Court held that the state's law was not designed to 
promote temperance but was ``mere economic protectionism.''
  The Court has adopted this line of reasoning in striking down 
numerous other state liquor laws. See e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers 
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (relying 
on Bacchus); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (relying on 
Brown-Forman). See also Capital Cities Cable versus Crisp (holding that 
a state statute which banned the transmission of out of state alcoholic 
beverage commercials by cable television stations in the state violated 
the Commerce Clause and was outside of the state's Twenty-First 
Amendment power); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Medcal 
Aluminum 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (holding that a state wine pricing system 
violated Sherman Antitrust Act and noting that the ``Federal Government 
retains some Commerce clause authority over liquor); Hostetter v. 
Idlewild Bon Voyage, 377 U.S. 324, (1968) (holding that the Commerce 
clause prohibited the State of New York from interfering with the sale 
of alcohol to departing international airline travelers at a New York 
airport and that the argument that the Twenty-First amendment trumps 
the Commerce clause where states regulate alcohol is ``patently 
bizarre,'' ``an absurd oversimplification,'' and ``demonstrably 
incorrect'').

                                                   August 2, 1999.
     Re amendment to H.R. 2031.

     Hon. John Conyers,
     Ranking member, House Judiciary Committee, Rayburn House 
         Office, Washington, DC.

     Hon. Bob Goodlatte,
     Rayburn House Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Representative Conyers and Representative Goodlatte: 
     We write to express our strong support for the amendment you 
     intend to offer tomorrow to H.R. 2031 to clarify that 
     injunctive relief under the bill is available against certain 
     shippers of alcohol, and not against providers of 
     communications services.
       This important clarification will avoid confusion and 
     needless litigation against internet service providers and 
     other providers of communications services who are not 
     engaged in the sort of shipments that are the subject of the 
     bill.
       Thank you very much for your leadership on this issue.
           Sincerely,
     AOL.
     Bell Atlantic.
     BellSouth.
     Commercial Internet eXchange Association.
     (``CIX'')
     Prodigy.
     PSINet.

  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I support the perfecting amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), and I commend him for offering 
this amendment. The underlying amendment that I have offered makes it 
clear that Internet service providers, those who provide interactive 
computer service or an electronic communications service, would not be 
subject to the injunction provided for in the underlying bill if all 
they did was provide the ability to communicate with people and were 
not involved in transactions themselves.
  The gentleman from Michigan's amendment makes it clear that if that 
company, that Internet service provider, is, in fact, themselves 
selling the alcoholic beverage, then they would be subject to the 
injunction, because it adds the language used by another person to 
engage in any activity that is subject to this act to create an 
exception to the exception already created for them to the injunction.
  The gentleman's language is well taken, I support it, and I urge my 
colleagues to support it.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) to the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte).
  The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I do not see the gentleman from California on the 
floor. Perhaps the gentleman from Virginia would engage in a colloquy.
  I think, getting to the intent, the Congressional intent of the 
proposed amendment, as amended, needs further clarification. If I could 
engage the gentleman from Virginia in a brief colloquy and elicit from 
him if he thinks it is accurate, just a simple yes or no.
  If, in fact, under the legislation as proposed and as amended, as 
proposed to be amended by the gentleman from California, if State A has 
a law on the books that prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages to 
anyone under 21, and the attorney general of that State seeks to go 
into Federal court under

[[Page H6872]]

this law simply based on that law to seek an injunction to enjoin a 
seller of an alcoholic beverage from State B from shipping that 
alcoholic beverage into State A and it being directed to or received by 
somebody under 21 in violation of State law, this proposal would still 
allow the attorney general of State A to seek injunctive relief. Is 
that correct?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, the one word answer is yes, and that is 
certainly my intention in offering this amendment to make sure that the 
underlying purpose of the bill is preserved, but make sure that, A, 
there are no efforts here to create new taxes or new regulations of 
Internet activities, and, B, that there is no unconstitutionally, and I 
think that is an important word we use here, unconstitutionally 
discriminatory action taken by a State that would disfavor out-of-State 
purveyors of these products.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, this is the 
problem, and maybe the gentleman from Florida could listen also, this 
is the problem that I have with this language. It has taken us 
approximately half an hour to debate this, trying to get just a simple 
yes or no.
  If State A has a law on the books that says no sales of alcoholic 
beverages to somebody under 21, with this language, does this modify or 
in some way limit the ability that the attorney general would have in 
the bill as proposed to stop an Internet sale of alcoholic beverage 
coming in from another State to that person?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, it 
would not stop the attorney general of a State that wishes to seek an 
injunction against a company violating that State's laws, prohibiting 
either the sale of alcohol in the State or the sale of alcohol to 
minors in that State from continuing to seek that injunction. I 
strongly support the gentleman and the gentleman from Florida's efforts 
to allow the States to go into Federal court to achieve that 
injunction.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, is it the 
purpose of this amendment to limit the scope of the Webb-Kenyon Act?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, it is not the purpose of this amendment 
to limit the scope of the Webb-Kenyon Act.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Does this amendment create any new right of 
action to challenge State laws regulating alcohol?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. In my opinion, it does not, and it is not my intention 
in offering this amendment to in any way affect the rights of the 
States to regulate the sale of alcohol in their State as provided by 
the Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Would this language, as proposed, permit a 
defendant in the recipient State or in the shipping State to delay 
enforcement of a valid State alcohol law by claiming that the law 
creates a barrier to competition, that this language creates a barrier 
to competition?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. That may be an issue in seeking an injunction, but 
certainly is not the intention of this amendment, to allow anybody to 
delay State enforcement of State laws controlling the sale of alcohol 
in their State borders.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Finally, are there any State laws today that 
would be subject to a challenge under this proposed language?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Would the gentleman repeat the question?
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Are there any State laws today that would be 
subject to a challenge under this proposed language by the gentleman 
from California?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. I am not aware of any laws that would be subject to 
them. However, I would say to the gentleman, the way I read section 
3(b) of the amendment, that if they would be subject to challenge, they 
would have already been subject to challenge as being unconstitutional 
to begin with. I think that portion of this amendment reinforces the 
gentleman from California's concern that we do not have any 
unconstitutionally discriminatory treatment, but, if it exists, I think 
it would have been treatable under existing law and certainly would 
also be treatable under this law.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. The gentleman from Virginia, who has researched 
issue extensively, is not aware of any State laws that would be subject 
to challenge under the proposed language today?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. None that I know of.
  Mr. NETHERCUTT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  Mr. Chairman, let me ask the gentleman from Virginia further 
clarification. I heard the gentleman say in the colloquy with the 
gentleman from Georgia that under the example that the gentleman from 
Georgia gave, that the attorney general of a State where there was an 
alleged violation relating to a sale to a person under 21, I thought I 
heard the gentleman say that if there was a violation, that the State 
attorney general would thereafter be enabled under this amendment to 
prohibit any further Internet sales into that State, even though it was 
to someone over the age of 21. Did I misunderstand the gentleman?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. NETHERCUTT. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. The gentleman misheard. The question from the 
gentleman from Georgia was whether or not anything in my amendment 
would undermine the purpose of the underlying bill, which is to allow 
the attorney general to go into Federal Court and to seek an injunction 
restraining the sale of alcohol to minors. Then later, or maybe in an 
earlier conversation, in reference to a dry State, whether they could 
seek an injunction from violating the laws of the State for shipping 
any alcohol into the State.
  If you have a dry State that prohibits the sale of alcohol, now or in 
the future, this amendment would not affect that one way or another. 
That is the assurance the gentleman from Georgia wanted, that the 
underlying bill would still have the effect the gentleman intends, 
which is that the attorney general of that State could go into Federal 
court and seek an injunction, but he would not be able to seek an 
injunction for the sale of alcohol to an adult unless that sale itself 
violated that State law in some way, shape, or form. This amendment 
does not in any way change that.
  Mr. NETHERCUTT. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I appreciate the 
clarification.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to rise in support of the Goodlatte amendment, 
which I believe improves significantly on H.R. 2031. The proponents 
have argued that this bill does not inappropriately interfere with 
Internet commerce. It is true they worked very hard to avoid any 
reference to the Internet on this legislation, but the reality is quite 
different.
  A great many of the wine sales we are discussing occur over the 
Internet sites of small wineries. The entrepreneurial owners of these 
wineries have learned, like many other small businessmen and women, 
that the Internet levels the playing field and makes it possible for 
small proprietors to reach customers. These companies cannot afford 
sales departments or national advertising. They are forced by their 
size to rely on Internet sales. That is what I want to be sure that 
this legislation does not prohibit.
  This amendment ensures that Internet sales by wineries are not 
treated any differently than any other product. The Internet Tax 
Freedom Act blocked the imposition of new Internet taxes, and this 
amendment ensures compliance with that act.
  Proponents of this legislation have called small wineries and brewers 
bootleggers and smugglers, suggesting somehow their intent in selling 
wine is criminal. To the contrary, these small businesses play by the 
rules and only want an opportunity to sell their superior product in 
the interstate marketplace. There is no pressing problem of minors 
buying cases of ultra-premium wines, and the authors of the legislation 
have shown no evidence to the contrary, notwithstanding the few news 
clips that they have discussed.
  I have talked with wineries in Washington State about the supposed 
problem of minors purchasing alcohol. They have told me that in fact 
they know virtually all of their customers. Their buyers have in 
virtually all cases

[[Page H6873]]

bought wine in person from the winery in the first place. These are 
repeat customers who have taken the time to travel all the way to rural 
wineries in eastern Washington. Once they get home, these customers 
enjoy the superior product that Washington State provides and that 
these wineries provide, and they want to order again. Many of these 
customers are from other States and would be unable to purchase wines 
with this legislation.
  Small businesses are the actual target of this legislation. These 
small wineries will never be able to ship their product through normal 
distributor channels. They simply do not produce enough to be worth the 
large distributors' time. These producers bottle 2,000 cases a year, an 
insignificant amount to a distributor, but a very significant quantity 
when the survival of these small businesses is on the line.
  We are adding a winery in our State of Washington every 18 days. It 
is a growth industry that creates new jobs in rural areas. These are 
small wineries, specialty wineries. Any Member representing 
constituencies that rely on Internet telemarketing or catalog sales 
should be concerned about where this legislation is taking us.
  From the perspective of the States, this bill is all about taxation. 
Any company or industry that is perceived to be circumventing State 
laws, State taxes through mail sales, could run afoul of such efforts 
in the future. This is why the National Conference on Legislators has 
opposed this bill, because of a belief that the problem should be 
resolved at the State level. I am still concerned about this bill, and 
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

                              {time}  1330

  Mr. DOOLEY of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the 
requisite number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this particular amendment, but I 
remain opposed to the underlying bill. I oppose the legislation because 
it is clearly anti-small business, and it is also anti-consumer.
  We are moving into a new economy, an economy that is giving 
opportunities for small business people to participate by offering 
their products over the Internet. One of the greatest innovations and 
greatest opportunities that we are seeing in E commerce is the fact 
that we are almost eliminating all barriers to entry. We are allowing 
almost any company to set up and develop a web page, and they can 
immediately be in a worldwide business.
  What we are doing with this legislation is to preclude a lot of small 
business people that are involved in the wine industry, that do not 
have the volumes to work with the archaic structure that is currently 
in place in many parts of the country to distribute their product, from 
having the opportunity to have the access to consumers that they need. 
This is clearly not a direction that we should be going, and is clearly 
a direction that is inconsistent with the changes in the United States' 
economy and the changes in the international economy.
  This legislation is a heavy-handed approach that would chill the 
rights of adults to purchase wine over the Internet, unfairly 
discourage small wineries from marketing their products nationwide 
through E commerce, and create a new Federal remedy for a problem that 
is already addressed by State and Federal statutes.
  Supporters of this legislation contend that the bill is being done at 
the behest of States' rights, but nothing could be further from the 
truth. As we saw just in the last week, the National Conference of 
State Legislatures overwhelmingly passed a resolution opposing this 
legislation.
  The arguments that this is somehow going to result in more alcohol 
being in the hands of minors is also equally without foundation and 
substantiation. Nothing could be further from the truth.
  I ask my colleagues to oppose this legislation. We ought to be 
passing policies which encourage and provide greater opportunity for 
more families to enter into business, for more families to live out a 
dream. What we are doing here, in so many ways, is impeding that 
opportunity.
  Also speaking as a wine consumer, I almost think it is un-American 
because I might live in a particular part of the country, in a 
particular State, that I am precluded from purchasing a bottle of wine 
over the Internet. That is not what our Founding Fathers had in mind 
when they passed the interstate commerce clauses. They had in mind that 
we would allow for free competition that would benefit consumers and 
benefit our businesses.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose this legislation.
  Mr. KOLBE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, although I rise in support of the pending amendment, 
which I think certainly improves the bill, I do want to express my 
concerns about the legislation as a whole, H.R. 2031.
  This is legislation that directly impacts interstate commerce, and it 
drastically tips the scales of commerce in favor of large wholesale 
distributors at the expense of consumers and small local vineyards, 
which rely heavily on direct sales for their business. This legislation 
gives attorneys general the power to sue out-of-State wine and beer 
distributors in Federal court for violations of State liquor laws.
  As a recent editorial in the Wall Street Journal makes clear, giving 
State attorneys general the power to sue out-of-State vineyards in 
Federal court can lead to nothing but political mischief. What better 
way for a politically ambitious attorney general to build political 
support at home than to sue out-of-State shippers on behalf of local 
wholesalers to help keep the competition out?
  The 21st amendment was designed to give States the power to regulate 
alcohol sales within their States, and to ban it altogether, if they 
choose. It was not designed to give States the power to keep the wine 
sales of some distributors out while allowing others in. Such a result 
flies directly in the face of the interstate commerce clause by 
establishing special interest protections for local distributors.
  Any resident who seeks to buy a rare or obscure vintage of wine not 
offered by his local distributor with this legislation is simply out of 
luck. The legislation is anticompetitive, it is anti-consumer. 
Unfortunately, it sounds good.
  This legislation would do great mischief. It injects the strong arm 
of the Federal courts into an area of commerce that is best left to the 
States. It imposes unnecessary Federal interference in the enforcement 
of State laws, and gives the State Attorney General a new weapon, the 
Federal court, to favor local over interstate commerce.
  The result will not balance the scales of justice. It will, instead, 
tip those scales against consumers who have found in the Internet a 
cornucopia of goods and services heretofore unknown to them.
  I urge us to defeat this legislation.


 Amendment Offered by Mr. Barr of Georgia to the Amendment Offered by 
                       Mr. Goodlatte, as Amended

  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the 
amendment, as amended.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Barr of Georgia to the amendment 
     offered by Mr. Goodlatte, as amended:
       On page 1 of the amendment offered by Mr. Goodlatte, at 
     line 16, strike the words ``thus'' and continuing to the end 
     of line 17, and inserting the following: ``erecting barriers 
     to competition, and constituting mere economic 
     protectionism.''

  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, this simply cleans up the 
language.
  It struck a number of us, in trying to analyze the final language on 
this page of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
Goodlatte) that the words ``thus erecting barriers to competition'' was 
unusual language to use in a statutory provision. Therefore, what we do 
is simply keep the same intent, but clarify it so it reads, ``erecting 
barriers to competition and constituting mere economic protectionism.''
  We are just taking out and changing the grammar so that it is 
consistent with the earlier language in the particular provision.
  Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) 
if he has any problem with the clarifying language.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. This

[[Page H6874]]

language is perfectly fine with us. We have no objection to the 
amendment, and urge its adoption.
  Mr. DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to urge my 
colleagues to support the Goodlatte/Conyers/Davis amendment to the 
Twenty-First Amendment Enforcement Act because it is essential to 
ensuring that this legislation does not restrict the growth of Internet 
commerce. This amendment clarifies first that the Act does not modify 
or supersede the Internet Tax Freedom Act that we worked hard to enact 
last year under the leadership of my colleague Representative Cox. 
Equally important is the clarification that an injunctive relief action 
may not be sought against an Internet Service Provider. Indeed, 
enforcement approaches such as injunctions to block Internet sites can 
seriously disrupt lawful Internet communications, and slow the 
operations of a service provider's network for all other uses.
  In sponsoring this clarifying amendment today with my colleagues, I 
want to alleviate the concern I had that in its current form, H.R. 2031 
could be misinterpreted as authorizing injunctions by the states 
against communications companies who are not involved in the shipping 
or importing of liquor, but are simply used by third parties for 
communications purposes. I want to ensure that in enacting this 
legislation, we do not implement a burdensome Federal enforcement 
action that would hamper the growth of the Internet. Not just when it 
comes to the sale of alcohol over the Internet, but we must consider 
the message we send to business--from the small entrepreneurs to large 
industry--when they make commercial decisions about how they use the 
Internet to do business.
  While the Twenty-First Amendment Enforcement Act does not 
specifically mention the Internet, there is no doubt that it is the 
inmate nature of the Internet that has spurred the call for this 
legislation. It is my firm belief that Federal policy must use market-
driven principles as the underpinning of any enacted legislation 
affecting the Internet. Despite the Federal Government's initiation and 
financing of the Internet, its expansion and diversity has been driven 
mainly by the private sector. Each piece of legislation that will 
change people's commercial behavior must be thoroughly examined and the 
consequences understood, lest we unleash a federal mandate or 
restriction that will harm the Internet's success and growth as the 
primary tool for communication between people and business.
  The Federal Government can be the leader in developing incentives to 
move the Internet forward as the primary tool of businesses, educators, 
scholars, students, and the ordinary citizen. We must ensure the no 
Government can hinder that development. I ask my colleagues to support 
the Goodlatte/Conyers/Davis/Boucher/McCollum/Dunn amendment and 
guarantee the continued growth of the Internet as a tool of business.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, today, I rise in support of the Twenty-
First Amendment Enforcement Act, which will provide individual states 
the ability to enforce statutes regulating the distribution and sale of 
alcoholic beverages within their border, a right guaranteed by the 
Twenty-First Amendment.
  Most states, including my home state of Georgia, employ a three-
tiered system of alcohol distribution to control the distribution and 
sale of alcoholic beverages within their borders. Under this system 
alcohol producers go through state-licensed wholesalers, who must go 
through retailers, who alone may sell to consumers. Furthermore, 
Georgia is one of nineteen ``express prohibition'' states that 
expressly outlaw direct shipments of alcohol from out-of-state. 
Georgia's system has proven quite effective in combating illegal 
alcohol sales to minors.
  While Georgia's alcohol statutes have proven successful throughout 
the years, the recent development of electronic commerce via the 
Internet has presented new challenges to preventing illegal shipments 
of alcohol into our state. Confronted with this new challenge, as well 
as the difficulty of enforcing its laws in court, Georgia in 1997 
enacted statutes making the illegal shipment of alcoholic beverages 
within its borders a felony. This action was necessary to ensure the 
state would have jurisdiction over violators of its state liquor 
transportation laws.
  I believe if states are unable to effectively enforce their laws 
against illegal interstate shipment of alcoholic beverages, they may 
also lose some ability to police sales to underage purchasers. Illegal 
direct shipments also deprive the state of the excise and sales tax 
revenue that would otherwise be generated by a regulated state, placing 
regulated businesses at a distinct commercial disadvantage. Finally, if 
direct shippers violate state law, they exclude themselves from other 
state obligations such as submitting to quality control inspections, 
licensing requirements, and complying with other restrictions placed 
upon sellers of alcohol.
  As an advocate of smaller government and state's rights, I favor a 
resolution to this problem that does not mandate changes to any 
existing state laws or alter existing case law interpreting the 
Commerce clause of the Constitution. I believe the Twenty-First 
Amendment Enforcement Act is the common-sense solution to this problem 
as it allows Georgia the authority to seek enforcement, through a 
federal district court injunction, of its state laws regulating the 
importation or transportation of intoxicating liquors without 
infringing on states' rights or creating Constitutional confusion.
  For these reasons, I support the passage of H.R. 2031, the Twenty-
First Amendment Enforcement Act, and urge its adoption.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr) to the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte), as amended.
  The amendment to the amendment, as amended, was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte), as amended.
  The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the bill?


                    Amendment Offered by Ms. Lofgren

  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Ms. Lofgren:
       Page 21, after line 17, insert the following (and make such 
     technical and conforming changes as may be appropriate):
       ``(2) the term `firearm' shall have the meaning given such 
     term in section 921(a) of title 18 of the United States Code;
       Page 3, line 128, insert ``or firearm'' after ``liquor''.

  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. A point of order is reserved by the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Scarborough) to the amendment offered by the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Lofgren).
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment on behalf of 
myself, as well as the gentlewomen from New York, Mrs. McCarthy and 
Mrs. Lowey.
  As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, in a discussion on the Cox 
amendment, I do have concerns about the underlying amendment and its 
ability to constrain interstate commerce unreasonably. However, if this 
House is insistent upon pursuing the remedies outlined in the 
Scarborough bill, I would suggest that we ought to provide those tools 
equally to the chief law enforcement officers of our States in the 
enforcement of gun laws.
  As many of my colleagues know, the State of California has recently 
passed, by wide margins in the assembly and the State Senate, and these 
measures have been signed into law by the Governor, a whole series of 
gun safety measures that I believe put California on the cutting edge 
of gun safety measures among the 50 States.
  It seems to me that, if we are going to give the Attorneys General of 
the 50 States the ability to go into Federal court to protect their 
citizens from $20 bottles of cabernet, we ought to be at least as 
willing to give the attorney general of the State of California the 
ability to go into Federal court to protect his citizens against the 
Tech-DC9, the AK-47, and other weapons of mass destruction.
  Mr. Chairman, as we know, we failed to come together across the aisle 
on a bipartisan basis to adopt gun safety measures earlier in this 
Congress, but we have an opportunity here to at least allow those 
States that have been more progressive and more receptive to the people 
of the country than has the United States Congress to have an 
additional tool to protect the citizens of the States who have forward-
thinking State legislatures and forward-thinking Governors.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LOFGREN. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lofgren), who finds it, as do many of us, ironic that 
this House apparently does not demonstrate the same concern for the 
dangers of interstate shipment of firearms as they claim to have about 
the interstate shipment of alcohol.
  If we opened the Federal courts to State alcohol suits, we should at 
least do the same for firearms. I thank the gentlewoman for making the 
connection in this debate.
  Ms. LOFGREN. I thank the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), the 
ranking member.

[[Page H6875]]

  I would note, as to the issue of germaneness, noting that the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Scarborough) has reserved a point of order, 
that it is my contention that the amendment is germane.
  As we know, the underlying bill deals with issues that are governed 
by the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau, as is the issue of guns. 
It seems to me, if we are going to give a tool to States to use the 
Federal courts for an item that is regulated by ATF, to wit, bottles of 
cabernet, that we ought to provide that same remedy and tool to States 
to deal with another item which is within the jurisdiction of ATF, to 
wit, firearms, as defined in title 18 of the U.S. Code.
  I would hope that we might move apace to adopt this resolution. I 
have two teenage children. They will be starting high school again this 
fall. They will be starting school, before this House finishes our 
annual recess. I would like to be able to tell them and to tell their 
classmates that the House of Representatives has done something, 
anything rational, to preserve and to enhance gun safety in America. I 
think we owe that to the mothers and fathers across the United States.
  Although we have not been able previously to come together, although 
we have not been able to support the gun safety measures that have 
passed the United States Senate, although we have not been able to 
deliver that level of safety to the American people, we could act today 
and at least do this much.
  So I am hopeful that we can approve this amendment. It is so 
important to me that I believe I would vote for the underlying bill, 
despite the reservations I have, in order to get this important new 
enforcement tool for State Attorneys General.


                             Point of Order

  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I ask to speak on the point of order, 
the fundamental purpose of the bill is to provide the attorney general 
of any State with the authority to bring a civil action to the United 
States district court to enjoin any person or entity that the attorney 
general has reasonable cause to believe is engaged in any act that 
would constitute a violation of State law regulating the importation or 
transportation of any intoxicating liquor.
  The fundamental purpose of the amendment is to expand the single 
class of merchandise covered by this bill, to wit, intoxicating liquor, 
by adding another class of merchandise, to wit, firearms, to the one 
class covered by this bill.
  A distinction also exists that the distinguished ranking member of 
the Committee on the Judiciary did not touch on when he said we ought 
to be able to blur alcohol and firearms together in this sort of stew. 
The main difference is that none of us here support the illegal 
transportation of firearms across State lines.

                              {time}  1345

  What this amendment does is this amendment tries to bring in the gun 
amendments. We all agree illegal transportation of firearms across 
State lines should not be permissible. Unfortunately, illegal alcohol 
sales being transported across State lines is still being defended by 
many people here today.
  According to House Practice Germaneness section 9: ``One individual 
proposition is not germane to another individual proposition.'' This is 
clearly one individual proposition being added to another. Accordingly, 
Mr. Chairman, the amendment is not germane, and I insist on my point of 
order.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren) 
desire to be heard on the point of order?
  Ms. LOFGREN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. Chairman, I believe that the amendment is germane. I would ask, 
clearly even if there is a question as to germaneness, it does not need 
to be raised if all Members agree that the underlying measure should be 
supported by us all. I was glad to hear the comments of the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Scarborough) that none of us support the illegal 
transport of firearms across State laws. The question is whose laws? In 
California, it is now, because of what the State legislature has done, 
it is illegal. TEC-9s are covered. TEC DC-9s are covered.
  That is not the case under Federal law. So this would allow those 
States' Attorneys General, the State of California, to go to Federal 
court to enforce California State laws vis-a-vis firearms.
  I hope that we might be able to come together, the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Scarborough) and I, to allow this amendment to be offered 
and adopted; and that if he would withdraw his point of order, we need 
not discuss the germaneness issue any further.
  I would hope that he would do that since, if I understood him 
correctly, he agrees or says he agrees with the intention of the 
amendment. Therefore, I would hope, and I do not know if he wishes to 
respond, but I would hope that he might withdraw his objection on this 
point.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr) desire to be 
heard on the point of order?
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. I do, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am not quite 
sure whether the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren) correctly 
characterized the earlier remarks of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Scarborough) who has sponsored the underlying bill here and who has 
risen and asserted and insisted on a point of order against the 
amendment of the gentlewoman from California.
  I think the gentleman from Florida has made very clear that he is 
opposed to this amendment. I think the point that the gentleman was 
making earlier is a very accurate one; and that is that Federal law 
already provides that, when one ships a firearm in interstate commerce, 
it has to be shipped consistent with State laws, and it has to be 
shipped, for example, to a licensed firearms dealer if it is shipped 
through the mails.
  There already, in other words, are very sever limitations on the 
interstate shipment of firearms. And to open that Pandora's box or that 
can of worms now to insert into a piece of legislation that is very 
specific, very clear, very limited, very reasonable, a whole new issue 
on which there have not been hearings, I mean, the opponents of the 
bill of the gentleman from Florida earlier were bemoaning the fact, 
erroneously as it turns out, bemoaning the fact that there had not been 
hearings and debate and information solicited on his proposed piece of 
legislation. In fact, as the gentleman from Florida correctly stated, 
there have been hearings. There has been information. There has been 
evidence to support his legislation.
  What the gentlewoman from California is now proposing to do is to 
raise another whole issue which has not been debated certainly in the 
context of the intent of this legislation.
  I believe the gentleman from Florida is very correct when he points 
respectfully to the Chair on section 9 of House Practice on 
Germaneness. The proposed amendment from the gentlewoman from 
California has nothing whatsoever to do with the intent or the effect 
of the underlying bill proposed by the gentleman from Florida.
  I rise in support of the reservation on this and I join the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Scarborough) in insisting on his point of order. I 
respectfully urge the Chair to strike the amendment as not germane and 
out of order.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is prepared to rule on the point of order.
  The bill permits a State Attorney General to bring a civil action in 
Federal court against a person who has violated a State law regulating 
the importation and transportation of intoxicating liquor.
  The amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California attempts to 
create an additional Federal cause of action against a person who 
violates a State law regulating firearms.
  As stated in section 798a of the House Rules and Manual, an amendment 
must address the same subject as the bill under consideration.
  This amendment addresses a separate subject matter (regulating 
traffic in firearms) than that addressed by the bill (regulating 
traffic in intoxicating liquors).
  Accordingly, the amendment is not germane and the point of order is 
sustained.


                    Amendment Offered By Ms. Lofgren

  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Ms. Lofgren:
       On page 6 at the end, insert the following:

[[Page H6876]]

       (c) Application of Amendment with regard to Certain 
     Violations of Law. This Act and the amendment made by this 
     act shall take immediate effect with regard to any violation 
     of a state law regulating the importation or transportation 
     of any intoxicating liquor which results from any violation 
     of a state's firearms laws.

  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida reserves a point of order on 
the amendment.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the amendment offered by 
myself and by the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. McCarthy) and the 
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Lowey) adequately addresses the 
germaneness issue that was the subject of the point of order on the 
prior amendment we offered.
  There are a series of cases that relate to the interplay between 
alcohol laws of the States and firearms. I would note for the Record 
and will include for the Record two cases: first, the case of Davis 
versus State of Alabama Alcohol Beverage Control Board wherein the 
court found that the ABC Board in Alabama was able to refuse the 
renewal of liquor licenses for good cause including the discharge of 
firearms in the parking lot of the facility in question.
  Second, a case from Illinois, Sip and Save Liquors versus Richard M. 
Daley, Mayor, cited at 657 N.E.2d. 1, provides that the Commission may 
take notice of gun law violations of the State in the proceedings 
instituted pursuant to the Illinois liquor laws.
  This amendment would allow State AGs to utilize the Federal courts to 
enforce the State gun laws relative to liquor law violations. Let me 
give an example where this might be pertinent. For example, as I 
mentioned earlier, in California, TEC-DC9s are no longer a legal 
weapon.
  It would be possible for a State AG, Mr. Lockyer, to go into Federal 
Court and to seek removal of the liquor license or the license of a 
winery when the violation of the winery owner related to the violation 
of the State weapons laws. This may be a niche, and it is a niche I 
propose only because of the germaneness issue, given the prior ruling 
of the Chair, and given the unwillingness of those who raised the 
germaneness issue to waive or withdraw it.
  But, once again, as I argued earlier, if we are able to do something, 
anything to enhance the Nation's gun safety laws, we should do it. As I 
mentioned before, school will commence all across America before our 
recess has ended. This is one of the last opportunities the House of 
Representatives will have before our recess to do something, to do 
something reasonable, to do something responsible to enhance gun safety 
laws.
  I would hope that we could come together across the aisle on a 
bipartisan basis to do even this modest thing to help guarantee the 
safety of the children of this country and the children of the high 
schools in California, even if it is only some modicum of increased 
safety when they return to school in September.

               (Cite as: 657 N.E.2d 1, 212 Ill.Dec. 306)

SIP & SAVE LIQUORS, INC., an Illinois corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. Richard M. DALEY, mayor and local liquor control commissioner of the 
  city of Chicago, and William D. O'Donaghue, chairman of the License 
                Appeal Commission, Defendants-Appellees

                             No. 1-93-0760

 Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division, Sept. 6, 
                  1995, Rehearing Denied Nov. 9, 1995

       Liquor retailer sought review of revocation of retailer's 
     license by mayor and city liquor control commissioner. The 
     Circuit Court, Cook County, Edward C. Hofert, J., denied 
     relief, and retailer appealed. The Appellate Court, Cerda, 
     J., held that: (1) municipal code section placing time limit 
     on issuance of revocation applied to liquor licenses; (2) 
     state's five-day time limit, not code's 60-day limit, was 
     applicable to revocation of liquor license; (3) failure to 
     issue revocation within five days did not deprive commission 
     of jurisdiction; (4) retailer was not deprived of due 
     process; and (5) revocation was warranted.
       Affirmed.
     [1] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--106(1)--223k106(1)
       City code section allowing mayor to suspend or revoke any 
     license issued under code and state reasons for any 
     revocation or suspension within 60 days was applicable to 
     liquor licenses. Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code Sec. Sec. 4-4-
     280, 4-60-070.
     [1] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--108.1--223k108.1
       City code section allowing mayor to suspend or revoke any 
     license issued under code and state reasons for any 
     revocation or suspension within 60 days was applicable to 
     liquor licenses. Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code Sec. Sec. 4-4-
     280, 4-60-070.
     [2] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--10(2)--223k10(2)
       Liquor control is subject to concurrent jurisdiction of 
     state and local government; home-rule municipalities may 
     legislate in area of liquor control, except as restricted by 
     state, pursuant to home-rule provisions of state 
     constitution. S.H.A. Const. Art. 7, Sec. 6.
     [2] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--11--223k11
       Liquor control is subject to concurrent jurisdiction of 
     state and local government; home-rule municipalities may 
     legislate in area of liquor control, except as restricted by 
     state, pursuant to home-rule provisions of state 
     constitution. S.H.A. Const. Art. 7, Sec. 6.
     [3] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--11--223k11
       State statute requiring that revocation of liquor license 
     be issued within five days of hearing prevailed over 
     municipal code section imposing 60-day time limitation for 
     issuing revocation, as code expanded state's time limit and 
     was thus inconsistent with state law. S.H.A. 235 ILCS 5/7-5; 
     Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code Sec. 4-4-280.
     [3] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--15--223k15
       State statute requiring that revocation of liquor license 
     be issued within five days of hearing prevailed over 
     municipal code section imposing 60-day time limitation for 
     issuing revocation, as code expanded state's time limit and 
     was thus inconsistent with state law. S.H.A. 235 ILCS 5/7-5; 
     Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code Sec. 4-4-280.
     [4] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE--489.1--15Ak489.1
       City liquor control commission's failure to issue reasons 
     for revocation within five-day period prescribed by state law 
     did not deprive commission of jurisdiction to revoke license, 
     as statute setting forth five-day period was directory, not 
     mandatory, Liquor Act was to be liberally construed, licensee 
     was not injured by late decision, and Liquor Act did not 
     provide that jurisdiction was lost. S.H.A. 235 ILCS 5/1-2, 7-
     5.
     [4] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--108.9--223K108.9
       City liquor control commission's failure to issue reasons 
     for revocation within five-day period prescribed by state law 
     did not deprive commission of jurisdiction to revoke license, 
     as statute setting forth five-day period was directory, not 
     mandatory, Liquor Act was to be liberally construed, licensee 
     was not injured by late decision, and Liquor Act did not 
     provide that jurisdiction was lost. S.H.A. 235 ILCS 5/1-2, 7-
     5.
     [5] STATUTES--227--361k227
       Word ``shall'' generally is mandatory and not directory, 
     but it can be construed as meaning ``may'' depending on 
     legislative intent.
     [6] STATUTES--227--361k227
       Generally, statutory regulations designed to secure order, 
     system and dispatch in proceedings, and by disregard of which 
     rights of interested parties cannot be injuriously affected, 
     are not mandatory unless they are accompanied by negative 
     language that imports that acts required shall not be done in 
     any other manner or time than designated.
     [7] STATUTES--227--361k227
       If statute is mandatory, it prescribes result that will 
     follow if required acts are not done; if statute is directory 
     then its terms are limited to what is required to be done.
     [8] STATUTES--227--361k227
       Failure to comply with mandatory provision will render void 
     proceeding to which provision relates, but strict observance 
     of directory provision is not essential to validity of 
     proceedings.
     [9] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE--670--15Ak670
       Liquor retailer waived issued that he was denied due 
     process because shotgun which retailer was charged with 
     possessing in license revocation proceeding was destroyed and 
     police officer was allowed to testify to its measurement, 
     where retailer did not object to testimony, and did not make 
     motion in limine at hearing, and did not raise issue until 
     penalty hearing.
     [9] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--108.10(4)--223k108.10(4)
       Liquor retailer waived issue that he was denied due process 
     because shotgun which retailer was charged with possessing in 
     license revocation proceeding was destroyed and police 
     officer was allowed to testify to its measurement, where 
     retailer did not object to testimony, did not make motion in 
     limine at hearing, and did not raise issue until penalty 
     hearing.
     [10] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--287.2(3)--92k287.2(3)
       Liquor retailer received sufficient notice of charge of 
     possessing sawed-off shotgun, thus, retailer was not denied 
     due process in license revocation proceeding. U.S.C.A. Const. 
     Amend. 14.
     [10] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--108.2--223k108.2
       Liquor retailer received sufficient notice of charge of 
     possessing sawed-off shotgun, thus, retailer was not denied 
     due process in license revocation proceeding. U.S.C.A. Const. 
     Amend. 14.
     [11] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--106(4)--223k106(4)
       Presence of sawed-off shotgun on premises of liquor 
     retailer warranted revocation of liquor license; retailer was 
     not improperly found guilty of failing to register gun which 
     was not registerable, location of shotgun permitted inference 
     that retailer had control

[[Page H6877]]

     of gun, and factors both in favor of and against revocation 
     existed.
     [12] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--108.10(8)--223k108.10(8)
       Appellate court may reverse licensing decision of liquor 
     control commission only if manifest weight of evidence 
     supports opposite conclusion.
       *2  **307  Lamendella & Daniel, Chicago (Joseph A. 
     Lamendella, Kris Daniel, of counsel), for appellant.
       Corp. Counsel, Chicago (Susan S. Sher, Lawrence Rosenthal, 
     Benna Ruth Solomon, Mardell Nereim, of cousel), for 
     appellees.
       Justice CERDA delivered the opinion of the court:
       Plaintiff, Sip & Save Liquors, Inc., an Illinois 
     corporation, appeals from the revocation of its retail liquor 
     license. It argues on appeal that: (1) the City of Chicago 
     Local Liquor Control Commission (the commission) lost 
     jurisdiction when it did not timely issue a decision; (2) 
     plaintiff was denied due process; and (3) revocation was 
     an unreasonable penalty.
       One of the issues in this case is whether the City of 
     Chicago Local Liquor Control Commission lost jurisdiction to 
     impose any sanction when it failed to render a decision 
     within the mandatory 15-day period prescribed by section 4-4-
     280 of the Chicago Municipal Code (the Code) (Chicago 
     Municipal Code Sec. 4-4-280 (1990)) and the holding in Puss N 
     Boots, Inc. v. Mayor's License Commission (1992), 232 Ill. 
     App. 3d 984, 173 Ill. Dec. 676, 597 N.E. 2d 650 or whether 
     instead the Liquor Control Act of 1934 (235 ILCS 5/1-1 et 
     seq. (West 1992)) (the Liquor Act) of the State of Illinois 
     was applicable.
       The commission charged in a notice of hearing to plaintiff 
     that on August 19, 1990, the Code was violated when Thomas 
     Shubalis, plaintiff's president, possessed an unregistered 
     Winchester .22-caliber rifle, a Harlin 20-gauge shotgun, a 
     Ruger .357 Magnum firearm, and a .25-caliber automatic 
     firearm. It was also charged that Shubailis violated State 
     law by possessing firearms without possessing an Illinois 
     firearm owner's identification card. The notice also charged 
     that on August 29, 1990, plaintiff sold or gave alcoholic 
     beverages on the licensed premises to a person under the age 
     of 21 years.
       The notice stated that the city would present evidence of 
     previous acts of misconduct. Attached as exhibits were orders 
     of dispositions of previous charges: (1) sale to a minor on 
     November 4, 1983, resulting in a warning on July 18, 1984; 
     (2) sale to a minor on January 11, 1985, resulting in a 
     warning on July 17, 1985; and (3) sale to a minor on August 
     31, 1985, resulting in a $300 voluntary fine on April 29, 
     1986.
       A hearing was held before the commission on January 17, 
     February 14, and April 4, 1991.
       Chicago police officer Anthony Wilczak testified at the 
     hearing that he responded to a burglary alarm on August 19, 
     1990, at plaintiff's liquor store. He searched the premises 
     and found a .357 Magnum revolver and a .25-caliber automatic 
     pistol below the cash register on the shelf. He asked 
     Shubalis *3**308 about the guns, and Shubalis said that the 
     guns were his brother's. Shubalis also said that the did not 
     know where the .22-caliber rifle came from and that the 
     sawed-off shotgun belonged to friend of his brother. He did 
     not find a firearm owner's identification card when he 
     searched Shubalis nor did he find a city registration for any 
     of the weapons.
       Chicago police officer Sharon Gaynor testified at the 
     hearing that she recovered in the search a sawed-off 20-gauge 
     shotgun and a Winchester rifle, which were found in a large 
     safe in a back storage area. The safe was open, and the guns 
     were lying in the safe.
       On April 26, 1991, Richard M. Daley, mayor and local liquor 
     control commissioner of the city of Chicago, revoked 
     plaintiff's city of Chicago retail liquor license. The order 
     stated that the proceedings were instituted pursuant to the 
     Liquor Act (Ill. Reve. Stat. 1989, ch. 43, pars. 93.9 through 
     195). The order made the following findings: (1) on or about 
     August 19, 1990, the licensee possessed unregistered firearms 
     (Harlin 20-gauge shotgun, Ruger .357 Magnum firearm, and .25-
     caliber automatic firearm) on the licensed premises in 
     violation of former section 11.1-13 of chapter 11.1 of the 
     code (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 11.1-13 (1983) (now 
     codified as Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 8-20-150 (1995))); 
     (2) on or about August 19, 1990, the licensee possessed 
     firearms on the licensed premises without possessing a 
     firearm owner's identification card issued by the State of 
     Illinois in violation of State law; and (3) on or about 
     August 29, 1990, plaintiff sold or gave alcoholic beverages 
     on the licensed premises to a person under 21 years of age in 
     violation of former section 147-14(a) of chapter 147 of the 
     Code (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 147-14(a) (1983) (now 
     codified as Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 4-60-140(a) (1993))).
       Plaintiff appealed to the City of Chicago License Appeal 
     Commission (the appeal commission), which affirmed Daley's 
     action on September 30, 1991. Plaintiff's petition for 
     rehearing was denied by the appeal commission on November 6, 
     1991.
       On December 6, 1991, plaintiff filed a complaint in 
     administrative review against defendants Daley and William D. 
     O'Donaghue, chairman of the appeal commission.
       On May 6, 1992, the trial court found the following: (1) 
     finding charge number one (Harlin 20-gauge shotgun) was 
     sustained; (2) the other findings were not sustained; (3) the 
     matter was remanded to the commission to consider its order 
     of revocation with respect to finding against the plaintiff 
     on charge number one.
       On June 6, 1992, the commission reconfirmed the revocation 
     of the license based on the finding that the owner possessed 
     an unregistered Harlin 20-gauge shotgun.
       On August 14, 1992, the trial court reversed the order 
     reconfirming revocation and remanded the matter for a hearing 
     by the commission on the penalty in view of the fact that the 
     charges were modified. The commission was ordered not to 
     consider the charges that were not sustained by the trial 
     court. It was also ordered that both parties would have a 
     full hearing in aggravation and mitigation.
       A hearing on the penalty was held on October 8, 1992, 
     before the commission. During Chicago police officer Lawrence 
     Seidler's testimony, plaintiff made an oral motion in limine 
     based on the following: (1) the charge was the failure to 
     exhibit a registration certificate and not the possession of 
     a sawed off shotgun; and (2) the shotgun was destroyed by the 
     police. The motion was denied.
       Officer Seidler testified that the barrel of the shotgun 
     was 14 inches long and that a portion of the stock was sawed 
     off.
       Thomas Shubalis testified at the hearing that the liquor 
     store had been in business at the same location for 17 years. 
     He recognized the shotgun and had seen it once before on the 
     premises. He did not believe that the shotgun was on the 
     premises on August 19, 1990. The shotgun had been brought in 
     by a neighbor who was moving and who was going to pick up the 
     gun in a *4 **309 couple of days. The shotgun had been on the 
     premises in a storeroom safe for a number of years but he 
     thought it had long been removed and never even thought of 
     it. The safe was not used, and it was hardly visible because 
     there were liquor boxes in front of it. He never had occasion 
     to open the safe between the time he saw the shotgun and the 
     time of the burglary. He had no registration for the shotgun.
       On October 14, 1992, plaintiff moved in the trial court to 
     reverse all orders of the commission and the appeal 
     commission on the basis that the mayor lost jurisdiction to 
     revoke the liquor license. The hearings had terminated on 
     April 4, 1991, and the decision was rendered on April 26, 
     1991, which was later than the mandatory 15-day period.
       On October 16, 1992, the commission sustained ``charge 
     one'' and revoked the license. The following findings of fact 
     were made. Shubalis admitted that he first saw the sawed-off 
     shotgun eight or nine years before the burglary and that he 
     did nothing to assure that the shotgun was removed from the 
     premises. Shubalis's testimony that the gun was hidden in the 
     old safe and that he did not even think about it after first 
     seeing it was not credible. The licensee had a history of 
     three prior violations, one of which resulted in a fine of 
     $300. The weapon was an extremely dangerous type of weapon. 
     In light of the serious nature of the offense, revocation was 
     appropriate.
       On January 22, 1993, the trial court denied plaintiff's 
     motion to reverse and to reinstate the license, denied 
     plaintiff's motion to reverse the post-remand order of 
     revocation, and affirmed the order of revocation.
       Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on February 19, 1993.


                            i. jurisdiction

       Plaintiff first argues that the commission lost 
     jurisdiction to impose any sanction when it failed to render 
     a decision within the 15 days following the hearing as 
     prescribed by section 4-4-280 of the Code (Chicago Municipal 
     Code Sec. 4-4-280 (1990)), which was amended in 1992 to 
     expand the time period to 60 days (Journal of the Proceedings 
     of the City Council of the City of Chicago, July 29, 1992, at 
     20041-42). If the proceedings were initiated exclusively 
     under the Liquor Act, then the procedural requirements of 
     section 7-5 of the Liquor Act were not met (235 ILCS 5/7-5 
     (West 1995)). The term ``shall'' was mandatory and not 
     directory.
       [1] The first issue is whether section 4-4-280 of the Code 
     applied to the revocation of plaintiff's liquor license. It 
     states in part:
       ``The mayor shall have the power to * * * suspend or revoke 
     any license issued under the provisions of this code * * *.
       If the mayor shall determine after [a] hearing that the 
     license should be revoked or suspended, within 60 days he 
     shall state the reason or reasons for such determination in a 
     written order or revocation or suspension * * *.''
       According to the Journal of the Proceedings of the City 
     Council of the City of Chicago, the ordinance was:
       ``intended to ratify prior actions of the Mayor in revoking 
     licenses and * * * shall apply to all cases in which licenses 
     have been revoked * * * within 60 days of the conclusion of a 
     hearing required by Section 4-4-280 * * *.'' Journal of the 
     Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Chicago, July 
     29, 1992, at p. 20042.
       Section 4-4-280 states that it is applicable to the 
     revocation of any license, and it does not exempt liquor 
     licenses. Section 4-60-070 of the Code states that a liquor 
     license shall be issued subject to chapter 4-4, the chapter 
     in which section 4-4-280 appears. [FN1] (Chicago Municipal 
     Code Sec. 4-60-070 (1994).) We find that section 4-4-280 
     covers liquor licenses.
       ``FN1. Section 4-60-070(a) of title four of the Code states 
     in part that ``[a] city retailer's license for the sale of 
     alcoholic liquor shall be issued by the local liquor control 
     commissioner, subject to the provisions of an act entitled 
     `An Act relating to alcoholic liquor,' approved January 31, 
     1934, as amended, and subject to the provisions of this 
     chapter and Chapter 4-4 relating to licenses in general not 
     inconsistent with the law relating

[[Page H6878]]

     to alcoholic liquor.'' (Emphasis added.) Chicago Municipal 
     Code Sec. 4-60-070 (1994).''
       *5  **310  The next issue is whether section 7-5 of the 
     Liquor Act states with its requirement that a statement of 
     reasons for revocation be given within five days of hearing 
     controls over Code section 4-4-280's time frame of 60 days. 
     Section 7-5 of the Liquor Act states in part:
       ``The local liquor control commissioner shall within 5 days 
     after [a] hearing, if he determines after such hearing that 
     the license should be revoked or suspended or that the 
     licensee should be fined, state the reason or reasons for 
     such determination in a written order * * *.'' 235 ILCS 5/7-5 
     (West 1995).
       [2] Liquor control is subject to concurrent jurisdiction of 
     the State and local government. (Easter Enterprises, Inc. v. 
     Illinois Liquor Control Commission (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 
     855, 858-59, 70 Ill. Dec. 666, 449 N.E. 2d 1013.) Home-rule 
     municipalities such as Chicago may legislate in the area of 
     liquor control, except as restricted by the State, pursuant 
     to the home-rule provisions of the 1970 Illinois Constitution 
     (Ill. Cont. 1970, art. VII, Sec. 6). (Easter, 114 Ill. App. 
     3d at 858-59, 70 Ill. Dec. 666, 449 N.E. 2d 1013.) Courts 
     have approved local liquor ordinances in home-rule 
     municipalities that were either more restrictive than State 
     statutes on the same subject matter or that placed additional 
     requirements on licenses not found in State statutes. Easter, 
     114 Ill. App. 3d at 859, 60 Ill. Dec. 666, 449 N.E. 2d 1013.
       [3] Section 4-60-070 states that provisions of the Code 
     chapter relating to licenses in general would govern liquor 
     licenses except when they are inconsistent with ``the law 
     relating to alcoholic liquor.'' (Chicago Municipal Code 
     Sec. 4-60-070 (1994).) The ordinance also states that the 
     license was subject to the provisions of the Liquor Act. The 
     Liquor Act enumerates in section 4-1 certain powers of 
     municipalities including the power ``to establish * * * 
     regulations and restrictions upon the issuance of an 
     operations under local licenses not inconsistent with law as 
     the public good and convenience may require.'' 235 ILCS 5/4-1 
     (West 1993).
       The Code's time limit is not just different than State law 
     but expands a time limit established by State law. The longer 
     time period is not a further restriction or an additional 
     requirement. (Easter, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 859, 70 Ill. Dec. 
     666, 449 N.E. 2d 1013.) The Code's longer time for the 
     issuance of the penalty decision is inconsistent with the 
     five-day time limit in the Liquor Act. Under the terms of the 
     Code and the Liquor Act, the inconsistent 15- and 60-day 
     limits cannot stand. (Village of Mundelein v. Hartnett 
     (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1015, 73 I11.Dec. 285, 454 
     N.E.2d 29 (where there is a conflict between a statute and 
     an ordinance, the ordinance must give way).) The State 
     five-day limitation for issuing a revocation decision 
     prevails over the Code.
       The case of Puss N Boots, Inc. v. Mayor's License 
     Commission (1992), 232 I11.App.3d 984, 173 I11.Dec. 676, 597 
     N.E.2d 650, was an appeal from an order of the mayor of the 
     city of Chicago revoking the public place of amusement 
     license of the plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that this court 
     should follow the decision in Puss N Boots. One of the issues 
     in that case was whether the mayor had lost jurisdiction to 
     revoke the public place of amusement license because of 
     failure to act within a 15-day time period prescribed by 
     ordinance section 4-4-280. The court pointed out that the 
     Code section providing for ``interpretation of language'' 
     expressly stated that ``[t]he word `shall' as used in this 
     code is mandatory.'' (Puss N Boots, 232 I11.App.3d at 987, 
     173 I11.Dec. 676, 597 N.E.2d 650.) The court concluded that 
     ``shall'' in section 4- 4-280 was mandatory and therefore the 
     failure to render a decision within the mandatory time 
     deprived the mayor of jurisdiction. Puss N Boots, 232 
     I11.App.3d at 987-89, 173 I11.Dec.676, 597 N.E.2d 650.
       We agree with the decision rendered in the Puss N Boots 
     case. The word ``shall'' in section 4-4-280 of the Municipal 
     Code of Chicago is mandatory rather than directory, and the 
     commission would have lost jurisdiction when the mayor failed 
     to act within the 15-day period in this case if only the 
     local code were involved. However, liquor control is subject 
     to concurrent jurisdiction of the State and the city of 
     Chicago. (Easter Enterprises, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control 
     Commission (1983), 114 I11.App.3d 855, 858-59, 70 I11.Dec. 
     666, 449 N.E.2d 1013.) In this  *6  **311  case, the order of 
     April 26, 1991, was issued by Richard M. Daley as mayor and 
     local liquor control commissioner. The order also stated that 
     the proceedings were instituted pursuant to the Liquor Act. 
     In the Puss N Boots case the State of Illinois had no 
     involvement in the revocation of a Chicago public place of 
     amusement license whereas in this case the proceedings were 
     conducted subject to the Liquor Act. We find that the Puss N 
     Boots case is distinguishable from the case sub judice and is 
     not controlling.
       [4] The next issue is whether the failure to issue the 
     reasons for revocation within the five-day period provided by 
     State law deprived the commission of jurisdiction. If the 
     five-day requirement of the Liquor Act was mandatory and not 
     directory, then the failure to act within the required time 
     meant the commission did not have jurisdiction to act beyond 
     the time limit. See Johnkol, Inc. v. License Appeal 
     Commission (1969), 42 I11.2d 377, 383- 84, 247 N.E.2d 901 
     (failure of liquor license appeal commission to render a 
     decision within 20 days of filing the appeal as required by 
     State law resulted in loss of jurisdiction for 
     noncompliance).
       [5][6][7][8] Section 7-5 of the Liquor Act states that the 
     local liquor control commissioner ``shall'' within five days 
     of the hearing state the reasons for revocation. (235 ILCS 5/
     7-5 (West 1995).) The word ``shall'' generally is mandatory 
     and not directory, but it can be construed as meaning ``may'' 
     depending on the legislative intent. (Village of Mundelein v. 
     Hartnett (1983), 117 I11.App.3d 1011, 1016, 73 I11.Dec. 285, 
     454 N.E.2d 29.) Generally, statutory regulations designed 
     ``to secure order, system and dispatch in proceedings, and by 
     a disregard of which the rights interested parties cannot be 
     injuriously affected'' are not mandatory unless they are 
     accompanied by negative language that imports that the acts 
     required shall not be done in any other manner or time than 
     designated. (Village of Mundelein, 117 I11.App.3d at 1016, 73 
     I11.Dec. 285, 454 N.E.2d 29.) If a statute is mandatory, it 
     prescribes the result that will follow if the required acts 
     are not done; if the statute is directory then its terms are 
     limited to what is required to be done. (Village of 
     Mundelein, 117 I11.App.3d at 1016, 73 I11.Dec. 285, 454 
     N.E.2d 29.) The failure to comply with a mandatory provision 
     will render void the proceeding to which the provision 
     relates, but strict observance of a directory provision is 
     not essential to the validity of the proceedings. Village of 
     Mundelein, 117 I11.App.3d at 1016, 73 I11.Dec. 285, 454 
     N.E.2d 29.
       Alpern v. License Appeal Commission (1976), 38 I11.App.3d 
     565, 567, 348 N.E.2d 271, was the first decision that held 
     that the Liquor Act's five-day requirement was directory so 
     that a revocation issued beyond that time was valid and the 
     commissioner did not lose jurisdiction. The court adopted the 
     reason that ordinarily a statute that specifies the time for 
     the performance of an official duty will be considered 
     directory only where the rights of the parties cannot be 
     injuriously affected by the failure to act within the time 
     indicated. (Alpern, 38 Ill. App. 3d at 567, 348 N.E. 2d 
     271.) The court also noted that the Liquor Act provided 
     that it was to be liberally construed to protect the 
     welfare of the people. (Alpern, 38 Ill. App. 3d at 567, 
     348 N.E. 2d 271.) The five-day provision did not contain 
     language denying the exercise of the power after the time 
     named and no right of plaintiff would be injuriously 
     affected by a failure to serve the revocation order 
     timely. Alpern, 38 Ill. App. 3d at 568, 348 N.E. 2d 271.
       Several first district cases have followed Alpern; Dugan's 
     Bistro, Inc. v. Daley (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 463, 475, 14 
     Ill. Dec. 63, 371 N.E. 2d 1116; Rincon v. License Appeal 
     Commission (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 600, 606, 19 Ill. Dec. 
     406, 378 N.E. 2d 1281; Watra, Inc. v. License Appeal 
     Commission (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 596, 600, 28 Ill Dec. 120, 
     390, N.E. 2d. 102; and Cox v. Daley (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 
     593, 595-96, 49 Ill. Dec. 55, 417 N.E. 2d 745.
       Miller v. Daley (1973), 14 Ill. App. 3d 394, 397, 302 N.E. 
     2d 347, stated that the five-day limit was mandatory but 
     found that the order was served within the period prescribed 
     by the statute so that the conclusion that it was mandatory 
     was dictum. (See Alpern, 38 Ill. App. 3d at 568, 348 N.E. 2d 
     271 (the interpretation in Miller was dictum).) The weight of 
     the authority is that the five-day period is directory.
       *7  **312  We concur with the cases finding that the 
     failure to act in five days does not result in the loss of 
     jurisdiction because even though the word ``shall'' is used 
     (1) the Liquor Act is to be liberally construed to protect 
     the welfare of the people (235 ILCS 5/1-2 (West 1993)), and a 
     construction voiding a late revocation order would not serve 
     the welfare of the people; (2) the license was not injured by 
     a late decision as he continued to run his business until the 
     license was revoked; and (3) the Liquor Act does not provide 
     that jurisdiction is lost after the five-day period.


                            ii. due process

       Plaintiff next argues that the plaintiff was denied due 
     process because the shotgun was destroyed and a police 
     officer was permitted to testify about the measurements of 
     one barrel of the shotgun. Plaintiff was also denied due 
     process because he did not receive notice of the charge of 
     possession of a sawed-off shotgun. The penalty was based on 
     possession of a sawed-off shotgun, which was a separate 
     offense from the charge of possession of an unregistered 
     shotgun.
       [9]  Plaintiff did not object to the testimony concerning 
     the shotgun at the first hearing, which was when the charges 
     were tried. A motion in limine was not made at the first 
     hearing. Plaintiff did not raise the issue of the denial of 
     due process based on destruction of the shotgun until the 
     penalty hearing. Therefore, that issue was waived. Harbor 
     Insurance C. v. Arthur Andersen & Co. (1986), 149 Ill. App. 
     3d 235, 240, 102 Ill. Dec. 814, 500 N.E. 2d 707.
       [10]  The charge of possessing an unregistered shotgun was 
     stated in the notice of hearing to be a violation of former 
     section 11.1-13 of chapter 11.1 of the Code, which is now 
     codified as section 8-20-150. Section 8-20-150 of the Code 
     requires one to exhibit a valid registration certificate. 
     (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 8-20-150 (1995).) Section 8-20-
     040 of the Code states in part that no person shall within 
     the city possess or have under his control any firearm unless 
     he holds a valid registration certificate for that firearm. 
     (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 8-20-040(a) (1990).) A sawed-off 
     shotgun is unregisterable. (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 8-20-
     050(a) (1995).) Although the predecessor of section 8-2-150 
     was cited in the notice of

[[Page H6879]]

     hearing instead of the predecessor of section 8-20-040, 
     plaintiff received adequate notice that he was charged with 
     possessing an unregistered sawed-off shotgun. From the 
     beginning of the proceedings plaintiff knew that possession 
     of a shotgun was the issue.


                            iii. revocation

       [11]  Plaintiff next argues that the revocation was 
     unreasonable. Plaintiff had no duty to register a firearm and 
     display a registration certificate for a firearm that was 
     unregisterable, that the licensee did not own, and that the 
     licensee did not constructively possess. The revocation order 
     states that the ordinance violated was section 8-20-150 
     requiring a registration certificate (Chicago Municipal Code 
     Sec.  8-20-150 (1995)), but the conduct was described 
     as possession of an unregistered firearm, which was 
     prohibited by section 8-20-040 Chicago Municipal Code 
     Sec. 8-20-040 (1990)).
       Plaintiff further argues that the finding of possession was 
     erroneously based on the fact that the licensee had knowledge 
     of the presence of the shotgun on the premises eight or nine 
     years earlier. Plaintiff operated the business for 17 years. 
     In a two-year period plaintiff was charged with three 
     separate sales of alcohol to minors, but there was no other 
     record of wrongful conduct. Failure to display a certificate 
     was the most venial of the firearms offenses and should have 
     resulted in a more lenient sanction of either fine or 
     suspension. There was no evidence that the shotgun was 
     functional.
       The second revocation order issued does not refer to the 
     specific ordinance violated as plaintiff contends but merely 
     states that ``charge one'' was sustained. The order should 
     have referred to the first ``finding'' of the revocation 
     order, which was that plaintiff possessed an unregistered 
     shotgun, because the first charge in the notice of hearing 
     was possession of a rifle. Plaintiff was informed as to the 
     basis for the revocation. Furthermore, the findings of the 
     commission were given, and they emphasized the possession of 
     the shotgun.
       *8  **313  The licensee was found to have possessed an 
     unregistered gun and was not found guilty of the offense of 
     failing to register the unregisterable shotgun. Therefore the 
     licensee was not punished for failing to perform an 
     impossible act, and United States v. Dalton (10th Cir. 1992), 
     960 F.2d 121, is distinguishable. The Dalton court held that 
     due process barred a conviction under a statute that required 
     registration of a firearm where the subject firearm could not 
     be legally registered. (Dalton, 960 F.2d at 124.) Section 8-
     20-040 does not only state that one cannot possese an 
     unregistered gun (which would imply that the gun was 
     registerable); the ordinance precludes possession of any 
     firearm that is unregisterable. Chicago Municipal Ordinance 
     Sec. 8-20-040 (1995).
       The next issue is whether the licensee possessed the 
     shotgun within the meaning of section 8-20-040(a), which 
     states that no person shall ``possess, harbor, have under his 
     control, * * * or accept'' Any unregisterable firearm. 
     (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 8-20-040(a) (1999).) Although 
     there were employees who had access to the room where the 
     shotgun was located, the shotgun was at the licensee's place 
     of business so that it can be inferred that the licensee had 
     control over the area where the shotgun was found.
       [12]  The appellate court may reverse the commission's 
     decision only if the manifest weight of the evidence supports 
     the opposite conclusion. (Lopez v. Illinois Liquor Control 
     Commission (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 756, 762-63, 76 Ill.Dec. 
     199, 458 N.E.2d 599.) Section 7-5 of the Liquor Act permits 
     revocation if the licensee violated any provisions of the act 
     or any ordinance of the municipality or any rule of the local 
     liquor control commission (235 ILCS 5/7-5 (West 1995)), but 
     the violation must fairly relate to the control of liquor. 
     Lopez, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 761, 765, 76 Ill.Dec. 199, 458 
     N.E.2d 599.
       That shotgun was deemed to be especially dangerous because 
     it was unregisterable. The presence of this firearm on the 
     premises jeopardized the safety of the public because 
     employees of the licensee would have access to it. On the 
     other hand, the business had been operated for 17 years with 
     only three other charges. There were factors going in favor 
     and against revocation. A less severe penalty could have been 
     imposed, but under the abuse of discretion standard, the 
     revocation must be upheld.
       The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
       Affirmed.
       RIZZI and TULLY, JJ., concur.
                                  ____


                        (Cite as: 636 So.2d 448)

   Robert DAVIS d/b/a Solid gold, Inc. v. STATE of Alabama ALCOHOLIC 
                        BEVERAGE CONTROL BOARD.

                               AV92000711

            Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, Feb. 25, 1994

       Owner of lounge sought review of Alcoholic Beverage Control 
     (ABC) Board decision denying renewal of lounge liquor 
     license. The Mobile Circuit Court, Ferill D. McRae, J., 
     affirmed. Owner appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, 
     Robertson, P.J., held that substantial evidence supported ABC 
     Board's finding that operation of lounge was prejudicial to 
     health, welfare and morals of community.
       Affirmed.
     [1] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE--701--15Ak701
       Circuit court review of decision of Alcoholic Beverage 
     Control (ABC) Board decision denying renewal of liquor 
     license is governed by administrative procedure statute 
     pertaining generally to judicial review of agency actions in 
     contested cases. Code 1975, Sec. 41-22-20.
     [1] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--102--223k102
       Circuit court review of decision of Alcoholic Beverage 
     Control (ABC) Board decision denying renewal of liquor 
     license is governed by administrative procedure statute 
     pertaining generally to judicial review of agency actions in 
     contested cases. Code 1975, Sec. 41-22-20.
     [2] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE--683--15Ak683
       In reviewing trial court's determination as to propriety of 
     action of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) Board, standard of 
     review of Court of Civil Appeals is same as that of trial 
     court. Code 1975, Sec. 41-22-20.
     [2] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--102--223k102
       In reviewing trial court's determination as to propriety of 
     action of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) Board, standard of 
     review of Court of Civil Appeals is same as that of trial 
     court. Code 1975, Sec. 41-22-20.
     [3] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--102--223k102
       Substantial evidence supported Alcoholic Beverage Control 
     (ABC) Board's finding that operation of lounge was 
     prejudicial to health, welfare and morals of community, thus 
     supporting Board's denial of lounge's liquor license renewal, 
     where neighborhood residents testified that lounge patrons 
     discharged firearms, brawled in parking lot, made excessive 
     noise, loitered, trespassed, deposited weapons and narcotics 
     in yards, parked illegally, and urinated, defecated, and 
     engaged in sexual activities on residents' property, and 
     residents' testimony was supported by testimony of ABC Board 
     employees and city police sergeant. Code 1975, Sec. 28-3A-
     5(b).
       *448  Major E. Madison, Jr., Mobile, for appellant.
       H. Lewis Gillis and Anita L. Kelly of Thomas, Means & 
     Gillis, P.C., Montgomery, for appellee.
       ROBERTSON, Presiding Judge.
       Robert Davis d/b/a Solid Gold, Inc., appeals from a 
     judgment of the trial court upholding a decision of the State 
     of Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (ABC *449 Board) 
     denying a renewal of his lounge liquor license.
       By a letter to the ABC Board dated August 20, 1991, Thomas 
     Sullivan, the City of Mobile council member representing the 
     district in which Davis operated his business, protested the 
     renewal of Davis's liquor license for the lounge known as the 
     Solid Gold Social Club (lounge), stating that he had received 
     several complaints from nearby residents that shootings, 
     prostitution, and drug deals had occurred at the lounge. The 
     ABC Board notified Davis of protests it had received that the 
     lounge's ``operation and location [were] prejudicial to the 
     health, welfare and morals of the community.''
       The ABC Board held a hearing on the protests on September 
     26, 1991. By a letter dated October 11, 1991, the ABC Board 
     notified Davis that it had denied a renewal of his liquor 
     license. Davis appealed the Board's decision to the Mobile 
     County Circuit Court, which, following an ore tenus 
     hearing, affirmed the Board's decision.
       The sole issue presented to this court on appeal is whether 
     the ABC Board's decision not to renew Davis's liquor license 
     for his lounge was clearly erroneous, unreasonable, 
     arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion.
       [1][2] The ABC Board may refuse the renewal of liquor 
     licenses for ``good cause,'' provided that ``within one month 
     prior to the scheduled date of expiration of such licenses 
     the applicant shall have been notified by the board of 
     objections to the [renewal] signed by persons authorized to 
     do so.'' Sec. 28-3A-5(b), Ala. Code 1975. The judicial review 
     of such an action in circuit court is governed by Sec. 41-22-
     20, Ala. Code 1975. Dawson v. Department of Environmental 
     Management, 529 So.2d 1012 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988). Section 41-
     22-20(k) provides that ``the agency order shall be taken as 
     prima facie just and reasonable and the court shall not 
     substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the 
     weight of the evidence on questions of fact, except where 
     otherwise authorized by statute.'' The trial court may 
     reverse, modify, or alter a decision of the ABC Board if the 
     Board's action was clearly erroneous, unreasonable, 
     arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Sec. 41-22-
     20(k)(6), (7), Ala. Code 1975. In reviewing a trial court's 
     determination as to the propriety of an ABC Board action, 
     this court's standard of review is the same as that of the 
     trial court. Dawson, supra.
       [3] The record of the ABC Board's hearing reflects that the 
     lounge is located in Mobile, at 1385 Dr. Martin Luther King, 
     Jr., Avenue, an area of mixed commercial and residential 
     properties. Neighborhood residents testified that the 
     lounge's patrons discharged firearms; brawled in the parking 
     lot; made excessive noise; loitered; trespassed; deposited 
     weapons and narcotics in neighborhood yards; illegally parked 
     their cars; and urinated, defecated, and engaged in sexual 
     activities on the residents' property. Supporting testimony 
     was offered by George Boan and Kenneth Kirkland, two ABC 
     Board employees, and by Sgt. Kay Taylor of the Mobile Police 
     Department. Boan, an ABC Board district supervisor, testified 
     that he had personally observed loitering, noise, and illegal 
     parking at the lounge, and he stated that during an 
     investigation of the lounge he had been approached by 
     prostitutes working the area. Kirkland, an ABC Board agent, 
     played a videotape that he had made of the parking lot and 
     the area surrounding the lounge; on that tape he had captured 
     an apparent drug deal. Sgt. Taylor presented a

[[Page H6880]]

     telephone log listing 95 complaints lodged with the police 
     department between January 1, 1990, and September 25, 1991, 
     concerning activities allegedly occurring inside the lounge 
     or on its premises.
       Davis denied that his patrons were responsible for the 
     illegal activities that had occurred in the vicinity, blaming 
     persons driving by and the occupants of a nearby house for 
     causing the trouble. However, after a thorough review of the 
     record, we find that the ABC Board heard substantial evidence 
     that the operation of the lounge was prejudicial to the 
     health, welfare, and morals of the community. Consequently, 
     we cannot hold that the Board's action was clearly erroneous, 
     unreasonable, arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion.
       *450  The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
       AFFIRMED.
       THIGPEN and YATES, JJ., concur.

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. LOFGREN. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan, the ranking 
member.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lofgren) for her insistence.


                         Parliamentary Inquiry

  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentlewoman from California yield to the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers)?
  Ms. LOFGREN. I have yielded to the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Parliamentary inquiry. Is this for the first 5 
minutes?
  Ms. LOFGREN. Yes, it is.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Parliamentary inquiry. Is it the rule of the Chair, 
then, that they can yield during the first 5 minutes when a point of 
order has been raised?
  The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentlewoman from California yield to the 
gentleman from Florida for a parliamentary inquiry?
  Ms. LOFGREN. I will yield for a parliamentary inquiry which has been 
stated. May I yield time to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), 
the ranking member, under regular order?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida may state his parliamentary 
inquiry.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, the parliamentary inquiry, earlier I 
had tried to yield some time on reserving a point of order.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair controls debate on the point of order when it 
is raised.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, that was on the 
germaneness issue. This is on the 5 minutes.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. I am trying to get a ruling from the Chair.
  The CHAIRMAN. Members will suspend. Earlier the gentleman tried to 
yield time during argument on a point of order. That cannot be done 
under the rules.
  The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren) controls 5 minutes and 
can yield to the gentleman from Florida for a parliamentary inquiry.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Okay.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Michigan 
(Mr. Conyers).
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from California 
for yielding to me.
  I am glad the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Scarborough) realizes that 
this is perfectly orderly procedure.
  I wanted to just thank the gentlewoman for her persistence in trying 
to connect at a Federal level the relationship between gun safety, the 
shipment of firearms, and the shipment of alcoholic beverages. There is 
nothing illogical or irrational about it. They are both very related 
subject matter.
  The need for using these regulations and looking at them from this 
perspective of a Federally licensed firearm dealer and wine distributor 
or alcohol beverage distributor are related.
  I am glad that the gentlewoman has reformulated her amendment. I 
think it now attaches to this bill with a great rationality, and it is 
an amendment on its own that I support very strongly.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for his kind 
comments.


                             Point of Order

  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak on the point of order 
that I reserved.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman may state his point of order.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, again, the fundamental purpose of this 
bill is to provide the attorney general of any State with the authority 
to bring a civil action in the United States district court to enjoin 
any person or entity that the attorney general has a reasonable cause 
to believe is engaged in any act that would constitute a violation of 
State law regulating the importation or transportation of intoxicating 
liquor.
  Now, the fundamental purpose of this amendment is again to expand the 
single class of merchandise covered by the bill from intoxicating 
liquor to now adding another class of merchandise, which is firearms to 
the one class covered by the bill.
  Secondly, it makes absolutely no sense because it adds an unrelated 
contingency in the final line when, again, reading the amendment, it 
says: ``This Act and the amendment made by this act shall take 
immediate effect with regard to any violation of a State law regulating 
the importation or transportation of any intoxicating liquor which 
results from any violation of a State's firearms laws.''

                              {time}  1400

  Now that is clearly, clearly, an unrelated contingency.
  Also, I think it is very important to understand that what we are 
doing here is we are commingling again two issues. Instead of the 
single issue of alcohol that is being illegally shipped across State 
lines, we are actually talking about gun sales or the transporting of 
guns inside of a State. Obviously, that can already be taken care of 
inside the State by a State attorney general who simply goes to State 
court. The State attorney general also has the power to simply take 
away the State liquor license of the person who is illegally selling 
guns, and so it is unnecessary.
  Again, it is a commingling of two issues and, as I said earlier, the 
fundamental purpose of this bill is a single issue, and that is to stop 
the illegal sales of alcohol across State lines. So for those reasons 
and many others, I think, once again, we have to go back to House 
Practice, Germaneness, section 9, which says, ``One individual 
proposition is not germane to another individual proposition.'' And 
this is clearly one individual proposition that is being added to 
another in a mix, sort of a legislative goo that I think even gives 
sausage making a bad name.
  Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe this amendment is germane 
and I insist on my point of order.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentlewoman from California wish to be heard 
on the point of order?
  Ms. LOFGREN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren) is 
recognized.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I would disagree with my colleague from 
Florida on the germaneness issue. In the example I gave in my 5 minutes 
in support of my amendment, I mentioned the issue where we had the 
possession of a Tech DC 9 by the owner of a winery and the holder of a 
Federal license of a winery. That is not a State license, that is a 
Federal license. And in order to affect that Federal license, recourse 
first of the ATF and later, and arguably necessarily, to the Federal 
courts, would be necessary. The State does not have jurisdiction over 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
  Further, I would note that the forum of a Federal court gives multi-
State enforcement opportunities that arguably are not available to the 
attorneys general by recourse to a State forum. And if that is not the 
case, if that turns out to be incorrect, then the entire basis for this 
act being asserted by the proponents of the Scarborough bill 
evaporates. Because if the point of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Scarborough) is that there is adequate remedy in State court, then 
there ought to be adequate remedy in State court for alcohol violations 
as well.
  As the Chair will note, I did not ask for a vote on his prior ruling 
on the first amendment, because although I think an argument, and a 
good argument, could be made on its germaneness, I think that the 
arguments on germaneness on this amendment are weak indeed, and I would 
hope that the Chair would allow a vote to be taken on this amendment.

[[Page H6881]]

  We have gone to great lengths to make sure it deals with the 
germaneness issue. Consequently, it is much smaller in scope than I 
think is appropriate and warranted by the violence emergency that faces 
us. But I offer it because at least it is something that this Congress 
could do as a show of good faith to the mothers and fathers of America 
who, like myself, are preparing to send their children back to school 
in just a month or so.
  So I would hope that the Chair would rule that this is germane, and 
that absent that, those who have raised the point of order might 
consider withdrawing that point of order. I think it is only fair that 
this House be given the opportunity to do something, something for gun 
safety for the mothers and fathers of this country.
  Mr. Chairman, I submitted for the Record legal citations from the 
Appellate Court of Illinois on this subject matter.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Georgia desire to be heard on 
the point of order?
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. He does.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr) is recognized.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, in looking at this amendment, I 
have to conclude that Rube Goldberg is alive and well. If the Chair can 
figure out what this amendment means, the Chair is indeed very smart.
  I think, though, that it can be stated very clearly, very succinctly, 
Mr. Chairman, that this is simply an evidence of the gun control 
advocates seeking to interject gun control into any piece of 
legislation they can at whatever the cost. And the cost here would be 
at the price of clarity and germaneness.
  What the gentlewoman is proposing here in bringing in the issue of 
State firearms laws, which have nothing whatsoever to do with the laws 
of a State regarding the sale of alcoholic beverages, is to try to 
bring in an unrelated contingency. That, Mr. Chairman, is specifically 
precluded by House rules, number 22, on germaneness, entitled 
Conditions or Qualifications, which I would respectfully quote to the 
Chair. It says, ``A condition or qualification sought to be added by 
way of amendment must be germane to the provisions of the bill.''
  The provisions of this bill relate solely and exclusively to State 
laws regarding the sale of alcoholic beverages. They have nothing 
whatsoever to do with firearms violations. This is not germane, it is 
unrelated, and I urge the Chair to sustain the point of order raised by 
the gentleman from Florida.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Michigan wish to be heard on 
the point of order?
  Mr. CONYERS. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) is 
recognized.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the point of order 
that is made, and I simply want to make it clear that this is a 
completely different amendment that is being brought forward.
  What the gentlewoman is pointing out is that this is a subset of 
liquor violations, and some liquor violations result from gun 
violations. She is merely setting a different effective date for those 
violations. This is just empowering the States to enforce their own 
liquor laws, which sometimes involve gun laws.
  So this supports the principle purpose of the bill. It in no way is 
caught by germaneness. It is stopping the sale of alcohol in violation 
of State laws. It does this by allowing cases where firearms' use 
violate State alcohol laws to be heard immediately. She merely changes 
the date.
  So to argue the same nongermaneness arguments that were previously 
advanced fails to recognize that this is a substantially different 
amendment, and that it is clearly germane and is in accord with the 
precedence of the House.
  This amendment does nothing whatsoever to expand the scope of the 
bill. It merely deals with the effective date issue, and for that 
reason I urge that the point of order be rejected.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is prepared to rule on the point of order 
raised by the gentleman from Florida.
  The gentleman from Florida raises a point of order that the amendment 
offered by the gentlewoman from California is not germane.
  The bill amends the Webb-Kenyon Act to authorize an attorney general 
of a State to bring a civil action in a Federal court against a person 
that an attorney general has reason to believe has engaged in an act in 
violation of a State law regulating the importation or transportation 
of intoxicating liquor. The bill also establishes certain parameters 
for Federal judicial purview of an action brought under the new law.
  Clause 7 of Rule XVI, the germaneness rule, provides that no 
proposition on a ``subject different from that under consideration 
shall be admitted under color of amendment.'' One of the central tenets 
of the germaneness rule is that the fundamental purpose of an amendment 
must be germane to the fundamental purpose of the bill.
  The Chair discerns that fundamental purpose of a bill by examining 
the text of the bill and the report language accompanying the bill as 
evidenced by the ruling of the Chair on July 18, 1990, recorded in 
Volume 10, Chapter 28, section 5.6 of the Deschler-Brown Precedents. As 
indicated on page 5 and 6 of the committee report, the underlying bill 
was ``introduced in order to specifically provide States with access to 
Federal court to enforce their laws regulating interstate shipments of 
alcoholic beverages.''
  The fundamental purpose of the amendment appears to be to single out 
certain violations of liquor trafficking laws on the basis of their 
regard for any and all firearms issues. The Chair is of the opinion 
that the question illustrates the principle that an amendment may 
relate to the same subject matter, yet still stray from adherence to a 
common fundamental purpose, by singling out one constituent element of 
the larger subject for specific and unrelated scrutiny.
  The fundamental purpose of the amendment is not the same as the 
fundamental purpose of the bill, nor is it a mere component of the 
larger purpose. Rather, the amendment pursues a purpose that, by its 
specialized focus, bears a corollary relationship to that pursued by 
the bill.
  The proponent of this amendment has argued that her amendment merely 
addresses a subset of those State laws already addressed in the bill 
and is germane based on subject matter grounds. The Chair would note 
that general principle found on page 618 of the House Rules and Manual 
that the standards by which the germaneness of an amendment may be 
measured are not exclusive. Thus, while the amendment may arguably 
address the same subject matter, or a subset thereof, as that of the 
underlying bill, the fundamental purpose of the amendment must still be 
germane under every application thereof to that of the bill.
  In the opinion of the Chair, the amendment is not germane and the 
point of order is sustained.
  Are there further amendments to the bill?


             Amendment Offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas

  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order.
  The CHAIRMAN. The point of order by the gentleman from Florida is 
reserved.
  The Clerk will report the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas: Page 6, line 
     9, strike the close quotation marks and the period at the 
     end.
       Page 6, after line 9, insert the following (and make such 
     technical and conforming changes as may be appropriate):

     ``SEC. 3. REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO CERTAIN CARRIERS IN 
                   CONNECTION WITH DELIVERY OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR 
                   TO A PLACE OF RESIDENCE.

       ``(a) Delivery of Intoxicating Liquor by Non-governmental 
     Carriers for Hire.--It shall be unlawful for a 
     nongovernmental carrier for hire to knowingly deliver a 
     container transported in interstate commerce that contains 
     intoxicating liquor to a place of residence of any kind if 
     such carrier fails to obtain the signature of the individual 
     to whom such container is addressed.
       ``(b) Penalty.--Whoever violates paragraph (1) shall be 
     liable for a fine of $500.''.

  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask 
unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed 
in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). Is there 
objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Texas?

[[Page H6882]]

  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Objection, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Objection is heard.
  The Clerk will continue the reading.
  The Clerk continued reading the amendment.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve a point of 
order.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-
Lee) is recognized.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I hope my colleague will see 
fit to join me in this amendment, and I would like to share with him 
language in H.R. 2031 in particular that specifically states, ``if the 
Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a person is 
engaged or has engaged in any act that would constitute a violation of 
State law regulating the importation or transportation of any liquor.'' 
In part, this provision reads that we are dealing with the illegal 
transportation of liquor. And the supporting materials that my 
colleagues have circulated to even support this legislation all goes to 
the underage drinking of our young people.
  We realize and have seen documentation, Mr. Chairman, that underage 
drinking is more devastating in our youth community than drugs. And 
interestingly enough, the amendment that I have just offered, and I 
might add that I would be happy to see if the gentleman would accept a 
friendly amendment to my amendment or a perfecting amendment that deals 
with narrowing the opportunity by way of requiring the carrier, and I 
might amend that to be shipper, to in fact make sure that they have the 
signature of the individual to whom the container is addressed, which 
would, in and of itself, help to bring down the amendment of illegal 
alcohol being shipped and transported to youth.

                              {time}  1415

  In particular, materials that were sent out by the beer wholesalers, 
national beer wholesalers, speak to this issue, as well as some 
additional new faces and anecdotal stories that tell us what happens 
when young people use the Internet and these amounts of liquor come 
without any restraint whatsoever.
  In Greenville, Mississippi, a teenage girl says ordering liquor or 
alcohol over the Internet is easier than walking into a store and 
buying it. February 16, 1999, in Boston, Massachusetts, indicates an 
18-year-old lies about his age and uses his own debit card to order 
wine by the Internet. One package is left at the door without an ID 
check. One winery uses a deceptive return label that indicates the 
package was shipped from a printing company.
  In addition, on May 13, 1999, again beer is sent to a 17-year-old. 
The UPS delivers it to an unmarked box. No ID check.
  Materials that the beer wholesalers have offered to us have said 
several things. There is a new black market in alcohol. It says State 
laws are broken. Today this sensitive marketplace structure is in 
jeopardy, a national problem with local impact. Television stations in 
more than three dozen communities across the Nation have produced 
investigative reports that document how easy it is for teenagers to use 
the Internet to acquire beer.
  If this is the premise upon which this legislation has been written, 
if we are to assist the attorney general in preventing illegal 
intoxicating liquors from being shipped across State lines, then I 
would argue that in fact this is an amendment that should be accepted. 
Because what it asks the carrier to do is to simply get a signature of 
the individual on the container that is addressed.
  I would say to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Scarborough) as well 
that we need to do what he says the legislation is attempting to do and 
that is to respond to underage drinking.
  We can all rally around underage drinking, Mr. Chairman. For many of 
the carriers who are receiving alcohol from the shippers, they are in 
fact shipping to teenagers, leaving it, getting no ID, getting no 
signature, getting absolutely nothing. And that allows our teenagers, 
our youth, our college students to engage in alcohol abuse, which 
enhances and increases the numbers of those who are abusing alcohol.
  I ask the gentleman from Florida to consider this amendment and, as 
well, be happy to offer a friendly amendment that should say that such 
requirement that requires the carriers to get the signature would be 
subject to the passage of a State law.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  If I understand the amendment, all she is asking is that the outside 
package have some identifying label that this is alcohol. Is that 
correct?
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I am 
asking for the signature.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlewoman would continue to 
yield, plus the signature when it is received to determine that it is 
going into the proper hands.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, that is correct.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I am sure that is consistent 
with the bill. I mean, I hope we do not have a germaneness problem.
  Secondly, it makes pretty good sense. It would seem that those who 
support the bill might want to make this improvement merely because it 
makes more efficacious the whole process.


                             Point of Order

  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I insist on my point of order and 
disagree with the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) and also the 
ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary. This is not 
consistent at all with the bill, and it is far outside the fundamental 
scope of this legislation.
  Mr. Chairman, again, the fundamental purpose of this bill is to 
provide the attorneys general of any State with the authority to bring 
civil action in the United States District Court to enjoin any person 
or entity that the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe is 
engaged in any act that would constitute a violation of State law 
regulating the importation or transportation of an intoxicating liquor.
  Now, what we have here from the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-
Lee) is actually a new set of substantive laws that would actually 
apply fines, penalties, and hold them accountable in Federal court for 
actual criminal or civil penalties. It is a substantive approach.
  It is very important to remember, in this legislation the only thing 
we are talking about is providing States' attorneys general a 
procedural mechanism to go into State courts.
  So by proposing this bill and if it passes, after it passes, we have 
not proposed any new Federal laws regarding the sale of alcohol. We 
have not proposed any new civil penalties. We have not proposed any new 
criminal penalties.
  The only thing that we are doing is providing States' attorneys 
general with a procedural mechanism to go into court and stop illegal 
wine sales that are transported across State lines.
  So when the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) offers this 
amendment, she is taking us out of this very narrowly limited 
procedural safeguard for States' attorneys general and instead 
expanding it to a point where we are going to have an entirely new 
class of individuals and businesses that are going to be liable under 
Federal law that are going to be able to be dragged into Federal court 
and be held accountable under civil or criminal penalties.
  Despite the debate that has preceded this conversation on the floor 
right now, there is nothing in my legislation and in the legislation of 
the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) that would hold anybody 
accountable under any new civil or criminal penalty. Again, it only 
provides a simple procedural safeguard so States' attorneys general are 
allowed only to stop the illegal shipment of alcohol into their States.
  According to House Practice Germaneness Section 9, one individual 
proposition is not germane to another individual proposition.
  This is clearly one individual proposition that is being added to 
another. We are clearly bringing in an entirely new group of people who 
will be liable under this. We are trying to add new

[[Page H6883]]

Federal regulations, telling shippers, nongovernmental shippers, what 
they may or may not ship and when they ship and how they ship and what 
procedures they must go through so they are not dragged into Federal 
court and then held liable.
  So accordingly, Mr. Chairman, this amendment is clearly not germane. 
And I will insist on my point of order.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). Does the 
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) wish to speak to the point of 
order?
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Yes, I would, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. Chairman, I am disappointed in my colleague from Florida. And I 
realize that he has turned the debate away from the premise of the 
bill.
  Again I say, Mr. Chairman, that this bill was argued on and discussed 
in the Committee on the Judiciary on the question of underaged 
drinking. What are we here for on the floor of the House?
  Again I refer to H.R. 2031, which says, ``if the attorney general has 
reasonable cause to believe that a person is engaged or has engaged in 
any act that would violate a constitution of State law regarding the 
importation or transportation of any intoxicating liquor.''
  That is what this amendment proposes to do. It proposes to make 
illegal for a nongovernmental carrier to deliver liquor to a place of 
residence without a signature.
  I have already indicated to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Scarborough) that I would be more than willing to make it subject to 
the passage of such State law. But we have a problem with underage 
drinking. And as the materials have indicated, sent out by the 
supporters of this bill, the national beer wholesalers who indicate 
that, if I might just cite some of their information, Mr. Chairman, 
State laws are broken. A national problem with local impact exists. 
They cited a number of instances where college students were receiving 
large amounts of alcohol and, of course, without any identification 
and, therefore, engaging in alcohol abuse.
  I would simply raise the specter to the gentleman that germaneness is 
a potential waiver to something that is on the crisis level. We are at 
a crisis level with the abuse of alcohol by our young people.
  First of all, I would ask the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Scarborough) would he accept a friendly amendment to modify it to make 
this subject to the passage of State laws in order to get to the point 
that we are trying to do?
  Let me say this, Mr. Chairman, in particular. We have a situation 
where our children are being negatively impacted. We have clear 
evidence that laws are being broken, that there is no enforcement. The 
amendment that I offer would provide enforcement. It would encourage 
carriers to make sure that the addressee and the individual that signs 
equals the same person. By that they would determine whether or not to 
deliver to underage drinkers.
  I think, Mr. Chairman, that we can do no less. If this bill is argued 
on the premise of bringing down underage drinking, then I clearly 
believe this amendment should be ruled not only in order but should be 
ruled as germane.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I wish to be heard on the point of 
order.
  Mr. Chairman, here again, similarly, though not exactly the same as 
the prior amendments, there is a germaneness issue that jumps to the 
fore in looking at the amendment proposed by the gentlewoman from 
Texas.
  I would note particularly in the House Practice Volume, Section 27, 
that what the gentlewoman is proposing to do is to amend a bill that 
amends existing law and going beyond the proposed amendment to the 
existing law.
  It says, ``A germaneness rule may provide the basis for a point of 
order against an amendment that is offered to a bill amending existing 
law.''
  The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Scarborough) is proposing an 
amendment to an existing law in a very narrow respect.
  What the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) is proposing to do 
by way of an amendment to the bill of the gentleman goes beyond that. 
It indeed would establish not an amendment to what the gentleman is 
proposing, and that is a change to Section 28 of the Federal Rules of 
Procedure relating to injunctive relief, but she is proposing a new 
substantive provision of the Federal Criminal Code.
  We are talking about two entirely different titles of the Federal 
Code. We are talking here about the Civil Code. She is talking about a 
new substantive criminal provision.
  It clearly raises germaneness questions. She is attempting to amend a 
bill that amends existing law in a way that is clearly improper 
pursuant to precedent and House Practice.
  I would urge the Chair to sustain the point of order raised by the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Scarborough).
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Does the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. 
Jackson-Lee) have further argument on the point of order?
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do.
  Mr. Chairman, I am disappointed. And I hear the opponents' arguments.
  As I indicated, the bill itself speaks to the attorney general being 
able to prohibit the illegal transfer or interstate transfer of 
alcohol. The underlying arguments for the bill speak to underage 
drinking.
  My amendment in particular deals with carriers shipping interstate, 
in the course of interstate commerce, alcohol and the requirement 
thereof for a signature to the addressee.
  I cannot imagine the unwillingness of the proponents of this 
legislation to be willing to accept this amendment based on the premise 
of the legislation to reduce underage drinking.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair is prepared to rule on the point 
of order.

                              {time}  1430

  The gentleman from Florida raises a point of order that the amendment 
offered by the gentlewoman from Texas is not germane.
  Under clause 7 of rule XVI, one of the fundamental tenets of the 
germaneness test is that the amendment must have the same fundamental 
purpose as the bill. The fundamental purpose of the bill under 
consideration is the creation of Federal court jurisdiction for civil 
actions arising under State laws regulating the importation or the 
transportation of intoxicating liquor. The fundamental purpose of the 
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Texas is the creation of new 
Federal prohibitions regarding the transportation of intoxicating 
liquor under Federal law. Therefore, the amendment has a different 
fundamental purpose and is not germane.
  The point of order is sustained.


             Amendment Offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas

  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas:
       At the end of the bill, add the following:

     SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       (a) Study.--This Act shall not take effect until 90 days 
     after the Attorney General submits to the Congress the 
     results of a study to determine the effect the amendment made 
     by this Act will have on reducing consumption of intoxicating 
     liquor by individuals who by reason of age may not lawfully 
     purchase such liquor.
       (b) Completion of Study.--The Attorney General shall carry 
     out the study required by subsection (a) and shall submit the 
     results of such study not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act.

  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). The gentleman 
from Florida reserves a point of order.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, we commit ourselves as 
Members of the United States Congress to not waste the taxpayers' 
dollars, to solve national crises, and to respond to the immediacy of 
the issue. As I indicated in all of the underlying arguments and 
supporting documentation that the proponents of this legislation have 
utilized, they have utilized the premises of teenagers getting alcohol, 
underage drinking, the abuse of alcohol. In fact, in their own 
documentation, there is a recounting of the tragedies of what happens 
when underage drinkers or how they get alcohol.
  This amendment is a simple request, Mr. Chairman. I would ask my good 
friend from Florida to reconsider his point of order, because it simply 
asks for a study to determine the impact of

[[Page H6884]]

this act on underage drinking. It then asks for the Attorney General to 
carry out the study required by subsection A and it asks for these 
results to be presented back to us, this Congress, to ensure that what 
we are trying to do, to bring down the numbers of underage drinking and 
to stop the abuse of alcohol, has really occurred by passage of this 
legislation.
  This is an amendment that deals with the question of what is H.R. 
2031 going to accomplish and what are we doing today with the passage 
of this legislation. Does it help the 17-year-old who calls a 
retailer's toll-free number to order a case of beer, she gives a fake 
birth date and uses someone else's credit card, the operator asks why 
she wants to pay $20 for a $7 case of beer and the teen says that she 
cannot get that brand where she lives although the brand is brewed in 
Michigan. The driver's license is never verified and the package is 
dropped off on the doorstep without an ID.
  So it is important that we understand as we pass this legislation 
whether or not we are seeing the results that we should see, whether or 
not it will impact, as I indicated earlier, the 19-year-old who lies 
about his age, uses his own debit card to order wine via the Internet, 
one package is left at the door without an ID, one winery uses a 
deceptive return label that indicates the package was shipped from a 
printing company. There we are, Mr. Chairman, misrepresenting.
  Or May 13, 1999, another television viewpoint, a 17-year-old orders 
beer from a Colorado company admitting that she is under 21, the 
company calls to confirm her age, she again admits she is under 21, 
beer arrives, anyway, left on the doorstep by UPS in an unmarked box, 
no ID checked.
  My amendment simply asks that all of the points that we have made 
today regarding the impact of this legislation on again underage 
drinking would be studied in order to, first of all, assess what impact 
legislation like this might have, to assist the States, many of whom do 
not have legislation like this. Most of them have the 21 requirement 
but they do not have the requirement dealing with shipper's labeling, 
they do not require the requirement of signatures, none of that is 
required, and this is a study, Mr. Chairman, that would simply be able 
to provide us with the necessary information.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Does the gentleman insist upon his point of 
order?
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. No, I do not.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida withdraws the 
point of order.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  Let me, first of all, respond to some things that have been said by 
the gentlewoman from Texas. She has been saying them several times 
today regarding the main purposes of this bill being to stop the 
illegal sales of alcohol to minors. That certainly is a very important 
part of it, but I believe it is just as important that we stop illegal 
bootlegging to people over 21 years of age as it is to stop illegal 
bootlegging for people under 21 years of age. I am hopeful that the 
gentlewoman from Texas will be able to support this overall bill.
  I must say that I was a bit confused in committee after she had 
expressed her deep concerns about underage drinking and said that it 
was a national crisis and that it was extraordinarily important for us 
to stop the illegal sales of alcohol to minors and then voted against 
the bill because she said that it applied also to people over the age 
of 21. This is a great first step. I know the gentlewoman wants to 
expand and wants to have carriers, nongovernmental carriers held 
liable, wants to put nongovernmental carriers in a position where they 
are actually going to be responsible for carding, and I certainly know 
that my friends, or perhaps my former friends, in the wine industry 
would not want to make Federal Express and UPS and other common 
carriers liable for carding at doors across the United States, because 
obviously their response to that would be to stop transporting wine 
across State lines.
  So I certainly am hopeful that the gentlewoman will be supportive of 
the overall bill. If she believes that illegal alcohol sales to minors 
is a national crisis, then this is the way you stop it. The argument 
that you oppose stopping illegal bootlegging to minors through a bill 
form because you also are trying to stop illegal bootlegging to people 
over the age of 21 is an argument that quite bluntly I just do not 
understand. I certainly am hopeful that the gentlewoman is not going to 
oppose this bill if again she is concerned about this national crisis.
  Let me also say, further, I am very pleased that she sees this as a 
national crisis. I mentioned 30, 35 news stations across the country 
that had identified this as a national crisis. I was accused of being 
clever and somehow, I do not know, I guess somehow getting these 35 
stations from San Francisco to Washington, DC to do this. I wish I 
could have had that influence in the media. I do not. I think it is 
helpful, though, that the gentlewoman understands that there is a 
national crisis out there but the national crisis is not limited to 
illegal alcoholic sales for people that are under the age of 21. 
Illegal bootlegging is occurring across the country now, people of all 
ages.
  I do obviously withdraw the point of order that I reserved. I do 
understand the purpose of this amendment. I will not be supporting this 
amendment. I do not think we need to stall an additional 90 days. If it 
is a crisis, I do not think we should give minors or people over 21 an 
additional 3 months to purchase alcohol illegally over the Internet. 
Likewise, I do not think you need a study for 180 days from the 
Attorney General to the State attorneys general telling them that 
illegal wine sales are occurring. They are occurring. Everybody knows 
they are occurring.
  Again the only thing this bill does, the overall bill that she is 
seeking to amend, is it differentiates between illegal alcoholic sales 
and legal alcoholic sales.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. CONYERS. I was wondering over here on our side, if we strike out 
the not taking effect for 90 days and make this a straight study, would 
that meet the objections and then the approval of the leadership on 
that side?
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Again, my only concern with that is if we strike out 
the 90 days, I am concerned that that gives in to the argument that 
this measure strictly is concerned with illegal sales to people under 
the age of 21.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Scarborough) has expired.
  (On request of Mr. Conyers, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Scarborough 
was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. I continue to yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. CONYERS. Suppose we make it a study of the impact of this 
legislation assuming that it passes, so that there would be no taking 
of effect and it would have no negative implications.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. If it will have no negative effect on the effective 
date, I certainly will consider it. I cannot give the gentleman an 
answer right now, but I certainly would consider that. My main concern 
is that we do not delay implementation of this obviously, because if it 
is a national crisis, as the gentlewoman from Texas says it is, we do 
not want to waste 3 months.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. I am still not quite sure what the purpose of a 
study just to have a study is. Members on the other side have spoken 
very eloquently in committee as well as on the floor today recognizing 
that there is indeed a very serious national problem with underage 
drinking. That conclusion has been reached in the absence of a magical 
study by the Attorney General. So we all know there is a problem out 
there. This bill has nothing to do with Federal authorities. This bill 
has to do with the authorities of State attorneys general, not the 
United States Attorney General. I think this is makework, I do not 
think we need this, and I would urge my colleagues, and especially the 
gentleman from Florida, to oppose the amendment as unnecessary and 
costly. The Attorney General of the United States has far too many 
issues, including what I presume my colleagues on the other side would 
agree is inadequate enforcement of gun

[[Page H6885]]

laws already, and now we are saying take some of those scarce resources 
and conduct a study of an issue that we are not even proposing here 
because what we are proposing here is the authority of State attorneys 
general, not the U.S. Attorney General. I would oppose the amendment.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Reclaiming my time, let me ask the gentleman, is he 
saying here that it is his position that this study would not delay the 
implementation of this?
  Mr. CONYERS. Absolutely. I am trying to save time actually, I am 
trying not to go to a vote and all of that, if we could merely have the 
impact of the legislation studied, which is not inconsistent with 
anything in the bill, nor anything that either of us on either side 
have debated in this matter.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Scarborough) has again expired.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, what we are trying to do is suggest that there be a 
study, an impact study on the legislation if and when it is passed. I 
do not think that will hurt anybody pro or con. It should be very 
helpful to us, particularly on the Committee on the Judiciary, who will 
be looking at this matter across the years. This is not some fly-by-
night provision. And it expedites time. We are working under 2 hours of 
amendments. The gentlewoman from California has an amendment she would 
like to put forward. It would save us a vote. I think that without a 
not taking effect for 90 days taken out of this, we are in a position 
to move forward expeditiously.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. We have concerns from the gentleman from Georgia 
regarding the cost of this. Is there any estimate, CBO estimate or any 
other estimate on what the cost of this study would be? Because 
certainly if it is a national crisis, as you say it is, it is certainly 
something that we need to address and we need to know the depth of that 
national crisis and certainly we know what kind of impact this is 
having.

                              {time}  1445

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, let me comfort the gentleman by saying 
that I am sure that the Attorney General has one or two or three people 
who could conduct a study here that would be negligible in the budget 
of the Department of Justice. I think cost would be no immediate 
concern whatsoever.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield one more 
time?
  Mr. CONYERS. Of course.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, is the gentleman also willing to get 
rid of the age issue and not only look at under-age, illegal alcohol 
sales to under age drinkers, but also illegal bootlegging for all ages? 
Would he be willing to do that?
  Mr. CONYERS. Yes, we are looking at an impact of this entire 
legislation. So we have taken out the specific references.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. So, Mr. Chairman, all aspects of this legislation, 
including lost revenues to States to enforce their laws.
  Mr. CONYERS. Absolutely.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I have got to say I have no objection 
to that. I would like to see the draft.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, we assure the gentleman that there is 
nothing but fairness exuding from this side of the aisle, no 
underhanded motives, and the impact study of the legislation, nothing 
could be more neutral than that.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Certainly, and if the gentleman would yield, if the 
gentlewoman would withdraw this amendment and then have the modified 
language offered at the desk, I would have no objection to that.
  Mr. CONYERS. There is no other way we can do that.
  I want to assure the gentleman that from my point of view there is no 
other way we can proceed without withdrawing this and advancing the 
other, and because I know the gentleman's good faith is no less than 
mine, I am prepared to go that way.
  Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this 
bill and in support of the amendment offered by my friend from 
California.
  I share the concern of my friend from Florida and other supporters 
that we must do everything possible to reduce underage drinking, and I 
would be proud to vote for this bill if I thought it would achieve that 
goal.
  But in reality, Mr. Chairman, this bill will do little to stop 
underage drinking while potentially crippling an industry that is very 
important to our nation and to my home state of New York.
  New York, like many other states across the country, has a thriving 
wine industry dominated by small vineyards.
  These vineyards have taken advantage of the Internet to sell their 
products across the nation.
  The vast majority of these sales are to responsible adult consumers.
  This legislation threatens these small wineries by permitting other 
states to seek action in federal court to block them from distributing 
their wines.
  This bill is an unjustified intrusion by the federal government into 
matters that should be left to the states. It is opposed by the 
National Conference of State Legislatures--the very same people that 
this bill is supposed to be helping. Moreover, it would effectively 
give states the authority to regulate interstate commerce, in direct 
violation of the Constitution.
   Mr. Chairman, the real purpose of this bill is not to prevent 
underage drinking. The real purpose of this bill is to protect the 
large beer and wine wholesalers from competition from independent 
producers, like many of the small wineries found in my home state of 
New York.
  The amendment, by contrast, will target our efforts toward preventing 
underage drinking, where they belong.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and to oppose this 
bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time authorized under the rule for consideration of 
amendments is now expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I object to the vote on the 
ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
quorum is not present.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count for a quorum.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, can we ask unanimous consent 
for additional time of 10 minutes? It is always better when we can work 
together.
  I ask unanimous consent for an additional 10 minutes to be able to 
respond to these concerns and work out some of the issues that we are 
working on.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair continues to count for a quorum, but the 
gentlewoman from Texas is advised that the Committee of the Whole 
cannot entertain such a unanimous consent request to change the rule 
adopted by the House.
  Does the gentlewoman withdraw her request?
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Can the Chair restate the motion that he 
cannot entertain for clarification?
  The CHAIRMAN. The Committee of the Whole may not entertain such a 
unanimous consent request.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. All right, Mr. Chairman. I now withdraw my 
request for a vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. The request for a vote on Amendment No. 4 offered by 
the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) is withdrawn.
  The amendment is rejected.
  The question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as amended.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, 
was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Calvert) having assumed the chair, Mr. Barrett of Nebraska, Chairman of 
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported 
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 
2031) to provide for injunctive relief in Federal district court to 
enforce State laws relating to the interstate transportation of 
intoxicating liquor, pursuant to House Resolution 272, he reported the 
bill back to the House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of 
the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on the amendment to the committee 
amendment in the nature of a substitute

[[Page H6886]]

adopted by the Committee of the Whole? If not, the question is on the 
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground 
that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum 
is not present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 325, 
nays 99, not voting 9, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 363]

                               YEAS--325

     Abercrombie
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Bono
     Boswell
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Callahan
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     Delahunt
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Filner
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Ford
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Hostettler
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kelly
     Kennedy
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Largent
     Larson
     Latham
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Mascara
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Mink
     Moakley
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Neal
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Pascrell
     Payne
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Toomey
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wu
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                                NAYS--99

     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Berman
     Blumenauer
     Borski
     Boucher
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Capps
     Carson
     Clay
     Conyers
     Cox
     Cummings
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Farr
     Fattah
     Forbes
     Gallegly
     Gejdenson
     Gordon
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hill (IN)
     Hinchey
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kasich
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kuykendall
     LaTourette
     Lee
     Lewis (CA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Maloney (NY)
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McKinney
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Nethercutt
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Paul
     Pelosi
     Phelps
     Pombo
     Radanovich
     Rangel
     Rohrabacher
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Schakowsky
     Serrano
     Shays
     Sherman
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Stark
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Woolsey

                             NOT VOTING--9

     Bilbray
     Frank (MA)
     Gephardt
     Lantos
     McDermott
     Mollohan
     Peterson (PA)
     Vitter
     Wynn

                              {time}  1513

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida and Mr. ENGEL changed their vote from ``yea'' 
to ``nay.''
  Messrs. CRANE, SISISKY, LaFACE, HINOJOSA, MALONEY of Connecticut, 
CUNNINGHAM, LaHOOD, BLILEY, ADERHOLT and SAWYER and Ms. BROWN of 
Florida changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time and was 
read the third time.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

                              {time}  1515


               Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Conyers

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Calvert). Is the gentleman opposed to 
the bill?
  Mr. CONYERS. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Conyers moves to recommit the bill H.R. 2031 to the 
     Committee on the Judiciary with instructions to report the 
     bill forthwith to the House with the following amendment:
       At the end of the bill, add the following:

     SEC. 4. STUDY.

       The Attorney General shall submit to the Congress the 
     results of a study to determine the impact of this Act. The 
     Attorney General shall carry out the study required by 
     subsection (a) and shall submit the results of such study not 
     later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) is 
recognized for 5 minutes on his motion to recommit.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I wish the membership to know that there 
was a vote taken on the third reading. That has only occurred about 2 
times in recent years.
  So this is a motion to recommit for which I will not ask a record 
vote, and then there will be a final passage vote, which may or may not 
be a record vote.
  Mr. Speaker, this motion to recommit is simple. It merely provides 
for a study to ascertain the impact of the legislation. It does not 
limit the study to the impact on underage drinking or any other 
specific area, although the amendment of the gentlewoman from Texas 
(Ms. Jackson-Lee) originally did that.
  This will give the Congress the information we need to assess how the 
legislation is working so that we can determine any changes that might 
be needed in the bill in the future.
  As the bill passed the committee, I opposed it. I believed the bill 
had the potential to burden Internet providers, to discriminate against 
out-of-State winemakers, and to authorize discriminatory taxes. Many of 
these concerns were addressed in the Goodlatte-Conyers-Cox amendment, 
which passed.
  The acceptance of this motion to recommit will offer an additional 
modest improvement to the bill.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, we can make this brief. I do not intend to oppose this 
motion to recommit. I certainly understand

[[Page H6887]]

the concerns of many people from California and other wine-producing 
regions, and understand their eagerness. I would like to thank them for 
working with us to make this a better bill. I would also like to thank 
them, in their eagerness, for allowing me the opportunity to vote on 
the engrossment and third reading. I have not done that before. I thank 
the gentleman from California that did that.
  Mr. Speaker, I think this is very important for us to have this 
study. I understand the gentleman's concerns. I thank the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Cox) and others for coming together and having us 
produce something that works. The study, I think, of the gentlewoman 
from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) would be helpful. As she said, we have a 
national crisis right now regarding the sale of alcohol to minors, and 
a national crisis on the sale of alcohol to people of majority age.
  I thank the gentleman for working with us on the motion to recommit, 
and I will be supporting it, as well as the final bill.
  Mr. CONYERS. I thank the gentleman, Mr. Speaker. I urge the Members 
to support the motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. If no Member rises in opposition, without 
objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The motion to recommit was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Scarborough).
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, acting under the instructions of the 
House on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, I report the bill, 
H.R. 2031, back to the House with an amendment.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment:
       At the end of the bill, add the following:

     SEC. 4. STUDY.

       The Attorney General shall submit to the Congress the 
     results of a study to determine the impact of this Act. The 
     Attorney General shall carry out the study required by 
     subsection (a) and shall submit the results of such study not 
     later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the amendment.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 310, 
nays 112, not voting 11, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 364]

                               YEAS--310

     Abercrombie
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Bass
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Bono
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Callahan
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Deal
     Delahunt
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fattah
     Filner
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Ford
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kelly
     Kildee
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kucinich
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Largent
     Larson
     Latham
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Mascara
     McCollum
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Menendez
     Mica
     Miller, Gary
     Mink
     Moakley
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Neal
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Toomey
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--112

     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Barton
     Berman
     Blumenauer
     Boucher
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Capps
     Carson
     Clay
     Conyers
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (VA)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Farr
     Forbes
     Gallegly
     Gejdenson
     Gibbons
     Gordon
     Goss
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hill (IN)
     Hinchey
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kasich
     Kilpatrick
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaFalce
     LaTourette
     Lee
     Lewis (CA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Maloney (NY)
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCrery
     McGovern
     McKeon
     McKinney
     Meeks (NY)
     Metcalf
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Moran (VA)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Nethercutt
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Phelps
     Pombo
     Radanovich
     Rangel
     Rohrabacher
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Schakowsky
     Serrano
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Skeen
     Slaughter
     Stark
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Young (AK)

                             NOT VOTING--11

     Barcia
     Bilbray
     Kennedy
     Lantos
     McDermott
     Meek (FL)
     Mollohan
     Peterson (PA)
     Portman
     Vitter
     Wynn

                              {time}  1539

  Mr. FOSSELLA changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated for:
  Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 364, final 
passage of H.R. 2031, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``yea.''
  Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 364, I was detained in a 
conference committee meeting and did not hear the bells. Had I been 
present, I would have voted ``yea.''

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