[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 109 (Thursday, July 29, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9758-S9764]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. THOMPSON (for himself and Mr. Ashcroft):
  S. 1466. A bill to amend chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, to 
provide for congressional review of rules establishing or increasing 
taxes; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:


                     taxpayer's defense act of 1999

  Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, today I rise to introduce the Taxpayer's 
Defense Act of 1999. I am pleased to be working with my good friend 
from Missouri, John Ashcroft, who has been a leader on this issue in 
the Senate. I also want to thank Chairman George Gekas for all of his 
hard work and leadership in the House. Our objective is clear and 
simple: no federal agency should set or raise a tax without the 
approval of Congress.
  America was founded on the principle that there should be no taxation 
without representation. In The Second Treatise of Government, John 
Locke said, ``[I]f any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on 
the people * * * without * * * consent of the people, he thereby * * * 
subverts the end of government.'' Consent, according to Locke, could 
only be given by a majority of the people, ``either by themselves

[[Page S9763]]

or their representatives chosen by them.'' The Boston Tea Party 
celebrated Americans' opposition to taxation without representation. 
And the Declaration of Independence listed, among the despotic acts of 
King George, his ``imposing Taxes on us without our Consent.'' First 
among the powers that the Constitution gave to the Congress, our new 
government's representative branch, was the power to levy taxes.
  The logic of allowing only Congress to establish federal taxes is 
clear: Congress considers and weighs the economic and social issues 
that rise to national importance. While any agency or government office 
may view its own priorities as paramount, only Congress can decide 
which goals of the people merit spending hard-earned taxpayer dollars. 
Only Congress can determine how many taxpayer dollars should be spent. 
Congress' decisions are made through an open political process that the 
public can see and participate in. And if the public is unhappy with a 
tax, they can hold Congress and the President responsible on election 
day.
  The accountability of lawmakers is a core feature of our 
representative democracy. But over time, Congress has delegated more 
and more of its legislative authority to unaccountable federal 
agencies. The Taxpayer's Defense Act would help restore constitutional 
balance and authority by requiring congressional approval for a rule 
that sets or raises a tax before the rule could take effect. Unelected 
agency officials could not directly establish or raise a tax, but would 
still have a chance to advance their proposals through an open 
political process in Congress.
  Few would publicly dispute the American principle of no taxation 
without representation. But increasingly, in ways often subtle or 
hidden, federal agencies are taking on--or receiving from Congress--the 
power to tax. Federal agency taxes pass the costs of government 
programs on to American consumers in the form of higher prices. These 
secret taxes often are regressive--hitting many who struggle to get by. 
They also put a drag on the economy. These taxes take money from 
everyone, and they are imposed without accountability.
  One big example of agency taxation is the Federal Communications 
Commission's Universal Service Tax. ``Universal service'' is the idea 
that everyone should have access to affordable telecommunications 
services. It originated at the beginning of the century when the nation 
was still being strung with telephone wires. The Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 included provisions that allowed the FCC to extend universal 
service, ensuring that telecommunications are available to all areas of 
the country and to institutions that benefit the community, such as 
schools, libraries, and rural health care facilities.

  Most importantly, the Act gave the FCC the power to decide the level 
of ``contributions''--taxes--that telecommunications providers would 
have to pay to support universal service. The FCC must determines how 
much can be collected in taxes to subsidize a variety of ``universal 
service'' spending programs. It charges telecommunications providers, 
who pass the costs on to consumers in the form of higher telephone 
bills. The FCC recently nearly doubled the tax to $2.5 billion per 
year, and Administration's budget have projected a rise to $10 billion 
per year. This agency tax is already out of control.
  The FCC's provisions for universal service have many flaws. These 
include the three ``administrative corporations'' set by the FCC. The 
General Accounting Office determined that the establishment of these 
corporations was illegal, and the FCC has collapsed them into one, no 
less questionable corporation. The head of one of these corporations 
was originally paid $200,000 per year--as much as the President of the 
United States.
  It seems that the more you look, the more you find that a number of 
federal agencies have been given, or discovered on their own, the power 
of tax. Congress has given taxing authority to the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Because these taxes 
are within statutory parameters, we have less concern with them than 
others, but they are still taxes. And an important principle is at 
stake: no taxation within representation. The Constitution gives the 
taxing power only to Congress. In practice, we often see a direct 
correlation between an agency taxing and the agency overspending 
taxpayer dollars. Congress must retain the power and accountability of 
the purse.
  More egregious examples are those where agencies have spontaneously 
discovered the power to tax. There's the FCC's telecommunications tax, 
and two new taxes, past and proposed, on Internet domain name 
registration. The first, sponsored by the National Science Foundation, 
collected more than $60 million before a federal judge put a stop to 
it. The second, under the aegis of the Commerce Department, proposes to 
charge $1 per Internet domain name per year. What Commerce Department 
official stands to be voted out of office if he or she sponsors an 
increase in this tax?
  The burden of this activity falls, of course, on the American 
taxpayer, whose money is being taken, laundered through the Washington 
bureaucracy, and returned (in dramatically reduced amounts) for 
purposes set by unelected agency staffers. This is why we must require 
the FCC, and all agencies, to get the approval of Congress before 
setting future tax rates.
  Some of my colleagues may question why Congress should shoulder the 
responsibility for taxes. Let me just note that in a recent fee-dispute 
case, the FCC argued, amazingly, that it had the unreviewable power to 
raise taxes. As the Court of Appeals put it:

       [A]ccording to counsel, the Commission could impose a tax 
     on an unregulated railroad or a tax on an individual for 
     eating ice cream . . . . This is a preposterous position, one 
     that we will not countenance. As this court [has] said . . . 
     ``it goes without saying that the bald assertion of power by 
     [an] agency cannot legitimize it. Unable to link its 
     assertion of authority to any statutory provision, the 
     [FCC's] position in this case amounts to be bare suggestion 
     that it possesses plenary authority to act within a given 
     area simply because Congress has endowed it with some 
     authority to act in that area. We categorically reject that 
     suggestion.''--Comsat Corporation v. FCC, 114 F. 3d 223, 227 
     (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

  Should tax dollars be used for federal programs? In what amounts? Or 
should Americans spend what they earn on their own, locally determined 
priorities? Requiring Congress to review agency taxes would answer this 
question.
  This legislation would create a new subchapter within the 
Congressional Review Act for mandatory review of certain rules. The 
portion of any agency rule that establishes or raises a tax would have 
to be submitted to Congress and receive the approval of Congress and 
the President before the agency could put it into effect. The Act would 
allow the agencies to formulate tax proposals for Congress to consider 
under existing rulemaking procedures. It is a version of a bill 
introduced last Congress by Chairman Gekas in the House and John 
Ashcroft in the Senate.
  Once submitted to Congress, a bill noting the taxing portion of a 
regulation would be introduced (by request) in each House of Congress 
by the Majority Leader. The bill would then be subject to expedited 
procedures, allowing a prompt decision on whether or not the agency may 
put the rule into effect. The rule could take effect once a bill 
approving it was passed by both Houses of Congress and signed by the 
President. If the rule were approved, the agency would retain power to 
reverse the regulation, lower the amount of the tax, or take any 
otherwise legal actions with respect to the rule.
  Mr. President, the rallying cry of ``no taxation without 
representation'' has been heard in America before, and now we are 
hearing it again. Congress must not allow unelected bureaucrats 
determine the amount of taxes hardworking Americans must pay. While 
preserving needed flexibility, the Taxpayer's Defense Act will allow 
elected officials alone to decide whether to raise taxes, and where to 
direct precious tax dollars.
  I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the Taxpayer's Defense Act be 
printed in the Record.

                                 S. 1466

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Taxpayer's Defense Act''.

     SEC. 2. MANDATORY CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW.

       Chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting after section 808 the following:

[[Page S9764]]

           ``SUBCHAPTER II--MANDATORY REVIEW OF CERTAIN RULES

     ``Sec. 815. Rules subject to mandatory congressional review

       ``(a) In this section, the term `tax' means a non-penal, 
     mandatory payment of money or its equivalent to the extent 
     such payment does not compensate the Federal Government or 
     other payee for a specific benefit conferred directly on the 
     payer.
       ``(b) A rule that establishes or increases a tax, however 
     denominated, shall not take effect before the date of the 
     enactment of a bill described in section 816 and is not 
     subject to review under subchapter I. This section does not 
     apply to a rule promulgated under the Internal Revenue Code 
     of 1986.

     ``Sec. 816. Agency submission

       ``Whenever an agency promulgates a rule subject to section 
     815, the agency shall submit to each House of Congress a 
     report containing the text of only the part of the rule that 
     causes the rule to be subject to section 815 and an 
     explanation of that part. An agency shall submit such a 
     report separately for each such rule the agency promulgates. 
     The explanation shall consist of the concise general 
     statement of the rule's basis and purpose required under 
     section 553 and such explanatory documents as are mandated by 
     other statutory requirements.

     ``Sec. 817. Approval bill

       ``(a)(1) Not later than 3 legislative days after the date 
     on which an agency submits a report under section 816, the 
     Majority Leader of each House of Congress shall introduce (by 
     request) a bill the matter after the enacting clause of which 
     is as follows: ``The following agency rule may take 
     effect:''. The text submitted under section 816 shall be set 
     forth after the colon. If such a bill is not introduced in a 
     House of Congress as provided in the first sentence of this 
     subsection, any Member of that House may introduce such a 
     bill not later than 7 legislative days after the period for 
     introduction by the Majority Leader.
       ``(2) A bill introduced under paragraph (1) shall be 
     referred to the Committees in each House of Congress with 
     jurisdiction over the subject matter of the rule involved.
       ``(b)(1)(A) Any committee of the House of Representatives 
     to which a bill is referred shall report the bill without 
     amendment, and with or without recommendation, not later than 
     the 30th calendar day of session after the date of its 
     introduction. If any committee fails to report the bill 
     within that period, it is in order to move that the House 
     discharge the committee from further consideration of the 
     bill. A motion to discharge may be made only by a Member 
     favoring the bill (but only at a time designated by the 
     Speaker on the legislative day after the calendar day on 
     which the Member offering the motion announces to the House 
     that Member's intention to do so and the form of the motion). 
     The motion is highly privileged. Debate thereon shall be 
     limited to not more than 1 hour, the time to be divided in 
     the House equally between the proponent and an opponent. The 
     previous question shall be considered as ordered on the 
     motion to its adoption without intervening motion. A motion 
     to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or 
     disagreed to shall not be in order.
       ``(B) After a bill is reported or a committee has been 
     discharged from further consideration, it is in order to move 
     that the House resolve into the Committee of the Whole House 
     on the State of the Union for consideration of the bill. If 
     reported and the report has been available for at least 1 
     calendar day, all points of order against the bill and 
     against consideration of the bill are waived. If discharged, 
     all points of order against the bill and against 
     consideration of the bill are waived. The motion is highly 
     privileged. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the 
     motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. 
     During consideration of the bill in the Committee of the 
     Whole, the first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. 
     General debate shall proceed, shall be confined to the bill, 
     and shall not exceed 1 hour equally divided and controlled by 
     a proponent and an opponent of the bill. After general 
     debate, the bill shall be considered as read for amendment 
     under the 5-minute rule. At the conclusion of the 
     consideration of the bill, the Committee shall rise and 
     report the bill to the House without intervening motion. The 
     previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill 
     to final passage without intervening motion. A motion to 
     reconsider the vote on passage of the bill shall not be in 
     order.
       ``(C) Appeals from decisions of the Chair regarding 
     application of the rules of the House of Representatives to 
     the procedure relating to a bill shall be decided without 
     debate.
       ``(2)(A) Any bill introduced in the Senate shall be 
     referred to the appropriate committee or committees. A 
     committee to which a bill has been referred shall report the 
     bill without amendment not later than the 30th day of session 
     following the date of introduction of that bill. If any 
     committee fails to report the bill within that period, that 
     committee shall be automatically discharged from further 
     consideration of the bill and the bill shall be placed on the 
     calendar.
       ``(B) When the Senate receives from the House of 
     Representatives a bill, such bill shall not be referred to 
     committee and shall be placed on the calendar.
       ``(C) A motion to proceed to consideration of a bill under 
     this subsection shall not be debatable. It shall not be in 
     order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion to 
     proceed was adopted or rejected, although subsequent motions 
     to proceed may be made under this paragraph.
       ``(D)(i) After no more than 10 hours of consideration of a 
     bill, the Senate shall proceed, without intervening action or 
     debate (except as permitted under subparagraph (F)), to vote 
     on the final disposition thereof to the exclusion of all 
     motions, except a motion to reconsider or to table.
       ``(ii) A single motion to extend the time for consideration 
     under clause (i) for no more than an additional 5 hours is in 
     order before the expiration of such time and shall be decided 
     without debate.
       ``(iii) The time for debate on the disapproval bill shall 
     be equally divided between the Majority Leader and the 
     Minority Leader or their designees.
       ``(E) A motion to recommit a bill shall not be in order.
       ``(F) If the Senate has read for the third time a bill that 
     originated in the Senate, then it shall be in order at any 
     time thereafter to move to proceed to the consideration of a 
     bill for the same special message received from the House of 
     Representatives and placed on the calendar under subparagraph 
     (B), strike all after the enacting clause, substitute the 
     text of the Senate bill, agree to the Senate amendment, and 
     vote on final disposition of the House bill, all without any 
     intervening action or debate.
       ``(G) Consideration in the Senate of all motions, 
     amendments, or appeals necessary to dispose of a message from 
     the House of Representatives on a bill shall be limited to 
     not more than 4 hours. Debate on each motion or amendment 
     shall be limited to 30 minutes. Debate on any appeal or point 
     of order that is submitted in connection with the disposition 
     of the House message shall be limited to 20 minutes. Any time 
     for debate shall be equally divided and controlled by the 
     proponent and the majority manager, unless the majority 
     manager is a proponent of the motion, amendment, appeal, or 
     point of order, in which case the minority manager shall be 
     in control of the time in opposition.''.

     SEC. 3. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Subchapter Heading.--Chapter 8 of title 5, United 
     States Code, is amended by inserting before section 801 the 
     following:

         ``SUBCHAPTER I--DISCRETIONARY CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW''.

       (b) Table of Sections.--The table of sections for chapter 8 
     of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
     before the reference to section 801 the following:

         ``SUBCHAPTER I--DISCRETIONARY CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW'';

     and by inserting after the reference to section 808 the 
     following:

           ``SUBCHAPTER II--MANDATORY REVIEW OF CERTAIN RULES

``815. Rules subject to mandatory congressional review.
``816. Agency submission.
``817. Approval bill.''.
       (c) Reference.--Section 804 of title 5, United States Code, 
     is amended by striking ``this chapter'' and inserting ``this 
     subchapter''.

                          ____________________