[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 108 (Wednesday, July 28, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9543-S9545]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. FRIST (for himself, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Brownback, and Mr. 
        Lieberman):
  S. 1453. A bill to facilitate relief efforts and a comprehensive 
solution to the war in Sudan; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.


                            sudan peace act

 Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, the United States has a tradition of 
defining our national interests overseas to reflect our values: freedom 
from persecution, freedom from religious intolerance, and the 
inalienable rights of self-determination and economic opportunity. In 
the twentieth century alone, we have sacrificed so much to defend those 
interests worldwide, based on the belief that freedom is truly an 
inalienable right, not simply for Americans, but for all peoples. Even 
now, in Kosovo and in Bosnia, we have been the world leaders in 
defending against tyranny and oppression, believing that, although far 
away, injustice must be met with resolve.
  Our response to the tragedy and injustice in Sudan has not been quite 
so aggressive. The radical Islamic regime in power in Sudan has 
coordinated a systematic campaign of terror against southern Sudan 
which includes calculated starvation, slavery, and the killing of 
innocent women and children. The war of low-level ethnic cleansing in 
Sudan has ground on for 16 years, claiming the lives of nearly 2 
million and displacing over 4 million. That staggering number 
represents more dead than the wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, 
Afghanistan, and Chechnya combined. In terms of loss of life, it has 
been the costliest war this century since the Second World War. After 
10 years of feeding the starving, with the war no closer to resolution 
than it was in 1983 when it began, we must change our approach. While 
we have been very generous as a Nation in terms of humanitarian relief, 
we have done little to address the causes of the war.
  Along with my colleagues, Senator Feingold, Senator Brownback, and 
Senator Lieberman, I am introducing the ``Sudan Peace Act,'' which aims 
to strengthen American policy and resolve to end the status quo.
  The timing of this initiative is critical. The Government of Sudan 
has publicly announced that they will use incoming oil revenues to 
increase the tempo and lethality of the war. An increase in the 
lethality and tempo of the war would translate into more death and 
destruction, more shattered lives and more slaves. Thus, time is of the 
essence in supporting efforts to reach a comprehensive conclusion to 
the hostilities. Even under such grim circumstances, a glimmer of 
opportunity to push for a comprehensive solution to the conflict may be 
at hand. We must take full advantage of that chance, for without the 
leadership of the United States, the war will certainly drag on for 
many more years.
  International relief operations have been in existence for 10 years 
with little change. The current arrangement allows Khartoum to 
manipulate our food donations as a weapon of mass destruction by 
vetoing United Nations' relief flight plans in areas of rebel activity. 
Also, at a cost of over $1 million per day, the effort is wrought with 
the potential for extreme donor fatigue.
  We need a new policy using all points of pressure and directing all 
efforts toward a comprehensive negotiated solution. Reinvigorating and 
pursuing a peace process based on the Declaration of Principles, signed 
by the combatants in 1994, is the best means we have to push for a 
comprehensive solution at this time. So far, the Government of Sudan 
has refused to negotiate in good faith, choosing instead to continue 
the brutal war and create political diversions to any credible, binding 
process.
  With a set of new or strengthened political and humanitarian tools, 
this legislation aims to push all players toward a comprehensive 
negotiated solution.
  The Government of Sudan has long abetted the practice of slavery. 
Additionally, it has helped organize and coordinate militia, Popular 
Defense Forces, and paramilitary holy warriors (``muraheleen'') to 
terrorize and sometimes enslave traditional agricultural and 
pastoralist tribes in the south and in the Nuba Mountains.
  The legislation condemns the gross violations of human rights in 
Sudan--including slavery, the use of the denial of access to food as a 
weapon of mass destruction, and targeting of civilians--and increases 
pressure for action in the United Nations Security Council and for UN 
human rights monitors to be deployed in contested areas.
  The effort to stop the conflict in Sudan has the best chance of 
success if

[[Page S9544]]

it is a multinational effort. The shameful lack of resolve among the 
international community to pressure the combatants has been a factor in 
the perpetuation of the conflict.
  The legislation does more than simply highlight the shameful lack of 
resolve internationally, it seeks to change our own policy to address 
the causes of the famine and the war.
  The legislation gives the Secretary of State clear authority to 
commit all necessary diplomatic efforts toward reinvigorating the 
Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process, 
including any necessary support for implementation of a settlement. It 
calls upon the leadership of the members of IGAD and the IGAD Partners 
Forum (IPF--a grouping of donors and multilateral organizations) to 
give all necessary support.
  The combination of a Declaration of Principles on which a peace 
process should be based and the engagement of the IGAD Partners' Forum 
bodes well for a reinvigoration of what has been a foundering process. 
The fact that IGAD is a credible regional organization adds to its 
potential success. The Declaration of Principles provides a first 
critical, measurable step to which the combatants can be held 
accountable.
  The legislation supports the President's sanctions against Sudan, 
codifying them into law and protecting them from piecemeal erosion 
until Sudan makes substantial and verifiable progress toward peace. The 
existing sanctions must be used as a pressure point for peace.
  The United States must maintain or strengthen every possible point on 
which to pressure Sudan to engage in a meaningful peace process. Any 
relaxation of any portion of the sanctions would essentially be a 
reward to Khartoum.
  The legislation also requires the President to report to Congress on 
the status and means of financing the new oil fields in Sudan and that 
financing's relationship to the sanctions, the number and circumstances 
of bombings of civilian targets by the Government of Sudan, the extent 
to which humanitarian operations are being compromised, and whether 
progress is being made toward peace by all parties.

  The issue of financing oil fields is especially important. The 
revenues from the new sources of oil will add a new source of hard 
currency to finance the war. A key player in making that influx of hard 
currency into Khartoum is a Canadian company that is listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange. Considering the wording of the sanctions in the 
President's Executive order of 1997, such a financial instrument would 
seem to be something the United States would not be able to legally 
facilitate. It is certainly not something the United States should want 
to facilitate.
  The United Nations-coordinated relief effort in Sudan, known as 
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), was founded in 1989 in response to the 
starvation deaths of 250,000 people in southern Sudan. In March and 
April 1998 the Government of Sudan denied OLS access to much of Bahr el 
Ghazal in an effort to starve out rebels. The ban caused severe famine.
  The ability of the Government of Sudan to veto OLS relief flight 
plans has allowed Khartoum to use food as a weapon of mass destruction. 
It indiscriminately targets combatants and noncombatants alike. Only 
with the cooperation and pressure from the members of the Security 
Council and those countries which continue normal trade relations with 
Sudan can we ever hope to achieve success on this point. Having a 
viable alternative to OLS would not only allow for the distribution of 
relief should a flight ban be imposed, it will immediately discourage 
Khartoum's use of flight bans as an instrument of war.
  This legislation continues to press for reform of all humanitarian 
assistance in Sudan. The bill includes measures to press for reform of 
OLS, for the continued use of relief organizations outside OLS to 
deliver the United States' relief assistance, and directs the 
Administration to develop a possible alternative organization to 
deliver relief, should Khartoum again place bans on relief flights.
  The use of non-OLS groups to distribute relief has two primary 
benefits. First, it fills in holes where OLS is prohibited from 
operating either by Khartoum or by its own security concerns. It can 
also strengthen the hand of OLS with respect to flight bans because 
Khartoum is reluctant to exercise its veto power when it clearly 
strengthens organizations outside its control.
  The legislation provides new and expanded authority for the Sudan 
Transition Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) program, which seeks to 
build the basic civil and economic institutions in areas devastated by 
the war.
  The move away from providing only disaster assistance toward 
providing development assistance is critical. STAR seeks to build the 
basic administrative and social institutions in areas outside of 
government control essential for a self sustaining Sudan: civil 
administration, civil society, agricultural extension services, courts, 
etc. One of the greatest advantages Khartoum enjoys is a destroyed 
society in the south. Again, a stronger society and economy in the 
south serves to disabuse Khartoum of the notion that it can win 
outright on the battlefield and is thus a pressure point to push for 
commitment to a viable peace process. The reconciliation efforts 
between the Dinka and Nuer peoples is arguably the most significant 
development in recent years in terms of strengthening the areas outside 
of the government's control and putting pressure on Khartoum to come to 
the table. Support for those efforts are critical. Finally, this 
position makes no assumption nor policy statement with regard to the 
eventual political status of the south.
  The legislation also provides for an independent assessment of the 
humanitarian needs of certain regions in Sudan, which are heavily 
contested and thus excluded from most multilateral humanitarian 
operations. The Nuba Mountains and its unique and fast-disappearing 
people and culture is especially vulnerable.
  In an effort to reduce the diversion of food assistance to 
combatants, to strengthen the targeted population's ability to defend 
themselves, and to provide for separation of combatants from ongoing 
humanitarian operations and the personnel who run them, the bill gives 
the President authority to provide direct food assistance to those 
forces protecting noncombatants from attacks by government or 
government-sponsored forces. However, such a program may only be 
conducted completely separate from current or future humanitarian 
operations and without compromising them.
  Currently, the majority of relief agencies, both within and outside 
OLS, provide assistance only to noncombatants. As a consequence, hungry 
rebel forces routinely divert food aid away from delivery areas, either 
by taxation, or by taking the food outright. The result is that normal 
food distribution is disrupted and any reasonable separation between 
combatants and noncombatants is breached. Providing a separate 
mechanism to feed combatants--who will be receiving food aid in one 
form or another, regardless of the distribution scheme--hOLSs the 
possibility of reducing diversions, maintaining a clear separation 
between combatant and noncombatants, and thus helping to minimize risk 
to relief agency personnel. Additionally, the necessity of pursuing 
food has seriously undermined the effectiveness of those forces to 
defend the population in areas outside of government control, as they 
must often demobilize for long periods of time to exact food from 
relief supplies or tend to farming or herding responsibilities. The 
Administration should make a determination on the potential for such a 
program to meet the goals outlined in the section. This legislation 
gives the President the authority to do so, with strong provisions to 
protect current humanitarian operations. Like other capacity building 
measures in this legislation, enhancing the ability of those in areas 
outside of government control to defend themselves from government 
aggression will ultimately help to dissuade the government from 
continued prosecution of the war and will thus strengthen the push to 
engage in a comprehensive peace process.
  These are all critical measures and opportunities which the United 
States must seize. Our policy has not done enough to change the status 
quo. Our generous response, which began in 1989, has grown and 
continued to feed more of the starving, yet as a response to the war, 
it has grown tepid. Unless we do all we can to end the conflict in 
Sudan,

[[Page S9545]]

we are part of the problem. For sixteen years we have witnessed the 
destruction of a nation and the loss of millions of lives, ground into 
dust as the world misses opportunity after opportunity to stop 
it.
                                 ______