[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 107 (Tuesday, July 27, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9381-S9382]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Mr. Harkin, and Mr. Wellstone):
  S. 1439. A bill to terminate production under the D5 submarine-
launched ballistic missile program; to the Committee on Armed Services.


           trident ii (d-5) missile production limitation act

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I come to the floor today to introduce a 
bill whose time has come.
  Mr. President, it is a decade since the Berlin Wall came down, 
heralding the end of the Cold War. Since then, we have reduced our 
nuclear arsenal, as have the Russians. And our Navy is advocating to 
downsize the Trident nuclear submarine fleet, the cornerstone of our 
nuclear triad strategy. It's just common sense to limit future 
production of weapons deployed in those submarines.
  The bill I introduce today would terminate future production of the 
Trident II missile. In doing so, this common sense bill would save 
American taxpayers $5 billion over the next five years, and more than 
$13 billion over the next ten years.
  Mr. President, the Trident II, or D-5 missile, is the Navy's 
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The missile is a Cold War 
relic that was designed specifically to be a first-strike strategic 
missile that would attack targets inside the Soviet Union from waters 
off the continental United States.
  The Trident II is deployed aboard Ohio-class nuclear submarines in 
the order of 24 per boat. Each missile is loaded with 8 independently 
targetable, nuclear warheads. In other words, 192 warheads per 
submarine. The warheads bear 300- to 475-kilotons of explosive power. 
Doing the math, that equals up to 91,200 kilotons of warheads on each 
and every Trident submarine.
  Mr. President, the truth of the matter is we all know that one 
submarine firing 192 warheads could bring about an apocalypse on this 
planet. Needless to say, 18, 14, or even 10 submarines with that kind 
of firepower is beyond necessity. This is especially true if one 
considers that in addition to, yes, in addition to the SLBMS, the 
United States deploys 500 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
missiles with three warheads each; 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs with 10 
warheads each; and 94 B-52 and 21 B-2 bombers capable of carrying 
strategic nuclear warheads.
  Mr. President, the United States is building or possesses, right now, 
360 Trident II missiles. Current plans would have us purchase 65 more 
missiles through 2005. The 360 missiles we already own are more than 
enough to fully arm the ten existing Trident II-armed submarines as 
well as maintain an adequate test flight program. We simply do not need 
65 more missiles. Nor do we need to backfit four Trident I, or C4, 
missile carrying submarines to carry Trident IIs, especially when one 
considers that the C4 submarines won't even outlast the Trident I 
missiles they carry.
  I'd like to briefly inform my colleagues on the difference between 
the Trident I and Trident II missiles. According to CBO, the C4 has an 
accuracy shortage of about 450 feet compared to the D5, or the distance 
from where the presiding officer is sitting right now to where the 
Speaker of the House is sitting down the hall. Given the fact that 
either missile could utterly destroy the District of Columbia many 
times over, spending billions of dollars to backfit the C4 submarines 
seems unnecessary.
  And this is not an inexpensive program, Mr. President. According to 
the Congressional Budget Office, which recommends that we discontinue 
production of the Trident II and retire all eight C4 submarines, if we 
terminate production of the missile after this year and retire the C4s 
by 2005, we would save more than $5 billion over five years, and more 
than $13 billion over the next ten years. Even here in the Senate, 
that's real money.
  Mr. President, I am not naive enough to believe that Russia's 
deteriorating infrastructure has eliminated the threat of their 
ballistic missile capability. And given the missile technology advances 
in China, North Korea, and Iran, and attempts by rogue states to buy 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, it is imperative that we maintain 
a deterrent to ward off this threat. There is still an important role 
for strategic nuclear weapons in our arsenal. Their role, however, is 
diminished dramatically from what it was in the past, and our missile 
procurement decisions should reflect that change.
  Mr. President, of our known potential adversaries, only Russia and 
China even possess ballistic missile-capable submarines. China's one 
ballistic missile capable submarine is used solely as a test platform. 
Russia is the only potential adversary with a credible SLBM force, and 
its submarine capabilities have deteriorated significantly or remain 
far behind those of our Navy. Due to Russia's continued economic 
hardships, they continue to cede ground to us in technology and 
training. Reports even contend that Russia is having trouble keeping 
just one or two of its strategic nuclear submarines operational. 
According to General Eugene E. Habiger, USAF (Ret.) and former 
commander in chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, Moscow's ``sub fleet 
is belly-up.''
  Mr. President, Russia's submarine fleet has shrunk from more than 300 
vessels to about 100. Even Russia's most modern submarines can't be 
used to full capability because Russia can't adequately train its 
sailors. Clearly, the threat is diminishing.
  Mr. President, earlier this year, Admiral Jay Johnson, the Chief of 
Naval Operations, went before the Senate Armed Services Committee and 
stated unequivocally that the Pentagon believes that 14 Trident 
submarines is adequate to anchor the sea-based corner of the nuclear 
triad. Based on that testimony, the committee put forward a Department 
of Defense authorization bill supporting the Navy's plan. Common sense 
would dictate that fewer submarines warrant fewer missiles. The threat 
is diminishing; the Navy knows it and the Congress knows it.

[[Page S9382]]

  The Navy's plan, with the Senate's agreement, to downsize our Trident 
submarine fleet saves valuable resources and allows us to reach START 
II arms levels for our SLBMs, and moves us toward future arms reduction 
treaties. By going with ten boats, the Navy could meet essential 
requirements under START II today and the anticipated requirements 
under a START III framework tomorrow.
  And ultimately, Mr. President, the United States' leadership in 
reducing our nuclear stockpile shows our good faith, and will make 
Russia's passage of a START II treaty more likely.
  This strategy of reducing our nuclear stockpile is supported widely 
by some of our foremost military leaders. General George Lee Butler, 
former commander in chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, and an ardent 
advocate of our deterrent force during the Cold War, has said that 
``With the end of the Cold War, these weapons are of sharply reduced 
utility, and there is much to be gained by substantially reducing their 
numbers.'' I believe we should heed his words.
  Mr. President, more than anything else, this issue comes down to a 
question of priorities. Do we want to spend $13 billion over the next 
ten years to purchase unnecessary Trident II missiles, or do we want to 
use that money to address readiness concerns that we've talked a lot 
about but haven't addressed adequately?
  Mr. President, for the past year, we've heard the call to address our 
military's readiness crisis from virtually all quarters. We were told 
that foremost among the readiness shortfalls were operations and 
maintenance as well as pay and allowances accounts.
  A preliminary General Accounting Office report on recruitment and 
retention found that issues like a lack of spare parts; concerns with 
the health care system; increased deployments; and dissatisfaction with 
military leaders have at least as much effect on retention, if not 
more, than a pay raise.
  And the Pentagon concurs. Last September, General Henry Shelton, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, stated that ``without relief, we will see 
a continuation of the downward trends in readiness . . . and shortfalls 
in critical skills.'' Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer claimed 
that the military faces a ``hollow force'' without increased readiness 
spending. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson asserted that 
the Navy has a $6 billion readiness deficit.
  To address the readiness shortfall, Mr. President, the Congress 
passed an emergency supplemental appropriations bill. The bill spent 
close to $9 billion, but just $1 billion of it went to address the 
readiness shortfall. Priorities, Mr. President.
  And last month, on the Defense appropriations bill, a couple of 
Senators inserted an amendment, without debate, to take $220 million 
from vital Army and Air Force spare parts and repair accounts, and from 
the National Guard equipment account to buy planes. Planes that the 
Pentagon doesn't even want. Sponsors of the amendment admitted readily 
that this was done for the benefit of a company that had lost a multi-
billion dollar contract with a foreign country. Priorities, Mr. 
President.
  This bill makes sense now and for the future by saving vital defense 
dollars now and for years to come, and by stimulating the arms treaty 
dialogue.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1439

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. TERMINATION OF D5 SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC 
                   MISSILE PROGRAM.

       (a) Termination of Program.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     terminate production of D5 submarine ballistic missiles under 
     the D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile program.
       (b) Payment of Termination Costs.--Funds available on or 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act for obligation 
     for the D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile program may 
     be obligated for production under that program only for 
     payment of the costs associated with the termination of 
     production under this Act.
       (c) Inapplicability to Missiles in Production.--Subsections 
     (a) and (b) do not apply to missiles in production on the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 ______