[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 104 (Wednesday, July 21, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8911-S8919]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




     INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000--Continued

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Lugar 
from Indiana be added as a cosponsor to the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will be happy to defer to Senator Levin. He 
is prepared now to report on one of his amendments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, in the last half-hour, or hour, there have 
been discussions going on relative to Senator Bingaman's second 
amendment. One of them has already been accepted, as I understand, in 
modified form. It is now my understanding that the managers would just 
as soon proceed to my amendment while they are trying to work out 
Senator Bingaman's second amendment. That is fine with me.
  Mr. KYL. Fine.


                Amendment No. 1261 To Amendment No. 1258

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative assistant read as follows:

       The Senator from Michigan [Mr. LEVIN] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1261 to amendment No. 1258:
       In section 213 of the Department of Energy Organization 
     Act, as proposed by subsection (c) of the amendment, add at 
     the end the following:
       (u) The Secretary shall be responsible for developing and 
     promulgating all Departmental-wide security, 
     counterintelligence and intelligence policies, and may use 
     his immediate staff to assist him in developing and 
     promulgating such policies. The Director of the Agency for 
     Nuclear Stewardship is responsible for implementation of the 
     Secretary's security, counterintelligence, and intelligence 
     policies within the new agency. The Director of the Agency 
     may establish agency-specific policies so long as they are 
     fully consistent with the departmental policies established 
     by the Secretary.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I will be happy to consider a time 
agreement. My good friend Senator Kyl suggested we try to adopt it. It 
is my understanding it might have been already adopted last night, so I 
suggest it would be perhaps an hour evenly divided.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, it is not often an amendment is read in its 
entirety around here, even a short one. Usually we ask unanimous 
consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with. I do 
not know how many times I have used those words on this floor in the 
last 20 years. But in this case I decided to have this amendment--it is 
fairly short--read in its entirety because it may sound familiar to 
some people.
  These are Senator Rudman's words. This amendment incorporates some 
very important parts of Senator Rudman's panel's recommendation that 
are left out of the pending amendment. That is why I wanted the entire 
amendment read.
  The sponsors of this amendment have correctly pointed out that 
Senator Rudman is recommending a semiautonomous agency, and that is the 
heart of Senator Rudman's proposal. It happens to be a proposal that I 
support. But the difference between my position and the sponsor's 
position, relative to Senator Rudman's recommendations, is that their 
amendment leaves out some very critical recommendations of the Rudman 
panel relative to the operation of the Department of Energy.
  My amendment would insert in the pending amendment some very 
important recommendations of the Rudman panel the pending amendment 
omits.
  We have heard a lot relative to the importance of the Rudman panel 
recommendations. Senator Rudman and his panel performed an extremely 
important service to this Nation in pointing out the complicated 
bureaucratic maze that exists at the Department of Energy and pointing 
out that for 20 years, report after report, recommendation after 
recommendation to streamline the bureaucracy the Department of Energy 
have been made, including made to the Congress, without action being 
taken by the Congress.
  All of us bear responsibility for that failure. Three administrations 
and 20 years of Congresses have been told in a number of reports there 
should be some reorganization done at the Department of Energy
  Finally, a year and a half ago, President Clinton issued a 
Presidential directive that reorganizes the Department of Energy. That 
directive has been mainly implemented, not yet fully apparently but 
mainly implemented. The Rudman panel goes beyond that Presidential 
directive but does give credit to President Clinton for being the first 
President in 20 years to direct the reorganization of the Department of 
Energy, even though three Presidents have been told there is 
significant organizational problems, and even though as early as 1990 
there was a public statement about espionage being carried out by the 
People's Republic of China at one of these labs.
  Secretary Richardson is engaged in significant reorganization of this 
agency, and the Rudman panel gave credit to Secretary Richardson for 
beginning the important reorganizational changes.

  This Congress has taken some steps to reorganize the Department of 
Energy. The Armed Services Committee, for instance, upon which our 
Presiding Officer sits with distinction, has acted on our bill, which 
is now in conference, to carry out some significant reorganization of 
the Department of Energy.
  On the House side, the Armed Services Committee did the same thing. 
The language is different. Parts of their provision differ from ours. 
But the point is, there are some very important things going on in 
terms of reorganization in the Department of Energy, as we speak. But 
the Rudman panel goes beyond that. It would put into law, for instance, 
things which are in an Executive order. We know how much more important 
a law is than an Executive order because an Executive order, No. 1, can 
be changed by the next President but, No. 2, can be too often ignored 
by the bureaucracy. We had a recent example of that in another agency 
where an agency just almost totally ignored an Executive order.
  We want to put into law a significant reorganization, and we want 
to--at least I do, and I think most of my colleagues want to--put into 
law a reorganization along the lines of the Rudman panel 
recommendation. I do not know that there is any disagreement on that, 
but apparently there is a disagreement when it comes to setting forth 
not just the provisions of the Rudman panel's recommendations relative 
to the power of this new semiautonomous agency, but when it comes to 
setting forth the power of the Secretary of Energy relative to 
directing and controlling his Department.
  What is left out in this amendment is also important, according to 
the Rudman panel. This is not the Senator from Michigan talking; this 
amendment is the Rudman panel talking. I will go into what these 
provisions are in just one moment.
  I emphasize, the security breakdown that has existed for 20 years 
that was highlighted in the Cox commission report must be corrected. 
There are a number of steps underway to correct them, but we should 
act. There have been some pretty important, good-faith discussions 
going on over the last few days as to how we might be able to come up 
with a bill which can become law.
  We can pass a bill, and if the House does not accept the bill because 
they think it ought to be a freestanding bill and not on an 
intelligence authorization bill, or because they do not think it ought 
to be on a Department of Defense authorization bill--and that is their 
position in conference relative to the defense authorization bill--we 
can attach language here. But if we do not have a strong, healthy 
consensus, it seems to me we are in a much weaker position in getting 
this law actually

[[Page S8912]]

passed in the House and signed by the President. That should be our 
goal.
  If we are serious about trying to tighten up and streamline the 
Department of Energy, if we are serious about passing a law to do that, 
then we ought to figure out a way we can come together, incorporate the 
Rudman panel recommendations, including the ones which are left out in 
this amendment which I will try to add in a moment, so we can go to the 
House of Representatives with a healthy consensus vote, a strong vote, 
rather than a divided vote, and the same message would then be 
delivered to the President.
  The Rudman report calls for a semiautonomous Agency for Nuclear 
Stewardship. I fully support that. That would be an agency which will 
oversee all nuclear-related matters in the Department of Energy, 
including defense programs and nuclear nonproliferation. It would also 
oversee all functions of the national security labs and the weapons 
production facilities. I strongly support that. It would streamline the 
new Agency's management structure by abolishing ties between the 
weapons labs and all DOE regional field and site offices and all 
contractor intermediaries. It would appoint the Director of the new 
Agency by the President with Senate confirmation, and it would have 
effective administration of safeguard security and counterintelligence 
at all the weapons labs and plants by creating a coherent security 
counterintelligence structure within the new Agency.

  In making the recommendation for a semiautonomous agency, the Rudman 
report cites as models similar agencies within the Department of 
Defense, such as the National Security Agency, NSA, the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA, and the National 
Reconnaissance Office, the NRO.
  Each of these three agencies is a separately organized agency run by 
an administrator within the Department of Defense. While the mission of 
each is different from the other, all three are under the authority, 
direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense; all three are 
subject to Department of Defense policies and regulations; and all 
three are directed by the Secretary and his deputy through an 
assistant.
  That is the model Senator Rudman has based his recommendation on--
three agencies in the Department of Defense, separately organized, each 
having their own staff, but where the Secretary and the Deputy 
Secretary direct that separately organized agency through an assistant.
  That is a very important part of that model which is omitted in this 
bill. So Senator Rudman and his panel, on June 30, sent a ``Memorandum 
of Clarification'' relative to their report. One of those 
recommendations in the statement is the following: ``The Secretary is 
still responsible,'' under their model, ``for developing and 
promulgating DOE-wide policy on these matters,'' these matters being 
security, intelligence, and counterintelligence, ``and it makes sense 
to us,'' that is, the Rudman panel, ``that a Secretary would want 
advisers on his/her immediate staff to assist in that vein.''
  So the first sentence of our amendment says:

       The Secretary shall be responsible for developing and 
     promulgating all Departmental-wide security, 
     counterintelligence and intelligence policies, and may use 
     his immediate staff to assist him in developing and 
     promulgating such policies.

  It is verbatim from Senator Rudman's panel's recommendation.
  Senator Rudman's panel also says: ``. . . The Agency Director,'' that 
is the new Agency, ``. . . is responsible and held accountable for 
ensuring complete and faithful implementation of the Secretary's 
security, counterintelligence and intelligence policies within the new 
Agency.''
  The second sentence of our amendment reads:

       The Director of the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship is 
     responsible for implementation of the Secretary's 
     security, counterintelligence, and intelligence policies 
     within the New Agency.
  Again, it is verbatim from the Rudman panel's memorandum of June 30.
  The Rudman panel also said on that day that ``The Director of the 
Agency,'' that is, the new Agency ``may establish agency-specific 
policies so long as they are fully consistent with the departmental 
policies established by the Secretary.''
  The third line in our amendment says:

       The Director of the Agency may establish agency-specific 
     policies so long as they are fully consistent with the 
     departmental policies established by the Secretary.

  It is verbatim from the Rudman panel recommendation.
  I do not think we can have it both ways. The Rudman panel's 
recommendations are very important. We are not obligated to adopt every 
one. We are not obligated to adopt any of them. But there are some of 
us who believe those recommendations are hugely important. As always is 
the case when you create a new agency within a Department, you have to 
figure out a balance between the power of the new Agency and the power 
of the Secretary to run his Department that contains that new Agency.
  That is a very important balance. We are doing it on the Senate 
floor. Usually that kind of a complex and rather arcane effort would be 
made by the Governmental Affairs Committee, but in this case, for many 
reasons, legitimate reasons, it comes to us in this form, and we must 
deal with it.
  But in dealing with these issues, as to that balance, we have 
guidance. We have guidance from the Rudman panel. The Rudman panel 
says: Create a semiautonomous agency. It then goes into detail on the 
functions of that semiautonomous agency and the power both of its 
director and the Secretary of Energy. It sets them out. It lays this 
out for us.
  The amendment before us omits some critically important 
recommendations of the Rudman panel, the ones I have just read and the 
ones that are in my amendment. It is that omission which, it seems to 
me, so flaws, and unnecessarily flaws, may I say, the amendment before 
us.
  I do not quite fathom why it is that specific recommendations of the 
Rudman panel, relative to what the balance and the relationship are, 
should be omitted when they are important.
  The sponsors of the amendment will no doubt say that the Secretary 
reserves the right in their amendment to direct and control the 
Department, and that is true. But when it comes down to putting any 
flesh on those bones, when it comes down to saying how the Secretary 
will do that--that he is able, for instance, to use his staff to 
promulgate policies, that the agency must comply with the Department's 
policies that apply departmentwide--when it comes to those things, then 
we have a problem with this amendment.
  This amendment actually suggests the opposite is true from what 
Rudman has suggested when it says that ``The Secretary may not delegate 
to any Department official the duty to supervise or direct'' but leaves 
out the critically important power that Rudman would give the Secretary 
to utilize his staff to assist him in developing and promulgating 
departmentwide policies.
  So we correct this omission. The spirit of Rudman is that there be a 
semiautonomous agency when it comes to spelling out how that agency 
would function, what the balance of powers and functions would be 
between the Secretary of the Department, of which this agency is a 
part, and the new Agency Director. It is at that point that we have the 
omissions that Rudman recommends and the omissions in this pending 
amendment which my amendment would fill in.

  Mr. President, I inquire how much time this Senator has left.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burns). The Senator from Michigan has 10 
minutes 26 seconds.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair and reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. We have 30 minutes on our side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 30 minutes exactly.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, the Senator from Illinois, Senator 
Fitzgerald, had asked, before we knew the Senator was coming up, 
whether he could come to the floor and speak for 5 minutes. He got 
here, but the Senator had started so he was cut out for an hour. I 
wonder if we could have consent for the Senator to speak for 5 minutes 
and it not be counted against either side.
  Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I so request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from Illinois.

[[Page S8913]]

  Mr. FITZGERALD. I thank the Chair. To the Senator from Michigan, I 
thank him for allowing me to speak on Senator Kyl's underlying 
amendment.
  The recent release of the Cox report and the President's Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board's report has confirmed our worst fears that 
lax security at our national laboratories enabled the Chinese to steal 
some of our nation's most guarded nuclear secrets. This appears to be 
among the most severe breaches of American security in our Nation's 
history. This issue is of particular concern to my state, Illinois, as 
we are the home of three labs--Argonne National Laboratory, Fermi 
National Accelerator Laboratory, and the New Brunswick National 
Laboratory.
  But despite years of warnings, beginning with a detailed briefing by 
the Department of Energy on the issue, the administration did next to 
nothing to close the breach in security at our national labs, and did 
next to nothing to keep suspected scientists away from classified 
information. Instead, the administration soft-pedaled the issue, 
encouraged the transfer of technology to China, and even denied that 
any secrets were lost to China during this administration. The 
administration's response to report after report of security threats to 
our labs has been, ``See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil.'' In 
fact, the administration sought to undermine the truth and accuracy of 
reports of these security breaches. And when the disastrous 
consequences of this policy of denial and inaction were exposed, the 
administration played a half-hearted game of catch-up that continues to 
this day.
  The report issued by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board presents a scathing and highly critical account of DOE's handling 
of, and response to, the threat posed to weapons labs by Chinese 
espionage. The report characterizes DOE as having a ``dysfunctional 
management structure and culture,'' unable to respond to the unique 
challenge posed by China. Unfortunately, DOE is in the words of the 
report a `dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven it is incapable of 
reforming itself''
  In the coming years, the United States may pay a terrible price for 
this dereliction of duty. China is likely to make a great leap forward 
in its ability to threaten the United States with nuclear attack, 
thanks to stolen American nuclear weapon and missile technology. In 
fact, China now admits that it has neutron bomb technology. A well-
known proliferator, China may sell or give this advanced technology to 
Iran or Pakistan, further increasing the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction and the missiles to deliver them.
  For our part we, as Senators, must undertake the task of repairing 
the system that allowed this information to fall into the hands of 
China. To this end a number of my colleagues and I have co-sponsored an 
amendment to the intelligence authorization bill initially offered by 
Senators Kyl, Domenici, and Chairman Murkowski. This amendment would 
create a semi-autonomous agency within DOE responsible for the nuclear 
weapons laboratories and their security. I ask for and encourage 
Senators to join me and the other cosponsors in supporting this 
measure. I welcome Secretary Richardson's change of mind on this issue. 
Although he was initially opposed to such an agency, the Secretary has 
joined the bipartisan group of Senators in supporting the concept of a 
semi-autonomous agency for nuclear stewardship.
  I hope that my colleagues will join us in passing this legislation 
and implementing this important step in sealing the breach in security 
at our Nation's weapons labs.
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will take the first few minutes and reply 
to Senator Levin's amendment, and then Senator Domenici will add his 
thoughts.
  I first note that this language was handed to us as this debate 
began, and so it has been a little difficult to correlate the 
provisions of this amendment with the provisions of our bill and with 
the recommendations of the Rudman report. I think it is fair to say the 
following four things about this amendment.
  First of all, it is not necessary. I haven't really heard any 
explanation of why we need this different language. I believe that our 
bill, which tracks the report of the President's Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board, allows the Secretary of Energy to create policies that 
are applicable to the entire department and that the implementation of 
security and counterintelligence within this new Agency is the 
responsibility of the new Under Secretary that is responsible for 
nuclear stewardship, but that the Secretary of Energy will always have 
the ultimate say with respect to those security and counterintelligence 
policies. That is what our bill calls for. That is what the Rudman 
report recommends should be done. I don't see any need for this 
different way of saying it.
  There are also at least two problems with the language itself. I am a 
little concerned because Senator Levin scores a debater point by saying 
one of the sentences of his three-sentence amendment comes right out of 
a letter that Senator Rudman wrote to us. It is not the Rudman report, 
but it is a letter that he sent to us. Since we have been saying that 
our legislation tracks the Rudman recommendation, therefore, we have to 
accept that sentence.
  That is, of course, a dual standard. Senator Levin is perfectly 
willing to reject parts of the PFIAB report. Under his analysis, then 
he should accept everything the Rudman report recommends as well.
  The truth of the matter is, we have tried to track it as closely as 
possible, and I think we have done a good job. We haven't included the 
sentence from the letter that Senator Rudman wrote. It is not 
necessary.
  I think there is a dual standard being applied here. I think all of 
us can appreciate the fact that we are trying to track it as closely as 
we can, consistent with writing this legislation.
  The two primary points of objection I have to the amendment are 
these: As a practical matter, this whole exercise is to do things 
differently within this new Agency than they are done departmentwide. 
That is the essence of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board report. It says: You need to create a new semiautonomous agency 
that doesn't have to do things the way they are done all over the rest 
of the Department of Energy. That has been the problem--all these 
different people making rules and regulations and policies. It is 
impossible to protect the Nation's security and our foremost secrets 
when you have so many people, in effect, with their finger in the pie. 
You need to create a very specific semiautonomous agency that has 
control over those nuclear programs, and don't apply all of the other 
departmentwide policies, as good as they may be for the rest of the 
Department, to this new Agency.
  Many of the departmentwide policies will be appropriate, but 
undoubtedly some of them will not be. The whole point is to do things 
differently than they have been done in the past and to have the 
flexibility to do them differently within this new Agency.

  For example, suppose the Secretary says to one of his staff 
assistants: I want you to develop a new departmentwide policy on 
polygraph tests. This person goes out and does the research, comes back 
and says: We shouldn't have any polygraph tests. The Secretary of 
Energy says: Okay, that is our departmentwide policy.
  Under the Levin amendment, this new Agency, this new semiautonomous 
Agency that is responsible for control of our nuclear secrets, wouldn't 
have any choice but to implement that departmentwide policy. That is 
exactly what this language says. I will read it, Mr. President:

       The director of the agency may establish agency-specific 
     policies so long as they are fully consistent with the 
     departmental policies established by the Secretary.

  No flexibility to do anything different. That is the whole point. 
That is what the PFIAB report said: You have to do things differently. 
You cannot expect a different result if you keep doing them the same 
old way. You cannot require, for this very unique, highly technical 
business of making nuclear weapons, the application of all the same 
standards and policies that apply throughout the Agency.
  The one example used frequently is the refrigerator standards. But 
there are so many differ examples you can point to. Agencywide policies 
may be fine agencywide, but they should not

[[Page S8914]]

necessarily be applicable to this new Agency. They may be, but they 
aren't necessarily. That is the approach our bill takes. It says the 
Secretary can develop these agencywide policies, but the Director of 
this new Agency has to have some flexibility to say some of the things 
that apply to other parts of the Department of Energy should not apply 
here; they are not applicable, and they may even be dangerous.
  That it the whole point of what we are trying to accomplish. When the 
amendment says the Director of the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship is 
responsible for the implementation of the Secretary's security, 
counterintelligence, and intelligence policies within the new Agency--
and he can only devise agency-specific policies as far as they are 
fully consistent with the departmentwide policies--you are tying his 
hands behind his back; he is set up for failure before he even starts.
  This amendment is very dangerous. One reason it is dangerous is that 
the language seems to track fairly closely elements of the report. But 
again, what we are saying is the Secretary, of course, can develop 
agencywide policies. Some of those will be applicable to this new 
Agency, but they don't necessarily have to be. That is where we 
diverge. That is a critical difference here. It would be impossible for 
this new Agency Director to do his job if he were bound by this 
language.
  Our whole point is to have accountability and responsibility of this 
person. Well, I would not take the job if I were given the 
responsibility to protect our Nation's nuclear secrets and then I was 
told: However, you cannot establish any policy within your new Agency 
that is inconsistent with departmentwide policies. I would not 
undertake that job because I would not be able to do it the way I 
thought best.

  Mr. President, with respect for the Senator from Michigan, I have to 
say this is the wrong approach and we will have to oppose this 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. KYL. How much time do we have on this side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 22 minutes 49 seconds. Senator 
Levin has 10 minutes.
  Mr. KYL. I inquire, does the Senator from Michigan want to speak 
next? We have more time on our side. Would he want to address the 
Senate?
  Mr. LEVIN. No.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, perhaps we should suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  Mr. LEVIN. I misheard the Senator. Did he say there were additional 
speakers on his side?
  Mr. KYL. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. Senator Kerrey has expressed a desire to speak in support 
of the amendment. I will briefly yield 2 minutes to myself. Regarding 
the comments of the Senator from Illinois about both the President and 
the Secretary relative to the Secretary's actions, the PFIAB, or the 
Rudman report, as we call it, says the following:

       We concur with and encourage many of Secretary Richardson's 
     recent initiatives to address the security problem at the 
     Department. And we are heartened by his aggressive approach 
     and command of the issue. He has recognized the 
     organizational dysfunction and cultural vagaries at the DOE 
     and has taken strong, positive steps to try to reverse the 
     legacy of more than 20 years of security mismanagement.

  Now, the contrast between what the Rudman report says about Secretary 
Richardson and what the Senator from Illinois says the Rudman report 
said, relative to Secretary Richardson, is a pretty sharp contrast, 
indeed. This is what the Rudman panel actually said:

       We concur with and encourage many of Secretary Richardson's 
     recent initiatives to address the security problems at the 
     Department. And we are heartened by his aggressive approach 
     and command of the issues. He [Secretary Richardson] has 
     recognized the organizational dysfunction and cultural 
     vagaries at the DOE, and he [Secretary Richardson] has taken 
     strong, positive steps to try to reverse the legacy of more 
     than 20 years of security mismanagement.

  I ask the Senator from Nebraska, the ranking Democrat, the vice chair 
of the committee, whether he wishes to speak at this time.
  Mr. KERREY. I am pleased to.
  Mr. LEVIN. I gave you both titles.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I apologize to the Senator from Arizona. I 
did not hear all the reasons for opposing the Levin amendment because I 
am afraid, in my own mind, this is getting down to a point where it 
seems to me--I said to Senator Levin earlier that it seems the bill 
gives the Secretary the right to do all these things. I don't see a lot 
of reason to oppose this, I really don't.
  As I understand it, the Senator from Arizona has a problem with the 
last sentence, which says, ``The director of the agency may 
establish''--this is a nuclear security agency--``agency-specific 
policies''--that is the same autonomous objection that we have--``so 
long as they are fully consistent with departmental policy established 
by the secretary.''
  It seems to me we want the Secretary to be able to establish 
Department policies that would apply to everybody and allow the new 
security Agency still to be able to establish specific policies that 
don't relate to the rest of the Department. I don't understand the 
Senator's objection to that because it seems to me that is a reasonable 
thing to say.
  The trouble I am having--and I am trying to make certain we achieve a 
big bipartisan vote on this because I don't want to lose the 
opportunity that we have been given many times in the past couple of 
decades, and the Senator from Arizona has been pushing hard on this 
thing. I would hate for us to fail as a consequence of not being able 
to resolve what seems to me is not that big a conflict. I would 
appreciate the Senator talking about this last sentence and what he 
thinks seems to be wrong with it.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will respond on my time, and if we need 
more time, we can utilize that.
  Senator Kerrey raises the exact right question. In many respects, we 
are not that far apart. I think this language creates one specific, big 
problem, however. In the bill, we provide the authority for the 
Secretary to establish not only departmentwide policies on security, 
counterintelligence, and other matters, but also he would have the 
residual authority to direct those issues within the new Agency itself 
if he really wanted.
  Mr. KERREY. Can the Senator refer to where that is in the bill?
  Mr. KYL. I will have my staff find the pages. On page 2 of the bill, 
there is ``general authorities residual to the secretary.''
  I refer the Senator's attention to section 213(c):

       The secretary shall be responsible for all policies of the 
     agency.

  So that is the overall general policy here. That is, of course, 
consistent with the recommendations of the Rudman report. It is what we 
have always said has to be--that ultimately the Secretary has the 
authority to impose his will on this new Agency in any way he should 
desire to do so, whether it is agency specific, or with respect to a 
departmentwide policy. We provide for that.

  The problem with this amendment and the problem with the last 
sentence is that it would remove from the Under Secretary in charge of 
the nuclear program the ability to have policies different from general 
DOE-wide policies because it says:

       The director of the agency may establish agency-specific 
     policies so long as they are fully consistent with the 
     departmental policies established by the Secretary.

  I can give an example of polygraphs. If you read the first sentence 
of this amendment, the Secretary may use his immediate staff to assist 
him in developing these departmentwide policies.
  He asks a person not in this new semiautonomous Agency to go out and 
develop a policy regarding polygraphs. I am using this as a 
hypothetical. The person comes back and says we shouldn't have 
polygraphs. That is a departmentwide policy. And the new Under 
Secretary, in the second sentence, is directed to implement the 
Secretary's policies within the new Agency.
  How might he do that? The third sentence:

       The director of the agency may establish agency-specific 
     policies so long as they are fully consistent with the 
     departmental policies established by the Secretary.

  We need to allow enough flexibility so there can be some differences.
  The whole point of the Rudman recommendation is that this new Agency 
may have to do some things different from the rest of the Department. 
There may be personnel policies. There may

[[Page S8915]]

be contracting policies. There may even be policies of security and 
counterintelligence that would be different in this new entity.
  But even if they are different--this, I know, goes right to the point 
of the Senator from Nebraska--even if the person in charge of this new 
semiautonomous Agency says, look, we have to do things differently with 
respect to security in our new Agency than you do them in the rest of 
the Departments, the Secretary of Energy still has the ultimate say as 
to whether he approves of that and agrees with that or not because he 
is ultimately in charge.
  But the way this amendment is written, the new Director wouldn't have 
any options. He has to do it consistent with the departmentwide policy. 
He has no discretion to do it differently. He has to have this 
discretion to do it differently if he thinks it is necessary. Then if 
the Secretary says, no, I don't want you to, the Secretary still wins. 
He is still the boss.
  That is my answer to the Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. KERREY. I appreciate that answer.
  I am struggling. I have been in this position before, I say to my 
friend from Arizona, where I hear words and they mean something to me 
and they mean something entirely different to somebody else. I am still 
struggling.
  It seems to me that the language of ``the director of the agency may 
establish agency-specific policies,'' which is what the Senator from 
Arizona wants, by the way, this amendment amends section 213(a). At the 
end of the following, ``the secretary shall be responsible''--OK, at 
the end. It has a paragraph (u) to this.
  Is that what the Senator from Michigan just took?
  Is the Senator saying in his amendment that the Secretary shall be 
responsible for all policies of the Agency? The Senator is saying the 
Secretary still has that authority.

  How is that inconsistent? I still don't understand how that 
undercuts. This one says:

       The director of the agency may establish agency-specific 
     policies so long as they are fully consistent with the 
     departmental policies established by the Secretary.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, the point is as long as they are consistent 
with departmental policies established by the Secretary. In other 
words, the policies the Secretary establishes for all of the other 
Departments would control. We don't want it to.
  I might add that the language that I quoted before was specifically 
requested by the Senator: The Secretary shall be responsible for all 
policies of the Agency.
  We think that is important to clarify--that in the end he always has 
the authority. If this language says something, it is not wise to try 
to fix that amendment during debate. But if the language in effect says 
that the Director of the Agency may establish agency-specific policies, 
it is obviously always subject to review by the Secretary--no problem. 
But when I say in the language that they have to be consistent with 
departmental policies, obviously that infers previously established.
  Then you could have a problem.
  Mr. KERREY. The Senator is saying that if this language says that the 
Director of the Agency may establish agency-specific policies--the 
Senator is quite right; I added that. I appreciate very much that 
change being made.
  Before I get to the rest of it, let me say that one of the reasons I 
did that was because of the experience of dealing with agencies or 
situations in the executive branch where somebody has the 
responsibility but lacks authority. It is a heck of a problem to be in 
where you are held accountable for something, but you don't really have 
the authority to do anything about it in the first place.
  That is exactly the problem that the Senator is trying to fix with 
this amendment in the first place--situations where Secretaries have 
authority and responsibility, but they lack the authority. They lack 
the ability to actually be able to manage.
  I appreciate that inclusion. The Senator is saying that if the 
language said the Director of the Agency may establish agency-specific 
policies subject to the approval of the Secretary, you have no problem 
with that?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, obviously that is in response to the 
amendment. But I think that is the general idea.
  I also add one other point. In the second sentence of the amendment 
it provides that the Director of the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship is 
responsible for implementation of the Secretary's security 
counterintelligence and intelligence policies within the new Agency.
  I think, while that is true, since it follows the Secretary, the 
sentence previous to it, which talks about departmentwide policies, 
there is an implication in the second sentence, again, that he has to 
implement all of the departmentwide policies without exception.
  I think we have to make it clear that the second sentence is what we 
are talking about, and the third sentence as well.
  Mr. KERREY. Part of the problem I am having with this is it is very 
clear in the Senator's amendment that the Secretary shall be 
responsible for all policies of the Agency. That is very clear in the 
language of the amendment. That is why I am having difficulty 
understanding how this language undercuts that, or changes that. The 
Senator wants the Secretary to have the responsibility for the policies 
of the Agency. What the Senator is trying to do is establish a 
sufficient amount of independence that this new Agency for nuclear 
security can develop its own agency-specific policies. It doesn't 
undercut or eliminate the authority of the Secretary to be able to come 
in and say: I don't like that. I am not going to allow you to do it. 
But it is going to occur in an environment where Congress knows it, and 
the people understand what is going on.

  It seems to me that is what Senator Levin is trying to do, as well.
  Mr. KYL. The Senator said it very well.
  Obviously, the whole intention here is that there be a lot of things 
done differently in this new Agency than would otherwise be done within 
the Department.
  Our problem with Senator Levin's amendment is it not only implies but 
in the last sentence actually directs that whatever is departmentwide 
also has to exist in this new Agency--no exceptions; ``fully consistent 
with.''
  That is just not what this whole reform is all about. There are going 
to be a lot of things with a new agency that are going to be different.
  To the Senator's point, as I said before, I wouldn't take the job as 
the new Under Secretary in charge of this new Agency if I took the job 
knowing that I had to begin by complying with all departmentwide 
policies.
  Mr. KERREY. We have comparable agencies.
  I was very much involved with the development of the new law 
governing the IRS. We wanted that agency also to be semiautonomous.
  In that case, we created a board with authority to evaluate the 
budget and make budget recommendations to the Secretary of the 
Treasury, and that budget has to be forwarded on. If the President 
wants to change it, he can change it. That budget gets forwarded on to 
us.
  In addition, we made a change that the Internal Revenue Commissioner 
has a 5-year term allowing some continuity. That is one of the problems 
we had. We had lots of turnover.
  The same problem existed with the FBI Director a number of years ago. 
I don't know who was involved in changing that law. We changed some 
independence of the FBI Director. But in both cases, if the Secretary 
of the Treasury decides they don't like what the IRS Commissioner is 
doing, or in Justice's case they don't like what the FBI Director is 
doing, one of the things we are not talking about is they can always go 
to the President. The President issues an Executive order; everybody 
does it. At least they are supposed to do it. Although, again, that is 
part of the problem that we are trying to address--eliminating a lot of 
that middle-level management and creating direct lines of authority so 
Executive orders are carried out. In this case, a Presidential 
directive was implemented relatively slowly. Perhaps the Senator from 
Michigan has some suggestions.

  Does the Senator see a substantial difference between the language in 
his amendment that says, ``the director of the agency may establish 
agency-specific policies so long as they are fully

[[Page S8916]]

consistent,'' and language that says, ``the director of the agency may 
establish agency-specific policies understanding,'' and then reference 
back to section 213(c) that says the Secretary shall be responsible for 
all policies of the agency? If the Senator can tie it into that line, 
it seems that is what he is trying to do.
  Mr. LEVIN. If the suggestion is that the Director of the Agency may 
establish agency-specific policies which are different from the 
policies which govern the rest of the Department with the approval of 
the Secretary--if that is the question, I see no difference between 
that and the last line because at that point those agency-specific 
policies are consistent with departmental policy. The departmental 
policy at that point is that that Agency will be governed by a 
different rule than the rest of the Department. I don't see any 
difference in terms of that concept with what is already in the last 
line.
  The last part of that discussion I am not sure I fully follow. As far 
as that specific question is concerned, the Senator from Arizona is 
saying, as I understand it, and the Senator from Nebraska is responding 
in the following way: The Senator from Arizona says we want to make it 
possible for there to be an agency-specific policy that does differ 
with the departmentwide policy. My answer to that is, yes, providing it 
is approved by the head of the Department, at which point it is then 
Department policy that that separate agency have a different policy 
than the rest of the Department.
  I have no problem with that.
  Mr. KERREY. If the Senator will yield, it seems to me what we ought 
to try to do is work this thing a little bit longer and see if we can 
get agreement.
  I think in the key area with the amendment, we have to reference back 
this very declarative and clear line the Senator from Arizona 
referenced, which is 213(C) that says the Secretary shall be 
responsible for all policies of the Agency.
  The Senator is shaking his head.
  Mr. LEVIN. I don't want to read too much into the Senator from 
Arizona nodding his head, but I think he is responding positively to 
how I characterized his suggestion.
  I ask the Senator from Nebraska if he would, perhaps, yield to me a 
moment.
  Mr. KERREY. I will yield the floor and let the Senator have more than 
a moment.
  Mr. LEVIN. I want to see if both concur in this.
  The Director of the Agency may establish agency-specific policies 
which are different from the general policy for the Department with the 
approval of the Secretary.
  Those are not artfully perfect words, but that is the concept as I 
understood it that the Senator from Arizona is proposing.
  I say to my dear friend from Nebraska, if that is what the Senator is 
proposing and with your intermediary help, that is fine with me.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, it appears to me that we have achieved a 
meeting of the minds--almost--and therefore the language could be 
worked out.
  Let me restate the two concerns I have, both of which I think we 
would have to satisfy. In the second sentence of the amendment, it says 
that the Director of the Agency is responsible for the implementation 
of the Secretary's policies within the new Agency. Obviously, that has 
to mean to the extent that they are applicable to this new Agency and 
not inconsistent with any agency-specific recommendations.
  If the Senator has that language following the first sentence, it 
doesn't mean that it means whatever the departmentwide policies are 
this new Director has to implement them. That is not what we intend.
  Secondly, to the final sentence, the Senator is correct, this head of 
this new Agency should have the ability to have agency-specific 
policies with respect to security and counterintelligence and virtually 
anything else. It is always subject to the Secretary's approval.
  I don't think in this one unique situation we want to say that prior 
to the effectiveness of any policy, the head of this new Agency has to 
obtain the approval of the Secretary. But since he has to report to the 
Secretary, the Secretary, obviously, has the ability to say no.
  Clearly, we want this Agency to be running not on its own but 
semiautonomously. If the new person has to go get approval from people 
before he does things--obviously, he would have to notify the 
Secretary--then I think that could diminish his ability to operate the 
new entity.
  However, if the principle is agreed to that there can be, and indeed 
should be in some cases, different policies within this new Agency than 
departmentwide, and if we understand that the Secretary always has the 
ability to say no or to say do it differently, then I will say 
positively that I think we have a meeting of the minds and it is simply 
a matter of drafting the language in a way to achieve that.
  I thought our bill did that. If the Senator thinks we need to modify 
it somewhat, clearly we can talk about it.
  Mr. KERREY. If I can respond, the Senator from Michigan has a lot of 
respect on this side of the aisle and I know a lot of respect on that 
side of the aisle as well, not just because of this particular issue 
but because of his longstanding interest in the operations of 
government and his understanding of how statutes need to be written in 
order to get government to function properly.
  If the goal is to produce a big bipartisan vote so we can seize this 
opportunity, as the Senator from Arizona has pressed so relentlessly to 
get done, it is my hope that there could be a meeting of the minds 
leading to an agreement of language.
  If we can get that done, we are one step closer to getting a very 
large bipartisan vote. That sends a very important signal to the House. 
That increases the chances to successfully conference this in the 
Intelligence Committee and bring it back to the full Senate for 
approval.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I believe that we are all in agreement that 
the weapons program should remain within the Department of Energy, with 
clear lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability.
  The sponsors of this amendment agree that the Secretary of Energy 
must have the ultimate authority for Department functions because he 
carries the ultimate responsibility.
  The question is how does the Secretary exercise his authority in a 
way that allows him to meet his Cabinet-level responsibilities and 
still remain consistent with the restrictions in this bill.
  The bill's prohibition against delegation of any supervisory or 
directive authority over the Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship 
means that only the Secretary may intervene in Agency matters that may 
be inconsistent with Department policy.
  That is backwards.
  The provision for non-Agency review of Agency programs permits the 
Secretary to understand the compliance status of the Agency, but the 
prohibition against delegation requires the Secretary to appeal to the 
Under Secretary to respond to noncompliance findings.
  That is a reveal of normal management flow of authority.
  The Under Secretary should be the one making the appeal to the 
Secretary if the Agency is found to be noncompliant in a review.
  Under the provisions of the amendment, the Secretary is likely to 
spend far too much of his valuable time ensuring that the Agency is 
complying with the Department policy.
  A simple change in the bill would effectively accommodate this 
concern.
  The amendment should specifically acknowledge that the Secretary is 
endowed with equivalent authority to meet his Department-wide 
responsibilities; and those include the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship.
  Instead of prohibiting delegation of authority, the bill should 
provide direct appeal authority for the Under Secretary to the 
Secretary.
  I understand the reluctance of the sponsors to encourage broad 
delegation of authority to non-Agency Department employees.
  Nevertheless, compliance reviews of the Agency should be communicated 
to the Under Secretary and to the Secretary, with the presumption that 
any corrective actions would be implemented by the Under Secretary 
unless he determines to appeal to the Secretary.

[[Page S8917]]

  This would encourage the Under Secretary to consider the merits of 
review findings and consider changes before involving the Secretary.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair informs the Senator from Nebraska 
all of his time has expired. There are 9 minutes 30 seconds remaining 
to the Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Certainly, Senator Domenici wants to speak to this issue. To 
the extent we need any further discussion, I am sure we will agree to 
provide the time for that.
  I agree with Senator Kerrey; the more bipartisan this is the better. 
I say the first goal is security. Frankly, I detect a flaw in the exact 
wording of this amendment. If we can eliminate that flaw and thereby 
achieve bipartisan consensus on this point, obviously, that is a 
twofer. It not only achieves our policy objective but the political 
objective of the bipartisan approach as well.
  Mr. KERREY. I ask unanimous consent for 2 minutes to speak on this 
and to respond on our side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I wonder if there is a chance, rather than 
going to a motion to table, we can work this out. If we can work it 
out, it increases the chances of getting a big affirmative vote on this 
bill, which all of us want.
  The Senator from Michigan sees a flaw in the bill and is concerned 
about national security and concerned about good science. He has a lot 
of experience in this.
  I ask the Senator from Arizona if it is possible we could get the two 
sides to see if the meeting of the minds we apparently have could lead 
to an agreement on specific language and acceptance of this amendment, 
rather than having to get a vote to table or a vote up or down on the 
amendment with disagreement.
  Mr. KYL. We will have to defer. I am advised the majority leader is 
concerned about the amount of time and is desirous of having a vote as 
soon as possible. I think perhaps after Senator Domenici has spoken, we 
should confer and attempt to resolve this very quickly along the lines 
the leader has requested.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I hope this issue does not in any firm 
manner split the Senate. It seems to me that need not be the case.
  I want to read from the original Rudman report and then I will try to 
put quickly into a framework why we think we have complied with what 
the distinguished Senator, the ranking member of the Department of the 
defense authorization committee, Senator Levin, is concerned about.
  I am reading from page 46 of the report:

       The panel is convinced that real and lasting security and 
     counterintelligence reform of the weapons lab is simply 
     unworkable within DOE's current structure and culture. To 
     achieve the kind of protection that these sensitive labs must 
     have, they and their functions must have their own autonomous 
     operational structure free of all the other obligations 
     imposed by DOE management.

  Actually, when you read that and you read the letter that came some 3 
or 4 weeks after the report from the panel, talking about 
clarification, the best you can conclude is that it is not absolutely 
clear how we should do this. I submit that when you read the 
clarifications that were proposed with reference to the issue before 
us, we have solved that issue in this bill. I hope those who are 
thinking they can vote against the bill if we do not do this will 
understand.
  On page 2 of the bill, as said a number of times, we have made it 
eminently clear that the Secretary is the ultimate authority; the 
Secretary, not the new Under Secretary. We have said:

       There shall be within the department a separately organized 
     agency under the direction, authority and control of the 
     Secretary.  . . .

  I do not read the rest of the sentence, but that is what it says. 
Then it says, at the request of the distinguished Senator from 
Nebraska, Senator Bob Kerrey, paragraph C:

       The Secretary shall be responsible for all the policies of 
     the agency.

  Then, at the request of others because they wanted to make sure the 
Secretary could use other Department people to help him--that is, the 
big Secretary--we said:

       The Secretary may direct other officials of the Department 
     who are not within the agency to review agency programs and 
     make recommendations to the Secretary regarding the 
     administration of such programs . . .

  And then--I read the next part very slowly:

       . . . including consistency with similar programs and 
     activities in the Department.

  I read that, and other things in this bill, to say that those who are 
putting this bill before us to straighten up the Department and give us 
some security and counterintelligence that is reliable have, to the 
best of our ability, provided the Secretary and the new Agency with 
precisely what the Rudman board recommended. First, they wanted 
autonomy. I read that: It should be a structure free of all other 
obligations of the DOE. Yet it goes on in the supplemental report, or 
the letter of transmittal, saying here is our final interpretation of 
conflicts. It talks about some policies that ought to be consistent 
across the Department.
  I do not believe we need to put language in that charges the 
Secretary with putting these policies that are departmentwide in place 
and then saying this new Agency is bound by them. I think the room 
ought to be there for the new Agency to prepare its programs in this 
regard, be it on the environment, be it on management, be it on safety, 
be it on whatever. The Secretary still has the overriding authority, if 
he chooses, to say: I have selected some members of the staff of the 
Department, we have reviewed it carefully, and we recommend that you 
change something because we want you to be more in harmony with the 
Department.
  But to create a structure that is semiautonomous and then say 
whatever policies the Secretary pronounces that are departmentwide are 
binding on this Agency is to deny the Agency the autonomy right up 
front and to set the presumption in the wrong place. So I hope we do 
not do that. I am willing to clarify it, if it needs to be clarified 
further, but I do not think we need this provision ripping at the 
autonomy at the very outset, waiting around to see what the 
departmentwide rules are before you can implement this. I just think 
that is the wrong way to go.
  Having said that, I want to recapitulate where we are going for just 
a moment. The amendments that have been offered so far have been 
offered on the Democrat side. Senator Bingaman and I have one we are 
going to offer together, that we have resolved and the Senate is going 
to accept, with reference to work for others within the laboratory, 
which has been an issue of concern. Then I understand there are a 
couple more amendments.
  I want to say to my friend, Senator Bingaman, I know he has an 
amendment with reference to the environment. Since I have not offered 
an amendment, I am going to offer an amendment on the environment 
before he offers his. I am hopeful it will clarify the situation and he 
may not offer his. But if he chooses to, we will have one on the 
environment, safety, and others, so as to make it eminently clear we do 
not intend to exculpate this new Agency from any of the national 
environmental laws or the national laws with reference to safety. We 
never intended to. We will make it clear.
  Beyond that, we have a little bit of time left. I, myself, am going 
to run out of time to be able to be down here working on this, but if 
the Senator thinks another 10 minutes of effort together will help--
might I do it this way? Might I ask, how much time do we have left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 1 minute 20 seconds remaining. 
The Senator from Michigan has 52 seconds remaining.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, if we have not 
reached conclusion of this amendment, that we vote on or in reference 
to this amendment at 1 o'clock.

[[Page S8918]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, Senator 
Kerrey has said he would be gone 30 minutes. I indicated to him I would 
reserve his right to get here before we voted. That will probably be, 
say, 1:15.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I modify my request and make it 1:15.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay the pending 
amendment aside and that I be able to speak for 10 minutes on the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act.
  While we cannot discuss the details of the bill, I can say that as a 
member of the Intelligence Committee, we have provided the necessary 
funds to the intelligence community to do their job.
  One matter of controversy for some is the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski DOE 
reorganization amendment. I strongly support this amendment.
  In the last year, the Cox report has shown us why we need to improve 
the security structure at DOE, and the President's Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board, headed by Senator Rudman, shows us the way. The Kyl 
amendment before us is nearly identical to the President's own Advisory 
Board recommendation.
  The President's Advisory Board report states that the problems at DOE 
are worse than most people could have ever imagined. Quoting from the 
report:

       In response to these problems, the Department has been the 
     subject of a nearly unbroken history of dire warnings and 
     attempted but aborted reforms . . . sSecond only to its 
     world-class intellectual feats has been its ability to fend 
     off systematic change.

  I know that Secretary Richardson has put forward a reorganization 
plan, and I commend him for taking the initiative. I have known him for 
some time and I know he is doing what he believes is right for the 
Department. However, my concern is that he will not be the Secretary 
forever, and I am worried that the Department's ``ability to fend off 
systematic change'' will prevail once he leaves.
  The only way to fix the security problems are to make radical changes 
at the Department, as recommended in the DOE study headed by then 
chairman of Motorola, Bob Galvin.
  The amendment before us is not the most ``radical'' idea which could 
have been presented. In many ways, I believe that a separate agency for 
the nuclear programs could be the best way to enhance security, but I 
am a realist and know that if the amendment before us causes such 
heartache, I can only imagine the reaction to a separate agency 
amendment.
  Basically, the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski amendment would establish a 
separate entity, the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship, within the 
Department of Energy. The Agency will have clear lines of authority, 
accountability, and an independent budget. The new Agency will be 
headed by an Under Secretary of Nuclear Stewardship who reports 
directly to the Secretary. The Directors of the 3 national labs and the 
nuclear labs will report to the Under Secretary.
  First, I understand the amendment creates a ``security czar,'' for 
the lack of a better term, who will be in charge of security for all 
the nuclear lab programs under the Under Secretary. While I understand 
why this position would be placed under the Under Secretary, I also 
understand how bureaucracies work and the perception they hold for 
their hierarchy of authority. That is why I believe the security czar 
position should be placed directly under the Secretary, if for no other 
reason than to show that he is in charge and will be held accountable. 
However, I have also heard the concern that if this person is placed 
under the Secretary then his attention may be diverted to the other 
matters outside of the nuclear programs. For this reason, I hope that 
it will be understood that the security czar has the authority, both 
real and perceived, and will be solely focused on the real security 
concerns of the nuclear programs but also with the flexibility to not 
be tied to nonnuclear concerns.
  Second, Secretary Richardson believes that this amendment would only 
divide the Department into more fiefdoms. I do not agree with this 
assessment. We must break the nuclear stewardship programs out of the 
main programs of DOE. This new Agency for Nuclear Stewardship is too 
important and sensitive to treat it like the power marketing 
administrations, fossil energy, or any other area of the Department. 
The reports from the last year show that we need to break the nuclear 
programs out and the approach in this amendment will raise the stature 
of the programs and will improve the security for our nation.
  Let me end by stating that after five internal DOE reviews, four 
outside studies, six GAO reports, and three blue ribbon commissions, it 
is time to make these much needed changes at the Department. I ask that 
all my colleagues support the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski amendment and the 
Intelligence Authorization Act.
  I yield back the remainder of my time. I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, Senator Bingaman is in the Chamber. I 
assume the Bingaman-Domenici amendment with reference to work for 
others is available and ready; is that correct, I ask the Senator?
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, it is ready. We have it written up in 
amendment form. We just got it on a sheet of paper. We can easily do 
that and take another minute or two.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I would like to get it done before this vote.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. We will put it on the right paper and go with it.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I will use the remaining 10, 15, 20 seconds to say we 
have been looking through the amendments to see if we can see daylight 
in dealing with the agency for nuclear weapons development. I believe 
Senator Carl Levin has another amendment. We are going to submit to him 
some language on reporting, the deputy to the Secretary being available 
for the Secretary to accomplish some of the responsibilities that the 
Secretary has. We will get with him on that. Hopefully, we can work 
that out.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Senator Bingaman has an environment and safety 
amendment. I will have one I will offer ahead of that. Perhaps it can 
be accepted and Senator Bingaman can offer his after it. We will work 
on that. It seems to me, other than the alleged, talked-about 
substitute, which I know nothing about, which I assume will be ready--
is that correct, I ask Senator Levin? It will not cause us a long delay 
to have that available?
  Mr. LEVIN. That is correct, depending on the actions of the Senate 
prior to that. It should not take more than perhaps 10, 15 minutes to 
prepare after we are done with all the amendments.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative assistant proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent Katy Lampron, of my 
staff, have privileges of the floor throughout today, including all 
votes today.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

[[Page S8919]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bunning). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have some rather brief remarks that will 
probably take me 15 minutes. Is this a time when I might speak out of 
order?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The vote is scheduled to occur at 1:15.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, if there is no objection, I would like to 
proceed. I ask unanimous consent that the vote be delayed for an 
additional 5 minutes or whatever.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, certainly I do not object for such a 
reasonable request from the Senator. But I would hope there would be no 
further delay. We had intended to vote at 12; then we were told 12:30, 
12:40, 1:15, and now it is 1:20. I know there is an effort being made 
to work it out, and that is very commendable, but I think we need to 
have a recorded vote. I will not object, but I plead with Senators, 
let's vote at 1:20.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished majority leader.
  I do not take the time of the Senate very often. I try not to impose 
upon other Senators or upon the Senate. But I noted a series of quorum 
calls, so I felt this might be a good time for me to speak.

                          ____________________