[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 103 (Tuesday, July 20, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8818-S8824]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




    INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000--MOTION TO 
                            PROCEED--Resumed

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Chair.
  I understand I am in charge of our half hour.
  I say to the other side, you have a half hour on this also. We 
clearly would like to move back and forth with the time on each side 
for various speakers, but for now we have two or three speakers who 
have already indicated they want to address this issue. So I yield 8 
minutes to the distinguished Senator from Arizona, Mr. Kyl. Then, 
within the next 30 or 40 minutes, if Senator Frank Murkowski, the 
chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, desires to 
speak, we will give him some time. I understand the Senator from 
Kentucky would like to speak on our side also, so we will make time for 
him.
  We will proceed now. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Thank you, Mr. President.
  First, I thank Senator Domenici for his leadership on this issue. It 
was really his leadership that brought this entire matter of 
reorganization of the Department of Energy to the fore. I appreciate 
his ability to predict what the President's Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board was going to be recommending to the President because 
indeed it was Senator Domenici's idea for the reorganization of the 
Department of Energy that eventually the Rudman board, the President's 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board--it was really that same idea that 
was recommended by the President's board which we have embodied in 
legislation that we bring to the floor.
  As the leader announced a few minutes ago, at 10:40 this morning we 
will vote on whether to invoke cloture on a motion to proceed to the 
intelligence authorization bill, which will include this reorganization 
of the Department of Energy amendment.
  This is the amendment Senator Domenici, Senator Murkowski, and I have 
drafted with the purpose to halt the ongoing losses of our Nation's 
most sensitive military secrets from our Nation's laboratories.
  As I look back over the last few months, it seems as if every week 
brought more news about Chinese espionage at our National Laboratories, 
about how the Chinese have obtained our country's nuclear secrets.
  In May, the declassified version of the Cox committee report was 
released. It painted a sobering picture of the increased danger the 
United States now faces as a result of the Chinese espionage at our 
nuclear labs. This bipartisan committee unanimously concluded that 
China stole classified information on every nuclear warhead currently 
in the U.S. arsenal, as well as the neutron bomb--literally the crown 
jewels of our nuclear stockpile.
  Worst still, the Cox committee noted that China also acquired other 
advanced American technology, including missile guidance and reentry 
vehicle technology, the results of developmental work on 
electromagnetic weapons that could be used to attack satellites and 
missiles, and radar technology and techniques that may someday allow 
China to track U.S. Navy submarines while they are submerged beneath 
the ocean's surface.
  Chinese acquisition of this technology is particularly troublesome 
because the majority of its roughly 20

[[Page S8819]]

long-range nuclear missiles are aimed at U.S. cities. As we all know, 
the United States currently has no defense against missile attack.
  Although one individual at the Los Alamos Laboratory, Wen Ho Lee, has 
been fired, Chinese espionage at our nuclear labs is presumably ongoing 
today. As the Cox committee stated in its report, China has engaged in 
a ``sustained espionage effort targeted at United States nuclear 
weapons facilities.''
  Furthermore, the report notes: ``The successful penetration by 
[China] of our nuclear weapons laboratories has taken place over the 
last several decades, and almost certainly continues to the present.''
  After the effects of China's espionage came to light earlier this 
year, the President asked the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, led 
by former Senator Warren Rudman, to examine why China was able to steal 
our nuclear secrets. The President's board released its findings in 
June, calling for sweeping organizational reform of the Energy 
Department to address what it described as ``the worst security record 
on secrecy'' that the panel members ``have ever encountered.''

  The Presidential panel cited as the root cause of DOE's poor security 
record ``organizational disarray, managerial neglect, and a culture of 
arrogance . . . [which] conspired to create an espionage scandal 
waiting to happen.'' Terrible problems were uncovered during the 
panel's investigation. For example, employees at nuclear facilities 
compared their computer systems to automatic teller machines, allowing 
top secret withdrawals at our Nation's expense.
  As public pressure has grown, Energy Secretary Richardson has 
announced various reforms; but these steps have been criticized as too 
little too late. In fact, the President's own advisory panel said, ``We 
seriously doubt [Energy Secretary Richardson's] initiatives will 
achieve lasting success,'' and noted ``these initiatives simply do not 
go far enough.'' In fact, though the Energy Secretary says he and his 
Department are on top of the situation, the Presidential panel warned 
that ``the Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy that has 
proven it is incapable of reforming itself.'' Instead, the panel 
recommended that Congress reorganize the Department.
  That is what Senator Domenici, Senator Murkowski, and I have written 
legislation to do, to implement this recommendation of the President's 
advisory group. Our proposal would gather all of the parts of the 
nuclear weapons program under one semiautonomous agency within the 
Energy Department. It would separate the nuclear weapons work at the 
Energy Department from the other things they do there, such as setting 
efficiency standards for refrigerators.
  The new agency will have clear lines of authority, responsibility, 
and accountability, with one person in charge, who will continue to 
report to the Energy Secretary. This would replace the current tangled 
bureaucratic structure that has led to the situation where everyone is 
responsible so no one is responsible. This is the only way to ensure 
that new security and counterintelligence measures are implemented to 
prevent future espionage from occurring unchecked.
  I am pleased that the legislation enjoys broad bipartisan support. In 
addition to Senator Domenici, who chairs the Energy and Water 
Appropriations Subcommittee, and Senator Murkowski, who chairs the 
Energy Committee, it is cosponsored by the chairman and vice chairman 
of the Intelligence Committee, Senators Shelby and Kerrey; the chairman 
of the Armed Services Committee and its subcommittee chairman on 
Strategic Forces, Senator Warner and Senator Smith; the chairman of the 
Governmental Affairs Committee, Senator Thompson; the chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms; the former chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee, Senator Specter; as well as Senators Feinstein, 
Hutchinson, Gregg, Bunning, Fitzgerald, and the distinguished majority 
leader, Senator Lott.
  Despite Secretary Richardson's recent announcement that he is 
prepared to drop his opposition to the creation of a semiautonomous 
agency, the reality is that he continues to oppose the core concepts 
underlying such an agency. Despite extensive discussions that the 
sponsors have had with the Secretary and his staff, he continues to 
oppose our legislation.

  The time has clearly come for the Senate to debate and adopt strong 
measures to safeguard our Nation and its nuclear secrets. As my 
colleagues will recall, in May Senators Domenici and Murkowski and I 
attempted to offer a similar amendment to the defense authorization 
bill which was met with a Democratic filibuster and a threat by the 
Energy Secretary that he would recommend the President veto the bill. 
In justifying his refusal to allow debate or even a vote on our 
amendment, the Democratic whip termed our proposal ``premature'' and 
urged the Senate to hold hearings on the measure.
  Over the past 2 months, four committees of the Senate have held six 
hearings specifically on our amendment. Furthermore, in the time since 
we first offered our amendment to the defense authorization bill, the 
Presidential panel headed by former Senator Rudman has published its 
report vindicating the approach of our original amendment. It is well 
past time to fix the chronic problems at our nuclear weapons 
facilities. Failure to move forward will only further jeopardize our 
Nation's security.
  I urge my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to rise above 
partisan politics, not to vote for obstruction and vulnerability but 
instead to vote in favor of cloture so the Senate can debate this 
important amendment.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to Senator Murkowski.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I thank my friend, Senator Domenici.
  Yesterday we had an opportunity to discuss the pending amendment at 
some length. I think I spoke for some 45 minutes, so I will not repeat 
what I said yesterday, but I am going to focus in on why we need this 
amendment.
  This whole issue associated with the lack of security in our labs has 
received a lot of attention over the last several months. My committee, 
the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, has held nine hearings. 
We had the pleasure of getting together with four other committees--the 
Government Affairs Committee, the Armed Services Committee, the 
Intelligence Committee, joining with the Energy Committee--and it was 
the first time we had ever assembled four committees together. We had 
over 30 Senators present. So there has been a good deal of time, 
effort, and examination on this matter.
  I am very pleased to join Senator Domenici, Senator Kyl, and a number 
of other cosponsors, including Senators Kerrey, Lott, Feinstein, Smith, 
Gregg, Hutchinson, Shelby, Warner, Bunning, Helms, Fitzgerald, Specter, 
Thompson, and others in bringing this matter before the Senate.
  We need this amendment because time is passing. This report, the 
Rudman report, entitled ``Science At Its Best, Security At Its Worst,'' 
in effect says it all. This was the expert panel authorized by the 
President, a special investigative panel of the President's Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board headed by former Senator Rudman. Again, the 
emphasis is on the title, recognizing that science has contributed 
probably the best in the world at the labs, but security at its worst.
  Now, why do we need this amendment? Why do we need it now? I will be 
very brief. I am going to give you a few quotes from the Rudman report.

       Organizational disarray, managerial neglect and a culture 
     of arrogance, both at the Department of Energy headquarters 
     and the labs themselves, conspired to create an espionage 
     scandal waiting to happen.

  Further from the report:

       The Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy 
     that has proven it is incapable of reforming itself.

  Further:

       Accountability at the Department of Energy labs has been 
     spread so thinly and erratically that it is now almost 
     impossible to find.

  That is the key word--``accountability.'' We had no accountability, 
as we look back on the espionage charges associated with the alleged 
Wen Ho Lee affair, no accountability. There it is.
  Further, I quote:

       Never have the members of the special investigative panel 
     witnessed a bureaucratic

[[Page S8820]]

     culture so thoroughly saturated with cynicism and disregard 
     for authority.

  Further, I quote:

       Never before has this panel found such a cavalier attitude 
     toward one of the most serious responsibilities in the 
     Federal Government: control of the design information 
     relating to nuclear weapons.

  Further, I quote:

       Never before has the panel found an agency with the 
     bureaucratic insolence to disrupt, delay and resist 
     implementation of a presidential directive on security.

  These are but a few of the quotes from the Rudman report. These few 
quotes and the full report itself speak eloquently about the need for 
this amendment, the justification for this amendment. While considering 
whether to vote for or against this amendment and the motion to invoke 
cloture, there is really only one relevant question: Do you want to put 
an end to lax management practices at the Department of Energy that 
have contributed to the poor security? In other words, do you want to 
fix it? Or do you want to do everything you can to prevent espionage 
from occurring again, further damaging national security?
  I urge Members to vote for cloture.
  I ask unanimous consent that excerpts from ``Science at its Best; 
Security at its Worst'' be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 Selected Excerpts from the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
 Board Report: Science at Its Best; Security at Its Worst: A Report on 
           Security Problems at the U.S. Department of Energy

       Findings (pp. 1-6):
       As the repository of America's most advanced know-how in 
     nuclear and related armaments and the home of some of 
     America's finest scientific minds, these labs have been and 
     will continue to be a major target of foreign intelligence 
     services, friendly as well as hostile. p.1
       More than 25 years worth of reports, studies and formal 
     inquiries--by executive branch agencies, Congress, 
     independent panels, and even DOE itself--have identified a 
     multitude of chronic security and counterintelligence 
     problems at all of the weapons labs. p.2
       Critical security flaws--have been cited for immediate 
     attention and resolution--over and over and over--ad nauseam.
       The open-source information alone on the weapons 
     laboratories overwhelmingly supports a troubling conclusion: 
     their security and counterintelligence operations have been 
     seriously hobbled and relegated to low-priority status for 
     decades. p.2
       . . . the DOE and its weapons labs have been Pollyannaish. 
     The predominant attitude toward security and 
     counterintelligence among many DOE and lab managers has 
     ranged from half-hearted, grudging accommodation been to smug 
     disregard. Thus the panel is convinced that the potential for 
     major leaks and thefts of sensitive information and material 
     has been substantial.
       Organizational disarray, managerial neglect, and a culture 
     of arrogance--both at DOE headquarters and the labs 
     themselves--conspired to create an espionage scandal waiting 
     to happen. pp.2-3
       Among the defects this panel found:
       Inefficient personnel clearance programs. Loosely 
     controlled and casually monitored programs for thousands of 
     unauthorized foreign scientists and assignees.
       Feckless systems for control of classified documents, which 
     periodically resulted in thousands of documents being 
     declared lost.
       Counterintelligence programs with part-time CI officers, 
     who often operated with little experience, minimal budgets, 
     and employed little more than crude ``awareness'' briefings 
     of foreign threats and perfunctory and sporadic debriefings 
     of scientists . . .
       A lab security management reporting system that led 
     everywhere but to responsible authority.
       Computer security methods that were naive at best and 
     dangerously irresponsible at worst.
       DOE has had a dysfunctional management structure and 
     culture that only occasionally gave proper credence to the 
     need for rigorous security and counterintelligence programs 
     at the weapons labs. For starters, there has been a 
     persisting lack of real leadership and effective management 
     at DOE.
       The nature of the intelligence-gathering methods used by 
     the People's Republic of China poses a special challenge to 
     the U.S. in general and the weapons labs in particular. p.3
       Despite widely publicized assertions of wholesale losses of 
     nuclear weapons technology from specific laboratories to 
     particular nations, the factual record in the majority of 
     cases regarding the DOE weapons laboratories supports 
     plausible inferences--but not irrefutable proof--about the 
     source and scope of espionage and the channels through which 
     recipient nations received information. pp.3-4.
       The actual damage done to U.S. security interests is, at 
     the least, currently unknown; at worst, it may be unknowable.
       The Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy 
     that has proven it is incapable of reforming itself. p. 4
       Accountability at DOE has been spread so thinly and 
     erratically that it is now almost impossible to find.
       Reorganization is clearly warranted to resolve the many 
     specific problems with security and counterintelligence in 
     the weapons laboratories, but also to address the lack of 
     accountability that has become endemic throughout the entire 
     Department. p. 4
       Convoluted, confusing, and often contradictory reporting 
     channels make the relationship between DOE headquarters and 
     the labs, in particular, tense, internecine, and chaotic.
       The criteria for the selection of Energy Secretaries have 
     been inconsistent in the past. Regardless of the outcome of 
     ongoing or contemplated reforms, the minimum qualifications 
     for an Energy Secretary should include experience in not only 
     energy and scientific issues, but national security and 
     intelligence issues as well. p. 5
       DOE cannot be fixed with a single legislative act: 
     management must follow mandate. The research functions of the 
     labs are vital to the nation's long term interest, and 
     instituting effective gates between weapons and nonweapons 
     research functions will require both disinterested scientific 
     expertise, judicious decision making, and considerable 
     political finesse. p. 5
       Thus both Congress and the Executive Branch . . . should be 
     prepared to monitor the progress of the Department's reforms 
     for years to come.
       The Foreign Visitor's and Assignments Program has been and 
     should continue to be a valuable contribution to the 
     scientific and technological progress of the nation. p. 5
       That said, DOE clearly requires measures to ensure that 
     legitimate use of the research laboratories for scientific 
     collaboration is not an open door to foreign espionage 
     agents.
       In commenting on security issues at DOE, we believe that 
     both Congressional and Executive branch leaders have resorted 
     to simplification and hyperbole in the past few months. The 
     panel found neither the dramatic damage assessments nor the 
     categorical reassurances of the Department's advocates to be 
     wholly substantiated. pp. 5-6
       However, the Board is extremely skeptical that any reform 
     effort, no matter how well-intentioned, well-designed, and 
     effectively applied, will gain more than a toehold at DOE, 
     given its labyrinthine management structure, fractious and 
     arrogant culture, and the fast-approaching reality of another 
     transition in DOE leadership. Thus we believe that he has 
     overstated the case when he asserts, as he did several weeks 
     ago, that ``Americans can be reassured: our nation's nuclear 
     secrets are, today, safe and secure.''
       Fundamental change in DOE's institutional culture--
     including the ingrained attitudes toward security among 
     personnel of the weapons laboratories--will be just as 
     important as organizational redesign. p. 6
       Never have the members of the Special Investigative Panel 
     witnessed a bureaucratic culture so thoroughly saturated with 
     cynicism and disregard for authority. Never before has this 
     panel found such a cavalier attitude toward one of the most 
     serious responsibilities in the federal government--control 
     of the design information relating to nuclear weapons. 
     Particularly egregious have been the failures to enforce 
     cyber-security measures to protect and control important 
     nuclear weapons design information, Never before has the 
     panel found an agency with the bureaucratic insolence to 
     dispute, delay, and resist implementation of a Presidential 
     directive on security, as DOE's bureaucracy tried to do the 
     Presidential Decision Directive No. 61 in February 1998.
       The best nuclear weapons expertise in the U.S. government 
     resides at the national weapons labs, and this asset should 
     be better used by the intelligence community. p. 6.
       Reorganization pp. 43-53:
       The panel is convinced that real and lasting security and 
     counterintelligence reform at the weapons labs is simply 
     unworkable within DOE's current structure and culture. To 
     achieve the kind of protection that these sensitive labs must 
     have, they and their functions must have their own autonomous 
     operational structure free of all the other obligations 
     imposed by DOE management. We strongly believe that this 
     cleaving can be best achieved by constituting a new 
     government agency that is far more mission-focused and 
     bureaucratically streamlined than its antecedent, and devoted 
     principally to nuclear weapons and national security matters. 
     (emphasis in original) p. 46
       The agency can be constructed in one of two ways. It could 
     remain an element of DOE but become semi-autonomous--by that 
     we mean strictly segregated from the rest of the Department. 
     This would be accomplished by having the agency director 
     report only to the Secretary of Energy. The agency 
     directorship also could be ``dual-hatted'' as an Under 
     Secretary, thereby investing it with extra bureaucratic clout 
     both inside and outside the Department. p. 46
       Regardless of the mold in which this agency is cast, it 
     must have staffing and support functions that are autonomous 
     from the remaining operations at DOE. p. 46
       To ensure its long-term success, this new agency must be 
     established by statute. p. 47
       Whichever solution Congress enacts, we do feel strongly 
     that the new agency never should be subordinated to the 
     Defense Department. p. 47
       Specifically, we recommend that the Congress pass and the 
     President sign legislation that: pp. 47-49

[[Page S8821]]

       Creates a new, semi-autonomous Agency for Nuclear 
     Stewardship (ANS), whose Director will report directly to the 
     Secretary of Energy.
       Streamlines the ANS/Weapons Lab management structure by 
     abolishing ties between the weapons labs and all DOE 
     regional, field and site offices, and all contractor 
     intermediaries.
       Mandates that the Director/ANS be appointed by the 
     President with the consent of the Senate and, ideally, have 
     an extensive background in national security, organizational 
     management, and appropriate technical fields.
       Stems the historical ``revolving door'' and management 
     expertise problems at DOE. . . .
       Ensures effective administration of safeguards, security, 
     and counterintelligence at all the weapons labs and plants by 
     creating a coherent security/CI structure within the new 
     agency.
       Abolishes the Office of Energy Intelligence.
       Shifts the balance of analytic billets . . . to bolster 
     intelligence community technical expertise on nuclear 
     matters.

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I ask the Senator from New Mexico, how is 
the time being controlled?
  Mr. DOMENICI. The Senator from Nebraska has 30 minutes and has used 
none of it.
  Mr. KERREY. Do I have to use my time to speak against or not?
  Mr. DOMENICI. The Senator may speak either way.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President I yield such time as is necessary from our 
side to speak in favor of the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski amendment.
  I believe this reorganization plan complements the reforms already 
included in our defense authorization bill as well as the reforms set 
forth by Secretary Richardson and that they help him achieve his 
mission. This plan, which is contained in this amendment, will sustain 
and improve the extraordinary science performed by the nuclear 
laboratories of the Energy Department while significantly improving 
security and counterintelligence.
  Under this reorganization, the Secretary of Energy will set policy 
and maintain authority over all elements of the new Agency for Nuclear 
Stewardship. The agency director will then implement his policy and 
demand that the highest security standards are maintained within the 
nuclear weapons laboratories.
  This plan reduces the bureaucracy that both stifles scientific 
endeavors and hinders security and counterintelligence at our 
laboratories. The agency will maintain the links between the weapons 
labs and other labs in parts of the Department of Energy, thereby 
preserving the capability to cross-fertilize science that is being 
performed in different programs and in different locations.
  Numerous reviews that have been performed over the past 25 years by 
executive branch agencies, the General Accounting Office, the Congress, 
independent panels, and the Energy Department itself have found 
security wanting and lax at all of the weapons laboratories. A spate of 
espionage cases over the last 15 years, cases involving the potential 
theft of our most potent nuclear weapons designs, shows that 
counterintelligence at the Energy Department needs serious improvement. 
In recent hearings, witnesses before the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence and other committees have described the confused lines of 
authority, lack of accountability, and both inadvertent and conscious 
disregard for security concerns.
  Last month the President's National Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board, the PFIAB, led by former Senator Warren Rudman, issued the 
latest in a long series of reports critical of security and 
counterintelligence at the weapons laboratories.
  In its report entitled ``Science At Its Best, Security At Its 
Worst,'' the PFIAB found that ``organization disarray, managerial 
neglect and a culture of arrogance both at DOE headquarters and the 
labs themselves, conspired to create an espionage scandal waiting to 
happen.''
  In response to these problems, the Rudman panel calls for 
reorganization as necessary ``to resolve the many specific problems 
with security and counterintelligence in the weapons laboratories but 
also to address the lack of accountability that has become endemic 
throughout the entire Department.''
  The new structure envisioned in this amendment strengthens the 
management structure overseeing the nuclear weapons laboratories. By 
removing the unnecessary involvement of redundant officials in the 
running of the labs, the new Agency for Nuclear Stewardship sets both 
clear lines of authority and defined lines of accountability in how the 
labs are managed. This helps assure that policy directives are properly 
and expeditiously developed, and that officials can be held accountable 
for success and failure related to scientific research and security 
measures.
  No management structure, however well designed, can be effective if 
the personnel filling the organization chart are not up to the job. The 
Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship will be appointed by the 
President and subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. He or 
she will be required by statute to have an extensive background in 
national security, organizational management, and the appropriate 
technical areas relevant to weapons design work. This individual will 
be assisted within the Agency by three Deputy Directors for defense 
programs, nonproliferation and materials disposition, and naval 
reactors. To promote security throughout the Agency, the Director will 
be assisted by a Chief of Nuclear Stewardship Counterintelligence, a 
Chief of Nuclear Stewardship Security, and a Chief of Nuclear 
Stewardship Intelligence who will work to promote the awareness of and 
implement measures related to security and counterintelligence.
  Under this amendment, the Under Secretary will have the necessary 
authority to effectively manage the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship. 
This Under Secretary will follow the policies established by the 
Secretary. The Agency's subordinate security, counterintelligence, and 
intelligence chiefs will follow policies developed by their 
corresponding Energy Department offices and approved by the Secretary.
  The point here is that the Secretary remains accountable, the 
Secretary retains authority, and as a consequence, the Secretary 
retains responsibility for the work that is being done.
  This amendment essentially, under statute, will remove much of the 
middle-level structure that has built up over the years, which has made 
it extremely difficult to manage and almost impossible to determine who 
is responsible. Despite the end of the cold war, our Nation still faces 
a nuclear threat, and that threat continues to grow. We must not allow 
the nuclear secrets paid for by the toil and ingenuity of Americans to 
become tools of those who may wish to harm our Nation. The new Agency 
for Nuclear Stewardship will help protect those secrets and keep our 
nuclear arsenal the most advanced and safest among nations.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes off our side to the 
Senator from Kentucky.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky is recognized.
  Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, our national laboratories have become 
revolving doors. On the way in, you have billions of dollars from the 
taxpayers to research and develop the most sophisticated weapons in the 
world, and on the way out you have all the plans and information any 
country needs to build a nuclear weapon.
  Unfortunately, the doors to our labs are still open. While the 
Department of Energy has made some cosmetic changes in their security 
procedures, we are still stuck with the same bureaucratic mess that 
created this problem.
  There is no accountability. Not one person has stood up and said, 
``the buck stops here.''--Not the lab directors--not any of the former 
Secretaries of Energy--not even the President has taken any 
responsibility for what occurred at Los Alamos Laboratory.

[[Page S8822]]

  It is clear that our nuclear weapons programs are in desperate need 
of accountability, leadership, and supervision. The amendment we are 
debating today will provide these essential ingredients.
  Mr. President, the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski amendment, creates a new 
agency for nuclear stewardship, which will provide clear lines of 
authority and responsibility within the Department of Energy. It will 
be managed by an administrator who will be directly responsible for all 
nuclear weapons production. Finally, someone will be able to say, ``the 
buck stops here.''
  In addition, the amendment will codify an Office of 
Counterintelligence in the Department of Energy. The Director of this 
Office will have the power to create preventative programs to make sure 
this kind of espionage does not occur again.
  The administration has proposed a number of band-aid type reforms, 
but none of them get to the heart of the problem. There are too many 
tangled lines of authority within the Department of Energy, and no one 
wants to take responsibility.
  According to the Cox report, ``the PRC's theft of nuclear secrets 
from our National Weapons Laboratories enabled the PRC to design, 
develop, and successfully test modern strategic nuclear weapons sooner 
than would otherwise have been possible.''
  Since the Chinese, who sell weapons around the world have these 
secrets, we can only ask who else may have this information. Iran? 
Iraq? Syria? North Korea?
  While it is scary to think about who may have access to our nuclear 
secrets, it is even more frightening to think that this kind of 
espionage could still be going on. We need the clear lines of authority 
and leadership that would be established by the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski 
amendment, to close the revolving door.
  Mr. President, I urge all of my colleagues to vote for cloture and 
support this important amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, might I ask the distinguished Senator, 
Mr. Bunning, would he like to speak for an additional couple of 
minutes?
  Mr. BUNNING. I have finished. I thank the Senator. I have completed 
my statement.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I don't know how we are going to use the 
rest of the time. I will use a little bit of time. If anyone wants to 
speak on either side of the issue, there is some time between now and 
10:40 or so when we are going to vote on cloture. I yield myself such 
time as I may use.
  I, too, urge that everybody vote for cloture. There is absolutely no 
reason for us not to proceed with the intelligence bill, which has been 
carefully thought out. It is not my bailiwick. I am not a chairman, 
cochairman, or a member, but I have attended meetings with them since 
the breaking news about the Chinese and their involvement in gathering 
up very secure and secret information from the United States through 
our laboratories.
  That bill should not be held up, and the Senate has already agreed by 
unanimous consent that when it comes up--the amendment we are alluding 
to, the amendment that has been talked about now for a number of weeks, 
has been prepared in its final form for some time. It has been 
circulated to whomever needs it. It has been discussed in various 
committees, and it has been criticized, praised, and modified.
  Before it came to the floor, it had the input from the now famous 
board that Senator Rudman headed with four other distinguished 
Americans with great expertise in the area. Their recommendations are 
in the amendment. We had people who know the Department and who know 
the Department of Defense help us draft it. It was conceived and being 
prepared even before the Rudman board made their final recommendations.
  Personally this Senator had arrived at the conclusion that something 
drastic had to be done even before the report. Now we can have some 
time this afternoon and this evening for those who want to argue about 
the potency of this amendment or whether it has some shortcomings to 
offer amendments.
  We will be meeting at about 11:30 in the leader's office with five or 
six Senators who have a particular interest or bipartisan interests and 
may have amendments. We will be meeting in the leader's office to see 
if we can't discuss them.
  I hope Senators who have raised issues about it and who have 
indicated they have amendments will join us and be prepared to talk on 
our bill on which they have amendments, and to bring forth their ideas 
also.
  Later in the day, if we continue to debate this issue, I will have 
more to say about why we need it, and I will discuss the specific 
provisions of this amendment in more detail.
  Let me just quickly read three or four provisions that I think should 
dispel some of the concerns that have been raised. If they do not quite 
do the job, let's talk about it.
  On page 2 of the amendment, for those who are wondering whether the 
Secretary of Energy, a Cabinet member, will still be in charge of this 
semiautonomous agency, when you call it ``semiautonomous,'' it means 
that somebody is in control of it and, therefore, it is not autonomous. 
That is why semiautonomous is included as a description.

  But the amendment says, first:

       The Secretary shall be responsible for all policies of the 
     agency. The Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship shall 
     report solely and directly to the Secretary, and shall be 
     subject to the supervision and direction of the Secretary.

  Skipping on a bit, to page 2 of the amendment:

       The Secretary may direct other officials of the Department 
     who are not within the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship to 
     review the agency's program and to make recommendations to 
     the Secretary regarding the administration of such programs, 
     including the consistency with other similar programs and 
     activities of the Department.

  There are some who want to make sure the Secretary has sufficient 
input, that he will have sufficient opportunity to look at what they 
are doing and make determinations as to the propriety of consistency 
with the Secretary's policies.
  I think what we just said makes the case.
  This morning, one of those writers who has been covering the 
deliberations in the Washington Post talked about the chief of nuclear 
stewardship counterintelligence and how there might be some 
inconsistency within that particular person's effort and what the 
Secretary's policies are on counterintelligence.
  I refer to page 4 of the amendment. I read the following at the 
bottom of the page:

       The Chief of Nuclear Stewardship Counterintelligence shall 
     report to the Under Secretary, and implement the 
     counterintelligence policies directed by the Secretary and 
     the Under Secretary. The Chief of Nuclear Stewardship 
     Counterintelligence shall have direct access to the Secretary 
     and all other officials of the Department and its contractors 
     concerning counterintelligence matters, and shall be 
     responsible for. . . .

  Then it proceeds to delineate for what they will be responsible.
  Mr. President, how much time do we have remaining on our side, and 
how much remains as a whole?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Grams). The Senator from New Mexico has 30 
minutes 22 seconds. The Democratic time remaining is 23 minutes 12 
seconds.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I note Senator Kyl's presence on the floor. I want to 
talk with him for a moment.
  I am not at all sure there will be additional time used on the other 
side of the aisle. When Senator Kerrey left the floor for other urgent 
business, he suggested there was not any more time on that side. I 
would like to yield to Senator Kyl the remaining time on our side. I am 
very hopeful, if there is going to be a wrap-up before the vote, that 
we will be able to get 2 or 3 minutes from the other side, although I 
am not sure that is the case at this point.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, perhaps we can inquire of the Democratic side 
if there is no one else who wishes to speak for that time to be 
yielded. I can take about 3 minutes now, and we can be prepared to vote 
at whatever time Members are ready.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I understand that is not possible. I understand there 
are some who are now relying upon the time that is set for the vote 
around 20 minutes of 11 and who may be absent from the Hill. So we 
can't do that.

[[Page S8823]]

  Mr. KYL. So as not to be in an unproductive quorum call, perhaps we 
could yield back time so we could speak in morning business.
  Mr. President, I echo one of the thoughts of Chairman Domenici; that 
is, as we consider amendments to the proposal for a semiautonomous 
agency that tracks the recommendations of the President's Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board, I think we need to be very careful to 
ensure that the spirit of the recommendation, the fundamental basis for 
the recommendation of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board--the so-called Rudman panel--is not in any way degrading.
  That spirit, that fundamental basis, was to go directly to the heart 
of the criticism of the Department of Energy to date that it is 
incapable of reorganizing itself; that there are too many disparate 
groups within the Department that want control of the nuclear weapons 
program, or at least their particular part of control; that what is 
really needed within the Department, the President's panel said, was a 
very clear direct line of responsibility from the Secretary right down 
through this entire nuclear weapons program so that no one else within 
the Department of Energy, in effect, could get their hands on it; and 
that there was only one line of responsibility, and it was the Under 
Secretary with his authority and his responsibility to make that 
program work.
  The amendments we have received from Members on the other side--all 
to one degree or another--picked that apart. They said, well, the 
Secretary can designate other people outside this semiautonomous agency 
to be in charge of certain personnel matters, or things of that sort, 
or we could have the Secretary interspersed between the Secretary of 
Energy and the Under Secretary in charge of these nuclear weapons 
programs.
  Those kinds of structural changes may not appear to be significant on 
the surface, but each one of them detracts from this concept of a 
semiautonomous agency, which is the fundamental basis of our amendment.
  It is what the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, or 
panel, said was the critical component of any reform to ensure that 
there are not other areas of responsibility.
  One of the proposals is that the Under Secretary would have to have 
field administrative staff administering this program. That is exactly 
what the Rudman panel said you didn't want. That was part of this 
bifurcation of responsibility that was creating the problem to date--
too many people having to sign off on too many different things.
  The point I want to make as we are prepared to vote on whether to 
proceed--I gather it will be a nearly unanimous vote--with the debate 
and potential amendment of this legislation, to echo what Senator 
Domenici said, is that whatever amendments we consider we have to 
remain true to the basic concept. You can't have a semiautonomous 
agency in name but have the same old disparate responsibility in 
practice. That is why we are not going to be agreeing to amendments 
that detract from the autonomy of this structure--this semiautonomous 
nature of the jurisdiction of the Under Secretary.
  That is going to be a critical component of this reform. We are going 
to have to reject all amendments, as benign sounding as they may be, 
that detract from that central concept.
  I hope, if Members are going to present amendments, that they will 
understand, at least from the sponsors of the legislation, they will be 
met with opposition if they detract from that central principle. We are 
going to be standing very firm to support the President's own advisory 
board recommendations to the President. We hope, obviously, that the 
President in the end will support those as well.
  My hope is, if there is no one else on the Democratic side who wishes 
to address this, that we can get some time yielded so we can address it 
from our side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I thank a number of people.
  We have come a long way from not knowing exactly what we ought to do 
to a very strong cadre of Senators in a bipartisan nature who have 
decided that this amendment should be adopted, and perhaps a couple of 
changes and technical adjustments can be made. But this is not just the 
work of three sponsors. I am very pleased to have been one of the three 
who has gathered.
  I note the Armed Services Committee's input is represented in this 
bill and has been present at almost all the meetings in the form of the 
chairman, John Warner. Senator Warner has been an integral part, along 
with the Armed Services Committee staff which has knowledge in this 
particular area.
  The Intelligence Committee has been excellent. While they have 
conducted their hearings--and they had a heavy workload to get ready 
for this bill--they have taken significant time to discuss this issue 
and to discuss this approach.
  This amendment is cosponsored by the chairman and cochairman of the 
Intelligence Committee. I thank Senator Shelby, the chairman, for his 
fine cooperation and that of his staff, and, obviously, the presence of 
Senator Bob Kerrey on the floor indicates he is totally cognizant, 
fully aware of this, and supports what we are trying to do.
  In addition, obviously there has been tireless work in terms of 
trying to get the facts in the name of the chairman of the Energy and 
Natural Resources Committee. Senator Murkowski of Alaska has spent a 
great deal of time with a very competent staff. It is small in number 
but efficient and knowledgeable. They have conducted some of the best 
hearings on this subject matter. I am very pleased he is taking an 
active role. The fact he is on this bill and articulately defending the 
approach within the amendment is very helpful and should be helpful to 
the Senate.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I also note Senator Thompson, the chairman of 
the Governmental Affairs Committee, which has responsibility for 
monitoring the organization and providing oversight to the Departments 
of Government, is also very interested and has provided assistance. I 
know he wants to speak on this later today.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I ask unanimous consent for 1 additional minute off 
their side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, Senator Thompson and his staff have been 
very objective. Obviously, his committee has a lot of jurisdiction to 
conduct hearings with reference to restructuring of anything in 
Government. We are very pleased he chose to join us and he chose to 
lend us the excellence and expertise of his staff as we put this 
package together.
  It is a very good approach. After 20 years of actually floundering 
around within a bureaucracy at the Department of Energy that was very 
top heavy, as reported by various commissions, I am very thrilled to be 
in this Chamber and able to say we are going to try to do better by the 
most serious research and the activities which are most apt to harm us 
in the future if others get them. It is the national security of 
America and perhaps peace in the world that hangs on whether this 
Department can do its job right, this autonomous agency with reference 
to nuclear activities, and whether we can find a better way to maintain 
freedom for those scientists, the greatest in the world, so they will 
come and do their work and at the same time do a far better job of 
securing the secrets that are within the minds and the products that 
our great scientists are producing at the nuclear laboratories.
  In the meantime, there are some who want to punish the laboratories. 
I note with some interest the appropriations bill in the House from the 
subcommittee that is supposed to fund our nuclear activities. 
Obviously, it has been reduced so dramatically I am not at all sure 
they can function. I do not know if that is a function of not having 
enough money or a function of saying: Let's do something about the fact 
that we are worried about security.
  That is not the way to do it. The way to do it is to adopt this 
amendment in both Houses, send it to the President, and get started 
with the task, for the first time in 22 years, of trying to set up an 
appropriate semiautonomous agency to do our nuclear work, to conduct 
the activities of our nuclear laboratories.
  I have been asked by the leader, unless my colleagues have an 
objection,

[[Page S8824]]

to ask unanimous consent that all the time be considered used on both 
sides of the aisle and the cloture vote occur at 10:40 this morning. 
This means we will go into a quorum call, and anybody who wants to can 
call off the quorum and speak. Is that fair enough to the Senator from 
Idaho?
  Mr. CRAIG. It is.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I propose that unanimous consent request I just 
articulated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New Mexico and the 
Senator from Arizona for their leadership on the issue of our 
laboratories and our concern about nuclear weapons security and the 
work they have done and the vote that will soon be taken in the Senate 
on that effort. It is of prime national importance.

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