[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 100 (Thursday, July 15, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H5580-H5608]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROTECTION ACT OF 1999

  Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I 
call up House Resolution 245 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 245

       Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it 
     shall be in order without intervention of any point of order 
     to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 1691) to protect 
     religious liberty. The bill shall be considered as read for 
     amendment. The amendment recommended by the Committee on the 
     Judiciary now printed in the bill shall be considered as 
     adopted. The previous question shall be considered as ordered 
     on the bill, as amended, and on any further amendment thereto 
     to final passage without intervening motion except: (1) one 
     hour of debate on the bill, as amended, equally divided and 
     controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the 
     Committee on the Judiciary; (2) a further amendment printed 
     in the Congressional Record pursuant to clause 8 of rule 
     XVIII, if offered by Representative Conyers of Michigan or 
     his designee, which shall be considered as read and shall be 
     separately debatable for one hour equally divided and 
     controlled by the proponent and an opponent; and (3) one 
     motion to recommit with or without instructions.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hefley). The gentlewoman from North 
Carolina (Mrs. Myrick) is recognized for 1 hour.
  Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield the 
customary 30 minutes to the gentleman

[[Page H5581]]

 from Ohio (Mr. Hall), pending which I yield myself such time as I may 
consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is 
for the purpose of debate only.
  Yesterday, the Committee on Rules met and granted the structured rule 
for H.R. 1691, the Religious Liberty Protection Act.
  The rule provides for 1 hour of debate to be equally divided between 
the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the 
Judiciary.
  The rule waives all points of order against consideration of the 
bill.
  The rule makes in order an amendment in the nature of a substitute if 
printed in the Congressional Record and if offered by the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) or his designee, debatable for 1 hour, 
equally divided between the proponent and an opponent.
  Finally, the rule provides for one motion to recommit with or without 
instructions.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a fair rule which will permit a thorough 
discussion of all the relevant issues. In fact, the Committee on the 
Judiciary considered one amendment during its markup of H.R. 1691, and 
that amendment is made in order under this rule.
  Prior to 1990, Mr. Speaker, the Supreme Court vigorously protected 
our first amendment freedoms. A State or local government could not 
impede religious expression unless its laws were narrowly tailored to 
protect a compelling government interest. In 1990, this all changed. In 
the case of Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court ruled that 
churches are subject to all generally applicable and civil laws as long 
as the laws were not enacted in a blatant attempt to suppress religious 
expression.
  The potential impact of the Smith case is frightening. Now police can 
arrest a Catholic priest for serving communion to minors in violation 
of a State's drinking laws. Local officials can force an elderly lady 
to rent her apartment to an unwed or homosexual couple in violation of 
her Christian beliefs. Our law enforcement officials can conduct an 
autopsy on an Orthodox Jewish victim in violation of the family's 
religious beliefs.
  Mr. Speaker, this is wrong, and it has to be changed. The Religious 
Liberty Protection Act would essentially overturn the Smith decision 
and return religious expression to its rightful place.
  Under H.R. 1691, State and local officials must narrowly draft their 
commerce regulations so they do not penalize religion. In addition, 
under the bill anyone who receives Federal grant moneys cannot then 
turn around and discriminate against religion, and State and local 
governments cannot adopt land use laws that treat religious 
organizations differently than secular organizations. There are 
legitimate health and safety reasons for local governments to make 
zoning decisions, but religious discrimination is not one of them.
  I urge my colleagues to support this rule and to support the 
underlying legislation.
  Again I repeat:
  The Committee on the Judiciary considered only one amendment during 
its markup of H.R. 1691, and that amendment is made in order under this 
rule.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume, and I want to thank my colleague, the gentlewoman from North 
Carolina (Mrs. Myrick), for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a structured rule. It will allow for 
consideration of H.R. 1691, which is called the Religious Liberty 
Protection Act. As my colleague from North Carolina has explained, this 
rule provides 1 hour of general debate to be equally divided and 
controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee 
on the Judiciary. The rule permits only one amendment which may be 
offered by the ranking minority member of the Committee on the 
Judiciary or his designee.
  The bill restricts States or local governments from passing laws that 
impose a substantial burden on an individual's rights to practice his 
or her religion. The bill attempts to reverse the effects of a Supreme 
Court decision which made it easier for States to interfere with 
religious freedom. This bill balances the right of individuals to 
practice their religion against the need of the States to regulate the 
conduct of their citizens. The bill attempts to give the right to 
practice religion the same kind of protected status as the right of 
free speech.
  I want to call attention to the enormous support this bill has 
received from the religious community. It is supported by more than 70 
religious and civil liberty groups including Protestant, Catholic, 
Jewish and Muslim groups. I do not think I have ever seen one piece of 
legislation unite so many different religious organizations as this 
bill has done.
  America was founded by people who wanted to practice their religion 
free from government interference, and I am pleased to be a cosponsor 
of this bill because I think it will protect the basic American right, 
freedom of religion.
  Mr. Speaker, the bill has broad bipartisan support and was adopted in 
an open committee process. I urge adoption of the rule and the bill.
  Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Paul).
  (Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule but in 
opposition to the bill.
  Mr. Speaker, as a legislature of enumerated powers, Congress may 
enact laws only for constitutionally authorized purposes. Despite 
citing the general welfare and commerce clause, the purpose of H.R. 
1691 is obviously to ``protect religious liberty.'' However, Congress 
has been granted no power to protect religious liberty. Rather, the 
first amendment is a limitation on congressional power. The first 
amendment of the United States Constitution provides that Congress 
shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, yet H.R. 
1691 specifically prohibits the free exercise of religion because it 
authorizes a government to substantially burden a person's free 
exercise if the government demonstrates some nondescript, compelling 
interest to do so.
  The U.S. Constitution vests all legislative powers in Congress and 
requires Congress to define government policy and select the means by 
which that policy is to be implemented. Congress, in allowing religious 
free exercise to be infringed using the least restrictive means 
whenever government pleads a compelling interest without defining 
either what constitutes least restrictive or compelling interest 
delegates, to the courts legislative powers to make these policy 
choices constitutionally reserved to the elected body.
  Nowhere does H.R. 1691 purport to enforce the provisions of the 
fourteenth amendment as applied to the States. Rather, its design 
imposes a national uniform standard of religious liberty protected 
beyond that allowed under the United States Constitution, thereby 
intruding upon the powers of the State to establish their own policies 
governing protection of religious liberty as preserved under the tenth 
amendment. The interstate commerce clause was never intended to be used 
to set such standards for the entire Nation.
  Admittedly, instances of State government infringement of religious 
exercise can be found in various forms and in various States, most of 
which, however, occur in government-operated schools, prisons and so-
called government enterprises and as a consequence of Federal 
Government programs. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that 
religious liberty will be somehow better protected by enacting national 
terms of infringement, a national infringement standard which is ill-
defined by a Federal legislature and further defined by Federal courts, 
both of which are remote from those whose rights are likely to be 
infringed.
  If one admires the Federal government's handling of the abortion 
question, one will have to wait with even greater anticipation to 
witness the Federal government's handiwork with respect to religious 
liberty.
  To the extent governments continue to expand the breadth and depth of 
their reach into those functions formally assumed by private entities, 
governments will continue to be caught in a hopeless paradox where 
intolerance of religious exercise in government facilities is argued to 
constitute establishment and, similarly, restrictions of

[[Page H5582]]

religious exercise constitute infringement.
  Mr. Speaker, our Nation does not need an unconstitutional Federal 
standard of religious freedom. We need instead for government, 
including the courts, to respect its existing constitutional 
limitations so we can have true religious liberty.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Edwards).

                              {time}  1115

  Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule and this 
bill, the Religious Liberty Protection Act. The first 16 words of the 
Bill of Rights were carefully chosen by our Founding Fathers to protect 
the religious freedom of all Americans. The words are these: ``Congress 
shall pass no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.''
  For over 200 years those words and the principles they represent have 
given Americans a land of unprecedented religious freedom and 
tolerance. The establishment clause was intended to prohibit government 
from forcing religion upon citizens. The free exercise clause was 
designed to keep government from limiting any citizen's rights to 
exercise his or her own religious faith.
  In recent weeks, I have been greatly concerned about congressional 
efforts that I felt would undermine the establishment clause and 
consequently tear down the wall of separation between church and State. 
Our Nation's religious community has been seriously divided on these 
issues. However, the legislation today does not focus on the 
establishment clause. Rather, it focuses on the importance of the free 
exercise clause of the First Amendment.
  I would suggest that the freedom to exercise one's religious beliefs 
is the foundation for all other freedoms we cherish as Americans. 
Without freedom of religion, the freedom of speech, press, and 
association lose much of their value.
  It is a commitment to the free exercise of religion that has united 
over 70 religious and civil rights organizations in support of this 
bill. It is the free exercise of religion that has united religious 
groups in support of this legislation that have been badly divided on 
so many other religious measures recently before this House.
  I will greatly respect Members of this House who cannot support this 
legislation today because I believe religious votes should be a matter 
of conscience, not of party. However, I am gratified to see so many 
diverse religious organizations coming together on this particular 
issue. Organizations from the Anti-Defamation League to the Christian 
Coalition, numerous organizations such as the American Jewish 
Committee, the American Congress, the Methodist church, the Southern 
Baptist Convention, groups that have very seldom come together in 
recent days, have come together in the support of the free exercise of 
individual American's religious rights.
  Mr. Speaker, the point I make in listing some of these organizations 
in support of this is not to say any Member must or should support this 
bill because of these religious groups' endorsement. My point is that 
this legislation was put together on a broad-based nonpartisan basis. 
Its intent was to protect religion, not to deal in partisan issues. The 
common bond of these diverse religious groups on this issue measure is 
that they all believe that government should have to show a compelling 
reason to limit any citizen's religious rights. I agree with those 
groups.
  More importantly, I believe the Founding Fathers intentionally began 
the First Amendment with the protection of religious rights because 
they recognized the fundamental role of religious freedom in our 
society.
  Now, I have been interested to see that some local and State 
officials have argued recently that this legislation might 
inconvenience them. Let me say that I agree. In fact, if they will 
reread the Bill of Rights, the Bill of Rights was written precisely to 
inconvenience governments. The Bill of Rights was written to make it 
inconvenient to step on the religious rights of citizens in this 
country.
  For that reason, I think this is a measure that should pass for the 
very precise reason that it does inconvenience local and State 
governments in their efforts as mentioned by the gentlewoman from North 
Carolina (Mrs. Myrick) in her speech, their efforts to limit the rights 
of Americans in their religious exercise.
  Others, Mr. Speaker, might argue in good faith that this bill will be 
used by some religious groups to defend discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. I can only say that it is neither my intent as a primary 
cosponsor of this bill nor the intent of the religious groups with whom 
I have met to design a bill for that purpose. Our intent is rather to 
build into the statutes a shield against government regulations that 
would limit religious freedom. Our intent, in the words of Rabbi David 
Sapperstein, is to clarify, quote, ``A universal, uniform standard of 
religious freedom.''
  This legislation protects the right of government entities to limit 
religious actions if there is a compelling interest to do so. Court 
cases have clearly established, for example, that protecting against 
race and gender discrimination are compelling State interests, as are 
safety and health protections in the laws.
  In the real world I recognize there are sometimes direct conflicts 
between one citizen's right and another citizen's right. That is why we 
have the judicial system, a system that can look at those issues on a 
case-by-case basis. I believe the judicial system, rather than the 
legislative system, is the best way to determine those specific cases.
  Consequently, personally I believe it would be a mistake for Congress 
in this bill to try to define who does and who does not have protected 
religious rights or to exclude certain circumstances from free exercise 
protections under this bill. Whether intended or not, and I do not 
think it is intended, such an action could in some cases relegate 
religious rights to a secondary status, something I do not think our 
Founding Fathers intended when they chose the first words of the first 
amendment to protect religious liberty.
  To my Democratic colleagues who will vote for the Nadler amendment, I 
respect your decision. No one in this House has been a stronger 
defender of religious liberty and civil rights in Congress than the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), and I respect his genuine 
concerns about possible conflicts between religious rights and other 
rights.
  However, if the gentleman's amendment fails, I would hope that 
Members who supported his amendment would vote for final passage of 
this bill. The need to protect religious freedom and to do it today is 
real. It is important. This bill can still be modified in the Senate, 
in the conference committee, and Members can make their final decision 
on passage at that time. But the principle of protecting religious 
freedom in my opinion is too important to delay.
  Mr. Speaker, no bill is perfect. I do not suggest this bill meets 
that impossible standard. But I believe the Religious Liberty 
Protection Act deserves our support because it protects the fundamental 
principle that government must have compelling reason to limit the 
religious rights of individual citizens. I can find few reasons more 
compelling to support any legislation before this House.
  Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Missouri (Mr. Blunt).
  Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule and of the 
legislation and certainly in support of the remarks just made by the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Edwards) that were so well said in this area.
  This is clearly an area that needs protection. It is an area where 
local governments constantly in recent years have fought in the face of 
what we consider to be First Amendment rights. A small church in 
Florida was ordered to stop its feeding ministry for feeding the 
homeless.
  In Greenville, South Carolina, home Bible study was banned in 
communities that could still have at the exact same locations 
Tupperware parties. When local ordinances ban Bible study but allow 
Tupperware parties there is some significant violation of the First 
Amendment there.
  A family in Michigan was tried under criminal statutes because they 
educated their children at home for religious reasons and did not have 
certification. In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,

[[Page H5583]]

Christian day care centers were threatened with closure if they did not 
change their hiring practices which barred them from hiring non-
Christians, but these were Christian day care centers.
  In Douglas County, Colorado, officials tried to limit the operational 
hours of churches. A local community college required a loyalty oath 
that made it impossible for Jehovah witnesses whose faith instructs 
against taking those oaths to go to work at that facility. Certain fire 
and police stations promulgate a blanket of no beards rules which 
interferes with, among other groups, Muslim firefighters.

  Mr. Speaker, these infringements on religious liberty are 
significant. They are not pervasive yet, but they are certainly 
prevalent. This bill allows churches in places like Rolling Hills 
Estates, California, to build in an area that was zoned commercial 
where the churches are told they cannot build if they want to, but 
adult businesses and adult massage parlors can be built in this same 
area of that community.
  The RLPA would allow an orthodox Jewish community to build their 
houses of worship within walking distance of their neighborhoods. It 
would allow prison ministries, which have had such a great impact all 
over the country, to continue to do efforts and prison programming that 
are currently threatened. This would also deal with the question of 
land-use regulation that so affects religious practice in communities 
today.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to enter into the Record, as I conclude my 
comments in support of this rule, I would like to enter into the Record 
a list that is even more inclusive than the list that was just referred 
to by the gentleman from Texas of religious groups that really cover a 
broad, broad spectrum of religious activity and association in this 
country who are in favor of H.R. 1691, and I am sure would also 
encourage the passage of this rule so we can get on to this important 
debate.

                Organizations and Supporters of R.L.P.A.

     Agudath Israel of America
     The Alepha Institute
     American Baptist Churches USA
     American Center for Law and Justice
     American Conference on Religious Movements
     American Ethical Union, Washington Ethical Action Office
     American Humanist Association
     American Jewish Committee
     American Jewish Congress
     American Muslim Council
     Americans for Democratic Action
     Americans for Religious Liberty
     Americans United for Separation of Church & State
     Anit-Defamation League
     Association of Christian Schools International
     Association on American Indian Affairs
     Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs
     B'nai B'rith
     Campus Crusade for Christ
     Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights
     Central Conference of American Rabbis
     Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)
     Christian Coalition
     Christian Legal Society
     Christian Science Committee on Publication
     Church of the Brethren
     Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
     Church of Scientology International
     Coalition for Christian Colleges and Universities
     Council of Jewish Federations
     Council on Religious Freedom
     Council on Spiritual Practices
     Criminal Justice Policy Foundation
     Episcopal Church
     Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist 
         Convention
     Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
     Family Research Council
     Focus on the Family
     Friends Committee on National Legislation
     General Conference of Seven-day Adventists
     Guru Gobind Singh Foundation
     Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization of American, Inc.
     Interfaith Religious Liberty Foundation
     International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists
     International Institute for Religious Freedom
     Japanese American Citizens League
     Jerry Falwell's Liberty Alliance
     Jewish Council for Public Affairs
     The Jewish Policy Center
     The Jewish Reconstructionist Federation
     Justice Fellowship
     Kay Coles James
     Liberty Counsel
     Mennonite Central Committee U.S.
     Muslim Prison Foundation
     Muslim Public Affairs Council
     Mystic Temple of Light, Inc.
     NA'AMATUSA
     National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
     National Association of Evangelicals
     National Campaign for a Peace Tax Fund
     National Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty
     National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA
     National Council of Jewish Women
     National Council on Islamic Affairs
     National Jewish Coalition
     National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs
     National Native American Prisoner's Rights Advocacy Coalition
     National Sikh Center
     Native American Church of North America
     Native American Rights Fund
     Native American Spirit Correction Project
     Navajo Nation Corrections Project
     North American Council For Muslim Women
     Pacific Justice Institute
     People For the American Way Action Fund
     Peyote Way Church of God
     Presbyterian Church (USA), Washington Office
     Prison Fellowship Ministries
     Rabbinical Council of America
     Religious Liberty Foundation
     Rutherford Institute
     Sacred Sites Inter-faith Alliance
     Soka-Gakkai International--USA
     Union of American Hebrew Congregations
     Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America
     Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations
     United Church of Christ, Office for Church in Society
     United Methodist Church, Board of Church & Society
     United States Catholic Conference
     United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism
     Women of Reform Judaism, Federation of Temple Sisterhood

  Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Kingston).
  Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from North 
Carolina (Mrs. Myrick) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule on H.R. 1691 and also for 
the subsequent legislation. What this legislation attempts to do is put 
some common sense in the murky waters of the First Amendment regarding 
the separation of church and state. And we can say, well it ought to be 
crystal clear. But that water is murky, and it will remain murky.
  Mr. Speaker, a couple of examples: we all remember the debate several 
years ago about nursing homes that receive Medicare not being able to 
have in their advertising in the Yellow Pages religious symbols if they 
have a religious, faith-based organization that supports the nursing 
home. If they want to use a cross in the Yellow Pages, that is a 
violation.
  The prayer-in-school issue, and this does not really affect these 
directly, but I am trying to prove a point about the murky water. 
Should kids be allowed to pray in school, nondenomination school 
prayer? There have been lots of cases on this, but let us look at the 
case of Littleton, Colorado. If a teacher were huddled in the classroom 
while gun shots were outside the door and in a room safely with kids 
and that teacher said, ``Can we bow our heads and say a prayer,'' as 
the shots were fired outside the door, they are not allowed to do that.
  Mr. Speaker, the point is there is murky water in the question of 
religion, prayer, and the role of the State. And what this does in a 
narrowly defined area, and that area which was really opened up by the 
Employment Division versus Smith decision in 1990, it simply tries to 
put some common sense into it by saying that the local laws, the laws 
of the State cannot interfere with religious beliefs.
  I think it is a very small step. It is a very carefully balanced 
bill. It is crafted. It is not, in terms of public prayer, a 
significant public religion-type bill at all. This again is just a very 
slight adjustment and it tries to put common sense in it.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this. It is bipartisan 
and I hope that we can move it and get back to some of the other issues 
that are before Congress.
  Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady), the subcommittee 
chairman.
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from 
North Carolina (Mrs. Myrick) for yielding me this time. And I thank all 
the members of the Committee on Rules for their bipartisan support for 
the rule that is before the House now. I would particularly like to 
also thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Edwards) for

[[Page H5584]]

his leading role in sponsoring this legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to respond very briefly to a point that the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Paul), my good friend, raised concerning our 
government being a government of enumerated powers. I certainly agree 
with him on that point and this bill is by no means inconsistent with 
the principle that we are a government of enumerated powers.
  Indeed, this bill is carefully drafted with that principle in mind 
and is carefully based on specific enumerated powers of the Congress 
which are set forth in the United States Constitution.

                              {time}  1130

  In using the enumerated powers that are in this bill, we are 
following well-established tradition with respect to the use of those 
same powers to protect civil rights other than the free exercise of 
religion.
  We use the commerce clause in this bill to protect the free exercise 
of religion. That same power is used in the 1964 Civil Rights Act to 
protect against discrimination in employment and public accommodations.
  We use the spending clause in this bill to protect against the 
infringement of religious freedom. That same power is used once again 
in the 1964 Civil Rights Act under title VI of that Act to prevent 
discrimination in programs at the State and local level, which receive 
Federal funds.
  We also use section 5 of the 14th amendment, which was used 
previously in the civil rights context to protect voting rights. So we 
are following in a well-established tradition of protecting civil 
rights using enumerated powers of the Congress under our Constitution.
  This bill is carefully crafted. I want to thank the Members of the 
Committee on Rules for bringing forward a rule which allows for the 
consideration of this bill, and I urge all Members to support the rule 
and to support the bill on final passage, without amendment.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Conyers), the ranking member of the committee.
  (Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the distinguished gentleman 
from Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley), the ranking member of Committee on 
Rules, for granting me the time.
  Religious freedom has been one of the cornerstones of American 
democracy, of course, since our founding. Like the Members of this 
body, I believe all of them, I am committed to preserving religious 
freedom.
  So we have before us soon today, first of all, we have a rule which I 
am in support of, but the bill, well-intentioned as it is, may cause 
far more harm than good. Because, instead of limiting religious 
discrimination, it will allow for an increase in other forms of 
discrimination. Instead of enhancing constitutional protections, it may 
very well run afoul of the Constitution itself.
  I would like to take a moment or two to explain this. A letter came 
to me from the American Civil Liberties Union that started out working 
with a coalition supporting this bill. It was multiracial, 
multireligious. But now the Religious Liberty Protection Act is being 
opposed by the Civil Liberties organization because it does not include 
explicit language ensuring that the language will not undermine the 
enforcement of civil rights laws.
  The Congress should not break from its long-standing practice, they 
say, of refraining from undermining or preempting State civil rights 
laws that are more protective of civil rights sometimes than even 
Federal law.
  So the opposition by the Civil Liberties organization is, unless this 
bill is corrected and amended to protect civil rights laws, and I think 
the substitute of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) would 
accomplish this, we would have a very serious problem.
  The Civil Liberties Union goes on to say that,

       We are no longer a part of the coalition supporting the 
     Religious Liberty Protection Act because we could not ignore 
     the potentially severe consequences that it may have on State 
     and local civil rights laws. And although we believe that 
     courts should find civil rights laws compelling and uniform 
     enforcement of these laws the least restrictive means, we 
     know that at least several courts have already rejected that 
     position.
       We have found that landlords across the country have been 
     using State religious liberty claims to challenge the 
     application of State and local civil rights laws protecting 
     persons against marital status discrimination.
       Now, none of these claims involve owner-occupied housing. 
     All of the landlords owned many investment properties that 
     were outside of the State laws exemptions for small 
     landlords. These landlords are companies. And they all sought 
     to turn the shield of religious exercise protection into a 
     sword against civil rights prospective tenants.

  So, Mr. Speaker, we want to consider an alternative, an improvement, 
if possible, to this measure. Without this improvement, I think this is 
a serious regression in both religious liberty and in civil rights 
protections as well.
  Remember, if you will, that a measure that will lead to an increase 
in discrimination, because whenever a party is sued for discrimination, 
this bill will allow in effect, the religious liberty defense, it will 
in effect allow a defendant to say, I have discriminated because my 
religion allowed me to do it. My religion made me do it.
  This is a right no other citizen or government can assert. So the 
bill is so sweeping that this new defense will not only apply to 
religious institutions themselves but to companies and corporations as 
well.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to hear all of the 
speakers today say they are in support of the rule. This is a fair 
rule, and I urge all of my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the 
previous question on the resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The resolution was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 245, 
I call up the bill (H.R. 1691) to protect religious liberty, and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). Pursuant to House 
Resolution 245, the bill is considered read for amendment.
  The text of H.R. 1691 is as follows:

                               H.R. 1691

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Religious Liberty Protection 
     Act of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE.

       (a) General Rule.--Except as provided in subsection (b), a 
     government shall not substantially burden a person's 
     religious exercise--
       (1) in a program or activity, operated by a government, 
     that receives Federal financial assistance; or
       (2) in any case in which the substantial burden on the 
     person's religious exercise affects, or in which a removal of 
     that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign 
     nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes;
     even if the burden results from a rule of general 
     applicability.
       (b) Exception.--A government may substantially burden a 
     person's religious exercise if the government demonstrates 
     that application of the burden to the person--
       (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
     interest; and
       (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
     compelling governmental interest.
       (c) Remedies of the United States.--Nothing in this section 
     shall be construed to authorize the United States to deny or 
     withhold Federal financial assistance as a remedy for a 
     violation of this Act. However, nothing in this subsection 
     shall be construed to deny, impair, or otherwise affect any 
     right or authority of the Attorney General or the United 
     States or any agency, officer, or employee thereof under 
     other law, including section 4(d) of this Act, to institute 
     or intervene in any action or proceeding.

     SEC. 3. ENFORCEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

       (a) Procedure.--If a claimant produces prima facie evidence 
     to support a claim alleging a violation of the Free Exercise 
     Clause or a violation of a provision of this Act enforcing 
     that clause, the government shall bear the burden of 
     persuasion on any element of the claim; however, the claimant 
     shall bear the burden of persuasion on whether the challenged 
     government practice, law, or regulation burdens or 
     substantially burdens the claimant's exercise of religion.
       (b) Land Use Regulation.--
       (1) Limitation on land use regulation.--
       (A) Where, in applying or implementing any land use 
     regulation or exemption, or system of land use regulations or 
     exemptions, a government has the authority to make 
     individualized assessments of the proposed uses

[[Page H5585]]

     to which real property would be put, the government may not 
     impose a substantial burden on a person's religious exercise, 
     unless the government demonstrates that application of the 
     burden to the person is in furtherance of a compelling 
     governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of 
     furthering that compelling governmental interest.
       (B) No government shall impose or implement a land use 
     regulation in a manner that does not treat religious 
     assemblies or institutions on equal terms with nonreligious 
     assemblies or institutions.
       (C) No government shall impose or implement a land use 
     regulation that discriminates against any assembly or 
     institution on the basis of religion or religious 
     denomination.
       (D) No government with zoning authority shall unreasonably 
     exclude from the jurisdiction over which it has authority, or 
     unreasonably limit within that jurisdiction, assemblies or 
     institutions principally devoted to religious exercise.
       (2) Full faith and credit.--Adjudication of a claim of a 
     violation of the Free Exercise Clause or this subsection in a 
     non-Federal forum shall be entitled to full faith and credit 
     in a Federal court only if the claimant had a full and fair 
     adjudication of that claim in the non-Federal forum.
       (3) Nonpreemption.--Nothing in this subsection shall 
     preempt State law that is equally or more protective of 
     religious exercise.

     SEC. 4. JUDICIAL RELIEF.

       (a) Cause of Action.--A person may assert a violation of 
     this Act as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and 
     obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to 
     assert a claim or defense under this section shall be 
     governed by the general rules of standing under article III 
     of the Constitution.
       (b) Attorneys' Fees.--Section 722(b) of the Revised 
     Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1988(b)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 
     1998,'' after ``Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,''; 
     and
       (2) by striking the comma that follows a comma.
       (c) Prisoners.--Any litigation under this Act in which the 
     claimant is a prisoner shall be subject to the Prison 
     Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (including provisions of law 
     amended by that Act).
       (d) Authority of United States to Enforce This Act.--The 
     United States may sue for injunctive or declaratory relief to 
     enforce compliance with this Act.

     SEC. 5. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

       (a) Religious Belief Unaffected.--Nothing in this Act shall 
     be construed to authorize any government to burden any 
     religious belief.
       (b) Religious Exercise Not Regulated.--Nothing in this Act 
     shall create any basis for restricting or burdening religious 
     exercise or for claims against a religious organization, 
     including any religiously affiliated school or university, 
     not acting under color of law.
       (c) Claims to Funding Unaffected.--Nothing in this Act 
     shall create or preclude a right of any religious 
     organization to receive funding or other assistance from a 
     government, or of any person to receive government funding 
     for a religious activity, but this Act may require government 
     to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a 
     burden or a substantial burden on religious exercise.
       (d) Other Authority To Impose Conditions on Funding 
     Unaffected.--Nothing in this Act shall--
       (1) authorize a government to regulate or affect, directly 
     or indirectly, the activities or policies of a person other 
     than a government as a condition of receiving funding or 
     other assistance; or
       (2) restrict any authority that may exist under other law 
     to so regulate or affect, except as provided in this Act.
       (e) Governmental Discretion in Alleviating Burdens on 
     Religious Exercise.--A government may avoid the preemptive 
     force of any provision of this Act by changing the policy 
     that results in the substantial burden on religious exercise, 
     by retaining the policy and exempting the burdened religious 
     exercise, by providing exemptions from the policy for 
     applications that substantially burden religious exercise, or 
     by any other means that eliminates the substantial burden.
       (f) Effect on Other Law.--In a claim under section 2(a)(2) 
     of this Act, proof that a substantial burden on a person's 
     religious exercise, or removal of that burden, affects or 
     would affect commerce, shall not establish any inference or 
     presumption that Congress intends that any religious exercise 
     is, or is not, subject to any other law.
       (g) Broad Construction.--This Act should be construed in 
     favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the 
     maximum extent permitted by its terms and the Constitution.
       (h) Severability.--If any provision of this Act or of an 
     amendment made by this Act, or any application of such 
     provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be 
     unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, the amendments 
     made by this Act, and the application of the provision to any 
     other person or circumstance shall not be affected.

     SEC. 6. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE UNAFFECTED.

       Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect, 
     interpret, or in any way address that portion of the first 
     amendment to the Constitution prohibiting laws respecting an 
     establishment of religion (referred to in this section as the 
     ``Establishment Clause''). Granting government funding, 
     benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the 
     Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of 
     this Act. As used in this section, the term ``granting'', 
     used with respect to government funding, benefits, or 
     exemptions, does not include the denial of government 
     funding, benefits, or exemptions.

     SEC. 7. AMENDMENTS TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT.

       (a) Definitions.--Section 5 of the Religious Freedom 
     Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb-2) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``a State, or subdivision 
     of a State'' and inserting ``a covered entity or a 
     subdivision of such an entity'';
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``term'' and all that 
     follows through ``includes'' and inserting ``term `covered 
     entity' means''; and
       (3) in paragraph (4), by striking all after ``means,'' and 
     inserting ``conduct that constitutes the exercise of religion 
     under the first amendment to the Constitution; however, such 
     conduct need not be compelled by, or central to, a system of 
     religious belief; the use, building, or converting of real 
     property for religious exercise shall itself be considered 
     religious exercise of the person or entities that use or 
     intend to use the property for religious exercise.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 6(a) of the Religious 
     Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb-3(a)) is 
     amended by striking ``and State''.

     SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.

       As used in this Act--
       (1) the term ``religious exercise'' means conduct that 
     constitutes the exercise of religion under the first 
     amendment to the Constitution; however, such conduct need not 
     be compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief; 
     the use, building, or converting of real property for 
     religious exercise shall itself be considered religious 
     exercise of the person or entities that use or intend to use 
     the property for religious exercise;
       (2) the term ``Free Exercise Clause'' means that portion of 
     the first amendment to the Constitution that proscribes laws 
     prohibiting the free exercise of religion and includes the 
     application of that proscription under the 14th amendment to 
     the Constitution;
       (3) the term ``land use regulation'' means a law or 
     decision by a government that limits or restricts a private 
     person's uses or development of land, or of structures 
     affixed to land, where the law or decision applies to one or 
     more particular parcels of land or to land within one or more 
     designated geographical zones, and where the private person 
     has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other 
     property interest in the regulated land, or a contract or 
     option to acquire such an interest;
       (4) the term ``program or activity'' means a program or 
     activity as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 606 of 
     the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d-4a);
       (5) the term ``demonstrates'' means meets the burdens of 
     going forward with the evidence and of persuasion; and
       (6) the term ``government''--
       (A) means--
       (i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental 
     entity created under the authority of a State;
       (ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, 
     subdivision, or official of an entity listed in clause (i); 
     and
       (iii) any other person acting under color of State law; and
       (B) for the purposes of sections 3(a) and 5, includes the 
     United States, a branch, department, agency, instrumentality 
     or official of the United States, and any person acting under 
     color of Federal law.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The amendment printed in the bill is 
adopted.
  The text of H.R. 1691, as amended, is as follows:

                               H.R. 1691

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Religious Liberty Protection 
     Act of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE.

       (a) General Rule.--Except as provided in subsection (b), a 
     government shall not substantially burden a person's 
     religious exercise--
       (1) in a program or activity, operated by a government, 
     that receives Federal financial assistance; or
       (2) in any case in which the substantial burden on the 
     person's religious exercise affects, or in which a removal of 
     that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign 
     nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes;
     even if the burden results from a rule of general 
     applicability.
       (b) Exception.--A government may substantially burden a 
     person's religious exercise if the government demonstrates 
     that application of the burden to the person--
       (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
     interest; and
       (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
     compelling governmental interest.
       (c) Remedies of the United States.--Nothing in this section 
     shall be construed to authorize the United States to deny or 
     withhold Federal financial assistance as a remedy for a 
     violation of this Act. However, nothing in this subsection 
     shall be construed to deny, impair, or

[[Page H5586]]

     otherwise affect any right or authority of the Attorney 
     General or the United States or any agency, officer, or 
     employee thereof under other law, including section 4(d) of 
     this Act, to institute or intervene in any action or 
     proceeding.

     SEC. 3. ENFORCEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

       (a) Procedure.--If a claimant produces prima facie evidence 
     to support a claim alleging a violation of the Free Exercise 
     Clause or a violation of a provision of this Act enforcing 
     that clause, the government shall bear the burden of 
     persuasion on any element of the claim; however, the claimant 
     shall bear the burden of persuasion on whether the challenged 
     government practice, law, or regulation burdens or 
     substantially burdens the claimant's exercise of religion.
       (b) Land Use Regulation.--
       (1) Limitation on land use regulation.--
       (A) Where, in applying or implementing any land use 
     regulation or exemption, or system of land use regulations or 
     exemptions, a government has the authority to make 
     individualized assessments of the proposed uses to which real 
     property would be put, the government may not impose a 
     substantial burden on a person's religious exercise, unless 
     the government demonstrates that application of the burden to 
     the person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
     interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering 
     that compelling governmental interest.
       (B) No government shall impose or implement a land use 
     regulation in a manner that does not treat religious 
     assemblies or institutions on equal terms with nonreligious 
     assemblies or institutions.
       (C) No government shall impose or implement a land use 
     regulation that discriminates against any assembly or 
     institution on the basis of religion or religious 
     denomination.
       (D) No government with zoning authority shall unreasonably 
     exclude from the jurisdiction over which it has authority, or 
     unreasonably limit within that jurisdiction, assemblies or 
     institutions principally devoted to religious exercise.
       (2) Full faith and credit.--Adjudication of a claim of a 
     violation of the Free Exercise Clause or this subsection in a 
     non-Federal forum shall be entitled to full faith and credit 
     in a Federal court only if the claimant had a full and fair 
     adjudication of that claim in the non-Federal forum.
       (3) Nonpreemption.--Nothing in this subsection shall 
     preempt State law that is equally or more protective of 
     religious exercise.

     SEC. 4. JUDICIAL RELIEF.

       (a) Cause of Action.--A person may assert a violation of 
     this Act as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and 
     obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to 
     assert a claim or defense under this section shall be 
     governed by the general rules of standing under article III 
     of the Constitution.
       (b) Attorneys' Fees.--Section 722(b) of the Revised 
     Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1988(b)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 
     1998,'' after ``Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,''; 
     and
       (2) by striking the comma that follows a comma.
       (c) Prisoners.--Any litigation under this Act in which the 
     claimant is a prisoner shall be subject to the Prison 
     Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (including provisions of law 
     amended by that Act).
       (d) Authority of United States to Enforce This Act.--The 
     United States may sue for injunctive or declaratory relief to 
     enforce compliance with this Act.

     SEC. 5. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

       (a) Religious Belief Unaffected.--Nothing in this Act shall 
     be construed to authorize any government to burden any 
     religious belief.
       (b) Religious Exercise Not Regulated.--Nothing in this Act 
     shall create any basis for restricting or burdening religious 
     exercise or for claims against a religious organization, 
     including any religiously affiliated school or university, 
     not acting under color of law.
       (c) Claims to Funding Unaffected.--Nothing in this Act 
     shall create or preclude a right of any religious 
     organization to receive funding or other assistance from a 
     government, or of any person to receive government funding 
     for a religious activity, but this Act may require government 
     to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a 
     burden or a substantial burden on religious exercise.
       (d) Other Authority To Impose Conditions on Funding 
     Unaffected.--Nothing in this Act shall--
       (1) authorize a government to regulate or affect, directly 
     or indirectly, the activities or policies of a person other 
     than a government as a condition of receiving funding or 
     other assistance; or
       (2) restrict any authority that may exist under other law 
     to so regulate or affect, except as provided in this Act.
       (e) Governmental Discretion in Alleviating Burdens on 
     Religious Exercise.--A government may avoid the preemptive 
     force of any provision of this Act by changing the policy 
     that results in the substantial burden on religious exercise, 
     by retaining the policy and exempting the burdened religious 
     exercise, by providing exemptions from the policy for 
     applications that substantially burden religious exercise, or 
     by any other means that eliminates the substantial burden.
       (f) Effect on Other Law.--In a claim under section 2(a)(2) 
     of this Act, proof that a substantial burden on a person's 
     religious exercise, or removal of that burden, affects or 
     would affect commerce, shall not establish any inference or 
     presumption that Congress intends that any religious exercise 
     is, or is not, subject to any other law.
       (g) Broad Construction.--This Act should be construed in 
     favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the 
     maximum extent permitted by its terms and the Constitution.
       (h) Severability.--If any provision of this Act or of an 
     amendment made by this Act, or any application of such 
     provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be 
     unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, the amendments 
     made by this Act, and the application of the provision to any 
     other person or circumstance shall not be affected.

     SEC. 6. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE UNAFFECTED.

       Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect, 
     interpret, or in any way address that portion of the first 
     amendment to the Constitution prohibiting laws respecting an 
     establishment of religion (referred to in this section as the 
     ``Establishment Clause''). Granting government funding, 
     benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the 
     Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of 
     this Act. As used in this section, the term ``granting'', 
     used with respect to government funding, benefits, or 
     exemptions, does not include the denial of government 
     funding, benefits, or exemptions.

     SEC. 7. AMENDMENTS TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT.

       (a) Definitions.--Section 5 of the Religious Freedom 
     Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb-2) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``a State, or subdivision 
     of a State'' and inserting ``a covered entity or a 
     subdivision of such an entity'';
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``term'' and all that 
     follows through ``includes'' and inserting ``term `covered 
     entity' means''; and
       (3) in paragraph (4), by striking all after ``means,'' and 
     inserting ``any exercise of religion, whether or not 
     compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief, 
     and includes (A) the use, building, or conversion of real 
     property by a person or entity intending that property for 
     religious exercise; and (B) any conduct protected as 
     exercise of religion under the first amendment to the 
     Constitution.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 6(a) of the Religious 
     Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb-3(a)) is 
     amended by striking ``and State''.

     SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.

       As used in this Act--
       (1) the term ``religious exercise'' means any exercise of 
     religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a 
     system of religious belief, and includes (A) the use, 
     building, or conversion of real property by a person or 
     entity intending that property for religious exercise; and 
     (B) any conduct protected as exercise of religion under the 
     first amendment to the Constitution;
       (2) the term ``Free Exercise Clause'' means that portion of 
     the first amendment to the Constitution that proscribes laws 
     prohibiting the free exercise of religion and includes the 
     application of that proscription under the 14th amendment to 
     the Constitution;
       (3) the term ``land use regulation'' means a law or 
     decision by a government that limits or restricts a private 
     person's uses or development of land, or of structures 
     affixed to land, where the law or decision applies to one or 
     more particular parcels of land or to land within one or more 
     designated geographical zones, and where the private person 
     has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other 
     property interest in the regulated land, or a contract or 
     option to acquire such an interest;
       (4) the term ``program or activity'' means a program or 
     activity as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 606 of 
     the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d-4a);
       (5) the term ``demonstrates'' means meets the burdens of 
     going forward with the evidence and of persuasion; and
       (6) the term ``government''--
       (A) means--
       (i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental 
     entity created under the authority of a State;
       (ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, 
     subdivision, or official of an entity listed in clause (i); 
     and
       (iii) any other person acting under color of State law; and
       (B) for the purposes of sections 3(a) and 5, includes the 
     United States, a branch, department, agency, instrumentality 
     or official of the United States, and any person acting under 
     color of Federal law.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. After 1 hour of debate on the bill, as 
amended, it shall be in order to consider the further amendment printed 
in the Congressional Record if offered by the gentleman from Michigan 
(Mr. Conyers) or his designee, which shall be considered read and 
debatable for 1 hour, equally divided and controlled by the proponent 
and an opponent.
  The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady) and the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Conyers) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady).
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1691, the Religious Liberty Protection Act, is 
legislation designed to ensure that the free exercise of religion is 
not trampled on by the insensitive and heedless actions of government. 
It is supported by a broad coalition of more than 70 religious and 
civil rights groups, ranging from the Christian Coalition and Campus 
Crusade for Christ to the National Council

[[Page H5587]]

of Churches and People for the American Way.
  This legislation has been introduced and is now being considered by 
the House because the Supreme Court has taken, as Professor Douglas 
Laycock has aptly described it, ``the cramped view that one has a right 
to believe a religion, and a right not to be discriminated against 
because of one's religion, but no right to practice one's religion.''
  The purpose of this bill is to use the constitutional authority of 
the Congress to help ensure that people do have a right, respected by 
government at all levels, to practice their religion. The supporters of 
the bill recognize that the free exercise of religion has been a 
hallmark of the American system of constitutional government and that 
Congress has a responsibility to protect the free exercise of religion 
to the maximum extent practicable.
  In considering the need for this legislation, it is important to 
understand that, at least in some respects, protection for religious 
liberty in America does remain strong. The Supreme Court has recognized 
that governmental actions which target religion for adverse treatment 
run afoul of the protections afforded by the first amendment of our 
Constitution.
  As Justice Kennedy, writing in 1993 for the Court in the City of 
Hialeah case, stated: ``Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or 
disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its 
practices.'' Protection against such religious persecution or 
oppression clearly is a core purpose of the first amendment 
proscription of laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion.
  But we are here today because in another important respect the 
religious practice of Americans have been denied protection by the 
Supreme Court of the United States. Let it be clearly understood that 
we are not here to change the scope of the protections afforded by the 
free exercise provision of the first amendment. That is not the purpose 
of the Religious Liberty Protection Act.
  Instead, the purpose of this legislation is to use the recognized 
powers of the Congress under the Constitution to fill a gap in the 
protections available to people of faith in America who, in fact, face 
substantial burdens imposed by government on their religious practices.
  We do not seek to alter the protections the Supreme Court has 
determined to be required by the first amendment but to provide 
separate and additional protections.
  Mr. Speaker, I will not now rehearse the detailed history of the 
judicial and legislative actions that have brought us to this day, but 
a brief word about that background is necessary to put today's debate 
in proper context.
  In 1990, the Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith held that 
governmental actions under neutral laws of general applicability, which 
is laws that do not target religion for adverse treatment, are not 
ordinarily subject to challenge under the free exercise clause, even if 
they result in substantial burdens on religious practice.
  Prior to the Smith decision, the Court had for many years recognized, 
as the Court said in 1972 in Wisconsin v. Yoder, that a ``regulation 
neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the 
constitutional requirement for government neutrality if it unduly 
burdens the free exercise of religion.''
  Yoder was a case that dealt with the adverse impact of a compulsory 
school attendance law on the religious practices of the Amish. It did 
not involve circumstances in which government had targeted religion for 
adverse treatment.
  In Yoder, the Court explained that ``the essence of all that has been 
said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the 
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate 
claims to a free exercise of religion.''
  The shorthand description of the standard applied in Yoder and 
similar cases is the compelling interest/least restrictive means test.
  In response to widespread public concern regarding the impact of the 
Smith decision, the Congress in 1993 passed the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, frequently referred to as RFRA. This legislation 
sought to require application of the compelling interest/least 
restrictive means test to governmental actions that substantially 
burden religious exercise.
  RFRA was based in part on the power of Congress under section 5 of 
the 14th amendment to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of the 14th amendment with respect to the States. The 
provisions of the first amendment are applied to the States by virtue 
of the 14th amendment.

                              {time}  1145

  The Supreme Court in 1997 in the City of Boerne versus Flores case 
held that Congress had gone beyond its proper powers under Section 5 of 
the 14th Amendment in enacting RFRA.
  The Religious Liberty Protection Act, which is before the House 
today, approaches the issue of protecting free exercise in a way that 
will not be subject to the same challenge that succeeded in the Boerne 
case.
  The heart of the bill, which is now before the House, is in Section 
2, where the general rule is established that government may not 
substantially burden a person's religious exercise even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government 
demonstrates that application of the burden is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that interest. As I have noted, the same test was adopted by 
Congress in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and a similar 
compelling interest test was applied by the Supreme Court for many 
years until it was abandoned by the court in 1990.
  As set forth in Section 2, this general rule is applicable in two 
distinct contexts. First, it applies where a person's religious 
exercise is burdened ``in a program or activity operated by the 
government that receives Federal financial assistance.'' This provision 
closely tracks title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
prohibits discrimination on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin under ``any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.''
  Second, the general rule under Section 2 is applicable where the 
burden on a person's religious exercise affects interstate commerce, or 
where the removal of the burden would affect interstate commerce. As 
with the provision on Federal financial assistance, this provision 
follows in the tradition of the civil rights laws. It uses the commerce 
power to protect the civil right of religious exercise as the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 uses the commerce power to protect against 
discrimination in employment and public accommodations.
  The provisions of the bill requiring application of the compelling 
interest/least restrictive means test are based on the conviction that 
government should accommodate the religious exercise of individuals and 
groups unless there are compelling reasons not to do so.
  Application of this test will not mean that a religious claimant will 
necessarily win against the government. And that is a very important 
point to understand. Indeed, in a great many cases the government will 
be able to establish that it has acted on the basis of a compelling 
interest using the least restrictive means, and thus justify the burden 
it has imposed on the free exercise of religion.
  Under the test provided for in the bill, however, the religious 
claimant will not automatically lose because the burden on the free 
exercise of religion is imposed by a neutral law of general 
applicability. The mere absence of an intention to persecute the 
religious claimant will not be sufficient to justify the governmental 
action.
  Section 3 of the bill contains additional safeguards for religious 
exercise. The provisions in Section 3 are remedial measures designed to 
prevent the violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution 
as that provision of the Constitution has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court. In this Section, Congress acts within the scope of the 
enforcement power under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court.
  Subsection (a) of Section 3 provides that once a claimant makes a 
prima facie case of a free exercise violation and shows a substantial 
burden, the burden of persuasion will shift to the government.
  Subsection (b) establishes certain limitations on land-use 
regulations. These provisions are necessary to effectively remedy the 
pervasive pattern, a

[[Page H5588]]

pattern well documented in the hearings of the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, of discriminatory and 
abusive treatment suffered by religious individuals and organizations 
in the land-use context.
  These limitations include a provision requiring application of the 
compelling interest/least restrictive means test ``when the government 
has the authority to make individualized assessments of the proposed 
uses to which real property will be put.'' This provision follows the 
principle articulated by the Supreme Court in the Smith case that 
``where the State has in place a system of individualized 
determinations or individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend 
that system to cases of `religious hardship' without compelling 
reason.''
  Under Subsection (b), land-use regulations must treat religious 
assemblies or institutions on equal terms with nonreligious assemblies 
or institutions and must not ``discriminate against any assembly or 
institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination.'' In 
addition, a zoning authority may not ``unreasonably limit'' or 
``unreasonably exclude'' assemblies or institutions principally devoted 
to religious exercise.
  I would like to make a comment about the impact of this bill on local 
land use. The impact of this bill on local land use, I believe, will be 
the same as the impact that was intended by the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act. So there is no real difference between the purpose of 
this bill with respect to land use and the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, which the Congress passed with an overwhelming vote of 
support.
  It is important to understand that we should not casually interfere 
with local land-use decisions, but I believe that where fundamental 
rights are at stake, the Federal Government does have an important role 
to play. And based on the record of abuse that we have seen in this 
particular context, I believe that the actions that we would take under 
this bill to protect the free exercise of religion in the local land-
use context are very well justified.
  I would point out that those particularly who are committed to using 
Federal power to protect property rights against infringement at the 
local land-use level should certainly be no less willing to use Federal 
power to protect against local actions which infringe on the free 
exercise of religion.
  Finally, in summarizing the bill, let me point out that the bill 
amends the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 to conform with 
the holding of the Supreme Court in the Boerne case. This provision of 
the bill recognizes the legal reality that after Boerne the courts will 
apply RFRA solely to the Federal Government and not to the States.
  Now, I have discussed the legal concepts involved in this 
legislation, but I should also mention some examples of the types of 
cases where the enforcement of neutral rules of general application may 
be challenged under the bill. We have heard some reference to such 
examples already, but let me cite to the Members of the House a 
catalogue of cases that Professor Michael McConnell has gathered. These 
are cases which were decided under RFRA before the Boerne decision.
  While RFRA was on the books, successful claimants included a 
Washington, D.C. church whose practice of feeding a hot breakfast to 
homeless men and women reportedly violated zoning laws; a Jehovah's 
Witness who was denied employment for refusing to take a loyalty oath; 
the Catholic University of America, which was sued for gender 
discrimination by a canon-law professor denied tenure; a religious 
school resisting a requirement that it hire a teacher of a different 
religion; a Catholic prisoner who was refused permission to wear a 
crucifix; and a church that was required to disgorge tithes contributed 
by a congregant who later declared bankruptcy.

  The same sorts of cases would be affected by this legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, the goal of protecting the ability of Americans freely 
to practice their religion according to the dictates of conscience is 
deeply rooted in our experience as a people. James Madison wrote of his 
``particular pleasure'' concerning support for ``the immunity of 
religion from civil jurisdiction in every case where it does not 
trespass on private rights or the public peace.''
  As Professor McConnell has written: ``Accommodations of religion in 
the years up to the framing of the First Amendment were frequent and 
well-known. For the most part, the largely Protestant population of the 
States as of 1789 entertained few religious tenets in conflict with the 
civil law; but where there were conflicts, accommodations were a 
frequent solution.''
  The best known example of accommodation from that period is the 
exemption from military conscription granted by the Continental 
Congress to members of the peace churches. In the midst of our great 
struggle for independence as a Nation, the Continental Congress passed 
a resolution to grant the exemption from conscription, observing that 
``as there are some people, who, from religious principles, cannot bear 
arms in any case, this Congress intends no violence to their 
consciences.''
  The purpose of avoiding governmental action that does violence to the 
consciences of individuals is based on the understanding that there are 
claims on the individual which are prior to the claims of government.
  This understanding finds expression in Madison's Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. Madison there wrote: ``It 
is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such 
only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent in 
order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of civil society. 
Every man who becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, must do 
it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign.''

  In the Christian tradition, the principle of prior allegiance is 
eloquently summed up in the words recorded in the Book of Acts of Peter 
and the other apostles who, when ordered to cease their preaching, 
responded by saying, ``We must obey God rather than men.''
  A government based on the idea of liberty must not turn a deaf ear to 
such claims of conscience. The government of a people who love freedom 
must not heedlessly enforce requirements that do violence to the 
consciences of those who seek only to ``render to the Creator such 
homage'' as they believe to be acceptable to him. So long as they do 
``not trespass on private rights or the public peace,'' Americans 
should be free to practice their religion without interference from the 
heavy hand of government.
  That is the sole purpose of the Religious Liberty Protection Act. Let 
this House today show that we respect the rights of conscience and 
honor the principles of liberty, just as the Continental Congress did 
more than two centuries ago. I urge the Members of the House to support 
this bill, to reject the substitute amendment which would weaken the 
bill, and move forward with the goal of protecting religious liberty 
for all Americans.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), who has worked very diligently on 
this measure.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, the bill we have before us today is a good 
and important bill, and I worked with the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Canady) and others prior to its original introduction.
  I want to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from 
Florida, and I agree with every word he said about the necessity for 
this bill and about its drafting. Unfortunately, this bill needs to be 
amended to ensure that while it acts as a shield to protect the 
fundamental religious rights of all Americans, as it is intended to do, 
it cannot also be used as a sword to do violence to the rights of 
others.
  I will be offering an amendment in the nature of a substitute later 
today which will consist of the exact language of this bill but will 
also add a provision that would ensure that the appropriate balance 
between competing rights is struck.
  With that change, I would hope that every Member of this House would 
support this important legislation. And I hope that if my amendment is 
adopted, my colleagues will do so. Without the amendment, 
unfortunately, the bill carries with it a fatal flaw threatening

[[Page H5589]]

to undermine existing civil rights protections. And I would urge my 
colleagues in that case to vote against the bill in order to increase 
the odds that the bill will be properly amended either in this House or 
in the Senate.
  This is a very difficult stand for me to take. As many of my 
colleagues know, I worked very hard for passage of the original 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or RFRA, in 1993. Since the Supreme 
Court decision declaring RFRA unconstitutional, I have worked hard to 
undo the damage the Supreme Court has repeatedly inflicted on our first 
freedom.
  Corrective legislation of this sort has been, since the Supreme 
Court's infamous decision in Employment Division versus Smith 9 years 
ago, one of my top priorities. So I want my colleagues to know it is 
with great sorrow I contemplate the possibility that I might have to 
vote against the legislation which addresses a problem that is very 
dear to my heart.
  Religious freedom is in peril because of the rulings set down by the 
court in Smith. Under that rule, facially neutral, generally applicable 
laws, having the incidental effect of burdening religion, are no longer 
deemed violations of the First Amendment.

                              {time}  1200

  This is unacceptable.
  The Committee on the Judiciary, in its hearings on this legislation, 
received more than ample evidence that religion has suffered under the 
court's new rule and that, by following the indication of Justice 
Scalia for the political branches to deal with conflicts between law 
and faith, religious liberty has not fared very well at all.
  This bill attempts to restore the protection of free exercise of 
religion which the Supreme Court has deprived us, but it does so at the 
cost of creating a real threat to the endorsement of State and local 
civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender, 
marital status, disability, sexual orientation, having or not having 
children, or any other innate characteristic.
  The bill as drafted would enable the CEO of a large corporation to 
say, my religion prohibits me from letting my corporation hire a 
divorced person or a disabled person or a mother who should be at home 
with her children and not at work or a gay or lesbian person and my 
religion prohibits me from letting my hotel rent a room to any such 
people. And nevermind the States' civil rights laws that prohibit that 
kind of discrimination.
  If this bill passes in its current form, many courts will say that 
the State does not have a compelling interest in enforcing their laws 
against these kinds of discrimination and that discrimination will go 
on despite the laws because of this bill.
  It is not right, Mr. Speaker, to abrogate the civil rights of many 
Americans in order to protect the religious liberty of other Americans; 
and it is not necessary to do so.
  Thankfully, we do not face such a stark choice between religious 
liberty and civil rights. We can protect the religious liberty of all 
Americans without threatening the civil rights of any Americans. And 
that is what my amendment in the nature of a substitute will do.
  So I will urge my colleagues to support the Nadler civil rights 
substitute, which I will describe later when I introduce it in greater 
detail, and, if it is adopted, to support what will then be an 
excellent and very important bill.
  But if the amendment is not adopted, I will unhappily urge my 
colleagues to vote against the bill in its current form in order to 
increase the likelihood that the bill will be properly amended either 
in the House or in the Senate.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. NADLER. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I merely wanted to commend the gentleman on 
his statement. It is a very courageous statement, and it is also a very 
well thought out statement from a constitutional point of view. I thank 
him very much for his contribution.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I appreciate the 
comments of the distinguished ranking member of the committee.
  Mr. Speaker, I will address this issue further when we get to the 
substitute.
  At this time, let me simply reiterate, the bill, except for its 
effect on civil rights laws, its potential effect, is a necessary and 
important bill. I hope we can amend it to get rid of this one but, 
unfortunately, fatal flaw so that we can really protect the rights of 
the religious liberties of all Americans without threatening the civil 
rights of any Americans.
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Hutchinson), a member of the Committee on 
the Judiciary.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
the time.
  I want to first respond to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), 
who has done an outstanding job of raising concerns about this bill. 
But this bill has been heard in subcommittee and in full committee, and 
those concerns have been addressed by the constitutional scholars, and 
I believe that it is not going to be the problems that have been 
addressed and expressed by the gentleman from New York.
  This bill has broad bipartisan support, and I think that that is 
important as we move through this process.
  I want to congratulate the chairman of the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady), who has done 
such an outstanding job in studying and providing leadership on this 
issue. He certainly has earned the justified expression in this 
Congress that he is a constitutional scholar.
  If we look at the history as to how we got here today, Congress 
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993 to enforce the 
constitutional guarantees of free exercise of religion.
  The Act codified a balancing test that had been applied by the court 
in 1990. Under this test, the government could restrict a person's free 
exercise of religion only if it demonstrated this amount of action is 
necessary to further a compelling governmental interest and it is the 
least restrictive means of achieving that governmental interest.
  Unfortunately, on June 25 of 1997, in the Burn decision, the Supreme 
Court struck down the law as it applied to the State but left open the 
opportunity for Congress to accomplish the same protections but in a 
different way.
  For the last 2 years, the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on 
the Constitution has been setting legislative record holding hearings, 
listening to constitutional scholars, and we learned clearly that the 
law is necessary to protect the religious freedoms promised by the 
Constitution.
  The legislation before us today strikes a good balance between 
providing much-needed protection while not exceeding the limitations on 
Federal power set forth in the Constitution.
  The development of this legislation is an example of how legislation 
should be developed in Congress. We pass legislation. The Supreme Court 
addresses it. We come back. We try to do it and answer the concerns of 
the Supreme Court. We hold the hearings. We listen to the 
constitutional scholars. It has been done in the right way under the 
Constitution, the right legislative process. And we have learned why it 
is necessary.
  It is necessary to make sure that a small church is able to continue 
its ministry to the homeless. It is necessary to make sure that home 
churches may continue to meet. It is necessary to make sure that 
prisoners are able to participate in Holy Communion. It is necessary to 
make sure that people of faith are not discriminated against in 
government employment. It is necessary to make sure that localities do 
not limit the number of students who may attend a religious school. It 
is necessary to make sure that Jewish boys are not prohibited from 
wearing yarmulkes at school. And it is necessary to make sure that 
communications between clergy and church members are protected.
  My constituents feel strongly about this legislation, and I am 
pleased to be able to represent them today in support of the Religious 
Liberty Protection Act. I urge my colleagues to support this bill, as 
well.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 4 minutes.

[[Page H5590]]

  Mr. Speaker, we are confronted with a very unusual situation here 
that, unless we put the legislation that we handled in 1993, which was 
passed by a voice vote, and of course many Members now present were not 
in the Congress nor on the Committee on the Judiciary at that time, 
into perspective, we may miss what is attempted to be done here.
  The court rendered part of that law invalid. They rendered the part 
that deals with State and local civil rights laws invalid, that it did 
not apply to them.
  What this measure is doing is coming back and getting the other part 
of it. And so, this is part of a one-two punch in which we are now 
doing something incredible if we look at it in the broader context.
  We have already put restrictions on Federal civil rights laws as a 
result of the 1993 case, and now we are coming back to get the part 
that escaped the court's criticism. That is why the leading civil 
rights litigation organization in the United States, the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, has, as of yesterday, sent me a strong 
letter explaining why they cannot support this measure.
  In addition, the American Civil Liberties Union, probably the second-
most active litigating organization, has also indicated their strong 
reservations about this measure in its present form.
  I would just give my colleagues a part of the reasoning of Director 
Counsel General Elaine Jones of LDF's letter to me that indicates why 
they urged Members not to succumb to this bill, as enticing as it may 
be, without some correction.
  Defendants in discrimination cases brought under State or local fair 
housing, employment laws may seek to avoid liability by claiming 
protection under the Religious Liberty Protection Act. This would 
require individuals proceeding under such State and local 
antidiscrimination laws to prove that the law they wish to utilize is a 
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental 
interest. This requirement would significantly increase the litigation 
time and expense of pursuing even ordinary antidiscrimination actions 
and as a result could even preclude some plaintiffs from pursuing their 
claims.
  And so, we are now being asked to submit to part two of the original 
law that limits the Federal civil rights jurisdiction and now we have 
come back in this rather clever and innocent-sounding defense of 
religious liberties to now put the hindrance, the binders, on local and 
State civil rights laws.
  Although I am committed to preserving religious freedom in this 
nation, I cannot support the Religious Liberty Protection Act as it is 
presently drafted.
  My principal concern is that the legislation creates a brand new 
right for so-called ``religious practitioners'' and no other group or 
government enjoys--the right to discriminate. The right is so sweeping 
it will apply not only to religious institutions, but to large 
corporations.
  I know that the bill's supporters say we should not worry about race 
and gender discrimination, because those interests have previously been 
found by the courts to be protected under the so-called ``compelling 
interest test set forth in the bill. Forgive me for being a little bit 
skeptical of this claim, particularly given the current conservative 
makeup of so many courts.
  Even if the supporters' predictions prove true, civil rights 
plaintiffs will be subject to vastly enhanced litigation costs. We have 
enough barriers to civil rights suits without adding these new 
obstacles. This is why the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund is so 
strongly opposed to the bill.
  Buyt it is beyond race and gender that the most significant civil 
rights concerns exist. This is because anti-discrimination laws based 
on sexual orientation, marital status, and disability have not been 
found by the courts to be based on a ``compelling'' government 
interest.
  This means that under the bill, businesses will be free to 
discriminate against gay and lesbian employees, and large landlords 
will be able to justify their refusal to rent to single parents or gays 
and lesbians. In my view, we have fought too hard in the civil rights 
arena over the years to give back these gains.
  I am also concerned that the bill raises serious constitutional 
problems. Among the many problems are the bill's tenuous relationship 
to Congress' interstate commerce and spending power authority, and its 
micro management of the federal judiciary and the state and local 
authorities. Given the recent trend of Supreme Court decisions on 
commerce, federalism and separation of powers, it is difficult to see 
this bill passing constitutional muster. Unfortunately, when the bill 
was struck down, it will serve as yet another precedent blocking 
Congress' path to protecting other civil rights which have a far 
stronger tie to our commerce and spending powers. In other words, we 
are sending the Court the weakest possible bill from a constitutional 
perspective and are inviting an adverse precedent.
  I seriously question whether another federal law which is so 
antagonistic towards civil rights holds the key to protecting religious 
liberty in this country. This country has more religion and a greater 
variety of religious expression than any nation on earth. We have done 
so by maintaining the delicate balance between the First Amendment's 
religious liberty clause and its establishment clause, as interpreted 
by an independent judiciary.
  It is doubtful the ``Religious Liberty Protection Act'' can improve 
on the scheme for protecting religious liberty designed by our founding 
fathers. I urge a ``no'' vote.

                                              NAACP Legal Defense,


                                      and Education Fund, Inc,

                                    Washington, DC, July 14, 1999.
     Congressman John Conyers, Jr.,
     Rayburn Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman Conyers: The NAACP Legal Defense and 
     Educational Fund, Inc. (``LDF''), urges you to oppose final 
     passage of H.R. 1691, The Religious Liberty Protection Act of 
     1999 (``RLPA''). LDF litigates civil rights cases throughout 
     the country on behalf of African Americans and other 
     minorities in an effort to preserve equity, fairness and 
     justice in educaiton, employment, housing, health care, 
     environment, criminal justice, and voting rights. RLPA poses 
     a potential threat to this type of litigation as RLPA may be 
     used in a manner to limit African Americans and other 
     minorities' rights to seek protection from discrimination 
     under state and local antidiscrimination laws.
       Defendants in discrimination cases brought under state or 
     local fair housing, employment, etc., laws may seek to avoid 
     liability by claiming protection udner RLPA. This would 
     require individuals and groups proceeding under such state 
     and local antidiscrimination laws to prove that the law they 
     wish to utilize is a least restrictive means of furthering a 
     compelling governmental interest. This requirement would 
     significantly increase the litigation time and expense of 
     pursuing even workday antidiscrimination actions and as a 
     result could hinder or preclude some plaintiffs from pursuing 
     their claims.
       Even if the courts ultimately rule, as they should, that 
     the various state and local antidiscrimination statutes are 
     least restrictive means to further compelling governmental 
     interests, the uncertainty of whether statutes will withstand 
     a RLPA defense may dissuade plaintiffs from seeking redress 
     under antidiscrimination statutes. Of course, if any court 
     were to determine that a particular antidiscrimination 
     statute were not a least restrictive means of furthering a 
     compelling governmental interest, a successful RLPA defense 
     would completely bar a plaintiff from proceeding under that 
     statute. In either event, RLPA will create an additional 
     burden for plaintiffs attempting to vindicate their civil 
     rights.
       For these reasons, LDF asks that you oppose RLPA, which may 
     be used as a mechanism to limit African Americans and other 
     minorities from proceeding under the state and local laws 
     that prohibit discrimination in a wide range of areas.
           Sincerely,
     Elaine R. Jones,
       Director-Counsel.
     Reed Colfax,
       Assistant Counsel.

Examples of Unintended and Adverse Consequences from Enactment of H.R. 
             1691, the ``Religious Liberty Protection Act''

       1. Knives in schools. Pursuant to its policy prohibiting 
     the possession of knives on school property, the school 
     district forbade Sikh elementary school children to wear 
     kirpans--seven-inch, ceremonial knives that are required by 
     their religion. Relying on the ``Religious Freedom 
     Restoration Act,'' the Sikhs filed suit and moved for a 
     preliminary injunction barring the district from applying its 
     no-knives policy to ban the possession of kirpans at school. 
     The court required the school district to permit the children 
     to wear the knives if the knives were basted in their 
     scabbards. See Cheema v. Thompson, 36F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 
     1994).
       2. Sexual abuse. In Arizona, a Warlock recently defended 
     his alleged sexual abuse of a 13-year-old girl as part of the 
     Wiccan religion. The open question is what is the least 
     restrictive means of dealing with religious conduct that 
     results in sexual abuse or statutory rape. Although the state 
     may have a compelling interest in preventing sexual abuse or 
     statutory rape, conviction and incarceration may not be the 
     least restrictive means of dealing with such individuals.
       3. Refusal to pay child support. A member of the Northeast 
     Kingdom Community Church--which requires members to eschew 
     all their personal possessions and work for the benefit of 
     the Community and forbids members to support estranged 
     spouses or children who live outside the community--was found 
     in contempt of court for failure to comply with an order to 
     pay child support.

[[Page H5591]]

     He alleged that both the finding of contempt and the 
     underlying support order violated his religious rights. The 
     court vacated the judgment of contempt and remanded the case 
     for a hearing as to the least restrictive means to enforce 
     the defendant's support obligation. See Hunt v. Hunt, 162 Vt. 
     423 (1994).
       4. Faith healing resulting in the death of a child. The son 
     of a believer in the Christian Science Religion died at age 
     11 from juvenile-onset diabetes following three days of 
     Christian Science care. A medical professional could have 
     easily diagnosed the child's diabetes from the various 
     symptoms he displayed in the weeks and days leading up to his 
     death (particularly breath with a fruity aroma). Although 
     juvenile-onset diabetes is usually responsive to insulin, 
     even up to within two hours of death, the Christian Science 
     individuals who cared for the child during his last days 
     failed to seek medical care for him--pursuant to a central 
     tenet of the Christian Science religion. The mother argued 
     that a wrongful death suit brought by the child's father was 
     not the least restrictive means of serving the state's 
     interest in the health of the child. Rather, the state could 
     have required the mother to report the child's illness to the 
     authorities when death seemed imminent. The court held that 
     the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion 
     does not extend to conduct that threatens a child's life. See 
     Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. App. 1995).
       5. Refusal to cooperate with discovery request. A wrongful 
     death suit alleged that the Church of Scientology is 
     responsible for the death of an individual who died of a 
     blood clot in her left lung after spending 17 days in the 
     care of church staffers. The church is attempting to block 
     discovery by contending that releasing the decedent's files 
     would violate the church's ``sacred religious belief'' that 
     the files remain confidential and that they be retained by 
     the church for use in a parishioner's future lives. The court 
     ruled that the decedent's estate had the right to see her 
     files. Upon the passage of the Florida religious freedom 
     restoration act, the court is now reconsidering its previous 
     ruling. See Thomas C. Tobin, Scientologists  Fight to Keep 
     Files Secret, St. Petersburg Times, Aug. 6, 1998, at 4B.
       6. Conjugal visits in prison. A Roman Catholic argued that 
     a prison regulation prohibiting condemned inmates from 
     receiving conjugal visits violates his first amendment right 
     to free exercise of religion. The court rejected this 
     argument because the prisoner failed to show that the prison 
     regulation prohibiting conjugal visits for condemned inmates 
     is not rationally related to a valid penological interest. 
     See Noguera v. Rowland, 940 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1991). Under 
     RFRA and RLRA, the prison would have to show that its policy 
     regulating conjugal visits was the least restrictive means of 
     achieving compelling penological interests.
       7. Jewelry in prison. Wisconsin severely restricted the 
     wearing of jewelry by jail and prison inmates. The prison 
     regulation forbade the possession of ``items which because of 
     shape or configuration are apt to cause a laceration if 
     applied to the skin with force,'' and the state refuses to 
     make an exception for religious jewelry, such as crucifixes, 
     which (unless made of cloth) fall within the ban. Inmates 
     brought a suit against the relevant officials to enjoin, as a 
     violation of RFRA, the defendant's refusal to make such an 
     exception. The court held that, because prison security is a 
     compelling state interest, if particular types of religious 
     jewelry (or religious jewelry of any type in the hands of 
     prisoners reasonably believed prone to use it for purposes of 
     weaponry, barter, or gang insignia), pose a genuine threat to 
     prison security, the state can ban them. Second-guessing the 
     prison authorities, the court ruled that the jewelry in that 
     case could not be banned. See Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 
     1018 (7th Cir. 1996).
       8. Class action against prison's grooming policy. Inmates 
     confined by the State of South Carolina, including Muslims, 
     Rastafarians, and Native Americans, filed a class action 
     challenging a South Carolina grooming policy that required 
     all male inmates to keep their hair short and their faces 
     shaven. The inmates claimed that the Grooming Policy forced 
     them to compromise their religious beliefs and practices, and 
     therefore violated their rights guaranteed by the Free 
     Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Following 
     invalidation of RFRA, the court held that the Grooming Policy 
     is an eminently rational means of achieving the compelling 
     governmental and prenological interests of maintaining order, 
     discipline, and safety in prison and did not violate the 
     inmates' free exercise rights. See Hines v. Taylor, 1998 U.S. 
     App. LEXIS 13362 (4th Cir. 1998).
       9. Landmaking. St. Bartholomew's Church owned a Community 
     House in which the church conducted many of its religious and 
     community outreach activities. New York's Landmarks 
     Preservation Commission denied the Church's requested to 
     level the historic Community House and replace it with an 
     office tower, which would both house the Church's religious 
     activities and significantly enhance the Church's revenues 
     through commercial rents. The Second Circuit found that 
     whether the Church's religious activity was `'substantially 
     burdened'' by New York's action turned on whether the Church 
     ``had been denied the ability to practice [its] religion or 
     coerced in the nature of those practices.'' the court found 
     that New York's action did not punish any religious activity. 
     See St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 
     348 (2d Cir. 1990). Interestingly many of the cases file 
     under RFRA turned on whether there was a ``substantial 
     burden'' and determined that there was no such burden. In 
     other words, RFRA (and RLPA) open the doors to the courthouse 
     in many cases where the religion cannot meet the threshold 
     inquiry.
       10. Polygamy and abuse. A battered and bruised teenager 
     fled from an isolated ranch that is used by a Utah polygamist 
     sect as a reeducation camp for recalcitrant women and 
     children. The husband of the girl was charged with incest and 
     unlawful sexual conduct stemming from the sexual relations he 
     allegedly had with her, his fifteenth wife. See Tom 
     Kenwoorthy, Spotlight on Utah Polygamy; Teenager's Escape 
     from Sect Revives Scrutiny of Practice. The Washington Post, 
     Aug. 9, 1998, at A3. RLPA would offer the father a defense 
     against statutory rape and polygamy.
       11. Refusal to provide social security numbers to DMV. 
     California residents contended that social security numbers 
     are the ``mark of the beast'' in the biblical Book of 
     Revelation and refused to give the DMV their numbers for 
     applications of their driver's licensees. The court held 
     that, because sincere religious convictions were involved, 
     the DMV must use an alternate identification for those 
     individuals. See John Dart, Judge Upholds Objections to 
     Identifications, L.A. Times. October 25, 1997, at B1. In 
     1986, the Supreme Court rejected a similar request in Bowen 
     v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). RLPA would require a result much 
     more in line with the California ruling than the Supreme 
     Court's ruling.
       12. Historic preservation. A Roman Church holds one service 
     per week asked permission to demolish the entirety of the 
     church,. which is located in the historic preservation 
     district, for the purpose of expanding. When the City Council 
     refused permission to demolish the church in its entirety, 
     the church filed suit under the Religious Freedom Restoration 
     Act, claiming that the city's historic preservation law could 
     not be applied to a church. The Supreme Court held that RFRA 
     is unconstitutional. Boerne v. Flores, 117 Ct. 2157 (1997). 
     RLPA invites churches and religious individuals to thwart and 
     ignore all land use laws, including historic and cultural 
     preservation laws.

  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska).
  The Chair advises that the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady) has 10 
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) has 20 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Doolittle).
  (Mr. DOOLITTLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. DOOLITTLE. Mr. Speaker, I believe that the present Smith standard 
gravely threatens as a practical matter the mission of churches at 
their most fundamental level, whether it is with regard to 
proselytizing or to the erection of houses of worship within 
communities.
  I commend the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady) for drafting this 
bill, which has not been easy to do. I think he has crafted a piece of 
legislation which we should all support.
  The Religious Liberty Protection Act addresses the serious situation 
caused by that ``Employment Division v. Smith'' decision by restoring 
the general rule that State or local officials may not burden a 
religious exercise without demonstrating a compelling governmental 
interest.
  The legislation before us protects religious institutions by giving 
them their day in court if they can show that their religious freedom 
has suffered at the hands of a State or local government.
  There is a long list of cases in which the religion freedom of 
Americans has been, in my opinion, unconstitutionally abridged since 
the 1990 Smith decision. Many of these infringements touch core 
religious teachings and beliefs.
  Let me just briefly cite three examples. As a result of these so-
called neutral laws of general applicability, a Catholic hospital has 
been denied State accreditation based on its refusal to instruct its 
residents on the performance of abortion in accordance with their 
strong religious objections.
  In New York, a religious mission for the homeless operated by the 
late Mother Teresa's order has been shut down because it was located on 
the second floor of a building without an elevator, thus violating a 
local building code.
  In Missouri, for example, a city there passed an ordinance 
prohibiting all door-to-door contacting and religious proselytizing on 
certain days of the week and indeed severely limiting the

[[Page H5592]]

hours of such contact on the remaining days.
  These are just a few of the numerous examples of how religious 
freedom has been and continues to be infringed across the country.
  Mr. Speaker, religious liberty is a fundamental right of all 
Americans and must not be trampled on by insensitive bureaucracy or bad 
policy. Having only to show a rational basis for such policy is no 
protection at all.
  These incidents are increasing, and that is why we need to adopt the 
measure before us today, which will stay the hand of government from 
heedlessly enacting laws that substantially burden the free exercise of 
religion.
  I urge my colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to join me in supporting this 
much-needed legislation.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from 
North Carolina (Mr. Watt). I believe he is the ranking member on the 
subcommittee.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for 
yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to start by complimenting all the parties to this 
debate and on both sides.

                              {time}  1215

  We have been at this for a good while in the subcommittee, in the 
full committee and now on the floor. While I rise in opposition to this 
bill, I would note that many of my colleagues of all political 
persuasions and many of my friends of all political persuasions are 
supporting this bill which should give Members and the public some 
indication of how difficult an issue this is. My opposition to the bill 
is based on several different factors.
  First of all, I believe this bill is of uncertain constitutionality. 
The earlier religious protection law that the Supreme Court struck down 
as having constitutional problems is addressed in this bill by tying 
this particular bill to the commerce clause. In effect, it gives us the 
jurisdiction to do what we are doing under this bill by virtue of a 
connection to the commerce clause. The problem with that is that it 
seems to me that that benefits larger, more established religions who 
tend to operate in interstate commerce at the expense of more localized 
private religious groups who tend to not operate in interstate 
commerce. The irony of this is that many of the people who are 
advocating that the commerce clause should cover this kind of activity 
and action are the very same people that are saying that the Federal 
Government should stay out of a number of different things and that the 
commerce clause does not cover these things and give the Federal courts 
and the Federal Government jurisdiction over these matters. I think on 
the commerce clause issue, while it is an ingenious way to bootstrap 
our way into hoping that the Supreme Court will not strike this down, I 
think it has its limitations and problems.
  Second, this bill is of uncertain interaction with other civil rights 
bills and civil rights laws. I am sure that people are going to be 
advocating on both sides of this, either that it overrules civil rights 
laws or that it does not overrule civil rights laws. The truth of the 
matter is that we do not know. But I am personally and on behalf of my 
constituents not prepared to take a gamble with this. I do not think we 
can simply pass a law that could be interpreted to place religion over 
race or religion over other civil rights and give religion a more 
important place in our jurisprudence than we give to other civil rights 
laws. I simply do not believe we can do that. I think the gentleman 
from New York's amendment would address that, but I have not seen any 
inclination yet on the part of the supporters of this bill to be 
supportive of the gentleman from New York's amendment. I want to come 
back to that briefly at the end of my discussions.
  The third reason that I have concerns about this bill is that it will 
give the Federal Government substantially more control and involvement 
in local zoning and land use decisions. This is something that we have 
historically reserved to local and State governments. Yet many of the 
very people who have said that this is something that is sacrosanct, 
that should be decided at the local levels, the advocates of States 
rights, so to speak, are some of the people who are advocating that we 
now put a national standard in this bill having to do with land use 
decisions. I think that is a problem.
  Finally, I want to address the people who continue to say, especially 
like my good friend the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Edwards) who says, 
``We're going to fix the concerns that we have about this bill, about 
civil rights and other civil rights issues, in conference,'' that this 
consideration of this bill has been going on for a long, long time. 
There has been no inclination to address that problem. That is why the 
gentleman from New York, who was one of the original cosponsors of this 
bill, is now on the floor of the United States House offering an 
amendment to address the problem. That problem needs to be addressed 
now. Otherwise, this bill should not warrant our support.
  I encourage my colleagues to oppose this bill in its current form.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute. I want to 
underscore a point made by the gentleman from North Carolina with 
reference to the commerce clause, because that has not been brought up 
and discussed in the fullness that he has done it. The bill is using 
now the commerce clause to seek to have a cover of constitutionality to 
protect religious liberty.
  In order to invoke that clause, it seems to me that we will now have 
to equate religion with interstate commercial activity, something I am 
not prepared to do this afternoon. And if we equate religion with 
interstate commerce, does it not open the door to further regulation of 
religion through the commerce power? And there I think these problems 
that the gentleman from North Carolina does not want to take a chance 
on finding out what a conservative court is going to do kicks in here 
and it makes this reference between a bill that was held partially 
unconstitutional and an attempt to remedy the other half of it through 
this measure that is before us now.
  Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank).
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member 
for yielding me this time.
  There are a number of concerns that are raised by this bill. I want 
to focus on what is central to me, and I am hoping that the House will 
take some direction here from Governor Bush of Texas. He appears to be 
growing in popularity on the other side, and I am sorry they are 
rejecting his wisdom in this one case.
  When a bill like this was presented in Texas, an amendment was 
offered which exempted all legislation aimed at protecting the civil 
rights of individuals. What the law in Texas says is, yes, we will 
protect people's rights to exercise their religion, but where we have 
as a legislature and a governor decided that certain rights of 
individuals and groups are important and that certain classes of people 
should be protected against discrimination, we will not allow you to 
use religion as a license for this discrimination.
  Now, that was signed into law by Governor George Bush, and I thought 
it made a lot of sense. We are not trying to go as far as Governor 
Bush. The gentleman from New York has a very thoughtful amendment which 
allows people to invoke religion as a means of ignoring civil rights 
laws. It allows, in fact, people to use their religion as a license to 
discriminate in a number of cases that would not be allowed in Texas. I 
think that is a very reasonable accommodation the gentleman has 
offered. He has said you do not give it to corporations, et cetera. If 
the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York does not pass, 
what we will have is a law which will say, ``All you need do is invoke 
your religion and you can defeat many civil rights laws.''
  Now, interestingly it says, ``Unless the courts find that that 
particular civil rights law protects a fundamental right.'' I am 
interested that people who describe themselves as conservative 
opponents of judicial activism want to so empower the judiciary, 
because what this bill will do absent the amendment by the gentleman 
from New York, is to say to the court, ``You now have the power to 
decide.'' There are civil rights laws at the State level. Various 
States have passed laws protecting different groups of people, based on 
religion, based on marital status, based on whether or not you have 
children, based on sexual orientation. We the

[[Page H5593]]

Congress will say to you the Federal courts, ``Pick and choose among 
those. You decide which of those will have to give way to this Federal 
statute and which do not,'' rather than have the Federal Government 
decide, or emulate Texas and say, ``In general the religious right will 
win unless it is an antidiscrimination law.''
  And remember, under our constitutional system, we do not want to 
subject individuals to some kind of inquisition when they invoke 
religion. So people who wish to invoke religion, people who want to go 
to Federal court and say, ``Hey Federal judge, let me ignore this law 
that this State passed,'' under this law the Federal courts will be 
empowered to let people pick and choose and they simply will have to 
say, ``My religion doesn't allow it.'' We certainly do not want a 
situation where that religion is subjected to some kind of examination.
  So what you will do is to tell the States that no matter what they 
may have decided through their own local democratic processes about 
protecting groups, we the Congress will empower Federal courts to pick 
and choose among them and say ``no'' to some and ``yes'' to others. I 
do not think that is appropriate.
  While the amendment from the gentleman from New York, because he has 
been very accommodating in this, does not completely rule that 
possibility out, it substantially diminishes it and it is the one thing 
that will save this bill.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, let me thank the ranking member and chairman of this 
committee. Let me also acknowledge the leadership and work of the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) of some 10 or 12 years on this 
issue. I think that our presence here today should hopefully connote to 
those who may be listening, this is an enormously important debate, and 
as I was reminded when we debated the flag amendment, let us not have 
it break down in partisan discourse but recognize that there is 
probably no more important right amongst others, if you will, than the 
free exercise of religion. And the first amendment gives us that.
  And so this legislation, Mr. Speaker, is in fact needed to provide 
protections that have been dangerously eroded by the Supreme Court in 
its 1990 Employment Division v. Smith decision. We have heard the Smith 
decision being mentioned quite frequently because it has been the one 
that has upset the apple cart in terms of recognizing the importance of 
individuals having the personal and private right of exercising their 
religion. Congress attempted to remedy this by enacting on a bipartisan 
basis the Religious Freedom Restoration Act which the court struck down 
in part in its 1997 City of Boerne v. Flores decision.
  H.R. 1691, the Religious Liberty Protection Act, seeks to restore the 
application of strict scrutiny in those cases in which facially 
neutral, generally applicable laws have the incidental effect of 
substantially burdening the free exercise of religion. I believe that 
the government should not have the ability to substantially burden a 
right that is enshrined in constitutional premise unless it is able to 
demonstrate that it has used the least restrictive means of achieving a 
compelling State interest, such as Thomas v. Review Board.
  I believe that this legislation is necessary because in the wake of 
the aformentioned Supreme Court decisions, religious groups in general 
and religious minorities in particular are no longer guaranteed the 
religious liberty protections of the Constitution and are more 
vulnerable to the danger of governmental restrictions on religious 
freedom.

                              {time}  1230

  There are numerous examples that we can find, for example, where it 
was partially struck down, of churches being ejected from certain 
neighborhoods, church soup kitchens and welfare programs being closed 
and prisoners having been denied basic rights to worship.
  But, Mr. Speaker, I started out by saying this is an enormously 
important constitutional right. Why can we not have the compromise and 
collaboration and respect for the various interests that are here today 
not denying the right to the free exercise of religion but at the same 
time acknowledging that we do not want to deny the civil rights of 
those who are under-represented who may be most challenged, and I say 
this in the backdrop of the wonderfully positive legislative initiative 
of the State of Texas, my State, a legislative initiative proposed and 
fostered by State Representative Scott Hochberg of Texas and signed 
into law by Governor George Bush. That legislative initiative 
recognized generally the importance, the high importance, of the free 
exercise of religion, but at the same time it provided, if my 
colleagues will, the particular provision that recognized the civil 
rights of individuals, that they should not be pounced upon and they 
should not be denied because of the constitutional right of the free 
exercise of religion.
  My question to my colleagues:
  Can we do less in the United States Congress? Can we in fostering a 
bill that is to enhance rights not ensure that we protect the rights of 
others who simply want to ensure that they in a more vulnerable 
position not be denied civil rights?
  I would hope that my colleagues will support the Nadler amendment 
from an individual who has made it very clear that he is one of the 
strongest proponents of the free exercise of religion, does not come to 
this floor in any way to attempt to undermine this legislative 
initiative but in keeping with the spirit of those in Texas and who I 
represent. My fear is that passing of this legislation without 
respecting the civil rights has some concerns that we should 
acknowledge. I hope my colleagues will see in their wisdom the 
importance of joining with the leadership of the Governor of the State 
of Texas, George Bush, on this issue and to provide for the civil 
rights of others as we move toward the complete free exercise of 
religion.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Utah (Mr. Cannon).
  Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 1691, the 
Religious Liberties Protection Act of 1999. This legislation was 
introduced by my friend, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady), and 
it is an important step in preserving the freedom that the Constitution 
affords religions in America.
  A little over 10 years ago, 200 of our Nation's leaders from all 
sectors signed the Williamsburg Charter. It affirmed that, ``Religious 
liberty in a democracy is a right that may not be submitted to vote and 
depends on the outcome of no election. A society is only as just and as 
free as it is respectful of this right, especially toward the beliefs 
of the smallest minorities and the least popular religious 
communities.''
  The provisions included in the Williamsburg Charter reflect our 
national commitment to respect and accommodate the philosophies, 
practices and needs of the many diverse religions in this Nation, even 
when doing so is inconvenient or annoying.
  But the realization of these principles is not always simple. The 
growth of government on every level, combined with government's 
inherent tendency to over-regulate, requires occasional legislative 
clarification. Given the complexities, there is no practical way to 
measure whether anti-religious motivation plays a factor in such 
matters as cities' planning and zoning decisions.
  In Senate hearings on this subject there was testimony that, ``Since 
the Smith decision, governments throughout the U.S. have run roughshod 
over religious conviction. In time, every religion in America will 
suffer. Must a Catholic church get permission from a landmarks 
commission before it can relocate its altar? Can Orthodox Jewish 
basketball players be excluded from inter-scholastic competition 
because their religious beliefs require them to wear yarmulkes? Are 
certain evangelical denominations going to be forced to ordain female 
ministers?''
  I believe that a balance can be struck, but we do not have that 
balance today.
  It is somewhat ironic that under current first amendment principles a 
city can totally zone out a church that desires to construct an edifice 
for its members and the surrounding community, but it cannot zone out 
of its community a sexually oriented adult bookstore.

[[Page H5594]]

  Religious freedom should never depend upon the amount of religious 
sensitivity in a particular community or on the willingness of local 
governments to craft appropriate exemptions for religious practices. I 
urge my colleagues to support the Religious Liberties Protection Act 
with a yes vote.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Manzullo).
  Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Speaker, I reluctantly rise in opposition to this 
bill drafted by my good friend and colleague and classmate, the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady).
  The first amendment is quite clear. It says, Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof. And yet, if we look at the words of the statute, it 
says, a government may substantially burden a person's religious 
exercise if the government demonstrates that application of the burden 
of the person is in furtherance of a compelling interest or is the 
least restrictive means of doing so.
  So, the first thing we have here is Congress making a statement that 
is in direct contradiction to the firm mandatory words of the United 
States Constitution. That bothers me for several reasons. One of those 
is that the attempt to protect religious liberties under the Religious 
Liberty Protection Act hinges on the spending clause of the 
Constitution and also upon the commerce clause of the Constitution, and 
we thus ask ourselves this question:
  If a religious liberty case comes up that is not hinged to the 
commerce clause or the spending clause, what protection do the people 
have? Is it pregnant with omissions, that the courts may end up saying 
the liberties set forth in the statutes simply do not supply to the 
people?
  The third problem I have with it is the fact that Justice Thomas back 
in 1994 after the Smith decision wrote a dissent in a case coming out 
of Alaska where the Supreme Court denied certiorari, and he said this. 
He said:

       What bothers me about the Alaska case or the Alaskan 
     statute, which is the equivalent of the statute we are trying 
     to pass today, is that the asserted government interests, the 
     asserted government compelling interests, are effusive. In 
     other words, the decision of the Alaskan Supreme Court drains 
     the word ``compelling'' of any meaning and seriously 
     undermines the protection of the exercise of religion that 
     Congress so emphatically mandated in RIFRA. In other words, 
     the very liberties we are trying to ensure we can end up 
     taking away.

  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Edwards).
  Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to address several questions: 
First, the question of is this bill constitutional. Obviously, legal 
scholars on this floor and elsewhere throughout the country may 
disagree, but for the Record I would like to read and then insert the 
full letter, a letter of July 14 to the Speaker of the House, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Hastert from Jon P. Jennings, Acting Assistant 
Attorney General. He says that, quote,

  The Department of Justice has concluded that the Religious Liberty 
Protection Act, as currently drafted, is constitutional under governing 
Supreme Court precedence.

  The letter in its entirety is as follows:

                                       U.S. Department of Justice,


                                Office of Legislative Affairs,

                                    Washington, DC, July 14, 1999.
     Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
     Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Speaker: I am writing with respect to H.R. 1691, 
     the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999 (``RLPA''), as 
     reported by the House of Representatives Committee on the 
     Judiciary. We understand that RLPA may be considered shortly 
     by the House of Representatives. We also understand that some 
     Members may be concerned about the constitutionality of the 
     legislation. This letter is addressed solely to the question 
     of RLPA's constitutionality. We understand that the 
     Administration is planning to convey further views on the 
     legislation, apart from the constitutional questions.
       Over the past two years, the Department of Justice has 
     worked diligently with supporters of RLPA to amend prior 
     versions of the bill so as to address serious constitutional 
     concerns. Moreover, we have reviewed carefully the testimony 
     of several legal scholars who have questioned the 
     constitutionality of the bill. We agree that RLPA raises 
     important and difficult constitutional questions--
     particularly with respect to recent and evolving federalism 
     doctrines--and that there may be ways to amend the bill 
     further to make it even less susceptible to constitutional 
     challenge. Nevertheless, the Department of Justice has 
     concluded that RLPA as currently drafted is constitutional 
     under governing Supreme Court precedents.
       Thank you for the opportunity to present our views. The 
     Office of Management and Budget has advised us that from the 
     perspective of the Administration's program, there is no 
     objection to submission of this report.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Jon P. Jennings,
                                Acting Assistant Attorney General.

  The second question I would like to address, Mr. Speaker, is: Who are 
some of the people that support this bill, recognizing that good people 
of good-faith will be on both sides of this issue. Let me first read in 
a statement from the administration dated July 14, as well.
  ``The administration strongly supports H.R. 1691, the Religious 
Liberty Protection Act, which would protect the religious liberty of 
all Americans. RLPA would, in many cases, forbid State and local 
governments from imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of 
religion, unless they could demonstrate that imposition of such a 
burden is the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling 
governmental interest.''
  For the Record let me mention some other religious groups, diverse 
religious groups, supporting this legislation:
     The American Jewish Committee,
     The American Jewish Congress,
     The Anti Defamation League,
     The Association of American Indian Affairs,
     The Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs,
     B'nai Brith,
     The Christian Coalition,
     The Christian Science Committee on Publication,
     The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,
     The Episcopal Church,
     The Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern 
         Baptist Convention,
     The Family Research Council,
     The General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists,
     Hadassah,
     NAACP,
     National Council of Churches of Christ,
     Presbyterian Church U.S.A,
     Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism,
     United Church of Christ,
     United Methodist Church,
     The U.S. Catholic Conference,

     as well as many other organizations.
  I ask no one to vote for this because of anyone's endorsement. I just 
point out that this is a bill supported on a broad-based basis.

         Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 
           and Budget,
                                    Washington, DC, July 14, 1999.

                   Statement of Administration Policy

    (This statement has been coordinated by OMB with the concerned 
                               agencies)

   [H.R. 1691--Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999 (Canady (R) 
                      Florida and 39 cosponsors)]

       The Administration strongly supports H.R. 1691, the 
     Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA), which would protect 
     the religious liberty of all Americans. RLPA would, in many 
     cases, forbid state and local governments from imposing a 
     substantial burden on the exercise of religion, unless they 
     could demonstrate that imposition of such a burden is the 
     least restrictive means of advancing a compelling 
     governmental interest. This statutory prohibition would, in 
     the cases in which it applies, embody the test that was 
     applied by the Supreme Court as a matter of Constitutional 
     law prior to 1990 and that is applied now to the Federal 
     Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
     (RFRA). RLPA will, in large measure, restore the principles 
     of RFRA, which was enacted with broad Congressional support 
     in 1993. It is necessary for Congress to enact RLPA since the 
     Supreme Court invalidated the application of RFRA to state 
     and local governments RLPA is carefully crafted to address 
     the Court's constitutional rulings. The Department of Justice 
     has reviewed H.R. 1691 and has concluded that, while RLPA 
     raises important and difficult Constitutional questions, 
     nevertheless it is constitutional under governing Supreme 
     Court precedents. The Administration looks forward to working 
     with Congress to ensure that any remaining concerns about the 
     bill, including clarification of civil rights protections, 
     are addressed and that it can be enacted into law as quickly 
     as possible.

  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I am very concerned that this 
legislation has the potential of establishing a dual track. Certainly 
none of us want to be in a position where government is discriminating 
against the free exercise of

[[Page H5595]]

religion, but, by the same token, as we have community after community 
across the country struggling to be able to maintain their liveability, 
to try and deal with issues of quality of life, to provide a broad 
exemption to a religious institution, to be able to violate the rules 
of the game that other people play by in terms of environmental 
protection, in terms of land use and transportation is ill advised. 
This is why we have a broad coalition of groups that deal with land 
use, with transportation, with the environment who are rising their 
voices in opposition led by the National Trust for Historic 
Preservation.
  We have heard here that there are areas where somehow there is 
discrimination against churches and their exercise of building and 
development activities, but this legislation would provide a 
requirement that in all instances government that has the authority to 
make individualized assessment, the action requires the State or local 
government to demonstrate the reasons for the land use are compelling 
and that the regulation is the least restrictive means supplied to each 
affected individual furthering that interest.
  This is something as a local official I can tell my colleagues the 
requirements economically, legally and practically to establish that 
burden unlike we would do for anybody else is unjustified and 
unnecessary. I find it frustrating that the Federal Government runs 
roughshod over local neighborhoods and communities where we have things 
like the local post office that does not obey local land use laws and 
zoning codes. To carve out another broad exemption under this act, that 
would have, I think, serious unintended consequences.
  Regardless of the outcome of today's vote in this legislation, I hope 
there is a careful look at section 3(b)1(a) and people make sure that 
they assure that we are protecting the rights of our neighborhoods for 
liveability and environmental protection.
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) for the purpose of a colloquy.
  (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  I am an urban planner by training. I have prepared lots of zoning 
ordinances for municipalities and counties, a certified planner by the 
American Planning Association, and on my own initiative I wanted a 
clarification from the gentleman. I thank him for yielding for a 
colloquy, and I have two questions.
  Will anything in the bill prevent local government from precluding 
religious uses in a particular category of zoning such as an industrial 
zone?
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Not ordinarily. But it would under certain 
circumstances, such as if the exclusion from the zone does not leave 
reasonable opportunity to locate within the jurisdiction or if like 
uses are not precluded from the particular category of zoning or if the 
preclusion is based on the religious nature of the use. This question 
is governed by section 3(b)1(b), (c) and (d).
  I would also say the communities that provide reasonable locations 
for churches have nothing to fear from this legislation, but sometimes 
exclusion from particular zones is in fact a device for excluding from 
the whole community. We have heard about cases where property was spot 
zoned industrial after the church bought it.

                              {time}  1245

  Some cities exclude churches from commercial zones, knowing that it 
is impractical to locate a church in a built-up residential zone. The 
intention and effect is to exclude all new churches. We believe that is 
not appropriate.
  Mr. BEREUTER. I agree with the gentleman that the examples given are 
abuses of the local zoning law.
  My second question will be this: Will anything in the bill prevent 
local government from requiring compliance with conditions authorized 
by statute for a conditional or special use permit for religious 
facilities or other traffic-generating uses in certain zoning 
categories?
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. If the compliance requirement substantially 
burdens religious exercise and is not the least restrictive means of 
furthering the local government's compelling interest, then a religious 
facility would have a claim that could be successful.
  This is governed by section 3(B)1)A). An example would be an orthodox 
Jewish temple forced to comply with parking space requirements. With 
the orthodox temple, no one drives a car in any case.
  Another example is if the condition for a special use permit is that 
the use ``serve the general welfare,'' or such other vague standards 
that can be used to exclude whomever the board chooses to exclude.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his colloquy. I 
think that is reassuring, particularly in light of the comments of the 
gentleman from Oregon.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 1 
minute to the distinguished gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Kennedy).
  Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for 
yielding time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I just have a few questions. I am very worried about 
this bill. Just 2 weeks ago when we had the gun debate on violence, 
this Congress passed, if Members can believe it, posting Ten 
Commandments, and this was our response to Columbine, post the Ten 
Commandments. It did not say which version of the Ten Commandments, the 
Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish version, it just said Ten Commandments.
  This is really getting me nervous, this notion that we are going to 
give religions preference in their religious tenets over our own civil 
rights.
  Let us make no mistake about it, the right wing of the Republican 
party is against gays and lesbians. They want to discriminate against 
people who are homosexuals. Let us just be right in front on what this 
debate is about.
  So they feel that if one has in their religion a belief that gays and 
lesbians would be damned by God, then you should be able to 
discriminate against them. But what this also does is it discriminates 
against all kinds of other people.
  Just imagine that fellow who killed all those people out in Chicago 
last week. He was part of this Church of the Creator. Is that kind of 
religion protected under this religious freedom? Is that going to take 
precedence over our civil rights in this country?
  I think we are all children in the eyes of God, and no religion 
should practice hate or intolerance of any kind. That is why I am going 
to vote against this bill when it comes up for a vote.
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to respond briefly to the comments the gentleman 
just made. It is unfortunate that the gentleman has misconstrued the 
purpose of this bill.
  This bill does not touch on the establishment clause issues that have 
from time to time divided the Members of this House. This is a bill 
that has broad bipartisan support. It has broad support in the 
religious community.
  When we can bring a bill forward that has the support of both the 
Christian Coalition and People for the American Way, major Jewish 
organizations and the National Council of Churches, I think this is an 
opportunity for the House to stand up for principles that we can all 
agree to to protect religious liberty.
  I would urge the Members of the House to do just that by adopting 
this bill.
  Mr. UDALL of New Mexico. Mr. Speaker, today I rise in support of the 
Religious Liberty Protection Act.
  Religious freedom is the foundation on which our nation was built. 
Every American, be they Catholic or Protestant, Jewish or Muslim, 
Buddhist, Sikh or of any other faith community, has the Constitutional 
right to practice their religious tradition without fear of government 
intervention or retribution.
  Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, as we've heard throughout this debate, 
too many people of faith in this country, particularly those in 
religious minorities, often find themselves facing rigid government 
policies that burden their religious practices.
  This bill, Mr. Speaker, would prevent government restrictions against 
religious practices, unless there is a compelling government

[[Page H5596]]

interest, and that policy is the least restrictive method of achieving 
that interest.
  It is an important step, Mr. Speaker, to protect and strengthen those 
religious liberties for which our forefathers sacrificed so much to 
give us.
  Now I understand, Mr. Speaker, that there are those who are concerned 
that this legislation would allow for some to hide behind the cloak of 
religious freedom in order to legally discriminate against others.
  Mr. Speaker, I too share this concern. There is the danger that this 
legislation might be construed by some courts to elevate religious 
claims above other civil rights.
  While we can be reassured by some recent court rulings that show 
government has a compelling interest in preventing racial or gender 
discrimination, there are other groups that do not have this same type 
of Constitutional protection.
  It is incumbent upon us, Mr. Speaker, to take all steps necessary to 
make sure that we do not permit religiously motivated conduct to 
``trump'' other civil rights claims. We should take steps to strengthen 
the civil rights of all individuals, with special attention to those 
populations that are at particular risk of discrimination.
  I am disappointed, Mr. Speaker, that the House failed to pass the 
amendment introduced by Mr. Nadler of New York. I believe that this 
amendment would have addressed the concerns that many have voiced.
  I urge my colleagues, therefore, to support future measures in this 
body to protect the civil rights of those minority segments of our 
population that do not enjoy Constitutional protection.
  And I urge our colleagues in the other body to further clarify and 
resolve these issues as the legislation moves through the Senate.
  Mr. PACKARD. Mr. Speaker, I would like to express my support for H.R. 
1691, the Religious Liberty Protection Act. The intent of this bill is 
to protect practices from unnecessary government interference.
  Religious freedom is one of the most important freedoms in our 
Constitution. The framers placed the right to free worship as our first 
Constitutional right. As stated by the father of our Constitution, 
Thomas Jefferson, ``The constitutional freedom of religion is the most 
inalienable and sacred of all human rights.'' Despite this fact, over 
the past few decades, the Supreme Court has continued to weaken our 
right to practice faith freely.
  The Religious Liberty Protection Act will reinforce our 
Constitutional right to practice individual faith by requiring judges 
to use strict scrutiny when reviewing a government burden on religious 
practices, unless it is to protect the health or safety of the public. 
This bill is simply common sense legislation. Protecting the freedom of 
religion should be one of the highest priorities for our nation and 
this Congress.
  Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to support the Religious 
Liberty Protection Act.
  Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose H.R. 1691.
  I would like to say that I am pleased to be submitting these remarks, 
but I am not.
  I know that the drafters and supporters of the Religious Liberty 
Protection Act (RLPA) share many of my beliefs about faith, government, 
and the Constitution, and it is not often that I find myself in 
disagreement with their views.
  But on one major RLPA issue, my conscience convicts me that in trying 
to right what many perceive to be wrong, Congress today is taking a 
major constitutional step in a dangerous direction--a constitutional 
step that I cannot in good faith support.
  It is a constitutional step that I believe may well undermine the 
protections for religious freedom under which Americans have prospered 
for over two hundred years.
  Today, because of a disagreement with the Supreme Court of the United 
States, and in keeping in line with the myth of the Court's supremacy 
over the other branches of government, we are seeking to change the 
nature of our right to the free exercise of religion.
  We are seeking to re-write our liberty.
  Because the Supreme Court has boxed Congress in, Congress is choosing 
to fight for the moment, Congress is trying to find any basis, 
whatsoever, to strike a blow for religious liberty.
  But we must not move in haste.
  Such haste may lead to unintended consequences.
  For as this legislation is drafted, one issue we are going to 
address, what is really being raised as an issue, is whether the 
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion will be a 
fundamental right protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, or 
merely an element of interstate commerce, which is not a right at all.
  This is not insignificant.
  By relegating religious liberty to Congress' power to regulate 
commerce, as the RLPA does, Congress may be opening the future to the 
end of liberty as we have been privileged to know it.
  Yes, some are burdened by the Supreme Court's treatment of the free 
exercise clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.
  I am not unsympathetic to believers who are suffering for their 
faith.
  But we must also consider the future ramifications of our actions.
  This future may well entail debates focused not on the fundamental 
right to the free exercise of religion, but on something that is not a 
right at all.
  That something is Congress' simple power to, and I quote from the 
Constitution: ``regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the 
several states, and with the Indian tribes.''
  In form, the argument today is not new.
  It is a form of the age-old question of whether the end justifies the 
means.
  While one might struggle with whether the end justifies the means, we 
must not ignore that the end will always, in some manner, reflect the 
means.
  This is especially true when we are determining the constitutional 
basis for our actions.
  We must today pause and ask ourselves, will our children and 
grandchildren, even to the fourth generation, look back at this day and 
say: There was the beginning of the end. There was the day when 
Congress--though well intentioned--cheapened our liberties. There was 
the day when Congress ceded the moral and intellectual argument that 
there is a fundamental right, independent of incidental affects on 
commerce, independent of what a particular congress might define as 
commerce, a right which our founders' cherished so much that they set 
it forth separately in our Bill of Rights.
  No, I do not relish being here today opposing my friends.
  But what we are doing today is wrong and I cannot simply turn my 
head.
  It does not matter that Congress has used the commerce clause in 
unprincipled ways in the past.
  It does not matter that we have been unable to come to an agreement 
as to how to proceed in light of the Court's rulings.
  Truth is truth.
  The free exercise of religion is a right, not because of any possible 
connection to commerce, but because it is a right given by our Creator.
  Our founders wisely sought to give special protection to these 
rights.
  Today, I fear that we are ignoring this wisdom for merely short term, 
but by no means permanent, gratification.
  I hope that my fears will not be realized.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). All time for 
general debate has expired.


     Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute Offered by Mr. Nadler

  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment in 
the nature of a substitute.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

       Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. 
     Nadler:
       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Religious Liberty Protection 
     Act of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE.

       (a) General Rule.--Except as provided in subsection (b), a 
     government shall not substantially burden a person's 
     religious exercise--
       (1) in a program or activity, operated by a government, 
     that receives Federal financial assistance; or
       (2) in any case in which the substantial burden on the 
     person's religious exercise affects, or in which a removal of 
     that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign 
     nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes;

     even if the burden results from a rule of general 
     applicability.
       (b) Exception.--A government may substantially burden a 
     person's religious exercise if the government demonstrates 
     that application of the burden to the person--
       (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
     interest; and
       (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
     compelling governmental interest.
       (c) Remedies of the United States.--Nothing in this section 
     shall be construed to authorize the United States to deny or 
     withhold Federal financial assistance as a remedy for a 
     violation of this Act. However, nothing in this subsection 
     shall be construed to deny, impair, or otherwise affect any 
     right or authority of the Attorney General or the United 
     States or any agency, officer, or employee thereof under 
     other law, including section 4(d) of this Act, to institute 
     or intervene in any action or proceeding.

     SEC. 3. ENFORCEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

       (a) Procedure.--If a claimant produces prima facie evidence 
     to support a claim alleging a violation of the Free Exercise 
     Clause or a violation of a provision of this

[[Page H5597]]

     Act enforcing that clause, the government shall bear the 
     burden of persuasion on any element of the claim; however, 
     the claimant shall bear the burden of persuasion on whether 
     the challenged government practice, law, or regulation 
     burdens or substantially burdens the claimant's exercise of 
     religion.
       (b) Land Use Regulation.--
       (1) Limitation on land use regulation.--
       (A) Where, in applying or implementing any land use 
     regulation or exemption, or system of land use regulations or 
     exemptions, a government has the authority to make 
     individualized assessments of the proposed uses to which real 
     property would be put, the government may not impose a 
     substantial burden on a person's religious exercise, unless 
     the government demonstrates that application of the burden to 
     the person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
     interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering 
     that compelling governmental interest.
       (B) No government shall impose or implement a land use 
     regulation in a manner that does not treat religious 
     assemblies or institutions on equal terms with nonreligious 
     assemblies or institutions.
       (C) No government shall impose or implement a land use 
     regulation that discriminates against any assembly or 
     institution on the basis of religion or religious 
     denomination.
       (D) No government with zoning authority shall unreasonably 
     exclude from the jurisdiction over which it has authority, or 
     unreasonably limit within that jurisdiction, assemblies or 
     institutions principally devoted to religious exercise.
       (2) Full faith and credit.--Adjudication of a claim of a 
     violation of the Free Exercise Clause or this subsection in a 
     non-Federal forum shall be entitled to full faith and credit 
     in a Federal court only if the claimant had a full and fair 
     adjudication of that claim in the non-Federal forum.
       (3) Nonpreemption.--Nothing in this subsection shall 
     preempt State law that is equally or more protective of 
     religious exercise.

     SEC. 4. JUDICIAL RELIEF.

       (a) Cause of Action.--A person may assert a violation of 
     this Act as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and 
     obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to 
     assert a claim or defense under this section shall be 
     governed by the general rules of standing under article III 
     of the Constitution.
       (b) Attorneys' Fees.--Section 722(b) of the Revised 
     Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1988(b)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 
     1998,'' after ``Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,''; 
     and
       (2) by striking the comma that follows a comma.
       (c) Prisoners.--Any litigation under this Act in which the 
     claimant is a prisoner shall be subject to the Prison 
     Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (including provisions of law 
     amended by that Act).
       (d) Authority of United States to Enforce This Act.--The 
     United States may sue for injunctive or declaratory relief to 
     enforce compliance with this Act.
       (e) Persons Who May Raise a Claim or Defense.--A person who 
     may raise a claim or defense under subsection (a) is--
       (1) an owner of a dwelling described in section 803(b) of 
     the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3603(b)), with respect to a 
     prohibition relating to discrimination in housing;
       (2) with respect to a prohibition against discrimination in 
     employment--
       (A) a religious corporation, association, educational 
     institution (as described in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e)), or 
     society, with respect to the employment of individuals who 
     perform duties such as spreading or teaching faith, other 
     instructional functions, performing or assisting in 
     devotional services, or activities relating to the internal 
     governance of such corporation, association, educational 
     institution, or society in the carrying on of its activities; 
     or
       (B) an entity employing 5 or fewer individuals; or
       (3) any other person, with respect to an assertion of any 
     other claim or defense relating to a law other than a law--
       (A) prohibiting discrimination in housing and employment, 
     except as described in paragraphs (1) and (2); or
       (B) prohibiting discrimination in a public accommodation.

     SEC. 5. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

       (a) Religious Belief Unaffected.--Nothing in this Act shall 
     be construed to authorize any government to burden any 
     religious belief.
       (b) Religious Exercise Not Regulated.--Nothing in this Act 
     shall create any basis for restricting or burdening religious 
     exercise or for claims against a religious organization, 
     including any religiously affiliated school or university, 
     not acting under color of law.
       (c) Claims to Funding Unaffected.--Nothing in this Act 
     shall create or preclude a right of any religious 
     organization to receive funding or other assistance from a 
     government, or of any person to receive government funding 
     for a religious activity, but this Act may require government 
     to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a 
     burden or a substantial burden on religious exercise.
       (d) Other Authority To Impose Conditions on Funding 
     Unaffected.--Nothing in this Act shall--
       (1) authorize a government to regulate or affect, directly 
     or indirectly, the activities or policies of a person other 
     than a government as a condition of receiving funding or 
     other assistance; or
       (2) restrict any authority that may exist under other law 
     to so regulate or affect, except as provided in this Act.
       (e) Governmental Discretion in Alleviating Burdens on 
     Religious Exercise.--A government may avoid the preemptive 
     force of any provision of this Act by changing the policy 
     that results in the substantial burden on religious exercise, 
     by retaining the policy and exempting the burdened religious 
     exercise, by providing exemptions from the policy for 
     applications that substantially burden religious exercise, or 
     by any other means that eliminates the substantial burden.
       (f) Effect on Other Law.--In a claim under section 2(a)(2) 
     of this Act, proof that a substantial burden on a person's 
     religious exercise, or removal of that burden, affects or 
     would affect commerce, shall not establish any inference or 
     presumption that Congress intends that any religious exercise 
     is, or is not, subject to any other law.
       (g) Broad Construction.--This Act should be construed in 
     favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the 
     maximum extent permitted by its terms and the Constitution.
       (h) Severability.--If any provision of this Act or of an 
     amendment made by this Act, or any application of such 
     provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be 
     unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, the amendments 
     made by this Act, and the application of the provision to any 
     other person or circumstance shall not be affected.

     SEC. 6. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE UNAFFECTED.

       Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect, 
     interpret, or in any way address that portion of the first 
     amendment to the Constitution prohibiting laws respecting an 
     establishment of religion (referred to in this section as the 
     ``Establishment Clause''). Granting government funding, 
     benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the 
     Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of 
     this Act. As used in this section, the term ``granting'', 
     used with respect to government funding, benefits, or 
     exemptions, does not include the denial of government 
     funding, benefits, or exemptions.

     SEC. 7. AMENDMENTS TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT.

       (a) Definitions.--Section 5 of the Religious Freedom 
     Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb-2) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``a State, or subdivision 
     of a State'' and inserting ``a covered entity or a 
     subdivision of such an entity'';
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``term'' and all that 
     follows through ``includes'' and inserting ``term `covered 
     entity' means''; and
       (3) in paragraph (4), by striking all after ``means,'' and 
     inserting ``any exercise of religion, whether or not 
     compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief, 
     and includes (A) the use, building, or conversion of real 
     property by a person or entity intending that property for 
     religious exercise; and (B) any conduct protected as exercise 
     of religion under the first amendment to the Constitution.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 6(a) of the Religious 
     Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb-3(a)) is 
     amended by striking ``and State''.

     SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.

       As used in this Act--
       (1) the term ``religious exercise'' means any exercise of 
     religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a 
     system of religious belief, and includes (A) the use, 
     building, or conversion of real property by a person or 
     entity intending that property for religious exercise; and 
     (B) any conduct protected as exercise of religion under the 
     first amendment to the Constitution;
       (2) the term ``Free Exercise Clause'' means that portion of 
     the first amendment to the Constitution that proscribes laws 
     prohibiting the free exercise of religion and includes the 
     application of that proscription under the 14th amendment to 
     the Constitution;
       (3) the term ``land use regulation'' means a law or 
     decision by a government that limits or restricts a private 
     person's uses or development of land, or of structures 
     affixed to land, where the law or decision applies to one or 
     more particular parcels of land or to land within one or more 
     designated geographical zones, and where the private person 
     has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other 
     property interest in the regulated land, or a contract or 
     option to acquire such an interest;
       (4) the term ``program or activity'' means a program or 
     activity as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 606 of 
     the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d-4a);
       (5) the term ``demonstrates'' means meets the burdens of 
     going forward with the evidence and of persuasion; and
       (6) the term ``government''--
       (A) means--
       (i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental 
     entity created under the authority of a State;
       (ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, 
     subdivision, or official of an entity listed in clause (i); 
     and
       (iii) any other person acting under color of State law; and
       (B) for the purposes of sections 3(a) and 5, includes the 
     United States, a branch, department, agency, instrumentality 
     or official of

[[Page H5598]]

     the United States, and any person acting under color of 
     Federal law.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 245, the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) and a Member opposed each will 
control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute. I will not repeat the arguments I made during the general 
debate as to why the underlying legislation is very necessary. I think 
the vast majority of the Members of this House agree with that 
proposition.
  The real question is whether it is appropriate to ensure that this 
legislation, once enacted, while providing an effective shield for the 
religious rights of all Americans, will not be used as a sword against 
the civil rights of other Americans. I believe the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute strikes that balance, and does so without doing 
violence to the underlying purpose of the bill.
  Members who support this legislation need not be concerned that the 
substitute will nullify its protections in any way. It is no secret 
there is substantial concern that establishing a standard that says a 
State and local law cannot be enforced in any case where someone raises 
a religious claim, unless the State can show a compelling interest in 
enforcing its law in the specific case, causes concerns about whether 
religious claims will prevail against State and local civil rights 
laws.
  The Committee on the Judiciary has received testimony from some 
supporters of this bill who have testified very forthrightly that they 
have and will continue to bring free exercise litigation in an effort 
to undermine some civil rights protections.
  While those religious beliefs may be sincere and entitled to a fair 
hearing, I think it is necessary to strike an appropriate balance 
without broad carve-outs and without politicizing the process, if that 
is possible.
  The amendment recognizes that religious rights are rights that belong 
to individuals and to religious assemblies and institutions. General 
Motors does not have sincerely held religious beliefs, by its nature. 
My amendment protects individual and religious institutions.
  In order to protect civil rights laws against the person who would 
say, ``My religion prohibits me from letting my corporation hire a 
divorced person or a disabled person, or a mother who should be at home 
with her children, or a gay or a lesbian person, and it prohibits me 
from letting my hotel rent a room to such people,'' never mind the 
State civil rights laws that prohibit this kind of discrimination, in 
order to protect civil rights laws against that sort of religious 
claim, the amendment places some limits on who may raise a claim under 
this bill against the application of a State or local law.
  Any person would have standing, any person would have standing under 
this amendment to raise any claim with respect to any issue, with the 
following narrow exceptions: Except a claim against the housing 
discrimination law could be raised only by a small landlord who was 
exempted by the terms of the Fair Housing Act; a claim against an 
employment discrimination law could be raised only by a small business 
with five or fewer employees, in accord with the general practice of 
exempting very small businesses from employment discrimination laws; or 
by a church or other religious institution or religious school 
exercising its right to decide whom to employ based on its religious 
beliefs.
  With these exceptions, businesses of any size could bring any free 
exercise claims. This is important for the mom and pop store that has 
difficulties with Sunday closing laws, or with laws allowing malls 
requiring stores to remain open 7 days a week, as well as for large 
firms that, for example, produce kosher meat or other products.
  The amendment recognizes that in protecting any rights, we are always 
balancing other peoples' rights. The courts do it, we do it, and there 
is no way around it. I think this amendment accomplishes that end.
  I can tell the Members that a great deal of work and consultation, 
both with Members of the religious coalition which is supporting this 
bill and with other civil rights groups, has gone into developing this 
language. It provides a basis to enact a bill that will pass and that 
will protect people who are in need of protection.
  I know there are those who will object that this amendment is a 
carve-out, a set of exceptions to a general religious protection 
principle that will set a precedent for many more exceptions and could 
lead to gutting of the bill, to rendering our first freedom a hollow 
shell. I disagree.
  In the first instance, this bill already has a carve-out that breaks 
the absolute, the principle of indivisibility that we must never have 
carve-outs. This bill limits the right of prison inmates to raise 
otherwise valid claims under the bill by specifically referencing the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act.
  So we already have a carve-out in the bill. This is simply a second 
carve-out. The question is not should we have a carve-out, but is it 
important, worthwhile, and valid. I submit that to protect civil rights 
laws from possible claims under this bill, it is a valid protection.
  Secondly, it is not a carve-out in the sense that, for instance, the 
prison carve-out is, where it simply says, this shall not apply by 
reference, or this shall not apply to this or that law. It is a 
limitation, a narrow limitation on standing which would be very 
difficult to extend further and which should not be extended any 
further.
  I believe that without good faith compromise by people with vastly 
different beliefs, it would be difficult to get this bill through the 
Senate, through the House, and through the President. That was our 
experience with RFRA, and nothing has changed.
  This amendment provides an opportunity to find the consensus we need 
to protect the rights of all Americans. If we could not draft this 
amendment, Mr. Speaker, if we had a stark choice in which we said we 
can either protect the free exercise of religious rights of people from 
the damage the Supreme Court has done to it at the expense of the civil 
rights of other Americans, or we can protect the civil rights of 
Americans but not their religious rights, that would be a terrible 
choice, indeed.
  This amendment offers us a way to do both, protect the religious 
liberties we need to protect, as the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Canady) and others have so eloquently expressed, but do so without 
violating or posing a threat to civil rights of Americans.
  We ought to do it in the proper way without posing a threat to the 
civil rights of Americans. I therefore urge my colleagues to adopt this 
substitute amendment and, reluctantly, if the substitute is not 
adopted, I will urge my colleagues to vote against the bill so that we 
can have, further in the process, better odds of getting this amendment 
or something like this into the bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I do rise in opposition to the amendment in the nature 
of a substitute offered by my colleague, the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Nadler). I at the outset would like to say that I know that the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) is passionately committed to the 
protection of religious liberty in this country, and I believe that he 
has a sincere desire to deal with this issue in a responsible manner.
  But I am concerned that in his efforts to develop language that will 
be acceptable to groups such as the ACLU, who have asserted concerns 
about this bill, concerns that I might add are based not on any current 
problems with the bill but on sheer speculation, he has varied from the 
principle that truly animates this bill.
  In his efforts to address the concerns that a few groups have raised 
on the far left, he has denigrated, unintentionally, I will concede, 
unintentionally denigrated protection for religious liberty. Therefore, 
I would urge all Members to vote against the substitute that the 
gentleman has offered.
  Again, Mr. Speaker, I want to express my utmost respect for the 
gentleman from New York. I know that he is passionately committed on 
this issue. I simply think that he has made a particular compromise 
here with the principle underlying this bill that we

[[Page H5599]]

should not make, and that the House should reject this amendment for 
that reason.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1691 is designed to provide the fundamental civil 
right of all Americans to practice their religion with a high level of 
protection, consistent with other fundamental rights. The Nadler 
amendment would subordinate religious liberty to all other civil 
rights, perpetuating the second class status for religious liberty that 
the court in effect created in the Smith case.
  I do not think that is the gentleman's intent, but that is the actual 
effect of what his amendment does. We cannot get away from it. That is 
what it will do. That is not something that this Congress should 
countenance.

                              {time}  1300

  Like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Religious Liberty 
Protection Act is intended to provide a uniform standard of review for 
religious liberty claims. H.R. 1961 employs the ``compelling interest/
least restrictive means'' test for all Americans who seek relief from 
substantial burdens on their religious exercise.
  Under the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York, only a 
preferred category of plaintiffs are granted this protection. The 
gentleman can describe it as a ``carve in'' or a ``carve out,'' but the 
fact is some people are not going to get the protection that the bill 
would otherwise afford them.
  While H.R. 1691 would restore the strong legal protection for 
religious freedom that was taken away by the Supreme Court in the Smith 
case, the Nadler amendment in effect perpetuates the weaker standard by 
intentionally excluding certain types of religious liberty claims from 
strict scrutiny review.
  One reason the gentleman has expressed for the limitation on claims 
to businesses of five or fewer employees is to preclude General Motors 
from filing a religious liberty claim as a ruse to discriminate against 
people. With all due respect to the gentleman from New York, I think 
that no one who has seriously looked at this law could conclude that 
General Motors would have any claim under the Religious Liberty 
Protection Act. The argument that General Motors would have such a 
claim ignores the requirement of the bill that a claimant prove that 
his religious liberty has been substantially burdened by the 
government.
  I do not think that General Motors or Exxon Corporation or any other 
such large corporation that the gentleman wants to bring forward as an 
example could come within a mile of showing that anything that was done 
would substantially infringe on their religious beliefs. They do not 
have a religious belief. They do not have a religious practice. It is 
not in the nature of such large corporations to have such religious 
beliefs or practices. So I think that that argument about Exxon and 
General Motors is, quite frankly, a bit of a red herring.
  The gentleman from New York admits that his amendment does not track 
Title VII's exemptions from civil rights laws for religious 
institutions. He does not explain why he thinks that Congress ought to, 
in this bill, provide less protection for religious institutions than 
it has provided for so many years under Title VII. The Nadler amendment 
would restrict claims to the employment of people ``spreading or 
teaching the faith . . . performing . . . in devotional services or'' 
involved ``in the internal governance'' of the institution.
  Title VII on the other hand states its provisions barring 
discrimination in employment ``shall not apply . . . to a religious 
corporation, association, educational institution or society with 
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion . . . 
to perform work connected with the carrying on by [a religious 
institution] of its activities.
  Federal courts have recognized that this special provision for 
religious institutions is a broad one and permits those entities, 
churches, synagogues, schools, which are covered by it to discriminate 
on the basis of religion ``in the hiring of all of their employees.''
  Mr. Speaker, if the Nadler amendment passes, Congress will have 
departed from the long-standing protection that it has afforded 
churches, synagogues, parochial schools and all other religious 
institutions for decades by embodying in Federal law for the first time 
a narrower protection for the religious liberty of religious 
institutions. There is no good reason to depart from the policy of 
protection for religious organizations established in Title VII.
  I think it is worth noting that the groups that urge adoption of this 
amendment did not find similar fault with the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act. And I know that is not something that the proponents 
of this amendment want to hear about. That was then and this is now. 
But all the arguments related to civil rights that have been advanced 
today were equally applicable to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
  On a general point about civil rights, the President and the 
administration have expressed their strong support for this 
legislation. I cannot speak for the President, but I have read the 
letter that was sent. Strong support is expressed.
  The President was a strong proponent of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, and I know he views that legislative accomplishment as 
something that was very significant. I think it is strange a bit to 
claim that this bill, which is strongly supported by the 
administration, poses such a great threat to civil rights. It just does 
not stand up to serious consideration. That sort of argument just does 
not.
  With all due respect to the gentleman from New York, I must suggest 
that I do not believe the President would express his strong support 
for a bill that would have the impact that some others have suggested 
it would have.
  Mr. Speaker, we go back to RFRA, the ACLU-supported RFRA. Now they 
have changed their minds. What triggered this objection? I think what 
all of this is about, if we get right down to the facts of what is 
motivating this, was a 9th Circuit case in which a small religious 
landlord challenging a housing law was granted an exemption from 
compliance. This should not be a cause for alarm. It is clear from the 
case law that under strict scrutiny sometimes religious landlords win 
their claims for exemption, sometimes they do not depending upon the 
facts of the case.
  H.R. 1691 will continue in this tradition weighing and balancing 
competing interests based on real facts before the Court. Religious 
interests will not always prevail, nor will those of the government. 
But the Nadler amendment would determine in advance that the interest 
of the Government will always prevail in certain cases. This is not 
what this Congress intended when it passed RFRA unanimously here in the 
House and is not the type of law I believe the American citizens want 
their Congress to enact.
  Let me finally say that H.R. 1691 remedies the Smith case's tragic 
outcome which resulted in only politically influential people being 
able to obtain meaningful protection of their religious freedom against 
a neutral law of general applicability.
  The Nadler amendment, on the other hand, exemplifies the problem 
created in the Smith case by legislatively doling out protection only 
to politically influential classes of claimants, or perhaps more 
accurately denying protection to politically not influential classes of 
claimants. Now, that is not the way we should be operating when we are 
dealing with religious liberty. Religious liberty should not be put in 
a second-class status to other civil rights. That is just not right.
  Now, we are not saying in this bill that religious freedom always 
takes precedent over everything else. That is not what the bill does, 
and the gentleman knows that, and anyone who has read the bill knows 
that. But those of us who oppose this amendment are simply saying that 
it is not right to establish as a matter of Federal policy in this bill 
that protection for the free exercise of religion, protection for the 
civil right of the exercise of religion is in second-class status 
behind other civil rights.
  So on that basis I would urge the Members of the House to reject the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) and move 
forward to the passage of this bill which has such broad support from 
the religious community. As we have noted earlier, it is truly 
remarkable that such a diverse group of religious organizations have 
joined together in support of any legislation. It is an unusual

[[Page H5600]]

circumstance when we can come to the floor with such broad support. We 
have that broad support in the religious community. We have the support 
of the administration.

  Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the Department of Justice for the 
work that they have done in helping us craft this legislation and 
addressing various concerns that had existed. They were very helpful in 
making suggestions which I think have strengthened the bill; and I, as 
the chief sponsor of this legislation, want to express my gratitude to 
the Attorney General for the assistance that was provided.
  We need to get on with this job. This is a problem that we have been 
struggling with since 1990, nearly a decade. Congress tried to address 
the problem back in 1993 during my first term as a Member of Congress. 
The effort we have made then has proved to not be successful in the way 
that we intended it. We have come back to the drawing board, and we 
have an approach here which we think will do the job within the 
constraints that the Supreme Court has imposed on us.
  Mr. Speaker, the House should listen to the voice of the religious 
community. The House should reject this weakening amendment and pass 
this important legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Weiner), a member of the committee.
  Mr. WEINER. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Committee on the 
Judiciary I have found a comfortable place standing somewhere between 
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady) and the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Nadler), and on this issue I believe I am there again. I want to 
commend the gentleman from Florida for drafting an excellent bill, one 
that I am proud to cosponsor. And I also am proud to support the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from New York, which I believe makes 
a good bill a little bit better.
  In 1963, the Supreme Court issued an important decision in Sherbert 
vs. Verner. In that case a South Carolina woman was denied unemployment 
compensation. Her denial was not based on any lack of interest in 
working but because she refused to work on Saturdays. South Carolina 
tried to argue that this woman had refused an employment opportunity. 
This, however, was not the case. Ms. Sherbert observed the Sabbath and 
she did no work from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday. The same is 
true for so many of my constituents.
  Her religious beliefs demanded that she decline employment 
opportunities that involved Saturday work, but her State saw fit to 
deny her unemployment compensation. Her case was litigated all the way 
to the Supreme Court, and there the Court held that the State's refusal 
violated the free exercise clause because its denial of unemployment 
compensation forced Mrs. Sherbert to choose between religious adherence 
and unemployment compensation benefits.
  The Court rightly ruled that South Carolina's interest in denying 
benefits was neither compelling nor was it narrowly tailored. 
Unfortunately, since that time the Supreme Court has retreated from 
that position and there have been several other examples that have 
emerged.
  The bill that the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady) and I and 
others have sponsored seeks to reverse that. And I believe that the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) has said in his arguments on the 
floor that he supports that concept. It is something that all of us 
agree on. The gentleman from Florida has argued, and I agree, that this 
is not a bill that is intended to be an attack on civil liberties. What 
the Nadler amendment seeks to do is make that clear. Make it clear that 
in our efforts to restore religious liberties we are not taking a 
hatchet to civil liberties. I would not have sponsored the bill if I 
thought that that was the case.
  Mr. Speaker, I think that what the Nadler language does is make it 
very clear that while we are going to have conflicts between religious 
rights and between civil liberties with or without H.R. 1691, what this 
amendment makes clear is where we stand, and that is we are not trying 
to take from one group of rights to serve another group. The Nadler 
amendment strengthens what is already a very good and a strong bill. It 
allows us to all vote for strong civil liberties and strong religious 
liberties.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 1691, and I urge 
support for the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), chairman of the House Committee on 
the Judiciary.
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Nadler) to listen to what I say and tell me if I am wrong. I 
want to make sure I understand the impact of his amendment.
  It seems to me that what the gentleman is seeking to do is to carve 
out, lift from under the umbrella of this bill civil rights. And among 
the civil rights that he interprets are what are sometimes known as gay 
rights, that is the right of homosexuals to practice their 
homosexuality. And, therefore, that becomes a preferred right and the 
free exercise of religion becomes subordinate to that. Mr. Speaker, I 
would ask the gentleman if I am correct.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HYDE. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, no, the gentleman from Illinois is not 
correct. The amendment makes no mention of gay rights or any other 
particular right, establishes no preferred status for anything.
  The amendment limits standing as to who may bring a claim under this 
bill. And it says anybody may bring a claim, except with respect to 
housing discrimination small landlords only may bring a claim. With 
respect to hiring discrimination, small businesspeople or churches and 
religious institutions only may bring a claim. Who benefits from that 
depends on State and local law. That could be anybody. In other words, 
who can bring a claim against a State or local law.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, it seems to me that absent 
the gentleman's amendment, the bill itself restores the compelling-
interest standard which obtained before the Smith case and that the 
question of which civil right trumps the free exercise of religion can 
be left to the States on a case-by-case basis.

                              {time}  1315

  Therefore, the amendment of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) 
is really not needed.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HYDE. Surely. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman from Illinois has got 
it backwards. The bill without the amendment does not lead to the 
decision of the States, what trumps what. Any State law would be 
trumped if the court finds that the State does not have a compelling 
State interest. If the court finds it has a compelling State interest, 
it is not trumped.
  This amendment in effect takes out from that question and gives more 
effect to the State law in the limited cases of housing and employment 
discrimination with a carve-out from that provision for churches, small 
landlords, and small businesspeople.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, it just seems to me the gentleman from New 
York is unduly complicating what is essentially not a complicated 
proposition. The civil rights that may or may not be jeopardized and 
any conflict with the free exercise of religion can be protected and 
will be protected on a case-by-case basis without the complexity of the 
gentleman's amendment.
  So I just take this time to congratulate the gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Canady) for a very important bill and his persistence in getting 
it to this point. I support it without the Nadler amendment.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi).
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Nadler) for yielding me this time and for his leadership on this very, 
very important issue.
  Certainly we all support the spirit of the Religious Liberty 
Protection Act,

[[Page H5601]]

and I also commend the maker of H.R. 1691 for bringing it to the floor.
  In its current form, however, the bill could undermine existing civil 
rights laws. We do need the Religious Liberty Protection Act. But, as I 
say, it could also, in its present form, undermine ongoing efforts to 
extend much-needed legal protections to currently unprotected and 
deserving individuals who suffer discrimination.
  While the Religious Liberty Protection Act was designed to protect an 
individual's exercise of religion from the overreach of government, 
law, and regulation, I believe this act would itself overreach and 
could undermine laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
disability, marital status, and parental status.
  If this law passes without the Nadler amendment, individuals with 
disabilities, unmarried cohabitating couples, and single mothers could 
face more legal discrimination.
  We would all, I think, oppose a measure that would allow an 
individual to use his or her religious exercise rights as a basis for 
legal claim to circumvent civil rights laws. I do not think there is 
any argument about that.
  We would, none of us, ever permit this rationale to be used to permit 
discrimination on any basis of race against African Americans or Asian 
Americans. Yet, discrimination clearly and harshly continues against 
other individuals and groups. If the issue were race, we would not be 
having this debate. We would all stipulate that that discrimination 
should not take place.
  This same principle should apply to these populations that could be 
adversely affected. That is why the Consortium for Citizens with 
Disabilities, the National Organization for Women, the Human Rights 
Campaign, and I might add, Mr. Speaker, the American Association of 
Pediatricians seek a civil rights solution to this bill. The amendment 
of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) offers that.
  I think that we must support the underlying bill, if and only if the 
Nadler amendment passes. I thank the gentleman for his leadership on 
this legislation.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). The gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Canady) has 15 minutes remaining. The gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Nadler) has 18 minutes remaining.
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt).
  Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Canady) for yielding me this time. I also appreciate the comments that 
have been made by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) and by the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) about the importance of this 
legislation, the reasons we need to move forward with it. Their 
commitments in the past in this area have been significant.
  I would just like to say today that I think really what we are 
talking about here is the status of this right of religious liberty. 
When the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) mentioned earlier his 
amendment would allow us to show what trumps what, I think that is 
exactly why I wanted to speak on this topic today, because I think we 
need to be careful that we do not create a second-class status for 
religious rights where those rights are automatically secondary to 
other rights. We should not be deciding that those rights are trumped 
by other rights. That is not what we are about here.
  This legislation, as it is written, gives the fundamental civil right 
of all Americans to practice their religion a high level of protection. 
It is consistent with the other fundamental rights that we give in the 
Constitution and in our laws.
  This legislation is consistent with title VII's long-standing 
exemptions for employees of religious institutions. There is nothing in 
this legislation that continues that.
  This legislation establishes a process where we weigh and balance 
competing interests based on the real facts before the court. Religious 
interests, as defined here, would not always prevail, but they would 
not automatically be secondary. The facts that support those rights 
have equal standing in court with other rights equally protected by the 
Constitution.
  I believe, and those of us in this body universally believe, that 
this is a government based on enumerated powers. Those powers are 
enumerated in the Constitution. Those enumerated powers are evidenced 
in this legislation.
  This Act relies on three congressional powers: the power to spend, 
the power to regulate interstate commerce, the power to reach certain 
conduct under section 5 of the 14th amendment.
  First of all, the Religious Liberty Protection Act protects 
individuals participating in federally assisted programs from burdens 
imposed by a government as a condition of participating, that those 
people could not be exempted from these programs because of their 
religious beliefs.
  For example, an individual cannot be excluded from or discriminated 
against in a federally assisted program because of his or her religious 
dress or the holidays that they observe unless one can prove there is a 
compelling interest that that particular religious activity somehow 
makes it impossible to do that job.
  Secondly, this Act protects religious exercise in the affecting of 
commerce. Some of our friends say we should not use the commerce clause 
here to determine whether or not a church can be built. Well, clearly, 
if one builds a church, if one adds on it a facility, one affects tens 
of thousands, sometimes hundreds of thousands, occasionally millions of 
dollars of commerce.
  Using the commerce clause to protect religious liberty is appropriate 
and obvious. Because the commerce clause has sometimes been used in 
onerous ways does not mean we should shy away from using it for good or 
that we should shy away from using it to protect this freedom, to 
protect religious freedom.
  Third, this legislation makes the use of the power of Congress to 
enforce the rights under section 5 of the 14th amendment consistent 
with recent court decisions, particularly the Supreme Court's decision 
in Boerne v. Flores.
  What this does, it attempts to simplify litigation of free exercise 
violations as defined by the Supreme Court. These litigations do not 
need to be cumbersome. They do not need to be needlessly burdensome. 
Certainly no right in these litigations needs to be secondary to other 
rights in these litigations.
  Evidence shows that individuals who have determinations in land use 
regulation that work against them, frequently we see that as a burden 
for religious activities. We see that particularly as it relates to 
minority faiths, and this bill reaches out and protects those minority 
faiths. We know that from the evidence of the very broad base of groups 
that are supporting this legislation today.
  Again, I would like to close by simply saying that this legislation 
levels the playing field for a critical first amendment right. It does 
not allow the creation of a secondary right.
  I think the Nadler substitute, while well intentioned, and I really 
admire what the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) has done in these 
areas in the past, while this amendment is well intentioned, I think it 
does have the potential and the likelihood, and, in fact, what I think 
it does is relegate religious freedom and religious liberty and 
religious practice and religious rights to a secondary position. I 
think we need to have those rights as protected as any other right. 
Those decisions can be made by the court.
  I support the bill and oppose the amendment, but I do so with 
deference to the sponsor of the amendment.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney).
  (Mrs. MALONEY of New York asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend her remarks.)
  Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me this time, and I thank him for his strong leadership on so 
many issues. I rise in support of the Nadler amendment.
  The Religious Liberty Protection Act is a well-intentioned bill with 
a noble purpose. No State or local government should be able to 
restrict legitimate religious practices such as the wearing of a 
yarmulke or a crucifix or the celebration of certain religious 
holidays. But if we are not careful, then this well-intentioned bill 
may be used to weaken our Nation's civil rights laws.

[[Page H5602]]

  Without the Nadler amendment, this bill could threaten the rights of 
single mothers, gays and lesbians, the disabled, and even perhaps 
members of certain religious groups.
  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court retreated from Sherbert in 1990, and 
since then the courts and the Congress have engaged in a decade-long 
dialog over how to properly guarantee that all of our citizens are able 
to freely exercise their religious beliefs. This is not an academic 
debate being conducted in ivory towers and judicial chambers. Rather, 
this is a real-world issue of deep concern to my constituents and to 
Americans everywhere.
  For example:
  The Jewish principle of kavod hamet mandates that a dead body is not 
left alone from the moment of death until burial. For this reason, 
autopsies, in all but the most serious situations, are forbidden. 
Following the Supreme Court's ruling in 1990, courts in both Michigan 
and Rhode Island forced Jewish families of accident victims to endure 
intrusive government autopsies of family members, even though the 
autopsies directly violated Jewish law.
  In Los Angeles, a court declined to protect the rights of fifty 
elderly Jews to meet for prayer in the Hancock Park area, because 
Hancock Park had no place of worship and the City did not want to 
create precedent for one.
  In Tennessee, a Mormon church was denied a permit to use property 
which had formerly been used as a church. The city of Forest Hills, 
Tennessee decided it would not be in the best interests of the city to 
grant the church a construction permit and a local judge upheld the 
decision.
  This bill could be used to deny housing or employment or otherwise 
discriminate against individuals based on their race, sexual 
orientation, disability, or marital status.
  Mr. Speaker, there is no justification for discrimination. Our Nation 
has made enormous strides in the past 30 years toward offering equal 
opportunities for all, regardless of race, gender, religion, or sexual 
orientation.
  We must not undo that progress under the guise of protecting 
religious freedom. But we also need to protect religious freedom. I 
urge my colleagues to support the Nadler amendment.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Deutsch).
  Mr. DEUTSCH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Nadler 
substitute. In the 103rd Congress, I was an original cosponsor of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. I would take second place to no one 
in this Chamber in terms of a concern about religious liberty 
protection. I take that very, very seriously. I understand the intent 
of this legislation as well.
  But I think all of us who have looked at this legislation realize 
that the legislation will have an incredibly unfortunate consequence 
and that would be to allow the overturning of anti-discrimination 
statutes in the United States of America, statutes which are really at 
a fundamental core of the American experience.
  There are well-intentioned, good arguments on both sides of this 
legislation. I think we come to this in one of our really better 
moments as an institution. But I really ask and I really plead with my 
colleagues who are contemplating not supporting the Nadler amendment to 
really spend the time to understand specifically what the effect of 
this legislation would do.
  It will in fact, and I do not think there is an argument about this 
at all, it would in fact change protection that exists under present 
law against discrimination, whether Federal, whether State, whether 
county or local discrimination statute.

                              {time}  1330

  It would force them into courts. And I think all of us understand 
that there will be many cases, and we do not know the exact percentage 
of those cases, that the standards of compelling State interest will 
not be met.
  And that really is the issue in front of us, that in terms of actual 
discrimination that is protected against today, if this legislation 
were to pass those protections would not exist and, in fact, that 
discrimination would occur.
  And in the balancing that we are trying to do, it would not, under 
any circumstance with the Nadler substitute, deal with some of the 
parade of horribles that I support the protections of that the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady) mentioned previously in terms of 
religious schools, dictating hiring practices of churches.
  I urge my colleagues, I implore my colleagues to support the Nadler 
substitute.
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher).
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation, 
and I think it is really important for us, when we are discussing 
discrimination and discussing how to treat each other decently in the 
society, to come to an honest analysis about whose ox is being gored in 
this society and whose toes are being stepped upon.
  I think there is a wide consensus in our society today that people 
who live less traditional lives, let us say, or have different types of 
values, sexual values, et cetera, have a right to their privacy and a 
right to their personal lives and a right to live as they see fit in 
their own lives. But, frankly, in the last 10 years, what I have seen, 
which is very disturbing to me, is that people with more traditional 
views, especially more traditional Christian views, although I think 
that this is true of Muslims and Jewish people, who are deeply involved 
in their religious traditions as well, that those people are being told 
they cannot make determinations for themselves and for their lives and 
for their families that are consistent with their religious values.
  I see the greatest victim of discrimination in our society today as 
being these people, these Christians, these Jews, these Muslims, who 
have more traditional religious values. If someone wants to have 
certain sexual activities, and this is what they desire and they do so 
in their privacy, there are very few people today who want the 
government to intrude in that.
  But there seem to be a lot of people trying to force their way into 
the lives of others. For example, the Catholics cannot have a parade. 
They attempted to have a parade in New York, and people whose social 
lives and social values are totally in conflict with what Catholics 
believe feel that they can force their way into a Catholic parade, 
which is, to me, violating those Catholics' right to have their own 
beliefs.
  We have the Boy Scouts of America, which is a private organization, 
and they have certain moral standards that they believe in. Now, who is 
under attack? Who is under attack here? The Boy Scouts of America are 
spending millions of dollars just to maintain what they consider to be 
their moral standards.
  No one is out forcing their way into the homes of other people who 
want to live in their privacy and want to live decent lives with their 
own values in terms of whether or not they are in agreement with some 
of these more traditional values, but the ones with the traditional 
values are under attack all the time.
  I think this piece of legislation is going to try to swing the 
pendulum back. Certainly 25 and 30 years ago there was great 
discrimination in our country against certain nonconformists, one might 
say, of people who had different than the traditional values. Today, 
that pendulum has swung so far in the opposite direction that people 
with more traditional values are under attack, and we need to protect 
their rights as well.
  So this, I think, is a balance and I support the legislation.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds.
  The views expressed by my friend from California are very interesting 
views. I would simply point out two things.
  Number one, this bill does and is intended to protect religious 
freedom for traditional Christians and Jews and for untraditional 
people, for wiccans, witches, or whatever their religious views. And, 
secondly, this has nothing whatsoever to do with this amendment. It 
does with the bill, but not with this amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Wexler).
  Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Nadler amendment, 
strong support, and in doing so acknowledge and recognize that H.R. 
1691 and the sponsor, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady), seek to 
address very important wrongs that are occurring in the United States 
today. There are, in fact, numerous examples of planning and zoning 
decisions that are being made for the either inherent or obvious 
purpose of denying individuals or groups their religious freedom.
  In my own community in South Florida, oftentimes there are autopsies

[[Page H5603]]

that are conducted in violation or contrary to people's religious 
beliefs, when there is little or no State purpose for doing so. And the 
State acts either out of insensitivity or just out of lack of knowledge 
for people's religious beliefs. And I believe the purpose of this bill 
would be to correct those violations, and that I support and 
compliment.
  But in doing so, there also is a flip side. The flip side is that in 
protecting one group's religious freedom, which is noble and certainly 
applaudable, we are, to some degree, and we can argue to what degree 
that is, but to some degree jeopardizing the rights of others.
  And while the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher) may suggest 
that people are trying to force themselves on maybe more traditional 
people in this country, I do not see it that way. What these so-called 
less traditional people are trying to do is work. They are trying to 
live in an apartment. And if that is forcing themselves on someone, 
well then, that is exactly why we need the Nadler amendment. Although, 
although, what the Nadler amendment seeks to do is both protect 
religious freedom and protect civil rights.
  This bill, as it is currently drafted, puts us in an untenable 
situation, civil rights versus religious liberty. Support the Nadler 
bill.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time I have 
remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). The gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Nadler) has 12 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Canady) has 7 minutes remaining.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Scott).
  Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, the Nadler amendment points out the problem of the 
underlying bill, and that is that without this amendment it may 
sabotage the enforcement of laws of general application, like civil 
rights laws, child protection laws and others. We should not subject 
vigorous enforcement of civil rights laws to individual beliefs.
  We know that there are some in our society, and we have seen on Web 
sites the Church of the Creator, where some have strongly held beliefs 
about race, and we should not make civil rights laws optional. Without 
this amendment, those people who just do not believe in civil rights 
can require a showing of a compelling State interest and least 
restrictive means to complicate the enforcement of civil rights laws by 
declaring that the compliance with the civil rights laws might violate 
their beliefs.
  Mr. Speaker, I would hope that we would not subject our civil rights 
laws it took us too long to enact and so long to enforce to this kind 
of situation. I would hope that we would adopt the Nadler amendment so 
these civil rights laws could be enforced.
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may 
consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Edwards) for the purpose of a 
colloquy.
  Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to engage the chief sponsor of 
this legislation in a colloquy in order to address concerns that the 
bill advantages or disadvantages any group or ideological perspective.
  Could the gentleman from Florida please explain how the compelling-
interest standard works in this legislation?
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. EDWARDS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, the compelling-interest standard 
is fair, but rigorous, not only for the government but also for 
religious claimants. The standard neither allows religious interests to 
always prevail, nor those of the government, even when its interests 
are compelling.
  The standard weighs and then balances competing interests, first 
considering the burden on the claimant's interest and then evaluating 
the government's interest in disallowing an exemption to the law or 
regulation and the available alternatives for achieving the 
government's goals. The Religious Liberty Protection Act, like the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, does not define the various elements 
of the standard.
  The legislation imposes a standard of review, not an outcome, and the 
cases are litigated on the real facts before the courts. Thus, it is 
difficult in some hypothetical cases to predict with certainty which 
interests will prevail.
  Mr. EDWARDS. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Speaker, I would further ask if 
it is correct that the point of this legislation is that by adopting 
the compelling-interest standard Congress is acknowledging that courts 
will consider and weigh important interests behind these laws; and that 
because each religious claimant's situation is unique, it is 
appropriately left to the courts to weigh the competing interests; and 
that because the legislation is not designed to resolve any specific 
case or set of facts, it is neutral and does not directly address a 
specific outcome.
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. That is correct.
  Mr. EDWARDS. I thank the gentleman for this clarification.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt).
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the 
Nadler amendment and want to encourage my colleagues to support the 
amendment.
  The thing that is really interesting about the debate on the Nadler 
amendment is how everybody seems to be claiming to be on the same side. 
The proponents of the underlying bill say, ``Oh, no, we are not trying 
to trump civil rights laws.'' The gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) 
says, ``Oh, no, we are not trying to trump religious use protection.'' 
And then we have people really claiming to be achieving the same 
objective, protecting religious freedom and protecting civil rights 
laws.
  The problem is those same people started out together, and they have 
been together all along during this process. The gentleman from New 
York has been trying to get the proponents of the bill to accept his 
amendment from the very beginning. He has gone through different 
iterations of it, revisions of it, and here we are on the floor of the 
House with everybody still saying they support the same objective: ``We 
do not want to undo civil right laws,'' they say, ``but we are not 
going to support the Nadler amendment to make that clear.''
  Well, there is a third version. There is the NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
saying that the amendment of the gentleman from New York does not go 
far enough. I happen to agree with the Legal Defense Fund in its 
assessment, but I will tell my colleagues what I am prepared to do. 
Since everybody says they would like to work this out in the conference 
committee, and everybody is trying to achieve the same objective, I 
have decided that I will support the Nadler amendment and I will vote 
for the bill if the Nadler amendment is adopted and we can continue to 
work on this in conference.
  The problem that I have is the people who keep telling me this is 
going to work itself out in conference are the people who have not 
given one inch, one word throughout the whole discussion of this 
process. We need to adopt this amendment and pass the bill; or, if we 
reject the amendment, we need to vote against the bill.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Frank).
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I was interested to hear the 
colloquy between the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Edwards) and the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady). It reinforces the central point. 
This bill is a Federal act that says to Federal judges, ``Go forth and 
pick and choose amongst State laws.''
  This empowers Federal judges to decide what is the compelling 
interest according to the State and what is not.

                              {time}  1345

  And if a State has said they are going to protect them if they are 
unmarried and seek with their child to get housing, it will be up to 
the Federal judge to decide whether that State law beats a religious 
objection; if they are gay or lesbian, it will be up to the Federal 
judge to decide whether the State law in Connecticut or Wisconsin or 
Minnesota or California is overridden; if they are an unmarried couple 
seeking

[[Page H5604]]

to live together, it will be up to the Federal Government to judge 
whether or not they can rent an apartment from a corporation, the 
stockholders of which said it is their religious objection.
  The gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher) cited the Boy Scouts 
and the March. Let us be very clear. Neither one of those has the 
remotest thing to do with this bill. Both of those entities, the people 
having the parade and the Boy Scouts, are already protected under the 
law. Nothing in the law would add to that protection. But, on the other 
hand, nothing in the Nadler amendment would detract one iota.
  The gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) says this: If they seek to 
live somewhere in a non-owner-occupied building or a very large 
apartment building, or if you seek a job with an employer with more 
than five people, if they can do the job, if they can pay the rent, 
their personal habits, whether they are married or not, whether they 
are gay or not, whether they have some particular affliction or not 
that might offend someone's religion will not keep them off of the work 
rolls, it will not keep them out of that house.
  We do not impinge on anybody's individual religious practice. Nobody 
goes into anybody's home. No one is involved here, under the Nadler 
amendment, with the ability to interfere.
  We are saying that they should not say where a State has said they 
wish to protect them based on their sexual orientation or their marital 
status or the fact that they have children. They should not allow 
Federal judges selectively to overrule those because those Federal 
judges do not find the State's policy a compelling interest.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). The gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Canady) has 5\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Nadler) has 7 minutes remaining.
  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Bachus).
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, first of all, I would like to commend the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady) for his excellent work in defending 
our Constitution and the first freedom enumerated there.
  In fact, we all know from our history that our forefathers came to 
this country for religious liberty. And it was not a coincidence that 
when they drafted our Constitution the very first right that they 
enumerated was the right to religious liberty. And this right has been 
unquestioned in our country until 1990.
  Of all things, in 1990, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a 
5-4 decision, questioned the right of every citizen to our right to 
full expression of our religious freedoms and beliefs. There was a 
long-standing principle that the State had to have a compelling reason 
to interfere with that right, and they did away with that.
  I am happy to say that this Congress, in 1993, with only three 
dissenting votes, passed legislation again saying that the Government 
has to have a compelling reason to interfere with our religious 
liberties. President Clinton signed that legislation.
  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court came back and basically said, we 
cannot do that; it is unconstitutional for the Congress to try to 
protect our freedom of religion. Thank goodness they had not done that 
with some of our other freedoms.
  So we are here today again. And I will say to my colleagues that, as 
a Congress, all three branches of government have an obligation and a 
duty to protect our constitutional rights and our freedom. It is not 
the sole responsibility of the Supreme Court, particularly in this case 
where the Supreme Court has shirked that responsibility and has 
actually taken away a freedom guaranteed in our Constitution.
  I would hope that every Member of this body, with not three 
dissenting votes but unanimously, would say to this country and the 
people we represent, their religious freedoms will not be violated. If 
they are a prisoner and they want to confess to their priest, we will 
not monitor that confessional; we will not prohibit them from talking 
to their priest; we will not prohibit a church here in Washington, 
D.C., to feed the homeless; we will not prohibit Jewish prisoners from 
wearing a yarmulke.
  It is time to end this abuse. It is time to pass this bill.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, it is now my privilege to yield 1\1/2\ 
minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), the distinguished 
ranking member of the Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  My colleagues, as the bill presently stands, whenever a parties 
brings suit claiming discrimination, the defendant will be able to 
claim that this is inconsistent with their religious beliefs.
  We are creating a huge disparity here. The Nadler amendment responds 
to the problem, thank goodness, by specifying that the bill's 
protections only apply to individuals, religious institutions, and 
small businesses.
  So the amendment will be particularly helpful with regard to laws 
prohibiting discrimination based on marital status, disability, sexual 
orientation, where there has not been found by the court a compelling 
interest test.
  That is why the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the American Civil 
Liberties Union have recently broken from this loose coalition because 
they realize what we would be doing if we allowed this bill to go 
through without this very important amendment.
  We do not want to turn a shield into a sword. At our hearings, the 
Christian Legal Society acknowledged that they planned a widespread 
campaign to use the Religion Freedom Protection Act to undermine State 
laws protecting people with different orientations.
  Please support the Nadler substitute.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New 
York for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, I started out this debate earlier today acknowledging 
that we have more in common than we have in disagreement.
  Today I rise and stand on behalf of the Sabbath keepers, on behalf of 
those who wear yarmulkes, on behalf of churches who feed the homeless, 
because I am standing in support of the Nadler amendment, particularly 
emphasizing the fact that the free exercise of religion is a prominent 
and important right and why can we not do it together, raising the 
concern that we should not discriminate against those in businesses and 
governments with respect to their employment, participation in the 
rental market, their right to observe the Sabbath, to wear religion 
articles, and to follow the other teachings of their faith, including 
those relating to family life, the education of children, and the 
conduct of their religious institutions. The Nadler amendment stands 
for this.
  But at the same time, as we did in my State of Texas, the Nadler 
amendment respects unmarried couples and single parents, lesbians and 
gays, maybe even racial and ethnic groups who differ in their 
acceptance in this community.
  Mr. Speaker, I am a believer in the free exercise of religion. But my 
ancestors, unfortunately, came as slaves. We had to be educated about 
the democracy, if you will, late in life and the free exercise of 
religion. I would hope we would not go along the lines of the free 
exercise of religion and civil rights.
  I offer in testimony, Mr. Speaker, the words of Scott Hochberg, the 
proponent of the legislation in Texas, where, in a bipartisan manner, 
this same legislation was passed and George Bush signed it. And what it 
offered to say is that he supports a strong religion liberty but he 
wanted to ensure that the Texas civil rights were not violated. They 
worked together in Texas.
  I will close by simply saying, let us work together and vote for the 
amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, today, we discuss what I believe is sorely needed 
legislation to restore the legal protections for the free exercise of 
religion. These legal protections have been dangerously eroded by the 
Supreme Court in its 1990 Employment Division v. Smith decision.
  Congress attempted to remedy this by enacting on a bipartisan basis, 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which the Court struck down in 
part in its 1997 City of Boerne v. Flores decision.
  H.R. 1691, the Religious Liberty Protection Act (``RLPA'') seeks to 
restore the application of strict scrutiny in those cases in which 
facially neutral, generally applicable laws have

[[Page H5605]]

the incidental effect of substantially burdening the free exercise of 
religion. I believe that the government should not have the ability to 
substantially burden a right that is enshrined in Constitution unless 
it is able to demonstrate that it has used ``the least restrictive 
means of achieving a compelling state interest.'' (Thomas v. Review 
Board, Indiana Employment Security Commission, 450 U.S. 707, 718 
(1981)).
  I am concerned that this legislation if left unamended could have 
deleterious affects on the enforcement of State and local civil rights 
laws. Many Americans, including unmarried couples, single parents, 
persons with different lifestyles, maybe even racial and ethnic 
minorities with different religious beliefs.
  The amendment offered in the nature of a substitute by Mr. Nadler of 
New York would address these concerns. This amendment would 
appropriately strike a balance between the free exercise sincerely held 
religious beliefs and the enforcement of hard-won civil rights.
  The amendment, crafted in consultation with both religious and civil 
rights groups clarifies the fact that religious liberty is an 
individual right expressed by individuals and through religious 
associations, educational institutions and house of worship. It also 
makes clear that the right to raise a claim under RLPA applies to that 
individual. A non-religious corporate entities could not use a RLPA for 
a claim or defense to attack civil rights laws.
  Individuals, under this amendment, could still raise a claim based on 
their sincerely held religious beliefs which are substantially burdened 
by the government, whether in the conduct of their businesses, their 
employment by governments, their participation in the rental market, 
their right to observe the sabbath or to wear religious articles and to 
follow the other teachings of their faith, including those relating to 
family life, the education of children and the conduct of their 
religious institutions.
  I urge my colleagues to join with me in supporting the Nadler 
amendment as it is a positive step forward in protecting the rights of 
all Americans and finally restores the legal protections for religious 
freedom for the average American citizens that have been threatened for 
nearly a decade.

    Testimony of Texas State Representative Scott Hochberg, Senate 
                   Judiciary Committee--June 23, 1999

       Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee;
       I appreciate the opportunity to share some thoughts with 
     you today.
       Two weeks ago, Governor George W. Bush signed the Texas 
     Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Texas RFRA) into law, I as 
     privileged to work the Gov. Bush as the House author of this 
     important bill. And I'm proud of this bill, because I believe 
     it strengthens religious freedom in Texas without weakening 
     other fundamental individual rights.
       Long before I ever heard of the Smith case or the federal 
     RFRA, I knew how hard it was for individuals to assert their 
     first amendment religious freedoms against the bureaucracy. 
     I've fought battles with our prison system over allowing 
     Jewish prisoners to practice their faith. And I found I had 
     to pass a law before I could be sure that judges would not 
     repeat the incident that occurred in a Houston courtroom, 
     where an Orthodox Jewish man was required to remove his 
     skullcap, in direct conflict with his religious practices, 
     before he could testify.
       So when the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-
     Defamation League, on whose local boards I serve, put the 
     state Religious Freedom Restoration Act on their legislative 
     agendas, I was eager to become the lead sponsor. And I was 
     certainly encouraged by the early and strong support of Gov. 
     Bush, who announced just before the opening of our 
     legislative session that Texas RFRA would be one of his 
     legislative priorities as well.
       Of course you know that no bill is a simple bill. Early on, 
     I saw that the model RFRA language left open a possibility 
     that the act could be used to get around Texas' civil rights 
     laws. That concern was first raised to me by the AJC, and 
     then later the ADL, the two groups that had initially brought 
     me the legislation, and two groups with long histories of 
     defending civil rights internationally.
       Clearly, the intended purpose of this bill was not to 
     weaken civil rights laws. When Gov. Bush talked about the 
     need for RFRA, he cited examples, including the skullcap 
     situation, where RFRA could be used to help protect a 
     person's religious practice from government interference. 
     None of the examples were about giving any individual the 
     right to deny another person's equal protection rights.
       The Texas Constitution is very clear about the primacy of 
     civil rights. The third and fourth sections of our Bill of 
     Rights guarantee equal protection under the law. The next 
     three sections protect religion and guarantee freedom of 
     worship. So, clearly, our framers saw these fundamental 
     rights as being on the same plane.
       I wanted to pass a strong RFRA in Texas, but not one that 
     would rewrite Texas civil rights laws. So I added language 
     clarifying that the act neither expanded nor reduced a 
     person's civil rights under any other law. That language drew 
     no objection initially.
       But later, some RFRA coalition members argued that to 
     completely move civil rights out from under RFRA might imply 
     that even a religious organization could not use religion as 
     a criteria in hiring--an exemption that is included in our 
     state labor code as well as in federal law.
       So coalition members helped craft language to apply RFRA to 
     the special circumstances of religious organizations, while 
     continuing to leave the task of balancing religious and equal 
     protection rights to the courts. That language was 
     unanimously adopted in a bipartisan amendment on the House 
     floor, and remained intact in the bill as it was signed by 
     Gov. Bush.
       The RFRA coalition in Texas endorsed the civil rights 
     language and strongly supported the bill, from the Texas 
     Freedom network on the left to the Liberty Legal Institute on 
     the right. I must tell you, however, that one or two 
     conservative groups in this very broad coalition objected and 
     went so far as to ask Gov. Bush to veto the bill. He chose 
     not to do so. Those particular groups said that they had 
     hoped to use RFRA to do exactly what others had feared--to 
     seek to override, in court, various civil rights laws that 
     they had not been able to override legislatively.
       I urge you to adopt a strong law to reinforce what we have 
     done in Texas. But in so doing, I would also ask that you 
     follow the wisdom of our governor and our legislature and 
     include language to protect state civil rights laws.
       I offer whatever assistance I can be to help develop and 
     refine the language of this bill so that those goals are met.
       This is too important a bill to be lost as a result of a 
     fear of weakening civil rights. But likewise, national and 
     state civil rights policies are too important to be weakened 
     as an unintended by-product of a bill with the noble purpose 
     of strengthening religious rights.
       Thank you again for your consideration, your time and your 
     hard work.

  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) has 
4 minutes remaining. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady) has 3 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, everything that has been said in support of the bill, as 
my colleagues know, I agree with. I support this bill. I think it is an 
important bill. I helped draft it. But it has a terrible flaw, and we 
must pass this amendment. The bill should be used as a shield for 
religious liberty but not as a sword against civil rights laws. And 
that is the problem and the need for this amendment. This amendment 
will prevent it from being used as such a sword against civil rights 
laws.
  My distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady), 
who has done yeoman's work on behalf of religious liberties and who I 
really respect on this, he says that the amendment would subordinate 
religious liberty. It does not subordinate religious liberty in any 
way.
  In fact, the bill, by establishing the compelling interest standard, 
establishes religious freedom as preeminent over other rights. Rarely 
can a State show a compelling as opposed to a legitimate interest. We 
could, if we wanted to, adopt the Supreme Court test of balancing the 
competing interests by the legitimate interest tests, and that would be 
an even playing field. But we are not doing that.
  We are, and I agree with this, establishing a compelling State 
interest test which establishes religious liberty as compelling over 
other interests. And I think that is proper to do so. We should afford 
religion a preferred status, but we are also entitled to fine-tune that 
balance if we think the courts, pursuant to that mandate of 
establishing religious freedom as a preferred status, will not do it 
quite right.
  What this amendment does is to create a somewhat different balance in 
the area of civil rights. Because recent court decisions that found 
that States had no compelling State interest in a case involving, for 
example, a State law against housing discrimination in a multiple 
dwelling, the State did not have compelling interest to enforce its 
antidiscrimination law in a multiple dwelling.
  The courts sometimes make mistakes. We want to exercise our rights in 
this amendment to tell the courts a little more finely how to balance 
it in the civil rights area. We are telling them to use the compelling 
State interest test to establish religion as preeminent in every other 
case. In civil rights, we are saying, be a little different than that.
  Finally, let me say that the religious groups that are supporting 
this bill, I have spoken with most of them, not all

[[Page H5606]]

of them, and most of them told me that they agree, they can live with 
the amendment, it gives them no practical problems, it protects all 
their legitimate interests. They only disagree with it because of what 
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Canady) said before, the principle of 
indivisibility, that there should be one standard.
  Mr. Speaker, let me simply say, sometimes we have to balance 
competing rights. We should adopt this amendment so that we do not have 
to say we will protect religious liberty at the expense of civil rights 
or civil rights at the expense of civil liberty. We can and should do 
both. With this amendment, we can and should pass the bill. And without 
the amendment, I would hope that we would not pass the bill today so 
that we can get a little more leverage to fine-tune the bill with 
something like this amendment before we finally pass it, as indeed we 
must eventually.
  So I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

                              {time}  1400

  Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to encourage the Members to focus on what is 
actually taking place and the actual consequence of the amendment that 
the gentleman has offered. It would establish as a matter of 
congressional policy that religious liberty would have a second-class 
status. I do not think that is really what the gentleman wants to do, I 
acknowledge that, but that is the effect of the language of his 
amendment.
  Let me point out that there are folks who have some of the same views 
on a whole range of civil rights issues, including issues related to 
homosexual rights, that the gentleman from New York has who have 
expressed their support for this bill without the gentleman's 
amendment. Members of Congress have received a letter just this week 
from groups such as the Friends Committee on National Legislation, the 
American Humanist Association, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
America, the Board of Church & Society of the United Methodist Church, 
People for the American Way, the Presbyterian Church (USA), Washington 
Office, where they say and they recognize some of the concerns that the 
gentleman has expressed but where they conclude, and I quote them, ``We 
believe that in every situation in which free exercise conflicts with 
government interest, application of the Religious Liberty Protection 
Act standard is appropriate.'' They go on to say, ``A no-exemptions, 
no-amendment Religious Liberty Protection Act provides the strongest 
possible protection of free exercise for all persons.''
  I would suggest that some who have listened to the concerns expressed 
by the gentleman from New York and others pay attention to the view of 
these religious and civil rights groups. I would suggest that Members 
consider the broad coalition of groups that are supportive of this 
legislation. I do not have time to list them all. I will try to list a 
few in the few seconds that I have remaining:
  The American Jewish Committee, Americans United for Separation of 
Church & State, the Anti-Defamation League, the Baptist Joint Committee 
on Public Affairs, Campus Crusade for Christ, the Catholic League for 
Religious and Civil Rights, the Christian Coalition, the Christian 
Legal Society, Christian Science Committee on Publication, the Church 
of the Brethren, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.
  I will skip toward the end of the alphabet here. The Union of 
American Hebrew Congregations, the Union of Orthodox Jewish 
Congregations of America, the United Methodist Church, Board of Church 
& Society; the United States Catholic Conference, the United Synagogue 
of Conservative Judaism; Women of Reform Judaism, Federation of Temple 
Sisterhoods. Those are just a few of the more than 70 religious and 
civil rights organizations that support the Religious Liberty 
Protection Act.
  I would urge all Members of this House to join together in a 
bipartisan effort to protect America's first freedom by passing this 
bill, this important bill, without the weakening amendment offered by 
the gentleman from New York. His amendment would do harm to this bill 
and needs to be rejected. We need to move forward with the passage of 
this legislation.

 Organization Supporting H.R. 1691, ``Religious Liberty Protection Act 
                               of 1999''


                                   A

       Agudath Israel of America
       The Aleph Institute
       American Baptist Churches, USA
       American Center for Law and Justice
       American Conference on Religious Movements
       American Ethical Union, Washington
       American Humanist Association
       American Jewish Committee
       American Jewish Congress
       American Muslim Council
       Americans for Democratic Action
       Americans for Religious Liberty
       Americans United for Separation of Church & State
       Anti-Defamation League
       Association on American Indian Affairs
       Association of Christian Schools International


                                   B

       Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs
       B'nai B'rith


                                   C

       Campus Crusade for Christ
       Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights
       Central Conference of American Rabbis
       Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)
       Christian Coalition
       Christian Legal Society
       Christian Science Committee on Publication
       Church of the Brethren
       Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
       Church of Scientology International
       Coalition for Christian Colleges and Universities
       Council of Jewish Federations
       Council on Religious Freedom
       Council on Spiritual Practices
       Criminal Justice Policy Foundation


                                   E

       Episcopal Church
       Ethics, and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern 
     Baptist Convention
       Evangelical Lutheran Church in America


                                   F

       Jerry Fawell's Liberty Alliance
       Family Research Council
       Focus on the Family
       Friends Committee on National Legislation


                                   G

       General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists
       Guru Gobind Singh Foundation


                                   H

       Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization of American, 
     Inc.


                                   I

       Interfaith Religious Liberty Foundation
       International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists
       International Institute for Religious Freedom


                                   J

       Kay Coles James
       Japanese American Citizens League
       Jewish Council for Public Affairs
       The Jewish Policy Center
       The Jewish Reconstructionist Federation
       Justice Fellowship


                                   L

       Liberty Counsel


                                   M

       Mennonite Central Committee U.S.
       Muslim Prison Foundation
       Muslim Public Affairs Council
       Mystic Temple of Light, Inc.


                                   N

       NA' AMAT USA
       National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
       National Association of Evangelicals
       National Campaign for a Peace Tax Fund
       National Committee for Public Education and Religious 
     Liberty
       National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA
       National Council of Jewish Women
       National Council on Islamic Affairs
       National Jewish Coalition
       National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs
       National Native American Prisoner's Rights Advocacy 
     Coalition
       National Sikh Center
       Native American Church of North America
       Native American Rights Fund
       Native American Spirit Correction Project
       Navajo Nation Corrections Project
       North American Council for Muslim Women


                                   P

       Pacific Justice Institute
       People for the American Way Action Fund
       Peyote Way Church of God
       Presbyterian Church (USA), Washington Office
       Prison Fellowship Ministries


                                   R

       Rabbinical Council of America
       Religious Liberty Foundation
       Rutherford Institute


                                   S

       Sacred Sites Inter-faith Alliance
       Soka-Gakkai International-USA


                                   U

       Union of American Hebrew Congregations

[[Page H5607]]

       Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America
       Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations
       United Church of Christ, Office for Church in Society
       United Methodist Church, Board of Church & Society
       United States Catholic Conference
       United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism


                                   W

       Women of Reform Judaism, Federation of Temple Sisterhoods
  Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Nadler amendment 
to H.R. 1691. This amendment will safeguard religious liberty, while 
also protecting other critical civil rights.
  This Nation was founded on the conviction that all individuals have 
the right to the free and full expression of religion. The First 
Amendment to the Constitution has protected that right for over 200 
years. Unfortunately, no court can be completely free of human error 
when interpreting the Constitution. Beginning with the 1990 Supreme 
Court decision in Oregon Dept. Of Human Resources v. Smith, religious 
expression has been subject to substantial and unnecessary restriction 
by governmental policies. Therefore, it is both necessary and 
appropriate for Congress to pass this legislation.
  As drafted, however, H.R. 1691 could have the unintended consequence 
of eroding critical civil rights and undermining state and local 
statutes. Several states and municipalities have passed laws 
prohibiting discrimination in housing and employment due to marital 
status, pregnancy status, or disability. Unless amended, H.R. 1691 
could undermine state laws and allow discrimination. A widowed mother 
or disabled individual should not be deprived equal access to housing 
or employment under the guide of ensuring religious liberty.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe that the Nadler amendment prevents the 
preemption of state and local statutes, while affording religious 
expression the highest level of constitutional protection. I urge my 
colleagues to vote in favor of this crucial provision.
  Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Nadler amendment 
to the Religious Liberty Protection Act.
  This amendment is exactly the same as the bill itself, except for 
some additional language which will clarify that the bill is not to be 
used as a blank check to override state and local civil rights laws.
  The amendment tracks language in the Civil Rights Act and the Fair 
Housing Act. Small businesses and small landlords are exempted from 
compliance. At the same time, the amendment will prevent large 
commercial enterprises from avoiding compliance with laws affecting 
housing, employment, and public accommodation.
  Basically, the amendment will assure that a landlord renting an 
apartment in his home may do so according to religious belief, while 
preventing the same landlord from discriminating on the basis of his or 
her religious beliefs in the rental of units in a large apartment 
building.
  The Nadler amendment makes clear our intent to strengthen individual 
religious liberty without overriding state and local anti-
discrimination laws. Support the Nadler amendment.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). Pursuant to House 
Resolution 245, the previous question is ordered on the bill, as 
amended, and on the further amendment by the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Nadler).
  The question is on the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 190, 
nays 234, not voting 10, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 298]

                               YEAS--190

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Bilbray
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Boehlert
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Castle
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Greenwood
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kelly
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McGovern
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sisisky
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                               NAYS--234

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boyd
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Clement
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gillmor
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kasich
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Largent
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paul
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Turner
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Baldwin
     Brown (CA)
     Chenoweth
     Frost
     Gilchrest
     Latham
     McDermott
     McNulty
     Rivers
     Thurman

                              {time}  1425

  Mr. COSTELLO and Mr. SWEENEY changed their vote from ``yea'' to 
``nay.''
  Mrs. JONES of Ohio changed her vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the amendment in the nature of a substitute was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). The question is on 
the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.

[[Page H5608]]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 306, 
noes 118, not voting 10, as follows:

                             [Roll No 299]

                               AYES--306

     Aderholt
     Allen
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barrett (NE)
     Barton
     Bateman
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Bono
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boyd
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (FL)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Capps
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Clayton
     Clement
     Coble
     Coburn
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (VA)
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Ford
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (IN)
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kildee
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Largent
     Larson
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Martinez
     Mascara
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     Meek (FL)
     Menendez
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Napolitano
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Obey
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanchez
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--118

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Baird
     Barr
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Bass
     Becerra
     Berman
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Boucher
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (OH)
     Campbell
     Capuano
     Carson
     Clay
     Clyburn
     Collins
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Crane
     Cummings
     Davis (IL)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Forbes
     Frank (MA)
     Gejdenson
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hostettler
     Jackson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kennedy
     Kilpatrick
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     Kuykendall
     Lantos
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Matsui
     McGovern
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Metcalf
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Owens
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Rangel
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sanford
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Stark
     Sununu
     Tancredo
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Woolsey
     Wu

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Baldwin
     Brown (CA)
     Chenoweth
     Frost
     Gilchrest
     Latham
     McDermott
     McNulty
     Rivers
     Thurman

                              {time}  1442

  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________