[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 96 (Thursday, July 1, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Page S8078]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                   ASIAN ECONOMIC AND SECURITY POLICY

  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, when we look at Asia these days, 
Americans' primary focus is on China and the many difficult challenges 
that we face in that relationship. Next on our list of what we are 
watching in the region is Japan where our economic and security 
relationship remains the linchpin of our presence in Asia. These days, 
however, Japan seems to get scant attention from either the public or 
the policymaking community. That is a mistake, but I will leave that 
issue to another day.
  After Japan in our focus comes the Korean Peninsula where we are 
concerned particularly about North Korea and its nuclear weapons 
development, missile technology, military adventurism, possible 
economic collapse, and internal instability. As we continue down the 
list of important things to think about in Asia, we come to Indonesia 
and the future of economic and political reform and internal stability 
in that hugely important nation.
  Some may differ with my analysis, but it appears to me that, right or 
wrong, these days, our nation is looking at Asia in this way.
  Today, however, I would like to call the Senate's attention to two 
important developments in other countries in Asia, specifically 
Southeast Asia, that are not on this list. These developments have been 
reported in our media, but, generally, on the back pages. They should 
not be ignored, because they relate to America's broad strategy toward 
the region where our interests are in security, stability, and open 
markets.
  The two developments are the passage by the Philippine Senate of a 
U.S.-Philippine Visiting Forces Agreement and the progress being made 
toward completion of a U.S.-Vietnam trade agreement.
  After a decade of stable democracy and economic reform, the 
Philippines may be the strongest economy in Southeast Asia after 
Singapore. Security ties, however, have remained at a very low level 
since the end of the base arrangement in 1991. This changed 
dramatically two weeks ago when the Philippine Senate ratified the new 
Visiting Forces Agreement.
  This arrangement, typical of the relationship we have with many of 
our allies, allows us to apply U.S. military law to American soldiers 
and sailors overseas. Its ratification will permit us to renew joint 
military exercises, pay naval port visits, and develop a stronger and 
more cooperative relationship than we have had in the decade since we 
left Subic Bay and Clark Field. President Estrada and the Philippine 
Senate deserve great credit for their statesmanship in bringing these 
talks to conclusion.
  The Visiting Forces Agreement also comes at an opportune time. 
Disputes between Southeast Asian states and China in the South China 
Sea are becoming more frequent. The financial crisis has forced most 
Southeast Asian nations to concentrate on internal economic issues. 
This agreement should give Southeast Asian countries more confidence in 
the U.S. commitment to the region, and, hence, serve as a long-term 
force for stability.
  In the case of Vietnam, we appear to be getting close to a bilateral 
trade agreement, which will promote economic reform in Vietnam and 
allow us to grant them Normal Trade Relations status, NTR.
  Vietnam, the fourth largest country in Asia and one that shares a 
land border with China, is an essential part of any regional policy. We 
have obvious historic sensitivities to address as we develop closer 
relations with Vietnam. We have taken a number of steps in the past few 
years--lifting the trade embargo, normalizing diplomatic relations, 
dispatching Pete Peterson as Ambassador, and concluding a Copyright 
Agreement, all in association with a commitment by Vietnam for full 
cooperation on resolving POW/MIA issues. As time passes, a normal and 
productive relationship with Vietnam will contribute immensely to 
stability and security in the southern Pacific.
  We are now negotiating an agreement that would begin to open the 
Vietnamese market to foreign trade and investment. This will support 
economic reform and market opening in Vietnam while also creating new 
commercial opportunities for Americans in a market of 80 million 
people. The strategic implications of this agreement, which will move 
us down the road to a normal bilateral relationship with Vietnam, are 
important. It will strengthen Southeast Asia, reduce chances for 
conflicts in the wider Asian region, and place the United States in a 
stronger regional position.
  Of course, an agreement must be meaningful in trade policy terms. It 
is not a WTO accession and, therefore, need not meet WTO standards, but 
it should include elements such as reform of trading rights and opening 
of key service sectors, in addition to other market-opening steps. For 
our part, if the Vietnamese are willing to conclude such an agreement, 
we should proceed rapidly to grant them Normal Trade Relations. This is 
in our trade and commercial interest, and also in our strategic 
interest. We have an opportunity to integrate Vietnam more fully into 
the Asian and world economies. I encourage our Administration, and the 
Vietnamese government, to complete the Commercial Agreement 
expeditiously.
  We should, parenthetically, also proceed to Normal Trade Relations 
with Laos, where a trade agreement has already been completed.
  The Philippine Visiting Forces Agreement and the bilateral trade 
agreement with Vietnam, once completed, mean we have taken additional 
steps toward creating a post-Cold War framework involving open trade 
and security relationships in the Pacific. This is very much in our 
national interest.

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