[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 96 (Thursday, July 1, 1999)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1503-E1504]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      CONTINUING CRISIS IN KASHMIR

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. BILL McCOLLUM

                               of florida

                    in the house of representatives

                         Thursday, July 1, 1999

  Mr. McCOLLUM.  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my concern for 
the ongoing conflict in the Kashmir region of India. This crisis is 
nearing a turning point for which the outcome is far from being clear. 
It is extremely important that in addressing this turning point, the 
United States should act pursuant to its own national and strategic 
interests rather than succumb to the allure of simplistic short-term 
``arrangements.''
  The conflict in Kashmir has been unfolding for nearly two months now. 
The Kargil crisis erupted in early May when the Indian Army discovered 
the infiltration of Pakistani regular troops and an assortment of ISI-
sponsored Mujahideen into the northern parts of Indian Kashmir. From 
these captured positions, the Pakistani forces were close to being able 
to disconnect India's national highway--the blood line to the country's 
uppermost northern regions. In the fighting that has since ensued, the 
Indian Army was able to first contain the infiltration and then 
doggedly evict the Pakistani forces from positions inside India. This 
fighting, conducted in the extremely rugged and high-elevation terrain 
of the Himalayan mountains, still continues as Indian troops climb one 
mountain after another to dislodge the Pakistani forces sheltered at 
the peaks. The Indian government is determined, and rightly so, to 
evict all the infiltrators.
  While taking place in a remote and desolate part of the world, the 
Kargil fighting is not conducted in isolation. In threatening the 
Indian national highway, the Pakistani intrusion has been of strategic 
significance--and so is its defeat. Therefore, the stakes are very high 
for both New Delhi and Islamabad. Indeed, fully aware of the explosive 
character of the Kargil crisis, New Delhi has instructed the Indian 
Army to operate only within Indian territory in removing the 
infiltrators, despite the military expediency of operating in the rear 
of the enemy and a higher cost in Indian casualties due to frontal 
assaults on towering peaks.
  Presently, with the fighting in the Kargil area stabilizing in 
India's favor, Pakistan is in dire need for a dramatic breakout to 
salvage some achievements from an otherwise doomed strategic gambit. 
Moreover, Beijing--Pakistan's closest ally and strategic patron that 
has its own territorial claims for parts of Indian Kashmir--is 
expressing growing interest in the outcome of the crisis. The People's 
Republic of China (PRC) is ready to intervene in the crisis in order to 
safeguard its own strategic interests.
  In order to meet the prerequisites of such a breakout Pakistan has 
been pursuing a twin track policy:
  On the one hand, Islamabad has been threatening the escalation of the 
crisis into a major war that, given the declared nuclear status of both 
protagonists, might escalate into a nuclear war. In order to ensure 
that Islamabad's threat of war is considered credible, the Pakistani 
Armed Forces have undertaken several steps since mid June. Pakistan put 
the Armed Forces on ``red alert'', sent the Navy out to sea, is moving 
military reinforcements to the border with India, parading units 
through the streets of cities and towns, is conducting civil and home 
defense exercises for the population, as well as deploying air defense 
forces to all airports and key civilian sites.
  On the other hand, Pakistan, with Beijing's active support, has been 
raising the possibility of a ``negotiated settlement'' to the Kargil 
crisis. In these political initiatives, the Pakistanis stress the need 
to resolve the crisis before it escalates out of control and a major, 
and potentially nuclear, war erupts. In reality, Islamabad is desperate 
to extract tangible gains from the cross-border intrusion of its forces 
before they are defeated and evicted by the Indian Army. And it is in 
these circumstances that the proposed negotiated solutions for the 
Kargil crisis are being offered.
  The most popular ``package deal'' which the Clinton administration 
seems to favor at this juncture calls for Islamabad's quiet an un-
acknowledged withdrawing of the Pakistani troops in return for the 
opening of an international negotiations process over the entire 
Kashmir problem. Such dynamics, the deal's proponents tell us, will 
provide Pakistan with a ``face-saving'' outlet out of the armed 
conflict before it escalates into a wider war.
  However, there are many pitfalls in this approach. In all political 
discussions to-date, the Pakistani forces involved are still formally 
defined as ``militants''--thus absolving Pakistan of the formal 
responsibility for what can otherwise be termed an act of war. Further 
more, the mere international acceptance without challenge of the 
Pakistani excuse that these ``militants'' are operating in an area 
where the Line of Control (the Indo-Pakistani cease-fire line in 
Kashmir) is not properly delineated and that therefore these 
``militants'' are actually on Pakistani soil, contradicts the 1972 
Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan. This argument is therefore 
making a mockery of any such bilateral agreements at the very moment 
both New Delhi and Islamabad are being urged by the international 
community to negotiate and ultimately sign yet another agreement on the 
`Kashimer problem.'' Then, the commonly discussed percept of the 
``Kashmir problem'' refers to the conditions of the Muslim population 
living in the Kashmir valley. Thus, the negotiations will delve on the 
fate of the Indian held part of Kashmir even though India, Pakistan and 
even the PRC each controls wide segments of the British-era Kashmir.
  Ultimately, international acceptance of these principles will reward 
Pakistan for its armed aggression and punish India for its self-
restraint in evicting the intruders. Moreover, any political outcome in 
which Pakistan's interests are met will also reward Beijing. The PRC, 
one should note, has just tested in a major military exercise in nearby 
Tibet, a quick reaction intervention force optimized for the region's 
rugged terrain. Moreover, the new strategic posture at the heart of 
Asia that will emerge from these negotiations will serve as a precedent 
for similar aggressive wars-by-proxy that could then be repeated and 
adopted throughout the developing world to the detriment of the 
interests of the United States and its Western allies.
  Mr. Speaker, in our pursuit to defuse a brewing crisis before it 
escalates into a war we should not ignore the overall enduring 
strategic interests of the United States. The United States does have 
long-term vital interests in Asia. Democratic and pro-Western India is 
a bulwark of stability in a region rife with such anti-U.S. forces and 
mega-trends as the hegemonic ascent of a PRC determined to become the 
regional supreme power at the expense of the United States, the spread 
of radical militant Islam and Islamist terrorism, as well as the 
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery 
systems by rogue states. At the same time, free access to the energy 
resources of Central Asia is crucial for the long-term economic 
development of the United States, while the sea lanes of communications 
in the Indian Ocean sustain the West's commercial relations with East 
Asia.
  Thus, any `Kashmire'' agreement based on the principles mentioned 
above will weaken India, reward and encourage the anti-U.S. forces, and 
will thus adversely affect the long-term national interests of the 
United States.
  It is, therefore, in the self-interest of the United States to pursue 
a negotiated process that will take into consideration the U.S. 
quintessential dynamics and interests in the region and will thus 
secure the American national interest. Such a process might take longer 
to define and be more intricate to attain. However, a genuine solution 
to such a complex problem as the Kashmir dispute will most likely 
endure future trials and tribulation. Thus, a genuine solution will 
ensure at the least a semblance of stability in a turbulent region that 
is of great importance to the United States. Congress should therefore 
encourage the Clinton administration to adopt such a principled 
approach to formulating the U.S. position toward the Kargil crisis. 
Congress should make sure the U.S. position does not reward aggression, 
challenge the viability of the principle that legitimate international 
agreements

[[Page E1504]]

remain valid and not vulnerable to the sudden expediency of one 
signatory or another, and support the creation of a conducive 
environment for the genuine solution of the entire Kashmire problem--
that of the areas held by India, Pakistan, and the PRC. Further more, 
we should congratulate the Indian government for the responsibility, 
maturity and self-restraint demonstrated in this crisis and encourage 
it to stay the course despite the mounting pressures.

                          ____________________