[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 95 (Wednesday, June 30, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7914-S7917]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
COLOMBIA'S FOUR WARS
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, we have just concluded the foreign
operations bill, and I congratulate Senator McConnell, Senator Leahy,
and others who have worked so very diligently on this difficult and
tough bill. Contained in the bill we just passed, among other things,
was a sense-of-the-Senate resolution. This sense-of-the-Senate
resolution was proposed and offered by myself and by my colleague from
Georgia, Senator Coverdell. It deals with the situation in Colombia and
the United States relationship to that troubled country.
I want to talk this evening about that sense-of-the-Senate resolution
and about the situation in Colombia.
For the past several months, United States foreign policy has really
been dominated by the crisis in Kosovo. Certainly we have to continue
to work with the NATO alliance and Russia to help bring the Albanian
Kosovars back to their homeland and to bring a stable peace to the
region. But tonight I want to discuss another compelling and very
serious foreign policy crisis that is taking place right in our own
hemisphere.
Like Kosovo, it is a crisis that has displaced hundreds of thousands
of people, more than 800,000 since 1995, and instead of a small
province being ethnically cleansed by its own government, this
democratic country is fighting multiple conflicts--a war against two
threatening and competing guerrilla groups, a war against paramilitary
organizations, and, finally, a war against drug lords who traffic in
deadly cocaine and in heroin.
I am, of course, talking about the four wars that are taking place
tonight in Colombia. While a 19-nation NATO alliance struggles to
prevent the disintegration of a small province, the disintegration of
an entire nation is going practically unnoticed by our own Government
in Washington. The decade-long struggle in the Balkans is being
duplicated in Colombia, which is fracturing into politically and
socially unstable ministates and is posing a significant threat to our
own hemisphere. Colombia is shaping up to be the Balkan problem of the
Americas.
More than 35,000 Colombians have been killed in the last decade. More
than 308,000 Colombians were internally displaced in 1998 alone. In
Kosovo, 230,000 people were displaced during this same period of time
before NATO took action. And like the Albanian Kosovars, Colombians are
fleeing their country today in large numbers. More than 2,000 crossed
into Venezuela in a matter of a few days recently. A Miami Herald
article recently reported a growing number of Colombians leaving for
south Florida.
Our Nation has a clear national interest in the future of the
stability of our neighbor to the south, Colombia. In 1998, legitimate
two-way trade between the United States and Colombia was more than $11
billion, making the United States Colombia's No. 1 trading partner, and
Colombia is our fifth-largest trading partner in the region.
In spite of this mutually beneficial partnership, the United States
simply has not devoted the level of time nor resources nor attention
needed to assist this important democratic partner as it struggles with
drug problems, with violent criminal and paramilitary organizations,
and guerrilla insurgents. In fact, in December 1998, a White House
official told the Washington Post that Colombia, quote, ``poses a
greater immediate threat to us than Bosnia did, yet it receives almost
no attention.''
Attention is needed--now more than ever. According to the State
Department, Colombia is the third most dangerous country in the world
in terms of political violence, and accounts for 34 percent of all
terrorist acts committed worldwide. The Colombian National Police
reported that Colombian rebels carried out 1,726 terrorist strikes in
1998--that's 12 percent more than in the previous year.
Kidnapping is also a significant problem. Approximately 2,609 people
were kidnapped in 1998, and there have been 513 reported kidnappings in
the first three months of this year. Guerrillas are responsible for a
high percentage of these incidents.
The wholesale acts of violence that have infected this country are
symptoms of four wars that are going on in Colombia. Any single one of
them would pose a significant threat to any country. Together, these
wars represent a threat beyond the borders of Colombia. Let me describe
them in detail.
For more than three decades, the guerrilla groups known as Colombian
Revolutionary Armed Forces--the FARC--and the National Liberation
Army--the ELN--have waged the longest-running anti-government
insurgency in Latin America.
Determining the size of these guerrilla organizations is an inexact
science. Most open sources range their combat strength from about
10,000 to 20,000 full-time guerrillas. However, irregular militias,
part-time guerrillas, and political sympathizers also play a role that
is hard to quantify.
The insurgents have their own armament capabilities and are
manufacturing high-quality improvised mortars. Organized crime links
also have long been suspected. The Chief of the Colombian National
Police, General Jose Serrano, has reported in the past that the FARC
has completed guns-and-cash-for-drugs deals with organized crime groups
in Russia, Ukraine, Chechnya and Uzbekistan. A Colombian army study
recently stated that the two main leftist guerrilla groups had raised
at least $5.3 billion from 1991 to 1998 from the drug trade,
abductions, and extortions to fund their long-running uprising against
the state.
According to the State Department's 1998 Human Rights Report, the
FARC and ELN, along with other, smaller groups, initiated armed action
in nearly 700 of the country's 1073 municipalities, and control or
influence 60 percent of rural Colombia. Although these
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groups have had no history of major urban operations, a number of
recent guerrilla-sponsored hostage takings recently have taken place.
Colombian President Pastrana is trying to make peace at all costs
with FARC rebels, who have little incentive to agree to any peace deal.
Throughout these negotiations, the FARC has continued to assault and
kill dozens of Colombian military and police.
The current prospects for peace are dismal. If Pastrana were to
accept the demands of the FARC and ELN for political and territorial
autonomy, he would have to splinter his country into Balkan-type
factions. The effects of this would be increased paramilitary violence
and increased regional instability.
In fact, one of the FARC conditions already agreed to by President
Pastrana was the creation of a temporary, demilitarized zone the size
of Switzerland. All Colombian Armed Forces and Police were ordered out
of the area. Despite this enormous concession on the part of the
Colombian government, the FARC has not agreed to any cease-fire and has
made no concessions. In fact, they made it clear to the Colombian
Government that they should expect continued guerrilla operations and
attacks.
``Farclandia'' is the name some local residents have given to this
odd state-within-a-state. The area has over 90,000 residents. Despite
its creation as a temporary demilitarized zone, the FARC appear to be
cementing control and taking steps to ensure that expulsion from the
zone would be extremely difficult, particularly if the talks break
down.
According to the Catholic Bishop residing in the DMZ area, residents
are required to feed the FARC, which is simply a form of taxation. The
FARC has attempted to expel a Catholic priest for being an ``enemy of
peace.'' The priest argued the FARC is violating human rights, usurping
the locally elected government, interfering with economic activity,
imposing labor duty, and recruiting minors, teenagers, and married men.
The bottom line is that FARC fighters are using their armed
stranglehold on the zone to abuse Colombian citizens.
In April, FARC leaders asked Pastrana to extend rebel control over
another zone in southern Colombia--approximately 7,600 square miles--
that is allegedly the home to some of the most concentrated cocaine-
production facilities in the world. The Pastrana Government agreed to
place the request on the negotiating table. While the additional zone
was not approved, Pastrana agreed to allow FARC rebels to have
continued control over the DMZ. This is the second time, since November
1998, that President Pastrana has extended the DMZ to the FARC during
the talks.
This decision provoked outrage within Colombian military ranks,
particularly since military officers had been humiliated by the
creation of the original zone. That earlier decision required the
withdrawal of hundreds of police and army troops. By the end of May,
Colombian Defense Minister Ricardo Lloreda announced his resignation.
Following his announcement, dozens of military officers resigned in
solidarity with Lloreda. Of the total of 30 Colombian army generals,
reports indicate that between 10 and 17 resigned in solidarity with
Lloreda. With the exception of Lloreda's resignation, Pastrana did not
accept any other resignations. However, as a result of this mass
protest, Pastrana agreed that the FARC zone would be demilitarized for
only six more months and that a retired general would be included in
the negotiating team for the talks.
In another important development, the Colombian Congress too is
beginning to express its doubt in the peace process. Earlier this
month, the Congress rejected a bill that would have given Pastrana
sweeping powers to grant political concessions--including an amnesty
for convicted guerrillas.
Lloreda's resignation was truly unfortunate. I met Defense Minister
Lloreda in Colombia last November. Lloreda, described by his peers as
someone who could help bring about needed reform in the military, was
just beginning to gain some ground. He had already begun rebuilding the
army, a difficult task given its record of human rights violations. In
fact, he had forced the resignation of Colombian military officers
suspected of human rights violations and had others arrested.
Lloreda had also lifted the morale among the military, having
suffered significant defeats by the FARC forces. According to the
Economist magazine, the defense budget has doubled this year to $1.2
billion. In March, the army even managed a successful offensive, which
left 50 guerrillas dead.
The resignation, however, threw Pastrana's 10-month-old government
into crisis and placed the future of the nation's fragile process in
doubt. It has also left open important questions about the future of
the Colombian military.
Mr. President, Colombian military operational mobility is widely
acknowledged to be a shortcoming. Colombia is a very large country. One
of their departments is as large as the nation of El Salvador. In
fighting an insurgency, the state has to defend many critical areas,
but also has to have the capability to mass and economize forces to
attack guerrilla formations when they present themselves. Colombia's
army has barely 40 helicopters for a territory the size of Texas and
Mexico combined. El Salvador, 1/50th the size of Colombia, had 80--
twice as many--during its civil war.
Although the Army has 122,000 soldiers, most of them are 1-year
conscripts. Approximately 35-40% are high school graduates not assigned
to combat duties by law. At any time, about 30% are undergoing basic
training. A large portion of the remaining force (50-60%) is assigned
to static defense of key economic or isolated municipal outposts. That
leaves approximately 20,000 soldiers remaining for offensive combat
operations. These are the veterans or volunteers that constitute--apart
from the officer corps-- the only true repository of combat experience
in their army. Now consider that the active guerrilla combatants alone
number between 11,000 and 20,000. You do the math. It doesn't look
good. It is conceivably a one to one ``fighting'' ratio. How can a
military, with limited resources, fight two guerrilla movements which
have virtually unlimited resources from drug trafficking, kidnappings,
extortion and arms trafficking?
The Colombian Army has already suffered a string of military defeats.
In 1998, the Colombian Armed Forces suffered three major blows in
March, August, and November. In fact, the FARC executed one of its
major blows against the military just as President Pastrana was meeting
with FARC leaders on the peace talks.
The FARC currently holds over 300 military and police POW's. And
according to Jane's Intelligence Review, Colombian guerrillas killed
445 soldiers during 1998. If you include Colombian National Police, the
figure would rise to 600. The CNP too has experienced significant
losses. Over 4,000 policemen have been killed in Colombia in the past
decade.
As if the FARC weren't enough of a problem, let me complicate this
situation further by discussing the war with the ELN. The ELN has been
envious of the attention the FARC has been getting, particularly at the
negotiating table. As a result, the ELN has resorted to a series of
recent hostage takings. Shortly after Pastrana and the FARC announced
in April that formal negotiations would take place in the summer, the
ELN hijacked a Colombian commercial airliner in mid-April, kidnapping
41 passengers and crew.
Then, shortly after Defense Minister Lloreda's resignation, about 30
ELN guerrillas invaded a church service in an upper-class neighborhood
in Cali and abducted over 140 worshipers. In response, the Government
deployed more than 3,000 soldiers and policemen to locate them. While
some hostages have been released from the hijacking and church
incidents, approximately 50 are still being held including two
Americans.
I have outlined, Mr. President, the two main guerrilla groups which
are a significant threat to Colombia. Unfortunately, however, I have
not yet spoken of another ongoing war which poses an additional and
substantial threat--the Colombian paramilitaries. In fact, the
Colombian paramilitaries are also seeking a role at the negotiations
table.
The Colombian paramilitaries are an umbrella organization of about
5,000 armed combatants. Their mission has
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been to counter the grip of leftist guerrillas. Carlos Castano, the
powerful leader of the paramilitary umbrella organization United Self-
Defense Groups of Colombia, has been quoted defending the strategy of
killing villagers who are guerrilla supporters and sympathizers.
The paramilitaries are funded by wealthy landowners and, in some
cases, cocaine traffickers. They exercised increasing influence during
1998, extending their presence into areas previously under guerrilla
control.
The presence of paramilitary groups have driven a wedge in the peace
talks because the FARC leadership refuses to negotiate until the
government effectively clamps down on the right wing gunmen. The
problem is that the government also has a problem in trying to control
the paramilitaries.
In an attempt to become a player at the negotiating table, Castano's
organization kidnapped a Colombian Senator last month. In fact, Castano
said shortly after the abduction that his aim was to gain political
recognition and a place at the negotiating table for his movement. The
Senator was freed after being held for two weeks. The Senator later
commented that Pastrana should eventually include Colombia's
paramilitary forces in negotiations to end the 35 year civil war. Since
the leftist rebels vehemently oppose their participation in the peace
talks, prospects for the peace negotiations are complicated even
further.
Before I talk about the increasing drug threat from Colombia, let me
spend a few minutes on the general violence in Colombia.
According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Colombia
led the world in kidnappings in 1998, and may be the most likely place
in the world to be abducted. The country averages five people a day
snatched by guerrillas or other criminals. Guerrillas from the FAR, ELN
and the smaller Popular Liberation Army accounted for approximately
1,600 kidnappings of the 2,609 reported in 1998.
A report issued by the Colombian Government's anti-kidnapping office
in May calculated that at least 4,925 people have been abducted since
January 1996, with the largest total coming in 1998. The problem with
this statistic is that many families and businesses prefer to deal
directly with kidnappers and not report abductions to the police.
Hence, this figure is only the official one. It is understandably
difficult to count how many kidnappings truly occur in Colombia.
Imagine, if you will, living in a country where you can't send your
child on school field trip; where you can't decide to go out of Bogota
for the weekend to visit relatives in a nearby city. In fact, the
situation is so grave that you think twice about going to the grocery
store or even to a movie.
A recent New York Times article described the lives of Colombians and
the precautions they must take on a daily basis. The article stated
that Colombians are refusing to fly on any airplane that is not a jet.
They cite the example of ELN hijacking of a prop plane. The Colombian
quoted in the article commented that it is almost impossible for
guerrillas to take over a big jet and make it land at some little
airstrip out in the jungle.
In the week before Easter, a traditional vacation time throughout
Latin America, travel within Colombia was down 40% over last year,
according to a Colombian civic group. With increasing regularity, the
five million residents of Bogota are canceling trips to towns that are
barely a two hour drive away, while traffic on highways to the
Caribbean coast has also dropped significantly.
Kidnapping is such a significant threat that a Colombian government
study made public estimates that the country's three main guerrilla
groups have obtained more than $1.2 billion in kidnapping ransoms in
recent years.
Mr. President, the situation in Colombia has gotten so bad that the
State Department recently issued a warning, advising Americans to not
travel to Colombia. You see, Colombians are not the only targets in
their country. There have been U.S. casualties as well.
In late 1997, the State Department added the FARC to its list of
terrorist organizations.
In January 1999, guerrillas announced that all U.S. military and law
enforcement personnel in Colombia would be considered legitimate
targets to be killed or captured. In late February, the FARC viciously
murdered three U.S. human rights workers. This horrific execution met
with no reaction from the Clinton Administration. A resolution was
recently introduced in the House, calling on the Colombian government
to pursue the killers, members of the FARC and extradite them to the
U.S.
Colombian terrorists continue to target Americans, kidnapping over a
dozen U.S. citizens in 1999 so far--this is double the total amount for
1998. The 1998 State Department Terrorism Report also suggests that
terrorists also continued to bomb U.S. commercial interests, such as
oil pipelines and small businesses.
There has also been much concern that the civil war in Colombia could
spill over into neighboring countries--including Venezuela, where
President Chavez is alleged to have had contacts in the past with the
ELN. A spill-over into Venezuela would be disastrous for the United
States, given that Venezuela is our number one--let me repeat this--
number one supplier of foreign oil. The situation is so grave that
Venezuela has sent 30,000 troops to the border with Colombia.
There has been a recent exodus of Colombians into Venezuela. In a two
day period recently, over 2,000 Colombians began their exodus to
Venezuela after death squads massacred about 80 people near a border
town. Many of the Colombians were said to be coca farmers.
At first, Venezuelan President Chavez said Venezuela was prepared to
offer the Colombians temporary refuge until they could return safely to
their homes. However, only one day after the recent cross-over began,
Venezuela had already started repatriating Colombians back to Colombia.
And within a few days, all Colombians have been repatriated.
Colombian-Venezuelan relations have been tense. For example, while
Chavez has agreed to play a role in the negotiations, in mid-May Chavez
announced he was seeking a direct meeting with FARC commander Manuel
Marulanda. In fact, two months earlier, he angered President Pastrana
by suggesting that the FARC's armed struggle was legitimate and
declaring that Venezuela remained ``neutral'' in the conflict.
There has also been some concern of a spillover of the conflict into
Ecuador, another nation bordering Colombia. In fact, Ecuadoran
government officials indicate that rebel forces have crossed over to
their nation, primarily for rest and relaxation. With the end of its
border dispute with Peru, Ecuador is in the process of relocating
10,000 troops to the Colombian border. In addition, Ecuadoran
intelligence has reportedly periodically taken down some guerrilla
supply routes.
Colombia also borders Panama, which should be of significant concern
to our nation. It is a known fact that Colombian rebels have been
infiltrating the Darien province in Panama for quite some time in
search of supplies.
In late May, hundreds of Panamanians fled their homes near the border
with Colombia, fearing a violent clash between Colombian guerrillas and
paramilitary bounty hunters. Witnesses claim that there were about 500
FARC rebels in Panama.
Mr. President, this rebel crossing is occurring just 250 miles
southeast of the Panama Canal. And let me remind you that U.S. military
forces are departing from Panama.
The United States should be extremely concerned. The departure of
U.S. forces could encourage Colombian rebel groups to become more
active in the deep, inaccessible rainforests of Panama's Darien region.
And while Panama has increased a border police force to 1,500, they are
no match to the Colombian rebels. Panama has no military, and our total
U.S. troop presence is scheduled to depart Panama by the end of this
year. We just closed down operations out of Howard Air Force Base in
May, and we are about to turn over the Panama Canal and remaining
military facilities at the end of this century.
Mr. President, while the United States is complying with the Panama
Canal Treaties, in terms of giving Panama the Canal at the end of this
year, the treaties state that the United
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States has the continued responsibility to protect and defend the
Panama Canal. And the duration of this treaty is indefinite. In the
event that something happens to the Panama Canal, just a few hundred
miles from Colombia, how would the United States respond then?
I have spent most of my time talking about the worsening civil strife
in Colombia. But I cannot end this speech without talking about the
final war in Colombia. It's the war Americans probably have heard the
most about--the war prompted by the fact that Colombia is the world's
most important cocaine producer and a leading producer of heroin.
According to our State Department, over 75% of the world's cocaine
HCL is processed in Colombia. 1998 marked the third consecutive year of
significant increase in Colombia coca crop size; recent statistics
indicate that about 75% of the heroin seized in the northeast United
States is of Colombian origin. Colombian heroin is so pure--roughly 80%
to 90%--that in 1998, the number of heroin overdose cases in the United
States went up significantly. In fact, in 1998, the number of heroin
overdoses in Orlando surpassed the number of homicides.
Drug trafficking is profitable, and provides the FARC with the
largest share of its income. Sixty percent of FARC fronts are involved
in the drug trade. About 30% of ELN war fronts are likewise engaged in
drug trafficking. This includes extortion/taxation of coca fields and
yields, precursor chemicals and security of labs and clandestine air
strips. The insurgents control the southern rural terrain of Colombia
where the largest density of cocaine fields and production is found.
Mr. President, I have outlined a deteriorating situation in Colombia.
I have spoken to you about Colombia's ongoing and escalating four wars.
These are significant issues that have a direct impact on our
hemisphere and our Nation. The future of Colombia as a unified country,
and the stability of an entire hemisphere is at risk. The sad reality
is that our country is not yet making an adequate response to this
crucial foreign policy challenge. We are simply not paying attention,
nor are we adequately responding.
U.S. leadership in this Colombian crisis is needed. This is no time
to keep our backs turned. Continued inattention will only contribute to
continued instability. Like Kosovo, the U.S. should mobilize the
international community to play a role in resolving the Colombian
conflict. Certainly we should pledge our support to the democratically
elected Government. We should also be ready to provide other types of
support such as training, equipment, and professional development to
help Colombia overcome these threats to democracy and freedom.
Finally, we must continue to work to disrupt and dismantle the drug
trafficking organizations and to reduce their financial control of
antidemocratic elements in Colombia.
We are doing some things in Colombia. I had the opportunity to see
those myself when I traveled there a few months ago. But we simply have
to do more. We have to become more engaged.
I remember President Ronald Reagan's profound wisdom in negotiating
from a position of strength in his efforts to strengthen our military.
This strategic vision led to the crumbling ultimately of our
adversaries. Unfortunately, this dynamic has not yet taken hold in
Colombia.
Because of the Colombian Government's weakness, no incentive appears
to exist for its multiple adversaries to respect and to adhere to any
agreements. Their only incentive is to extract further concessions from
the Government and to further attempt to weaken the Colombian
Government.
Before I close, let me quote a passage from a report in Time
magazine. I quote:
The six members of the presidential peace commission did
not know where they were headed when their Bell 212
helicopter took off from Bogota at dawn. The pilot had been
given the top-secret coordinates minutes before takeoff, but
not even he was sure of the destination. Suddenly, the flag
of the FARC, the oldest, largest and bloodiest of the
country's numerous anti-government guerrilla groups, was
sighted in the jungle below. This time, however, the flag
signified the making of history, not war. In a small clearing
in the Alto de la Mesa rain forest, FARC guerrillas and the
government's representatives met to sign a momentous eleven-
point cease-fire agreement.
While this article seems to depict the present situation in Colombia
in terms of peace talks, the fact is that it does not. The main reason
is that there has not yet been a cease-fire agreement as a result of
this latest round of talks.
Let me repeat that. There has not yet, to this day, been a cease-fire
agreement as a result of this latest round of talks.
The article I quoted appeared in Time magazine's issue dated April
16, 1984.
In April 1984, the then-Colombian President triumphantly announced on
national television his Government's formal acceptance of that pact
with the FARC guerrillas. He thought that he had negotiated an end to
the guerrilla conflict with the FARC leadership.
Let me note that there have been numerous other accounts by other
Colombian Presidents throughout the years to negotiate a resolution to
the guerrilla wars in Colombia. Each time the peace talks have failed,
and each time the guerrilla groups have been further strengthened.
While the current President of Colombia is negotiating with the very
same FARC leader, a few things have changed over the last 15 years.
Back in 1984, the Time article reported that the FARC consisted of
2,050 guerrillas backed by an additional 5,000 people in ``civil
defense cadres'' spread mainly throughout the countryside. But today
the FARC has about 10,000 to 15,000 active combatants--quite a change.
In 1994, the ELN had roughly 200 men and the Popular Liberation Army
had about 275. The ELN today has between 5,000 and 7,000 troops.
It is simply amazing to me what a difference 15 years has made in
Colombia, a difference, unfortunately and tragically, for the worse. We
have gone from seeing Colombia's combat-ready guerrilla number in the
2,000 range--2,000 is what it was--to a situation today where there is
likely a guerrilla combatant rebel for every Colombian military
combatant person available, a 1-to-1 ratio.
My question to this Congress and to this administration is, How can
we expect Colombia to overcome these multiple wars? The rebel personnel
resources have significantly increased since the mid-1980s and are one
of the main reasons behind this rise in the alliance between the
guerrillas and the drug traffickers.
This strategic alliance, in which each party benefits from the
other's involvement, makes it very clear that it is extremely difficult
to separate the drug war from guerrilla and paramilitary wars. That is
why the United States must play a role to help Colombia overcome all of
its wars--not just the drug dealers. We must understand that our drug
consumption only further exacerbates the Colombian crisis. And we must
be involved in helping them resolve the four wars I have described.
In the 1980s, the United States made a major investment in the
struggle for democracy and human rights in Latin America. We pretty
much succeeded. We basically went from a situation a generation or two
ago where half the countries were democratic to a situation today where
every country save one is democratic, or is at least moving rapidly
towards democracy. We have succeeded.
But if we want Latin America to continue to evolve into a stable and
peaceful trading partner and a friend of the United States, we will
have to make a more serious commitment to Colombia. No one wants to see
Colombia devolve into a criminal narcostate. But unless we act soon in
partnership with the democratically elected Government of Colombia,
unless we act soon to reverse this democratic death spiral, it is only
a matter of time before Colombia ceases to exist as a sovereign nation
with democratic principles.
President Ronald Reagan showed profound wisdom in leading this
hemisphere toward democracy and toward free markets. We must do all we
can to make sure that this positive tide is not rolled back for our
neighbors to the south.
I thank the Chair for his indulgence.
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