[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 95 (Wednesday, June 30, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7877-S7900]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                 RECESS

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
stand in recess for six minutes so we can greet President Mubarak.
  I thank the Chair.
  There being no objection, the Senate, at 4:13 p.m., recessed until 
4:19 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate was called to order by the Presiding 
Officer (Mr. Sessions).
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, which amendment is pending?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending amendment is No. 1165, offered by 
Senator Bingaman of New Mexico.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I ask the Bingaman amendment be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


 Amendments Nos. 1125, 1146, 1150, 1151, 1158, 1162, 1163, 1167, 1168, 
                     and 1173 Through 1177, En Bloc

  Mr. McCONNELL. There are a number of amendments that have been 
cleared by both sides that I send to the desk:
  Amendment No. 1125 by Senator Smith of Oregon related to CDC; 
amendment No. 1146 by Senator Lautenberg related to war crimes; 
amendment No. 1150 by Senator Helms related to Serbia; amendment No. 
1151 by

[[Page S7878]]

Senator Burns dealing with narcotics; amendment No. 1158 by Senator 
Dodd dealing with IMET; amendment No. 1162 by Senator Boxer, dealing 
with tuberculosis; amendment No. 1167, by Senator Kerry of 
Massachusetts relating to arms transfer; amendment No. 1168 by Senator 
Kerry of Massachusetts relating to Cambodia; amendment No. 1173 by 
Senator Biden relating to threat reduction; amendment No. 1174 by 
Senator Levin relating to KEDO; amendment No. 1175 by Senator Domenici 
relating to Habitat for Humanity; amendment No. 1177 by Senator Schumer 
relating to ETRI; amendment No. 1176 by Senator Cochran relating to 
IMET; amendment No. 1163 by Senator Cleland relating to the Balkans 
conference.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McConnell] proposes 
     amendment Nos. 1125, 1146, 1150, 1151, 1158, 1162, 1163, 
     1167, 1168, and 1173 through 1177, en bloc.

  The amendments are as follows:


                           amendment no. 1125

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     new section and renumber any remaining sections accordingly:

     SEC.  SENSE OF THE SENATE ON THE CITIZENS DEMOCRACY CORPS.

       It is the sense of the Senate that--
       (1) with regard to promoting economic development and open, 
     democratic countries in the former Soviet Union and Central 
     Eastern Europe, the Committee commends the work of the 
     Citizens Democracy Corps (CDC), which utilizes senior-level 
     U.S. business volunteers to assist enterprises, institutions, 
     and local governments abroad. Their work demonstrates the 
     significant impact that USAID support of a U.S. non-
     governmental organization (NGO) program can have on the key 
     U.S. foreign policy priorities of promoting broad-based, 
     stable economic growth and open, market-oriented economies in 
     transitioning economies. By drawing upon the skills and 
     voluntary spirit of U.S. businessmen and women to introduce 
     companies, CDC furthers the goals of the Freedom of Support 
     Act (NIS) and Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED), 
     forging positive, lasting connections between the U.S. and 
     these countries. The Committee endorses CDC's very cost-
     effective programs and believes they should be supported and 
     expanded not only in the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
     Europe, but in transitioning and developing economiecs 
     throughout the world.
                                  ____



                           AMENDMENT NO. 1146

 (Purpose: To provide substitute language relating to restrictions on 
 assistance to countries providing sanctuary to indicted war criminals)

       Beginning on page 100, strike line 11 and all that follows 
     through line 13 on page 107 and insert the following:


 RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES, ENTITIES, AND COMMUNITIES IN 
  THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA PROVIDING SANCTUARY TO PUBLICLY INDICTED WAR 
                               CRIMINALS

       Sec.  567. (a) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the 
     United States to use bilateral and multilateral assistance to 
     promote peace and respect for internationally recognized 
     human rights by encouraging countries, entities, and 
     communities in the territory of the former Yugoslavia to 
     cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for 
     the Former Yugoslavia--
       (1) by apprehending publicly indicted war criminals and 
     transferring custody of those individuals to the Tribunal to 
     stand trial; and
       (2) by assisting the Tribunal in the investigation and 
     prosecution of crimes subject to its jurisdiction.
       (b) Sanctioned Country, Entity, or Community.--
       (1) In general.--A sanctioned country, entity, or community 
     described in this section is one in which there is present a 
     publicly indicted war criminal or in which the Tribunal has 
     been hindered in efforts to investigate crimes subject to its 
     jurisdiction.
       (2) Special rule.--Subject to subsection (f), subsections 
     (c) and (d) shall not apply to the provision of assistance to 
     an entity that is not a sanctioned entity within a sanctioned 
     country, or to a community that is not a sanctioned community 
     within a sanctioned country or sanctioned entity, if the 
     Secretary of State determines and so reports to the 
     appropriate congressional committees that providing such 
     assistance would further the policy of subsection (a).
       (c) Bilateral Assistance.--
       (1) Prohibition.--None of the funds made available by this 
     or any prior Act making appropriations for foreign 
     operations, export financing and related programs may be 
     provided for any country, entity, or community described in 
     subsection (b).
       (2) Notification.--Not less than 15 days before any 
     assistance described in this subsection is disbursed to any 
     country, entity, or community described in subsection (b), 
     the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
     Administrator of the Agency for International Development, 
     shall publish in the Federal Register a written justification 
     for the proposed assistance, including a description of the 
     location of the proposed assistance program or project by 
     municipality, its purpose, and the intended recipient of the 
     assistance, including the names of individuals, companies and 
     their boards of directors, and shareholders with controlling 
     or substantial financial interest in the program or project.
       (d) Multilateral Assistance.--
       (1) Prohibition.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall 
     instruct the United States executive directors of the 
     international financial institutions to work in opposition 
     to, and vote against, any extension by such institutions of 
     any financial or technical assistance or grants of any kind 
     to any country or entity described in subsection (b).
       (2) Notification.--Not less than 15 days before any vote in 
     an international financial institution regarding the 
     extension of financial or technical assistance or grants to 
     any country or community described in subsection (b), the 
     Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary 
     of State, shall provide to the appropriate Congressional 
     committees a written justification for the proposed 
     assistance, including an explanation of the United States 
     position regarding any such vote, as well as a description of 
     the location of the proposed assistance by municipality, its 
     purpose, and its intended beneficiaries, including the names 
     of individuals with a controlling or substantial financial 
     interest in the project.
       (e) Exceptions.--Subject to subsection (f), subsections (c) 
     and (d) shall not apply to the provision of--
       (1) humanitarian assistance;
       (2) assistance to nongovernmental organizations that 
     promote democracy and respect for human rights; and
       (3) assistance for cross border physical infrastructure 
     projects involving activities in both a sanctioned country, 
     entity, or community and a nonsanctioned contiguous country, 
     entity, or community, if the project is primarily located in 
     and primarily benefits the nonsanctioned country, entity, or 
     community and if the portion of the project located in the 
     sanctioned country, entity, or community is necessary only to 
     complete the project.
       (f) Further Limitations.--
       (1) Prohibition on direct assistance to publicly indicted 
     war criminals and other persons.--Notwithstanding subsection 
     (e) or subsection (g), no assistance may be made available by 
     this Act, or any prior Act making appropriations for foreign 
     operations, export financing and related programs, in any 
     country, entity, or community described in subsection (b), 
     for any financial or technical assistance, grant, or loan 
     that would directly benefit a publicly indicted war criminal, 
     any person who aids or abets a publicly indicted war criminal 
     to evade apprehension, or any person who otherwise obstructs 
     the work of the Tribunal.
       (2) Certification.--At the end of each fiscal year, the 
     President shall certify to the appropriate congressional 
     committees that no assistance described in paragraph (1) 
     directly benefited any person described in that paragraph 
     during the preceding 12-month period.
       (g) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the 
     application of subsection (c) with respect to specified 
     United States projects, or subsection (d) with respect to 
     specified international financial institution programs or 
     projects, in a sanctioned country or entity upon providing a 
     written determination to the appropriate congressional 
     committees that the government of the country or entity is 
     doing everything within its power and authority to apprehend 
     or aid in the apprehension of publicly indicted war criminals 
     and is fully cooperating in the investigation and prosecution 
     of war crimes.
       (h) Current Record of War Criminals and Sanctioned 
     Countries, Entities, and Communities.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of State, acting through the 
     Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, and after 
     consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and 
     the Secretary of Defense, shall establish and maintain a 
     current record of the location, including the community, if 
     known, of publicly indicted war criminals and of sanctioned 
     countries, entities, and communities.
       (2) Report.--Beginning 30 days after the date of enactment 
     of this Act, and not later than September 1 each year 
     thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report in 
     classified and unclassified form to the appropriate 
     congressional committees on the location, including the 
     community, if known, of publicly indicted war criminals and 
     the identity of countries, entities, and communities that are 
     failing to cooperate fully with the Tribunal.
       (3) Information to congress.--Upon the request of the 
     chairman or ranking minority member of any of the appropriate 
     congressional committees, the Secretary of State shall make 
     available to that committee the information recorded under 
     paragraph (1) in a report submitted to the committee in 
     classified and unclassified form.
       (j) Definitions.--As used in this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee 
     on Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
     the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations and the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) Canton.--The term ``canton'' means the administrative 
     units in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       (3) Community.--The term ``community'' means any canton, 
     district, opstina, city, town, or village.

[[Page S7879]]

       (4) Country.--The term ``country'' means Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
     (Serbia-Montenegro), the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
     Macedonia, and Slovenia.
       (5) Dayton agreement.--The term ``Dayton Agreement'' means 
     the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina, together with annexes relating thereto, done at 
     Dayton, November 10 through 16, 1995.
       (6) Entity.--The term ``entity'' refers to the Federation 
     of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska, Brcko in 
     Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo.
       (7) International financial institution.--The term 
     ``international financial institution'' includes the 
     International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for 
     Reconstruction and Development, the International Development 
     Association, the International Finance Corporation, the 
     Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency, and the European 
     Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
       (8) Publicly indicted war criminals.--The term ``publicly 
     indicted war criminals'' means persons indicted by the 
     Tribunal for crimes subject to the jurisdiction of the 
     Tribunal.
       (9) Tribunal or international criminal tribunal for the 
     former yugoslavia.--The term ``Tribunal'' or the term 
     ``International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia'' 
     means the International Tribunal for the prosecution of 
     persons responsible for serious violations of international 
     humanitarian law committed in the Territory of the Former 
     Yugoslavia since 1991, as established by United Nations 
     Security Council Resolution 827 of May 25, 1993.

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I would like to thank Senator 
McConnell and Senator Leahy for including my amendment No. 1146 in the 
managers' package.
  Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment to ensure U.S. aid 
does not go to countries or regions or communities in the former 
Yugoslavia which continue to harbor indicted war criminals.
  This amendment would improve language we adopted last year with a 
clearer provision covering all of the former Yugoslavia.
  Mr. President, we have seen terrible atrocities committed in Croatia, 
in Bosnia, and most recently in Kosovo.
  The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia has 
publicly indicted 89 persons for war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide. There are almost certainly more indictments which remain 
sealed. Ongoing investigations in Bosnia and now in Kosovo will surely 
lead to more indictments.
  However, the justice of the War Crimes Tribunal relies on the 
governments of countries in the region to apprehend indicted war 
criminals and transfer them to The Hague to stand trial.
  Because the Republika Srpska authorities failed to fulfill their 
responsibilities, United States and other NATO armed forces in the 
United Nations-authorized peacekeeping force in Bosnia have arrested 7 
war criminals. However, 36 publicly indicted war criminals remain at 
large.
  Mr. President, our aid programs provide important leverage to 
motivate governments in the former Yugoslavia to stop harboring war 
criminals and start arresting them.
  United States policy linking aid to cooperation with the war crimes 
tribunal is clear.
  Indeed, a few years ago, Secretary Albright said the following in her 
remarks at the Tribunal:

       . . . The United States has made full cooperation with the 
     War Crimes Tribunal, especially the transfer of indictees to 
     The Hague, a prerequisite for U.S. assistance, our support 
     for assistance by others, and our backing for membership in 
     international institutions.

  Unfortunately, the administration has resisted putting this policy 
into practice. Indeed, Secretary Albright has issued broad waivers of 
the provision included in the fiscal year 1998 and 1999 appropriations 
bills. The United States now provides aid to the city of Prijedor which 
hosts no fewer than 8 indicted war criminals.
  Just this month Secretary Albright signed another waiver to provide 
$10 million in budget support to the Republika Srpska Government--the 
very Government which includes the Bosnian Serb police force which 
should be carrying out arrest warrants and is not.
  Mr. President, ever more atrocities committed by Serbian police and 
paramilitary forces in Kosovo are coming to light: executions, torture, 
rape, burning of homes, expulsions on a massive scale.
  We must now send a strong signal that we are determined to see the 
perpetrators of these crimes face justice. We must end our support for 
so-called moderates in Republika Srpska until and unless they fulfill 
their obligations to arrest war criminals and cooperate with the War 
Crimes Tribunal.
  The Amendment I am offering today clearly states the policy of the 
United States ``to use bilateral and multilateral assistance to promote 
peace and respect for internationally recognized human rights by 
encouraging countries, entities, and communities in the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia,'' among other things ``by apprehending publicly 
indicted war criminals and transferring custody of those individuals to 
the Tribunal to stand trial.''
  The amendment sets out mechanisms to ensure that U.S. and 
multilateral aid will go to areas like the Bosnian Federation, where no 
war criminals remain at large, while prohibiting aid to authorities and 
areas that harbor war criminals.
  Mr. President, I would urge my colleagues to join me in this effort 
to ensure that the perpetrators of horrible crimes in Croatia, Bosnia, 
and Kosovo will ultimately face justice.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 1150

     (Purpose: Providing assistance to promote democracy in Serbia)

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:

     SEC.   ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
                   YUGOSLAVIA.

       (a) Assistance.--
       (1) Purpose of assistance.--The purpose of assistance under 
     this subsection is to promote and strengthen institutions of 
     democratic government and the growth of an independent civil 
     society in Yugoslavia, including ethnic tolerance and respect 
     for internationally recognized human rights.
       (2) Authorization for assistance.--The President is 
     authorized to furnish assistance and other support for 
     individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations to 
     carry out the purpose of paragraph (1) through support for 
     the activities described in paragraph (3).
       (3) Activities supported.--Activities that may be supported 
     by assistance under paragraph (2) include the following:
       (A) Democracy building.
       (B) The development of nongovernmental organizations.
       (C) The development of independent media.
       (D) The development of the rule of law, a strong, 
     independent judiciary, and transparency in political 
     practices.
       (E) International exchanges and advanced professional 
     training programs in skill areas central to the development 
     of civil society and a market economy.
       (F) The development of all elements of the democratic 
     process, including political parties and the ability to 
     administer free and fair elections.
       (G) The development of local governance.
       (H) The development of a free-market economy.
       (4) Authorization of appropriations.--
       (A) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to 
     the President $100,000,000 for the period beginning October 
     1, 1999, and ending September 30, 2001, to carry out this 
     subsection.
       (B) Availability of funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant 
     to subparagraph (A) are authorized to remain available until 
     expended.
       (b) Prohibition on Assistance to Government of Serbia.--In 
     carrying out subsection (a), the President shall take all 
     necessary steps to ensure that no funds or other assistance 
     is provided to the Government of Yugoslavia or to the 
     Government of Serbia.
       (c) Assistance to Government of Montenegro.--In carrying 
     out subsection (a), the President is authorized to provide 
     assistance to the Government of Montenegro, if the President 
     determines, and so reports to the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate, that the Government of Montenegro is committed to, 
     and is taking steps to promote, democratic principles, the 
     rule of law, and respect for internationally recognized human 
     rights.
                                  ____



                           AMENDMENT TO 1151

  (Purpose: To allocate funds to continue mycoherbicide counter drug 
                       research and development)

       On page 26, line 15, before the period insert the 
     following: ``Provided further, That of the funds made 
     available under this heading, not less than $10,000,000 shall 
     be made available to continue mycoherbicide counter drug 
     research and development''.

  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleagues, 
Senator Burns and Senator DeWine, to offer an amendment to the Foreign 
Operations Appropriations bill. This amendment would provide $10 
million to the State Department Bureau of International Law Enforcement 
Affairs

[[Page S7880]]

for mycoherbicide research and development to be used for narcotic crop 
eradication. The appropriations bill, as it currently stands, provides 
no funding for this important tool in our war against illegal drugs.
  Many of my colleagues and I view this mycoherbicide technology as a 
promising new tool that will reduce the cultivation and supply of 
narcotic crops, and thereby increasing our capacity to combat illegal 
drugs. I have been briefed on the mycoherbicide technology and 
understand that it is a naturally occurring plant pathogen that can be 
introduced into an area to control a target plant species. The program 
is also environmentally friendly--it posses no threat to humans or 
animals, other crops, or water supply and replaces the use of harmful 
chemicals. In addition, the program is a cost effective tool in our war 
on drugs. The mycoherbicides will remain in the soil for an extended 
period of time, for up to 40 years, and costs a fraction of the $2.65 
billion we spend on other supply reduction methods.
  I remind my colleagues that Congress has recognized the importance of 
this technology and its ability to eradicate deadly crops when it 
endorsed the program last year in the Western Hemisphere Drug 
Elimination Act. The program was funded in the amount of $23 million 
for fiscal year 1999. I strongly urge my colleagues to continue their 
support for this program by passing this amendment and supporting the 
continued development of the mycoherbicide program.
  Mr. President, as illegal drugs continue to cross our borders and 
threaten the welfare of American citizens, this program is a top 
priority that can significantly reduce the production of narcotics 
crops. We know that elimination of illicit crops is the best way of 
preventing deadly drugs from reaching our streets and destroying untold 
lives and communities. I urge my colleagues to join with Senator Burns, 
Senator DeWine and me in support of this amendment and in support of 
this important program.
  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss yet again one of 
the key problems I have been addressing, as a U.S. Senator, over the 
last four years. The problem is the inflow of illegal drugs into 
America. I have heard it said that if we eliminate demand, if we 
address the domestic side of drug abuse, we really don't have to worry 
about illegal narcotics producers and importers, because they would 
then have no market for their drugs.
  Mr. President, this argument makes sense on a superficial level, but 
it does not reflect reality. I have been, throughout my career as a 
local, state and Federal elected official, a strong supporter of 
domestic efforts to reduce drug demand. But I have always believed--and 
continue to believe--that we need a balanced program to attack the drug 
problem on all fronts. We need to invest not only in domestic demand 
reduction and law enforcement programs, but also in international 
programs to increase interdiction and reduce production of illegal 
narcotics. We need to do our best to stop drugs from ever reaching our 
borders.
  Mr. President, for nearly a year, I have expressed my belief that 
this Administration is not doing its best to address this problem. 
Little seems to have changed in one year.
  Before this Administration took office, almost one-third of our 
counter narcotics resources were committed to stopping drugs outside 
our borders. Today, that figure is less than 14 percent. Although 
overall funding for counter narcotics programs has increased 
dramatically in the last decade, from $4.5 billion to $17.8 billion, 
statistics show an increase in drug use among our youngest citizens. I 
am disturbed by how easily and how cheaply illegal drugs can be 
purchased. I am disturbed that the Administration is not taking 
seriously the initiatives Congress passed last year as part of the 
bipartisan Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act.
  Mr. President, President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2000 
provided ZERO funding for any of the initiatives in that Act. In fact, 
the President's overall anti-drug budget for next year is $100 million 
less than what Congress provided in 1999. The Coast Guard received no 
funding to acquire additional ships and planes to stop drug trafficking 
in the Caribbean; the Drug Enforcement Administration received ZERO 
funding for new agents; the US Customs Service received ZERO funding to 
acquire maritime/air assets, and ZERO increases for inspectors.
  In addition, the Administration has also ignored other key 
initiatives sought by Congress, including mycoherbicide research and 
development, and eradication and alternative crop development 
assistance to our Latin American neighbors, particularly, Colombia and 
Bolivia. I very much appreciate the efforts of the Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations in working with me on these issues. 
They have done a remarkable job to incorporate a key anti-drug 
initiative that was not sought by the President.
  Specifically, Mr. President, I commend the managers of the bill for 
accepting the amendment offered by the Senator from Montana, Senator 
Burns, to fund the mycoherbicide program which we began funding last 
year under the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act. Mycoherbicide 
technology is a new and promising eradication technique for coca, 
poppy, and marijuana. The concept is to employ a natural disease that 
only attacks a specific narcotics plant without harming neighboring 
vegetation. Mycoherbicides can be applied through aerial spraying and 
will remain in the soil to prevent future growth of the narcotics crops 
in that area. Mr. President, this has the potential to be a very cost-
effective and low-risk way to drastically reduce drug production at its 
source. We must pursue this technology and fund the additional research 
and testing necessary to bring about a deployable product as soon as 
possible.
  Mr. President, let me now turn to the subject of eradication and 
alternative crop development assistance to Colombia and Bolivia. I am 
particularly concerned about the lack of resources made available by 
this Administration for what I consider to be our most urgent foreign 
assistance project--counter narcotics funding. I fear that we are 
sending a signal abroad that the United States is not entirely serious 
about the fight against drugs.
  The report language accompanying this bill makes special mention of 
the progress made in the drug fight by the Government of Bolivia, and I 
want to add my voice to the committee report as well. Since coming to 
power in August of 1997, the Government of President Hugo Banzer and 
Vice President Jorge Quiroga has undertaken an ambitious plan to remove 
Bolivia from the illegal narcotics trade by the time they leave office 
in 2002.
  Mr. President, many, myself included, were skeptical that this goal 
could be reached in the time allotted. Now, nearly two years into their 
``Dignity Plan,'' the Bolivian Government has shown that this goal can 
be reached. Since taking office, the Banzer Government has successfully 
reduced Bolivia's cocaine production potential by a remarkable 40 
percent. This has been accomplished by an effective eradication program 
and an aggressive and successful program of interdiction and control of 
the chemical precursors which go into cocaine production.
  The Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill makes mention of Bolivia's 
success, and its financial needs. I am deeply concerned that we are not 
providing sufficient support to the historic effort of the Bolivian 
Government. They have moved tens of thousands of farmers out of the 
illegal coca fields and it is absolutely imperative that we help to 
provide viable commercial alternatives for these farmers and their 
families. It would be a great tragedy to be within sight of a major 
victory in the drug war and to lose it for want of resources. The 
anticipated level of funding in this Bill falls far short of what is 
required to finish the job in Bolivia in the next two years.
  Mr. President, I look forward to working with the Senator from 
Alaska, Senator Stevens, the Senator from Georgia, Senator Coverdell, 
and the Senator from Iowa, Senator Grassley, to help Bolivia and other 
countries in their fight against drugs. We will work with the 
appropriators during conference to provide the highest possible level 
of funding for this effort. This is a key investment in the future 
safety of our own streets--and it will bring us closer to the drug-free 
America our children deserve.

[[Page S7881]]

                           amendment no. 1158

       At the appropriate place in the bill at the following new 
     section:

     SEC.   . FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING REPORT.

       (a) The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State 
     shall jointly provide to the Congress by January 31, 2000 a 
     report on all military training provided to foreign military 
     personnel (excluding sales) administered by the Department of 
     Defense and the Department of State during fiscal years 1999 
     and 2000, including those proposed for fiscal year 2000. This 
     report shall include, for each such military training 
     activity, the foreign policy justification and purpose for 
     the training activity, the cost of the training activity, the 
     number of foreign students trained and their units of 
     operation, and the location of the training. In addition, 
     this report shall also include, with respect to United States 
     personnel, the operational benefits to United States forces 
     derived from each such training activity and the United 
     States military units involved in each such training 
     activity. This report may include a classified annex if 
     deemed necessary and appropriate.
       (b) For purposes of this section a report to Congress shall 
     be deemed to mean a report to the Appropriations and Foreign 
     Relations Committees of the Senate and the Appropriations and 
     International Relations Committees of the House of 
     Representatives.
                                  ____



                           amendment no. 1162

   (Purpose: To increase the commitment to control and eliminate the 
             growing international problem of tuberculosis)

       At the end, add the following:
       Sec. 5  . (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
       (1) Since the development of antibiotics in the 1950s, 
     tuberculosis has been largely controlled in the United States 
     and the Western World.
       (2) Due to societal factors, including growing urban decay, 
     inadequate health care systems, persistent poverty, 
     overcrowding, and malnutrition, as well as medical factors, 
     including the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the emergence of multi-
     drug resistant strains of tuberculosis, tuberculosis has 
     again become a leading and growing cause of adult deaths in 
     the developing world.
       (3) According to the World Health Organization--
       (A) in 1998, about 1,860,000 people worldwide died of 
     tuberculosis-related illnesses;
       (B) one-third of the world's total population is infected 
     with tuberculosis; and
       (C) tuberculosis is the world's leading killer of women 
     between 15 and 44 years old and is a leading cause of 
     children becoming orphans.
       (4) Because of the ease of transmission of tuberculosis, 
     its international persistence and growth pose a direct public 
     health threat to those nations that had previously largely 
     controlled the disease. This is complicated in the United 
     States by the growth of the homeless population, the rate of 
     incarceration, international travel, immigration, and HIV/
     AIDS.
       (5) With nearly 40 percent of the tuberculosis cases in the 
     United States attributable to foreign-born persons, 
     tuberculosis will never be eliminated in the United States 
     until it is controlled abroad.
       (6) The means exist to control tuberculosis through 
     screening, diagnosis, treatment, patient compliance, 
     monitoring, and ongoing review of outcomes.
       (7) Efforts to control tuberculosis are complicated by 
     several barriers, including--
       (A) the labor intensive and lengthy process involved in 
     screening, detecting, and treating the disease;
       (B) a lack of funding, trainer personnel, and medicine in 
     virtually every nation with a high rate of the disease; and
       (C) the unique circumstances in each country, which 
     requires the development and implementation of country-
     specific programs.
       (8) Eliminating the barriers to the international control 
     of tuberculosis through a well-structured, comprehensive, and 
     coordinated worldwide effort would be a significant step in 
     dealing with the increasing public health problem posed by 
     the disease.
       (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that if the total allocation for this Act is higher than the 
     level passed by the Senate, a top priority for the additional 
     funds should be to increase the funding to combat infectious 
     diseases, especially tuberculosis.
                                  ____



                           AMENDMENT NO. 1163

 (Purpose: Supporting an international conference to achieve a durable 
                  political settlement in the Balkans)

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:

     SEC. __. SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING AN INTERNATIONAL 
                   CONFERENCE ON THE BALKANS.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (1) The United States and its allies in the North Atlantic 
     Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted large-scale military 
     operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
       (2) At the conclusion of 78 days of these hostilities, the 
     United States and its NATO allies suspended military 
     operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia based 
     upon credible assurances by the latter that it would fulfill 
     the following conditions as laid down by the so called Group 
     of Eight (G-8):
       (A) An immediate and verifiable end of violence and 
     repression in Kosovo.
       (B) Staged withdrawal of all Yugoslav military, police, and 
     paramilitary forces from Kosovo.
       (C) Deployment in Kosovo of effective international and 
     security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United 
     Nations Security Council, and capable of guaranteeing the 
     achievement of the agreed objectives.
       (D) Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo, 
     to be decided by the United Nations Security Council which 
     will seek to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life 
     for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
       (E) Provision for the safe and free return of all refugees 
     and displaced persons from Kosovo and an unimpeded access to 
     Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
       (3) These objectives appear to have been fulfilled, or to 
     be in the process of being fulfilled, which has led the 
     United States and its NATO allies to terminate military 
     operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
       (4) The G-8 also called for a comprehensive approach to the 
     economic development and stabilization of the crisis region, 
     and the European Union has announced plans for $1,500,000,000 
     over the next 3 years for the reconstruction of Kosovo, for 
     the convening in July of an international donors' conference 
     for Kosovo aid, and for subsequent provision of 
     reconstruction aid to the other countries in the region 
     affected by the recent hostilities followed by reconstruction 
     aid directed at the Balkans region as a whole.
       (5) The United States and some of its NATO allies oppose 
     the provision of any aid, other than limited humanitarian 
     assistance, to Serbia until Yugoslav President Slobodan 
     Milosevic is out of office.
       (6) The policy of providing reconstruction aid to Kosovo 
     and other countries in the region affected by the recent 
     hostilities while withholding such aid for Serbia presents a 
     number of practical problems, including the absence in Kosovo 
     of financial and other institutions independent of 
     Yugoslavia, the difficulty in drawing clear and enforceable 
     distinctions between humanitarian and reconstruction 
     assistance, and the difficulty in reconstructing Montenegro 
     in the absence of similar efforts in Serbia.
       (7) In any case, the achievement of effective and durable 
     economic reconstruction and revitalization in the countries 
     of the Balkans is unlikely until a political settlement is 
     reached as to the final status of Kosovo and Yugoslavia.
       (8) The G-8 proposed a political process towards the 
     establishment of an interim political framework agreement for 
     a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking into full 
     account the final Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-
     Government in Kosovo, also known as the Rambouillet Accords, 
     and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity 
     of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries 
     of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK (Kosovo 
     Liberation Army).
       (9) The G-8 proposal contains no guidance as to a final 
     political settlement for Kosovo and Yugoslavia, while the 
     original position of the United States and the other 
     participants in the so-called Contact Group on this matter, 
     as reflected in the Rambouillet Accords, called for the 
     convening of an international conference, after 3 years, to 
     determine a mechanism for a final settlement of Kosovo status 
     based on the will of the people, opinions of relevant 
     authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the 
     implementation of the agreement and the provisions of the 
     Helsinki Final Act.
       (10) The current position of the United States and its NATO 
     allies as to the final status of Kosovo and Yugoslavia calls 
     for an autonomous, multiethnic, democratic Kosovo which would 
     remain as part of Serbia, and such an outcome is not 
     supported by any of the Parties directly involved, including 
     the governments of Yugoslavia and Serbia, representatives of 
     the Kosovar Albanians, and the people of Yugoslavia, Serbia 
     and Kosovo.
       (11) There has been no final political settlement in 
     Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Armed Forces of the United 
     States, its NATO allies, and other non-Balkan nations have 
     been enforcing an uneasy peace since 1996, at a cost to the 
     United States alone of over $10,000,000,000, with no clear 
     end in sight to such enforcement.
       (12) The trend throughout the Balkans since 1990 has been 
     in the direction of ethnically based particularism, as 
     exemplified by the 1991 declarations of independence from 
     Yugoslavia by Slovenia and Croatia, and the country in the 
     Balkans which currently comes the closest to the goal of a 
     democratic government which respects the human rights of its 
     citizens is the nation of Slovenia, which was the first 
     portion of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to 
     secede and is also the nation in the region with the greatest 
     ethnic homogeneity, with a population which is 91 percent 
     Slovene.
       (13) The boundaries of the various national and sub-
     national divisions in the Balkans have been altered 
     repeatedly throughout history, and international conferences 
     have frequently played the decisive role in fixing such 
     boundaries in the modern era, including the Berlin Congress 
     of 1878, the London Conference of 1913, and the Paris Peace 
     Conference of 1919.
       (14) The development of an effective exit strategy for the 
     withdrawal from the Balkans of foreign military forces, 
     including the armed forces of the United States, its NATO

[[Page S7882]]

     allies, Russia, and any other nation from outside the Balkans 
     which has such forces in the Balkans is in the best interests 
     of all such nations.
       (15) The ultimate withdrawal of foreign military forces, 
     accompanied by the establishment of durable and peaceful 
     relations among all of the nations and peoples of the Balkans 
     is in the best interests of those nations and peoples.
       (16) An effective exit strategy for the withdrawal from the 
     Balkans of foreign military forces is contingent upon the 
     achievement of a lasting political settlement for the region, 
     and that only such a settlement, acceptable to all parties 
     involved, can ensure the fundamental goals of the United 
     States of peace, stability, and human rights in the Balkans;
       (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that--
       (1) the United States should call immediately for the 
     convening of an international conference on the Balkans, 
     under the auspices of the United Nations, and based upon the 
     principles of the Rambouillet Accords for a final settlement 
     of Kosovo status, namely that such a settlement should be 
     based on the will of the people, opinions of relevant 
     authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the 
     implementation of the agreement and the provisions of the 
     Helsinki Final Act;
       (2) the international conference on the Balkans should also 
     be empowered to seek a final settlement for Bosnia-
     Herzegovina based on the same principles as specified for 
     Kosovo in the Rambouillet Accords; and
       (3) in order to produce a lasting political settlement in 
     the Balkans acceptable to all parties, which can lead to the 
     departure from the Balkans in timely fashion of all foreign 
     military forces, including those of the United States, the 
     international conference should have the authority to 
     consider any and all of the following: political boundaries; 
     humanitarian and reconstruction assistance for all nations in 
     the Balkans; stationing of United Nations peacekeeping forces 
     along international boundaries; security arrangements and 
     guarantees for all of the nations of the Balkans; and 
     tangible, enforceable and verifiable human rights guarantees 
     for the individuals and peoples of the Balkans.
                                  ____



                           amendment no. 1167

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:
       Sec.   . (a) The President shall continue and expand 
     efforts through the United Nations and other international 
     fora, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, to limit arms 
     transfers worldwide. The President shall take the necessary 
     steps to begin multilateral negotiations within 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, for the purpose 
     of establishing a permanent multilateral regime to govern the 
     transfer of conventional arms, particularly transfers to 
     countries:
       (1) that engage in persistent violations of human rights, 
     engage in acts of armed aggression in violation of 
     international law, and do not fully participate in the United 
     Nations Register of Conventional Arms; and
       (2) in regions in which arms transfers would exacerbate 
     regional arms races or international tensions that present a 
     danger to international peace and stability.
       (b) Report to Congress.--(1) Not later than 6 months after 
     the commencement of the negotiations under subsection (a), 
     and not later than the end of every 6-month period thereafter 
     until an agreement described in subsection (a) is concluded, 
     the President shall report to the appropriate committees of 
     the Congress on the progress made during these negotiations.

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the amendment I am offering today calls on 
the President to begin multilateral negotiations for the purpose of 
establishing a permanent multilateral regime to govern the transfer of 
conventional arms to countries that engage in persistent violations of 
human rights, engage in acts of armed aggression, do not fully 
participate in the United Nations Register of Conventional, and 
countries in regions in which arms transfers would exacerbate regional 
arms races or international tensions.
  As the United States and its allies work to expand the community of 
democratic nations and prevent the spread of violence and ethnic 
conflict, we must give higher priority to consideration of how 
conventional arms transfers may work to undermine these important 
objectives. It is simply not in our interest to allow weapons to flow 
freely into countries who abuse the rights of their citizens or who are 
engaged in conflict or destabilizing arms races.
  International restraint in arms exports is important to U.S. national 
security interests, as well as for the furtherance of democracy and 
human rights. The June 1996 ``Report of the Presidential Advisory Board 
on Arms Proliferation Policy'' concluded that U.S. and international 
security are threatened by the proliferation of advanced conventional 
weapons. According to the Report, ``The world struggles today with the 
implications of advanced conventional weapons. It will in the future be 
confronted with yet another generation of weapons, whose destructive 
power, size, cost, and availability can raise many more problems even 
than their predecessors today. These challenges will require a new 
culture among nations, one that accepts increased responsibility for 
control and restraint, despite short-term economic and political 
factors pulling in other directions.'' An international Code of Conduct 
is a step toward that new culture.
  The United States is far-and-away the world's biggest arms merchant, 
and we must lead the way for the rest of the world in addressing this 
issue. But we cannot do it alone. A unilateral decision by the United 
States to limit conventional arms transfers would be an important 
signal of our commitment to this issue, but it would not stop the flow 
of weapons into the countries about whom we are most concerned. We 
should be under no illusion about the ability or willingness of other 
arms-producing nations to rush in and fill any gap we might create. 
This amendment will require the President to expand international 
efforts to curb worldwide arms sales through the United Nations and 
other fora, such as the Wassenaar Agreement, and to report to the 
Congress on progress made during these negotiations.
  The United States should lead the way to establishing a multilateral 
regime to prevent nations that ignore the rights of their citizens or 
bully their neighbors from obtaining the weapons that support these 
nefarious activities. This legislation can be the vehicle to accomplish 
this important objective. I thank the managers of this bill for 
accepting my amendment.


                           amendment no. 1168

               Purpose: To restrict U.S. aid to Cambodia

       On page 13, strike lines 2 through the colon on line 14, 
     and insert in lieu the following:
  ``None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be made available 
for activities or programs for the Central Government of Cambodia until 
the Secretary of State determines and reports to the Committee on 
Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign Relations that the 
Government of Cambodia has established a tribunal consistent with the 
requirements of international law and justice including the 
participation of international jurists and prosecutors for the trial of 
those who committed genocide or crimes against humanity and that the 
Government of Cambodia is making significant progress in establishing 
an independent and accountable judicial system, a professional military 
subordinate to civilian control, and a neutral and accountable police 
force:''

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the pending bill prohibits the 
Administration from providing aid to the central government of Cambodia 
pending certification by the Secretary of State that Cambodia has held 
free and fair elections, that the Central Election Commission was 
comprised of representatives from all parties, and that the Cambodian 
government has established an international panel of jurists to try 
individuals who have committed genocide against the Cambodian people.
  I share the Committee's view that aid can be a source of leverage in 
dealing with the new Cambodian government, and I agree that we should 
use our aid to encourage the Cambodian government to establish a 
credible, internationally acceptable genocide tribunal. However, I do 
not believe that the conditions in the bill provide us with effective 
leverage because they are outdated and irrelevant to the realities on 
the ground in Cambodia today.
  All of us who are involved with Cambodia recognize full well that the 
elections held last July in Cambodia were a mixed bag at best. The 
process leading up to the elections had flaws. The elections themselves 
were quite successful in terms of large voter turnout, lack of 
intimidation, international monitoring, and lack of violence. But they 
were less than perfect.
  Cambodians know this, but they have moved on. They have formed a new 
coalition government with what appears to be a workable power sharing 
arrangement between the two major parties. They have an effective 
opposition party. The Khmer Rouge is no longer a military or political 
player, looming as a threat to the new government. The climate of 
political intimidation and violence that has so often characterized 
Cambodia is no longer prevalent.

[[Page S7883]]

The new Cambodian government has put forth a policy platform which, if 
implemented, would enable Cambodia to make real strides toward the 
establishment of democratic institutions and processes.
  In light of these realities, it makes no sense to put restrictions on 
our aid that simply cut off the aid and prevent us from using US aid as 
an incentive to move the Cambodian government to deal with the serious 
problems that are on the table now--building an independent judiciary, 
reforming the military and the policy so that they are professional, 
neutral and accountable, providing health care and schooling, and 
tackling the overwhelming problem of poverty.
  The amendment that I am offering with Senator McCain replaces the 
conditions in the bill with new conditions designed to promote the 
building of democratic institutions and to encourage the Cambodian 
government to establish a tribunal consistent with the requirements of 
international law and justice to try those guilty of genocide and 
crimes against humanity.
  Specifically, this amendment prohibits aid to the central government 
pending a certification by the Secretary of State that Cambodia is 
making significant progress in establishing an independent and 
accountable judicial system, a professional military subordinate to 
civilian control, and a neutral and accountable police force. The 
amendment also requires the Secretary to certify that the Cambodian 
government has established a tribunal consistent with the requirements 
of international law and justice and including the participation of 
international jurists and prosecutors for the trial of those who 
committed genocide or crimes against humanity.
  Let me say a word about the condition related to the tribunal. When I 
was in Cambodia in April, I had extensive discussions with Prime 
Minister Hun Sen, National Assembly Chairman Prince Ranarridh, King 
Sihanouk, and others about the issues related to the constitution of a 
genocide tribunal. While the Prime Minister insisted that the tribunal 
be in Cambodia, he agreed with my proposal that international judges, 
prosecutors and investigators actively participate in the process. He 
also indicated that he would support changes in Cambodian law to allow 
these individuals to actively operate within the Cambodian judicial 
system. Prince Ranariddh and King Sihanouk also were supportive of this 
concept.
  I believe that this kind of tribunal, with meaningful international 
participation, could provide a credible and accountable process, 
consistent with international law and standards, for trying those who 
committed genocide and crimes against humanity. The carrot of US aid 
can serve as an important incentive for the Cambodian government to 
follow through on this process.
  Mr. President, I believe this is a good amendment and I thank the 
managers for accepting it.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise to join with Senator Kerry in 
offering an amendment to the foreign operations appropriations bill 
that would replace language currently in the bill pertaining to 
Cambodia with language that I firmly believe will prove far more 
productive in accomplishing our goals in that strife-torn nation. The 
amendment would replace the current prohibition on assistance pending 
unrealistic and counterproductive certifications with attainable goals 
consistent with the positive developments that have occurred in 
Cambodia since its elections last July.
  Few countries in the entire world have experienced the scale of 
suffering since the Second World War that was inflicted upon the people 
of Cambodia between 1975 and 1979. A phrase that has become a part of 
our normal lexicon in discussions of tragedies of great proportion in 
foreign countries originated in descriptions of the killing fields of 
Cambodia. What transpired in that country during the rule of the Khmer 
Rouge defies comprehension. It is a history, however, that must not be 
forgotten.
  After decades of struggling with political events in Cambodia, we 
have an opportunity to finally help it move in a positive direction. We 
have an opportunity to help the people of that beautiful nation to 
begin to put their painful past behind them, and to join the community 
of nations in good standing. We cannot accomplish that objective, 
however, with the language currently in the bill before us today. That 
language prohibits all direct U.S. assistance to the central government 
of Cambodia until the Secretary of State certifies that the July 1998 
elections were free and fair, with emphasis on the period leading up to 
election day.
  Few would argue that numerous irregularities occurred in the months 
leading up to the election of July 26, 1998. I wish that had not been 
the case. But those irregularities took place, and we cannot change the 
past. The question, however, becomes where we go from here. The 
election itself was, by and large, a free and fair election, and it is 
unlikely that the pre-election irregularities fundamentally altered its 
outcome. Since the election, the main competing factions have agreed at 
an amicable arrangement, and Cambodia today stands its best chance of 
making significant political and economic progress. A U.S. role, which 
is currently limited to support of nongovernmental organizations 
anyway, can be instrumental in facilitating greater levels of 
liberalization. The Central Government of Cambodia shows every sign of 
wanting to move in that direction. That is why the language in this 
bill is so troubling. It fails to account for a far more positive 
political atmosphere in Cambodia than has existed in decades.
  We can help Cambodia to move forward, or we can stand aside and see 
an opportunity to act productively in Southeast Asia squandered. I am 
under no illusions about the scale of problems that continue to plague 
that troubled nation. The government of Phnom Penh must move forward on 
the issue of establishing an international tribunal for the prosecution 
of Khmer Rouge officials, it must continue to address pressing issues 
like deforestation, and it must carry out needed political and economic 
reforms. But we must not let an important opportunity to help such 
reforms move forward by restricting aid unless the State Department 
certifies to something all parties know cannot be certified. We can 
predicate our policy toward Cambodia on the past, or we can remember 
the past but look to the future. The Kerry-McCain amendment provides an 
opportunity to do the latter. I urge its support.


                             Amendment 1173

       At the appropriate place, insert the following section:

     SEC.  . EXPANDED THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE.

       It is the sense of the Senate that the programs contained 
     in the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative are vital to the 
     national security of the United States and that funding for 
     those programs should be restored in conference to the levels 
     requested in the President's budget.
                                  ____



                             Amendment 1174

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:
       Sec.  . Sense of the Senate Regarding U.S. Commitments 
     Under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework.--It is the 
     Sense of the Senate that, as long as North Korea meets its 
     obligations under the U.S.-North Korean nuclear Agreed 
     Framework of 1994, the U.S. should meet its commitments under 
     the Agreed Framework, including required deliveries of heavy 
     fuel oil to North Korea and support of the Korean Peninsula 
     Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I wish to comment on the foreign operations 
appropriations bill being considered by the Senate. There is one area 
of this bill that I believe deserves particular attention, and that is 
the series of provisions relating to U.S. funding for the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization, or KEDO. This is the 
organization that is implementing certain provisions of the U.S.-North 
Korean nuclear Agreed Framework of 1994. U.S. funds for KEDO pay for 
the heavy fuel oil that the U.S. is committed to provide to North Korea 
in exchange for its agreement to freeze and eventually dismantle its 
plutonium production program that could be used for nuclear weapons.
  Mr. President, that Agreed Framework is working in our national 
security interests now. Under that agreement, North Korea has frozen 
its plutonium production facilities and canned almost all of the spent 
nuclear reactor fuel from its graphite-moderated reactor in Yongbyon, 
all under the watchful eye of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
personnel and monitoring instruments.
  As recent Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff

[[Page S7884]]

have repeatedly and consistently testified to Congress, it is clearly 
in our security interest that North Korea not produced any more 
plutonium and that its spend reactor fuel be canned and removed from 
North Korea. In addition, it is important for North Korea to account 
for all its past plutonium production to the satisfaction of the IAEA. 
If, and only if, North Korea satisfies all those requirements of the 
Agreed Framework, then KEDO, will provide two lightwater nuclear power 
production reactors to North Korea, with South Korea and Japan paying 
the overwhelming majority of the cost of those reactors.
  The U.S. is required to provide heavy fuel oil to North Korea on an 
agreed schedule, and we have had a spotty record so far, largely 
because of Congressional funding reductions and restrictions. But we 
have managed to deliver the required oil, albeit sometimes late.
  This bill would reduce the Administration's funding request for heavy 
fuel oil from $55 million to $40 million dollars, a decrease of $15 
million. This reduction would prevent the U.S. from purchasing and 
delivering the required heavy fuel oil to North Korea. In my view, what 
would be a serious mistake.
  If we do not provide the required heavy fuel oil under the Agreed 
Framework, we would be failing to meet our commitments under the Agreed 
Framework. This would provide North Korea with a ready-made excuse to 
withdraw from or violate the Agreed Framework, something we should all 
recognize would be contrary to our national interests and bad for U.S. 
security.
  As long as North Korea meets its obligations under the Agreed 
Framework, we should meet our commitments and obligations under the 
Agreed Framework, including providing the funds necessary to deliver 
all the required heavy fuel oil to North Korea.
  Mr. President, this bill also places unnecessary and unworkable 
restrictions on the obligation of the $40 million that is provided for 
KEDO. These are contained in certifications required before the funds 
can be obligated. Two of these certifications go beyond the terms of 
the Agreed Framework and would make it very hard for the U.S. to 
provide funds to KEDO, unless the President uses a waiver.
  I believe it is important that we work in good faith to keep North 
Korea in compliance with its obligations under the Agreed Framework, 
and that includes our obligation to provide the necessary funds to 
deliver the required heavy fuel oil to North Korea.
  When the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee 
members met recently with Former Defense Secretary William Perry, the 
President's Special Advisor on North Korea, one of my colleagues asked 
Dr. Perry what Congress could do to help move North Korea in a more 
peaceful and cooperative direction. Dr. Perry indicated that the most 
important Congressional action would be to provide full funding for 
KEDO. I believe Dr. Perry is correct.
  Mr. President, for these reasons I offer an amendment to the bill 
that states the sense of the Senate that, ``as long as North Korea 
meets its obligations under the U.S.-North Korean nuclear Agreed 
Framework of 1994, the U.S. should meet its commitments under the 
Agreed Framework, including required deliveries of heavy fuel oil to 
North Korea and support of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO).''
  This amendment puts the Senate on record as stating its view that the 
United States should meet its commitments under the Agreed Framework, 
including the heavy fuel oil and KEDO commitments.
  Mr. President, I believe this amendment improves the bill and makes 
it clear that the Senate wants the U.S. to uphold its end of the Agreed 
Framework, and I hope that the bill's provisions relating to KEDO can 
be modified in conference and that the Administration's requested 
funding will be restored in conference, to reflect the view of the 
Senate as expressed in my amendment.


                           amendment no. 1175

              (Purpose: To provide Tibetan refugee relief)

       On page 17, line 10, before the period insert the 
     following:
       ``That of the amounts appropriated under this heading, $1.5 
     million shall be made available to Habitat for Humanity 
     International for the purchase of 14 acres of land on behalf 
     of Tibetan refugees living in northern India, and the 
     construction of multi-unit development.''

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment that 
would provide Habitat for Humanity $1.5 million for construction of a 
multi-unit development for Tibetan refugees living in Northern India.
  These refugees were forcibly driven from their homes by the Chinese 
communists. They are living in the Dehradun area and are among the 
poorest people on earth. They are without citizenship rights and cannot 
own land. As such, they exist as squatters in burned out homes and 
shacks remaining after the Hindu-Moslem conflicts of a few years ago. 
The conditions are deplorable; soaking wet in the monsoon season and 
freezing in the winter.
  Many Americans are aware of the plight of these Tibetan refugees and 
have started taking actions to help them. The Dalai Lama is a full 
partner in this project and has put the full weight of his friends and 
government behind this.
  This money will fund a plan to purchase 14 acres of land on behalf of 
the Tibetans and provide for the construction of a multi-unit 
development for 160 of the poorest families. An American architect has 
volunteered his time to visit the site, direct the preliminary 
clearing, and draw the plans for the village.
  General Mick Kicklighter, U.S. Army, Ret., serves as President of 
Habitat for Humanity International and will oversee the direction of 
resources for this project. The President of the Arundel County, 
Maryland, Habitat for Humanity affiliate is working to lay out detailed 
building time and cost management for the village. The property has 
been obtained, building permits secured and the land has been cleared 
by the hand effort of the refugees.
  I ask my colleagues to join me and the cosponsors to this amendment 
to support funding in the amount of $1.5 million to directed to Habitat 
for Humanity International for completion of this project. The creation 
of this village with U.S. assistance will serve as a model for the 
international aid community. I firmly believe that the impact of this 
modest sum will be felt globally.


                           amendment no. 1176

       On page 33, line 6, before the colon, insert the following: 
     ``, of which no less than $1,000,000 shall be available for 
     the Defense Institute of International Studies to enhance its 
     mission, functioning and performance by providing for its 
     fixed costs of operation''.
                                  ____



                           amendment no. 1177

       At the appropriate place, insert:
       It is the sense of the Senate that:
       The Senate finds, that: The proposed programs under the 
     Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) are critical and 
     essential to preserving U.S. national security.
       The Department of State programs under the ETRI be funded 
     at or near the full request of $250 million in the Foreign 
     Operations Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2000 prior to 
     final passage.

  Mr. McCONNELL. These amendments have been cleared on both sides, and 
I ask they be considered and agreed to en bloc.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendments 
en bloc.
  The amendments (Nos. 1125, 1146, 1150, 1151, 1158, 1162, 1163, 1167, 
1168, and 1173 through 1177) were agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEAHY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


    Amendments Nos. 1159 and 1170 through 1172, En Bloc, as modified

  Mr. McCONNELL. I send the following modifications to amendments that 
are at the desk:
  No. 1159, Senator Landrieu on orphans; No. 1170, Senator Brownback, 
the Sudan; No. 1171, Senator DeWine on Colombia; and No. 1172, Senator 
Reid on Iraq.
  The amendment (No. 1170), as modified, is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:

     SEC. __. INTERNATIONAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE FOR OPPOSITION-
                   CONTROLLED AREAS OF SUDAN.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, of the funds 
     made available under chapter 9 of part I of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to international disaster 
     assistance) for fiscal year 2000, up to $4,000,000

[[Page S7885]]

     should be made available for rehabilitation and economic 
     recovery in opposition-controlled areas of Sudan. Such funds 
     are to be used to improve economic governance, primary 
     education, agriculture, and other locally-determined 
     priorities. Such funds are to be programmed and implemented 
     jointly by the United States Agency for International 
     Development and the Department of Agriculture, and may be 
     utilized for activities which can be implemented for a period 
     of up to two years.

     SEC. __. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR SUDANESE INDIGENOUS 
                   GROUPS.

       The President, acting through the appropriate Federal 
     agencies, is authorized to provide humanitarian assistance, 
     including food, directly to the National Democratic Alliance 
     participants and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement 
     operating outside of the Operation Lifeline Sudan structure.

     SEC. __. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR OPPOSITION-CONTROLLED 
                   AREAS OF SUDAN.

       (a) Increase in Development Assistance.--The President, 
     acting through the United States Agency for International 
     Development, is authorized to increase substantially the 
     amount of development assistance for capacity building, 
     democracy promotion, civil administration, judiciary, and 
     infrastructure support in opposition-controlled areas of 
     Sudan.
       (b) Quarterly Report.--The President shall submit a report 
     on a quarterly basis to the Congress on progress made in 
     carrying out subsection (a).

  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment that 
has been cleared, I understand, by both sides. I would like to submit 
into the Record a clarification regarding the distribution of 
humanitarian assistance, including food, directly to the National 
Democratic Alliance participants operating outside of the Operation 
Lifeline Sudan structure. Namely, the intent and expectation of the 
Senate through this language is for the Sudanese People's Liberation 
Movement to be a recipient as a leading member participant in the 
National Democratic Alliance.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, it is important to view this amendment in 
the greater context of the current humanitarian situation in southern 
Sudan.
  The situation is dire, to say the least: the famine of last year took 
the lives of hundreds of thousands as flights of relief were banned by 
Khartoum from large areas outside their control, an act which triggered 
famine and starvation. The regime in Khartoum is allowed to halt U.N. 
relief flights at will because of the terms of the 1989 agreement which 
establish Operation Lifeline Sudan--the U.N. relief organization. As I 
noted in an op-ed in The Washington Post on July 19, 1998, the 
``practice starves combatants and noncombatants alike and compromises 
the integrity and effectiveness of relief groups desperately trying to 
fend off famine.''
  I ask unanimous consent that op-ed be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, July 19, 1998]

                Sudan's Merciless War on Its Own People

                            (By Bill Frist)

       When the United Nations World Food Program announced last 
     week that up to 2.6 million people in southern Sudan are in 
     imminent danger of starvation, the news was received with 
     surprising nonchalance. Such news is becoming almost routine 
     from misery-plagued East Africa, but what is unfolding in 
     southern Sudan is at least the fourth widespread, large-scale 
     humanitarian disaster in the region in the past 15 years.
       In all cases, the United States' record is not one of 
     success. Ethiopia in 1984, a disastrous military involvement 
     in Somalia in 1993 and shameful neglect in Rwanda in 1994 
     have left the public bitter toward the prospect of yet more 
     involvement. But again, as famine hovers over the region, we 
     face a disconcertingly similar quandary on the nature of our 
     response.
       In January I worked in southern Sudan as a medical 
     missionary, and I have seen firsthand the terrible effects of 
     the continuing civil war and how that war came to help create 
     this situation. As a United States senator, however, I fear 
     that by failing to make necessary changes in our response, 
     American policy toward Sudan may be a contributing factor in 
     the horrendous prospect of widespread starvation.
       The radical Islamic regime in Khartoum is unmatched in its 
     barbarity toward the sub-Saharan or ``black African'' 
     Christians of the country's South. It is largely responsible 
     for creating this impending disaster through a concerted and 
     sustained war on its own people, in which calculated 
     starvation, bombing of hospitals, slavery and the killing of 
     innocent women and children are standard procedure.
       Our policy toward Khartoum looks tough on paper, but it has 
     yet to pose a serious challenge to the Islamic dictatorship. 
     Neither has our wavering and inconsistent commitment to 
     sanctions affected its behavior or its ability to finance the 
     war.
       Khartoum is set to gain billions of dollars in oil revenues 
     from fields it is preparing to exploit in areas of rebel 
     activity. The U.S. sanctions prohibit any American 
     investment, but recent evidence indicates that enforcement is 
     lax. Additionally, relief groups operating there report that 
     new weapons are flowing in as part of a deal with one of the 
     partners--a government-owned petroleum company in China.
       It is our policy toward southern Sudan that is of more 
     immediate importance to the potential humanitarian disaster. 
     From my own experience operating in areas where U.S. 
     government relief is rarely distributed, I fear that both 
     unilaterally and as a member of the United Nations, the 
     United States unnecessarily restricts our own policy in odd 
     deference to the regime in Khartoum.
       In southern Sudan our humanitarian relief contributions to 
     the starving are largely funneled through nongovernmental 
     relief organizations that participate in Operation Lifeline 
     Sudan. All of our contributions to the United Nations efforts 
     are distributed through this flawed deal.
       In this political arrangement the Khartoum regime has veto 
     power over all decisions as to where food can be sent. That 
     which is needed in the areas outside their control is often 
     used as an instrument of war, with Khartoum routinely denying 
     permission for a flight to land in an area of rebel activity, 
     especially during times when international attention lacks 
     its current focus. This practice starves combatants and 
     noncombatants alike and compromises the integrity 
     and effectiveness of relief groups desperately trying to 
     fend off famine.
       Despite associated risks, some relief groups operate 
     successfully outside the arrangement's umbrella, getting good 
     and medicine to areas that the regime in Khartoum would 
     rather see starve. Out of concern that the Khartoum regime 
     would be provoked into prohibiting all relief deliveries 
     under the scheme, the U.S. Agency for International 
     Development and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance do 
     not regularly funnel famine relief through outside 
     organizations, and thus our relief supplies are only 
     selectively distributed--a decision that unnecessarily abets 
     Khartoum's agenda.
       The U.S. policy in Sudan does not seek an immediate rebel 
     victory and the fragmenting of Sudan that could follow. 
     Because the splintered rebel groups could not provide a 
     functioning government or civil society at this time, that 
     policy cannot be thrown out wholesale. Yet our failure to 
     separate this policy from the action necessary to save these 
     people from starvation result in absurdity.
       Thus even while generously increasing the amount of aid, 
     for political reasons we seek the permission of the ``host 
     government'' in Khartoum to distribute it and feed the very 
     people they are attempting to kill through starvation and 
     war. A second reason for this posture is, presumably, a fear 
     that even modest, calculated food aid would allow the rebels 
     to mobilize instead of foraging for their families--a factor 
     that could turn the outcome on the battlefield in their 
     favor.
       The prospect of widespread starvation in southern Sudan 
     does not necessitate that the United States seek a quick 
     solution on the battlefield. Military victory and an end to 
     hostilities are not a substitute for food. However, the 
     administration should make an immediate and necessary 
     distinction between the policy principle and the humanitarian 
     challenge. It should articulate a response without political 
     limitations, which, frankly, are trivial in comparison to the 
     human lives at stake, and it should press the United Nations 
     to do the same.
       We can no longer afford to dance around the issues of 
     sovereignty and political principles while restraining our 
     response to a looming disaster that Khartoum helped create. 
     Such academic debates and diplomatic concerns are for the 
     well fed, but offer no solace to the starving.

  Mr. FRIST. The Government of Sudan continues to prosecute the war 
against the south, including the bombing of hospitals and churches, and 
a campaign of terror, including slavery. Nearly 2 million have died 
since 1983, with over 4 million displaced from their homes.
  In January of last year, I worked in southern Sudan as a medical 
missionary, in areas outside of government control, and in 
``hospitals'' and clinics where I treated people who had never seen a 
doctor. What I saw was the product of an indiscriminate and savage war.
  Since that time I have worked with other Senators, relief 
organizations, and the administration in trying to make our 
humanitarian policy as effective as it possibly can be. It must be a 
policy which does more than meet the immediate food needs of those who 
hover on the brink of starvation. It must be a policy which seeks to 
eliminate the root causes. The inability of the populations in areas 
outside of the control of the Government of Sudan to protect themselves 
is at the root of

[[Page S7886]]

their vulnerability to starvation and famine.
  That is not a politically or logistically easy task. It does not have 
a single solution which can simply be enacted. It requires that we 
constantly push the policy to adapt and become more effective, rather 
than simply become an amount for which we simply write a check each 
fiscal year. This amendment does not represent the solution to the root 
causes of the human tragedy in Sudan, but it is one critical piece 
which we must consider.
  The authorization in this amendment will open this issue and place it 
at the top of the list of issues which we continue to work through with 
the administration. That process of Congress and the administration 
jointly working on a more effective Sudan policy has had its moments of 
disagreement, but it has been largely productive and one where our 
shared goals have never been compromised.
  Additionally, it is worth noting that, beyond the traditional 
chiefdoms, the groups designated in this amendment are really the only 
organizations functioning in areas outside of the control of the 
government of Sudan. As a consequence, these are the only organizations 
which are defending these populations against the heinous attacks by 
the Government of Sudan and, increasingly, by irregular or paramilitary 
organizations sponsored by Khartoum--including slaving parties.
  The more than 1 million dollars' worth of relief distributed in Sudan 
on a daily basis is done so in such a way that it is purposefully 
steered away from combatants. From the relief organizations' view 
point, that is essential to maintain some level of insulation from the 
political aspects of the war. They see themselves as strictly 
humanitarian organizations.
  However, from a practical standpoint, that practice has an 
unintended, but not surprising consequence. Because the members of the 
resistance groups have to eat too--for they suffer from starvation as 
much as women and children--they regularly divert food donations to 
their own use.
  Possibly more important than that is the effect on these 
organizations themselves and their ability to provide protection for 
the populations they defend. Because their food supply is erratic and 
dependent on diversions of other aid, they are often forced to 
demobilize to either collect food on their own, to steal food, or to 
leave to plant their crops. The practical effect of that is that they 
cannot stay mobilized and cannot provide any reliable or cohesive 
defense.
  It is important to remember then that this amendment should not be 
seen as a reward to the resistance groups. Yet I remind my colleagues 
that they are the only line of defense between those people and the 
regime in Khartoum which seeks to subdue or exterminate them in a 
sustained effort of low-level ethnic cleansing.
  The timing of presenting this authority to the President is 
critically important. The government of Sudan is poised to begin 
receiving billions of dollars in hard currency from the sale of newly 
exploited oil in contested areas. The regime in Khartoum has repeatedly 
and publically said their intention is to convert that hard currency 
straight into an renewed effort to subdue or eradicate the people in 
areas outside their control. The ability of the resistance groups to 
stay mobilized and coherent is arguably more important now than since 
the beginning of the war. A predictable supply of food is the key to 
realizing that defense. Again, more so than the weapons Khartoum is 
purchasing or receiving from the outside world, it is food which most 
devastating.
  Besides the obvious human cost of an ineffective defense against 
Khartoum and their proxies, is the potential cost to the renewed effort 
to bring the combatants into an effective peace process. As I noted in 
a further piece in The Washington Post, we must use all available tools 
to bring the combatants to the table.
  I ask unanimous consent that be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the Washington Post, June 9, 1999]

                      An End to the Sudan Tragedy

                            (By Bill Frist)

       The Post's May 7 editorial ``Sudan: The Unending War'' 
     brought to light two critical points about that barbaric war 
     of ``ethnic cleansing.'' One is that our actions in Kosovo 
     emphasize our failure to act in the much larger war in Sudan. 
     Without Kosovo, the war in Sudan would continue in obscurity. 
     The other is that it is time for the United States to 
     redouble its efforts toward bringing the war to a conclusion. 
     As bad as the situation has become and intractable as the 
     conflict may seem, we may have a small chance for peace.
       But the United States must redouble its efforts 
     strategically with a realistic understanding of our strengths 
     and limitations. What may seem like minor differences among 
     our options actually can represent fundamental differences 
     between success and failure. The appointment of a special 
     envoy may bring needed attention and diplomatic weight to 
     that effort, but it would represent neither a clear 
     understanding of our limitations nor a strategy that can 
     maximize our effectiveness.
       A strategy that does so requires three basic steps in the 
     coming months:
       We must recognize the conflict for what it is: a calculated 
     and sustained effort by the regime in Khartoum to subdue, 
     eradicate or forcibly convert to Islam large segments of 
     their own population. The fact that it is not exclusively a 
     Muslim against Christian or Arab against black African war 
     must not distract us from its barbarity. Even without a clear 
     ``good guy,'' the war is indiscriminate and patently evil. As 
     the editorial pointed out, it already has claimed more lives 
     than the wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya and Somalia 
     combined.
       We must conduct our relief operations so they address the 
     roots of the humanitarian disaster, not just the symptoms. We 
     must continue to change our operations so they do not 
     inadvertently abet the agenda of Khartoum by allowing the 
     government to use our food donations as a weapon--as it dose 
     with its calculated denial of access to relief flights that 
     carry out contributions through the United Nations.
       We also must change the nature of our generous 
     contributions, moving away from simply food, literally 
     falling from the sky into starving villages, to one where we 
     seek to help establish the most basic civil and economic 
     institutions in the areas outside the government's control. 
     It is the near absence of those institutions in some areas 
     that prevents the Sudanese from sustaining themselves. I plan 
     to introduce legislation that will address those 
     shortcomings, both in our own programs and in the United 
     Nations. Congress can urge the president to continue 
     implementing those changes, but we also must be prepared to 
     support him fully as he does.
       We must work harder to reinvigorate the existing 
     multilateral peace process and bring significant pressure to 
     bear on the warring parties and supporters to come to the 
     peace table. Khartoum uses seductive diversions--
     ``confessions'' of war-weariness and other hints that a 
     ``breakthrough'' is at hand--to avoid a process in which it 
     would actually have to produce results.
       The rebels continue to be fractious on their endgame. A 
     strong peace process based on an airtight list of principles 
     and measures of success can encourage both to deliver 
     tangible results. A special envoy alone, secret ``diplomatic 
     missions'' or any other effort that does not bring the 
     combatants and their supporters to the table cannot provide 
     three essential elements: the elimination of a scapegoat for 
     a failed process, sustained pressure on all parties to show 
     progress and a healthy dose of embarrassment for the world 
     regarding the situation.
       The tragedy of Sudan has been perpetuated by shameful, 
     worldwide neglect and a stunning lack of resolve. Until 
     Khartoum succeeds in its goal of ethnic cleansing, the war 
     will never go away on its own. Short of military intervention 
     or comprehensive U.N. sanctions, for which there is no 
     political will, a coherent, cooperative and realistic 
     strategy offers the best chance for progress--albeit 16 years 
     late.

  Mr. FRIST. The most important tool to bring them to the table is to 
continue to highlight the fact that neither side will win this war 
outright on the battlefield. If Khartoum believes they can not win the 
war on the battlefield because of their new found source of hard 
currency, they have absolutely no reason to come to the table and work 
for real peace. Short of military intervention on our own, the best way 
we can disabuse them of that notion and continue to press them to 
commit to a peace process is to clearly eliminate the greatest 
weaknesses which they will exploit. The greatest weakness is not so 
much the southern Sudanese's vulnerability to attack, but their 
inability to defend. That inability is not caused by a lack of 
weaponry, but a lack of calories.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McConnell] proposes 
     amendments Nos. 1159, 1171 and 1172, as modified, en bloc.

  The amendments are as follows:


                    amendment no. 1159, as modified

       On page 21, line 22, before the period insert the 
     following: ``Provided further; That of the

[[Page S7887]]

     amount appropriated under this heading, not to exceed 
     $2,000,000 shall be available for grants to nongovernmental 
     organization that work with orphans who are transitioning out 
     of institutions to teach life skills and job skills''.
                                  ____



                    amendment no. 1171, as modified

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC.   . SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING COLOMBIA.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Colombia is a democratic country fighting multiple 
     wars:
       (A) a war against the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces 
     (FARC);
       (B) a war against the National Liberation Army (ELN);
       (C) a war against paramilitary organizations; and
       (C) a war against drug lords who traffic in deadly cocaine 
     and heroin.
       (3)Colombia is the world's third most dangerous country in 
     terms of political violence with 34 percent of world 
     terrorist acts committed there.
       (4) Colombia is the world's kidnaping capital of the world 
     with 2,609 kidnapings reported in 1998 and 513 reported in 
     the first three months of 1999.
       (5) In 1998 alone, 308,000 Colombians were internally 
     displaced in Colombia. Over the last decade, 35,000 
     Colombians have been killed.
       (6) The FARC and ELN are the two main guerrilla groups 
     which have waged the longest-running anti-government 
     insurgency in Latin America.
       (7) The Colombian rebels have a combined strength of 10,00 
     to 20,000 full-time guerrillas; they have initiated armed 
     action in nearly 700 of the country's 1073 municipalities, 
     and control or influence roughly 60 percent of rural Colombia 
     including a demilitarized zone using their armed stranglehold 
     to abuse Colombian citizens.
       (8) Although the Colombian Army has 122,000 soldiers, there 
     are roughly only 20,000 soldiers available for offensive 
     combat operations.
       (9) Colombia faces the threat of the armed paramilitaries, 
     5,000 strong, who are constantly driving a wedge in the peace 
     process by their insistence in participating in the peace 
     talks.
       (10) More than 75 percent of the world's cocaine HCL and 75 
     percent of the heroin seized in the northeast United States 
     is of Colombian origin.
       (11) The conflicts in Colombia are creating spillovers to 
     the border countries of Venezuela, Panama and Equador: 
     Venezuela has sent 30,000 troops to its border the Ecuador is 
     sending 10,000 troops to its border.
       (12) Venezuela is our number one supplier of oil.
       (13) By the end of 1999, all U.S. military troops will have 
     departed from Panama, leaving the Panama Canal unprotected.
       (14) In 1998, two-way trade between the United States and 
     Colombia was more than $11 billion, making the United States 
     Colombia's number one trading partner and Colombia the fifth 
     largest market for U.S. exports in the region.
       (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that--
       (1) the United States should recognize the crisis in 
     Colombia and play a more pro-active role in its resolution;
       (2) the United States should mobilize the international 
     community to pro-actively engaged in resolving Colombian 
     wars; and
       (3) pledge or political support to help Colombia with the 
     peace process.
                                  ____



                    amendment no. 1172, as modified

       At the appropriate place, add the following:
       It is the sense of the Senate that the President and the 
     Secretary of State should--
       (1) raise the need for accountability of Saddam Hussein and 
     several key members of his regime at the International 
     Criminal Court Preparatory Commission, which will meet in New 
     York on July 26, 1999, through August 13, 1999;
       (2) continue to push for the creation of a commission under 
     the auspices of the United Nations to establish an 
     international record of the criminal culpability of Saddam 
     Hussein and other Iraqi officials;
       (3) continue to push for the United Nations to form an 
     international criminal tribunal for the purpose of indicting, 
     prosecuting, and imprisoning Saddam Hussein and any other 
     Iraqi officials who may be found responsible for crimes 
     against humanity, genocide, and other violations of 
     international humanitarian law; and
       (4) upon the creation of a commission and international 
     criminal tribunal, take steps necessary, including the 
     reprogramming of funds, to ensure United States support for 
     efforts to bring Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials to 
     justice.

  Mr. McCONNELL. I ask unanimous consent that these amendments, as 
modified, be agreed to en bloc.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendments 
en bloc, as modified.
  The amendments (Nos. 1159, and 1171 and 1172) as modified, were 
agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEAHY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. There are six amendments at the desk that will not be 
proposed. I ask unanimous consent the following amendments not be 
proposed:
  No. 1120, Senator Brownback on the Sudan; No. 1147, Senator Brownback 
on the Sudan; No. 1149, Senator Grassley on narcotics; No. 1156, 
Senator Biden on Iraq; No. 1169, Senator Kerry of Massachusetts, code 
of conduct; No. 1155, Senator Biden on Iraq.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. We approved earlier in the day 19 amendments in the 
managers' package. We just approved 18 more from a list compiled at 1 
p.m., the deadline for getting amendments to the desk.
  There are 5 more amendments we withdrew that will not be offered. 
That leaves 12 amendments, I say to my friend from Vermont, that remain 
to be addressed.
  We are working on paring that list down further.
  Mr. DODD. I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I call up an amendment at the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has two amendments?
  Mr. DODD. One amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. One amendment.


                           Amendment No. 1157

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd], for himself and 
     Mr. Leahy, proposes an amendment numbered 1157.

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill at the following new 
     section:

     SEC.   . TERMINATION OF PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON 
                   TRAVEL TO CUBA.

       (a) Travel to Cuba.--
       (1) Freedom of travel for united states citizens and legal 
     residents.--Subject to subsection (b), the President shall 
     not regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly, travel to 
     or from Cuba by United States citizens or legal residents, or 
     any of the transactions incident to such travel that are set 
     forth in paragraph (2).
       (2) Transactions incident to travel.--The transactions 
     referred paragraph (1) are--
       (A) any transaction ordinarily incident to travel to or 
     from Cuba, including the importation into Cuba or the United 
     States of accompanied baggage for personal use only:
       (B) any transaction ordinarily incident to travel or 
     maintenance within Cuba, including the payment of living 
     expenses and the acquisition of goods or services for 
     personal use;
       (C) any transaction ordinarily incident to the arrangement, 
     promotion, or facilitation of travel to, from, or within 
     Cuba;
       (D) any transaction incident to non-scheduled air, sea, or 
     land voyages, except that this subparagraph does not 
     authorize the carriage of articles into Cuba or the United 
     States except accompanied baggage; and
       (E) any normal banking transaction incident to any activity 
     described in any of the preceding subparagraphs, including 
     the issuance, clearing, processing, or payment of checks, 
     drafts, travelers checks, credit or debit card instruments, 
     or similar instruments; except that this paragraph does not 
     authorize the importation into the United States of any goods 
     for personal consumption acquired in Cuba.
       (b) Exceptions.--The restrictions on authority contained in 
     subsection (a)(1) do not apply in a case in which--
       (1) the United States is at war with Cuba; or
       (2) armed hostilities between the two countries are in 
     progress.
       (c) Applicability.--This section applies to actions taken 
     by the President before the date of the enactment of this Act 
     which are in effect on such date, and to action taken on or 
     after such date.
       (d) Supersedes Other Provisions.--This section supersedes 
     any other provision of law, including section 102(h) of the 
     Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 
     1996.


                Amendment No. 1182 To Amendment No. 1157

(Purpose: To terminate prohibitions and restrictions on travel to Cuba)

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment in the 
second degree and ask for its immediate consideration.

[[Page S7888]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Vermont [Mr. Leahy] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1182 to amendment No. 1157.

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       Strike everything after ``SEC___.'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof the following:

     RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL BY AMERICAN CITIZENS TO 
                   CUBA.

       (a) Travel to Cuba.--
       (1) Freedom of travel for united states citizens and legal 
     residents.--Subject to subsection (b), the President shall 
     not regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly, travel to 
     or from Cuba by United States citizens or legal residents, or 
     any of the transactions incident to such travel that are set 
     forth in paragraph (2).
       (2) Transactions incident to travel.--The transactions 
     referred to in paragraph (1) are--
       (A) any transaction ordinarily incident to travel to or 
     from Cuba, including the importation into Cuba or the United 
     States of accompanied baggage for personal use only;
       (B) any transaction ordinarily incident to travel or 
     maintenance within Cuba, including the payment of living 
     expenses and the acquisition of goods or services for 
     personal use;
       (C) any transaction ordinarily incident to the arrangement, 
     promotion, or facilitation of travel to, from, or within 
     Cuba;
       (D) any transaction incident to nonscheduled air, sea, or 
     land voyages, except that this subparagraph does not 
     authorize the carriage of articles into Cuba or the United 
     States except accompanied baggage; and
       (E) any normal banking transaction incident to any activity 
     described in any of the preceding subparagraphs, including 
     the issuance, clearing, processing, or payment of checks, 
     drafts, travelers checks, credit or debit card instruments, 
     or similar instruments;
     except that this paragraph does not authorize the importation 
     into the United States of any goods for personal consumption 
     acquired in Cuba.
       (b) Exceptions.--The restrictions on authority contained in 
     subsection (a)(1) do not apply in a case in which--
       (1) the United States is at war with Cuba;
       (2) armed hostilities between the two countries are in 
     progress; or
       (3) there is imminent danger to the public health or the 
     physical safety of United States travelers.
       (c) Applicability.--This section applies to actions taken 
     by the President before the date of the enactment of this Act 
     which are in effect on such date, and to actions taken on or 
     after such date.
       (d) Supersedes Other Provisions.--This section supersedes 
     any other provision of law, including section 102(h) of the 
     Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 
     1996.

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the Dodd 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to it being in order to 
request the yeas and nays on the first-degree amendment?
  Mr. DODD. On the Dodd amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Is there a sufficient second?
  There is not a sufficient second.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative assistant proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, as I understand it, the second-degree 
amendment is what is pending before the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second on the second-
degree amendment? There is not.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative assistant proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. I believe the Senator would like to renew his request for 
the yeas and nays.
  Mr. LEAHY. I renew the request on the second-degree amendment, Mr. 
President. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Vermont for his 
second-degree proposal. We will take a very short amount of time. It is 
not our intention to spend a great deal of time on this particular 
proposal. We have proposed the pending amendments because we believe 
the time has come to lift the very archaic, counterproductive, and ill-
conceived ban on Americans traveling to Cuba. Not only does this ban 
hinder rather than help our effort to spread democracy, it 
unnecessarily abridges the rights of ordinary Americans.
  The United States was founded on the principles of liberty and 
freedom. Yet when it comes to Cuba, our Government abridges these 
rights with no greater rationale than political and rhetorical gain.
  Cuba lies just 90 miles from America's shore. Yet those 90 miles of 
water might as well be an entire ocean. We have made a land ripe for 
American influence forbidden territory. In doing so, we have enabled 
Fidel Castro's regime to hold onto power longer and contributed to the 
continued oppression of the Cuban people.
  Surely we do not ban travel to Cuba out of concern for the safety of 
Americans who might visit that island nation. Today Americans are free 
to travel to Iran, Sudan, Burma, Yugoslavia, North Korea--but not to 
Cuba. You can fly to North Korea; you can fly to Iran; you can travel 
freely. Yet it seems to me if you can go to those countries, you ought 
not be denied the right to go to Cuba. If the Cubans want to stop 
Americans from visiting that country, that ought to be their business. 
But to say to an American citizen that you can travel to Iran, where 
they held hostages for months on end, to North Korea, which has 
declared us to be an enemy of theirs completely, but not to travel 90 
miles off our shore to Cuba I think is a mistake.
  To this day, some Iranian politicians believe the United States to be 
``the Great Satan.'' We hear it all the time. Just two decades ago, 
Iran occupied our Embassy and took innocent American diplomats hostage. 
To this day, protesters in Tehran burn the American flag with the 
encouragement of the members of their Government. Those few Americans 
who venture into such inhospitable surroundings often find themselves 
pelted by rocks and accosted by the public.
  Similarly, we do not ban travel to Sudan, a nation we attacked with 
cruise missiles last summer for its support of terrorism; to Burma, a 
nation with one of the most oppressive regimes in the world today; to 
North Korea, whose soldiers have peered at American servicemen through 
gun sights for decades; or Syria, which has one of the most egregious 
human rights records and is one of the foremost sponsors of terrorism.
  I can go to Iran, but I cannot go to Cuba. There is an inconsistency 
here that I think we ought to undo. We ban travel to Cuba, a nation 
which is neither at war with the United States nor a sponsor of 
terrorism. I fail to see how isolating the Cuban people from democratic 
values and ideals will foster the transition to democracy in that 
country.
  I fail to see how isolating the Cuban people from democratic values 
and from the influence of Americans when they go to that country to 
help bring about the change we all seek serves our own interests.
  Before I go on, let me be perfectly clear: I strongly support 
effective measures to bring democratic values and rule to all people, 
including Cuba. No one, certainly not Cubans, should have to live under 
a dictator's fist. Cubans cannot travel freely to the United States. 
That is because Fidel Castro does not allow them to do so. Those of us 
who watched our television screens last night and saw those Cubans 
trying to escape the dictatorial regime in Cuba, picked up by Cuban 
boats were horrified by that kind of activity.
  Because Fidel Castro does not permit Cubans to leave Cuba and come to 
this country is not justification for adopting a similar principle in 
this country

[[Page S7889]]

that says Americans cannot travel freely. We have a Bill of Rights. We 
have fundamental rights that we embrace as American citizens. Travel is 
one of them. If other countries want to prohibit us from going there, 
then that is their business. But for us to say that citizens of 
Connecticut or Alabama cannot go where they like is not the kind of 
restraint we ought to put on people.
  If I can travel to North Korea, if I can travel to the Sudan, if I 
can travel to Iran, I do not understand the justification for saying I 
cannot travel to Cuba. I happen to believe that by allowing Americans 
to travel there, we can begin to have the influence in Cuba that can 
begin to change the demographics politically to make a difference in 
bringing about the change we all seek in that country.
  Today, every single country in the Western Hemisphere is a democracy, 
with one exception: Cuba. American influence through person-to-person 
and cultural exchanges was a prime factor in this evolution from a 
hemisphere ruled predominantly by authoritarian or military regimes to 
one where democracy is the rule, with one exception: Cuba.
  Our policy toward Cuba blocks these exchanges and prevents the United 
States from using our most potent weapon in our effort to combat 
totalitarian regimes, and that is our own people. They are the best 
ambassadors we have.
  Most totalitarian regimes bar Americans from coming into their 
countries for the very reasons I just mentioned. They are afraid the 
gospel of freedom will motivate their citizens to overthrow dictators, 
as they have done in dozens of nations over the last half century. 
Isn't it ironic that when it comes to Cuba we do the dictator's bidding 
for him in a sense? Cuba does not have to worry about spreading 
democracy. Our own Government stops us from doing so.
  The current state of regulations governing who can and cannot travel 
to Cuba is a complex and subjective morass. My colleague, Senator 
Leahy, has first-hand experience in attempting to navigate the sea of 
bureaucracy.
  When he attempted to travel to Cuba earlier this year with his wife 
Marcelle, he discovered that while his travel was exempt from certain 
licensing requirements, his wife's travel was not. Ultimately, she was 
able to accompany her husband after applying for a license based on her 
work as a registered nurse.
  The fact is, the entire process is a farce and everyone knows it. 
Other couples, not a U.S. Senator and his wife, would probably not fare 
as well in gaining a license to travel to Cuba.

  Let me review for my colleagues who may travel to Cuba under current 
Government regulations and under what circumstances. The following 
categories of people may travel to Cuba without applying to the 
Treasury Department for a specific license to travel. They are deemed 
to be authorized to travel under so-called general license: Government 
officials, regularly employed journalists, professional researchers who 
are ``full time professionals who travel to Cuba to conduct 
professional research in their professional areas,'' Cuban Americans 
who have relatives in Cuba who are ill but only once a year they can go 
back.
  There are other categories of individuals who theoretically are 
eligible to travel to Cuba as well, but they must apply for a license 
from the Department of the Treasury and prove they fit a category in 
which travel to Cuba is permissible.
  What are these categories?
  One, freelance journalists, provided they can prove they are 
journalists; they must also submit their itinerary for the proposed 
research.
  Two, Cuban Americans who are unfortunate enough to have more than one 
humanitarian emergency in a 12-month period and therefore cannot travel 
under a general license.
  Three, students and faculty from U.S. academic institutions that are 
accredited by an appropriate national or regional educational 
accrediting association who are participating in a ``structural 
education program.''
  Four, members of U.S. religious organizations.
  Five, individuals participating in public performances, clinics, 
workshops, athletic and other competitions and exhibitions.
  Just because you think you may fall into one of the above enumerated 
categories does not necessarily mean you will actually be licensed by 
the U.S. Government to travel to Cuba.
  Who decides whether a researcher's work is legitimate? Who decides 
whether a freelance journalist is really conducting journalistic 
activities? Who decides whether or not a professor or student is 
participating in a ``structured educational program''? Who decides 
whether a religious person is really going to conduct religious 
activities?
  I will tell you who does. Some Government bureaucrats are making 
those decisions about those personal rights of American citizens.
  It is truly unsettling, to put it mildly, when you think about it, 
and probably unconstitutional at its core. It is a real intrusion on 
the fundamental rights of American citizens.
  It also says something about what we as a Government think about our 
own people. Do we really believe that a journalist, a Government 
official, a Senator, a Congressman, a baseball player, a ballerina, a 
college professor or minister are somehow superior to other citizens 
who do not fall into those categories; that only these categories of 
people are ``good examples'' for the Cuban people to observe in order 
to understand American values?
  I do not think so. I find such a notion insulting. There is no better 
way to communicate America's values and ideals than by unleashing 
average American men and women to demonstrate by daily living what our 
great country stands for and the contrasts between what we stand for 
and what exists in Cuba today.
  I do not believe there was ever a sensible rationale for restricting 
Americans' right to travel to Cuba. With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and an end to the cold war, I do not think an excuse remains 
today to ban this kind of travel.

  This argument that dollars and tourism will be used to prop up the 
regime is specious. The regime seems to have survived 38 years despite 
the Draconian U.S. embargo during that entire period. The notion that 
allowing Americans to spend a few dollars in Cuba is somehow going to 
give major aid and comfort to the Cuban regime is without basis, in my 
view.
  This spring, we got a taste of what people-to-people exchanges 
between the United States and Cuba might mean when the Baltimore 
Orioles and the Cuban National Team played a home-and-home series. The 
game brought players from two nations with the greatest love of 
baseball together for the first time in generations. It is time to 
bring the fans together. It is time to let Americans and Cubans meet in 
the baseball stands and on the streets of Havana.
  Political rhetoric is not sufficient reason to abridge the freedoms 
of American citizens. Nor is it sufficient reason to stand by a law 
which counteracts one of the basic premises of American foreign policy; 
namely, the spread of democracy. The time has come to allow Americans--
average Americans--to travel freely to Cuba. I urge my colleagues to 
support this amendment.
  Again, I make this point to my colleagues: There are no restrictions 
on you if you want to travel to the Communist Government of North 
Korea, to the Communist Government of the People's Republic of China, 
to the Communist Government of Vietnam, to the terrorist-supported 
Government of Iran, or to travel to the Sudan. This is a completely 
uneven standard we are applying in order to satisfy some political 
rhetoric.
  If you really want to create some change in Cuba, then unleash the 
flood of U.S. citizens going down there and talking to average Cubans 
on the streets of Havana and Santiago and the small communities. Give 
the 11 million people in Cuba a chance to interface and interact with 
American citizens. If Fidel Castro wants to say, ``No, you can't come 
here,'' let him say that, but let not us do his bidding by saying to 
average citizens: You cannot go there. That is a denial, in my view, of 
a fundamental right and freedom, unless there is an overriding national 
interest which would preclude and prohibit American citizens from 
traveling to a given country. That case has not been

[[Page S7890]]

made. It cannot be made when it comes to Cuba.
  Senator Leahy and I urge the adoption of this amendment to begin to 
create the change we all want to see on this island nation 90 miles off 
our shore.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Abraham). The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the distinguished senior Senator from 
Connecticut has stated the arguments so very well. Like he, I have 
traveled to Cuba. I visited Cuba 3 months ago with the distinguished 
senior Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Reed.
  We were able to go there because we are U.S. Government officials. If 
we had been private citizens, as the distinguished Senator from 
Connecticut has said, we would have had some problems.
  My friend from Connecticut mentioned the problems that my wife 
Marcelle faced when she went to Cuba. He and I have discussed that 
because of the absurdity of it.
  My wife Marcelle has accompanied me on many foreign trips. We have 
gone abroad representing our country, at the request of the Senate, at 
the request of the President; and sometimes we have traveled on our own 
just to visit friends abroad.
  So we did not think there was much of a difference that time. Our 
passports were in order. We were going to a Caribbean country, having 
traveled in that area often, so we didn't need any special shots or 
anything.
  We were about to go. But a few days before we were to leave --this is 
what the Senator from Connecticut referenced--we received a call from 
the State Department saying they were not sure they could approve my 
wife's travel to Cuba.
  I cannot speak for other Senators, but I suspect that most Senators 
would react the same way I did if they were told that a State 
Department bureaucrat had the authority to prevent their spouse or 
their children from traveling with them to a country with which we are 
not at war and which, according to the Defense Department, and 
practically every other American, poses no threat to our national 
security.
  At first I thought it was a joke. They said no. My wife is not a 
Government official. She is not a journalist. They did not think she 
could go. She is, and has been, a practicing, registered nurse 
throughout her professional life. In the end, she was able to join me 
because an American nurses association asked her to report on an aspect 
of current health in Cuba, and she agreed to report back to them.
  Actually she has visited, with me, other parts of the world where we 
have used the Leahy War Victims Fund or where we have gone to visit 
landmine victims or looked at health care. I have always relied on her 
knowledge and expertise and did on this trip.
  But I thought, how many Senators realize that if they wanted to take 
their spouse or their children with them to Cuba, they could be 
prevented from doing so by U.S. authorities. They can take them 
anywhere else in the world, any other country that would allow them in, 
but here it is not that the other country would not allow them in. Our 
country is saying: We're not going to allow you to leave if that is 
where you're going.
  The authors who put that law together knew the blanket prohibition on 
travel by American citizens would be unconstitutional, so they came up 
with a nifty way to avoid that problem while still having the same 
result. They said: Well, Americans could travel to Cuba; they just 
cannot spend any money there.
  Think of it. You can go to Cuba but you can't stay anywhere if it is 
going to cost you money to stay; you can't eat anything if it is going 
to cost you money for the food; you can't take a cab, or anything, from 
the airport if it is going to cost you money.
  Well, come on. Almost a decade has passed since the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union. But even before that Americans went there. Now 
they freely travel to Russia by the thousands every year, as they did 
before the collapse of the Soviet Union.

  Eight years have passed since the Russians cut their $3 billion 
subsidy a year to Cuba, and we now give hundreds of millions of dollars 
in aid to Russia, even though that was our great enemy during the cold 
war.
  Americans, as the Senator from Connecticut has said, can travel to 
North Korea. There are no restrictions on the right of Americans to 
travel there or to spend money there.
  I ask a question of my colleagues: Which country poses a greater 
threat to the United States or world stability? North Korea or Cuba? I 
think the answer, especially if you watch the news at all, is North 
Korea, for it is in South Korea where we have tens of thousands of U.S. 
troops poised to defend it.
  Americans can travel to Iran, a country that is in total, gross 
violation of all international law. They took over our embassy, held 
our diplomats hostage, broke every single possible international law 
there was--they still hold our property that they confiscated from us--
but we can travel freely there; we can spend money there.
  The same goes for Sudan. These are countries that are on our own 
terrorist list, but we can travel there.
  Americans travel to China and Vietnam, countries that have had 
abysmal human rights records. We not only travel there, we actively 
promote American investment there.
  So our Cuban policy is hypocritical, inconsistent, self-defeating, 
and contrary to our values--to give it the benefit of the doubt. We are 
a nation that prides itself on our tradition of encouraging the free 
flow of people and ideas. It is simply impossible to make a rational 
argument that Americans should be able to travel freely to North Korea 
or Iran but not to Cuba. You cannot make that argument.
  I cannot believe that Members of Congress want the State Department 
or the Treasury Department deciding where their family members or 
constituents can travel, unless we are at war or there is a national 
emergency to justify it. But that is what is happening.
  So because it is happening, it should not be surprising to anybody in 
this Chamber that the law is being violated by tens of thousands of 
Americans who are traveling to Cuba every year, and almost none of them 
are prosecuted. I kept running into people on the streets of Havana 
from the United States. I said: Do you have licenses or anything? No. 
We just came down.
  I know people from my own State who drive an hour's drive away to 
Montreal and then fly to Cuba; people who go to the Hemingway Marina in 
their boats and then spend time in Cuba.
  Mr. DODD. Will my colleague yield on that point?
  Mr. LEAHY. Certainly.
  Mr. DODD. I think it is an important point you are making. But I 
think in almost every single case, what these citizens are doing is 
flying through Canada or Cancun and in a sense violating the law; they 
are acting illegally.
  Mr. LEAHY. That is right.
  Mr. DODD. So in a sense we are promoting, by this particular 
provision in our existing law, illegal travel.
  Mr. LEAHY. And also promoting a complete disrespect for our laws 
because everybody knows they are not going to be prosecuted. It is a 
ridiculous thing. Why have this significant law on the books and then 
not prosecute it? Yet if it was being prosecuted, maybe we would hear 
more of a hue and cry to change it.
  It is demeaning to the American people. It is damaging to the rule of 
law. We have been stuck with this absurd policy for years, even though 
almost everybody knows--and most say privately--that it makes 
absolutely no sense. It is beneath the dignity of a great country.
  But I also say it not only helps strengthen Fidel Castro's grip on 
America, it has a huge advantage for our European competitors who are 
building relationships and establishing a base for future investment in 
a post-Castro Cuba.
  When the Castro era ends is anybody's guess. I was a student in law 
school here in Washington shortly after the Bay of Pigs. I remember 
people talking: It will be any minute now--any minute now--Castro is 
out.
  Well, I graduated in 1964, 35 years ago, and he is still there. 
President Castro is not a democratic leader; he is not going to become 
one. But maybe it is time we start pursuing a policy that is in our 
interest, not in a lobbyist's interest or somebody else's interest. I 
should be clear about this amendment. It does not--I repeat and 
underscore

[[Page S7891]]

that--lift the U.S. embargo. It is narrowly worded so it does not do 
that. It permits travelers to go there but to carry only their personal 
belongings. We are not opening up a floodgate for imports to Cuba.

  It limits the value of what Americans can bring home from Cuba to the 
current amount that we Government officials could bring back. That is 
$100. You are not going to start a huge trade in Cuban goods of 
whatever sort for $100, especially some of the more popular Cuban 
goods.
  It reaffirms the President's authority to prohibit travel in times of 
war, armed hostilities, or if there is imminent danger to the health or 
safety of Americans.
  Those who oppose this amendment, who want to prevent Americans from 
traveling to Cuba, will argue that spending dollars there helps prop up 
the Castro government. To some extent that is true, because the Cuban 
Government does run the economy. It also runs the schools, the 
hospitals, maintains roads. As is the U.S. Government, it is 
responsible for a full range of social services. Any money that goes 
into the Cuban economy supports the programs that support ordinary 
Cubans.
  There is a black market in Cuba because no one can survive on their 
meager Government salary. So the income from tourism also fuels that 
informal sector and goes in the pockets of ordinary Cubans.
  It is also worth mentioning that while the average Cuban cannot 
survive on his or her Government salary, you do not see the kind of 
abject poverty in Cuba that is so common elsewhere in Latin America. In 
Brazil, Panama, Mexico, or Peru, all countries we support openly, there 
are children searching through garbage in the street for scraps of food 
next to gleaming highrise hotels with limousines lined up outside.
  In Cuba, with the exception of a tiny elite consisting of the 
President and his friends, everyone is poor. They do have access to 
some basics: A literacy rate of 95 percent; their life expectancy is 
about the same as that of Americans, even though the health system is 
focused on preventive care.
  The point is that while there are obviously parts of the Cuban 
economy we would prefer not to support, as there is in North Korea, 
where we are sending aid, or China or Sudan or any country the 
government of which we disagree, much of the Cuban Government's budget 
benefits ordinary Cubans. So when opponents of this amendment argue 
that we cannot let Americans travel to Cuba because the money they 
spend there will prop up Castro, remember what they are not saying: The 
same dollars also help the Cuban people.
  We are not going to weaken President Castro's grip on power by 
keeping Americans from traveling to Cuba. History has proven that. He 
is as firmly in control now as he was 40 years ago. So let us put a 
little sense into our relationship with Cuba. Let's have a little more 
faith in the power of ideas.
  I would rather have U.S. citizens down there speaking about democracy 
than to have the only voice being the Government's voice speaking about 
our embargo. Let's have the courage to admit the cold war is over, but 
let's also get the State Department out of the business of telling our 
spouses and our children and our constituents where they can travel and 
spend their own money, especially in a tiny country where most 
people are too poor to own an extra pair of shoes or clothes, a country 
that poses no security threat to us.

  This amendment will do far more to win the hearts and minds of the 
Cuban people than the shortsighted approach of those who continue to 
pretend that nothing has changed since 1959.
  I am not one who supports the nondemocratic actions of the Castro 
government. I have spoken very critically both here and in Cuba, of the 
trials and arrests of those who dared to speak out for a different 
government. But I was struck over and over again by Cubans of all walks 
of life basically saying, what are we afraid of? Do we deny our people, 
U.S. citizens, the ability to travel in other countries around the 
world? When I say no, we don't stop them from going to Iran, North 
Korea, China, Russia, Sudan, elsewhere, countries that are even on our 
terrorist list, but we do here, they shake their heads in disbelief--
this in a country where, during the baseball game down there, when the 
United States flag was carried out on to the baseball field, the Cubans 
stood and cheered. We ought to think about that.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I understand the remarks the Senators 
have made. It has been suggested earlier that we have had an absurd 
policy for years and that Cuba is not a real threat to us, certainly 
not as much of a threat as North Korea. I suggest if that is so--and it 
certainly has not been so for very long; I suggest Cuba could in the 
future be a threat to the United States--it is because we stood up to 
them. We contained them. We basically defeated them and stopped them 
when they had a systematic determination to subvert the Western 
Hemisphere and even sent troops into Africa on behalf of Russia, when 
there was a Soviet Union to subvert Africa for totalitarian communism.
  That is what it was about. We have done some things that I think were 
necessary and have preserved democracy for this hemisphere. It is 
something we ought to be proud of.
  As for Castro, it is time for him to retire. It is time for him to 
give it up. It is time for him to put his people above his own personal 
aggrandizement and lust for power. If he cares about his people, he 
ought to give it up. He can go to North Korea, if he wants to go to a 
Communist nation.
  I don't have any sympathy for the man. I do not know why people want 
to go to Cuba. All the time: I want to go to Cuba, go to Cuba. Well, I 
would suggest maybe Honduras. Those people have suffered terrifically. 
There are people in Haiti we could help. I do not know why everybody 
wants to help a nation that is oppressing its people so much.
  Be that as it may, there are provisions now for people to gain 
exemptions, if they have a just cause to do so, to go to Cuba. Those 
who have a legitimate reason can find a way to go there, as the Senator 
noted. I think we have an appropriate policy. I will oppose changing 
it.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, a case has been made that Americans 
cannot travel to Cuba. Indeed, the facts reveal that Americans travel 
to Cuba by the thousands. The policy that this Congress has endorsed, 
President Reagan, President Bush, and President Clinton have supported.
  There has been a calculated policy of American contacts in travel to 
Cuba. Today American students, journalists, people with archeological 
interests, cultural interests, travel to Cuba by the thousands. Cuban 
Americans travel to visit family members who have problems, medical 
emergencies, by the thousands. The restriction of the U.S. Government 
is not about travel.
  We are using travel as a weapon to help convince the Cuban people to 
put pressure on the Cuban Government, support for democracy, free 
markets, that their contact with Americans is helpful in changing the 
politics of the repression of Cuba. Restrictions in travel is not about 
denying Americans the right to go to Cuba. It is about denying Fidel 
Castro the economic benefits of American tourism. Travel that enhances 
knowledge, causes political difficulties, we not only allow but we have 
encouraged.
  Travel that simply provides Fidel Castro with millions of dollars to 
support his regime, his military, his security forces, we are denying, 
and appropriately so. Nor is it a static policy.
  On January 9 of this year, President Clinton revised the policy 
again, for the second time in 2 years, to add new remittances by 
American citizens to Cuba, so that people can send money and support 
their families at appropriate levels that are humanitarian, to help 
with medical or food emergencies but not so much that it would allow 
Fidel Castro to profit by it. President Clinton has allowed charter 
passenger flights to cities other than Havana for the first time, and 
the measure permits direct mail service to Cuba. The measure also 
authorizes the sale of food and agricultural inputs to independent 
nongovernment entities.
  New regulations for all of this were issued on May 10--flights, new 
authority for travel, food and medicine--as

[[Page S7892]]

part of a calculated policy to always test Castro: When you are ready 
to talk about democracy, to respect human rights, American policy will 
begin to change. Several days after President Clinton announced these 
new initiatives, the Cuban Government responded and Castro announced 
that it constituted a policy of ``aggression.'' Once again, as 
President Carter found, as did Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, 
every time you make an act of concession--in this case, a legitimate 
concession--to test Fidel Castro to see whether he is interested in a 
bilateral relationship, we are denounced for redressing the Cuban 
nation by disallowing travel.
  My colleagues offer an amendment now to remove these restrictions and 
open travel and allow Fidel Castro to get the full economic benefit of 
millions, potentially hundreds of millions of dollars worth of travel.
  What kind of regime is it that they will be visiting? If Castro is to 
receive the benefit of our tourist dollars, what is it he would be 
doing with this money? It is worth taking a look at Cuba, not of 1961 
when the cold war brought us to sanctions, but the Cuba of 1999. It is 
suggested by my friend and colleague from Vermont that the cold war is 
over, implying that perhaps we have no argument with this regime.
  Our argument with Cuba is about more than the cold war. It is about 
all the things that have always motivated the United States: human 
rights, human decency, the nature of the regime itself. Our argument 
with Fidel Castro is not over. The causes of that argument still 
endure.
  While the United States has been seeking to ease sanctions, look at 
the record in the last 24 months in response to our review and change 
of policy. In February, Fidel Castro criminalized all forms of 
cooperation or participation in any prodemocracy efforts--not a fine, 
not an arrest, but 20 years in jail if you participate in a 
prodemocracy effort. This is the Cuba you will be visiting. He imposes 
a 30-year jail term on anybody who cooperates with an agency of the 
U.S. Government. That includes Radio Marti, distribution of food or 
medicine by a government agency, or anyone acting on behalf of anyone 
associating with this Government.
  On March 1, the law was tested. Four prominent human rights 
dissidents were tried in secrecy for their criticism of the Communist 
Party of Cuba. International diplomats who traveled to Cuba to witness 
the trial were barred from attending any of the proceedings. After 
being held without charges for 1 year--no foreign press, no foreign 
visitors, no diplomats, held in secrecy for 1 year--they were found 
guilty and sentenced for up to 5 years in jail. This is the Cuba of 
1999.
  Amnesty International, in its recent report, concludes that there are 
now 350 political prisoners in Cuba. Ten unarmed civilians, in the 
meantime, have been shot by Cuban security officials on the streets of 
Havana.
  I do not ask the Senate to do anything it has not done before. Just 
on March 25, the Senate voted 98-0, stating that the United States 
should make all efforts to criticize Cuba and condemn its human rights 
record. What is the price of this conduct? They hold hundreds of 
political prisoners, people are shot in the streets, people are held in 
secret trials, and our response is: Let's go for a visit. Let's go see 
how they are doing and have a good meal in Havana. No. My colleague is 
right. There is no cold war, but there is a great deal at issue that 
this country cares a great deal about.
  Mr. LEAHY. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Yes.
  Mr. LEAHY. People have been shot in the streets in China, and held in 
prisons in China, and tortured and executed in China; are we allowed to 
go and visit there without having to get a license from our country to 
do so?
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Let me, in my time, answer the Senator's question 
with a question. Do you believe that travel restrictions on China would 
change Chinese policy?
  Mr. LEAHY. I don't think it would change the policy any more than it 
would change the policy with Cuba.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. That is where we agree.
  Mr. LEAHY. I have a further question.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. I will answer the question first and continue my 
remarks. I don't think travel restrictions on China would change 
Chinese policy. I oppose those restrictions. I do believe travel 
restrictions on Cuba will change Cuban policy. That is why I support 
them. I do believe that continued international resolve--for the first 
time, the Senator's amendment would weaken America's policy. We have 
gotten Europeans and Latins so outraged by the jailing of these 
dissidents and these secret trials that European and Latin nations that 
have voted against us for 20 years have joined with us this year in 
Europe in voting to condemn the Cuban Government. Just as they are 
joining the fight for human rights, the United States would abandon it.
  There is one other thing that is important. I will finish making my 
case and I will be glad to yield. There is one other change. This isn't 
just about what Cuba does internally anymore. This is also about what 
they are doing to our country. The government that you would have us 
now visit, in lifting these restrictions, is a Cuba that has crossed a 
very important threshold.
  Just this last year, indicted by the government of Cuba on May 7, 
were 14 Cubans captured in Miami. Let me suggest to you the nature of 
that indictment to see whether it makes an impression on the Senator 
and see whether or not he thinks this is an appropriate time to ease 
restrictions on travel to Cuba. The indictment of Cuban agents in Miami 
last fall was for attempting to penetrate the U.S. Southern Command and 
planning ``terrorist acts against U.S. military installations.'' The 
indictment was further revised to include 2 of the 14 with conspiracy 
to murder 4 American citizens by shooting down their aircraft over the 
Straits of Florida.
  Let me suggest that I, as all of my colleagues, am prepared to 
respond to initiatives from Havana. The day there are elections, the 
day there are open trials, the day there is a free press, the day they 
respond to a request for extradition of people who murder American 
citizens, I will join you with my colleagues on that day on this floor 
matching the Cuban Government 2-to-1, 3-to-1, 1 of their initiatives to 
3 of ours, 10 of ours, or 20 of ours. We will meet them 95 percent of 
the way down the field.
  But, my friends, to ask this Senate to respond to the record of the 
last year of jailing dissidents, secret trials, shooting people on the 
streets, the indictment of 14 Cuban agents penetrating the United 
States military installations to commit terrorist acts against the 
United States, and the indictment of Cubans for murdering American 
citizens--this, my colleagues, would not appear to me to be the best 
time to suggest that it is time to forgive and forget, and have 
thousands--maybe tens of thousands--of Americans visit Cuba to rescue 
the Cuban economy from its current position of collapse, and provide 
Fidel Castro with the revenue to strengthen his regime.
  These sanctions are having an effect. Fidel Castro has had to reduce 
his military by one-half. He cannot afford to keep them in uniform. The 
secret police have been reduced by nearly a third in their size. We are 
causing the collapse of the Communist Party of Cuba--not in a timely 
way, not as I would like it to be, but it is having an impact.
  Why, given this record of indictments and terrorism and murder 
against American citizens, would we choose this moment?
  Those in the world who have been the most critical of our policy--the 
Holy Father in the Vatican, who led an initiative himself to ease 
restrictions on Cuba, has now joined the chorus of those. Fidel Castro 
broke his promise about priests. The Holy Father appealed to him not to 
proceed with these jail terms, and he did it anyway. The Vatican is now 
joining the criticism.
  The states of Latin America for the first time are voting against his 
human rights record. And we in the United States who led this effort 
for all of these years are about to change sides.
  This Senate has been resolute on this issue in the past.
  I will join with my friend from Kentucky, Senator McConnell, I hope 
in a motion to table this amendment.
  I think the debate has been worthwhile.

[[Page S7893]]

  My friend from Connecticut and my friend from Vermont have made it 
very clear to the Cuban Government that we are ready, willing, and able 
to change our policy if they change theirs. But I believe the motion to 
table is the right way to proceed in the Senate at the moment.
  I would be glad to yield to the Senator from Vermont.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, let's be clear where we are. My friend from 
New Jersey speaks of the trial of the dissidents. Many who have spoken 
on the floor were critical of that.
  I sat 10 feet across the table from Fidel Castro and strongly and 
harshly criticized the trial of the dissidents. I went to visit each of 
their families and strongly and harshly criticized that trial and spoke 
also on the floor. With my reputation on free speech issues, I would be 
the last person to yield to anybody on the question of criticism of 
those who try cases against dissidents and those who spoke out against 
the Government.

  I was very pleased to see our European allies speak out about it. But 
I note for the Record that while they spoke out on that, not one of 
those European allies that the Senator from New Jersey says now come 
over to our side--not one of those countries--has put limits on the 
travel of their people to Cuba as we have--not one.
  The United States, the most powerful, wealthiest nation on Earth, 
limits its population in traveling only to this country.
  The distinguished Senator from New Jersey said quite correctly that 
we limited travel of our people to China. It might not make much 
difference in what they did. I suspect it made some, but probably not 
much. I say that it probably wouldn't make any more difference in that 
Government than it does in the Government of Cuba. But we see a huge 
market there, so we are not going to do that anyway.
  I suggest that during the cold war the fact was that we encouraged 
travel to places like the Soviet Union and China, and we got a 
diversity of views. Our thoughts and our views were heard more and 
more, not as much as we would like but more and more.
  The Holy Father spoke out, as did most of us in this body, about the 
trial of the dissidents. But I point out that the Holy Father has never 
withdrawn his very strong criticism of the United States.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. May I reclaim my time for the moment? I yielded to 
the Senator----
  Mr. LEAHY. I thought the Senator had yielded the floor.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Please conclude.
  Mr. LEAHY. That is my mistake. I assumed the Senator had yielded the 
floor.
  One last thing: We indicted, and we are using our criminal justice 
system to try, Cuban spies, just as we have Russian spies, Chinese 
spies, Japanese spies, Israeli spies, and spies from even our NATO 
allies. We have done that. We have not broken our relationships with 
any one of those countries when we have done that, and some of the 
things some of those countries have done to us have been very serious 
crimes, indeed.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. I recognize that. I thank the Senator from Vermont.
  Let me further present the case, in case the Senator misunderstood 
me, that this is not a case that Cuba spied against the United States. 
That we expect. This is a case where the President of the United 
States, in my judgment, rightfully sought to ease restrictions on 
travel to Cuba and did so in allowing charter flights, the expansion of 
flights throughout Cuba, the easing of restrictions on travel to Cuba, 
and the response that he received is that we now have 14 Cubans under 
indictment, not for responding but for attempting to infiltrate an 
American military installation and committing a terrorist act.
  What I want the Senator from Vermont to do is put himself in the 
position of Fidel Castro. The United States makes concessions to allow 
greater travel, which we have now done twice in 24 months. The Cuban 
Government attacks those concessions with acts of aggression and 
attempts to commit terrorist acts against the United States. The human 
rights situation further deteriorates. People are jailed. Contact with 
the U.S. Government is criminalized. And now this Senate returns not in 
outrage but says, Mr. President, we don't think you went far enough; 
let's go further and further and liberalize trade.

  That is my concern, recognizing how this will be seen in Havana.
  I agree with the Senator's analysis. The United States allows travel 
to many places. But the Senator has to concede to me that travel has 
often been an effective tool in altering international conduct.
  This country participated in prohibiting flights to Libya after it 
shot down the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland. We prohibited 
flights. After a period of 10 years, the Libyan Government relented and 
allowed extradition to an international court those who are responsible 
for the act. I don't ask anything with regard to the victims of 
Lockerbie that we are not asking now of those in the Cuban Government.
  What is the difference? How do you look at the families of the young 
men shot down over the Straits of Florida and murdered by the Cuban 
Government, and tell them, well, we will overlook this, though we will 
resolve it with Libya?
  When Americans have been in jeopardy, whether it was in Iran, or in 
Libya, or years ago in Vietnam, when they were arresting people and 
putting them in concentration camps, we prohibited travel. I suggest to 
the Senator that that prohibition is still an effective mechanism of 
policy.
  In any case, I yield the floor to allow my friend from Connecticut to 
speak.
  I urge my colleagues to join with Senator McConnell on a motion to 
table. This is the wrong judgment with the wrong signal at the wrong 
moment--not undermining the historic American policy, but it is 
undermining the policy of the Clinton administration which has been 
well calibrated and very well defined.
  This is not a partisan matter. It is bipartisan against the 
leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate led by 
Senator Helms and by President Clinton. It counters both policies.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, very briefly, if I may, I will not take much 
time, because my colleague from Florida wants to be heard, as well as 
others.
  Let me say to my friend and colleague from New Jersey, I admire his 
rhetorical skills immensely. He made a valiant effort to shift the 
argument and debate implying we are doing a favor, this is somehow a 
great act of generosity and kindness, that those who are proposing 
lifting a restraint on travel to Cuba are trying to help out Fidel 
Castro.
  It is a good, clever argument. I hope it is not a persuasive 
argument.
  We are talking here not about what we are trying to do to help Fidel 
Castro but a right that American citizens ought to have to travel 
freely.
  My colleague from New Jersey and others have pointed out the 
dastardly deeds that go on in Cuba. I don't disagree at all. I am 
outraged by it and condemn it.
  I point out, if that is the basis upon which we restrict Americans to 
travel freely, we would have bans on travel all over the world. It goes 
on every day. We don't say to a single American citizen: You can't 
travel to the People's Republic of China. Every day, that government 
abuses its own people far more egregiously than occurs in Cuba. We see 
it in Vietnam, Sudan, Yugoslavia, Iran, North Korea. Is there any more 
oppressive government on the face of this Earth than the Republic of 
North Korea? Yet any citizen in this country tomorrow or tonight can 
get on a plane and fly there without having to get permission from the 
State Department or the Treasury.
  My point is, we are applying a standard that is not being applied 
equally or fairly. I subscribe to the notion that by opening up access 
you begin to create change. I argue that in Poland, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia it was the access and the interchange between citizens 
of the free world and those countries which helped create the kind of 
change that caused communism in those nations to fall. It wasn't 
isolation that did it; it was contact that did it.

[[Page S7894]]

  I have watched for 40 years a policy in Cuba that has not produced 
the change that the Senator from North Carolina and I both want. We 
disagree how to get there, but I agree with the conclusion he seeks. I 
believe he agrees with the conclusion I seek.
  Why don't we try a different tactic? What is the point of further 
isolation after 40 years if there is no change? If I can say to a 
citizen of my State: You can fly to the North Korea, you can fly to the 
People's Republic of China, you can fly to Iran--countries that have 
done far worse than the incidents that have occurred in Cuba, far more 
egregious--we have understood we don't deny citizens of our own country 
the right to travel.
  Let Fidel Castro shut the door and say to my constituents: You can't 
come to my country. I don't want to sit in the Senate and do his 
bidding. I don't think I ought to be saying to the citizens of New 
Jersey, North Carolina, or Florida that you can't travel there. Let 
them say that.
  To tell Cuban Americans: You can go back to your country once a year, 
and if someone is sick, apply for an application, a license, and maybe 
we will let you go see your family, maybe we will let you go, that is 
not my view of the way we ought to be conducting our foreign policy.
  This is about American rights. We provide in the Leahy amendment that 
unless we are involved in a state of war, hostilities, or public health 
reasons or good reasons why the Government may restrain the travel of 
its citizens--we are not in that condition here.

  If you want to create change in Cuba, let good, honest, average 
American citizens interface with these people. They are the best 
ambassadors in the world. They do more good on an hourly basis on 
behalf of our country than all the diplomats combined. Give them a 
chance to make that difference and go to the country 90 miles off our 
shore.
  I yield to my colleague from Massachusetts 1 minute for a question.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may yield for a question.
  Mr. KERRY. I congratulate my colleague on his leadership with respect 
to this. In the years that the Senator served on the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, in all those years with the visits of Lech Walesa, the 
visits of Vaclav Havel, and we have all shared wonderful moments with 
leaders of countries where the curtain fell--I think I recall each of 
those leaders saying it was the ability of people to come in during the 
time things were shut, to share with them the sense of what was 
happening elsewhere, the possibilities, bringing information, to bring 
them hope; that, indeed, was one of the great sustaining values and 
empowerments that brought them ultimately to the point of sharing the 
freedom that we have.
  I wonder if the Senator wouldn't agree that it is almost totally 
contradictory with a Stalinist, tight police structure. In fact, by not 
having intercourse with other people elsewhere--the discussion, the 
movement of people, the discourse, the exchange of ideas that comes 
with it--you are, in fact, empowering the capacity of that secrecy and 
of that closed society to keep the hammer down on people, and that 
flies directly contrary to all of the experience we have learned from 
those wonderful visits we have had.
  Mr. DODD. I say in response to my colleague from Massachusetts, he 
makes an excellent point. I think the observation he has drawn is 
correct. No one can grant with any certainty whether or not we will 
create change overnight.
  I look down the list of the people who can get licenses to go to 
Cuba. Members of Congress can; journalists can; people who are involved 
in some cultural exchanges. Ballerinas can go through a licensing 
process to get there.
  I like the idea that an average citizen in my State, in 
Massachusetts, in Florida, can go into Cuba and walk those streets, 
talk to people in the marketplaces, and share with them what we stand 
for as a nation. Every time we have allowed that to occur, we have 
created change--maybe not in the People's Republic of China. We did in 
Poland. We did in Czechoslovakia. We did in Hungary. We did throughout 
the Soviet bloc when we had a constant flow of people; that opening up, 
that engagement, that creates change.
  It seems to me after 38 years of saying no one can go there, this 
might be worth trying. Then Fidel Castro can say: I'm not going to 
allow these people in.
  Let him be the one who shuts the door to U.S. citizens traveling 
there. Let us not deny our own citizens the right to try and make a 
difference, if that is what they want to do, without going through some 
bureaucratic licensing process. Even the wife of a distinguished 
colleague had to go through this process, as a registered nurse, to 
qualify under the regulations. The spouse of a Senator. She can go to 
North Korea, China, abusive governments, but she cannot go 90 miles off 
the shore with her husband, a Senator. If that woman were not the wife 
of a Senator, she would have been denied that license. We all know 
that.
  I bet there are nurses all across this country who might go to Cuba 
and make a difference through their engagement in conversation, 
interfacing with the people of that country, and to begin to create the 
kind of change we seek.
  It is absurd. As my colleague from Massachusetts has suggested by his 
question, it is absurd. We are 185 days away from the millennium and we 
sit in this Chamber and tell American citizens that because we 
disagree, strongly disagree, with the Government of Cuba, we are going 
to deny them the right to travel there and put it in the same basket as 
Iraq and Libya.
  That doesn't make sense.
  I yield.
  Mr. KERRY. I ask my colleague if, in fact, by denying that exchange, 
those people the right to travel and connect with relatives and others 
within the country, if we don't provide Fidel Castro with the 
selectivity and greater capacity to restrict what information they get, 
when they get it, how they get it, and if, in fact, we aren't playing 
right into his capacity to keep a stranglehold--which is the very thing 
we are trying to undo.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, again, my colleague from Massachusetts makes 
an excellent point. When you restrict the ability of average citizens 
to travel, you then restrict the ability of information exchanges about 
what is going on around the world to actually reach the average citizen 
in the streets. It can make a difference. So in a sense you empower Mr. 
Castro and those who support him by giving them the ability to restrain 
the amount of information people in the streets ought to be able to get 
about what is going on in the rest of the world. As a matter of fact, 
we become a coconspirator, if you will, in sustaining this man in 
power, in my view. But by opening up this process, given the examples 
we can cite--there are concrete examples all over the world where, when 
we allowed that travel and that contact to occur, we have made a 
difference; we created change. The only place there has been no change 
that I know of is in Cuba, and it is the only place where we have not 
changed our policy.
  There seems to be some logic in that argument. If you want to follow 
other examples, and those who argue against this resolution who 
simultaneously argue they want Castro to go, it seems to me our best 
formulation is to give this a chance to see if we cannot create the 
kind of change the Senator from Massachusetts and I strongly support. I 
thank him for his questions. I yield the floor.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I know this is spirited debate but we 
need to wrap up a couple of items. Let me notify the Senate, before 
returning to the debate on this amendment, we are just about to 
completion. So let me ask unanimous consent the Dodd-Leahy amendments 
be temporarily laid aside. We will come back to them in just a moment.
  Mr. KERRY. Reserving the right to object, could I ask a question? I 
inquire, I ask the Senator, where we are with respect to the Brownback 
amendment?
  Mr. McCONNELL. The Brownback amendment is yet to be disposed of. 
There are a couple of amendments upon which we are going to have to 
have rollcall votes. I would like to proceed, if I may.
  Mr. KERRY. If I can ask, will there be time to speak to that 
amendment?

[[Page S7895]]

  Mr. McCONNELL. We are trying to wrap the bill up. I would very much 
like the Senator from Massachusetts to say a few words on that 
amendment, knowing full well where he stands. But if he will just 
suspend for a minute and let us wrap up a few housekeeping items here?
  Mr. KERRY. Fine.


                           Amendment No. 1165

  Mr. McCONNELL. I understand there is a Bingaman amendment still at 
the desk that has now been cleared on both sides. I ask unanimous 
consent we return to the Bingaman amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The amendment is agreed 
to.
  The amendment (No. 1165) was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEAHY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I have an amendment by the Senate 
majority leader that has been cleared on both sides.


                           Amendment No. 1183

      (Purpose: To require annual reports on arms sales to Taiwan)

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I send the amendment to the desk and 
ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McConnell], for Mr. Lott, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 1183.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC.   . CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.

       Consistent with the intent of Congress expressed in the 
     enactment of section (3)(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act the 
     Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate 
     committees and leadership of Congress to devise a mechanism 
     to provide for congressional input prior to making any 
     determination on the nature of quantity of defense articles 
     and services to be made available to Taiwan.

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I am pleased to offer this amendment that 
would require that the Congress be notified in a timely fashion of any 
report or list submitted by the Taiwanese Government for the potential 
purchase or other acquisition of any defense article or defense 
service.
  This amendment would remedy a long-festering situation whereby the 
Congress has ceded virtually all decisionmaking authority to the 
executive branch with respect to arms sales to Taiwan. This situation 
is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act of 
1979, which established that arms sales decisions regarding Taiwan must 
be made jointly between the legislative and executive branches of 
government.
  Specifically, the relevant sections of Public Law 96-8, the ``Taiwan 
Relations Act'' of April 10, 1979, are as follows: Section 3(a) states, 
``. . . the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense 
articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to 
enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.'' And 
Section 3(b) states, ``The President and the Congress shall determine 
the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based 
solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with 
procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense 
needs shall include review by United States military authorities in 
connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.''
  When Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, it was in 
response to the Carter administration's abrupt efforts to curtail long-
standing defense ties between Washington and Taipei. At the time of the 
adoption of the Taiwan Relations Act, Congress wanted to make clear 
that the enduring ties between the American people and the people of 
Taiwan included a clear and sustained commitment to ensuring that the 
people of Taiwan had the means to defend themselves. Taiwan's ability 
to maintain a credible deterrent, qualitatively superior to that of the 
mainland's forces across the narrow Taiwan Strait, has been crucial in 
keeping peace in East Asia.
  The central tenet of the Taiwan Relations Act was stated very clearly 
in section 3, namely, that the President and Congress together would 
determine what Taiwan required for its legitimate self defense without 
regard to pressures imposed by any third party nation. This provision 
was written in the law to ensure that executive branch officials would 
not become excessively concerned with the protestations of the PRC 
whenever the United States proposed to provide Taiwan defense articles 
and services needed for Taiwan's self-defense. Unique among laws 
governing United States defense ties with other nations, the Taiwan 
Relations Act explicitly requires in law that Congress and President 
together decide what Taiwan's military defenses require.
  The first year after the TRA's enactment, this provision was sorely 
tested when the executive branch failed to inform Congress fully and 
currently on what Taiwan needed for its defense. The Foreign Relations 
Committee under the leadership of Senator Frank Church lambasted 
executive branch officials. Together with Senator Glenn, Senator 
Javits, and others, Chairman Church insisted that the administration 
provide full details on those weapon systems Taiwan had requested.
  This practice of involving Congress in reviewing procurement 
decisions--as required by law--lapsed since that time. In recent years, 
the executive branch has met with representatives of Taiwan in secret 
and has refused to share with Congress the complete list of those 
defense articles and services requested formally or informally by 
Taiwan.
  In this regard, on May 11 of this year I wrote to Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright requesting a copy of the list of defense articles 
and services sought by Taiwan in the most recent round of annual arms 
procurement talks. Those talks ended on April 21. I received a reply to 
my letter on May 21, signed by Assistant Secretary of State for 
Legislative Affairs Barbara Larkin. Mrs. Larkin's reply asserted that 
the Department would only provide information on ``the systems for 
which we [the Administration] have given Taiwan a positive response.''
  In other words, the State Department refused my legitimate request to 
be informed in writing of Taiwan's request for potential purchase or 
other acquisition of defense articles and services. Frankly, I was 
shocked and dismayed by this response, especially given the fact the 
most recent round of talks had already been concluded and given the 
clear intent of Section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act. Instead, Mrs. 
Larkin's letter provided information only on those portions of Taiwan's 
request that the administration unilaterally had decided to approve.
  I understand that a similar, written request by the chairman of the 
House International Relations Committee Representative Benjamin Gilman, 
and others, have received the same unsatisfactory response from the 
administration.
  Mr. President, the current situation is intolerable and must be 
changed. The law of the land requires that Congress be involved in 
decisions regarding Taiwan's legitimate defense needs. The President 
and future administrations should know that the American people's 
representatives in Congress will meet our obligations under the law to 
be involved in this decisionmaking process.
  Toward this end, my amendment requires that Taiwan's procurement 
request be furnished, on an appropriate basis and in a timely fashion, 
to the appropriate committees of Congress. I believe this is a 
necessary step in ensuring that there is a meaningful dialogue between 
the legislative and executive branches of government and that the 
decisionmaking process regarding what Taiwan legitimately needs for its 
self defense, proceeds on a basis that is fully consistent with the 
letter and spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act.
  THE PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 1183) was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

[[Page S7896]]

  Mr. LEAHY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask Senator Mack be added as a 
cosponsor to amendment No. 1136.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, the following amendments will not be 
offered. They are at the desk. They will not be offered: amendment No. 
1121 by Senator Thomas; amendment No. 1122, amendment No. 1152, and 
amendment No. 1153, all three by Senator Ashcroft; amendment No. 1154 
by Senator Craig; amendment No. 1148 by Senator Grassley; amendment No. 
1164 by Senator Cleland.
  I ask unanimous consent those amendments no longer be in order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Those 
amendments will not be proposed.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, we are down to a precious few.
  What we are considering doing is propounding an agreement, and I am 
going to go on and propound it even though I know there may be some 
objection, but to give a sense of what the roadmap here is to 
completion. We believe we are down to the amendment we have been 
discussing all day, the Brownback amendment, as second-degreed by 
myself and Senator Abraham regarding section 907, and the amendment we 
are in the process of debating, the Leahy-Dodd amendment with regard to 
travel restrictions to Cuba. And final passage. That is where I believe 
we are at this moment--with the need to wrap up the debate on the Dodd-
Leahy amendment, the need to give Senator Kerry an opportunity to speak 
on the 907 issue and Senator Torricelli an opportunity to speak to the 
907 issue.
  Mr. DODD. I would also like to be heard on 907.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Also, Senator Dodd on the 907 issue and Senator 
Bingaman for a couple of minutes on Cuba.
  That is about where we are. Senator Graham, obviously, is going to 
speak on the Cuba issue as well.
  At that point we should be able to move ahead. Does my colleague from 
Vermont think we should go ahead and propound this unanimous consent 
agreement or go on with the debate and just move on through it?
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I see the Senator from Florida on the 
floor. I was wondering about how much time does he think he will need?
  Mr. GRAHAM. I will need 15 minutes.
  Mr. LEAHY. That will make it impossible to get the unanimous consent 
agreement that might get us out of here at a decent hour.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Graham of Florida be allowed 15 minutes to speak to the Dodd-Leahy 
amendment; Senator Bingaman, 3 minutes on the Cuba amendment; Senator 
Kerry, 5 minutes on the 907 amendment; Senator Torricelli on the 907 
amendment, 5 minutes; Senator Dodd, 2 minutes on the 907 amendment; 
Senator Brownback, 3 minutes to wrap up on 907; myself 3 minutes to 
yield on 907.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I understand the distinguished Senator from 
Maryland would have an objection on a time agreement. Maybe we should 
start on our debate and urge people to be as brief as we can because I 
still think we could and should vote on all these.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The objection of the Senator from Maryland is to the 
Brownback amendment, I gather?
  Mr. LEAHY. That is correct.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Why don't we proceed to complete debate on the Dodd-
Leahy matter and see if we can dispose of that? Let's proceed on it.
  Mr. DODD. That is fine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.


                           amendment no. 1157

  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I want all to know that there is no 
disagreement with the objectives, the end goals being sought by the 
advocates of this amendment and those of us who oppose it. I believe we 
are all Americans of good conscience and we seek for the Cuban people 
what we seek for ourselves. We seek a nation that lives with the 
freedoms associated with democracy. We seek a nation that respects the 
basic human rights of its people. We seek a nation which will encourage 
an economy that offers hope to the people of Cuba.
  We have had a long association with Cuba. It is an association which 
runs almost to the first Spanish exploration of our two nations. We 
were a major participant in the freedom of Cuba in 1898. In fact, we 
had celebrations within the last few months of our participation in the 
independence of Cuba.
  So our goals for those people, our feeling for the people of Cuba, is 
a shared one. The question is, What is the appropriate course of U.S. 
policy to achieve those goals? I believe, as with every other question 
of what U.S. foreign policy should be, it should be a mixture of a 
consideration of our national interests and a consideration of the 
universal values for which America has stood since those words in the 
Declaration of Independence that declared that we saw that all men--not 
just American men, not just men, but women--that all persons had 
certain inalienable rights. Those have been an important factor in our 
relationships with other peoples of other nations.
  On the specific issue of the use of travel restrictions as a part of 
that U.S. foreign policy, Senator Torricelli has talked about the way 
in which travel restrictions were imposed on Libya and the fact that 
those restrictions had certain objectives and have had certain 
consequences.
  The Presiding Officer and I have been interested in the issue of 
Lebanon for a long time. The United States had travel restrictions on 
Americans visiting Lebanon. The purpose of those travel restrictions 
was to encourage changes that would create a greater sense of security. 
While there are still tense days, as we have seen in the very recent 
past, it is now considered appropriate to allow Americans to begin 
again to visit Lebanon.
  We have used travel restrictions as a means of achieving goals that 
were considered to be important to the United States in the past.
  Yes, we are using a restriction on travel to Cuba as part of the 
larger, comprehensive restriction on relationships with the Government 
of Cuba while we attempt to achieve increased contacts with the people 
of Cuba.
  There is an assumption that if the United States does not open up its 
travel restrictions, the Cuban people are going to walk down sidewalks 
that are barren of foreign travelers and the Cuban people will not have 
contact with the outside world. In fact, almost 100,000 Americans 
visited Cuba last year under the various provisions of our existing 
law. In addition to that, some of the major nations of the world, 
nations with which we have the closest relationship, such as Spain and 
Canada, have an open policy, in terms of travel to Cuba, for their 
citizens.
  When you ask Spaniards or Canadians, what effect has your open policy 
towards Cuba had? what effect have the relationships you have had in 
these instances for decades with the Castro regime had? have you seen a 
change in the commitment to democracy? have you seen, as a result of 
your openness towards Cuba, a greater degree of respect for human 
rights? the answer is a sad no. These democracies, these nations which 
share our values and which have taken the course of action that is 
being advocated by the proponents of this amendment, have seen no 
effect in achieving the goals we share for Cuba--democracy, human 
rights, and an open economy.
  What gives us reason to believe that adopting an unconsidered, 
undebated--other than the words we speak this afternoon--major change 
in our policy toward Cuba would have any different result? Recent 
events, in fact, are to the contrary.
  In January of last year, 1998, a significant, what many hoped would 
be a historic, turning point event occurred in Cuba. The Pope visited 
that island. Many hoped, prayed, believed that it would lead to 
fundamental change in Cuba.
  We reinforced the momentum of the papal visit by a number of 
initiatives towards Cuba. On March 20, 1998, just a few weeks after the 
Pope had departed, in an attempt to build goodwill towards Cuba, 
President Clinton announced the resumption of licensing for direct 
humanitarian flights to Cuba.
  The President announced the resumption of cash remittances to Cuba.
  The President asked for the development of licensing procedures to

[[Page S7897]]

streamline and expedite the commercial sale of medicine, medical 
supplies, and medical equipment to Cuba.
  Continuing in that vein, on January 9 of this year the President 
authorized additional steps to reach out to the Cuban people. The new 
measures expanded remittances by allowing any United States citizens, 
not just family members, to send limited funds to the people of Cuba. 
The President expanded people-to-people contacts. The President allowed 
charter passenger flights to cities other than Havana and to initiate 
from cities other than Miami.

  The measures also permitted an effort to establish direct mail 
service to Cuba. The measures also authorized the sale of food and 
agricultural inputs to independent, nongovernmental entities, including 
religious groups, family restaurants, and farmers.
  All of those are initiatives which the United States has taken since 
January of 1998 in hopes that it would result in a reciprocal response 
of some loosening of the police state that is Cuba today.
  What happened to all of those initiatives the United States took? 
What happened to the initiatives that were hoped to flow from the papal 
visit?
  The Cuban Government responded to our United States initiatives by 
calling these actions acts of aggression. That is what the Cuban 
Government labeled the opening of additional flights, of direct mail, 
of allowing greater remittances to the people of Cuba. Fidel Castro 
called all of those actions acts of aggression.
  What did Fidel Castro do in the context of the visit by the Pope? 
Almost exactly a year after the Pope departed Cuba, the Cuban 
Government passed a new security law. That law criminalized any form of 
cooperation or participation in prodemocracy efforts. That law imposed 
penalties ranging from 20 to 30 years for those who were found to be 
cooperating with the U.S. Government. Those are the responses of Fidel 
Castro to the papal visit.
  On March 1, four prominent human rights dissidents were tried in 
secrecy for their peaceful criticism of the Communist Party. Diplomats 
were barred from attendance at the trial. These four human rights and 
prodemocracy dissidents were held for over 1 year without charges. They 
were found guilty. They were sentenced to jail terms, for advocating 
human rights and democracy, of 3\1/2\ to 5 years.
  This did not happen 40 years ago. This happened in March of 1999. The 
Cuban Government ignored calls from the Vatican and the international 
community for release. Canada, the European Union, and several Latin 
American countries criticized the Cuban Government and stated their 
intention to reassess their relationship with the Government. The King 
of Spain had a scheduled visit to Cuba which he has deferred, in large 
part because of the treatment of these four dissidents.
  Cuba's human rights record in 1999 reflects a continued policy of 
repression, a policy which has been recognized not just by the United 
States, not just by the people of Cuba who suffer under the yoke of 
oppression, but by the international community.
  In its annual report on human rights, which was released earlier this 
year, Amnesty International states that at least 350 political 
prisoners remained imprisoned in Cuban cells in 1998. Amnesty 
International reports that 10 unarmed civilians were shot, executed by 
Cuban authorities, in 1998.
  As we know, the Senate passed a resolution by a vote of 98-0 on March 
25 of this year stating that the United States would make all efforts 
necessary to pass a resolution criticizing Cuba for its human rights 
records before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. We were very 
pleased when the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, with 
support of nations which just in the last 2 years had opposed such a 
resolution, passed a resolution on April 23 condemning Cuba for its 
human rights abuses.
  Finally, the State Department country report on human rights 
practices detailed the same human rights abuses as last year and the 
year before.
  We have made an effort to reach out to Cuba. We have made an effort 
to send a signal that we were looking for some reciprocity, some 
demonstration of a wavering in the steel-hard police state which has 
been Cuba for 40 years.
  One is hard pressed to see even the faintest breeze of a positive 
response to our efforts. The examples of human rights violations in all 
of these reports are numerous, brutal, and startling. Human rights 
activists are beaten in their homes. People are arbitrarily detained 
and arrested. Political prisoners are denied food and medicine brought 
by their own families. Children are made to stand in the rain chanting 
slogans against democracy.
  In the United States, on May 7 of this year, the U.S. Government 
revised indictments against 14 Cuban spies captured in Miami last fall 
while attempting to penetrate the U.S. Southern Command, the United 
States Naval Air Station at Boca Chica Key near Key West, and planning 
terrorist acts against military installations. The revised indictments 
also charge 2 of the 14 with conspiracy to commit murder in the 1996 
shoot down of the Brothers to the Rescue fliers.
  It is at this point that I must become personal. I know the families 
of the four fliers who were shot down over international waters, now we 
know, at the direct command of the highest officials of the Cuban 
Government. If homicide is defined as the intentional taking of a human 
life, four acts of homicide occurred over the Straits of Florida 
against three U.S. citizens and one U.S. resident.
  This is the nature of the response that Fidel Castro has given to the 
efforts by the Pope, by the international community, and by the United 
States to try to ask, to plead for some relief for the people of Cuba.
  As these examples show, as the continuing reign of repression flows 
from week to week, from day to day in Cuba this is not the time for 
lifting any of the sanctions on Cuba. This is the time for us to hold 
the line on our policy, to continue to reach out to the people of Cuba 
in hopes that someday they will breathe the free air of democracy but 
to give no quarter to the oppressive Government of Fidel Castro.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. GRAHAM. I will be pleased to yield.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. I congratulate the Senator from Florida on his 
statement and his extraordinary leadership on this issue through the 
years and simply inquire of him, through this decade, American policy 
towards Cuba has largely been defined by the Cuban Democracy Act that 
the Senator from Florida joined with me in writing, the Helms-Burton 
Act that the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, 
Senator Helms, wrote, and now under the leadership of President 
Clinton.
  This amendment would largely undermine the policies outlined in that 
legislation and by President Clinton. Indeed, the President recently 
has redefined his own policy of travel towards Cuba. But by a sweep of 
the pen, that bipartisan policy that the Senators and the President of 
the United States have written would largely be undermined, in my 
estimation.
  Is that the Senator's conclusion?
  Mr. GRAHAM. That would certainly be one of the consequences. Another 
consequence, I say to my friend and colleague, would be that we would 
send a signal to Fidel Castro that we are prepared to do virtually 
anything without expecting anything in response; that the same thing 
that has happened to the Canadians, the Spaniards, to other European 
and Latin American countries--attempts to reach out to Castro, which 
are rebuffed in terms of those things that are most important to the 
people of Cuba--that now we would become complicitous in that same 
process of unrequited love.

  The last thing we have to play, the last policy option that is 
available to us as we try to influence Castro is exactly the embargo 
which, by this casual act tonight, we are being asked to begin to 
dismantle.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. If the Senator would continue to yield, I think what 
is important about your statement is you recognize this policy isn't 
about travel; it is about money. It is about giving Fidel Castro 
millions of dollars of American tourist money to support his regime, 
his dictatorship, his armed forces, his security forces. That is what 
we are denying.
  But the frustration that the Senator from Florida may have--and you 
probably know more about the Cuban economic experience and the travel 
experience than anyone in this institution by virtue of your 
constituency--and to

[[Page S7898]]

rely upon your expertise for a moment, it is my understanding, contrary 
to what the Senate may be led to believe today, that when tourists go 
to Cuba from European countries, they are put into tourist compounds. 
Cubans are not allowed to visit those hotels. They cannot talk to 
people in those hotels. So the notion that hundreds of thousands of 
American tourists are going to walk the streets of Cuba and democratize 
the island, spread the message of human rights--in fact, the average 
Cuban cannot get inside those compounds. They are walled off.
  The Senator knows more about this, by far, than I do, but is that not 
the story of many of these beach-front hotels?
  Mr. GRAHAM. That is the story. Unfortunately, the people who those 
tourists will come in contact with will be the virtual serfs of the 
Castro regime because the hotels are required to purchase their 
employees through the Cuban Government, not by direct negotiation with 
the individual or through some organization representing those 
individuals. So by that walled-off enclave in which they are enjoying 
themselves, on an island of prosperity in a sea of despair--which is 
Cuba today --they are contributing to the maintenance of a system of 
economic slavery that virtually has left the face of the Earth for the 
past century and a half.
  Mr. DODD. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. TORRICELLI. A final question. And I am very pleased the 
distinguished minority whip, Senator Reid of Nevada, is going to join 
with us on a motion to table.
  But before I yield back, Senator Kerry of Massachusetts left a very 
appealing notion of the example of President Havel, that this exchange 
of visiting and talking to people about democratic ideas would somehow 
change the Cuban political reality.
  Again, you know more about this than I do. It is my impression that 
under Cuban law, as Fidel Castro has now changed the law, if a would-be 
Havel walked up, in Havana, to an American tourist and talked to that 
tourist about democracy, he would be rewarded--not with information, a 
growth of knowledge--but he would go to jail because talking about 
democracy in Cuba to an American tourist will guarantee one thing--you 
will be arrested, you will be indicted, and you will go to jail.
  Is that the reality of what a conversation about democracy with an 
American tourist is?
  Mr. GRAHAM. Yes. And under the law which I alluded to, which was 
passed just in February of this year, that Cuban citizen who was found 
to be engaging in that friendly discussion about democracy and the 
graces that liberty brings to the human spirit will be subject to 
spending 20 to 30 years, without his freedom, in a Cuban cell precisely 
because he engaged in that conversation.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. I thank the Senator from Florida.
  Mr. DODD. Will my colleague yield?
  Just very quickly, I want to raise the point--I do not know if my 
colleagues from New Jersey and Florida have been to Cuba at all 
recently.
  Has my colleague traveled to Cuba in the last several years?
  Mr. GRAHAM. Other than Guantanamo, I have not been to Cuba.
  Mr. DODD. I appreciate that. Just as a point of reference, I spent a 
week in Cuba in December, in fact, all over the area, all over Havana, 
and Varadero as well for a day. I point out to my colleague that I saw 
Americans all over the streets of Havana. The idea you are confined to 
Varadero Beach is just not the case. There are people literally 
everywhere, right in the marketplaces, in the streets, in the 
restaurants, places they could go. The idea that you are restricted 
only to go to Varadero Beach is not the case.

  Mr. TORRICELLI. Cubans are restricted.
  Mr. DODD. To Cuban Americans who want to travel to Cuba--many do--
this is, in a sense, saying you can only go back to the country of your 
birth once during a year, unless you have a sick relative, and then you 
have to apply to some bureaucrat in the Treasury Department to go down 
and see your family. That is wrong.
  But the idea that Cuban Americans would be restricted to Varadero 
Beach is just not the case. You can talk with Cuban Americans who have 
been back to Cuba. They are not restrained on where they can travel in 
Cuba.
  Mr. GRAHAM. I think the point the Senator from New Jersey was raising 
in his question to me was that for many of those Europeans, Latin 
Americans, and Americans who go to Cuba, the nature of the hotel 
arrangements in which they live does not lend itself to the sort of 
interplay that, for instance, some of us experienced in places such as 
Prague and Budapest prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall.
  It also is the case that Cuban citizens who, in those rare instances, 
might have an opportunity to relate with an American, since February of 
this year, face the prospect of being charged with a criminal act of 
collaborating with a United States citizen and face the prospect of 
spending 20 to 30 years in a 17th century cell.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Will the Senator allow me to respond to the point? 
Will the Senator allow me to respond?
  Mr. GRAHAM. Yes.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. The point is, Americans clearly do in Cuba have the 
freedom to leave the hotels and wander around the island. As Senator 
Graham has pointed out, nearly 100,000 Americans went to Cuba last 
year. So this is not a question that many Americans cannot go. It has 
simply been the Clinton administration's view to restrict the number so 
as not to give Castro great financial rewards. One hundred thousand 
Americans go.
  The point I was making with Senator Graham was not to give people the 
illusion that Americans in a hotel on the beaches near Havana are going 
to receive Cuban visitors. The average Cuban is not allowed on the 
hotel grounds on these compounds. This is not going to be people 
visiting President Havel in his office. They are not allowed to go 
there. They can't spend money there. They can't be guests there. They 
are foreign compounds. You might as well be on a beach somewhere on a 
desert island in the Pacific. They are restricted.
  I thank the Senator from Florida for yielding.
  Mr. DODD. As someone who has been there and spent the time and 
wandered without restraint and had conversations with people--I had a 
long conversation, as someone who speaks the language, speaks Spanish; 
I was able to have lengthy conversations with people. I wasn't being 
followed around. I had long discussions with people in marketplaces 
where they were highly critical of the Cuban Government.
  I had a lengthy discussion with a family down there about their 
objections and opposition to Fidel Castro with a group of people 
around. In my personal experience and that of others, just on the point 
of 100,000 U.S. citizens going, most of them are going illegally. It is 
not as if they have licenses to go. We all know what they do. They go 
to Montreal or Quebec or Cancun, and then they go in, because they 
don't stamp their visas. You can meet them all in the airports down 
there.

  We are making them illegal, illegal activities of U.S. citizens. That 
is not something we ought to be condoning. But this isn't licenses they 
receive; this is because they are using other means to go down and 
spend time there. But this is not permissible, visa-stamped approved 
travel by these people.
  Mr. KERRY. Will the Senator yield further?
  Mr. GRAHAM. Yes.
  Mr. KERRY. I just make the point to the Senator that, having spoken 
with a lot of people who have gone down there and made some of those 
trips, the families aren't restricted in that way. They meet with 
relations. They tell people what is going on in the United States. They 
talk about their feelings about Fidel Castro.
  What is amazing about this debate, what is absolutely stupefying, is 
that what the Senators seem to be defending is completely contrary now 
to the experience since 1959. We went through the whole 1960s, went 
through the Bay of Pigs, went through the 1970s. We went through the 
height of the Reagan opposition to the Iron Curtain and through all of 
the changes in Russia, the former Soviet Union, the former east bloc 
countries. We have seen the dynamics of that change.
  The one place where our policy remains the same as it has throughout 
all of those years is the place where

[[Page S7899]]

there has been the least change. One of the reasons they had the power 
to shoot down those four planes is that there is no movement in the 
relationship, because they are as isolated.
  If you look at the experience of Cubans, restricted, who go back to 
Cuba to visit their families, limited by the United States of America 
to one visit a year with their own family, you find that they are the 
ones saying to us today, we would like to have the right to travel to 
visit our families as frequently as we can. I am confident that the 
same kinds of changes that swept over the rest of the world will sweep 
over that tiny island.
  Mr. GRAHAM. I will conclude by saying that I ask those who think the 
United States changing its policy towards Cuba will have these 
miraculous effects in terms of breaking waves of freedom to the people 
that will crush what is an East German police state today--I only ask 
them to tell us what is the evidence, based on the outreach which has 
been made by countries such as Canada and Spain and European and Latin 
American countries, which largely share our values, which have been for 
40 years in a continuous relationship with Cuba?
  I think the answer to the question is, there are no such evidences 
that that outreach has had a positive effect on Cuba. We are dealing 
with a sui generis anachronism in Cuba. That degree of singularity 
requires the kind of singularity of foreign policy that we are 
directing towards it, with our hopes that soon the people of Cuba will 
be released from that hold and that our policy will have contributed to 
that release and will help to establish a basis for a transition to a 
Cuba that will be respectful of its people and with which the United 
States can have normal and peaceful and prosperous relationships.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERRY. Would the Senator like an answer to the question?
 Mr. MACK. Mr. President, I oppose this travel amendment in the 
strongest possible terms. This is the wrong language at the wrong time. 
It represents a fundamental change in our Cuba policy--a change without 
proper consideration.
  The Foreign Relations Committee has not considered this language; in 
fact, nobody has seen this language until it was introduced this 
afternoon. We should not rush this language through.
  We should not do this. This is a half-baked approach, which makes for 
weak policy; it is not a mature effort to craft serious policy.
  Fidel responds to our positive gestures with arrests, oppression, and 
crackdown. This effort is misguided and must be tabled.
  Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I move to table the underlying Dodd 
amendment No. 1157, and I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, as in executive session, I ask unanimous 
consent that immediately following this rollcall vote about to begin, 
the Senate immediately proceed to executive session and vote en bloc on 
the confirmation of the following nominations on the Executive 
Calendar: Nos. 104 through 108. I further ask unanimous consent that 
immediately following the vote, the President be notified of the 
Senate's action and the Senate then return to legislative session.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. I also ask unanimous consent that it now be in order to ask 
for the yeas and nays on the nominations en bloc.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I don't have any objection, but I ask 
unanimous consent that the majority leader may proceed in this way. A 
tabling motion has been made, and there is no debate on a tabling 
motion.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to 
do this, even though the vote has been ordered on the tabling 
amendment, so that we can have this vote in this sequence. It is to 
have a vote on the confirmation of five judicial nominations. Both have 
been requested, but it will be one vote, and it will count as only one 
vote on all five nominations.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. I thank Senator Byrd for that correction.
  I ask consent then that it now be in order to ask for the yeas and 
nays on the nominations en bloc.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll on the motion to 
table.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that 
notwithstanding the tabling motion----
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask for the regular order.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, is it out of order to ask for unanimous 
consent?
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, there is no debate following a motion to 
table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, 
notwithstanding the rules that there be no debate, the Senator be 
allowed to make a unanimous consent.
  Mr. LEAHY. That is what I was asking.
  Mr. BYRD. The Chair should have the advice from the Parliamentarian 
to call this to the Senate's attention.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from West 
Virginia was making the exact same request that I was making. Let's 
just vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to 
table amendment No. 1157. The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative assistant called the roll.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, House Members may not be in the Well.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The well will be cleared.
  The well will be cleared.
  The clerk will continue to call the roll.
  The legislative assistant resumed the call of the roll.
  Mr. BYRD addressed the chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask for order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
  Mr. BYRD. Now, Mr. President, I ask that House Members stay out of 
the well and stop lobbying Senators. I have had a number of Senators 
come to me and tell me that House Members are in the well lobbying 
them. The other Members didn't speak up, but I shall.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
  Mr. BYRD. I hope the Sergeant at Arms will see to it that House 
Members, who are our guests, will get out of the well. There are places 
in the back of the Chamber for them.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will resume the call of the roll.
  The legislative assistant resumed the call of the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Voinovich) 
and the Senate from Florida (Mr. Mack), are necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 55, nays 43, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 189 Leg.]

                                YEAS--55

     Abraham
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeWine
     Domenici
     Edwards
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Lieberman
     Lott
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Reid
     Robb
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)

[[Page S7900]]


     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli

                                NAYS--43

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Grams
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     Mikulski
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Reed
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Specter
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Mack
     Voinovich
       
  The motion was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

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