[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 95 (Wednesday, June 30, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7877-S7900]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
RECESS
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate
stand in recess for six minutes so we can greet President Mubarak.
I thank the Chair.
There being no objection, the Senate, at 4:13 p.m., recessed until
4:19 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate was called to order by the Presiding
Officer (Mr. Sessions).
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, which amendment is pending?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending amendment is No. 1165, offered by
Senator Bingaman of New Mexico.
Mr. McCONNELL. I ask the Bingaman amendment be set aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendments Nos. 1125, 1146, 1150, 1151, 1158, 1162, 1163, 1167, 1168,
and 1173 Through 1177, En Bloc
Mr. McCONNELL. There are a number of amendments that have been
cleared by both sides that I send to the desk:
Amendment No. 1125 by Senator Smith of Oregon related to CDC;
amendment No. 1146 by Senator Lautenberg related to war crimes;
amendment No. 1150 by Senator Helms related to Serbia; amendment No.
1151 by
[[Page S7878]]
Senator Burns dealing with narcotics; amendment No. 1158 by Senator
Dodd dealing with IMET; amendment No. 1162 by Senator Boxer, dealing
with tuberculosis; amendment No. 1167, by Senator Kerry of
Massachusetts relating to arms transfer; amendment No. 1168 by Senator
Kerry of Massachusetts relating to Cambodia; amendment No. 1173 by
Senator Biden relating to threat reduction; amendment No. 1174 by
Senator Levin relating to KEDO; amendment No. 1175 by Senator Domenici
relating to Habitat for Humanity; amendment No. 1177 by Senator Schumer
relating to ETRI; amendment No. 1176 by Senator Cochran relating to
IMET; amendment No. 1163 by Senator Cleland relating to the Balkans
conference.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McConnell] proposes
amendment Nos. 1125, 1146, 1150, 1151, 1158, 1162, 1163,
1167, 1168, and 1173 through 1177, en bloc.
The amendments are as follows:
amendment no. 1125
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following
new section and renumber any remaining sections accordingly:
SEC. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON THE CITIZENS DEMOCRACY CORPS.
It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) with regard to promoting economic development and open,
democratic countries in the former Soviet Union and Central
Eastern Europe, the Committee commends the work of the
Citizens Democracy Corps (CDC), which utilizes senior-level
U.S. business volunteers to assist enterprises, institutions,
and local governments abroad. Their work demonstrates the
significant impact that USAID support of a U.S. non-
governmental organization (NGO) program can have on the key
U.S. foreign policy priorities of promoting broad-based,
stable economic growth and open, market-oriented economies in
transitioning economies. By drawing upon the skills and
voluntary spirit of U.S. businessmen and women to introduce
companies, CDC furthers the goals of the Freedom of Support
Act (NIS) and Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED),
forging positive, lasting connections between the U.S. and
these countries. The Committee endorses CDC's very cost-
effective programs and believes they should be supported and
expanded not only in the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, but in transitioning and developing economiecs
throughout the world.
____
AMENDMENT NO. 1146
(Purpose: To provide substitute language relating to restrictions on
assistance to countries providing sanctuary to indicted war criminals)
Beginning on page 100, strike line 11 and all that follows
through line 13 on page 107 and insert the following:
RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES, ENTITIES, AND COMMUNITIES IN
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA PROVIDING SANCTUARY TO PUBLICLY INDICTED WAR
CRIMINALS
Sec. 567. (a) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the
United States to use bilateral and multilateral assistance to
promote peace and respect for internationally recognized
human rights by encouraging countries, entities, and
communities in the territory of the former Yugoslavia to
cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia--
(1) by apprehending publicly indicted war criminals and
transferring custody of those individuals to the Tribunal to
stand trial; and
(2) by assisting the Tribunal in the investigation and
prosecution of crimes subject to its jurisdiction.
(b) Sanctioned Country, Entity, or Community.--
(1) In general.--A sanctioned country, entity, or community
described in this section is one in which there is present a
publicly indicted war criminal or in which the Tribunal has
been hindered in efforts to investigate crimes subject to its
jurisdiction.
(2) Special rule.--Subject to subsection (f), subsections
(c) and (d) shall not apply to the provision of assistance to
an entity that is not a sanctioned entity within a sanctioned
country, or to a community that is not a sanctioned community
within a sanctioned country or sanctioned entity, if the
Secretary of State determines and so reports to the
appropriate congressional committees that providing such
assistance would further the policy of subsection (a).
(c) Bilateral Assistance.--
(1) Prohibition.--None of the funds made available by this
or any prior Act making appropriations for foreign
operations, export financing and related programs may be
provided for any country, entity, or community described in
subsection (b).
(2) Notification.--Not less than 15 days before any
assistance described in this subsection is disbursed to any
country, entity, or community described in subsection (b),
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Administrator of the Agency for International Development,
shall publish in the Federal Register a written justification
for the proposed assistance, including a description of the
location of the proposed assistance program or project by
municipality, its purpose, and the intended recipient of the
assistance, including the names of individuals, companies and
their boards of directors, and shareholders with controlling
or substantial financial interest in the program or project.
(d) Multilateral Assistance.--
(1) Prohibition.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall
instruct the United States executive directors of the
international financial institutions to work in opposition
to, and vote against, any extension by such institutions of
any financial or technical assistance or grants of any kind
to any country or entity described in subsection (b).
(2) Notification.--Not less than 15 days before any vote in
an international financial institution regarding the
extension of financial or technical assistance or grants to
any country or community described in subsection (b), the
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, shall provide to the appropriate Congressional
committees a written justification for the proposed
assistance, including an explanation of the United States
position regarding any such vote, as well as a description of
the location of the proposed assistance by municipality, its
purpose, and its intended beneficiaries, including the names
of individuals with a controlling or substantial financial
interest in the project.
(e) Exceptions.--Subject to subsection (f), subsections (c)
and (d) shall not apply to the provision of--
(1) humanitarian assistance;
(2) assistance to nongovernmental organizations that
promote democracy and respect for human rights; and
(3) assistance for cross border physical infrastructure
projects involving activities in both a sanctioned country,
entity, or community and a nonsanctioned contiguous country,
entity, or community, if the project is primarily located in
and primarily benefits the nonsanctioned country, entity, or
community and if the portion of the project located in the
sanctioned country, entity, or community is necessary only to
complete the project.
(f) Further Limitations.--
(1) Prohibition on direct assistance to publicly indicted
war criminals and other persons.--Notwithstanding subsection
(e) or subsection (g), no assistance may be made available by
this Act, or any prior Act making appropriations for foreign
operations, export financing and related programs, in any
country, entity, or community described in subsection (b),
for any financial or technical assistance, grant, or loan
that would directly benefit a publicly indicted war criminal,
any person who aids or abets a publicly indicted war criminal
to evade apprehension, or any person who otherwise obstructs
the work of the Tribunal.
(2) Certification.--At the end of each fiscal year, the
President shall certify to the appropriate congressional
committees that no assistance described in paragraph (1)
directly benefited any person described in that paragraph
during the preceding 12-month period.
(g) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the
application of subsection (c) with respect to specified
United States projects, or subsection (d) with respect to
specified international financial institution programs or
projects, in a sanctioned country or entity upon providing a
written determination to the appropriate congressional
committees that the government of the country or entity is
doing everything within its power and authority to apprehend
or aid in the apprehension of publicly indicted war criminals
and is fully cooperating in the investigation and prosecution
of war crimes.
(h) Current Record of War Criminals and Sanctioned
Countries, Entities, and Communities.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, acting through the
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, and after
consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and
the Secretary of Defense, shall establish and maintain a
current record of the location, including the community, if
known, of publicly indicted war criminals and of sanctioned
countries, entities, and communities.
(2) Report.--Beginning 30 days after the date of enactment
of this Act, and not later than September 1 each year
thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report in
classified and unclassified form to the appropriate
congressional committees on the location, including the
community, if known, of publicly indicted war criminals and
the identity of countries, entities, and communities that are
failing to cooperate fully with the Tribunal.
(3) Information to congress.--Upon the request of the
chairman or ranking minority member of any of the appropriate
congressional committees, the Secretary of State shall make
available to that committee the information recorded under
paragraph (1) in a report submitted to the committee in
classified and unclassified form.
(j) Definitions.--As used in this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee
on Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Canton.--The term ``canton'' means the administrative
units in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(3) Community.--The term ``community'' means any canton,
district, opstina, city, town, or village.
[[Page S7879]]
(4) Country.--The term ``country'' means Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia-Montenegro), the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, and Slovenia.
(5) Dayton agreement.--The term ``Dayton Agreement'' means
the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, together with annexes relating thereto, done at
Dayton, November 10 through 16, 1995.
(6) Entity.--The term ``entity'' refers to the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska, Brcko in
Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo.
(7) International financial institution.--The term
``international financial institution'' includes the
International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the International Development
Association, the International Finance Corporation, the
Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency, and the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
(8) Publicly indicted war criminals.--The term ``publicly
indicted war criminals'' means persons indicted by the
Tribunal for crimes subject to the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal.
(9) Tribunal or international criminal tribunal for the
former yugoslavia.--The term ``Tribunal'' or the term
``International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia''
means the International Tribunal for the prosecution of
persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, as established by United Nations
Security Council Resolution 827 of May 25, 1993.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I would like to thank Senator
McConnell and Senator Leahy for including my amendment No. 1146 in the
managers' package.
Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment to ensure U.S. aid
does not go to countries or regions or communities in the former
Yugoslavia which continue to harbor indicted war criminals.
This amendment would improve language we adopted last year with a
clearer provision covering all of the former Yugoslavia.
Mr. President, we have seen terrible atrocities committed in Croatia,
in Bosnia, and most recently in Kosovo.
The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia has
publicly indicted 89 persons for war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide. There are almost certainly more indictments which remain
sealed. Ongoing investigations in Bosnia and now in Kosovo will surely
lead to more indictments.
However, the justice of the War Crimes Tribunal relies on the
governments of countries in the region to apprehend indicted war
criminals and transfer them to The Hague to stand trial.
Because the Republika Srpska authorities failed to fulfill their
responsibilities, United States and other NATO armed forces in the
United Nations-authorized peacekeeping force in Bosnia have arrested 7
war criminals. However, 36 publicly indicted war criminals remain at
large.
Mr. President, our aid programs provide important leverage to
motivate governments in the former Yugoslavia to stop harboring war
criminals and start arresting them.
United States policy linking aid to cooperation with the war crimes
tribunal is clear.
Indeed, a few years ago, Secretary Albright said the following in her
remarks at the Tribunal:
. . . The United States has made full cooperation with the
War Crimes Tribunal, especially the transfer of indictees to
The Hague, a prerequisite for U.S. assistance, our support
for assistance by others, and our backing for membership in
international institutions.
Unfortunately, the administration has resisted putting this policy
into practice. Indeed, Secretary Albright has issued broad waivers of
the provision included in the fiscal year 1998 and 1999 appropriations
bills. The United States now provides aid to the city of Prijedor which
hosts no fewer than 8 indicted war criminals.
Just this month Secretary Albright signed another waiver to provide
$10 million in budget support to the Republika Srpska Government--the
very Government which includes the Bosnian Serb police force which
should be carrying out arrest warrants and is not.
Mr. President, ever more atrocities committed by Serbian police and
paramilitary forces in Kosovo are coming to light: executions, torture,
rape, burning of homes, expulsions on a massive scale.
We must now send a strong signal that we are determined to see the
perpetrators of these crimes face justice. We must end our support for
so-called moderates in Republika Srpska until and unless they fulfill
their obligations to arrest war criminals and cooperate with the War
Crimes Tribunal.
The Amendment I am offering today clearly states the policy of the
United States ``to use bilateral and multilateral assistance to promote
peace and respect for internationally recognized human rights by
encouraging countries, entities, and communities in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia,'' among other things ``by apprehending publicly
indicted war criminals and transferring custody of those individuals to
the Tribunal to stand trial.''
The amendment sets out mechanisms to ensure that U.S. and
multilateral aid will go to areas like the Bosnian Federation, where no
war criminals remain at large, while prohibiting aid to authorities and
areas that harbor war criminals.
Mr. President, I would urge my colleagues to join me in this effort
to ensure that the perpetrators of horrible crimes in Croatia, Bosnia,
and Kosovo will ultimately face justice.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
AMENDMENT NO. 1150
(Purpose: Providing assistance to promote democracy in Serbia)
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:
SEC. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN
YUGOSLAVIA.
(a) Assistance.--
(1) Purpose of assistance.--The purpose of assistance under
this subsection is to promote and strengthen institutions of
democratic government and the growth of an independent civil
society in Yugoslavia, including ethnic tolerance and respect
for internationally recognized human rights.
(2) Authorization for assistance.--The President is
authorized to furnish assistance and other support for
individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations to
carry out the purpose of paragraph (1) through support for
the activities described in paragraph (3).
(3) Activities supported.--Activities that may be supported
by assistance under paragraph (2) include the following:
(A) Democracy building.
(B) The development of nongovernmental organizations.
(C) The development of independent media.
(D) The development of the rule of law, a strong,
independent judiciary, and transparency in political
practices.
(E) International exchanges and advanced professional
training programs in skill areas central to the development
of civil society and a market economy.
(F) The development of all elements of the democratic
process, including political parties and the ability to
administer free and fair elections.
(G) The development of local governance.
(H) The development of a free-market economy.
(4) Authorization of appropriations.--
(A) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to
the President $100,000,000 for the period beginning October
1, 1999, and ending September 30, 2001, to carry out this
subsection.
(B) Availability of funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant
to subparagraph (A) are authorized to remain available until
expended.
(b) Prohibition on Assistance to Government of Serbia.--In
carrying out subsection (a), the President shall take all
necessary steps to ensure that no funds or other assistance
is provided to the Government of Yugoslavia or to the
Government of Serbia.
(c) Assistance to Government of Montenegro.--In carrying
out subsection (a), the President is authorized to provide
assistance to the Government of Montenegro, if the President
determines, and so reports to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate, that the Government of Montenegro is committed to,
and is taking steps to promote, democratic principles, the
rule of law, and respect for internationally recognized human
rights.
____
AMENDMENT TO 1151
(Purpose: To allocate funds to continue mycoherbicide counter drug
research and development)
On page 26, line 15, before the period insert the
following: ``Provided further, That of the funds made
available under this heading, not less than $10,000,000 shall
be made available to continue mycoherbicide counter drug
research and development''.
Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleagues,
Senator Burns and Senator DeWine, to offer an amendment to the Foreign
Operations Appropriations bill. This amendment would provide $10
million to the State Department Bureau of International Law Enforcement
Affairs
[[Page S7880]]
for mycoherbicide research and development to be used for narcotic crop
eradication. The appropriations bill, as it currently stands, provides
no funding for this important tool in our war against illegal drugs.
Many of my colleagues and I view this mycoherbicide technology as a
promising new tool that will reduce the cultivation and supply of
narcotic crops, and thereby increasing our capacity to combat illegal
drugs. I have been briefed on the mycoherbicide technology and
understand that it is a naturally occurring plant pathogen that can be
introduced into an area to control a target plant species. The program
is also environmentally friendly--it posses no threat to humans or
animals, other crops, or water supply and replaces the use of harmful
chemicals. In addition, the program is a cost effective tool in our war
on drugs. The mycoherbicides will remain in the soil for an extended
period of time, for up to 40 years, and costs a fraction of the $2.65
billion we spend on other supply reduction methods.
I remind my colleagues that Congress has recognized the importance of
this technology and its ability to eradicate deadly crops when it
endorsed the program last year in the Western Hemisphere Drug
Elimination Act. The program was funded in the amount of $23 million
for fiscal year 1999. I strongly urge my colleagues to continue their
support for this program by passing this amendment and supporting the
continued development of the mycoherbicide program.
Mr. President, as illegal drugs continue to cross our borders and
threaten the welfare of American citizens, this program is a top
priority that can significantly reduce the production of narcotics
crops. We know that elimination of illicit crops is the best way of
preventing deadly drugs from reaching our streets and destroying untold
lives and communities. I urge my colleagues to join with Senator Burns,
Senator DeWine and me in support of this amendment and in support of
this important program.
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss yet again one of
the key problems I have been addressing, as a U.S. Senator, over the
last four years. The problem is the inflow of illegal drugs into
America. I have heard it said that if we eliminate demand, if we
address the domestic side of drug abuse, we really don't have to worry
about illegal narcotics producers and importers, because they would
then have no market for their drugs.
Mr. President, this argument makes sense on a superficial level, but
it does not reflect reality. I have been, throughout my career as a
local, state and Federal elected official, a strong supporter of
domestic efforts to reduce drug demand. But I have always believed--and
continue to believe--that we need a balanced program to attack the drug
problem on all fronts. We need to invest not only in domestic demand
reduction and law enforcement programs, but also in international
programs to increase interdiction and reduce production of illegal
narcotics. We need to do our best to stop drugs from ever reaching our
borders.
Mr. President, for nearly a year, I have expressed my belief that
this Administration is not doing its best to address this problem.
Little seems to have changed in one year.
Before this Administration took office, almost one-third of our
counter narcotics resources were committed to stopping drugs outside
our borders. Today, that figure is less than 14 percent. Although
overall funding for counter narcotics programs has increased
dramatically in the last decade, from $4.5 billion to $17.8 billion,
statistics show an increase in drug use among our youngest citizens. I
am disturbed by how easily and how cheaply illegal drugs can be
purchased. I am disturbed that the Administration is not taking
seriously the initiatives Congress passed last year as part of the
bipartisan Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act.
Mr. President, President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2000
provided ZERO funding for any of the initiatives in that Act. In fact,
the President's overall anti-drug budget for next year is $100 million
less than what Congress provided in 1999. The Coast Guard received no
funding to acquire additional ships and planes to stop drug trafficking
in the Caribbean; the Drug Enforcement Administration received ZERO
funding for new agents; the US Customs Service received ZERO funding to
acquire maritime/air assets, and ZERO increases for inspectors.
In addition, the Administration has also ignored other key
initiatives sought by Congress, including mycoherbicide research and
development, and eradication and alternative crop development
assistance to our Latin American neighbors, particularly, Colombia and
Bolivia. I very much appreciate the efforts of the Appropriations
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations in working with me on these issues.
They have done a remarkable job to incorporate a key anti-drug
initiative that was not sought by the President.
Specifically, Mr. President, I commend the managers of the bill for
accepting the amendment offered by the Senator from Montana, Senator
Burns, to fund the mycoherbicide program which we began funding last
year under the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act. Mycoherbicide
technology is a new and promising eradication technique for coca,
poppy, and marijuana. The concept is to employ a natural disease that
only attacks a specific narcotics plant without harming neighboring
vegetation. Mycoherbicides can be applied through aerial spraying and
will remain in the soil to prevent future growth of the narcotics crops
in that area. Mr. President, this has the potential to be a very cost-
effective and low-risk way to drastically reduce drug production at its
source. We must pursue this technology and fund the additional research
and testing necessary to bring about a deployable product as soon as
possible.
Mr. President, let me now turn to the subject of eradication and
alternative crop development assistance to Colombia and Bolivia. I am
particularly concerned about the lack of resources made available by
this Administration for what I consider to be our most urgent foreign
assistance project--counter narcotics funding. I fear that we are
sending a signal abroad that the United States is not entirely serious
about the fight against drugs.
The report language accompanying this bill makes special mention of
the progress made in the drug fight by the Government of Bolivia, and I
want to add my voice to the committee report as well. Since coming to
power in August of 1997, the Government of President Hugo Banzer and
Vice President Jorge Quiroga has undertaken an ambitious plan to remove
Bolivia from the illegal narcotics trade by the time they leave office
in 2002.
Mr. President, many, myself included, were skeptical that this goal
could be reached in the time allotted. Now, nearly two years into their
``Dignity Plan,'' the Bolivian Government has shown that this goal can
be reached. Since taking office, the Banzer Government has successfully
reduced Bolivia's cocaine production potential by a remarkable 40
percent. This has been accomplished by an effective eradication program
and an aggressive and successful program of interdiction and control of
the chemical precursors which go into cocaine production.
The Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill makes mention of Bolivia's
success, and its financial needs. I am deeply concerned that we are not
providing sufficient support to the historic effort of the Bolivian
Government. They have moved tens of thousands of farmers out of the
illegal coca fields and it is absolutely imperative that we help to
provide viable commercial alternatives for these farmers and their
families. It would be a great tragedy to be within sight of a major
victory in the drug war and to lose it for want of resources. The
anticipated level of funding in this Bill falls far short of what is
required to finish the job in Bolivia in the next two years.
Mr. President, I look forward to working with the Senator from
Alaska, Senator Stevens, the Senator from Georgia, Senator Coverdell,
and the Senator from Iowa, Senator Grassley, to help Bolivia and other
countries in their fight against drugs. We will work with the
appropriators during conference to provide the highest possible level
of funding for this effort. This is a key investment in the future
safety of our own streets--and it will bring us closer to the drug-free
America our children deserve.
[[Page S7881]]
amendment no. 1158
At the appropriate place in the bill at the following new
section:
SEC. . FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING REPORT.
(a) The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State
shall jointly provide to the Congress by January 31, 2000 a
report on all military training provided to foreign military
personnel (excluding sales) administered by the Department of
Defense and the Department of State during fiscal years 1999
and 2000, including those proposed for fiscal year 2000. This
report shall include, for each such military training
activity, the foreign policy justification and purpose for
the training activity, the cost of the training activity, the
number of foreign students trained and their units of
operation, and the location of the training. In addition,
this report shall also include, with respect to United States
personnel, the operational benefits to United States forces
derived from each such training activity and the United
States military units involved in each such training
activity. This report may include a classified annex if
deemed necessary and appropriate.
(b) For purposes of this section a report to Congress shall
be deemed to mean a report to the Appropriations and Foreign
Relations Committees of the Senate and the Appropriations and
International Relations Committees of the House of
Representatives.
____
amendment no. 1162
(Purpose: To increase the commitment to control and eliminate the
growing international problem of tuberculosis)
At the end, add the following:
Sec. 5 . (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
(1) Since the development of antibiotics in the 1950s,
tuberculosis has been largely controlled in the United States
and the Western World.
(2) Due to societal factors, including growing urban decay,
inadequate health care systems, persistent poverty,
overcrowding, and malnutrition, as well as medical factors,
including the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the emergence of multi-
drug resistant strains of tuberculosis, tuberculosis has
again become a leading and growing cause of adult deaths in
the developing world.
(3) According to the World Health Organization--
(A) in 1998, about 1,860,000 people worldwide died of
tuberculosis-related illnesses;
(B) one-third of the world's total population is infected
with tuberculosis; and
(C) tuberculosis is the world's leading killer of women
between 15 and 44 years old and is a leading cause of
children becoming orphans.
(4) Because of the ease of transmission of tuberculosis,
its international persistence and growth pose a direct public
health threat to those nations that had previously largely
controlled the disease. This is complicated in the United
States by the growth of the homeless population, the rate of
incarceration, international travel, immigration, and HIV/
AIDS.
(5) With nearly 40 percent of the tuberculosis cases in the
United States attributable to foreign-born persons,
tuberculosis will never be eliminated in the United States
until it is controlled abroad.
(6) The means exist to control tuberculosis through
screening, diagnosis, treatment, patient compliance,
monitoring, and ongoing review of outcomes.
(7) Efforts to control tuberculosis are complicated by
several barriers, including--
(A) the labor intensive and lengthy process involved in
screening, detecting, and treating the disease;
(B) a lack of funding, trainer personnel, and medicine in
virtually every nation with a high rate of the disease; and
(C) the unique circumstances in each country, which
requires the development and implementation of country-
specific programs.
(8) Eliminating the barriers to the international control
of tuberculosis through a well-structured, comprehensive, and
coordinated worldwide effort would be a significant step in
dealing with the increasing public health problem posed by
the disease.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that if the total allocation for this Act is higher than the
level passed by the Senate, a top priority for the additional
funds should be to increase the funding to combat infectious
diseases, especially tuberculosis.
____
AMENDMENT NO. 1163
(Purpose: Supporting an international conference to achieve a durable
political settlement in the Balkans)
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:
SEC. __. SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING AN INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE BALKANS.
(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) The United States and its allies in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted large-scale military
operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
(2) At the conclusion of 78 days of these hostilities, the
United States and its NATO allies suspended military
operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia based
upon credible assurances by the latter that it would fulfill
the following conditions as laid down by the so called Group
of Eight (G-8):
(A) An immediate and verifiable end of violence and
repression in Kosovo.
(B) Staged withdrawal of all Yugoslav military, police, and
paramilitary forces from Kosovo.
(C) Deployment in Kosovo of effective international and
security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United
Nations Security Council, and capable of guaranteeing the
achievement of the agreed objectives.
(D) Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo,
to be decided by the United Nations Security Council which
will seek to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life
for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
(E) Provision for the safe and free return of all refugees
and displaced persons from Kosovo and an unimpeded access to
Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
(3) These objectives appear to have been fulfilled, or to
be in the process of being fulfilled, which has led the
United States and its NATO allies to terminate military
operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
(4) The G-8 also called for a comprehensive approach to the
economic development and stabilization of the crisis region,
and the European Union has announced plans for $1,500,000,000
over the next 3 years for the reconstruction of Kosovo, for
the convening in July of an international donors' conference
for Kosovo aid, and for subsequent provision of
reconstruction aid to the other countries in the region
affected by the recent hostilities followed by reconstruction
aid directed at the Balkans region as a whole.
(5) The United States and some of its NATO allies oppose
the provision of any aid, other than limited humanitarian
assistance, to Serbia until Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milosevic is out of office.
(6) The policy of providing reconstruction aid to Kosovo
and other countries in the region affected by the recent
hostilities while withholding such aid for Serbia presents a
number of practical problems, including the absence in Kosovo
of financial and other institutions independent of
Yugoslavia, the difficulty in drawing clear and enforceable
distinctions between humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance, and the difficulty in reconstructing Montenegro
in the absence of similar efforts in Serbia.
(7) In any case, the achievement of effective and durable
economic reconstruction and revitalization in the countries
of the Balkans is unlikely until a political settlement is
reached as to the final status of Kosovo and Yugoslavia.
(8) The G-8 proposed a political process towards the
establishment of an interim political framework agreement for
a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking into full
account the final Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-
Government in Kosovo, also known as the Rambouillet Accords,
and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries
of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK (Kosovo
Liberation Army).
(9) The G-8 proposal contains no guidance as to a final
political settlement for Kosovo and Yugoslavia, while the
original position of the United States and the other
participants in the so-called Contact Group on this matter,
as reflected in the Rambouillet Accords, called for the
convening of an international conference, after 3 years, to
determine a mechanism for a final settlement of Kosovo status
based on the will of the people, opinions of relevant
authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the
implementation of the agreement and the provisions of the
Helsinki Final Act.
(10) The current position of the United States and its NATO
allies as to the final status of Kosovo and Yugoslavia calls
for an autonomous, multiethnic, democratic Kosovo which would
remain as part of Serbia, and such an outcome is not
supported by any of the Parties directly involved, including
the governments of Yugoslavia and Serbia, representatives of
the Kosovar Albanians, and the people of Yugoslavia, Serbia
and Kosovo.
(11) There has been no final political settlement in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Armed Forces of the United
States, its NATO allies, and other non-Balkan nations have
been enforcing an uneasy peace since 1996, at a cost to the
United States alone of over $10,000,000,000, with no clear
end in sight to such enforcement.
(12) The trend throughout the Balkans since 1990 has been
in the direction of ethnically based particularism, as
exemplified by the 1991 declarations of independence from
Yugoslavia by Slovenia and Croatia, and the country in the
Balkans which currently comes the closest to the goal of a
democratic government which respects the human rights of its
citizens is the nation of Slovenia, which was the first
portion of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to
secede and is also the nation in the region with the greatest
ethnic homogeneity, with a population which is 91 percent
Slovene.
(13) The boundaries of the various national and sub-
national divisions in the Balkans have been altered
repeatedly throughout history, and international conferences
have frequently played the decisive role in fixing such
boundaries in the modern era, including the Berlin Congress
of 1878, the London Conference of 1913, and the Paris Peace
Conference of 1919.
(14) The development of an effective exit strategy for the
withdrawal from the Balkans of foreign military forces,
including the armed forces of the United States, its NATO
[[Page S7882]]
allies, Russia, and any other nation from outside the Balkans
which has such forces in the Balkans is in the best interests
of all such nations.
(15) The ultimate withdrawal of foreign military forces,
accompanied by the establishment of durable and peaceful
relations among all of the nations and peoples of the Balkans
is in the best interests of those nations and peoples.
(16) An effective exit strategy for the withdrawal from the
Balkans of foreign military forces is contingent upon the
achievement of a lasting political settlement for the region,
and that only such a settlement, acceptable to all parties
involved, can ensure the fundamental goals of the United
States of peace, stability, and human rights in the Balkans;
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that--
(1) the United States should call immediately for the
convening of an international conference on the Balkans,
under the auspices of the United Nations, and based upon the
principles of the Rambouillet Accords for a final settlement
of Kosovo status, namely that such a settlement should be
based on the will of the people, opinions of relevant
authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the
implementation of the agreement and the provisions of the
Helsinki Final Act;
(2) the international conference on the Balkans should also
be empowered to seek a final settlement for Bosnia-
Herzegovina based on the same principles as specified for
Kosovo in the Rambouillet Accords; and
(3) in order to produce a lasting political settlement in
the Balkans acceptable to all parties, which can lead to the
departure from the Balkans in timely fashion of all foreign
military forces, including those of the United States, the
international conference should have the authority to
consider any and all of the following: political boundaries;
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance for all nations in
the Balkans; stationing of United Nations peacekeeping forces
along international boundaries; security arrangements and
guarantees for all of the nations of the Balkans; and
tangible, enforceable and verifiable human rights guarantees
for the individuals and peoples of the Balkans.
____
amendment no. 1167
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:
Sec. . (a) The President shall continue and expand
efforts through the United Nations and other international
fora, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, to limit arms
transfers worldwide. The President shall take the necessary
steps to begin multilateral negotiations within 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, for the purpose
of establishing a permanent multilateral regime to govern the
transfer of conventional arms, particularly transfers to
countries:
(1) that engage in persistent violations of human rights,
engage in acts of armed aggression in violation of
international law, and do not fully participate in the United
Nations Register of Conventional Arms; and
(2) in regions in which arms transfers would exacerbate
regional arms races or international tensions that present a
danger to international peace and stability.
(b) Report to Congress.--(1) Not later than 6 months after
the commencement of the negotiations under subsection (a),
and not later than the end of every 6-month period thereafter
until an agreement described in subsection (a) is concluded,
the President shall report to the appropriate committees of
the Congress on the progress made during these negotiations.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the amendment I am offering today calls on
the President to begin multilateral negotiations for the purpose of
establishing a permanent multilateral regime to govern the transfer of
conventional arms to countries that engage in persistent violations of
human rights, engage in acts of armed aggression, do not fully
participate in the United Nations Register of Conventional, and
countries in regions in which arms transfers would exacerbate regional
arms races or international tensions.
As the United States and its allies work to expand the community of
democratic nations and prevent the spread of violence and ethnic
conflict, we must give higher priority to consideration of how
conventional arms transfers may work to undermine these important
objectives. It is simply not in our interest to allow weapons to flow
freely into countries who abuse the rights of their citizens or who are
engaged in conflict or destabilizing arms races.
International restraint in arms exports is important to U.S. national
security interests, as well as for the furtherance of democracy and
human rights. The June 1996 ``Report of the Presidential Advisory Board
on Arms Proliferation Policy'' concluded that U.S. and international
security are threatened by the proliferation of advanced conventional
weapons. According to the Report, ``The world struggles today with the
implications of advanced conventional weapons. It will in the future be
confronted with yet another generation of weapons, whose destructive
power, size, cost, and availability can raise many more problems even
than their predecessors today. These challenges will require a new
culture among nations, one that accepts increased responsibility for
control and restraint, despite short-term economic and political
factors pulling in other directions.'' An international Code of Conduct
is a step toward that new culture.
The United States is far-and-away the world's biggest arms merchant,
and we must lead the way for the rest of the world in addressing this
issue. But we cannot do it alone. A unilateral decision by the United
States to limit conventional arms transfers would be an important
signal of our commitment to this issue, but it would not stop the flow
of weapons into the countries about whom we are most concerned. We
should be under no illusion about the ability or willingness of other
arms-producing nations to rush in and fill any gap we might create.
This amendment will require the President to expand international
efforts to curb worldwide arms sales through the United Nations and
other fora, such as the Wassenaar Agreement, and to report to the
Congress on progress made during these negotiations.
The United States should lead the way to establishing a multilateral
regime to prevent nations that ignore the rights of their citizens or
bully their neighbors from obtaining the weapons that support these
nefarious activities. This legislation can be the vehicle to accomplish
this important objective. I thank the managers of this bill for
accepting my amendment.
amendment no. 1168
Purpose: To restrict U.S. aid to Cambodia
On page 13, strike lines 2 through the colon on line 14,
and insert in lieu the following:
``None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be made available
for activities or programs for the Central Government of Cambodia until
the Secretary of State determines and reports to the Committee on
Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign Relations that the
Government of Cambodia has established a tribunal consistent with the
requirements of international law and justice including the
participation of international jurists and prosecutors for the trial of
those who committed genocide or crimes against humanity and that the
Government of Cambodia is making significant progress in establishing
an independent and accountable judicial system, a professional military
subordinate to civilian control, and a neutral and accountable police
force:''
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the pending bill prohibits the
Administration from providing aid to the central government of Cambodia
pending certification by the Secretary of State that Cambodia has held
free and fair elections, that the Central Election Commission was
comprised of representatives from all parties, and that the Cambodian
government has established an international panel of jurists to try
individuals who have committed genocide against the Cambodian people.
I share the Committee's view that aid can be a source of leverage in
dealing with the new Cambodian government, and I agree that we should
use our aid to encourage the Cambodian government to establish a
credible, internationally acceptable genocide tribunal. However, I do
not believe that the conditions in the bill provide us with effective
leverage because they are outdated and irrelevant to the realities on
the ground in Cambodia today.
All of us who are involved with Cambodia recognize full well that the
elections held last July in Cambodia were a mixed bag at best. The
process leading up to the elections had flaws. The elections themselves
were quite successful in terms of large voter turnout, lack of
intimidation, international monitoring, and lack of violence. But they
were less than perfect.
Cambodians know this, but they have moved on. They have formed a new
coalition government with what appears to be a workable power sharing
arrangement between the two major parties. They have an effective
opposition party. The Khmer Rouge is no longer a military or political
player, looming as a threat to the new government. The climate of
political intimidation and violence that has so often characterized
Cambodia is no longer prevalent.
[[Page S7883]]
The new Cambodian government has put forth a policy platform which, if
implemented, would enable Cambodia to make real strides toward the
establishment of democratic institutions and processes.
In light of these realities, it makes no sense to put restrictions on
our aid that simply cut off the aid and prevent us from using US aid as
an incentive to move the Cambodian government to deal with the serious
problems that are on the table now--building an independent judiciary,
reforming the military and the policy so that they are professional,
neutral and accountable, providing health care and schooling, and
tackling the overwhelming problem of poverty.
The amendment that I am offering with Senator McCain replaces the
conditions in the bill with new conditions designed to promote the
building of democratic institutions and to encourage the Cambodian
government to establish a tribunal consistent with the requirements of
international law and justice to try those guilty of genocide and
crimes against humanity.
Specifically, this amendment prohibits aid to the central government
pending a certification by the Secretary of State that Cambodia is
making significant progress in establishing an independent and
accountable judicial system, a professional military subordinate to
civilian control, and a neutral and accountable police force. The
amendment also requires the Secretary to certify that the Cambodian
government has established a tribunal consistent with the requirements
of international law and justice and including the participation of
international jurists and prosecutors for the trial of those who
committed genocide or crimes against humanity.
Let me say a word about the condition related to the tribunal. When I
was in Cambodia in April, I had extensive discussions with Prime
Minister Hun Sen, National Assembly Chairman Prince Ranarridh, King
Sihanouk, and others about the issues related to the constitution of a
genocide tribunal. While the Prime Minister insisted that the tribunal
be in Cambodia, he agreed with my proposal that international judges,
prosecutors and investigators actively participate in the process. He
also indicated that he would support changes in Cambodian law to allow
these individuals to actively operate within the Cambodian judicial
system. Prince Ranariddh and King Sihanouk also were supportive of this
concept.
I believe that this kind of tribunal, with meaningful international
participation, could provide a credible and accountable process,
consistent with international law and standards, for trying those who
committed genocide and crimes against humanity. The carrot of US aid
can serve as an important incentive for the Cambodian government to
follow through on this process.
Mr. President, I believe this is a good amendment and I thank the
managers for accepting it.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise to join with Senator Kerry in
offering an amendment to the foreign operations appropriations bill
that would replace language currently in the bill pertaining to
Cambodia with language that I firmly believe will prove far more
productive in accomplishing our goals in that strife-torn nation. The
amendment would replace the current prohibition on assistance pending
unrealistic and counterproductive certifications with attainable goals
consistent with the positive developments that have occurred in
Cambodia since its elections last July.
Few countries in the entire world have experienced the scale of
suffering since the Second World War that was inflicted upon the people
of Cambodia between 1975 and 1979. A phrase that has become a part of
our normal lexicon in discussions of tragedies of great proportion in
foreign countries originated in descriptions of the killing fields of
Cambodia. What transpired in that country during the rule of the Khmer
Rouge defies comprehension. It is a history, however, that must not be
forgotten.
After decades of struggling with political events in Cambodia, we
have an opportunity to finally help it move in a positive direction. We
have an opportunity to help the people of that beautiful nation to
begin to put their painful past behind them, and to join the community
of nations in good standing. We cannot accomplish that objective,
however, with the language currently in the bill before us today. That
language prohibits all direct U.S. assistance to the central government
of Cambodia until the Secretary of State certifies that the July 1998
elections were free and fair, with emphasis on the period leading up to
election day.
Few would argue that numerous irregularities occurred in the months
leading up to the election of July 26, 1998. I wish that had not been
the case. But those irregularities took place, and we cannot change the
past. The question, however, becomes where we go from here. The
election itself was, by and large, a free and fair election, and it is
unlikely that the pre-election irregularities fundamentally altered its
outcome. Since the election, the main competing factions have agreed at
an amicable arrangement, and Cambodia today stands its best chance of
making significant political and economic progress. A U.S. role, which
is currently limited to support of nongovernmental organizations
anyway, can be instrumental in facilitating greater levels of
liberalization. The Central Government of Cambodia shows every sign of
wanting to move in that direction. That is why the language in this
bill is so troubling. It fails to account for a far more positive
political atmosphere in Cambodia than has existed in decades.
We can help Cambodia to move forward, or we can stand aside and see
an opportunity to act productively in Southeast Asia squandered. I am
under no illusions about the scale of problems that continue to plague
that troubled nation. The government of Phnom Penh must move forward on
the issue of establishing an international tribunal for the prosecution
of Khmer Rouge officials, it must continue to address pressing issues
like deforestation, and it must carry out needed political and economic
reforms. But we must not let an important opportunity to help such
reforms move forward by restricting aid unless the State Department
certifies to something all parties know cannot be certified. We can
predicate our policy toward Cambodia on the past, or we can remember
the past but look to the future. The Kerry-McCain amendment provides an
opportunity to do the latter. I urge its support.
Amendment 1173
At the appropriate place, insert the following section:
SEC. . EXPANDED THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE.
It is the sense of the Senate that the programs contained
in the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative are vital to the
national security of the United States and that funding for
those programs should be restored in conference to the levels
requested in the President's budget.
____
Amendment 1174
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:
Sec. . Sense of the Senate Regarding U.S. Commitments
Under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework.--It is the
Sense of the Senate that, as long as North Korea meets its
obligations under the U.S.-North Korean nuclear Agreed
Framework of 1994, the U.S. should meet its commitments under
the Agreed Framework, including required deliveries of heavy
fuel oil to North Korea and support of the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO).
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I wish to comment on the foreign operations
appropriations bill being considered by the Senate. There is one area
of this bill that I believe deserves particular attention, and that is
the series of provisions relating to U.S. funding for the Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization, or KEDO. This is the
organization that is implementing certain provisions of the U.S.-North
Korean nuclear Agreed Framework of 1994. U.S. funds for KEDO pay for
the heavy fuel oil that the U.S. is committed to provide to North Korea
in exchange for its agreement to freeze and eventually dismantle its
plutonium production program that could be used for nuclear weapons.
Mr. President, that Agreed Framework is working in our national
security interests now. Under that agreement, North Korea has frozen
its plutonium production facilities and canned almost all of the spent
nuclear reactor fuel from its graphite-moderated reactor in Yongbyon,
all under the watchful eye of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
personnel and monitoring instruments.
As recent Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff
[[Page S7884]]
have repeatedly and consistently testified to Congress, it is clearly
in our security interest that North Korea not produced any more
plutonium and that its spend reactor fuel be canned and removed from
North Korea. In addition, it is important for North Korea to account
for all its past plutonium production to the satisfaction of the IAEA.
If, and only if, North Korea satisfies all those requirements of the
Agreed Framework, then KEDO, will provide two lightwater nuclear power
production reactors to North Korea, with South Korea and Japan paying
the overwhelming majority of the cost of those reactors.
The U.S. is required to provide heavy fuel oil to North Korea on an
agreed schedule, and we have had a spotty record so far, largely
because of Congressional funding reductions and restrictions. But we
have managed to deliver the required oil, albeit sometimes late.
This bill would reduce the Administration's funding request for heavy
fuel oil from $55 million to $40 million dollars, a decrease of $15
million. This reduction would prevent the U.S. from purchasing and
delivering the required heavy fuel oil to North Korea. In my view, what
would be a serious mistake.
If we do not provide the required heavy fuel oil under the Agreed
Framework, we would be failing to meet our commitments under the Agreed
Framework. This would provide North Korea with a ready-made excuse to
withdraw from or violate the Agreed Framework, something we should all
recognize would be contrary to our national interests and bad for U.S.
security.
As long as North Korea meets its obligations under the Agreed
Framework, we should meet our commitments and obligations under the
Agreed Framework, including providing the funds necessary to deliver
all the required heavy fuel oil to North Korea.
Mr. President, this bill also places unnecessary and unworkable
restrictions on the obligation of the $40 million that is provided for
KEDO. These are contained in certifications required before the funds
can be obligated. Two of these certifications go beyond the terms of
the Agreed Framework and would make it very hard for the U.S. to
provide funds to KEDO, unless the President uses a waiver.
I believe it is important that we work in good faith to keep North
Korea in compliance with its obligations under the Agreed Framework,
and that includes our obligation to provide the necessary funds to
deliver the required heavy fuel oil to North Korea.
When the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee
members met recently with Former Defense Secretary William Perry, the
President's Special Advisor on North Korea, one of my colleagues asked
Dr. Perry what Congress could do to help move North Korea in a more
peaceful and cooperative direction. Dr. Perry indicated that the most
important Congressional action would be to provide full funding for
KEDO. I believe Dr. Perry is correct.
Mr. President, for these reasons I offer an amendment to the bill
that states the sense of the Senate that, ``as long as North Korea
meets its obligations under the U.S.-North Korean nuclear Agreed
Framework of 1994, the U.S. should meet its commitments under the
Agreed Framework, including required deliveries of heavy fuel oil to
North Korea and support of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO).''
This amendment puts the Senate on record as stating its view that the
United States should meet its commitments under the Agreed Framework,
including the heavy fuel oil and KEDO commitments.
Mr. President, I believe this amendment improves the bill and makes
it clear that the Senate wants the U.S. to uphold its end of the Agreed
Framework, and I hope that the bill's provisions relating to KEDO can
be modified in conference and that the Administration's requested
funding will be restored in conference, to reflect the view of the
Senate as expressed in my amendment.
amendment no. 1175
(Purpose: To provide Tibetan refugee relief)
On page 17, line 10, before the period insert the
following:
``That of the amounts appropriated under this heading, $1.5
million shall be made available to Habitat for Humanity
International for the purchase of 14 acres of land on behalf
of Tibetan refugees living in northern India, and the
construction of multi-unit development.''
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment that
would provide Habitat for Humanity $1.5 million for construction of a
multi-unit development for Tibetan refugees living in Northern India.
These refugees were forcibly driven from their homes by the Chinese
communists. They are living in the Dehradun area and are among the
poorest people on earth. They are without citizenship rights and cannot
own land. As such, they exist as squatters in burned out homes and
shacks remaining after the Hindu-Moslem conflicts of a few years ago.
The conditions are deplorable; soaking wet in the monsoon season and
freezing in the winter.
Many Americans are aware of the plight of these Tibetan refugees and
have started taking actions to help them. The Dalai Lama is a full
partner in this project and has put the full weight of his friends and
government behind this.
This money will fund a plan to purchase 14 acres of land on behalf of
the Tibetans and provide for the construction of a multi-unit
development for 160 of the poorest families. An American architect has
volunteered his time to visit the site, direct the preliminary
clearing, and draw the plans for the village.
General Mick Kicklighter, U.S. Army, Ret., serves as President of
Habitat for Humanity International and will oversee the direction of
resources for this project. The President of the Arundel County,
Maryland, Habitat for Humanity affiliate is working to lay out detailed
building time and cost management for the village. The property has
been obtained, building permits secured and the land has been cleared
by the hand effort of the refugees.
I ask my colleagues to join me and the cosponsors to this amendment
to support funding in the amount of $1.5 million to directed to Habitat
for Humanity International for completion of this project. The creation
of this village with U.S. assistance will serve as a model for the
international aid community. I firmly believe that the impact of this
modest sum will be felt globally.
amendment no. 1176
On page 33, line 6, before the colon, insert the following:
``, of which no less than $1,000,000 shall be available for
the Defense Institute of International Studies to enhance its
mission, functioning and performance by providing for its
fixed costs of operation''.
____
amendment no. 1177
At the appropriate place, insert:
It is the sense of the Senate that:
The Senate finds, that: The proposed programs under the
Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) are critical and
essential to preserving U.S. national security.
The Department of State programs under the ETRI be funded
at or near the full request of $250 million in the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2000 prior to
final passage.
Mr. McCONNELL. These amendments have been cleared on both sides, and
I ask they be considered and agreed to en bloc.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendments
en bloc.
The amendments (Nos. 1125, 1146, 1150, 1151, 1158, 1162, 1163, 1167,
1168, and 1173 through 1177) were agreed to.
Mr. McCONNELL. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEAHY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendments Nos. 1159 and 1170 through 1172, En Bloc, as modified
Mr. McCONNELL. I send the following modifications to amendments that
are at the desk:
No. 1159, Senator Landrieu on orphans; No. 1170, Senator Brownback,
the Sudan; No. 1171, Senator DeWine on Colombia; and No. 1172, Senator
Reid on Iraq.
The amendment (No. 1170), as modified, is as follows:
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:
SEC. __. INTERNATIONAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE FOR OPPOSITION-
CONTROLLED AREAS OF SUDAN.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, of the funds
made available under chapter 9 of part I of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to international disaster
assistance) for fiscal year 2000, up to $4,000,000
[[Page S7885]]
should be made available for rehabilitation and economic
recovery in opposition-controlled areas of Sudan. Such funds
are to be used to improve economic governance, primary
education, agriculture, and other locally-determined
priorities. Such funds are to be programmed and implemented
jointly by the United States Agency for International
Development and the Department of Agriculture, and may be
utilized for activities which can be implemented for a period
of up to two years.
SEC. __. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR SUDANESE INDIGENOUS
GROUPS.
The President, acting through the appropriate Federal
agencies, is authorized to provide humanitarian assistance,
including food, directly to the National Democratic Alliance
participants and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement
operating outside of the Operation Lifeline Sudan structure.
SEC. __. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR OPPOSITION-CONTROLLED
AREAS OF SUDAN.
(a) Increase in Development Assistance.--The President,
acting through the United States Agency for International
Development, is authorized to increase substantially the
amount of development assistance for capacity building,
democracy promotion, civil administration, judiciary, and
infrastructure support in opposition-controlled areas of
Sudan.
(b) Quarterly Report.--The President shall submit a report
on a quarterly basis to the Congress on progress made in
carrying out subsection (a).
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment that
has been cleared, I understand, by both sides. I would like to submit
into the Record a clarification regarding the distribution of
humanitarian assistance, including food, directly to the National
Democratic Alliance participants operating outside of the Operation
Lifeline Sudan structure. Namely, the intent and expectation of the
Senate through this language is for the Sudanese People's Liberation
Movement to be a recipient as a leading member participant in the
National Democratic Alliance.
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, it is important to view this amendment in
the greater context of the current humanitarian situation in southern
Sudan.
The situation is dire, to say the least: the famine of last year took
the lives of hundreds of thousands as flights of relief were banned by
Khartoum from large areas outside their control, an act which triggered
famine and starvation. The regime in Khartoum is allowed to halt U.N.
relief flights at will because of the terms of the 1989 agreement which
establish Operation Lifeline Sudan--the U.N. relief organization. As I
noted in an op-ed in The Washington Post on July 19, 1998, the
``practice starves combatants and noncombatants alike and compromises
the integrity and effectiveness of relief groups desperately trying to
fend off famine.''
I ask unanimous consent that op-ed be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, July 19, 1998]
Sudan's Merciless War on Its Own People
(By Bill Frist)
When the United Nations World Food Program announced last
week that up to 2.6 million people in southern Sudan are in
imminent danger of starvation, the news was received with
surprising nonchalance. Such news is becoming almost routine
from misery-plagued East Africa, but what is unfolding in
southern Sudan is at least the fourth widespread, large-scale
humanitarian disaster in the region in the past 15 years.
In all cases, the United States' record is not one of
success. Ethiopia in 1984, a disastrous military involvement
in Somalia in 1993 and shameful neglect in Rwanda in 1994
have left the public bitter toward the prospect of yet more
involvement. But again, as famine hovers over the region, we
face a disconcertingly similar quandary on the nature of our
response.
In January I worked in southern Sudan as a medical
missionary, and I have seen firsthand the terrible effects of
the continuing civil war and how that war came to help create
this situation. As a United States senator, however, I fear
that by failing to make necessary changes in our response,
American policy toward Sudan may be a contributing factor in
the horrendous prospect of widespread starvation.
The radical Islamic regime in Khartoum is unmatched in its
barbarity toward the sub-Saharan or ``black African''
Christians of the country's South. It is largely responsible
for creating this impending disaster through a concerted and
sustained war on its own people, in which calculated
starvation, bombing of hospitals, slavery and the killing of
innocent women and children are standard procedure.
Our policy toward Khartoum looks tough on paper, but it has
yet to pose a serious challenge to the Islamic dictatorship.
Neither has our wavering and inconsistent commitment to
sanctions affected its behavior or its ability to finance the
war.
Khartoum is set to gain billions of dollars in oil revenues
from fields it is preparing to exploit in areas of rebel
activity. The U.S. sanctions prohibit any American
investment, but recent evidence indicates that enforcement is
lax. Additionally, relief groups operating there report that
new weapons are flowing in as part of a deal with one of the
partners--a government-owned petroleum company in China.
It is our policy toward southern Sudan that is of more
immediate importance to the potential humanitarian disaster.
From my own experience operating in areas where U.S.
government relief is rarely distributed, I fear that both
unilaterally and as a member of the United Nations, the
United States unnecessarily restricts our own policy in odd
deference to the regime in Khartoum.
In southern Sudan our humanitarian relief contributions to
the starving are largely funneled through nongovernmental
relief organizations that participate in Operation Lifeline
Sudan. All of our contributions to the United Nations efforts
are distributed through this flawed deal.
In this political arrangement the Khartoum regime has veto
power over all decisions as to where food can be sent. That
which is needed in the areas outside their control is often
used as an instrument of war, with Khartoum routinely denying
permission for a flight to land in an area of rebel activity,
especially during times when international attention lacks
its current focus. This practice starves combatants and
noncombatants alike and compromises the integrity
and effectiveness of relief groups desperately trying to
fend off famine.
Despite associated risks, some relief groups operate
successfully outside the arrangement's umbrella, getting good
and medicine to areas that the regime in Khartoum would
rather see starve. Out of concern that the Khartoum regime
would be provoked into prohibiting all relief deliveries
under the scheme, the U.S. Agency for International
Development and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance do
not regularly funnel famine relief through outside
organizations, and thus our relief supplies are only
selectively distributed--a decision that unnecessarily abets
Khartoum's agenda.
The U.S. policy in Sudan does not seek an immediate rebel
victory and the fragmenting of Sudan that could follow.
Because the splintered rebel groups could not provide a
functioning government or civil society at this time, that
policy cannot be thrown out wholesale. Yet our failure to
separate this policy from the action necessary to save these
people from starvation result in absurdity.
Thus even while generously increasing the amount of aid,
for political reasons we seek the permission of the ``host
government'' in Khartoum to distribute it and feed the very
people they are attempting to kill through starvation and
war. A second reason for this posture is, presumably, a fear
that even modest, calculated food aid would allow the rebels
to mobilize instead of foraging for their families--a factor
that could turn the outcome on the battlefield in their
favor.
The prospect of widespread starvation in southern Sudan
does not necessitate that the United States seek a quick
solution on the battlefield. Military victory and an end to
hostilities are not a substitute for food. However, the
administration should make an immediate and necessary
distinction between the policy principle and the humanitarian
challenge. It should articulate a response without political
limitations, which, frankly, are trivial in comparison to the
human lives at stake, and it should press the United Nations
to do the same.
We can no longer afford to dance around the issues of
sovereignty and political principles while restraining our
response to a looming disaster that Khartoum helped create.
Such academic debates and diplomatic concerns are for the
well fed, but offer no solace to the starving.
Mr. FRIST. The Government of Sudan continues to prosecute the war
against the south, including the bombing of hospitals and churches, and
a campaign of terror, including slavery. Nearly 2 million have died
since 1983, with over 4 million displaced from their homes.
In January of last year, I worked in southern Sudan as a medical
missionary, in areas outside of government control, and in
``hospitals'' and clinics where I treated people who had never seen a
doctor. What I saw was the product of an indiscriminate and savage war.
Since that time I have worked with other Senators, relief
organizations, and the administration in trying to make our
humanitarian policy as effective as it possibly can be. It must be a
policy which does more than meet the immediate food needs of those who
hover on the brink of starvation. It must be a policy which seeks to
eliminate the root causes. The inability of the populations in areas
outside of the control of the Government of Sudan to protect themselves
is at the root of
[[Page S7886]]
their vulnerability to starvation and famine.
That is not a politically or logistically easy task. It does not have
a single solution which can simply be enacted. It requires that we
constantly push the policy to adapt and become more effective, rather
than simply become an amount for which we simply write a check each
fiscal year. This amendment does not represent the solution to the root
causes of the human tragedy in Sudan, but it is one critical piece
which we must consider.
The authorization in this amendment will open this issue and place it
at the top of the list of issues which we continue to work through with
the administration. That process of Congress and the administration
jointly working on a more effective Sudan policy has had its moments of
disagreement, but it has been largely productive and one where our
shared goals have never been compromised.
Additionally, it is worth noting that, beyond the traditional
chiefdoms, the groups designated in this amendment are really the only
organizations functioning in areas outside of the control of the
government of Sudan. As a consequence, these are the only organizations
which are defending these populations against the heinous attacks by
the Government of Sudan and, increasingly, by irregular or paramilitary
organizations sponsored by Khartoum--including slaving parties.
The more than 1 million dollars' worth of relief distributed in Sudan
on a daily basis is done so in such a way that it is purposefully
steered away from combatants. From the relief organizations' view
point, that is essential to maintain some level of insulation from the
political aspects of the war. They see themselves as strictly
humanitarian organizations.
However, from a practical standpoint, that practice has an
unintended, but not surprising consequence. Because the members of the
resistance groups have to eat too--for they suffer from starvation as
much as women and children--they regularly divert food donations to
their own use.
Possibly more important than that is the effect on these
organizations themselves and their ability to provide protection for
the populations they defend. Because their food supply is erratic and
dependent on diversions of other aid, they are often forced to
demobilize to either collect food on their own, to steal food, or to
leave to plant their crops. The practical effect of that is that they
cannot stay mobilized and cannot provide any reliable or cohesive
defense.
It is important to remember then that this amendment should not be
seen as a reward to the resistance groups. Yet I remind my colleagues
that they are the only line of defense between those people and the
regime in Khartoum which seeks to subdue or exterminate them in a
sustained effort of low-level ethnic cleansing.
The timing of presenting this authority to the President is
critically important. The government of Sudan is poised to begin
receiving billions of dollars in hard currency from the sale of newly
exploited oil in contested areas. The regime in Khartoum has repeatedly
and publically said their intention is to convert that hard currency
straight into an renewed effort to subdue or eradicate the people in
areas outside their control. The ability of the resistance groups to
stay mobilized and coherent is arguably more important now than since
the beginning of the war. A predictable supply of food is the key to
realizing that defense. Again, more so than the weapons Khartoum is
purchasing or receiving from the outside world, it is food which most
devastating.
Besides the obvious human cost of an ineffective defense against
Khartoum and their proxies, is the potential cost to the renewed effort
to bring the combatants into an effective peace process. As I noted in
a further piece in The Washington Post, we must use all available tools
to bring the combatants to the table.
I ask unanimous consent that be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, June 9, 1999]
An End to the Sudan Tragedy
(By Bill Frist)
The Post's May 7 editorial ``Sudan: The Unending War''
brought to light two critical points about that barbaric war
of ``ethnic cleansing.'' One is that our actions in Kosovo
emphasize our failure to act in the much larger war in Sudan.
Without Kosovo, the war in Sudan would continue in obscurity.
The other is that it is time for the United States to
redouble its efforts toward bringing the war to a conclusion.
As bad as the situation has become and intractable as the
conflict may seem, we may have a small chance for peace.
But the United States must redouble its efforts
strategically with a realistic understanding of our strengths
and limitations. What may seem like minor differences among
our options actually can represent fundamental differences
between success and failure. The appointment of a special
envoy may bring needed attention and diplomatic weight to
that effort, but it would represent neither a clear
understanding of our limitations nor a strategy that can
maximize our effectiveness.
A strategy that does so requires three basic steps in the
coming months:
We must recognize the conflict for what it is: a calculated
and sustained effort by the regime in Khartoum to subdue,
eradicate or forcibly convert to Islam large segments of
their own population. The fact that it is not exclusively a
Muslim against Christian or Arab against black African war
must not distract us from its barbarity. Even without a clear
``good guy,'' the war is indiscriminate and patently evil. As
the editorial pointed out, it already has claimed more lives
than the wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya and Somalia
combined.
We must conduct our relief operations so they address the
roots of the humanitarian disaster, not just the symptoms. We
must continue to change our operations so they do not
inadvertently abet the agenda of Khartoum by allowing the
government to use our food donations as a weapon--as it dose
with its calculated denial of access to relief flights that
carry out contributions through the United Nations.
We also must change the nature of our generous
contributions, moving away from simply food, literally
falling from the sky into starving villages, to one where we
seek to help establish the most basic civil and economic
institutions in the areas outside the government's control.
It is the near absence of those institutions in some areas
that prevents the Sudanese from sustaining themselves. I plan
to introduce legislation that will address those
shortcomings, both in our own programs and in the United
Nations. Congress can urge the president to continue
implementing those changes, but we also must be prepared to
support him fully as he does.
We must work harder to reinvigorate the existing
multilateral peace process and bring significant pressure to
bear on the warring parties and supporters to come to the
peace table. Khartoum uses seductive diversions--
``confessions'' of war-weariness and other hints that a
``breakthrough'' is at hand--to avoid a process in which it
would actually have to produce results.
The rebels continue to be fractious on their endgame. A
strong peace process based on an airtight list of principles
and measures of success can encourage both to deliver
tangible results. A special envoy alone, secret ``diplomatic
missions'' or any other effort that does not bring the
combatants and their supporters to the table cannot provide
three essential elements: the elimination of a scapegoat for
a failed process, sustained pressure on all parties to show
progress and a healthy dose of embarrassment for the world
regarding the situation.
The tragedy of Sudan has been perpetuated by shameful,
worldwide neglect and a stunning lack of resolve. Until
Khartoum succeeds in its goal of ethnic cleansing, the war
will never go away on its own. Short of military intervention
or comprehensive U.N. sanctions, for which there is no
political will, a coherent, cooperative and realistic
strategy offers the best chance for progress--albeit 16 years
late.
Mr. FRIST. The most important tool to bring them to the table is to
continue to highlight the fact that neither side will win this war
outright on the battlefield. If Khartoum believes they can not win the
war on the battlefield because of their new found source of hard
currency, they have absolutely no reason to come to the table and work
for real peace. Short of military intervention on our own, the best way
we can disabuse them of that notion and continue to press them to
commit to a peace process is to clearly eliminate the greatest
weaknesses which they will exploit. The greatest weakness is not so
much the southern Sudanese's vulnerability to attack, but their
inability to defend. That inability is not caused by a lack of
weaponry, but a lack of calories.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McConnell] proposes
amendments Nos. 1159, 1171 and 1172, as modified, en bloc.
The amendments are as follows:
amendment no. 1159, as modified
On page 21, line 22, before the period insert the
following: ``Provided further; That of the
[[Page S7887]]
amount appropriated under this heading, not to exceed
$2,000,000 shall be available for grants to nongovernmental
organization that work with orphans who are transitioning out
of institutions to teach life skills and job skills''.
____
amendment no. 1171, as modified
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following
new section:
SEC. . SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING COLOMBIA.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Colombia is a democratic country fighting multiple
wars:
(A) a war against the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces
(FARC);
(B) a war against the National Liberation Army (ELN);
(C) a war against paramilitary organizations; and
(C) a war against drug lords who traffic in deadly cocaine
and heroin.
(3)Colombia is the world's third most dangerous country in
terms of political violence with 34 percent of world
terrorist acts committed there.
(4) Colombia is the world's kidnaping capital of the world
with 2,609 kidnapings reported in 1998 and 513 reported in
the first three months of 1999.
(5) In 1998 alone, 308,000 Colombians were internally
displaced in Colombia. Over the last decade, 35,000
Colombians have been killed.
(6) The FARC and ELN are the two main guerrilla groups
which have waged the longest-running anti-government
insurgency in Latin America.
(7) The Colombian rebels have a combined strength of 10,00
to 20,000 full-time guerrillas; they have initiated armed
action in nearly 700 of the country's 1073 municipalities,
and control or influence roughly 60 percent of rural Colombia
including a demilitarized zone using their armed stranglehold
to abuse Colombian citizens.
(8) Although the Colombian Army has 122,000 soldiers, there
are roughly only 20,000 soldiers available for offensive
combat operations.
(9) Colombia faces the threat of the armed paramilitaries,
5,000 strong, who are constantly driving a wedge in the peace
process by their insistence in participating in the peace
talks.
(10) More than 75 percent of the world's cocaine HCL and 75
percent of the heroin seized in the northeast United States
is of Colombian origin.
(11) The conflicts in Colombia are creating spillovers to
the border countries of Venezuela, Panama and Equador:
Venezuela has sent 30,000 troops to its border the Ecuador is
sending 10,000 troops to its border.
(12) Venezuela is our number one supplier of oil.
(13) By the end of 1999, all U.S. military troops will have
departed from Panama, leaving the Panama Canal unprotected.
(14) In 1998, two-way trade between the United States and
Colombia was more than $11 billion, making the United States
Colombia's number one trading partner and Colombia the fifth
largest market for U.S. exports in the region.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that--
(1) the United States should recognize the crisis in
Colombia and play a more pro-active role in its resolution;
(2) the United States should mobilize the international
community to pro-actively engaged in resolving Colombian
wars; and
(3) pledge or political support to help Colombia with the
peace process.
____
amendment no. 1172, as modified
At the appropriate place, add the following:
It is the sense of the Senate that the President and the
Secretary of State should--
(1) raise the need for accountability of Saddam Hussein and
several key members of his regime at the International
Criminal Court Preparatory Commission, which will meet in New
York on July 26, 1999, through August 13, 1999;
(2) continue to push for the creation of a commission under
the auspices of the United Nations to establish an
international record of the criminal culpability of Saddam
Hussein and other Iraqi officials;
(3) continue to push for the United Nations to form an
international criminal tribunal for the purpose of indicting,
prosecuting, and imprisoning Saddam Hussein and any other
Iraqi officials who may be found responsible for crimes
against humanity, genocide, and other violations of
international humanitarian law; and
(4) upon the creation of a commission and international
criminal tribunal, take steps necessary, including the
reprogramming of funds, to ensure United States support for
efforts to bring Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials to
justice.
Mr. McCONNELL. I ask unanimous consent that these amendments, as
modified, be agreed to en bloc.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendments
en bloc, as modified.
The amendments (Nos. 1159, and 1171 and 1172) as modified, were
agreed to.
Mr. McCONNELL. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEAHY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. McCONNELL. There are six amendments at the desk that will not be
proposed. I ask unanimous consent the following amendments not be
proposed:
No. 1120, Senator Brownback on the Sudan; No. 1147, Senator Brownback
on the Sudan; No. 1149, Senator Grassley on narcotics; No. 1156,
Senator Biden on Iraq; No. 1169, Senator Kerry of Massachusetts, code
of conduct; No. 1155, Senator Biden on Iraq.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCONNELL. We approved earlier in the day 19 amendments in the
managers' package. We just approved 18 more from a list compiled at 1
p.m., the deadline for getting amendments to the desk.
There are 5 more amendments we withdrew that will not be offered.
That leaves 12 amendments, I say to my friend from Vermont, that remain
to be addressed.
We are working on paring that list down further.
Mr. DODD. I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I call up an amendment at the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has two amendments?
Mr. DODD. One amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. One amendment.
Amendment No. 1157
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd], for himself and
Mr. Leahy, proposes an amendment numbered 1157.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in the bill at the following new
section:
SEC. . TERMINATION OF PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON
TRAVEL TO CUBA.
(a) Travel to Cuba.--
(1) Freedom of travel for united states citizens and legal
residents.--Subject to subsection (b), the President shall
not regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly, travel to
or from Cuba by United States citizens or legal residents, or
any of the transactions incident to such travel that are set
forth in paragraph (2).
(2) Transactions incident to travel.--The transactions
referred paragraph (1) are--
(A) any transaction ordinarily incident to travel to or
from Cuba, including the importation into Cuba or the United
States of accompanied baggage for personal use only:
(B) any transaction ordinarily incident to travel or
maintenance within Cuba, including the payment of living
expenses and the acquisition of goods or services for
personal use;
(C) any transaction ordinarily incident to the arrangement,
promotion, or facilitation of travel to, from, or within
Cuba;
(D) any transaction incident to non-scheduled air, sea, or
land voyages, except that this subparagraph does not
authorize the carriage of articles into Cuba or the United
States except accompanied baggage; and
(E) any normal banking transaction incident to any activity
described in any of the preceding subparagraphs, including
the issuance, clearing, processing, or payment of checks,
drafts, travelers checks, credit or debit card instruments,
or similar instruments; except that this paragraph does not
authorize the importation into the United States of any goods
for personal consumption acquired in Cuba.
(b) Exceptions.--The restrictions on authority contained in
subsection (a)(1) do not apply in a case in which--
(1) the United States is at war with Cuba; or
(2) armed hostilities between the two countries are in
progress.
(c) Applicability.--This section applies to actions taken
by the President before the date of the enactment of this Act
which are in effect on such date, and to action taken on or
after such date.
(d) Supersedes Other Provisions.--This section supersedes
any other provision of law, including section 102(h) of the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996.
Amendment No. 1182 To Amendment No. 1157
(Purpose: To terminate prohibitions and restrictions on travel to Cuba)
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment in the
second degree and ask for its immediate consideration.
[[Page S7888]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Vermont [Mr. Leahy] proposes an amendment
numbered 1182 to amendment No. 1157.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike everything after ``SEC___.'' and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL BY AMERICAN CITIZENS TO
CUBA.
(a) Travel to Cuba.--
(1) Freedom of travel for united states citizens and legal
residents.--Subject to subsection (b), the President shall
not regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly, travel to
or from Cuba by United States citizens or legal residents, or
any of the transactions incident to such travel that are set
forth in paragraph (2).
(2) Transactions incident to travel.--The transactions
referred to in paragraph (1) are--
(A) any transaction ordinarily incident to travel to or
from Cuba, including the importation into Cuba or the United
States of accompanied baggage for personal use only;
(B) any transaction ordinarily incident to travel or
maintenance within Cuba, including the payment of living
expenses and the acquisition of goods or services for
personal use;
(C) any transaction ordinarily incident to the arrangement,
promotion, or facilitation of travel to, from, or within
Cuba;
(D) any transaction incident to nonscheduled air, sea, or
land voyages, except that this subparagraph does not
authorize the carriage of articles into Cuba or the United
States except accompanied baggage; and
(E) any normal banking transaction incident to any activity
described in any of the preceding subparagraphs, including
the issuance, clearing, processing, or payment of checks,
drafts, travelers checks, credit or debit card instruments,
or similar instruments;
except that this paragraph does not authorize the importation
into the United States of any goods for personal consumption
acquired in Cuba.
(b) Exceptions.--The restrictions on authority contained in
subsection (a)(1) do not apply in a case in which--
(1) the United States is at war with Cuba;
(2) armed hostilities between the two countries are in
progress; or
(3) there is imminent danger to the public health or the
physical safety of United States travelers.
(c) Applicability.--This section applies to actions taken
by the President before the date of the enactment of this Act
which are in effect on such date, and to actions taken on or
after such date.
(d) Supersedes Other Provisions.--This section supersedes
any other provision of law, including section 102(h) of the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the Dodd
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to it being in order to
request the yeas and nays on the first-degree amendment?
Mr. DODD. On the Dodd amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Is there a sufficient second?
There is not a sufficient second.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative assistant proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, as I understand it, the second-degree
amendment is what is pending before the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second on the second-
degree amendment? There is not.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative assistant proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. I believe the Senator would like to renew his request for
the yeas and nays.
Mr. LEAHY. I renew the request on the second-degree amendment, Mr.
President. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Vermont for his
second-degree proposal. We will take a very short amount of time. It is
not our intention to spend a great deal of time on this particular
proposal. We have proposed the pending amendments because we believe
the time has come to lift the very archaic, counterproductive, and ill-
conceived ban on Americans traveling to Cuba. Not only does this ban
hinder rather than help our effort to spread democracy, it
unnecessarily abridges the rights of ordinary Americans.
The United States was founded on the principles of liberty and
freedom. Yet when it comes to Cuba, our Government abridges these
rights with no greater rationale than political and rhetorical gain.
Cuba lies just 90 miles from America's shore. Yet those 90 miles of
water might as well be an entire ocean. We have made a land ripe for
American influence forbidden territory. In doing so, we have enabled
Fidel Castro's regime to hold onto power longer and contributed to the
continued oppression of the Cuban people.
Surely we do not ban travel to Cuba out of concern for the safety of
Americans who might visit that island nation. Today Americans are free
to travel to Iran, Sudan, Burma, Yugoslavia, North Korea--but not to
Cuba. You can fly to North Korea; you can fly to Iran; you can travel
freely. Yet it seems to me if you can go to those countries, you ought
not be denied the right to go to Cuba. If the Cubans want to stop
Americans from visiting that country, that ought to be their business.
But to say to an American citizen that you can travel to Iran, where
they held hostages for months on end, to North Korea, which has
declared us to be an enemy of theirs completely, but not to travel 90
miles off our shore to Cuba I think is a mistake.
To this day, some Iranian politicians believe the United States to be
``the Great Satan.'' We hear it all the time. Just two decades ago,
Iran occupied our Embassy and took innocent American diplomats hostage.
To this day, protesters in Tehran burn the American flag with the
encouragement of the members of their Government. Those few Americans
who venture into such inhospitable surroundings often find themselves
pelted by rocks and accosted by the public.
Similarly, we do not ban travel to Sudan, a nation we attacked with
cruise missiles last summer for its support of terrorism; to Burma, a
nation with one of the most oppressive regimes in the world today; to
North Korea, whose soldiers have peered at American servicemen through
gun sights for decades; or Syria, which has one of the most egregious
human rights records and is one of the foremost sponsors of terrorism.
I can go to Iran, but I cannot go to Cuba. There is an inconsistency
here that I think we ought to undo. We ban travel to Cuba, a nation
which is neither at war with the United States nor a sponsor of
terrorism. I fail to see how isolating the Cuban people from democratic
values and ideals will foster the transition to democracy in that
country.
I fail to see how isolating the Cuban people from democratic values
and from the influence of Americans when they go to that country to
help bring about the change we all seek serves our own interests.
Before I go on, let me be perfectly clear: I strongly support
effective measures to bring democratic values and rule to all people,
including Cuba. No one, certainly not Cubans, should have to live under
a dictator's fist. Cubans cannot travel freely to the United States.
That is because Fidel Castro does not allow them to do so. Those of us
who watched our television screens last night and saw those Cubans
trying to escape the dictatorial regime in Cuba, picked up by Cuban
boats were horrified by that kind of activity.
Because Fidel Castro does not permit Cubans to leave Cuba and come to
this country is not justification for adopting a similar principle in
this country
[[Page S7889]]
that says Americans cannot travel freely. We have a Bill of Rights. We
have fundamental rights that we embrace as American citizens. Travel is
one of them. If other countries want to prohibit us from going there,
then that is their business. But for us to say that citizens of
Connecticut or Alabama cannot go where they like is not the kind of
restraint we ought to put on people.
If I can travel to North Korea, if I can travel to the Sudan, if I
can travel to Iran, I do not understand the justification for saying I
cannot travel to Cuba. I happen to believe that by allowing Americans
to travel there, we can begin to have the influence in Cuba that can
begin to change the demographics politically to make a difference in
bringing about the change we all seek in that country.
Today, every single country in the Western Hemisphere is a democracy,
with one exception: Cuba. American influence through person-to-person
and cultural exchanges was a prime factor in this evolution from a
hemisphere ruled predominantly by authoritarian or military regimes to
one where democracy is the rule, with one exception: Cuba.
Our policy toward Cuba blocks these exchanges and prevents the United
States from using our most potent weapon in our effort to combat
totalitarian regimes, and that is our own people. They are the best
ambassadors we have.
Most totalitarian regimes bar Americans from coming into their
countries for the very reasons I just mentioned. They are afraid the
gospel of freedom will motivate their citizens to overthrow dictators,
as they have done in dozens of nations over the last half century.
Isn't it ironic that when it comes to Cuba we do the dictator's bidding
for him in a sense? Cuba does not have to worry about spreading
democracy. Our own Government stops us from doing so.
The current state of regulations governing who can and cannot travel
to Cuba is a complex and subjective morass. My colleague, Senator
Leahy, has first-hand experience in attempting to navigate the sea of
bureaucracy.
When he attempted to travel to Cuba earlier this year with his wife
Marcelle, he discovered that while his travel was exempt from certain
licensing requirements, his wife's travel was not. Ultimately, she was
able to accompany her husband after applying for a license based on her
work as a registered nurse.
The fact is, the entire process is a farce and everyone knows it.
Other couples, not a U.S. Senator and his wife, would probably not fare
as well in gaining a license to travel to Cuba.
Let me review for my colleagues who may travel to Cuba under current
Government regulations and under what circumstances. The following
categories of people may travel to Cuba without applying to the
Treasury Department for a specific license to travel. They are deemed
to be authorized to travel under so-called general license: Government
officials, regularly employed journalists, professional researchers who
are ``full time professionals who travel to Cuba to conduct
professional research in their professional areas,'' Cuban Americans
who have relatives in Cuba who are ill but only once a year they can go
back.
There are other categories of individuals who theoretically are
eligible to travel to Cuba as well, but they must apply for a license
from the Department of the Treasury and prove they fit a category in
which travel to Cuba is permissible.
What are these categories?
One, freelance journalists, provided they can prove they are
journalists; they must also submit their itinerary for the proposed
research.
Two, Cuban Americans who are unfortunate enough to have more than one
humanitarian emergency in a 12-month period and therefore cannot travel
under a general license.
Three, students and faculty from U.S. academic institutions that are
accredited by an appropriate national or regional educational
accrediting association who are participating in a ``structural
education program.''
Four, members of U.S. religious organizations.
Five, individuals participating in public performances, clinics,
workshops, athletic and other competitions and exhibitions.
Just because you think you may fall into one of the above enumerated
categories does not necessarily mean you will actually be licensed by
the U.S. Government to travel to Cuba.
Who decides whether a researcher's work is legitimate? Who decides
whether a freelance journalist is really conducting journalistic
activities? Who decides whether or not a professor or student is
participating in a ``structured educational program''? Who decides
whether a religious person is really going to conduct religious
activities?
I will tell you who does. Some Government bureaucrats are making
those decisions about those personal rights of American citizens.
It is truly unsettling, to put it mildly, when you think about it,
and probably unconstitutional at its core. It is a real intrusion on
the fundamental rights of American citizens.
It also says something about what we as a Government think about our
own people. Do we really believe that a journalist, a Government
official, a Senator, a Congressman, a baseball player, a ballerina, a
college professor or minister are somehow superior to other citizens
who do not fall into those categories; that only these categories of
people are ``good examples'' for the Cuban people to observe in order
to understand American values?
I do not think so. I find such a notion insulting. There is no better
way to communicate America's values and ideals than by unleashing
average American men and women to demonstrate by daily living what our
great country stands for and the contrasts between what we stand for
and what exists in Cuba today.
I do not believe there was ever a sensible rationale for restricting
Americans' right to travel to Cuba. With the collapse of the Soviet
Union and an end to the cold war, I do not think an excuse remains
today to ban this kind of travel.
This argument that dollars and tourism will be used to prop up the
regime is specious. The regime seems to have survived 38 years despite
the Draconian U.S. embargo during that entire period. The notion that
allowing Americans to spend a few dollars in Cuba is somehow going to
give major aid and comfort to the Cuban regime is without basis, in my
view.
This spring, we got a taste of what people-to-people exchanges
between the United States and Cuba might mean when the Baltimore
Orioles and the Cuban National Team played a home-and-home series. The
game brought players from two nations with the greatest love of
baseball together for the first time in generations. It is time to
bring the fans together. It is time to let Americans and Cubans meet in
the baseball stands and on the streets of Havana.
Political rhetoric is not sufficient reason to abridge the freedoms
of American citizens. Nor is it sufficient reason to stand by a law
which counteracts one of the basic premises of American foreign policy;
namely, the spread of democracy. The time has come to allow Americans--
average Americans--to travel freely to Cuba. I urge my colleagues to
support this amendment.
Again, I make this point to my colleagues: There are no restrictions
on you if you want to travel to the Communist Government of North
Korea, to the Communist Government of the People's Republic of China,
to the Communist Government of Vietnam, to the terrorist-supported
Government of Iran, or to travel to the Sudan. This is a completely
uneven standard we are applying in order to satisfy some political
rhetoric.
If you really want to create some change in Cuba, then unleash the
flood of U.S. citizens going down there and talking to average Cubans
on the streets of Havana and Santiago and the small communities. Give
the 11 million people in Cuba a chance to interface and interact with
American citizens. If Fidel Castro wants to say, ``No, you can't come
here,'' let him say that, but let not us do his bidding by saying to
average citizens: You cannot go there. That is a denial, in my view, of
a fundamental right and freedom, unless there is an overriding national
interest which would preclude and prohibit American citizens from
traveling to a given country. That case has not been
[[Page S7890]]
made. It cannot be made when it comes to Cuba.
Senator Leahy and I urge the adoption of this amendment to begin to
create the change we all want to see on this island nation 90 miles off
our shore.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Abraham). The Senator from Vermont.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the distinguished senior Senator from
Connecticut has stated the arguments so very well. Like he, I have
traveled to Cuba. I visited Cuba 3 months ago with the distinguished
senior Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Reed.
We were able to go there because we are U.S. Government officials. If
we had been private citizens, as the distinguished Senator from
Connecticut has said, we would have had some problems.
My friend from Connecticut mentioned the problems that my wife
Marcelle faced when she went to Cuba. He and I have discussed that
because of the absurdity of it.
My wife Marcelle has accompanied me on many foreign trips. We have
gone abroad representing our country, at the request of the Senate, at
the request of the President; and sometimes we have traveled on our own
just to visit friends abroad.
So we did not think there was much of a difference that time. Our
passports were in order. We were going to a Caribbean country, having
traveled in that area often, so we didn't need any special shots or
anything.
We were about to go. But a few days before we were to leave --this is
what the Senator from Connecticut referenced--we received a call from
the State Department saying they were not sure they could approve my
wife's travel to Cuba.
I cannot speak for other Senators, but I suspect that most Senators
would react the same way I did if they were told that a State
Department bureaucrat had the authority to prevent their spouse or
their children from traveling with them to a country with which we are
not at war and which, according to the Defense Department, and
practically every other American, poses no threat to our national
security.
At first I thought it was a joke. They said no. My wife is not a
Government official. She is not a journalist. They did not think she
could go. She is, and has been, a practicing, registered nurse
throughout her professional life. In the end, she was able to join me
because an American nurses association asked her to report on an aspect
of current health in Cuba, and she agreed to report back to them.
Actually she has visited, with me, other parts of the world where we
have used the Leahy War Victims Fund or where we have gone to visit
landmine victims or looked at health care. I have always relied on her
knowledge and expertise and did on this trip.
But I thought, how many Senators realize that if they wanted to take
their spouse or their children with them to Cuba, they could be
prevented from doing so by U.S. authorities. They can take them
anywhere else in the world, any other country that would allow them in,
but here it is not that the other country would not allow them in. Our
country is saying: We're not going to allow you to leave if that is
where you're going.
The authors who put that law together knew the blanket prohibition on
travel by American citizens would be unconstitutional, so they came up
with a nifty way to avoid that problem while still having the same
result. They said: Well, Americans could travel to Cuba; they just
cannot spend any money there.
Think of it. You can go to Cuba but you can't stay anywhere if it is
going to cost you money to stay; you can't eat anything if it is going
to cost you money for the food; you can't take a cab, or anything, from
the airport if it is going to cost you money.
Well, come on. Almost a decade has passed since the collapse of the
former Soviet Union. But even before that Americans went there. Now
they freely travel to Russia by the thousands every year, as they did
before the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Eight years have passed since the Russians cut their $3 billion
subsidy a year to Cuba, and we now give hundreds of millions of dollars
in aid to Russia, even though that was our great enemy during the cold
war.
Americans, as the Senator from Connecticut has said, can travel to
North Korea. There are no restrictions on the right of Americans to
travel there or to spend money there.
I ask a question of my colleagues: Which country poses a greater
threat to the United States or world stability? North Korea or Cuba? I
think the answer, especially if you watch the news at all, is North
Korea, for it is in South Korea where we have tens of thousands of U.S.
troops poised to defend it.
Americans can travel to Iran, a country that is in total, gross
violation of all international law. They took over our embassy, held
our diplomats hostage, broke every single possible international law
there was--they still hold our property that they confiscated from us--
but we can travel freely there; we can spend money there.
The same goes for Sudan. These are countries that are on our own
terrorist list, but we can travel there.
Americans travel to China and Vietnam, countries that have had
abysmal human rights records. We not only travel there, we actively
promote American investment there.
So our Cuban policy is hypocritical, inconsistent, self-defeating,
and contrary to our values--to give it the benefit of the doubt. We are
a nation that prides itself on our tradition of encouraging the free
flow of people and ideas. It is simply impossible to make a rational
argument that Americans should be able to travel freely to North Korea
or Iran but not to Cuba. You cannot make that argument.
I cannot believe that Members of Congress want the State Department
or the Treasury Department deciding where their family members or
constituents can travel, unless we are at war or there is a national
emergency to justify it. But that is what is happening.
So because it is happening, it should not be surprising to anybody in
this Chamber that the law is being violated by tens of thousands of
Americans who are traveling to Cuba every year, and almost none of them
are prosecuted. I kept running into people on the streets of Havana
from the United States. I said: Do you have licenses or anything? No.
We just came down.
I know people from my own State who drive an hour's drive away to
Montreal and then fly to Cuba; people who go to the Hemingway Marina in
their boats and then spend time in Cuba.
Mr. DODD. Will my colleague yield on that point?
Mr. LEAHY. Certainly.
Mr. DODD. I think it is an important point you are making. But I
think in almost every single case, what these citizens are doing is
flying through Canada or Cancun and in a sense violating the law; they
are acting illegally.
Mr. LEAHY. That is right.
Mr. DODD. So in a sense we are promoting, by this particular
provision in our existing law, illegal travel.
Mr. LEAHY. And also promoting a complete disrespect for our laws
because everybody knows they are not going to be prosecuted. It is a
ridiculous thing. Why have this significant law on the books and then
not prosecute it? Yet if it was being prosecuted, maybe we would hear
more of a hue and cry to change it.
It is demeaning to the American people. It is damaging to the rule of
law. We have been stuck with this absurd policy for years, even though
almost everybody knows--and most say privately--that it makes
absolutely no sense. It is beneath the dignity of a great country.
But I also say it not only helps strengthen Fidel Castro's grip on
America, it has a huge advantage for our European competitors who are
building relationships and establishing a base for future investment in
a post-Castro Cuba.
When the Castro era ends is anybody's guess. I was a student in law
school here in Washington shortly after the Bay of Pigs. I remember
people talking: It will be any minute now--any minute now--Castro is
out.
Well, I graduated in 1964, 35 years ago, and he is still there.
President Castro is not a democratic leader; he is not going to become
one. But maybe it is time we start pursuing a policy that is in our
interest, not in a lobbyist's interest or somebody else's interest. I
should be clear about this amendment. It does not--I repeat and
underscore
[[Page S7891]]
that--lift the U.S. embargo. It is narrowly worded so it does not do
that. It permits travelers to go there but to carry only their personal
belongings. We are not opening up a floodgate for imports to Cuba.
It limits the value of what Americans can bring home from Cuba to the
current amount that we Government officials could bring back. That is
$100. You are not going to start a huge trade in Cuban goods of
whatever sort for $100, especially some of the more popular Cuban
goods.
It reaffirms the President's authority to prohibit travel in times of
war, armed hostilities, or if there is imminent danger to the health or
safety of Americans.
Those who oppose this amendment, who want to prevent Americans from
traveling to Cuba, will argue that spending dollars there helps prop up
the Castro government. To some extent that is true, because the Cuban
Government does run the economy. It also runs the schools, the
hospitals, maintains roads. As is the U.S. Government, it is
responsible for a full range of social services. Any money that goes
into the Cuban economy supports the programs that support ordinary
Cubans.
There is a black market in Cuba because no one can survive on their
meager Government salary. So the income from tourism also fuels that
informal sector and goes in the pockets of ordinary Cubans.
It is also worth mentioning that while the average Cuban cannot
survive on his or her Government salary, you do not see the kind of
abject poverty in Cuba that is so common elsewhere in Latin America. In
Brazil, Panama, Mexico, or Peru, all countries we support openly, there
are children searching through garbage in the street for scraps of food
next to gleaming highrise hotels with limousines lined up outside.
In Cuba, with the exception of a tiny elite consisting of the
President and his friends, everyone is poor. They do have access to
some basics: A literacy rate of 95 percent; their life expectancy is
about the same as that of Americans, even though the health system is
focused on preventive care.
The point is that while there are obviously parts of the Cuban
economy we would prefer not to support, as there is in North Korea,
where we are sending aid, or China or Sudan or any country the
government of which we disagree, much of the Cuban Government's budget
benefits ordinary Cubans. So when opponents of this amendment argue
that we cannot let Americans travel to Cuba because the money they
spend there will prop up Castro, remember what they are not saying: The
same dollars also help the Cuban people.
We are not going to weaken President Castro's grip on power by
keeping Americans from traveling to Cuba. History has proven that. He
is as firmly in control now as he was 40 years ago. So let us put a
little sense into our relationship with Cuba. Let's have a little more
faith in the power of ideas.
I would rather have U.S. citizens down there speaking about democracy
than to have the only voice being the Government's voice speaking about
our embargo. Let's have the courage to admit the cold war is over, but
let's also get the State Department out of the business of telling our
spouses and our children and our constituents where they can travel and
spend their own money, especially in a tiny country where most
people are too poor to own an extra pair of shoes or clothes, a country
that poses no security threat to us.
This amendment will do far more to win the hearts and minds of the
Cuban people than the shortsighted approach of those who continue to
pretend that nothing has changed since 1959.
I am not one who supports the nondemocratic actions of the Castro
government. I have spoken very critically both here and in Cuba, of the
trials and arrests of those who dared to speak out for a different
government. But I was struck over and over again by Cubans of all walks
of life basically saying, what are we afraid of? Do we deny our people,
U.S. citizens, the ability to travel in other countries around the
world? When I say no, we don't stop them from going to Iran, North
Korea, China, Russia, Sudan, elsewhere, countries that are even on our
terrorist list, but we do here, they shake their heads in disbelief--
this in a country where, during the baseball game down there, when the
United States flag was carried out on to the baseball field, the Cubans
stood and cheered. We ought to think about that.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I understand the remarks the Senators
have made. It has been suggested earlier that we have had an absurd
policy for years and that Cuba is not a real threat to us, certainly
not as much of a threat as North Korea. I suggest if that is so--and it
certainly has not been so for very long; I suggest Cuba could in the
future be a threat to the United States--it is because we stood up to
them. We contained them. We basically defeated them and stopped them
when they had a systematic determination to subvert the Western
Hemisphere and even sent troops into Africa on behalf of Russia, when
there was a Soviet Union to subvert Africa for totalitarian communism.
That is what it was about. We have done some things that I think were
necessary and have preserved democracy for this hemisphere. It is
something we ought to be proud of.
As for Castro, it is time for him to retire. It is time for him to
give it up. It is time for him to put his people above his own personal
aggrandizement and lust for power. If he cares about his people, he
ought to give it up. He can go to North Korea, if he wants to go to a
Communist nation.
I don't have any sympathy for the man. I do not know why people want
to go to Cuba. All the time: I want to go to Cuba, go to Cuba. Well, I
would suggest maybe Honduras. Those people have suffered terrifically.
There are people in Haiti we could help. I do not know why everybody
wants to help a nation that is oppressing its people so much.
Be that as it may, there are provisions now for people to gain
exemptions, if they have a just cause to do so, to go to Cuba. Those
who have a legitimate reason can find a way to go there, as the Senator
noted. I think we have an appropriate policy. I will oppose changing
it.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, a case has been made that Americans
cannot travel to Cuba. Indeed, the facts reveal that Americans travel
to Cuba by the thousands. The policy that this Congress has endorsed,
President Reagan, President Bush, and President Clinton have supported.
There has been a calculated policy of American contacts in travel to
Cuba. Today American students, journalists, people with archeological
interests, cultural interests, travel to Cuba by the thousands. Cuban
Americans travel to visit family members who have problems, medical
emergencies, by the thousands. The restriction of the U.S. Government
is not about travel.
We are using travel as a weapon to help convince the Cuban people to
put pressure on the Cuban Government, support for democracy, free
markets, that their contact with Americans is helpful in changing the
politics of the repression of Cuba. Restrictions in travel is not about
denying Americans the right to go to Cuba. It is about denying Fidel
Castro the economic benefits of American tourism. Travel that enhances
knowledge, causes political difficulties, we not only allow but we have
encouraged.
Travel that simply provides Fidel Castro with millions of dollars to
support his regime, his military, his security forces, we are denying,
and appropriately so. Nor is it a static policy.
On January 9 of this year, President Clinton revised the policy
again, for the second time in 2 years, to add new remittances by
American citizens to Cuba, so that people can send money and support
their families at appropriate levels that are humanitarian, to help
with medical or food emergencies but not so much that it would allow
Fidel Castro to profit by it. President Clinton has allowed charter
passenger flights to cities other than Havana for the first time, and
the measure permits direct mail service to Cuba. The measure also
authorizes the sale of food and agricultural inputs to independent
nongovernment entities.
New regulations for all of this were issued on May 10--flights, new
authority for travel, food and medicine--as
[[Page S7892]]
part of a calculated policy to always test Castro: When you are ready
to talk about democracy, to respect human rights, American policy will
begin to change. Several days after President Clinton announced these
new initiatives, the Cuban Government responded and Castro announced
that it constituted a policy of ``aggression.'' Once again, as
President Carter found, as did Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton,
every time you make an act of concession--in this case, a legitimate
concession--to test Fidel Castro to see whether he is interested in a
bilateral relationship, we are denounced for redressing the Cuban
nation by disallowing travel.
My colleagues offer an amendment now to remove these restrictions and
open travel and allow Fidel Castro to get the full economic benefit of
millions, potentially hundreds of millions of dollars worth of travel.
What kind of regime is it that they will be visiting? If Castro is to
receive the benefit of our tourist dollars, what is it he would be
doing with this money? It is worth taking a look at Cuba, not of 1961
when the cold war brought us to sanctions, but the Cuba of 1999. It is
suggested by my friend and colleague from Vermont that the cold war is
over, implying that perhaps we have no argument with this regime.
Our argument with Cuba is about more than the cold war. It is about
all the things that have always motivated the United States: human
rights, human decency, the nature of the regime itself. Our argument
with Fidel Castro is not over. The causes of that argument still
endure.
While the United States has been seeking to ease sanctions, look at
the record in the last 24 months in response to our review and change
of policy. In February, Fidel Castro criminalized all forms of
cooperation or participation in any prodemocracy efforts--not a fine,
not an arrest, but 20 years in jail if you participate in a
prodemocracy effort. This is the Cuba you will be visiting. He imposes
a 30-year jail term on anybody who cooperates with an agency of the
U.S. Government. That includes Radio Marti, distribution of food or
medicine by a government agency, or anyone acting on behalf of anyone
associating with this Government.
On March 1, the law was tested. Four prominent human rights
dissidents were tried in secrecy for their criticism of the Communist
Party of Cuba. International diplomats who traveled to Cuba to witness
the trial were barred from attending any of the proceedings. After
being held without charges for 1 year--no foreign press, no foreign
visitors, no diplomats, held in secrecy for 1 year--they were found
guilty and sentenced for up to 5 years in jail. This is the Cuba of
1999.
Amnesty International, in its recent report, concludes that there are
now 350 political prisoners in Cuba. Ten unarmed civilians, in the
meantime, have been shot by Cuban security officials on the streets of
Havana.
I do not ask the Senate to do anything it has not done before. Just
on March 25, the Senate voted 98-0, stating that the United States
should make all efforts to criticize Cuba and condemn its human rights
record. What is the price of this conduct? They hold hundreds of
political prisoners, people are shot in the streets, people are held in
secret trials, and our response is: Let's go for a visit. Let's go see
how they are doing and have a good meal in Havana. No. My colleague is
right. There is no cold war, but there is a great deal at issue that
this country cares a great deal about.
Mr. LEAHY. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. TORRICELLI. Yes.
Mr. LEAHY. People have been shot in the streets in China, and held in
prisons in China, and tortured and executed in China; are we allowed to
go and visit there without having to get a license from our country to
do so?
Mr. TORRICELLI. Let me, in my time, answer the Senator's question
with a question. Do you believe that travel restrictions on China would
change Chinese policy?
Mr. LEAHY. I don't think it would change the policy any more than it
would change the policy with Cuba.
Mr. TORRICELLI. That is where we agree.
Mr. LEAHY. I have a further question.
Mr. TORRICELLI. I will answer the question first and continue my
remarks. I don't think travel restrictions on China would change
Chinese policy. I oppose those restrictions. I do believe travel
restrictions on Cuba will change Cuban policy. That is why I support
them. I do believe that continued international resolve--for the first
time, the Senator's amendment would weaken America's policy. We have
gotten Europeans and Latins so outraged by the jailing of these
dissidents and these secret trials that European and Latin nations that
have voted against us for 20 years have joined with us this year in
Europe in voting to condemn the Cuban Government. Just as they are
joining the fight for human rights, the United States would abandon it.
There is one other thing that is important. I will finish making my
case and I will be glad to yield. There is one other change. This isn't
just about what Cuba does internally anymore. This is also about what
they are doing to our country. The government that you would have us
now visit, in lifting these restrictions, is a Cuba that has crossed a
very important threshold.
Just this last year, indicted by the government of Cuba on May 7,
were 14 Cubans captured in Miami. Let me suggest to you the nature of
that indictment to see whether it makes an impression on the Senator
and see whether or not he thinks this is an appropriate time to ease
restrictions on travel to Cuba. The indictment of Cuban agents in Miami
last fall was for attempting to penetrate the U.S. Southern Command and
planning ``terrorist acts against U.S. military installations.'' The
indictment was further revised to include 2 of the 14 with conspiracy
to murder 4 American citizens by shooting down their aircraft over the
Straits of Florida.
Let me suggest that I, as all of my colleagues, am prepared to
respond to initiatives from Havana. The day there are elections, the
day there are open trials, the day there is a free press, the day they
respond to a request for extradition of people who murder American
citizens, I will join you with my colleagues on that day on this floor
matching the Cuban Government 2-to-1, 3-to-1, 1 of their initiatives to
3 of ours, 10 of ours, or 20 of ours. We will meet them 95 percent of
the way down the field.
But, my friends, to ask this Senate to respond to the record of the
last year of jailing dissidents, secret trials, shooting people on the
streets, the indictment of 14 Cuban agents penetrating the United
States military installations to commit terrorist acts against the
United States, and the indictment of Cubans for murdering American
citizens--this, my colleagues, would not appear to me to be the best
time to suggest that it is time to forgive and forget, and have
thousands--maybe tens of thousands--of Americans visit Cuba to rescue
the Cuban economy from its current position of collapse, and provide
Fidel Castro with the revenue to strengthen his regime.
These sanctions are having an effect. Fidel Castro has had to reduce
his military by one-half. He cannot afford to keep them in uniform. The
secret police have been reduced by nearly a third in their size. We are
causing the collapse of the Communist Party of Cuba--not in a timely
way, not as I would like it to be, but it is having an impact.
Why, given this record of indictments and terrorism and murder
against American citizens, would we choose this moment?
Those in the world who have been the most critical of our policy--the
Holy Father in the Vatican, who led an initiative himself to ease
restrictions on Cuba, has now joined the chorus of those. Fidel Castro
broke his promise about priests. The Holy Father appealed to him not to
proceed with these jail terms, and he did it anyway. The Vatican is now
joining the criticism.
The states of Latin America for the first time are voting against his
human rights record. And we in the United States who led this effort
for all of these years are about to change sides.
This Senate has been resolute on this issue in the past.
I will join with my friend from Kentucky, Senator McConnell, I hope
in a motion to table this amendment.
I think the debate has been worthwhile.
[[Page S7893]]
My friend from Connecticut and my friend from Vermont have made it
very clear to the Cuban Government that we are ready, willing, and able
to change our policy if they change theirs. But I believe the motion to
table is the right way to proceed in the Senate at the moment.
I would be glad to yield to the Senator from Vermont.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, let's be clear where we are. My friend from
New Jersey speaks of the trial of the dissidents. Many who have spoken
on the floor were critical of that.
I sat 10 feet across the table from Fidel Castro and strongly and
harshly criticized the trial of the dissidents. I went to visit each of
their families and strongly and harshly criticized that trial and spoke
also on the floor. With my reputation on free speech issues, I would be
the last person to yield to anybody on the question of criticism of
those who try cases against dissidents and those who spoke out against
the Government.
I was very pleased to see our European allies speak out about it. But
I note for the Record that while they spoke out on that, not one of
those European allies that the Senator from New Jersey says now come
over to our side--not one of those countries--has put limits on the
travel of their people to Cuba as we have--not one.
The United States, the most powerful, wealthiest nation on Earth,
limits its population in traveling only to this country.
The distinguished Senator from New Jersey said quite correctly that
we limited travel of our people to China. It might not make much
difference in what they did. I suspect it made some, but probably not
much. I say that it probably wouldn't make any more difference in that
Government than it does in the Government of Cuba. But we see a huge
market there, so we are not going to do that anyway.
I suggest that during the cold war the fact was that we encouraged
travel to places like the Soviet Union and China, and we got a
diversity of views. Our thoughts and our views were heard more and
more, not as much as we would like but more and more.
The Holy Father spoke out, as did most of us in this body, about the
trial of the dissidents. But I point out that the Holy Father has never
withdrawn his very strong criticism of the United States.
Mr. TORRICELLI. May I reclaim my time for the moment? I yielded to
the Senator----
Mr. LEAHY. I thought the Senator had yielded the floor.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Please conclude.
Mr. LEAHY. That is my mistake. I assumed the Senator had yielded the
floor.
One last thing: We indicted, and we are using our criminal justice
system to try, Cuban spies, just as we have Russian spies, Chinese
spies, Japanese spies, Israeli spies, and spies from even our NATO
allies. We have done that. We have not broken our relationships with
any one of those countries when we have done that, and some of the
things some of those countries have done to us have been very serious
crimes, indeed.
Mr. TORRICELLI. I recognize that. I thank the Senator from Vermont.
Let me further present the case, in case the Senator misunderstood
me, that this is not a case that Cuba spied against the United States.
That we expect. This is a case where the President of the United
States, in my judgment, rightfully sought to ease restrictions on
travel to Cuba and did so in allowing charter flights, the expansion of
flights throughout Cuba, the easing of restrictions on travel to Cuba,
and the response that he received is that we now have 14 Cubans under
indictment, not for responding but for attempting to infiltrate an
American military installation and committing a terrorist act.
What I want the Senator from Vermont to do is put himself in the
position of Fidel Castro. The United States makes concessions to allow
greater travel, which we have now done twice in 24 months. The Cuban
Government attacks those concessions with acts of aggression and
attempts to commit terrorist acts against the United States. The human
rights situation further deteriorates. People are jailed. Contact with
the U.S. Government is criminalized. And now this Senate returns not in
outrage but says, Mr. President, we don't think you went far enough;
let's go further and further and liberalize trade.
That is my concern, recognizing how this will be seen in Havana.
I agree with the Senator's analysis. The United States allows travel
to many places. But the Senator has to concede to me that travel has
often been an effective tool in altering international conduct.
This country participated in prohibiting flights to Libya after it
shot down the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland. We prohibited
flights. After a period of 10 years, the Libyan Government relented and
allowed extradition to an international court those who are responsible
for the act. I don't ask anything with regard to the victims of
Lockerbie that we are not asking now of those in the Cuban Government.
What is the difference? How do you look at the families of the young
men shot down over the Straits of Florida and murdered by the Cuban
Government, and tell them, well, we will overlook this, though we will
resolve it with Libya?
When Americans have been in jeopardy, whether it was in Iran, or in
Libya, or years ago in Vietnam, when they were arresting people and
putting them in concentration camps, we prohibited travel. I suggest to
the Senator that that prohibition is still an effective mechanism of
policy.
In any case, I yield the floor to allow my friend from Connecticut to
speak.
I urge my colleagues to join with Senator McConnell on a motion to
table. This is the wrong judgment with the wrong signal at the wrong
moment--not undermining the historic American policy, but it is
undermining the policy of the Clinton administration which has been
well calibrated and very well defined.
This is not a partisan matter. It is bipartisan against the
leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate led by
Senator Helms and by President Clinton. It counters both policies.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, very briefly, if I may, I will not take much
time, because my colleague from Florida wants to be heard, as well as
others.
Let me say to my friend and colleague from New Jersey, I admire his
rhetorical skills immensely. He made a valiant effort to shift the
argument and debate implying we are doing a favor, this is somehow a
great act of generosity and kindness, that those who are proposing
lifting a restraint on travel to Cuba are trying to help out Fidel
Castro.
It is a good, clever argument. I hope it is not a persuasive
argument.
We are talking here not about what we are trying to do to help Fidel
Castro but a right that American citizens ought to have to travel
freely.
My colleague from New Jersey and others have pointed out the
dastardly deeds that go on in Cuba. I don't disagree at all. I am
outraged by it and condemn it.
I point out, if that is the basis upon which we restrict Americans to
travel freely, we would have bans on travel all over the world. It goes
on every day. We don't say to a single American citizen: You can't
travel to the People's Republic of China. Every day, that government
abuses its own people far more egregiously than occurs in Cuba. We see
it in Vietnam, Sudan, Yugoslavia, Iran, North Korea. Is there any more
oppressive government on the face of this Earth than the Republic of
North Korea? Yet any citizen in this country tomorrow or tonight can
get on a plane and fly there without having to get permission from the
State Department or the Treasury.
My point is, we are applying a standard that is not being applied
equally or fairly. I subscribe to the notion that by opening up access
you begin to create change. I argue that in Poland, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia it was the access and the interchange between citizens
of the free world and those countries which helped create the kind of
change that caused communism in those nations to fall. It wasn't
isolation that did it; it was contact that did it.
[[Page S7894]]
I have watched for 40 years a policy in Cuba that has not produced
the change that the Senator from North Carolina and I both want. We
disagree how to get there, but I agree with the conclusion he seeks. I
believe he agrees with the conclusion I seek.
Why don't we try a different tactic? What is the point of further
isolation after 40 years if there is no change? If I can say to a
citizen of my State: You can fly to the North Korea, you can fly to the
People's Republic of China, you can fly to Iran--countries that have
done far worse than the incidents that have occurred in Cuba, far more
egregious--we have understood we don't deny citizens of our own country
the right to travel.
Let Fidel Castro shut the door and say to my constituents: You can't
come to my country. I don't want to sit in the Senate and do his
bidding. I don't think I ought to be saying to the citizens of New
Jersey, North Carolina, or Florida that you can't travel there. Let
them say that.
To tell Cuban Americans: You can go back to your country once a year,
and if someone is sick, apply for an application, a license, and maybe
we will let you go see your family, maybe we will let you go, that is
not my view of the way we ought to be conducting our foreign policy.
This is about American rights. We provide in the Leahy amendment that
unless we are involved in a state of war, hostilities, or public health
reasons or good reasons why the Government may restrain the travel of
its citizens--we are not in that condition here.
If you want to create change in Cuba, let good, honest, average
American citizens interface with these people. They are the best
ambassadors in the world. They do more good on an hourly basis on
behalf of our country than all the diplomats combined. Give them a
chance to make that difference and go to the country 90 miles off our
shore.
I yield to my colleague from Massachusetts 1 minute for a question.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may yield for a question.
Mr. KERRY. I congratulate my colleague on his leadership with respect
to this. In the years that the Senator served on the Foreign Affairs
Committee, in all those years with the visits of Lech Walesa, the
visits of Vaclav Havel, and we have all shared wonderful moments with
leaders of countries where the curtain fell--I think I recall each of
those leaders saying it was the ability of people to come in during the
time things were shut, to share with them the sense of what was
happening elsewhere, the possibilities, bringing information, to bring
them hope; that, indeed, was one of the great sustaining values and
empowerments that brought them ultimately to the point of sharing the
freedom that we have.
I wonder if the Senator wouldn't agree that it is almost totally
contradictory with a Stalinist, tight police structure. In fact, by not
having intercourse with other people elsewhere--the discussion, the
movement of people, the discourse, the exchange of ideas that comes
with it--you are, in fact, empowering the capacity of that secrecy and
of that closed society to keep the hammer down on people, and that
flies directly contrary to all of the experience we have learned from
those wonderful visits we have had.
Mr. DODD. I say in response to my colleague from Massachusetts, he
makes an excellent point. I think the observation he has drawn is
correct. No one can grant with any certainty whether or not we will
create change overnight.
I look down the list of the people who can get licenses to go to
Cuba. Members of Congress can; journalists can; people who are involved
in some cultural exchanges. Ballerinas can go through a licensing
process to get there.
I like the idea that an average citizen in my State, in
Massachusetts, in Florida, can go into Cuba and walk those streets,
talk to people in the marketplaces, and share with them what we stand
for as a nation. Every time we have allowed that to occur, we have
created change--maybe not in the People's Republic of China. We did in
Poland. We did in Czechoslovakia. We did in Hungary. We did throughout
the Soviet bloc when we had a constant flow of people; that opening up,
that engagement, that creates change.
It seems to me after 38 years of saying no one can go there, this
might be worth trying. Then Fidel Castro can say: I'm not going to
allow these people in.
Let him be the one who shuts the door to U.S. citizens traveling
there. Let us not deny our own citizens the right to try and make a
difference, if that is what they want to do, without going through some
bureaucratic licensing process. Even the wife of a distinguished
colleague had to go through this process, as a registered nurse, to
qualify under the regulations. The spouse of a Senator. She can go to
North Korea, China, abusive governments, but she cannot go 90 miles off
the shore with her husband, a Senator. If that woman were not the wife
of a Senator, she would have been denied that license. We all know
that.
I bet there are nurses all across this country who might go to Cuba
and make a difference through their engagement in conversation,
interfacing with the people of that country, and to begin to create the
kind of change we seek.
It is absurd. As my colleague from Massachusetts has suggested by his
question, it is absurd. We are 185 days away from the millennium and we
sit in this Chamber and tell American citizens that because we
disagree, strongly disagree, with the Government of Cuba, we are going
to deny them the right to travel there and put it in the same basket as
Iraq and Libya.
That doesn't make sense.
I yield.
Mr. KERRY. I ask my colleague if, in fact, by denying that exchange,
those people the right to travel and connect with relatives and others
within the country, if we don't provide Fidel Castro with the
selectivity and greater capacity to restrict what information they get,
when they get it, how they get it, and if, in fact, we aren't playing
right into his capacity to keep a stranglehold--which is the very thing
we are trying to undo.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, again, my colleague from Massachusetts makes
an excellent point. When you restrict the ability of average citizens
to travel, you then restrict the ability of information exchanges about
what is going on around the world to actually reach the average citizen
in the streets. It can make a difference. So in a sense you empower Mr.
Castro and those who support him by giving them the ability to restrain
the amount of information people in the streets ought to be able to get
about what is going on in the rest of the world. As a matter of fact,
we become a coconspirator, if you will, in sustaining this man in
power, in my view. But by opening up this process, given the examples
we can cite--there are concrete examples all over the world where, when
we allowed that travel and that contact to occur, we have made a
difference; we created change. The only place there has been no change
that I know of is in Cuba, and it is the only place where we have not
changed our policy.
There seems to be some logic in that argument. If you want to follow
other examples, and those who argue against this resolution who
simultaneously argue they want Castro to go, it seems to me our best
formulation is to give this a chance to see if we cannot create the
kind of change the Senator from Massachusetts and I strongly support. I
thank him for his questions. I yield the floor.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I know this is spirited debate but we
need to wrap up a couple of items. Let me notify the Senate, before
returning to the debate on this amendment, we are just about to
completion. So let me ask unanimous consent the Dodd-Leahy amendments
be temporarily laid aside. We will come back to them in just a moment.
Mr. KERRY. Reserving the right to object, could I ask a question? I
inquire, I ask the Senator, where we are with respect to the Brownback
amendment?
Mr. McCONNELL. The Brownback amendment is yet to be disposed of.
There are a couple of amendments upon which we are going to have to
have rollcall votes. I would like to proceed, if I may.
Mr. KERRY. If I can ask, will there be time to speak to that
amendment?
[[Page S7895]]
Mr. McCONNELL. We are trying to wrap the bill up. I would very much
like the Senator from Massachusetts to say a few words on that
amendment, knowing full well where he stands. But if he will just
suspend for a minute and let us wrap up a few housekeeping items here?
Mr. KERRY. Fine.
Amendment No. 1165
Mr. McCONNELL. I understand there is a Bingaman amendment still at
the desk that has now been cleared on both sides. I ask unanimous
consent we return to the Bingaman amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The amendment is agreed
to.
The amendment (No. 1165) was agreed to.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEAHY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I have an amendment by the Senate
majority leader that has been cleared on both sides.
Amendment No. 1183
(Purpose: To require annual reports on arms sales to Taiwan)
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I send the amendment to the desk and
ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McConnell], for Mr. Lott,
proposes an amendment numbered 1183.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following
new section:
SEC. . CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.
Consistent with the intent of Congress expressed in the
enactment of section (3)(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act the
Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate
committees and leadership of Congress to devise a mechanism
to provide for congressional input prior to making any
determination on the nature of quantity of defense articles
and services to be made available to Taiwan.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I am pleased to offer this amendment that
would require that the Congress be notified in a timely fashion of any
report or list submitted by the Taiwanese Government for the potential
purchase or other acquisition of any defense article or defense
service.
This amendment would remedy a long-festering situation whereby the
Congress has ceded virtually all decisionmaking authority to the
executive branch with respect to arms sales to Taiwan. This situation
is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act of
1979, which established that arms sales decisions regarding Taiwan must
be made jointly between the legislative and executive branches of
government.
Specifically, the relevant sections of Public Law 96-8, the ``Taiwan
Relations Act'' of April 10, 1979, are as follows: Section 3(a) states,
``. . . the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense
articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to
enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.'' And
Section 3(b) states, ``The President and the Congress shall determine
the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based
solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with
procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense
needs shall include review by United States military authorities in
connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.''
When Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, it was in
response to the Carter administration's abrupt efforts to curtail long-
standing defense ties between Washington and Taipei. At the time of the
adoption of the Taiwan Relations Act, Congress wanted to make clear
that the enduring ties between the American people and the people of
Taiwan included a clear and sustained commitment to ensuring that the
people of Taiwan had the means to defend themselves. Taiwan's ability
to maintain a credible deterrent, qualitatively superior to that of the
mainland's forces across the narrow Taiwan Strait, has been crucial in
keeping peace in East Asia.
The central tenet of the Taiwan Relations Act was stated very clearly
in section 3, namely, that the President and Congress together would
determine what Taiwan required for its legitimate self defense without
regard to pressures imposed by any third party nation. This provision
was written in the law to ensure that executive branch officials would
not become excessively concerned with the protestations of the PRC
whenever the United States proposed to provide Taiwan defense articles
and services needed for Taiwan's self-defense. Unique among laws
governing United States defense ties with other nations, the Taiwan
Relations Act explicitly requires in law that Congress and President
together decide what Taiwan's military defenses require.
The first year after the TRA's enactment, this provision was sorely
tested when the executive branch failed to inform Congress fully and
currently on what Taiwan needed for its defense. The Foreign Relations
Committee under the leadership of Senator Frank Church lambasted
executive branch officials. Together with Senator Glenn, Senator
Javits, and others, Chairman Church insisted that the administration
provide full details on those weapon systems Taiwan had requested.
This practice of involving Congress in reviewing procurement
decisions--as required by law--lapsed since that time. In recent years,
the executive branch has met with representatives of Taiwan in secret
and has refused to share with Congress the complete list of those
defense articles and services requested formally or informally by
Taiwan.
In this regard, on May 11 of this year I wrote to Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright requesting a copy of the list of defense articles
and services sought by Taiwan in the most recent round of annual arms
procurement talks. Those talks ended on April 21. I received a reply to
my letter on May 21, signed by Assistant Secretary of State for
Legislative Affairs Barbara Larkin. Mrs. Larkin's reply asserted that
the Department would only provide information on ``the systems for
which we [the Administration] have given Taiwan a positive response.''
In other words, the State Department refused my legitimate request to
be informed in writing of Taiwan's request for potential purchase or
other acquisition of defense articles and services. Frankly, I was
shocked and dismayed by this response, especially given the fact the
most recent round of talks had already been concluded and given the
clear intent of Section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act. Instead, Mrs.
Larkin's letter provided information only on those portions of Taiwan's
request that the administration unilaterally had decided to approve.
I understand that a similar, written request by the chairman of the
House International Relations Committee Representative Benjamin Gilman,
and others, have received the same unsatisfactory response from the
administration.
Mr. President, the current situation is intolerable and must be
changed. The law of the land requires that Congress be involved in
decisions regarding Taiwan's legitimate defense needs. The President
and future administrations should know that the American people's
representatives in Congress will meet our obligations under the law to
be involved in this decisionmaking process.
Toward this end, my amendment requires that Taiwan's procurement
request be furnished, on an appropriate basis and in a timely fashion,
to the appropriate committees of Congress. I believe this is a
necessary step in ensuring that there is a meaningful dialogue between
the legislative and executive branches of government and that the
decisionmaking process regarding what Taiwan legitimately needs for its
self defense, proceeds on a basis that is fully consistent with the
letter and spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is
on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 1183) was agreed to.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
[[Page S7896]]
Mr. LEAHY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask Senator Mack be added as a
cosponsor to amendment No. 1136.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, the following amendments will not be
offered. They are at the desk. They will not be offered: amendment No.
1121 by Senator Thomas; amendment No. 1122, amendment No. 1152, and
amendment No. 1153, all three by Senator Ashcroft; amendment No. 1154
by Senator Craig; amendment No. 1148 by Senator Grassley; amendment No.
1164 by Senator Cleland.
I ask unanimous consent those amendments no longer be in order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Those
amendments will not be proposed.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, we are down to a precious few.
What we are considering doing is propounding an agreement, and I am
going to go on and propound it even though I know there may be some
objection, but to give a sense of what the roadmap here is to
completion. We believe we are down to the amendment we have been
discussing all day, the Brownback amendment, as second-degreed by
myself and Senator Abraham regarding section 907, and the amendment we
are in the process of debating, the Leahy-Dodd amendment with regard to
travel restrictions to Cuba. And final passage. That is where I believe
we are at this moment--with the need to wrap up the debate on the Dodd-
Leahy amendment, the need to give Senator Kerry an opportunity to speak
on the 907 issue and Senator Torricelli an opportunity to speak to the
907 issue.
Mr. DODD. I would also like to be heard on 907.
Mr. McCONNELL. Also, Senator Dodd on the 907 issue and Senator
Bingaman for a couple of minutes on Cuba.
That is about where we are. Senator Graham, obviously, is going to
speak on the Cuba issue as well.
At that point we should be able to move ahead. Does my colleague from
Vermont think we should go ahead and propound this unanimous consent
agreement or go on with the debate and just move on through it?
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I see the Senator from Florida on the
floor. I was wondering about how much time does he think he will need?
Mr. GRAHAM. I will need 15 minutes.
Mr. LEAHY. That will make it impossible to get the unanimous consent
agreement that might get us out of here at a decent hour.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator
Graham of Florida be allowed 15 minutes to speak to the Dodd-Leahy
amendment; Senator Bingaman, 3 minutes on the Cuba amendment; Senator
Kerry, 5 minutes on the 907 amendment; Senator Torricelli on the 907
amendment, 5 minutes; Senator Dodd, 2 minutes on the 907 amendment;
Senator Brownback, 3 minutes to wrap up on 907; myself 3 minutes to
yield on 907.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I understand the distinguished Senator from
Maryland would have an objection on a time agreement. Maybe we should
start on our debate and urge people to be as brief as we can because I
still think we could and should vote on all these.
Mr. McCONNELL. The objection of the Senator from Maryland is to the
Brownback amendment, I gather?
Mr. LEAHY. That is correct.
Mr. McCONNELL. Why don't we proceed to complete debate on the Dodd-
Leahy matter and see if we can dispose of that? Let's proceed on it.
Mr. DODD. That is fine.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.
amendment no. 1157
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I want all to know that there is no
disagreement with the objectives, the end goals being sought by the
advocates of this amendment and those of us who oppose it. I believe we
are all Americans of good conscience and we seek for the Cuban people
what we seek for ourselves. We seek a nation that lives with the
freedoms associated with democracy. We seek a nation that respects the
basic human rights of its people. We seek a nation which will encourage
an economy that offers hope to the people of Cuba.
We have had a long association with Cuba. It is an association which
runs almost to the first Spanish exploration of our two nations. We
were a major participant in the freedom of Cuba in 1898. In fact, we
had celebrations within the last few months of our participation in the
independence of Cuba.
So our goals for those people, our feeling for the people of Cuba, is
a shared one. The question is, What is the appropriate course of U.S.
policy to achieve those goals? I believe, as with every other question
of what U.S. foreign policy should be, it should be a mixture of a
consideration of our national interests and a consideration of the
universal values for which America has stood since those words in the
Declaration of Independence that declared that we saw that all men--not
just American men, not just men, but women--that all persons had
certain inalienable rights. Those have been an important factor in our
relationships with other peoples of other nations.
On the specific issue of the use of travel restrictions as a part of
that U.S. foreign policy, Senator Torricelli has talked about the way
in which travel restrictions were imposed on Libya and the fact that
those restrictions had certain objectives and have had certain
consequences.
The Presiding Officer and I have been interested in the issue of
Lebanon for a long time. The United States had travel restrictions on
Americans visiting Lebanon. The purpose of those travel restrictions
was to encourage changes that would create a greater sense of security.
While there are still tense days, as we have seen in the very recent
past, it is now considered appropriate to allow Americans to begin
again to visit Lebanon.
We have used travel restrictions as a means of achieving goals that
were considered to be important to the United States in the past.
Yes, we are using a restriction on travel to Cuba as part of the
larger, comprehensive restriction on relationships with the Government
of Cuba while we attempt to achieve increased contacts with the people
of Cuba.
There is an assumption that if the United States does not open up its
travel restrictions, the Cuban people are going to walk down sidewalks
that are barren of foreign travelers and the Cuban people will not have
contact with the outside world. In fact, almost 100,000 Americans
visited Cuba last year under the various provisions of our existing
law. In addition to that, some of the major nations of the world,
nations with which we have the closest relationship, such as Spain and
Canada, have an open policy, in terms of travel to Cuba, for their
citizens.
When you ask Spaniards or Canadians, what effect has your open policy
towards Cuba had? what effect have the relationships you have had in
these instances for decades with the Castro regime had? have you seen a
change in the commitment to democracy? have you seen, as a result of
your openness towards Cuba, a greater degree of respect for human
rights? the answer is a sad no. These democracies, these nations which
share our values and which have taken the course of action that is
being advocated by the proponents of this amendment, have seen no
effect in achieving the goals we share for Cuba--democracy, human
rights, and an open economy.
What gives us reason to believe that adopting an unconsidered,
undebated--other than the words we speak this afternoon--major change
in our policy toward Cuba would have any different result? Recent
events, in fact, are to the contrary.
In January of last year, 1998, a significant, what many hoped would
be a historic, turning point event occurred in Cuba. The Pope visited
that island. Many hoped, prayed, believed that it would lead to
fundamental change in Cuba.
We reinforced the momentum of the papal visit by a number of
initiatives towards Cuba. On March 20, 1998, just a few weeks after the
Pope had departed, in an attempt to build goodwill towards Cuba,
President Clinton announced the resumption of licensing for direct
humanitarian flights to Cuba.
The President announced the resumption of cash remittances to Cuba.
The President asked for the development of licensing procedures to
[[Page S7897]]
streamline and expedite the commercial sale of medicine, medical
supplies, and medical equipment to Cuba.
Continuing in that vein, on January 9 of this year the President
authorized additional steps to reach out to the Cuban people. The new
measures expanded remittances by allowing any United States citizens,
not just family members, to send limited funds to the people of Cuba.
The President expanded people-to-people contacts. The President allowed
charter passenger flights to cities other than Havana and to initiate
from cities other than Miami.
The measures also permitted an effort to establish direct mail
service to Cuba. The measures also authorized the sale of food and
agricultural inputs to independent, nongovernmental entities, including
religious groups, family restaurants, and farmers.
All of those are initiatives which the United States has taken since
January of 1998 in hopes that it would result in a reciprocal response
of some loosening of the police state that is Cuba today.
What happened to all of those initiatives the United States took?
What happened to the initiatives that were hoped to flow from the papal
visit?
The Cuban Government responded to our United States initiatives by
calling these actions acts of aggression. That is what the Cuban
Government labeled the opening of additional flights, of direct mail,
of allowing greater remittances to the people of Cuba. Fidel Castro
called all of those actions acts of aggression.
What did Fidel Castro do in the context of the visit by the Pope?
Almost exactly a year after the Pope departed Cuba, the Cuban
Government passed a new security law. That law criminalized any form of
cooperation or participation in prodemocracy efforts. That law imposed
penalties ranging from 20 to 30 years for those who were found to be
cooperating with the U.S. Government. Those are the responses of Fidel
Castro to the papal visit.
On March 1, four prominent human rights dissidents were tried in
secrecy for their peaceful criticism of the Communist Party. Diplomats
were barred from attendance at the trial. These four human rights and
prodemocracy dissidents were held for over 1 year without charges. They
were found guilty. They were sentenced to jail terms, for advocating
human rights and democracy, of 3\1/2\ to 5 years.
This did not happen 40 years ago. This happened in March of 1999. The
Cuban Government ignored calls from the Vatican and the international
community for release. Canada, the European Union, and several Latin
American countries criticized the Cuban Government and stated their
intention to reassess their relationship with the Government. The King
of Spain had a scheduled visit to Cuba which he has deferred, in large
part because of the treatment of these four dissidents.
Cuba's human rights record in 1999 reflects a continued policy of
repression, a policy which has been recognized not just by the United
States, not just by the people of Cuba who suffer under the yoke of
oppression, but by the international community.
In its annual report on human rights, which was released earlier this
year, Amnesty International states that at least 350 political
prisoners remained imprisoned in Cuban cells in 1998. Amnesty
International reports that 10 unarmed civilians were shot, executed by
Cuban authorities, in 1998.
As we know, the Senate passed a resolution by a vote of 98-0 on March
25 of this year stating that the United States would make all efforts
necessary to pass a resolution criticizing Cuba for its human rights
records before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. We were very
pleased when the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, with
support of nations which just in the last 2 years had opposed such a
resolution, passed a resolution on April 23 condemning Cuba for its
human rights abuses.
Finally, the State Department country report on human rights
practices detailed the same human rights abuses as last year and the
year before.
We have made an effort to reach out to Cuba. We have made an effort
to send a signal that we were looking for some reciprocity, some
demonstration of a wavering in the steel-hard police state which has
been Cuba for 40 years.
One is hard pressed to see even the faintest breeze of a positive
response to our efforts. The examples of human rights violations in all
of these reports are numerous, brutal, and startling. Human rights
activists are beaten in their homes. People are arbitrarily detained
and arrested. Political prisoners are denied food and medicine brought
by their own families. Children are made to stand in the rain chanting
slogans against democracy.
In the United States, on May 7 of this year, the U.S. Government
revised indictments against 14 Cuban spies captured in Miami last fall
while attempting to penetrate the U.S. Southern Command, the United
States Naval Air Station at Boca Chica Key near Key West, and planning
terrorist acts against military installations. The revised indictments
also charge 2 of the 14 with conspiracy to commit murder in the 1996
shoot down of the Brothers to the Rescue fliers.
It is at this point that I must become personal. I know the families
of the four fliers who were shot down over international waters, now we
know, at the direct command of the highest officials of the Cuban
Government. If homicide is defined as the intentional taking of a human
life, four acts of homicide occurred over the Straits of Florida
against three U.S. citizens and one U.S. resident.
This is the nature of the response that Fidel Castro has given to the
efforts by the Pope, by the international community, and by the United
States to try to ask, to plead for some relief for the people of Cuba.
As these examples show, as the continuing reign of repression flows
from week to week, from day to day in Cuba this is not the time for
lifting any of the sanctions on Cuba. This is the time for us to hold
the line on our policy, to continue to reach out to the people of Cuba
in hopes that someday they will breathe the free air of democracy but
to give no quarter to the oppressive Government of Fidel Castro.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. GRAHAM. I will be pleased to yield.
Mr. TORRICELLI. I congratulate the Senator from Florida on his
statement and his extraordinary leadership on this issue through the
years and simply inquire of him, through this decade, American policy
towards Cuba has largely been defined by the Cuban Democracy Act that
the Senator from Florida joined with me in writing, the Helms-Burton
Act that the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate,
Senator Helms, wrote, and now under the leadership of President
Clinton.
This amendment would largely undermine the policies outlined in that
legislation and by President Clinton. Indeed, the President recently
has redefined his own policy of travel towards Cuba. But by a sweep of
the pen, that bipartisan policy that the Senators and the President of
the United States have written would largely be undermined, in my
estimation.
Is that the Senator's conclusion?
Mr. GRAHAM. That would certainly be one of the consequences. Another
consequence, I say to my friend and colleague, would be that we would
send a signal to Fidel Castro that we are prepared to do virtually
anything without expecting anything in response; that the same thing
that has happened to the Canadians, the Spaniards, to other European
and Latin American countries--attempts to reach out to Castro, which
are rebuffed in terms of those things that are most important to the
people of Cuba--that now we would become complicitous in that same
process of unrequited love.
The last thing we have to play, the last policy option that is
available to us as we try to influence Castro is exactly the embargo
which, by this casual act tonight, we are being asked to begin to
dismantle.
Mr. TORRICELLI. If the Senator would continue to yield, I think what
is important about your statement is you recognize this policy isn't
about travel; it is about money. It is about giving Fidel Castro
millions of dollars of American tourist money to support his regime,
his dictatorship, his armed forces, his security forces. That is what
we are denying.
But the frustration that the Senator from Florida may have--and you
probably know more about the Cuban economic experience and the travel
experience than anyone in this institution by virtue of your
constituency--and to
[[Page S7898]]
rely upon your expertise for a moment, it is my understanding, contrary
to what the Senate may be led to believe today, that when tourists go
to Cuba from European countries, they are put into tourist compounds.
Cubans are not allowed to visit those hotels. They cannot talk to
people in those hotels. So the notion that hundreds of thousands of
American tourists are going to walk the streets of Cuba and democratize
the island, spread the message of human rights--in fact, the average
Cuban cannot get inside those compounds. They are walled off.
The Senator knows more about this, by far, than I do, but is that not
the story of many of these beach-front hotels?
Mr. GRAHAM. That is the story. Unfortunately, the people who those
tourists will come in contact with will be the virtual serfs of the
Castro regime because the hotels are required to purchase their
employees through the Cuban Government, not by direct negotiation with
the individual or through some organization representing those
individuals. So by that walled-off enclave in which they are enjoying
themselves, on an island of prosperity in a sea of despair--which is
Cuba today --they are contributing to the maintenance of a system of
economic slavery that virtually has left the face of the Earth for the
past century and a half.
Mr. DODD. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. TORRICELLI. A final question. And I am very pleased the
distinguished minority whip, Senator Reid of Nevada, is going to join
with us on a motion to table.
But before I yield back, Senator Kerry of Massachusetts left a very
appealing notion of the example of President Havel, that this exchange
of visiting and talking to people about democratic ideas would somehow
change the Cuban political reality.
Again, you know more about this than I do. It is my impression that
under Cuban law, as Fidel Castro has now changed the law, if a would-be
Havel walked up, in Havana, to an American tourist and talked to that
tourist about democracy, he would be rewarded--not with information, a
growth of knowledge--but he would go to jail because talking about
democracy in Cuba to an American tourist will guarantee one thing--you
will be arrested, you will be indicted, and you will go to jail.
Is that the reality of what a conversation about democracy with an
American tourist is?
Mr. GRAHAM. Yes. And under the law which I alluded to, which was
passed just in February of this year, that Cuban citizen who was found
to be engaging in that friendly discussion about democracy and the
graces that liberty brings to the human spirit will be subject to
spending 20 to 30 years, without his freedom, in a Cuban cell precisely
because he engaged in that conversation.
Mr. TORRICELLI. I thank the Senator from Florida.
Mr. DODD. Will my colleague yield?
Just very quickly, I want to raise the point--I do not know if my
colleagues from New Jersey and Florida have been to Cuba at all
recently.
Has my colleague traveled to Cuba in the last several years?
Mr. GRAHAM. Other than Guantanamo, I have not been to Cuba.
Mr. DODD. I appreciate that. Just as a point of reference, I spent a
week in Cuba in December, in fact, all over the area, all over Havana,
and Varadero as well for a day. I point out to my colleague that I saw
Americans all over the streets of Havana. The idea you are confined to
Varadero Beach is just not the case. There are people literally
everywhere, right in the marketplaces, in the streets, in the
restaurants, places they could go. The idea that you are restricted
only to go to Varadero Beach is not the case.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Cubans are restricted.
Mr. DODD. To Cuban Americans who want to travel to Cuba--many do--
this is, in a sense, saying you can only go back to the country of your
birth once during a year, unless you have a sick relative, and then you
have to apply to some bureaucrat in the Treasury Department to go down
and see your family. That is wrong.
But the idea that Cuban Americans would be restricted to Varadero
Beach is just not the case. You can talk with Cuban Americans who have
been back to Cuba. They are not restrained on where they can travel in
Cuba.
Mr. GRAHAM. I think the point the Senator from New Jersey was raising
in his question to me was that for many of those Europeans, Latin
Americans, and Americans who go to Cuba, the nature of the hotel
arrangements in which they live does not lend itself to the sort of
interplay that, for instance, some of us experienced in places such as
Prague and Budapest prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall.
It also is the case that Cuban citizens who, in those rare instances,
might have an opportunity to relate with an American, since February of
this year, face the prospect of being charged with a criminal act of
collaborating with a United States citizen and face the prospect of
spending 20 to 30 years in a 17th century cell.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Will the Senator allow me to respond to the point?
Will the Senator allow me to respond?
Mr. GRAHAM. Yes.
Mr. TORRICELLI. The point is, Americans clearly do in Cuba have the
freedom to leave the hotels and wander around the island. As Senator
Graham has pointed out, nearly 100,000 Americans went to Cuba last
year. So this is not a question that many Americans cannot go. It has
simply been the Clinton administration's view to restrict the number so
as not to give Castro great financial rewards. One hundred thousand
Americans go.
The point I was making with Senator Graham was not to give people the
illusion that Americans in a hotel on the beaches near Havana are going
to receive Cuban visitors. The average Cuban is not allowed on the
hotel grounds on these compounds. This is not going to be people
visiting President Havel in his office. They are not allowed to go
there. They can't spend money there. They can't be guests there. They
are foreign compounds. You might as well be on a beach somewhere on a
desert island in the Pacific. They are restricted.
I thank the Senator from Florida for yielding.
Mr. DODD. As someone who has been there and spent the time and
wandered without restraint and had conversations with people--I had a
long conversation, as someone who speaks the language, speaks Spanish;
I was able to have lengthy conversations with people. I wasn't being
followed around. I had long discussions with people in marketplaces
where they were highly critical of the Cuban Government.
I had a lengthy discussion with a family down there about their
objections and opposition to Fidel Castro with a group of people
around. In my personal experience and that of others, just on the point
of 100,000 U.S. citizens going, most of them are going illegally. It is
not as if they have licenses to go. We all know what they do. They go
to Montreal or Quebec or Cancun, and then they go in, because they
don't stamp their visas. You can meet them all in the airports down
there.
We are making them illegal, illegal activities of U.S. citizens. That
is not something we ought to be condoning. But this isn't licenses they
receive; this is because they are using other means to go down and
spend time there. But this is not permissible, visa-stamped approved
travel by these people.
Mr. KERRY. Will the Senator yield further?
Mr. GRAHAM. Yes.
Mr. KERRY. I just make the point to the Senator that, having spoken
with a lot of people who have gone down there and made some of those
trips, the families aren't restricted in that way. They meet with
relations. They tell people what is going on in the United States. They
talk about their feelings about Fidel Castro.
What is amazing about this debate, what is absolutely stupefying, is
that what the Senators seem to be defending is completely contrary now
to the experience since 1959. We went through the whole 1960s, went
through the Bay of Pigs, went through the 1970s. We went through the
height of the Reagan opposition to the Iron Curtain and through all of
the changes in Russia, the former Soviet Union, the former east bloc
countries. We have seen the dynamics of that change.
The one place where our policy remains the same as it has throughout
all of those years is the place where
[[Page S7899]]
there has been the least change. One of the reasons they had the power
to shoot down those four planes is that there is no movement in the
relationship, because they are as isolated.
If you look at the experience of Cubans, restricted, who go back to
Cuba to visit their families, limited by the United States of America
to one visit a year with their own family, you find that they are the
ones saying to us today, we would like to have the right to travel to
visit our families as frequently as we can. I am confident that the
same kinds of changes that swept over the rest of the world will sweep
over that tiny island.
Mr. GRAHAM. I will conclude by saying that I ask those who think the
United States changing its policy towards Cuba will have these
miraculous effects in terms of breaking waves of freedom to the people
that will crush what is an East German police state today--I only ask
them to tell us what is the evidence, based on the outreach which has
been made by countries such as Canada and Spain and European and Latin
American countries, which largely share our values, which have been for
40 years in a continuous relationship with Cuba?
I think the answer to the question is, there are no such evidences
that that outreach has had a positive effect on Cuba. We are dealing
with a sui generis anachronism in Cuba. That degree of singularity
requires the kind of singularity of foreign policy that we are
directing towards it, with our hopes that soon the people of Cuba will
be released from that hold and that our policy will have contributed to
that release and will help to establish a basis for a transition to a
Cuba that will be respectful of its people and with which the United
States can have normal and peaceful and prosperous relationships.
I yield the floor.
Mr. KERRY. Would the Senator like an answer to the question?
Mr. MACK. Mr. President, I oppose this travel amendment in the
strongest possible terms. This is the wrong language at the wrong time.
It represents a fundamental change in our Cuba policy--a change without
proper consideration.
The Foreign Relations Committee has not considered this language; in
fact, nobody has seen this language until it was introduced this
afternoon. We should not rush this language through.
We should not do this. This is a half-baked approach, which makes for
weak policy; it is not a mature effort to craft serious policy.
Fidel responds to our positive gestures with arrests, oppression, and
crackdown. This effort is misguided and must be tabled.
Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I move to table the underlying Dodd
amendment No. 1157, and I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
Unanimous-Consent Agreement
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, as in executive session, I ask unanimous
consent that immediately following this rollcall vote about to begin,
the Senate immediately proceed to executive session and vote en bloc on
the confirmation of the following nominations on the Executive
Calendar: Nos. 104 through 108. I further ask unanimous consent that
immediately following the vote, the President be notified of the
Senate's action and the Senate then return to legislative session.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. I also ask unanimous consent that it now be in order to ask
for the yeas and nays on the nominations en bloc.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I don't have any objection, but I ask
unanimous consent that the majority leader may proceed in this way. A
tabling motion has been made, and there is no debate on a tabling
motion.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to
do this, even though the vote has been ordered on the tabling
amendment, so that we can have this vote in this sequence. It is to
have a vote on the confirmation of five judicial nominations. Both have
been requested, but it will be one vote, and it will count as only one
vote on all five nominations.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. I thank Senator Byrd for that correction.
I ask consent then that it now be in order to ask for the yeas and
nays on the nominations en bloc.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll on the motion to
table.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that
notwithstanding the tabling motion----
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask for the regular order.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, is it out of order to ask for unanimous
consent?
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, there is no debate following a motion to
table.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that,
notwithstanding the rules that there be no debate, the Senator be
allowed to make a unanimous consent.
Mr. LEAHY. That is what I was asking.
Mr. BYRD. The Chair should have the advice from the Parliamentarian
to call this to the Senate's attention.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from West
Virginia was making the exact same request that I was making. Let's
just vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to
table amendment No. 1157. The yeas and nays have been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative assistant called the roll.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, House Members may not be in the Well.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The well will be cleared.
The well will be cleared.
The clerk will continue to call the roll.
The legislative assistant resumed the call of the roll.
Mr. BYRD addressed the chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask for order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
Mr. BYRD. Now, Mr. President, I ask that House Members stay out of
the well and stop lobbying Senators. I have had a number of Senators
come to me and tell me that House Members are in the well lobbying
them. The other Members didn't speak up, but I shall.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
Mr. BYRD. I hope the Sergeant at Arms will see to it that House
Members, who are our guests, will get out of the well. There are places
in the back of the Chamber for them.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will resume the call of the roll.
The legislative assistant resumed the call of the roll.
Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Voinovich)
and the Senate from Florida (Mr. Mack), are necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 55, nays 43, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 189 Leg.]
YEAS--55
Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bayh
Bennett
Breaux
Brownback
Bryan
Bunning
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Domenici
Edwards
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grassley
Gregg
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kohl
Kyl
Lieberman
Lott
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Reid
Robb
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
[[Page S7900]]
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Torricelli
NAYS--43
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Chafee
Cleland
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Grams
Hagel
Harkin
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lincoln
Lugar
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Roberts
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Specter
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden
NOT VOTING--2
Mack
Voinovich
The motion was agreed to.
Mr. LEAHY. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. McCONNELL. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
____________________