[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 93 (Monday, June 28, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7685-S7687]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           NATIONAL SECURITY

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, as a member of the Energy Committee and the 
Governmental Affairs Committee where I am ranking member on the 
International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services 
Subcommittee, I have benefited from numerous briefings and extensive 
hearings on the issues raised in the House select committee's Report on 
U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns With the 
People's Republic of China. Representative Cox and Representative Dicks 
and their colleagues on the House select committee have done the 
country a great national service in producing the report.
  The bipartisan manner in which they conducted their analysis is an 
example to us all of the importance of placing bipartisanship above 
political interests for the sake of national security.
  I was dismayed, as other Members have been, by the extent of Chinese 
espionage efforts exposed in the committee's report. I wish we could 
say that American efforts and commitment to countering Chinese 
espionage were as relentless and as persistent as their ongoing efforts 
to acquire information from us.
  Importantly, the President and the entire administration have taken 
major steps to reform our security at the national nuclear weapons 
laboratories and to improve our counterintelligence capability. Many of 
these changes were ordered by the President in February 1998 well 
before the House Select Committee was formed.
  Additional measures were taken during the committee's review as the 
extent of Chinese espionage became apparent.
  Let me make two cautionary statements:
  There is a great deal of discussion now in Washington as to whom to 
blame for the security lapses. There is the usual round of finger-
pointing and calls for this or that person to resign.
  We should not spend all of our time searching for scapegoats. Only 
our adversaries take solace when we turn on ourselves and become 
distracted by partisan squabbling. Let us instead focus our attention 
on improving our security and rooting out those guilty of betraying 
America.
  Secondly, let us not sacrifice our efforts to build a constructive 
relationship with the Chinese people because of our justifiable anger 
at their government's espionage.
  Much of what has occurred is to our embarrassment for not being more 
vigilant.
  We need to engage China. We have issues and problems that can only be 
resolved by cooperation. These include bread and butter issues such as 
reducing our trade deficit and improving market accessibility for 
American goods. They include global issues such as global warming and 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  The Select Committee's report indicates that, despite international 
commitments to the contrary, China continues to proliferate weapons of 
mass destruction.
  To convince China to cooperate with us in ending the threat of 
proliferation we will need to engage China.
  Our foreign visitor's program at the national laboratories has 
provided us with one opportunity to engage the Chinese on issues such 
as improving export controls. With enhanced restrictions, these 
programs should continue. it is our openness to the best scientific 
minds which aids America in keeping its intellectual edge sharp on the 
frontiers of science.
  But engagement is not a one-way street.
  China needs to demonstrate that it wants to and can engage the United 
States in a constructive and cooperative manner.
  China can choose to swamp us either with spies or with friends. The 
choice is theirs.
  There is a sense in the country from the revelations contained in the 
Cox Committee report that the Chinese have ``poisoned the well'' of 
relations between the United States and China. The report observes that 
``the PRC uses a variety of techniques, including espionage, controlled 
commercial entities, and a network of individuals and organizations 
that engage in a vast array of contacts with scientists, business 
people, and academics.''
  The report further charges that there are an increasing number of 
Chinese ``front companies'' in the United States attempting to gain 
access to our technology and national security secrets. China seems to 
be almost unchecked in its efforts to gain information on the United 
States.
  This view has two detrimental effects. The first effect is on the 
overall perception of the benefits of relations with China.
  On June 3, the President took the correct step of renewing normal 
trade relations with China. But it was a step that China needs to 
match. With a growing trade imbalance of $57 billion in 1998 out of a 
total trade of $85.4 billion, China is our fourth largest trading 
partner. We are also the third largest foreign investor in China. 
During the Asian financial crisis, American trade with China played a 
substantial role in keeping the Chinese economy afloat as Chinese 
exports to the U.S. grew even as Chinese exports to other nations fell. 
The lesson for China is that we are too important for them to ignore. 
The lesson for us is that China has become too big for us to ignore.
  A step in the right direction for both countries is to achieve an 
agreement on conditions for China's entry into the World Trade 
Organization. Chinese participation in this international body would be 
a major leap forward into integrating China in the world economy. 
Conditions that permit more access for American goods and protection 
for American investment in China would help accelerate the 
modernization of the Chinese economy.
  I think the battle within China over whether or not to participate in 
the international economy has been won by the advocates of 
modernization led by President Jiang Zemin and Premier

[[Page S7686]]

Zhu Rongji. Granting NTR to China this year will set the stage for a 
conclusion to the long-running negotiations with China over WTO 
accession. I support renewal of NTR for China because it is an 
essential step towards redefining American-Chinese relations in terms 
of mutual benefit rather than in terms of winner and loser.
  The second discouraging effect of the report is to taint Asian 
Americans, especially Chinese Americans, with the stain of suspicion of 
espionage. This unfair, but very real, perception came through clearly 
during a recent visit by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson to Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory where one Asian American employee 
declared, ``we all feel like suspects of espionage.'' Mr. Hoyt Zia, 
chief counsel for export administration in the Commerce Department, 
wrote in the New York Times recently about the unfortunate and 
unwarranted charge that ``Asian-Americans continue to be accused of 
having dual loyalties to a degree far greater than any other immigrant 
group to this country.''
  I commend his article, ``Well, Is He A Spy--Or Not?'', to my 
colleagues and ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in its 
entirety in the Record following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. AKAKA. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Yes, it is true, according to our counter intelligence specialists, 
that Chinese intelligence officers target Chinese Americans and that 
they also rely on Chinese in the United States who are not American 
citizens, but it has always been true that foreign intelligence 
services seek out Americans with similar ethnic backgrounds when trying 
to establish spy networks. There are numerous examples of this. During 
the cold war, East German operatives targeted German Americans. From an 
operational perspective, this only makes sense.
  It is the job of all Americans to be vigilant, regardless of ethnic 
background. This is the lesson of the recent concern over national 
security leaks. We should not overreact or allow ourselves to become 
sidetracked by unsupported charges that unfairly tarnish any individual 
or group absent solid evidence. As the recent report about national lab 
security by a Presidential panel chaired by former Senator Warren 
Rudman stated, ``enough is enough.'' We need now to sit down, review, 
improve our security procedures and think seriously anew about our 
policy towards China.
  I urge my colleagues in joining me in examining next steps, not our 
last steps, in an effort to implement security reforms at the national 
laboratories and to encourage the development of a more effective 
policy towards the People's Republic of China.
  I thank the Chair for this time. I, again, ask that we seriously look 
into our relationship with China.

                             Exhibit No. 1

                [From the New York Times, May 26, 1999]

                       Well Is He a Spy--or Not?

                             (By Hoyt Zia)

       Washington, DC.--After serving almost five years in the 
     Clinton Administration, I've learned a number of things about 
     Washington--and one of them is how innuendo can ruin a 
     reputation in no time.
       In my job as chief counsel for export administration in the 
     Commerce Department, I work daily with classified information 
     in order to help regulate technology exports to China and 
     other countries that can be used for military purposes.
       As such, I am well familiar with the risks to national 
     security that could result from the improper disclosure of 
     classified information, as well as the highly politicized 
     nature of technology transfers to China. From this vantage 
     point, I find myself greatly troubled by the atmosphere 
     surrounding the espionage allegations leveled against Wen Ho 
     Lee, a nuclear weapons scientist at Los Alamos National 
     Laboratory in New Mexico. I'm afraid this tension is only 
     going to get worse with the release yesterday of the report 
     from the Congressional investigation led by Representative 
     Christopher Cox.
       The case against Mr. Lee goes something like this: In 1996, 
     intelligence officials obtains a Chinese document from 1988 
     containing classified information about an advanced American 
     nuclear warhead. Since Mr. Lee traveled to China for 
     scientific conferences in 1986 and 1988, and in 1982 had 
     called a Chinese-American scientist at another national lab 
     who was suspected of espionage, he was added to the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation's list of Chinese spies.
       After a three-year investigation by the F.B.I. yielded 
     insufficient evidence to support a charge of espionage, Mr. 
     Lee was fired from his job in March for unspecified breaches 
     of security and identified as an espionage suspect. While 
     recent Congressional investigations into the matter, 
     including the one led by Representative Cox, have 
     concluded that Chinese spying at the labs is pervasive and 
     ongoing, there is no other evidence that Mr. Lee passed 
     classified information to the Chinese, intentionally or 
     otherwise. Nonetheless, many in the media and in the 
     Government have pronounced Mr. Lee guilty of passing 
     nuclear weapons secrets to the Chinese.
       Let me make clear that I do not defend Mr. Lee's alleged 
     misconduct or contend that he has not done anything wrong. 
     While the F.B.I. has yet to uncover any evidence to support 
     charging him with espionage, he appears to have committed 
     gross violations of the rules for handling classified 
     material. The details of the security violations for which he 
     was fired were never specified, but subsequently it was found 
     that he had transferred highly classified nuclear weapons 
     programs from a protected classified computer system to his 
     unprotected desktop computer. If Mr. Lee indeed mishandled 
     classified information, then he deserves to be punished for 
     those violations, the same as anyone else.
       Nevertheless, such violations do not on their face make him 
     a spy. A charge of espionage requires the specific intent to 
     steal the secrets of one in order to turn them over to 
     another. Mishandling classified information has nothing to do 
     with giving secrets away, but simply failing to safeguard 
     them properly.
       It has been reported that many of Mr. Lee's colleagues at 
     the national laboratories have also been lax about observing 
     these rules. Even John Deutch, the former head of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, was reportedly investigated after being 
     accused of mishandling classified information, including 
     allegedly having 31 secret C.I.A. files on his unsecure home 
     computer. And it is well known that the major national 
     weapons labs long resisted F.B.I. and Congressional pressure 
     to tighten their security policies.
       While Mr. Lee should not be excused because ``everybody 
     does it,'' neither should he be singled out if he has acted 
     no differently from many of his colleagues of all 
     ethnicities.
       Although the problem of lax security has been around for 
     two decades and largely unnoticed, the controversy 
     surrounding Mr. Lee will not let up. Attorney General Janet 
     Reno has been vilified for the Justice Department's decision 
     not to order wiretaps on Mr. Lee. Under normal circumstances 
     would this even have been considered given the inadequate 
     evidence? And there has even been talk of banning those 
     scientists with ``dual loyalties'' from our scientific 
     laboratories.
       Why this single-minded pursuit of Mr. Lee? There is an 
     obvious difference between him and others in his position: He 
     is of Chinese ancestry. For reasons that I cannot fathom, and 
     notwithstanding numerous cases of exemplary service to this 
     country, Asian-Americans continue to be accused of having 
     dual loyalties to a degree far greater than any other 
     immigrant group in this country.
       I know--I, too, have been accused of having dual loyalties 
     because, though an American, I happen to be of Chinese 
     ancestry. During the Congressional investigations into 
     improper campaign fund-raising, I, like many other Asian-
     Americans, was interviewed by Federal and Congressional 
     investigators as well as by self-appointed ``watchdog'' 
     groups with their own political agendas.
       Though I was not involved in fund-raising and had no 
     personal ties to the Chinese Government, I was named as a 
     possible link to China by far-right publications like The 
     American Spectator. The sole evidence was my Chinese 
     ancestry. No official evidence was ever given to support 
     those offensive falsehoods, but the damage to one's 
     reputation from accusations of disloyalty are irreparable.
       The link to possible controversy was enough to cause 
     Administration officials to withdraw my appointment to a 
     higher position in the Department of the Navy where, as a 
     former Marine officer, I hoped I could serve. I will forever 
     have to explain to prospective employers why my loyalty as an 
     American was called into question.
       It is no secret that the Chinese, like the Israelis, 
     Russians, French, Germans and every other industrialized 
     country, are spying on us every day. Perhaps it is also a 
     fact of life that politicians conjure up fears against 
     minority groups to achieve their objectives.
       But in the United States, there is something called due 
     process. If the Government has evidence that Wen Ho Lee 
     committed espionage, it should charge him and let the 
     accusations be aired in a courtroom. If it doesn't, then it 
     should put the matter to rest rather than allow innuendo and 
     rumor not only to smear Mr. Lee but to call into question the 
     loyalty of every Asian-American.

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative assistant proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.

[[Page S7687]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Voinovich). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

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