[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 90 (Wednesday, June 23, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7522-S7523]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION AGREEMENT EXTENSION

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President. I take the opportunity today to call to 
the attention of Members of the Senate and to the American people a 
very important event that took place last week but was not widely 
publicized. On Wednesday, June 16, representatives from the Department 
of Defense and Russia's Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Yuri 
Ushakov, signed an agreement extending the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
(CTR) program sponsored in 1991 by our distinguished colleagues, 
Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Richard Lugar. The agreement signed last 
week extends the Nunn-Lugar threat reduction programs for 7 years until 
2006. That extension will build upon the critical work already 
accomplished that has reduced Russia's military threat to the United 
States and our allies more effectively than any other measures 
undertaken since the end of the Cold War. In the context of these 
uncertain times and Russia's uncertain future, the investments made 
through Cooperative Threat Reduction programs promise to yield 
dividends that are essential to long-term peace and stability 
throughout the world.
  Indeed, the accomplishments of CTR are a more cost effective means to 
enhancing national security than any I know. Between 1992 and 1999, the 
Nunn-Lugar programs have eliminated the potential for nuclear threats 
from former members of the Soviet Union including Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Uzbekistan. For $2.7 billion that the United States has 
spent on CTR since 1992, a bit more than the cost of a single B-2 
bomber, there are now 1,538 fewer nuclear warheads available for use 
against the U.S. or our allies. The Russians have eliminated 50 missile 
silos and 254 intercontinental ballistic missiles. In addition, we are 
in the process of dismantling some 30 strategic ballistic missile 
submarines that formerly threatened the United States from deep ocean 
sites. So far, U.S. and Russian teams have dismantled 148 missile 
launch tubes on those submarines and 30 sea-launched ballistic 
missiles. CTR programs have eliminated more than 40 Russian strategic 
bombers that used to be within hours of American military and civilian 
targets. Collectively, those actions under CTR have ensured that Russia 
has met and continues to meet its treaty obligations under the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START. More important, they have 
significantly cut back on the potential threat posed by those weapons 
to the United States, our allies, and our worldwide security interests.
  The Cooperative Threat Reduction program extends beyond the 
elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Funds for 
this program are allocated to ensure the safe transportation, storage, 
security, accounting, and monitoring of strategic and tactical nuclear 
weapons scheduled for destruction and for weapons grade nuclear 
materials from weapons that have been dismantled. I have visited Russia 
and personally observed implementation of the Department of Energy's 
Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program which enhances 
day-to-day security at dozens of nuclear sites across Russia. I remain 
deeply concerned that without that assistance, the possibility of 
smuggling nuclear materials into the wrong hands is a serious 
possibility that could threaten the entire world.
  Looking toward the future, funds from CTR are helping to convert 
Russia's reactors that produce plutonium to eliminate that capability. 
Ultimately, the cutoff of production of fissile materials is the tool 
by which we can help prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials 
from becoming an even greater problem than it is today. Conversion of 
Russia's nuclear production capability is a key part of addressing that 
problem.
  The Cooperative Threat Reduction program also assists the Russians in 
meeting obligations assumed under the Chemical Weapons Convention we 
ratified in the Senate two years ago. Under this program, the United 
States has assisted Russia in planning the construction of a chemical 
weapons destruction facility needed to destroy the large volume of 
aging chemical munitions in their inventory. Funds are essential to 
keep this program moving forward in order to ensure that we can reduce 
the threat of proliferation of chemical weapons and their use against 
our security interests. I am aware that some in the Congress believe 
that Russia has not shouldered its responsibilities under this and 
other CTR programs, but I prefer to consider such matters from our own 
selfish security point of view. To the extent that we are able to 
purchase or finance reductions to Russian military capabilities that 
directly threaten us, those are funds well spent. When Russians are 
able and agree to provide funding or support in kind for CTR programs, 
so much the better.

  I would like to point out an additional benefit to the Nunn-Lugar 
programs that is not often recognized or understood. I am certain that 
the Members of this body can recall the perceptions shared by many 
Americans concerning the government and people of the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War. I need not remind us of the unbridgeable gap that 
existed between our governments, our political systems, and our 
cultures. In the wake of the Cold War, however, many of those gaps have 
been bridged and important bonds have been forged between our two 
countries and citizens. Thousands of American and Russian technical and 
support personnel have built a foundation of trust and understanding 
through their cooperative efforts under the CTR program. I firmly 
believe that those bonds will pay dividends and serve the long-term 
interests of peaceful relations between our two countries--particularly 
if we in the United States continue to hold the course in supporting 
CTR and other cooperative programs such as the Initiative for 
Proliferation Prevention, the Nuclear Cities Initiative, and the 
Russian American Cooperative Satellite program. Key Russian personnel 
in implementing those programs have come to know Americans with whom 
they frequently meet and vice versa. I have spoken personally with many 
Russians and Americans who are directly involved in these programs all 
of whom share the same conviction that cooperation is the key to a 
peaceful future.
  These are very uncertain times. We are at a crucial juncture in our 
relations with Russia that could determine

[[Page S7523]]

the direction of the global political climate for many years to come. 
No one is certain what the future of Russia will bring once President 
Yeltsin leaves office. Everyone is aware that a deep reservoir of 
distrust and fear exists among Russian citizens, officials, and 
military personnel concerning the United States and NATO. We have done 
much in the past couple of years to feed those fears and anxieties, 
thereby generating hostility that could threaten to reawaken Cold War 
tensions. On the other hand, we have established critical relationships 
that could weigh against such a reprise through programs such as CTR. 
The impending post-Yeltsin debate within Russia regarding its future 
direction must include the voice of cooperation rather than 
confrontation as the way to peace and stability. The Cooperative Threat 
Reduction program has built a constituency in Russia to articulate that 
voice. I salute its sponsors, Senators Nunn and Lugar for their 
visionary contribution, and celebrate its extension into the next 
millennium. I strongly encourage my colleagues to continue to support 
CTR and related programs through the ebbs and flows of U.S.-Russian 
relations. The prospects for long term global peace and stability will 
be the better for it.

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