[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 87 (Friday, June 18, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7279-S7281]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                   TECHNICAL REALITIES OF THE Y2K ACT

  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, earlier this week the Senate passed a bill 
that tries to bring some reason to the legal chaos that could result 
from Y2K failures and Wednesday evening the Senate appointed conferees 
to reconcile the differences between the House and Senate bills. I rise 
today to commend the Senate for doing this, and to read from an 
excellent memorandum underscoring the need for a quick resolution and 
final passage of a conference report.
  A memorandum prepared by the Year 2000 Technical Information Focus 
Group of the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, the 
``I triple E,'' provides the best analyses and explanations I have seen 
of the complexity of Y2K litigation; of why the argument we heard 
during floor debate that the bill is designed to protect ``bad actors'' 
and that it fails to provide sufficient incentives for remediation is 
generally hollow; and of why it is so important that we do what we can 
to minimize the economically paralyzing effects of a predictable and 
utterly overwhelming legal snarl.
  The memorandum, sent to various members of Congress, is particularly 
compelling because its authors do not represent businesses that may be 
sued, but are members of an international non-profit association of 
engineers and computer scientists.
  The memorandum is so good that rather than simply have it printed in 
the Record, I will read it:

                                          TAB Year 2000 Technical,


                                      Information Focus Group,

                                     Piscataway, NJ, June 9, 1999.
     To: Members, Senate Commerce, Science And Transportation 
       Committee; Members, Special Senate Committee On The Year 
       2000 Technology Problem; Members, House of Representatives 
       Committee on Science, Subcommittee on Technology; Members, 
       Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government 
       Management Information, and Technology; Sponsors, House 
       Bill ``Year 2000 Readiness and Responsibility Act of 
       1999,'' H.R. 775.

     Re: Year 2000 Liability Legislation.
     From: The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
       (IEEE), Technical Activities Board, Year 2000 Technical 
       Information Focus Group.
       Dear Honorable Senators, Congressmen and Congresswomen: As 
     leaders of the Y2K effort of the Institute of Electrical and 
     Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the oldest and largest 
     international non-profit association of engineers and 
     computer scientists in the world, we would like to offer some 
     thoughts on the pending legislation involving Y2K liability 
     obtained from our years of work and collective wisdom spent 
     studying Y2K. The IEEE has drafted an Institute position on 
     Y2K Legal Liability regarding United States federal law, to 
     which our committee greatly contributed. We offer these 
     additional thoughts in hopes that they may further assist 
     your understanding as you attempt to reconcile two very valid 
     but conflicting underlying public policy goals in structuring 
     and passing the Year 2000 Liability Legislation currently 
     under consideration.
       Minimize Damage to the Economy and Quality of Life: 
     minimize the overall damage to the nation's economy and 
     quality of life by reducing the need of organizations to 
     redirect their limited resources away from the task of 
     maintaining their operations in the face of Y2K in order to 
     defend themselves from lawsuits arising from alleged Y2K 
     failures.
       Maximize Incentive for Y2K Failure Prevention: maximize the 
     incentive of every organization to prevent Y2K failures as 
     well as preserve the legal rights and remedies available for 
     those seeking legitimate redress for wrongs they may suffer 
     resulting from Y2K failures.
       In addressing public policy issues we have no more 
     expertise than the literate public. However, we do possess 
     expertise in the technical issues underlying the situation 
     that should be considered as you weigh the conflicting public 
     policy goals in formulating appropriate Year 2000 Liability 
     Legislation. In particular, for your consideration we offer 
     the following points pertaining to the technical realities of 
     Y2K.
       1. Prevention of all Y2K Failures Was Never Possible: For 
     many large and important organizations, technical prevention 
     of all Y2K failures has never been possible in any practical 
     way for these reasons:

[[Page S7280]]

       1.1  ``Y2K Compliant'' Does Not Equal ``No Y2K Failures.'' 
     If an organization makes all of its systems ``Y2K 
     compliant'', it does not mean that that same organization 
     will not experience Y2K failures causing harm to itself and 
     other organizations. In fact, efforts to become ``Y2K 
     compliant'' in one place could be the direct cause of such 
     failures in others. If interconnected systems are made 
     compliant in different ways, they will be incompatible 
     with each other. Many systems in government and industry 
     are mistakenly being treated as if they were independent 
     and fixed in the most expedient way for each of them. When 
     this ``Humpty Dumpty'' is put back together again, it will 
     not work as expected without complete testing, which is 
     unlikely (see Complexity Kills below).
       1.2  All Problems Are Not Visible or Controllable. In the 
     best case organizations can only address those things they 
     can see and those things they have control over. Given this 
     reality, many Y2K failures are inevitable because some 
     technical problems will not be discernible prior to a 
     failure, and others, while discernible, may not be within an 
     organizations' jurisdictional control to correct. This is 
     especially true in large complex organizations with large 
     amounts of richly interconnected software involved in long 
     and complex information chains and in systems containing a 
     high degree of embedded devices or systems purchased in whole 
     from external parties. (The temporary lifting of certain 
     copyright and reverse engineering restrictions for specific 
     Y2K protection efforts should also be considered as long as 
     copyright holders are not unduly harmed.)
       1.3  Incoming Data May Be Bad or Missing. To maintain their 
     operations many organizations require data imported from 
     other organizations over which they have no control. Such 
     data may have unknowingly been corrupted, made incompatible 
     by misguided compliance efforts or simply missing due to the 
     upstream organizations lawful business decisions.
       1.4  Complexity Kills. The internal complexity of large 
     systems, the further complexity due to the rich 
     interconnections between systems, the diversity of the 
     technical environments in type and vintage of most large 
     organizations and the need to make even small changes in most 
     systems will overwhelm the testing infrastructure that was 
     never designed to test ``everything at once.'' Hence, much 
     software will have to be put back into use without complete 
     testing, a recipe, almost a commandment, for widespread 
     failures.
       2.  Determining Legal Liability Will Be Very Difficult. 
     Traditionally the makers of products that underlie customer 
     operations are liable if those products are ``defective'' 
     enough to unreasonably interfere with those operations 
     resulting in damage. Y2K is different in that those customers 
     themselves are also at risk for legal action if they fail to 
     fulfill contractual obligations or fail to maintain their 
     stock values and their failure to ``fix'' their Y2K problems 
     can be shown as the cause. This customer base of technology 
     producers cannot be overlooked in this issue. As it 
     constitutes most of the organizations in the world, its needs 
     and the implications of legislative actions on it considered 
     now should not be overshadowed by undue focus on the much 
     smaller technology producer sector. Nonetheless, even there 
     liability is not as clear as tradition might indicate. 
     Several factors make liability determination difficult, 
     expensive, time consuming and not at all certain.
       2.1  There Is a Shared Responsibility Between Buyers, 
     Sellers and Users of Technology. Computer products themselves 
     have only clocks that have dates in them. Application 
     software products usually offer optional ways of handling 
     dates. The customer/user organizations, especially larger, 
     older ones, have created much of their application software 
     in-house. When new products are introduced into the buying 
     organization, the customer/user usually has vast amounts of 
     data already in place that have date formats and meaning 
     already established. These formats and meanings cannot be 
     changed as a practical matter. The majority of, and the 
     longest-lasting, potential system problems lay in application 
     software and the data they process, not in clock functions. 
     (Clock-based failures, those likely to happen early in 
     January 2000, while potentially troublesome, will be for the 
     most part localized and of short duration.) Various service 
     providers can be optionally called in to help plan and apply 
     technology for business purposes. But it is only when these 
     are all merged together and put to actual use that failures 
     can emerge. It is very rare that one of them alone can cause 
     a failure that carries legal consequences.
       2.2  Many Things Are Outside the Control of Any Defendant. 
     Incoming data from external sources outside its control may 
     be corrupted, incompatible or missing. Devices and systems 
     embedded in critical purchased equipment may be beyond the 
     defendant's knowledge or legal access. Non-technical goods 
     and services the defendant depends upon may not be available 
     due to Y2K problems within their source organizations or 
     distribution channel.
       2.3  There Will Be a Strong Defense of Impracticability. 
     Existing large-scale systems were not made safe from Y2K long 
     ago for good reasons. Many systems resist large-scale 
     modernization (e.g., IRS, FAA Air Traffic Control, Medicare) 
     for the same reasons. Wide-spread, coordinated modifications 
     across entrenched, diverse, interconnected systems is 
     technically difficult if not impossible at the current level 
     of transformational technology. New products must be made to 
     operate within the established environment, especially date 
     data formats. Technology producers will claim, with reason, 
     that the determining factor in any Y2K failures lay in the 
     way the customer chose to integrate their products into its 
     environment. It will be asserted, perhaps successfully, by 
     user organizations that economic impracticability prevented 
     the prevention of Y2K failures. Regardless of the judicial 
     outcome, it will take a long time and many resources to 
     finally resolve. And that resolution may have to come in 
     thousands of separate cases.
       3. Complexity and Time Negates Any Legal Liability 
     Incentive. Even if making all of an organization's systems 
     ``Y2K compliant'' would render an organization immune from 
     Y2K failures (it will not), the size and complexity of the 
     undertaking is such that if any but the smallest organization 
     is not already well into the work, there is not enough time 
     for the incentive of legal liability to have any discernible 
     positive effect on the outcome. As an analogy, providing any 
     kind of incentive to land a man on Mars within one year would 
     have no effect on anyone's efforts to achieve that unless 
     they had been already working to that end for many years. A 
     negative effect will result from management diverting 
     resources from prevention into legal protection.
       4. The Threat of Legal Action Is a Dangerous Distraction at 
     a Critical Time. There will be system failures, especially in 
     large, old, richly interconnected ``systems of systems'' as 
     exist in the financial services and government sector. The 
     question is how to keep such technical failures from becoming 
     business or organization failures. We should be asking 
     ourselves how we as a society can best keep the flow of goods 
     and services going until the technical problems and failures 
     can be overcome. The following points bear on these 
     questions.
       4.1  Y2K Is a Long Term, Not Short Term, Problem. 
     Irrespective of the notion of Y2K being about time, a point 
     in time, or the fixation on the rollover event at midnight 
     December 31, 1999, or even the name `Year 2000' itself, Y2K 
     computer problems will be causing computer system 
     malfunctions and failures for years into the next decade. Y2K 
     is much more about the dates that can span the century 
     boundary represented in data that must be processed by 
     software than it is about any calendar time or clock issues. 
     Because of the vast amounts of these, the complex 
     intertwining among them and our less than complete 
     understanding of the whole, it will take years for the 
     infrastructure to ``calm down'' after Y2K impacts themselves 
     AND the impacts of the sometimes frantic and misguided 
     changes we have made to it. The current prevention phase is 
     only the beginning.
       4.2  Rapid and Effective Organizational Adaptability Will 
     Be a Prime Necessity. They key to an organization's ability 
     to continue to provide the goods and services other 
     organizations and individuals need to continue their 
     operations will be determined by an organization's ability to 
     adapt its practices and policies quickly and effectively in 
     the face of potentially numerous, rapid and unexpected 
     events.
       4.3  Lawsuits, Actual or Threatened, Will Divert Requisite 
     Resources. Preventing and minimizing harm to society from Y2K 
     disruption is different than, and at times opposed to, 
     protecting one's organization from legal liability. 
     Addressing lawsuits, and even the threat of a lawsuit, will 
     divert requisite resources, particularly management 
     attention, from an organization's rapid and effective 
     adaptation. This is already happening regarding technical 
     prevention and will get worse the longer such legal 
     threats remain. Organizational management has much more 
     experience dealing with legal threats than they do 
     addressing something as unique and unprecedented as Y2K. 
     Their tendency is to address the familiar at the expense 
     of the novel. They must be allowed to focus on the greater 
     good.
       4.4  Judicial System Overload Is Another Danger. Given the 
     great interactive and interdependent complexity of Y2K's 
     impact on the operations of our institutions on a national 
     and global scale, the effort to determine exactly what 
     happened, why it happened and who is legally responsible for 
     each micro-event is itself a huge undertaking requiring the 
     resolution of many questions. For the legal and judicial 
     system to attempt to resolve the legal rights and remedies of 
     affected parties while Y2K impacts are still unfolding will, 
     in any case, threaten to overwhelm the legal and judicial 
     system's capacity to assure justice in the matter, let alone 
     its ability to continue to do its other necessary work.
       For all of the reasons discussed above, we support 
     limitations on Y2K-related legal liability. Minimizing harm 
     and assessing blame are each formidable and important tasks, 
     but they cannot be done simultaneously without sacrificing 
     one for the other. Minimizing harm is more important and 
     there is an increased threat to our welfare if assessing 
     blame adversely interferes with our ability to minimize harm. 
     The value of incentives at this late date is very small. We 
     trust that the collective wisdom of Congress will find ways 
     to reduce these threats. We have additional background 
     material available. Please contact IEEE staff contact Paula 
     Dunne if you are interested in this material. We have other 
     ideas beyond the scope of this legislation of what the U.S. 
     federal government can do to help minimize

[[Page S7281]]

     harm throughout this crisis. We are ready to help in any way 
     you may deem appropriate.
           Respectfully,
     The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 
      Technical Activities Board, Year 2000 Technical Information 
                                                      Focus Group.

  Mr. President, the bill we passed earlier this week is modest. It may 
very well not meet all the concerns expressed by the IEEE. The 
legislation may, however, at least reduce these threats. As a 
consequence, we must enact meaningful legislation and we must enact it 
quickly.

                          ____________________