Congressional Record, Volume 145 Issue 81 (Wednesday, June 9, 1999)

[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 81 (Wednesday, June 9, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H3964-H3997]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 200 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill,
H.R. 1401.

{time} 1522

In the Committee of the Whole

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of
the bill (H.R. 1401) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2000
and 2001 for military activities of the Department of Defense, to
prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal years 2000 and 2001,
and for other purposes, with Mr. Nethercutt in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today, the
amendment by the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) printed in the
Congressional Record of June 8, 1999, had been disposed of.
The Chair understands that amendment No. 2 will not be offered.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed in House
Report 106-175.

Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Costello

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Part A Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Costello:
At the end of title XXXI (page 453, after line 15), insert
the following new section:

SEC. 3167. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY REGULATIONS RELATING TO THE
SAFEGUARDING AND SECURITY OF RESTRICTED DATA.

(a) In General.--Chapter 18 of title I of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.) is amended by inserting
after section 234A the following new section:
``Sec. 234B. Civil Monetary Penalties for Violations of
Department of Energy Regulations Regarding Security of
Classified or Sensitive Information or Data.--
``a. Any person who has entered into a contract or
agreement with the Department of Energy, or a subcontract or
subagreement thereto, and who violates (or whose employee
violates) any applicable rule, regulation, or order
prescribed or otherwise issued by the Secretary pursuant to
this Act relating to the safeguarding or security of
Restricted Data or other classified or sensitive information
shall be subject to a civil penalty of not to exceed $100,000
for each such violation.

[[Page H3965]]

``b. The Secretary shall include in each contract with a
contractor of the Department provisions which provide an
appropriate reduction in the fees or amounts paid to the
contractor under the contract in the event of a violation by
the contractor or contractor employee of any rule,
regulation, or order relating to the safeguarding or security
of Restricted Data or other classified or sensitive
information. The provisions shall specify various degrees of
violations and the amount of the reduction attributable to
each degree of violation.
``c. The powers and limitations applicable to the
assessment of civil penalties under section 234A, except for
subsection d. of that section, shall apply to the assessment
of civil penalties under this section.''.
(b) Clarifying Amendment.--The section heading of section
234A of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2282a) is amended by inserting
``Safety'' before ``Regulations''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for that Act
is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
234 the following new items:

``Sec. 234A. Civil Monetary Penalties for Violations of Department of
Energy Safety Regulations.
``Sec. 234B. Civil Monetary Penalties for Violations of Department of
Energy Regulations Regarding Security of Classified or
Sensitive Information or Data.''.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Costello) and a Member opposed each will control 15
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Costello).
Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the Committee on Rules for making
my amendment in order. I applaud the gentleman from California (Mr.
Cox) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) for their amendment.
However, I believe there is a loophole in their amendment.
The Cox-Dicks amendment does not cover all contractors and it does
not cover not-for-profit contractors. My amendment addresses this
problem by ensuring that any lab contractor who violates rules relating
to the safeguarding and security of sensitive information or data will
be held accountable.
My amendment to the Atomic Energy Act gives the Secretary of Energy
the discretion to decide when and how the fines for national security
breaches would be imposed. If the breach of national security is
unintentional and without consequence, the Secretary could choose to
impose a small fine or waive the fine and issue a warning instead.
The Act also gives the Secretary the flexibility to promulgate a
different rule from the collection of fees for not-for-profit
contractors. My amendment has not removed any of the flexibility
afforded the Secretary in the Atomic Energy Act. Instead, I have given
the Secretary the discretion to impose fines on all liable contractors.
When a contractor employee knowingly, willfully, or repeatedly breaks
the rules, the contractor should be held accountable and not
automatically exempted.
Last month when I offered this amendment in the full Committee on
Science to H.R. 1656, the DOE authorization bill, it passed
unanimously.
When Secretary Richardson testified before the Committee on Science
last month, he agreed with me that penalties should be imposed for
national security infractions for all lab contractors, including not-
for-profit contractors.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment is very simple. It is to the point. It
levels the playing field and, in my opinion, provides accountability to
anyone working at any of our labs throughout the United States, be they
for-profit or not-for-profit contractors.
Mr. Chairman, I ask my colleagues to adopt the amendment.
Mr. CALVERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. COSTELLO. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. CALVERT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I certainly support the intent of this amendment. It is a good
amendment. There is some language that I would like to work with the
gentleman from Illinois prior to going to conference. There are some
concerns regarding fines and how it affects the taxpayers of California
because the University of California and other public institutions.
I would like the assurance of the gentleman that we will work
together to come to some agreeable language that will work for everyone
concerned.
Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I would be happy to
work with the gentleman. And I not only have had conversations with him
concerning this issue, but also the gentlewoman from California (Mrs.
Tauscher) who I would like to yield to now to express some concerns, as
well.
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise for the purpose of a colloquy
with the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Costello).
As I understood it, the Costello amendment would subject Department
of Energy laboratory contractors to financial penalties for violations
of security procedures. I agree with my colleague that laboratory
contractors must be held accountable for security lapses by their
employees. Such accountability is necessary if we are to ensure that
the security procedures that we put in place are properly administered.
Protecting our Nation's secrets must be a top priority of our national
laboratories. I am pleased that the House just voted to adopt the Cox-
Dicks amendment that enhances security at the labs.
I am concerned, however, that the amendment of the gentleman makes no
distinction between laboratory contractors that are for-profit
organizations and those that are not-for-profit organizations.

{time} 1530

There are key differences between how these two types of
organizations function. For example, subjecting the University of
California, which is a public institution, to the same fines and
penalties as a for-profit corporation would potentially penalize all of
the tax-paying residents of the State of California for the operations
of a Federal facility in pursuit of a national mission. I believe that
in leveling civil penalties against these contractors, we must account
for the differences inherent in their organizations. I am hopeful that
this legislation moves forward and as it moves forward we can continue
to work together to address concerns about applying civil penalties
against not-for-profit laboratory contractors.
Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I appreciate the
gentlewoman's comments and concerns. I assure her, as I do my other
friend from California and the California delegation, that I intend to
work with them to address this issue in conference. The goal of my
amendment is to create a level playing field for both for- and not-for-
profit contractors. The goal in our Committee on Science, of course,
was to try and level the playing field and as we move this legislation
forward and hopefully if this amendment is adopted by the committee, we
will work in conference to address the issues that you have raised
here.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman
from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very
much for yielding me this time. I rise to support the legislation. I
believe that we have a challenge to promote good scientific research,
to do it in a manner that includes many of our citizens here in the
United States, to reflect the diversity of this Nation, to promote
collaboration but also to secure the important security issues of this
country.
With that, I would simply ask, since I happen to come from a
community that has a great emphasis on scientific research, NASA is
located in my area, many of my universities like the University of
Houston, Texas Southern University, Rice University and many others who
I have not called their names, collaborate with the Department of
Energy and other such entities such as the Department of Defense. I
would simply like to yield to the gentleman to inquire whether his
amendment would in any way inhibit or put a particular hardship on the
very good research that many of our not-for-profit, nonprofit
institutions are engaged in.
I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. COSTELLO. I would say to the gentlewoman that the intent of the
amendment is not to penalize in any way any university in the State of
Texas or for that matter in my State of Illinois that are involved in
research at

[[Page H3966]]

our national labs. But it is intended to give the Secretary of Energy
the ability to penalize any not-for-profit corporation that is doing
work for our labs that repeatedly and intentionally violates the
security regulations and rules that we have adopted. So I would assure
her as I have the members of the California delegation that we will
work in conference to address the issue.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Reclaiming my time, I want to thank the
gentleman and particularly for the fact that he has given this issue
over to the Secretary of Energy in his wisdom and discretion, I think
that is very important. I thank the gentleman very much for his
amendment. I look forward to supporting this amendment.
Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to
the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence).
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend the gentleman for
his amendment. It is a good one. As the chairman I am prepared to
accept it.
Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to
the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking Democrat on the
committee.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Illinois for
yielding me this time. We have examined the amendment on this side, we
fully understand it and find it acceptable.
Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the House adopt my amendment,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Costello).
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed
in House Report 106-175.

Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Hunter

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Part A amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Hunter:
At the end of title XXXI (page 453, after line 15), insert
the following new section:

SEC. 3167. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE POLYGRAPH
PROGRAM.

(a) Program Required.--The Secretary of Energy, acting
through the Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of
the Department of Energy, shall carry out a
counterintelligence polygraph program for the defense-related
activities of the Department. The counterintelligence
polygraph program shall consist of the administration of
counterintelligence polygraph examinations to each covered
person who has access to high-risk programs or information.
(b) Covered Persons.--For purposes of this section, a
covered person is one of the following:
(1) An officer or employee of the Department.
(2) An expert or consultant under contract to the
Department.
(3) An officer or employee of any contractor of the
Department.
(c) High-Risk Programs or Information.--For purposes of
this section, high-risk programs or information are any of
the following:
(1) The programs identified as high risk in the regulations
prescribed by the Secretary and known as--
(A) Special Access Programs;
(B) Personnel Security And Assurance Programs; and
(C) Personnel Assurance Programs.
(2) The information identified as high risk in the
regulations prescribed by the Secretary and known as
Sensitive Compartmented Information.
(d) Initial Testing and Consent.--The Secretary may not
permit a covered person to have any access to any high-risk
program or information unless that person first undergoes a
counterintelligence polygraph examination and consents in a
signed writing to the counterintelligence polygraph
examinations required by this section.
(e) Additional Testing.--The Secretary may not permit a
covered person to have continued access to any high-risk
program or information unless that person undergoes a
counterintelligence polygraph examination--
(1) not less frequently than every five years; and
(2) at any time at the direction of the Director of the
Office of Counterintelligence.
(f) Counterintelligence Polygraph Examination.--For
purposes of this section, the term ``counterintelligence
polygraph examination'' means a polygraph examination using
questions reasonably calculated to obtain counterintelligence
information, including questions relating to espionage,
sabotage, unauthorized disclosure of classified information,
and unauthorized contact with foreign nationals.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Hunter) and the gentlewoman from Hawaii (Mrs. Mink)
each will control 10 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter).
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
This amendment expands and I think makes somewhat more concise the
polygraph provision in the umbrella Cox-Dicks amendment that was just
passed. We are all concerned obviously with the losses that have been
categorized before us throughout the media, that have been the subject
of this major piece of legislation, and one answer to that, of course,
is to do more polygraphs, do them on a regular basis. In looking at the
language that was proposed by the special committee, that language
directs itself to what are known as special access programs. What my
amendment does is expand that to include people who have access to
nuclear weapons design, which is the very subject of the technology
that was stolen, and fissile material, that is nuclear weapons
material. So people who have access in those very important areas are
similarly subjected to polygraphs.
The other aspect of our amendment is that the amendment also
designates that these polygraphs should be given every 5 years, no less
than every 5 years, which we think is a reasonable rate. That is the
difference.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume. I discussed this amendment with the offeror of the amendment,
the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter). While he assured me that
this requirement of the counterintelligence polygraph would be
universal in the sense that it would apply to all employees that fit
into the category of being an employee of a high-risk program in the
Department of Energy, I just wanted to confirm with the gentleman from
California (Mr. Hunter) at this point if that is the real intent and
meaning of this amendment.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. HUNTER. I would say to my colleague, yes, that is the intent of
the amendment and the amendment very clearly states that the
counterintelligence polygraph program shall be administered to each
covered person who has access to these high-risk programs. And those
high-risk programs are, of course, the nuclear weapons design programs,
special access programs, and access to the material that we make
nuclear weapons out of. Very clearly this is totally ethnic neutral, it
is race neutral, it has no reference to the backgrounds of these
people. If you qualify and are given a clearance under one of these
high-risk programs, you have to take the polygraph test. So it is very
fairly in this particular amendment, very fairly delineated to apply to
all people who have to get those particular clearances.
Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Chairman, I have a further question of my
colleague. Who is to manage the polygraph program? Who is to design it?
And how is it to be applied to these employees in these high-risk
programs? Whose guidance will the Department of Energy be following?
The CIA, the FBI or exactly who?
Mr. HUNTER. No, the director of the Office of Counterintelligence of
the Department of Energy shall administer this program for the
Secretary of Energy.
Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Now, the polygraph would be directed
specifically to questions referring to leaks of sensitive information
and not those things that refer to the privacy of the individuals or
their associations in private life outside the context of the
laboratory, or will it go into matters of their social behavior, their
family relationships with other persons who may not be employed in the
labs? How extensive is this polygraph going to be in its search for
information which would be critical to the national security of these
laboratories?
Mr. HUNTER. Of course, there is a certain discipline and a certain
structure to polygraphs that are directed to people who have access to
highly secret

[[Page H3967]]

material. And, of course, one very important point, and I know the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) is concerned about this, too, is
that the polygraph and the polygraph examination and the people who
undertake it do so with a high degree of integrity, that is, that they
limit it to intelligence areas that will give them information, only
information as to whether or not the subjects may have been subject to
a security breach. And, secondly, that the polygraph is given in a very
professional manner and is given by very professional people with a
high degree of integrity. I know that is a concern, and I think that is
something that we simply have to monitor very closely. But again the
Secretary of Energy is charged with this program. He is charged with it
and he carries it out through his director of the Office of
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy. So you have the
President's Cabinet member overseeing this particular program. I think
we should pay a great deal of attention to make sure that it is
administered with a high degree of integrity but I think we can achieve
that.
Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. A question by one of our colleagues, who
unfortunately could not be here because there is another pressing
meeting, raises the point of many of these employees are not fully
conversant in English. They are limited English speakers. Many of them
are highly skilled, very, very important technical scientists in this
field. Is the polygraph examination going to be given in different
languages so that the failure of communication in English is not going
to tag this individual as being a risk because they could not relate to
the types of questions that are coming at them in the English language
nor could they respond in English in an adequate way?
Mr. HUNTER. First, I think obviously that is a very important part of
the integrity of the polygraph examination. It has to be given in a way
that is fully communicated to the person who is the subject of the
examination and once again that is a part of the professionalism of the
examination. Of course if you have a person who does not communicate
fully in English, it must be communicated in the language that they are
conversant with. We will certainly expect that that is the way that it
would be administered. I think we can have conversations with the
Secretary of Energy to make sure that that occurs.
Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Does the amendment in any way set down the
monitoring mechanism so that we can be assured that the responses that
you have given to my inquiries will actually be the process followed by
the Department of Energy?
Mr. HUNTER. The answer to that is I would say to my colleague that
giving polygraph tests is a science that has been built up over the
years. The Department of Energy, because this is such an important
area, and the gentleman from Indiana has mentioned this, we have had
actual failures of polygraph in the past who register a positive when
in fact it should have, but because this is such a critical area, I
think we can expect the Secretary of Energy to adopt, A, the highest
standards, and, B, use the best trained professionals to do this,
because this is so serious. And I think we should ensure that that
occurs, but I think we can.
Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer).
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend from Hawaii for
yielding me this time. I rise not in opposition at all to the author of
the amendment but to commend him especially for two areas that he has
covered in this amendment. First of all, those individuals covered and
also how often this is administered and to what programs are
administered. I think the gentleman has done a thorough job. My
concerns and caveats come to who is administering this and how they
administer it in a professional, scientific way with thorough analysis
and comprehensive integrity.
The Washington Post had an interesting story on this several weeks
ago looking at the credibility of polygraphs, about the validity of the
system, the analysis of answers using output of flawed polygraphs, the
issue of false positives. What we want to do, I think, and the
gentleman from California very much wants to do this, too, and
accomplish this, is establish uniform standards.

{time} 1545

Now I do not know that we should contract these out. Maybe the FBI
has the ultimate science and professionalism and integrity. We have
seen that we have had some problems in contracting this out in the
past, that there have been some unreliable polygraphs produced; and I
want to work with the gentleman in conference to make sure that not
only have we got the parts right that he has done such an effective job
on who is covered, how often, what special access programs are covered,
but who administers this, and should we allow a contracting out of
this.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I would say to
my friend he has raised excellent questions, that this is a subject
that we need to sit down and discuss with the Secretary of Energy, and
I would say that I can assure him that I will ask our chairman, the
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence), because this is a very
important area to him also, to participate with us and with the
gentleman and with the Secretary of Energy and have some discussions
during the conference to make sure that we have two things: the highest
professionalism, and, No. 2, the best standards.
If those best standards fall in the area of government-given
polygraphs, and perhaps they are not in the private sector, then let us
go with the best standards if they are in the government. If the best
standards and the best science has been developed on the outside, let
us use that capability, but certainly let us make sure we have the
best.
Mr. ROEMER. As long as the gentleman says the best standards are in
the private sector and everybody agrees on that, that we do not then
have this jumping back and forth between established best standards for
one and their administering 50 or 60 percent of the polygraphs and the
FBI or somebody else is doing the remaining 40 percent, and we know
there is a discrepancy between or differences between the
administration of those tests. I think it is very important that we
establish a uniform standard of policy here as to who is administering
it, and if it is the FBI, maybe we do not contract out. If the
established science is in the private sector, then that is the uniform
standard that we establish, and I look forward to working with the
gentleman. I am not going to oppose this amendment.
Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman, and let me just respond that I
will work also to see that we have uniformity. I think that is a key.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter).
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed
in House Report 106-175.

Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Roemer

Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Part A amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Roemer:
At the end of title XXXI (page 453, after line 15), insert
the following new section:

SEC. 3167. REPORT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
PRACTICES AT NATIONAL LABORATORIES.

(a) In General.--Not later than March 1 of each year, the
Secretary of Energy shall submit to the Congress a report for
the preceding year on counterintelligence and security
practices at the facilities of the national laboratories
(whether or not classified activities are carried out at the
facility).
(b) Content of Report.--The report shall include, with
respect to each national laboratory, the following:
(1) The number of full-time counterintelligence and
security professionals employed.
(2) A description of the counterintelligence and security
training courses conducted and, for each such course, any
requirement that employees successfully complete that course.
(3) A description of each contract awarded that provides an
incentive for the effective performance of
counterintelligence or security activities.
(4) A description of the services provided by the employee
assistance programs.
(5) A description of any requirement that an employee
report the foreign travel of that

[[Page H3968]]

employee (whether or not the travel was for official
business).
(6) A description of any visit by the Secretary or by the
Deputy Secretary of Energy, a purpose of which was to
emphasize to employees the need for effective
counterintelligence and seurity practices.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Roemer) and a Member opposed each will control 10 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer).
(Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I have been a member of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence since the beginning of this Congress. I have been
especially interested in the issues surrounding the compromise of
nuclear weapons design information and the security and
counterintelligence programs at the national laboratories. I do not
believe that all of the facts surrounding what happened and how it
happened with respect to the compromise of sensitive weapons
information to the PRC have yet been sorted out.
Problems clearly existed for 2 decades, and for reasons that are
still inexplicable, very little appears to have been done on a
systematic basis until the press reports, the promulgation of
Presidential Decision Directive 61. While I commend Director Freeh and
the Director of Central Intelligence Tenet for pushing PDD 61, and
Secretary Richardson for his commitment to fully implement
counterintelligence and security reforms, and just recently to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from Washington
(Mr. Dicks) for their amendment today, I am not yet convinced all
specific reforms have been considered addressing the culture and
leadership between our national labs and the Department of Energy.
Nevertheless, I am convinced that counterintelligence and security
reforms will only succeed if good counterintelligence and security
practices become ingrained, ingrained in the daily business of those
who have the duty to protect national security information and if there
is continued high-level attention being made to security and
counterintelligence discipline from the leadership and the national
security agencies of the United States Congress. The keys, Mr.
Chairman, are ingrained in the daily business, continued high-level
attention, and disciplined leadership and direct communication between
DOE and their employees and the United States Congress.
I have thus proposed in this amendment that the Secretary of Energy
provide the Congress with a report each year on certain matters related
to counterintelligence and security that would give one indication that
there is keen attention and involved leadership to security and
counterintelligence practices at the national laboratories. I would
expect the report to be sent each year to the Armed Services and
Intelligence Committees of the Congress with classified attachments, if
necessary. There were three reports in the Cox and Dicks amendment just
voted on. This amendment does not produce any kind of duplication
between those other reports. I would hope that the committees would
then use the report as one springboard for oversight.
Again, I believe Congress must send the strongest constructive
message about counterintelligence and security, and the message must be
sustained over the long term, not just in the heat of revelations about
espionage with sufficient appropriations from our oversight committees
to ensure that the job gets done.
I would like to thank the House committee staff on intelligence,
current members of the intelligence and counterintelligence communities
and former members, such as the Director of Intelligence Jim Woolsey
and experts on counterintelligence matters such as Paul Rudman and John
Feron for their help in putting this amendment together.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle) who
has also been helpful in putting together the bipartisan amendment.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Indiana for
yielding, and I do rise in strong support of his amendment, of which I
am a cosponsor, which would require the Secretary of Energy to report
to Congress annually regarding the counterintelligence and security
practices at our national laboratories.
I will not belabor this too much, because a lot of what I would say
would be repetitious of what the gentleman from Indiana has already
stated; but as a member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, I do have a distinct interest, as I think we all do, but
perhaps it is a little more focused on the intelligence committee in
safeguarding our national labs, especially considering the recent
release of the details of the Cox-Dicks report regarding United States
national security and the People's Republic of China.
The facts obviously are still emerging, the consequences of that are
still emerging, and efforts are being made to address it, but I think
we have come to the conclusion that something needs to be done on a
longer term regular basis, if my colleagues will, is what this
amendment is all about, requiring the Secretary of Energy to issue an
annual report on certain matters related to counterintelligence and
security, in those particular labs.
So I am strongly supportive of this. I think we need to remain ever
vigilant on this. We need to learn from the past, and we need to make
sure that whatever it is that we do to cure these things will be
continued into the future, and in my judgment some sort of annual
review is exactly what is needed, and so for that reason I strongly
support this amendment.
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend from Delaware for
his strong bipartisan support for the amendment, and again come back to
the many hearings and the many reports that we have had from the Cox-
Dicks Commission, the many meetings that we have set up with members of
the counterintelligence community. They stress over and over and over
again that the culture in our laboratories has to change; that we have
to have ingrained in the daily business a concern and riveted attention
to the details of security; that we have to have this as a continuum;
that we have to continue to stress this at the highest levels;
Secretary of Energy Richardson, who has got a good start on this,
continue to visit the national laboratories and make this a top-down
and bottom-up change in the culture.
The Chinese have probably been spying on the United States for 30
years since they started a nuclear program. We need to be more
vigilant, we need to be more detailed about securing the most sensitive
secrets we have, some of which are at our national laboratories.
So I would hope that this amendment would be accepted, that we can
change the culture, we can keep attention to this, and that we will
continue to put the necessary appropriations forward to keep ever
vigilant in protecting our national security secrets.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton)
for any comments he may have on the amendment.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I would merely say it is a good amendment,
and we examined it on this side. We have no problem with it and endorse
it.
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend from Missouri and
would ask that the House adopt the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr.
Spence).
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend the gentleman for
his amendment, too, and as chairman of the committee I am prepared to
accept it.
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend from South Carolina,
and with those two resounding endorsements I know when to stop talking,
Mr. Chairman, and I would ask the House to adopt the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Does any Member claim time in opposition to the
amendment?
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Roemer).
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed
in House Report 106-175.

Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Sweeney

Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

[[Page H3969]]

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Part A amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Sweeney:
At the end of title XII (page 317, after line 17), insert
the following new section:

SEC. 1206. ANNUAL AUDIT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA.

(a) Annual Audit.--The Inspectors General of the Department
of Defense and the Department of Energy, in consultation with
the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall each conduct an annual
audit of the policies and procedures of the Department of
Defense and the Department of Energy, respectively, with
respect to the export of technologies and the transfer of
scientific and technical information, to the People's
Republic of China in order to assess the extent to which the
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy, as the
case may be, is carrying out its activities to ensure that
any technology transfer, including a transfer of scientific
or technical information, will not measurably improve the
weapons systems or space launch capabilities of the People's
Republic of China.
(b) Report to Congress.--The Inspectors General of the
Department of Defense and the Department of Energy shall each
submit to Congress a report each year describing the results
of the annual audit under subsection (a).

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Sweeney) and a Member opposed each will control 10
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Sweeney).
(Mr. SWEENEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I do not expect to use all my allotted time, and I want
to thank both the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) and the
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence) for the opportunity to
present this amendment.
As my colleagues know, the past several years have revealed two major
breaches in the national security interests of this great Nation, and
we have heard a lot of debate and discussion on the floor today about
one of those. And the Chinese nuclear espionage and the transfer of
militarily-sensitive technology to satellite trade have now proven
beyond a doubt to have significantly enhanced the military capability
of communist China.
Since the end of the Cold War, I believe, Mr. Chairman, we have taken
our military strength and in turn our national security a bit for
granted. Sadly, the recent events have revealed that American strength
is not automatic and we must take positive steps to preserve our role
as the only remaining superpower.
Today I offer my amendment to reestablish that it is the policy of
the United States to ensure that our technological advances and
military knowhow are not turned against us in the form of advanced
military threat. My amendment and the real value of my amendment, I
believe, is that it would provide an additional and very necessary
layer of security and scrutiny to ensure that Chinese espionage
experienced in the Department of Energy labs is not repeated in the
Departments of Defense and Energy and that they regularly monitor their
policies with respect to the technological transfers with China. The
amendment requires that the Inspector General of Defense and Energy
assess in consultation with our intelligence community their
departments' policies and procedures with respect to the exchange of
technology and scientific information that could be used to enhance the
military capabilities in China. This audit must be conducted on an
annual basis and is continuing with a report to Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I offered a similar amendment to the NASA authorization
just a few weeks ago that passed the House, calling for an annual audit
of policies regarding the transfer of technology to China from our
space program. I believe this is a commonsense review and it should
exist in all relevant departments throughout the Federal Government.
Surely I recognize that the Department of Energy has taken steps to
correct some of the problems that led to the compromise of our most
critical military secrets.

{time} 1600

I also recognize that there have been a number of amendments
presented, and there will be more that will be presented today, that
also provide for some answers and some solutions, and Congress has made
this a priority as we address these security issues.
A few years ago we were pretty certain that the top secret scientific
information at our nuclear labs was secure. We now know that was not
the case. I think it is entirely appropriate and I would suggest
essential that the agencies of the U.S. Government engaging in national
security related matters be required to regularly conduct comprehensive
evaluations of their policies for protecting militarily sensitive
technology.
Again, the amendment simply provides an extra layer of protection at
the Departments of Defense and Energy to prevent the repeat of the
breach of our nuclear labs. America can no longer take our national
security for granted and we in Congress can no longer take our national
security for granted. I believe this is a common sense oversight
amendment, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from South Carolina (Mr. Spence).
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I find no fault with the amendment, and I
commend the gentleman for offering it. On behalf of the committee, I
accept it.
Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton).
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I have examined the amendment on our side
and find it commendable.
Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Does any Member claim time in opposition?
If not, the question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Sweeney).
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed
in House Report 106-175.

Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Ryun of Kansas

Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Part A amendment No. 7 offered by Mr. Ryun of Kansas:
At the end of title XXXI (page 453, after line 15), insert
the following new subtitle:

Subtitle F--Department of Energy Foreign Visitors Program Moratorium

SEC. 3181. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the ``Department of Energy
Foreign Visitors Program Moratorium Act''.

SEC. 3182. MORATORIUM ON FOREIGN VISITORS PROGRAM.

(a) Moratorium.--Until otherwise provided by law, the
Secretary of Energy may not, during the foreign visitors
moratorium period, admit to any facility of a national
laboratory any individual who is a citizen of a nation that
is named on the current Department of Energy sensitive
countries list.
(b) Waiver Authority.--(1) The Secretary of Energy may
waive the prohibition in subsection (a) on a monthly basis
with respect to specific individuals whose admission to a
national laboratory is determined by the Secretary to be
necessary for the national security of the United States.
(2) On a monthly basis, but not later than the 15th day of
each month, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate and Committee on Armed Services
of the House of Representatives a report in writing providing
notice of the waivers made in the previous month. The report
shall identify each individual for whom such a waiver was
made and, with respect to each such individual, provide a
detailed justification for the waiver and the Secretary's
certification that the admission of that individual to a
national laboratory is necessary for the national security of
the United States.
(3) The authority of the Secretary under paragraph (1) may
be delegated only to the Deputy Secretary of Energy or an
Assistant Secretary of Energy.
(c) Foreign Visitors Moratorium Period.--For purposes of
this section, the term ``foreign visitors moratorium period''
means the period beginning on the date of the enactment of
this Act and ending on the later of the following:
(1) The date that is 2 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(2) The date that is 90 days after the date on which the
Secretary of Energy, after consultation with the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, submits to the Committee
on Armed Services of the Senate and

[[Page H3970]]

the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives a certification in writing by the Secretary
of each of the following:
(A) That the counterintelligence program required by
section 3183 is fully implemented, and fully operating, at
each of the national laboratories.
(B) That such counterintelligence program complies with the
requirements of Presidential Decision Directive number 61.
(C) That the Secretary is in compliance with the provisions
of subsection (b).

SEC. 3183. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

(a) Establishment at Each Laboratory.--The Secretary of
Energy shall establish a counterintelligence program at each
of the national laboratories. The counterintelligence program
at each such laboratory shall have a full-time staff assigned
to counterintelligence functions at that laboratory,
including such personnel from other agencies as may be
approved by the Secretary. The counterintelligence program at
each such laboratory shall be under the direction of, and
shall report to, the Director of the Office of
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.
(b) Investigation of Past Security Breaches.--The Secretary
shall require that the counterintelligence program at each
laboratory include a specific plan pursuant to which the
Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of the
Department of Energy shall--
(1) investigate any breaches of security discovered after
the date of the enactment of this Act that occurred at that
laboratory before the establishment of the
counterintelligence program at that laboratory; and
(2) study the extent to which a breach of security may have
occurred before the establishment of the counterintelligence
program at that laboratory with respect to a classified
project at that laboratory by the admittance to that
laboratory, for purposes of a nonclassified project, of a
citizen of a foreign nation.
(c) Required Checks on All Non-Cleared Individuals.--(1)
The Secretary, acting through the Director of the Office of
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy, shall ensure
the following:
(A) That before any non-cleared individual is allowed to
enter any facility of a national laboratory, a security
investigation known as an ``indices check'' is carried out
with respect to that individual.
(B) That before any non-cleared individual is allowed to
enter a classified facility of a national laboratory or to
work for more than 15 days in any 30-day period in any
facility of a national laboratory, a security investigation
known as a ``background check'' is carried out with respect
to that individual.
(2) Non-Cleared Individual.--For purposes of paragraph (1),
a non-cleared individual is any of the following:
(A) An individual who is a citizen of a nation that is
named on the current Department of Energy sensitive countries
list.
(B) An individual who has not been investigated by the
United States, or by a foreign nation with which the United
States has an appropriate reciprocity agreement, in a manner
at least as comprehensive as the investigation required for
the issuance of a security clearance at the level designated
as ``Secret''.

SEC. 3184. EXCEPTION TO MORATORIUM FOR CERTAIN GRANDFATHERED
INDIVIDUALS.

(a) Grandfathered Individuals.--Notwithstanding section
3182(a), the Secretary may, during the foreign visitors
moratorium period described section 3182(c), admit to a
facility of a national laboratory an individual who is a
citizen of a nation that is named on the current Department
of Energy sensitive countries list, for a period of not more
than 3 months for the purposes of transitional work, if--
(1) that individual was regularly admitted to that facility
before that period for purposes of a project or series of
projects;
(2) the continued admittance of that individual to that
facility during that period is important to that project or
series of projects; and
(3) the admittance is carried out in accordance with
section 3183(c).
(b) Report on Grandfathered Individuals.--Not later than 30
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of
the Senate and Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives a report on each individual admitted to a
facility of a national laboratory under subsection (a). The
report shall identify each such individual and, with respect
to each such individual, provide a detailed justification for
such admittance and the Secretary's certification that such
admission was carried out in accordance with section 3183(c).

SEC. 3185. DEFINITIONS.

For purposes of this subtitle:
(1) The term ``national laboratory'' means any of the
following:
(A) The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore,
California.
(B) The Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New
Mexico.
(C) The Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New
Mexico, and Livermore, California.
(2) The term ``sensitive countries list'' means the list
prescribed by the Secretary of Energy known as the Department
of Energy List of Sensitive Countries.
(3) The term ``indices check'' means using an individual's
name, date of birth, and place of birth to review government
intelligence and investigative agencies databases for
suspected ties to foreign intelligence services or terrorist
groups.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from
Kansas (Mr. Ryun) and a Member opposed each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun).
Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I offer my amendment today because I believe its strong
moratorium language will enable the Department of Energy to enact the
previously debated and passed intelligence programs.
Mr. Chairman, I have worked with the bipartisan group that wrote the
Cox-Dicks amendment, and I voted for it. I agree with the series of
strong security provisions that the amendment offers. However, I also
believe putting these security provisions in place cannot be achieved
overnight.
Until a comprehensive counterintelligence program is up and running
at each laboratory, access must be limited to ensure that enhanced
security is functioning properly.
Mr. Chairman, as you can see, I would have had a chart just a moment
ago, but it would have shown that 16 percent of our foreign visitors
from sensitive countries were not given any kind of background check
between 1994 and 1996. Congress needs to make sure that every effort is
made in our power to limit that access until we discover the full
extent of the revealed security breaches. It is pretty extensive when
you look at the numbers between 1994 and 1996.
Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson in a letter written today to all
Members of Congress states that the Ryun amendment ``effectively kills
several important national security programs at the DOE laboratories.''
However, the amendment allows the Secretary of Energy to waive the
moratorium for individuals deemed necessary to our national security,
so we have a waiver provision in there with the moratorium that allows
if we have a national security problem allowing necessary people to
come in and be able to perform in those laboratories. For each waiver,
the secretary must report which individuals were admitted, along with
the justification for their admittance to the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees on a monthly basis.
Mr. Chairman, after the two-year moratorium is complete and after
consultation with the Director of the FBI, the Secretary of Energy is
required then to certify in writing that the new counterintelligence
programs are running effectively before giving Congress a 90-day review
period for the lifting of the moratorium.
This amendment puts accountability and Congressional oversight back
into the security process at our nuclear labs. We must establish
procedures to ensure that the theft of our national security secrets
never happens again.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri is recognized to control 20
minutes.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, were it not for the Cox-Dicks amendment, this would be
a different case. We not only are replowing the same ground, we find
this amendment in conflict with that amendment which we have already
passed unanimously in this body.
Mr. Chairman, let me commend my friend from Kansas, who is a very
sincere and dedicated member of our committee. However, this amendment
is not necessary because of the reasons that I heretofore stated.
Mr. Chairman, the protection of critical nuclear information is a
very serious matter. There has been a compromise, and some changes are
required in the manner in which security and counterintelligence
matters are handled. The amendment does provide some increased emphasis
on counterintelligence and potential for enhanced protection, but would
codify the counterintelligence program mandated by Presidential
Directive 61 in the least restrictive manner thus far proposed that
provides a waiver by the Secretary of Energy during moratorium.

[[Page H3971]]

However, since the Cox-Dicks amendment has been accepted by this
body, as I point out, by unanimous vote on a rollcall vote, this
amendment is not needed. It flies in the face, sadly, with the Cox-
Dicks amendment, so we would have two standards set forth in the bill
should this be adopted. That, of course, is a very serious problem for
anyone to follow when you have two standards, two ways of doing
something, two time limits. It would be very difficult, and, frankly,
unworkable.
Regretfully, because the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) is such a
dedicated member of the committee, I find that I really in all
sincerity must oppose this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, it is important to draw the distinction here, because
while the Cox report allows for a moratorium, it is a very limited
moratorium. It is a 90-day moratorium. In actually reading the report
by the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), who is a part of this
amendment, and Mr. Cox, it is very clear to me that is a very limited
period of time.
My amendment allows for a two-year moratorium, which is sufficient
time to put a counterintelligence program in place and ensure that we
genuinely protect those national secrets. That is the reason for the
length. Under the Cox report it has a 90-day period with a 30-day
reporting period, so conceivably at the end of 60 days there would not
be a need for any further moratorium.
So I believe the extension is necessary if we are going to make sure
that we have a counterintelligence program in place and to ensure our
national secrets.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr.
Hunter).
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
Mr. Chairman, I want to rise in strong support of the Ryun amendment,
and I want to say at the outset that I very much respect the position
of folks on the other side. I know the gentlewoman from New Mexico
(Mrs. Wilson) is very dedicated, very bright, and has the best
interests of our country at heart and serves her constituents very
well. I have though a difference of opinion on this issue with the
folks that limited the scope of the foreign visitors cutoff.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HUNTER. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make sure we have this
understood here. Nothing happens. There is a moratorium until Ed
Curran, the new Director of Counterintelligence, certifies that we now
have in place an effective counterintelligence program. Then, under the
Cox-Dicks amendment you would have 45 days, and Congress would then
have a chance to review it. So you would have 60. But this is 60 days
after the new head of counterintelligence certifies that we have an
effective plan in place.
Why would we want to keep it on for two years after that? That does
not make any sense.
Mr. HUNTER. Reclaiming my time from my B-2 friend, let me tell----
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the B-2 did very well over there, by the
way, in Kosovo.
Mr. HUNTER. I know the B-2 did very well in Kosovo. Let me say why
the Ryun amendment makes a lot of sense. It is for this reason. I
understand under both provisions we establish a counterintelligence
office. That is, of course, a must. It is a mandate.
But the issue should go beyond how we establish the
counterintelligence operation. It should also include the issue of
this: Does it make sense for us to have visitors and to allow Algeria,
Cuba, and I am looking at the GAO report on foreign visitation to our
nuclear weapons complex, Cuba, Iran, Iraq and China in our nuclear
laboratories at all? What advancement is Cuba giving us to our nuclear
weapons program? What is the reasoning whereby we feel that we need to
make, and I have added them up here, six visits by the states of
Algeria, Cuba, Iran, Iraq and China to our nuclear weapons
laboratories?
I think, and I say to my friend in all sincerity, I think we have
missed part of the debate. I think when we do counterintelligence
background checks on people from Iraq, you know what our
counterintelligence people are going to give us on these particular
agents and scientists? They are going to give us blank pieces of paper,
because it is very difficult for us to get background information on
those folks.
Now, I do not think that people from those states and many of the
other controlled access states have anything to give to our nuclear
weapons complex that helps us either build nuclear weapons or do
stockpile stewardship on nuclear weapons, which is our primary purpose.
I would simply say this to my friend: The Secretary of Energy can
execute waivers, but this is all about accountability. Under both
provisions, the Ryun amendment and the base bill, the Secretary of
Energy can execute waivers. I think if you look at this list of people
from controlled countries that had no business being at our national
labs, and you see the percentage of people that, in the cases of Iran
and Iraq who were even given background checks, and it is down to 10
and 20 percent of people from Iraq were given background checks to come
into our nuclear weapons complex, I think it is appropriate for us to
say to the Secretary of Energy, listen, for the next two years, you can
have people come in, and if it is the Nunn-Lugar program that affects
the Soviet Union, if it is one of our missile control regimes, if it is
a fissile material control regime, all you have to do is sign a piece
of paper and you bring those scientists in. But we want you to look at
these applicants for admission to our national weapons complex. The
Ryun amendment does that.
I think, in light of that, the two-year moratorium makes a lot of
sense. These people have not been paying attention. I think the
gentleman would agree with me, when you let people come in from
Algeria, Cuba, Iran and Iraq, and they are supposed to be contributing
to our nuclear weapons development or stockpile stewardship, it makes
us realize the leadership in DOE has not been reflecting on these
admissions. We want to make them reflect.
Lastly, I would say what Leo Thorsen has said, the great Medal of
Honor winner. He said in areas of national security, he said, go with
strength. Go the extra mile. We are going the extra mile with the Ryun
amendment.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Guam (Mr. Underwood).
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
time.
Mr. Chairman, I stand in opposition to the Ryun amendment, although I
understand the sincerity with which he offers it.

{time} 1615

This amendment is entirely unnecessary, as has been already pointed
out. The concerns that are pertaining to the moratorium and checking
out all the foreign scientists who come have been dealt with adequately
in the Cox/Dicks amendment that has already passed.
This amendment places a 2-year moratorium on the entry of foreign
visitors from sensitive countries, and it presents what seems to me to
be a very simplistic solution to a wave of espionage that has already
occurred in our weapons labs.
I know that the sponsor indicated that between 1995 and 1996, that
some 16 percent of the foreign scientists did not receive any
background checks. If we had a 2-year moratorium for that time period,
then it would make a lot of sense. But what we have in the situation
here is that we are trying to solve a problem that we are already aware
of, and it is like locking the barn door after the horses have escaped.
The free exchange of scientists in unclassified research areas at our
nuclear weapons lab is important for recruiting and retaining a world
class staff. We need to help maintain the U.S. nuclear stockpile and
maintain American scientific leadership. A quarantine at our national
laboratories in effect will insulate us from some of the world's finest
minds in many scientific fields, and has the effect of undercutting our
own progress, development, and superiority in nuclear weapons
development and scientific advancement.
Imagine if this moratorium had existed during the U.S. development of

[[Page H3972]]

the atom bomb. Dozens of scientists and physicists, people like
Einstein and Fermi, who were citizens of enemy nations, would have been
prohibited from research and development of a weapon that helped end
World War II. These exceptional minds who labored tirelessly for their
adopted country would be barred from that work today.
Secretary Richardson has responded to this. The Cox/Dicks amendment
has responded to this. This amendment is entirely unnecessary.
Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, in response to the gentleman who just spoke, we have a
waiver provision that allows for national security, to allow certain
scientists to come in if necessary.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina
(Mr. Spence), the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed
Services.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered
by the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun). I think it is a good
amendment.
I have listened intently to all of the opposition. It does not make
sense. It takes years to learn the scope of espionage that has already
occurred in our nuclear labs. We still may not know the full extent of
the problem.
As a matter of fact, the Cox report has only been able to offer up
for the public view certain portions of what they found out. Many parts
of it are still classified, and we would not know what has been learned
there.
In March, the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory
wrote in the Washington Post that during his tenure at the lab a great
number of individuals from sensitive countries visited, but there was
``. . . no indication that these contacts compromised our security.''
Unfortunately, it was during this same period of time that classified
information on the W-88 warhead designed at Los Alamos was stolen by
the Chinese. In this case, what we did not know has certainly hurt us.
Espionage by definition is not conducted in plain sight. We did not
know that China was obtaining our nuclear secrets from laboratory
employees, and my theory is that we do not know of losses that have
occurred because of the foreign visitor program.
The Government Accounting Office has reported that during the period
1994 through 1996 there were 5,472 visits from sensitive countries to
the three weapons laboratories. Of that number, 2,237 were from Russia;
1,464 were from China; and 814 were from India. That high visitation
rate continues, with Los Alamos recently reporting 1,040 visits from
sensitive countries in 1997 alone.
In view of this high volume of visitation from countries of
proliferation concern, at least one of which has illicitly obtained our
nuclear weapons secrets, I do not think it is inappropriate to place
strict limits on these visitations.
I would point out what has already been pointed out to a lot of the
concerns of our opponents in this matter, that the moratorium imposed
by this amendment would not be permanent, nor would it be absolute. The
amendment provides for waivers by the Secretary of Energy, allowing the
admission to a national laboratory of specific individuals from a
sensitive country if the Secretary determines the visit to be necessary
for the national security interests of the United States.
The amendment also includes a sunset provision that has not been
mentioned which would, under certain conditions, make it possible for
termination of the moratorium within 2 years.
Mr. Chairman, this is a good amendment. It should be adopted.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson).
Mrs. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I find parts of this amendment to be
difficult to understand, at least in the real world and the way the
laboratories operate.
Sandia National Laboratory in my district is a multi-program
laboratory. Yes, it does nuclear defense work, but it also does a whole
lot of other things. This amendment would prohibit foreign visitors
from sensitive countries to any facility on Sandia National
Laboratories, and the only exceptions are for when it is necessary for
national security.
This means we are no longer going to have any foreign visits that
deal with the solar energy farm or the micromachines program or nuclear
fusion or semiconductors or lithography, or a whole range of scientific
developments arrayed with computing.
We need our scientists to be engaged in the most advanced science in
the world, and the reality in this country today is that half of the
graduate students in engineering in American universities are not
American citizens.
We need to stay on the cutting edge of science, and we would make a
mistake if we cut ourselves off from that science.
Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my friend and
distinguished colleague, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Hayes).
(Mr. HAYES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HAYES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment
introduced by my friend, the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun), fellow
member of our Committee on Armed Services. I have the utmost respect
for the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) and Members on that side
of the aisle. I appreciate what is being done by the Cox/Dicks
amendment.
There are many steps in the right direction. My friend, the
gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson) has great concern for her
district, country, and her labs, and she very carefully and
meticulously explained to me her views on the bill. I appreciate her
willingness to talk with me at length about this.
But as I evaluate the situation from my perspective as a member of
the Committee on Armed Services, it is apparent to me that to simply
rely on the Cox/Dicks amendment is a potential underreaction to an
extremely serious situation.
With that in mind, I strongly support the efforts of the gentleman
from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) to put our security first, to put the future
security of our Nation at the absolute top of our priority list. I have
listened to a number of colleagues. The amendment of the gentleman from
Kansas (Mr. Ryun) does nothing but strengthen the recommendations put
forth by the Cox commission.
It is clear from our debate that we are all in agreement over the
seriousness of what is at stake. Events at Los Alamos reflect a
collapse in DOE counterintelligence and a compromise of national
security. Again, the Cox/Dicks amendment is crafted to address these
counterintelligence lapses, and outlines no less than 13 new
initiatives for DOE implementation. This is good.
There is no doubt that the measures, if properly executed, will close
loopholes exploited by Chinese spies. It seems to me, however,
impossible to set in place an extensive, verifiable counterintelligence
system in a mere 90 days.
I would remind my colleagues, and there is not a member in this
Chamber that did not support the Cox/Dicks amendment, that this
amendment establishes three new agencies of counterintelligence
oversight. Do we really believe these new agencies will be operational
in 3 short months? I submit the answer is no.
The gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) is simply providing the DOE
adequate time to ensure that some of America's most sophisticated
technology is safe from foreign espionage. I contend any Member that is
troubled by events at Los Alamos and is interested in legitimate
solutions will support this amendment.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Dicks).
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I very reluctantly rise in opposition to the
Ryun amendment. I want to commend the gentleman for his work on this
issue. He was an early proponent of tightening security at DOE, and his
realization of the problems there have been proven correct.
We attempted in the drafting of the original Dicks amendment to
address the problems he identified and, to a large measure, we were
successful. The Dicks-Ryun amendments are now almost identical except
for one major

[[Page H3973]]

point. However, in my view, this point is a major difference. I must
reluctantly oppose his amendment.
The Ryun amendment, like the Cox/Dicks amendment, imposes a
moratorium on foreign visitors to the dose national laboratories. But
under the Ryun amendment, this moratorium would extend for at least 2
years, regardless of whether or not all possible security measures
needed to protect the labs are in place.
This is a serious concern to me because Ed Curran, chief of
counterintelligence at DOE, assures me that it will not take that long
to fix the problems at the labs. Frankly, I do not think the House
could accept any answer from DOE that said it would take 2 years to fix
these problems. To let problems continue for that long once they have
been identified would be totally unacceptable.
Because the Ryun moratorium would last well after the amount of time
needed to fix the problem, I am concerned that it will actually reduce
the incentive for DOE to react quickly. I believe the amendment of the
gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) will slow down the improvement of
security at DOE.
The Cox/Dicks amendment already adopted by the House provides ample
time for congressional oversight of DOE's changes to security at the
labs, and it provides DOE the incentive to act quickly. I urge Members
to oppose the Ryun amendment.
I just want to underline, our amendment is in place until the
director, Mr. Curran, and the director of the FBI certify to the
president, to the Congress, to the DOE that they have a security
program in place. Then there will be 45 days of congressional review
after that to make certain we agree with that.
But to put a 2-year lock on this thing, as the gentleman from Kansas
(Mr. Ryun) does, will undermine any incentive to act quickly, which is
what we want. We want Richardson, Curran, and Freeh out there
implementing this program as quickly as possible.
I do not think the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) intended this. I
think it is an unintended consequence, but I think it really undermines
our effort to get a quick solution to this problem.
Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from Georgia (Mr. Kingston).
Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
time.
Mr. Chairman, I stand in strong support of the Ryun amendment. This
is a commonsense amendment. To quote the amendment of the gentleman
from Kansas (Mr. Ryun), the letter of June 8, it says his amendment
simply prohibits foreign visitors from sensitive countries, and those
are constituents that are such staunch U.S. allies as China, Cuba,
North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Russia, from entering national laboratories
unless the Secretary of Energy grants a waiver to individuals deemed
necessary to our, the United States', national security.
Frankly, given the track record of this administration, I hate to see
them have the ability to grant waivers. I would love to have some
language in there that said unless they have been giving to the
campaign, but I do not want to go that route.

{time} 1630

I think we have already hashed that out. We know the relationships
that have caused some of these breaches in security. But let us look at
some of the statistics: 742 Chinese scientists visited Los Alamos
National Laboratory, but only 12 were given background checks; 23 Iraqi
and Iranian scientists visited the Sandia National Laboratory, none
were given background checks; 1,110 Russian scientists visited Los
Alamos National Laboratory, yet only 116 were given background checks.
Come on. This is national security. What is it that these people from
sensitive countries offer that people are opposing the Ryun amendment
over? I am not sure. What was it that the scientists from Cuba or North
Korea or Iran or Iraq or Russia gave that we are afraid to give up for
2 years? Really we are not giving it up for 2 years. The Secretary of
Energy would have the right to waive the requirement.
This is a common sense amendment. Our national security has been
breached because of the sloppiness of the current administration. This
tries to correct it. I stand in strong support of the Ryun amendment.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Mrs. Tauscher).
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for yielding
me this time.
Mr. Chairman, when the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) released their report last month,
I feared amendments like this one offered by the gentleman from Kansas
(Mr. Ryun) today.
This amendment is nothing more than a misdirected overreaction.
Instead of making constructive changes to improve our
counterintelligence operations, this amendment blindly cuts off our
labs to foreign scientists, scientists who work in many nonclassified,
nonweapons-oriented areas of the labs.
Specifically, this amendment fails to distinguish between the
smuggling of our classified national secrets by American citizens from
nonclassified disarmament-oriented exchanges with countries such as
Russia.
Among our country's greatest national security threat is the spread
of nuclear chemical and biological weapons. In February I spent a week
in Moscow, meeting with U.S. and Russian scientists who administer
programs designed to stop Russian scientists and their nuclear
materials from going to countries such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.
Given the State of the Russian economy and the fact that Russia's
uranium stockpiles are not locked down, we have no choice but to engage
our Russian counterparts on a scientist-to-scientist level.
The Ryun amendment would end this cooperative effort. It would
prevent Russian scientists from visiting our laboratories for 2 years
and would severely damage U.S.-Russian relations.
Mr. Chairman, for those who are concerned about visits to our
national labs, let me say just this. Earlier today, as part of the Cox
and Dicks amendment, this House took steps that would reasonably
address the need to protect classified materials at our national labs
from foreign visitors.
It would provide for the lifting of a moratorium when DOE's Director
of Counterintelligence, with the concurrence of the FBI Director,
determines that the proper counterintelligence measures are in place.
Let us embrace this measured approach offered by the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks). Let
us reject the reactionary approach before use. Let us not blindly shut
down vital national security programs that have nothing to do with
classified secrets.
Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I have no further speakers, but I
would like to reserve the right to close.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) has the right
to close.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentleman from Kansas
(Mr. Ryun) for the serious work he has done in this effort. It is
certainly rare that I would have a different opinion from my committee
chairman, but I believe that the Cox-Dicks approach is better.
I think it is important for us to focus on the important parts of
these security problems. There has been no indication whatsoever that
the foreign visitor program has been in any way related to any of the
security lapses that we have had at the national laboratories. Now
other things are related, management of DOE and the number of other
areas where more work is required, but not the foreign visitor program.
I would further say that the numbers that we hear talked about do not
really tell us very much. For example, the Governor of California once
called Lawrence Livermore and asked that a busload of Chinese tourists
be able to visit Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and go to the publicly
open museum. Every person on that bus counts as a foreign visitor. I do
not think we wanted to have the Secretary of Energy sign a waiver for
each and every one of those tourists on a bus going to a public
building.

[[Page H3974]]

I think the Cox-Dicks approach is better and ask that this amendment
be defeated.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
(Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I want to repeat the commendation of the
last speaker to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun), because he served
a purpose in raising this issue to the forefront. He caused us to take
what he was proposing, to consider it in depth; and that was the
genesis of the amendment we adopted unanimously today, the Cox-Dicks
amendment.
While it included other things, that was our initial purpose, to take
the foreign visitors program and add strictures to it, but not stifle
it so much that we would literally suffocate and kill it, because this
particular proposal would simply wipe out the foreign visitors program
except for perhaps a few singular individuals who might be certified
into it.
Now, what does that mean? What is the foreign visitors program? The
foreign visitors program exists on reservations like Los Alamos, which
is about the size of the District of Columbia. It is not just some
small laboratory. It is a huge complex of facilities, an enormous site.
It includes secure areas to which they do not have access and lots of
other areas and labs and work spaces.
It would include an Israeli scientist there working on solar energy,
a Swedish chemist who has come to work on plutonium issues, because
there is a lot we still do not know about plutonium. The Swedish
chemist, an actual case, is one of the world's experts. We need his
insights and advice into the nature of plutonium, how it ages and what
its effects are.
It includes lots of foreign citizens who will soon be American
citizens who post-doc'd from American universities and are working
there, working at Los Alamos, or Livermore. They are the scientific
talent of the present or the future.
It includes a lot of Russians and lab-to-lab exchanges. Why are they
there? Their knowledge is just about on parity with us anyway, but it
is reciprocal. We do not talk a lot about this. That is part of the Cox
report that was not published. We have gained a great deal through
these exchanges. That reciprocity has enhanced our knowledge of what
they are doing and enabled us to get a better grip on the spread or
misuse of nuclear materials and nuclear devices.
It could include IAEA trainees, because this is the perfect place to
come where the knowledge resides. It could include nonnuclear
exchanges. As the gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson) stated,
lots of other things have nothing to do with nuclear weapons,
lithography for inscribing ships, for example, micromachinery, and
stuff like that.
We will wipe out this program. Why is it important? Why does it have
to occur at the labs? We set it up years ago when we created the
stockpiles stewardship program so that we could have at these labs,
which are national treasure houses, scientific talent that is second to
none, so that we could attract excellent scientists there and maintain
our excellence in nuclear weapons.
This is an important program. The strictures we need for the security
and counterintelligence have already been passed and put into effect by
the Cox-Dicks amendment. This is not necessary. In fact, it is a
dangerous precedent.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member
for yielding me this time, and I certainly thank the gentleman from
Kansas (Mr. Ryun) for his leadership on these important issues.
Mr. Chairman, we have been through some troubling times. We have been
sometimes amazed, sometimes fearful, and sometimes deliberating what
can we do to protect the national security issues of this government,
and how can we combine that with the necessities of research and
collaboration and our own intrinsic spirit of a country that welcomes
those into our borders.
I believe there is good intent behind this particular amendment, but
I rise in opposition because of the importance of our national labs and
the relevance that they have to part of the collaborative effort we
have on very important research.
While the intent of preserving our national security secrets is one
that I am committed to accomplishing and will be supporting several
amendments dealing with the recent incident that we had in our national
labs, I feel that this amendment imposes an unnecessary burden on the
ability of our national labs to function.
In fact, we have already addressed many of these issues. The Cox-
Dicks amendment gives DOE incentive to rapidly fix security problems.
Under the Ryun amendment DOE has a 2-year moratorium, no matter what
they do, because they are forbidding those who are foreign nationals
from even coming near our national labs.
I think the American ingenuity is better than that. I think we are
smart people. I think we can address this question right now; and we
can not or will not, by addressing it right now, prohibit the
collaborative research that is important by most of those who come to
our national labs, who have no intent of spying.
We had a terrible series of events which have been noted by the Cox-
Dicks report, started under Republican administrations, continued under
Democratic administrations, went under a Republican administration.
There is no one that can claim that one party over another has not had
some responsibility for what has happened.
I would ask we vote down the Ryun amendment and support the measures
that have already been done and support the Department of Energy's
works that they have already begun to do, and make sure that we
continue in the attitude that we have that good research is good and
spying is bad.
Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of the Chair how much
time is remaining on both sides, please.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) has 2\1/2\ minutes
remaining. The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) has 3\1/2\ minutes
remaining.
Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman
from Kansas (Mr. Tiahrt), my friend and colleague.
Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Kansas for
yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, it is apparent that the Department of Energy has no
culture for keeping secrets. They keep secrets about like a sieve holds
water. Personally, I think that we should move all nuclear functions
from the Department of Energy to the Department of Defense under
civilian control. At least in the Department of Defense we have a
culture for keeping secrets, a culture for protecting our Nation's
secrets.
Now, what is being asked by the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) is
not outside the realm of possibility. It is a very reasonable
consideration, a small step in the giant trip we need to take towards
recovering our Nation's secrets and putting into place a system that
would prevent them from being lost in the future.
We simply have a counterintelligence function being put in place, a
2-year moratorium, and start the process of protecting the secrets that
our country has invested billions of dollars in developing, and the
loss of our secrets places our Nation in jeopardy. Our children's
safety is very important to us. Whether they are in school or on the
streets, it is important.
The Ryun amendment is a good first step, and I would encourage my
colleagues to vote for it.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\3/4\ minutes to the gentleman
from Arkansas (Mr. Snyder).
Mr. SNYDER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment of
the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun), my friend and personal hero.
A year ago, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry) and I traveled
to Russia and visited several classified Russian nuclear labs. While we
were there, we saw a demonstration, a cooperative venture that was set
up between Sandia lab back in the United States and Russia.
We actually looked on TV screens and were looking at this Sandia lab.
It was an experiment on how to most efficiently control nuclear
materials, how

[[Page H3975]]

to most efficiently verify that respective Nations are following treaty
requirements.
What will happen if this amendment passes? First of all, there will
be retaliation. Any nation that is on this sensitive nations list, they
are going to retaliate against us. Of course, they are not going to let
people like the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry) and I continue to
visit their complexes.
Second, the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) a while ago gave a
list of the nations that are on the list of sensitive countries, and he
mentioned Cuba and Algeria. I mean, who can complain about not letting
Cuban baseball players into our nuclear facilities?
The problem is that is an incomplete list. The list I received from
staff also mentions that are on the list of sensitive countries,
Israel, Taiwan, India, Pakistan. Surely we would all acknowledge that
these are countries that we do have need for cooperative scientific
venture even in some classified areas.
The third point I would make is that this amendment is too broad. The
specific language puts this 2-year moratorium on ``any facility of a
national laboratory.''
Now, the doctor in me, when I hear the word ``laboratory,'' I think
it talks about some one little small space or one room. These
laboratories, like Sandia lab, Los Alamos, are large, sprawling, many,
many acres, many, many buildings, doing all kinds of work with all
kinds of different scientists, much of which is not classified.
We would be cutting off all of this material and all of those
opportunities by passing this amendment.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Costello).
(Mr. COSTELLO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Missouri for
yielding me this time, and I rise in opposition to the Ryun amendment.
I rise today in strong opposition to the Ryun amendment.
Last month Congressman Nethercutt offered an amendment to the DOE
authorization bill in the Science Committee that would have imposed a
moratorium on the Department of Energy's foreign visitor program. I
amended Mr. Nethercutt's amendment to include a sunset provision. My
amendment was unanimously accepted.
I offered my amendment in the Science Committee because I am very
concerned about national security at our labs. My amendment called for
a moratorium on foreign visitors from sensitive countries to all labs
when the visit is to a classified facility, and topics involve export
control and nonproliferation. However, it included a
1. Waiver of the moratorium on visits related to the U.S.-Russia
nonproliferation programs that are important to our national security.
2. Similar to the bipartisan bill passed by the Senate Intelligence
Committee, the Secretary can issue waivers as long as the Secretary
reports to Congress within 30 days.
3. Contained a sunset to the moratorium. After all applicable
portions of the Presidential Decision Directive 61 are in place,
additional counterintelligence, safeguards and security measures
announced by Secretary Richardson are in place and that DOE's current
export controls on nonproliferation that govern foreign visits is in
place.
4. Annual report by DOE and FBI to Congress assessing security at
each lab.
Mr. Ryun's amendment would effectively kill several important
security programs at the DOE labs including the nonproliferation
programs that are so important to our national security.
I went before the Rules Committee to offer my amendment that was
unanimously passed by the full Science Committee, however, my amendment
was not made in order. Therefore, I will vote against the Ryun
amendment and urge my colleagues to also vote against the amendment.

{time} 1645

Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my
time.
Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, the current administration has used
words like unnecessary, overdramatize, and overreaction when discussing
this legislation that tightens security at our nuclear labs.
Security at the Department of Energy nuclear laboratories has been a
systematic problem for over two decades. To blame one agency, one
administration, or one individual would certainly be inappropriate.
However, the discovery of all the thefts that have taken place in our
most sensitive secrets does indeed warrant prompt and decisive action.
The recent security proposals by the Department of Energy will leave
visitors from China, Iran, Iraq, and Russia, many of these sensitive
countries, back in the status quo. Congress must enter in and make the
change so that we no longer have the status quo.
I ask that my colleagues vote in support of this amendment and in
support of the chairman, the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox), who
intends to vote ``yes''.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Pallone).
Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment
offered by the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun). This amendment could
have the potentially destructive effect of cutting off important
exchanges for 2 years between American scientists and their
counterparts from other countries.
The amendment attempts to respond to compromises to our national
security with regard to the People's Republic of China, obviously, a
worthy goal, but it goes too far, extending the moratorium for 2 years
instead of the 90 days specified in the Cox-Dicks amendment.
The sensitive country list, as has been mentioned, includes many
friends of the United States, including Israel. The list includes most
of the former Soviet republics, including countries like Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia that are part of NATO's Partnership For Peace,
and whose presidents took part in the recent 50th anniversary
celebrations for NATO here in Washington. It includes India, the
world's largest democracy. The stated reason for putting India on the
list is it has not yet signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. But
it needs to be made clear that India's nuclear program is an indigenous
one, developed by India's own scientists.
Export controls on supercomputers and other dual-use technologies
have been in effect against India for years, forcing India to develop
its own highly advanced R&D infrastructure. There is no evidence or
even suggestion that India has been involved in the kinds of espionage
activities that have been documented with regard to China.
And we must be careful not to cut off scientific exchanges for as
long as 2 years. And I know, Mr. Chairman, there is a waiver provision
for national security reasons, but I would suggest that that is a very
difficult test. Experience shows these types of waivers are rarely
used.
And I just want to say that I agree that China's espionage activities
should cause us to be more vigilant, but the Cox-Dicks amendment
addresses many of these concerns, including a much more measured
approach to dealing with the Department of Energy's foreign visitors
program. So I think that for that reason we should oppose this
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas
(Mr. Ryun).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) will
be postponed.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8, printed
in House Report 106-175.

Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Gilman

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Part A amendment No. 8 offered by the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Gilman):
At the end of title XII (page 317, after line 17), insert
the following new section:

SEC. 1206. RESOURCES FOR EXPORT LICENSE FUNCTIONS.

(a) Office of Defense Trade Controls.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall take the
necessary steps to ensure that, in any fiscal year, adequate
resources are allocated to the functions of the Office of

[[Page H3976]]

Defense Trade Controls of the Department of State relating to
the review and processing of export license applications so
as to ensure that those functions are performed in a thorough
and timely manner.
(2) Availability of existing appropriations.--The Secretary
of State shall take the necessary steps to ensure that those
funds made available under the heading ``Administration of
Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic and Consular Programs'' in title
IV of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, as
contained in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277)
are made available, upon the enactment of this Act, to the
Office of Defense Trade Controls of the Department of State
to carry out the purposes of the Office.
(b) Defense Threat Reduction Agency.--The Secretary of
Defense shall take the necessary steps to ensure that, in any
fiscal year, adequate resources are allocated to the
functions of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the
Department of Defense relating to the review of export
license applications so as to ensure that those functions are
performed in a thorough and timely manner.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Gilman) and a Member opposed each will control 10
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to join with the distinguished chairman of
the Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr.
Spence), in offering an amendment which requires the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that adequate resources are
allocated to the Office of Defense Trade Controls and the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency for the purpose of reviewing and processing
export license applications.
The Office of Defense Trade Controls, the ODTC, within the Department
of State, currently processes about 45,000 licenses each year, which is
nearly four times what the Bureau of Export Administration in the
Department of Commerce deals with, with only one-fourth of the
personnel.
With the transfer in jurisdiction of satellites and related
technology from the commodity control list to the munitions list, ODTC
will be taxed even greater to meet its obligations to review and
process munition licenses as well as meeting its mandate to ensure
compliance with our export control laws. That is why the gentleman from
South Carolina (Mr. Spence) and I worked together to ensure that last
year's Omnibus Appropriations Act contained $2 million for the Office
of Defense Trade Controls to carry out its responsibilities.
Regrettably, the State Department has refused to allocate the
necessary funds to ODTC. Therefore, additional language was placed in
last month's emergency supplemental as report language directing State
to provide the monies that are needed. The State Department still
refuses to provide all of the $2 million to ODTC, citing other pressing
needs. Given the State Department's refusal to provide these needed
funds, this amendment directs the Secretary of State to provide the
balance of the funds needed to ODTC.
This amendment ensures that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency is
going to be adequately resourced by the Department of Defense.
Accordingly, I urge support for this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from South Carolina (Mr. Spence), the chairman of the Committee on
Armed Services.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Gilman) and myself would require both the Secretary of State and
Secretary of Defense to provide sufficient resources to the offices
within their respective departments that are responsible for reviewing
and processing export license applications, as the gentleman from New
York has said. This is premised on the strong belief that review of the
export licenses should be carried out in a thorough and timely manner.
This amendment builds upon the provision in last year's Defense
Authorization Act that transfers licensing jurisdiction for the export
of United States satellites from the Commerce Department back to the
State Department. Last year's legislation also mandated a greater
Defense Department role in ensuring that sophisticated military-related
technology is not inappropriately transferred to dangerous countries
and countries of proliferation concern.
Mr. Chairman, this is a common sense amendment that simply requires
both secretaries to commit sufficient resources to carry out their
department's licensing activities. In particular, it calls on the
Secretary of State to immediately allocate those funds provided last
year for this purpose. As the Cox report indicated, the relaxation of
export controls on sensitive dual-use technologies has had a
devastating consequence for United States national security. Combined
with the actions taken by the Congress last year to tighten our export
control process, this amendment will help to see to it that American
national security interests are protected.
The amendment's requirement that all export license reviews be
carried out in a timely manner addresses industry's concerns regarding
possible delays in the licensing process.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Gilman).
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed
in House Report 106-175.

Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Part A amendment No. 9 offered by Mr. Weldon of
Pennsylvania:
At the end of title IX (page 265, after line 11), insert
the following new section:

SEC. 910. DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY ENHANCEMENT.

(a) Reorganization of Technology Security Functions of
Department of Defense.--The Secretary of Defense shall
establish the Technology Security Directorate of the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency as a separate Defense Agency named
the Defense Technology Security Agency. The Agency shall be
under the authority, direction, and control of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy.
(b) Director.--The Director of the Defense Technology
Security Agency shall also serve as Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Technology Security Policy.
(c) Functions.--The Director shall advise the Secretary of
Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, through the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, on policy issues
related to the transfer of strategically sensitive
technology, including the following:
(1) Strategic trade.
(2) Defense cooperative programs.
(3) Science and technology agreements and exchanges.
(4) Export of munitions items.
(5) International Memorandums of Understanding.
(6) Industrial base and competitiveness concerns.
(7) Foreign acquisitions.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and a Member opposed each will control 10
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon).
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as
I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I think this amendment and the one that will follow are
noncontroversial amendments. I have discussed them with my colleagues
on the other side. I have discussed them with the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Dicks), the ranking member on the Select Committee on
U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the
People's Republic of China.
My colleagues, these are perfecting amendments to try to deal with
the internal operations of DOD to make sure that we have in place the
appropriate role for our agency personnel who are charged with the
responsibility of monitoring input on potential technology transfers in
licensing so that we have maximum effort available to raise the

[[Page H3977]]

potential threats that these technologies might bring to bear on the
U.S. This change would take DTSA and the Technology Security
Directorate out from under the control of DTRA, which is the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, and allow it to operate as a separate entity.
The reason why this is important is that in a reorganization that
occurred in the fall of last year, DTSA was placed under the
acquisition side of the Department of Defense, thereby providing undue
influence on those technical people whose job it is to monitor
technologies that, in fact, may be requested for licensing.
It is true that the DTSA organization also reports to the policy side
of the Department of Defense, but there is a conflict in that dual
reporting relationship. What we simply do with this amendment is have
DTSA report directly to the policy side alone so that the technical
people in DTSA, who are those that are best able to make key decisions
relative to technology licensing in exports to the upper levels of the
Pentagon, so they can have the appropriate response for the decision-
making process involving Commerce and State on technologies that in
fact may be exported.
It is a technical amendment, but it is one that I think is consistent
with what was done by the Select Committee on U.S. National Security
and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China.
It is consistent with the goals and objectives of the chairman and the
ranking member, and I ask my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Does any Member claim time in opposition to the
amendment? If not, all time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon).
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10 printed
in House Report 106-175.

Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Part A amendment No. 10 offered by Mr. Weldon of
Pennsylvania:
At the end of title XII (page 317, after line 17), insert
the following new section:

SEC. 1206. NATIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT OF EXPORT LICENSES.

(a) Report to Congress.--The Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall provide to
Congress a report assessing the cumulative impact of
individual licenses granted by the United States for exports,
goods, or technology to countries of concern.
(b) Contents of Report.--Each report under subsection (a)
shall include an assessment of--
(1) the cumulative impact of exports of technology on
improving the military capabilities of countries of concern;
(2) the impact of exports of technology which would be
harmful to United States military capabilities, as well as
countermeasures necessary to overcome the use of such
technology; and
(3) those technologies, systems, and components which have
applications to conventional military and strategic
capabilities.
(c) Timing of Reports.--The first report under subsection
(a) shall be submitted to Congress not later than 1 year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall assess
the cumulative impact of exports to countries of concern in
the previous 5-year period. Subsequent reports under
subsection (a) shall be submitted to Congress at the end of
each 1-year period after the submission of the first report.
Each such subsequent report shall include an assessment of
the cumulative impact of technology exports based on analyses
contained in previous reports under this section.
(d) Support of Other Federal Agencies.--The Secretary of
Commerce, the Secretary of State, and the heads of other
departments and agencies shall make available to the
Secretary of Defense information necessary to carry out this
section, including information on export licensing.
(e) Definition.--As used in this section, the term
``country of concern'' means--
(1) a country the government of which the Secretary of
State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979 or other applicable law, to
have repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism; and
(2) a country on the list of covered countries under
section 1211(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1998 (50 U.S.C. app. 2404 note).

{time} 1700

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as
I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I will also make this brief. This is also
noncontroversial. This also is an outgrowth of the Cox committee and a
recommendation that I brought forward because of the findings that we
made in looking at the damage done to our security.
We came to a bipartisan conclusion that U.S. international export
control regimes have actually facilitated China's efforts to obtain
militarily useful technology. And, therefore, what this amendment does
is, I think, go a long way toward addressing the problem of monitoring
what countries like China are attempting to acquire by ensuring that an
annual comprehensive assessment of export licenses to countries of
concern be prepared by the Department of Defense.
In other words, when an export license is granted to what we call a
tier-three country, which is a country that the State Department
identifies as one that is a potential threat to us, or when an export
license is given perhaps to a country listed as a terrorist state,
there is no requirement today that there is a process in place to
monitor the cumulative effect of those licenses.
What my amendment says is that the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has to submit to the
Congress an annual report. That annual report will reveal to us the
cumulative impact of individual exports to countries of concern. It
does not say that any action will occur in a negative sense. It simply
provides for the Congress to be given an annual report by DOD of these
exports.
I think it is a common sense amendment. It will increase our
effectiveness in this area. I would ask my colleagues to support this.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment,
and I yield myself such time as I may consume. I do so to ask my friend
some questions.
I am sure that his intentions are very solid, but my question on the
wording of the amendment is that, what if they do the study and they
find out it has actually aided America's defense? Are they allowed to
record that?
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEJDENSON. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, that would be fine. That
would be outstanding, and we would be happy to receive that report.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, as I understand the
language, I do not have it in front of me, it says to report the
adverse impacts of international trade in high-technology items.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will
continue to yield, actually, if he will real my amendment, he will see
that section 2 says ``the impacts of exports of technology which would
be harmful.'' It says, ``which would be harmful.''
Mr. GEJDENSON. Right. So in that, would it be okay, for the record,
if they assess something and they found out it would be helpful?
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to accept
that.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, excellent.
Let me just say again, we have taken a spying case that started in
the 1980s and we are trying in the process, I am fearful, of destroying
the future economic and military strength of the country.
All these amendments are well-intentioned. But the reality is that
most of this technology is not exclusively American, that American
industry that has led the world with modern technology will not
continue to do so if we unilaterally stop selling things, especially
when they are generally available.
There are tens of companies that have most of these products. And if
we

[[Page H3978]]

continue to look through this in the same way we looked at machined
tools, we will do to the computer industry and to other high-tech
industries what we did to the machine tool industry.
Some of the same Members here would not allow American machine tool
companies to sell abroad for fear it would end up in Russia's hands.
What happened? The American machine tool industry continued to degrade
to the point where the Defense Department wanted Japanese machines. And
when the Soviets in those days were looking for a machine tool to
create the kind of quality they needed for their submarine program,
they bought a Toshiba.
So let us not sit here and believe that we exist in a vacuum of total
control of this technology. What we are going to set up with this
stampede before any of the committees of jurisdiction have dealt with
the issues is create the only restrictive process in the world. None of
our allies are with us. They are selling everything they can to
everybody who will put money on the table. And we are about to restrict
things that are not in our national interest.
We need to deal with choke-point technologies. We need to deal with
fissionable material, chemical and biological weapons, not with every
piece of technology that leaves this country. And it seems to me that
unless we calm down here a bit, we are going to do fundamental damage
to a critical industry for the future of this country.
The choice is ours. Are we going to continue to add these amendments
whose cumulative weight will create an export licensing process so
complex that no one will believe America is a reliable supplier?
And again, these are not generally technologies that we hold
unilaterally. These are technologies that exist all across the planet.
Other countries, other companies have them.
I will close with this: In the early days of this Clinton
administration, they were refusing a license for telephone switches to
China. These switches operated at 565. And so, I took a look at that.
And again, I am saying none of these things are made in my district, to
my dismay, but this is an American product by AT&T. It was a 565
switch.
The Clinton administration refused to sell it. The Chinese made their
own 565s. So we forced them to create a competitive technology. And a
third country sold them 625 switches even faster. We have to understand
the reality of the world and what really helps us.
The mistakes we have to date I think are clearly of the kind that
this new approach will only exacerbate. Do not try to cast the wide
net. Focus on the critical technologies, on things that are fundamental
to weapons and other secrets that are critical to national security.
Trying to have this broad net across the globe on computers when a
Sony Playstation, our kids' Sony version of Nintendo, operates at a
greater speed than what we consider a super computer today is
unachievable. It will only have one result. It will not increase
national security. It will do damage to America's forward-looking
industries.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as
I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I was not going to do this but I cannot let those
comments go unanswered. Here is a chart that I prepared, starting in
1993 until 1999. This chart has been made available to every one of my
colleagues; and for the past two nights, I have done one-hour special
orders here each night in detail about these charts. I cannot go
through all of that today, but I would encourage my colleagues to read
what I said and then come on the floor and dispute what I have said.
These charts were prepared by employees of the Federal Government
that I have been working with from those agencies whose responsibility
has been to monitor our technology, not to stop it, as the gentleman is
trying to say, but to monitor it, so the DOD has at least the ability
to know what it is we are selling.
Now, let us look at what has happened. And why did I pick 1993? Was
it because Bill Clinton was elected? No. It is because in 1993 this
administration decided to end COCOM.
COCOM was a process that was in place with our allied nations to
monitor technology to make sure that in fact that technology, if it was
going to be sold, we would understand the implications. This
administration ended it. And I do not want to hear that it was started
by the Bush administration.

Our Select Committee on China went into detail. We called in the
witnesses. The final decision and the ultimate demise was, by this
administration, they replaced it with something called Wassenaar, which
is a total and complete failure. It has done nothing to stop technology
or to give us the ability to monitor it.
Look at what happened since this administration ended COCOM. Each of
these red dots are decisions that we took unilaterally to allow
technology to flow overseas.
Now, in the case of high-performance computers, let us take that for
a moment. Because the story is, well, every nation builds them today.
Wait a minute. Up until 1995, only two countries built them, Japan and
the U.S. There was an unwritten understanding between Japan and the
U.S. that neither country would export high-performance computers to
tier-three countries. We unilaterally ended that. We did it.
DTSA, the agency that I just talked about, said that is a bad
decision. The administration said, we do not care. We are going to sell
these computers anyplace. Within 2 years, China had acquired 350 high-
performance computers.
What is the industry saying today? Oh, Japan is selling these. We
have to compete with them. Well, why are they selling them? Because our
Government stripped away the process, stripped away the process to
allow the input by defense experts on the implications of these
technology transfers.
Now, I cannot help it if my colleague does not believe employees of
his administration. That is where I got this information from. But it
goes beyond that also during this time period. These are export
violations by this administration that occurred by China that this
administration ignored and did not impose sanctions required under arms
control regimes.
Where did these technologies go? They did not go to normal countries.
They went to Libya. They went to Iraq. They went to Iran. They went to
North Korea. This administration ignored the violations. This
administration 20 times in the last 7 years, when we caught these
violations occurring, said, we are not going to do anything because we
do not want to upset our relationship with China. This combination of
factors, along with these numerous visits by Chinese influence
peddlers.
I wish my Democrat constituents could visit the President 12 times in
one year like John Huang did. I wish my constituents could have
personal meetings with President Clinton 12 times in one year to
influence peddle. But my constituents do not have that opportunity.
So when the gentleman says we are going too far, I say to the
gentleman, we had a 9-0 vote in the China committee for recommendations
to improve our security. It was this administration who removed the
laboratory security color coding at our Federal labs in 1993.
It was Hazel O'Leary who removed the FBI background checks in 1993.
It was Hazel O'Leary who overruled Lawrence Livermore Laboratory when
they caught a retired employee giving classified information, and she
reinstated. And it was Hazel O'Leary in 1995 who gave the design for
the W-87 warhead to U.S. News and World Report the same year they said
we caught China.
This administration has been the problem with export policy, and we
are trying to make some modest changes sensitive to the concerns of
business to allow us to get a control on what it is we are selling. We
are not trying to hurt business.
I will put my record against that of the gentleman on free market
support of our business any day of the week. For him to stand up here
and say we are trying to hurt our business is nothing less, in my
opinion, than totally distorting our reputation and what we support.
We are concerned about America's security, and we are concerned about
giving our employees in the Defense Department the chance to have input
into what is happening.

[[Page H3979]]

I wish the gentleman on the Committee on International Affairs would
have done more on the elimination of COCOM or the other things that
occurred over the past several years that this administration gave away
the complete ability of our country to monitor the kinds of technology
that we are selling. Because if we would have stopped these things, we
would not have had to have a China commission, we would not have had to
have a Cox committee. But none of those things occurred.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Hawaii.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, I ask the gentleman, would it be fair
to characterize some of the discussion that took place in the Committee
on Armed Services since 1993 as addressing some of the very problems
that the gentleman has outlined in that chart?
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time,
absolutely. And the gentleman and my friend was in the leadership in
some of those debates.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield further,
has it not been a topic of discussion among Democrats and Republicans
that these questions that have been raised and which are addressed in
the amendments now before us have been, if anything, stated in just as
strong if not stronger terms in trying to deal with the question of
technology transfer in the security interests of this Nation?
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely. And Democrats have been on
the forefront of that in this body, as have Republicans. Our battle has
not been within this Congress.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And would it not be fair to say that the question we
had in the Committee on Armed Services was as to whether the Commerce
Department was the best area to be making decisions with respect to
national security interests of this country and technology transfer?
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And so, I think it would be also fair to indicate
that these two amendments that appear before us today, if anything,
would be characterized by individuals on the Committee on Armed
Services, such as myself, as possibly being even a little light in
terms of what we might reasonably expect to impose given the sorry
record that has appeared before us over the last 6 years.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I would say the gentleman
is correct.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, some interesting things have been said, not all of them
completely accurate. And I am sure it is unintentional.
The reality is that COCOM died and it died for a very simple reason.
None of our European, Japanese, and other partners would sit by any of
the rules. Even when we had the Soviet Union, we could not get the
French, Germans, and others to restrict sales.
Once the Soviet Union fell apart, in 1991, not when Bill Clinton got
to be President, but in 1991, COCOM stopped functioning. And the reason
there is not a COCOM today is because we cannot get an agreement from
any of our allies or former members of COCOM on any restrictions
whatsoever. The most that they are willing to do is to have their own
set of rules essentially.
So they can dream about blaming Bill Clinton for everything, even
when he wins. They can use his name here on a regular basis as some
kind of scoundrel. But the reality is, in 1991, when he was not
President, COCOM already stopped working.

{time} 1715

What he tried to do with a follow-on organization is try to get our
allies to have some semblance of a united position on exports. He has
not been able to do it. The next President will not be able to do it.
And not if the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) were the
President would he be able to do it because the Europeans will not
enter into that agreement with us.
Supercomputers, the Bulgarians made supercomputers when they were
still communists. It is impossible to think that we are somehow going
to strengthen America's security by degrading the industries that are
giving us a new generation of computers every 6 months. So what you are
going to do is, you are going to try to slow this process down. When a
shelf life of a product is 6 months, you have basically disposed of
that product's value.
When we look at where the future is, the future is very clear. The
societies that take advantage of their leads and invest in future
research and development will be the societies that succeed. American
industry is not always right but in this area they are and the
gentleman is wrong. American industry is competing globally. There are
competitors making high speed computers and others of these products
across the globe. And in every system, the present system and the
previous system, the Defense Department was at the table. But if you
ask people whose sole responsibility is defense, I guess they would not
sell grain, they would not sell cars, they would not sell anything,
because in some way that does assist your adversary.
Mr. Chairman, if we do not develop the technology for the future, we
will be begging the Japanese or the Germans to sell us the computers we
need and then tell me about American national security, when we no
longer make the best in this country. It happened in electronics, it
happened in machine tools, and with this kind of attitude, it is going
to happen in the most forward industry we have had in this country in
some time, in telecommunication and computers.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance
of my time.
In closing, the gentleman would make a fine fantasy writer for
fantasy books. We are dealing in substance here. There have been
serious security concerns brought before this Congress by nine of the
most solid Members of this institution, four members of the Democrat
Party who I have the highest respect for, who understand security
issues and understand the implications of them and do not get on this
floor and rail with a bunch of uninformed and unbacked-up rhetoric
about what we are trying to do. This is a serious issue that deserves a
serious response. This amendment takes that step. I would encourage and
ask my colleagues to support this bipartisan effort to provide one more
tool to allow us to monitor our technology before it is sold to a rogue
nation or a terrorist state.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon).
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Ryun of Kansas

The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) on
which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes
prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 159,
noes 266, not voting 9, as follows:

[Roll No. 181]

AYES--159

Aderholt
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Bartlett
Barton
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Blunt
Bonilla
Bono
Bryant
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Camp
Campbell
Cannon
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Cooksey
Cox
Crane
Cubin
Cunningham
Deal
DeLay
DeMint
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Duncan
Everett
Fletcher
Fossella
Franks (NJ)
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Granger
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill (MT)
Hilleary
Hoekstra
Hostettler
Hulshof

[[Page H3980]]

Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Isakson
Istook
Jenkins
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Kelly
King (NY)
Kingston
LaHood
Latham
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
McCollum
McInnis
McKeon
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Myrick
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Packard
Paul
Pease
Peterson (MN)
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Portman
Radanovich
Ramstad
Reynolds
Riley
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Sununu
Sweeney
Talent
Tancredo
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thune
Tiahrt
Toomey
Traficant
Upton
Walden
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Wu
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOES--266

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baird
Baker
Baldacci
Baldwin
Barrett (NE)
Barrett (WI)
Bass
Bateman
Becerra
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bishop
Blagojevich
Bliley
Blumenauer
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonior
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Burr
Calvert
Canady
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson
Castle
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Combest
Condit
Conyers
Cook
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Crowley
Cummings
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (VA)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Dreier
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fowler
Frank (MA)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gonzalez
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hill (IN)
Hilliard
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoeffel
Holden
Holt
Hooley
Horn
Houghton
Hoyer
Inslee
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
John
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Klink
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kucinich
Kuykendall
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Largent
Larson
LaTourette
Lee
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCrery
McDermott
McGovern
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nethercutt
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Ose
Owens
Oxley
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Phelps
Pickett
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Rahall
Rangel
Regula
Reyes
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Salmon
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Schaffer
Schakowsky
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sherman
Shows
Simpson
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Stark
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Thurman
Tierney
Towns
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Vitter
Walsh
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (PA)
Wexler
Weygand
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn

NOT VOTING--9

Brown (CA)
Ewing
Hinchey
Kasich
Luther
McHugh
Quinn
Sherwood
Waters

{time} 1741

Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. ABERCROMBIE, Ms. BERKLEY, Mr.
BRADY of Texas and Mr. OWENS changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. WALDEN of Oregon and Mr. HULSHOF changed their vote from ``no''
to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
(By unanimous consent Mr. Skelton was allowed to speak out of order).

Announcement of Agreement by Military Forces of Yugoslavia to Withdraw
From Kosovo Within 11 Days

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief.
Some in the House may know this, but many may not:
Secretary of Defense Cohen just a few moments ago announced that
there is a withdrawal agreement by the military forces of Yugoslavia
back to Serbia, and the agreement is that they will be completely out
of Kosovo in 11 days.
I thought the House should know that.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider Amendment No. 11 printed
in House Report 106-175.
The Chair understands that it will not be offered.
It is now in order to consider Amendment No. 12 printed in the House
Report 106- 175.

Amendment No. 12 Offered by Mr. DeLay

Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Part A amendment No. 12 offered by Mr. DeLay:
Strike section 1203 (page 310, line 22 through page 314,
line 7) and insert the following:

SEC. 1203. LIMITATION ON MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGES WITH
CHINA'S PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY.

(a) Limitation.--The Secretary of Defense may not authorize
any military-to-military exchange or contact described in
subsection (b) to be conducted by the Armed Forces with
representatives of the People's Liberation Army of the
People's Republic of China.
(b) Covered Exchanges and Contacts.--Subsection (a) applies
to any military-to-military exchange or contact that includes
any of the following:
(1) Force projection operations.
(2) Nuclear operations.
(3) Field operations.
(4) Logistics.
(5) Chemical and biological defense and other capabilities
related to weapons of mass destruction.
(6) Surveillance, and reconnaissance operations.
(7) Joint warfighting experiments and other activities
related to warfare.
(8) Military space operations.
(9) Other warfighting capabilities of the Armed Forces.
(10) Arms sales or military-related technology transfers.
(11) Release of classified or restricted information.
(12) Access to a Department of Defense laboratory.
(c) Exceptions.--Subsection (a) does not apply to any
search and rescue exercise or any humanitarian exercise.
(d) Certification by Secretary.--The Secretary of Defense
shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate
and the Committee on Armed Service of the House of
Representatives, not later than December 31 of each year, a
certification in writing as to whether or not any military-
to-miltary exchange or contact during that calandar year was
conducted in violation of subsection (a).
(e) Annual Report.--Not later than June 1 each year, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed
Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Service of
the House of Representatives a report providing the
Secretary's assessment of the current state of military-to-
military contacts with the People's Liberation Army. The
report shall include the following:
(1) A summary of all such military-to-military contacts
during the period since the last such report, including a
summary of topics discussed and questions asked by the
Chinese participants in those contacts.
(2) A description of the military-to-military contacts
scheduled for the next 12-month period and a five-year plan
for those contacts.
(3) The Secretary's assessment of the benefits the Chinese
expect to gain from those military-to-military contacts.
(4) The Secretary's assessment of the benefits the
Department of Defense expects to gain from those military-to-
military contacts.
(5) The Secretary's assessment of how military-to-military
contacts with the People's Liberation Army fit into the
larger security relationship between United States and the
People's Republic of China.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. DeLay) and a Member opposed each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay).

{time} 1745.

Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today to offer an amendment to bar the United
States from training the Communist Chinese military. Now, at first this
amendment may sound unnecessary, especially after all the revelations
about the Red

[[Page H3981]]

Chinese spying that was found in the Cox report. It seems almost crazy
to even suggest that the American government might tutor its ambitious
nemesis in military strategy, but that is exactly what the United
States Department of Defense under Bill Clinton has planned.
Unless this Congress acts to stop it, the Pentagon will go ahead with
military to military exchanges and other sensitive information sharing
with the People's Liberation Army. Such cooperation between American
and Red Chinese Armed Forces has been both hot and cold for the better
part of two decades. President Bush ended military exercises 10 years
ago after the communist government violently suppressed the peaceful
protest for democracy in Tiananmen Square. But consistent with his
administration's habitual appeasement of Communist China, President
Clinton jump-started American cooperation with the PLA soon after
taking office in 1993. The imbalance in these so-called exchanges is
extreme and predictably benefits the PRC.
Just this year, more than 80 cooperative military contacts were
planned between the U.S. and Red China. Proposals for these training
exercises include American operation on advice from Special Forces
units, from the Navy Seals, the Army Green Berets and the Air Force.
Last December a ship from Communist China participated for the first
time ever in complex exercises with America in Hong Kong. Plans were
hatched this year for the PLA to engage in Code Thunder, the largest
U.S. Air Force exercise in the Pacific, and, remarkably, the United
States Army has already hosted communist troops for training exercises,
and it just recently squelched a visit by PLA observers to view the
entire American air and infantry divisions that were practicing at the
Army's National Training Center.
Such suicidal national behavior has to come to an end. The role of
our military is to defend America from hostile foreign powers, not to
train them. This amendment protects the American military from its own
expertise.
The United States has the most sophisticated military equipment in
the world, bar none. Rogue nations and other aggressors are permanently
discouraged from wreaking havoc around the globe because they fear the
wrath of American retaliation.
One key to this influence is our unmatched technological and
strategic supremacy. Why on earth would we want to share our most
valuable secrets with any nation, let alone a potential aggressor? The
Cox report went into painful detail about the extent to which our
arsenals have already been compromised to Communist China. The massive
depth of the PRC's operation to infiltrate American security should
teach us many lessons about our relationship with the growing power in
Asia.
Primarily our relationship is not a two-way street. The PRC steals
our nuclear secrets and we do nothing. We give them industrial
technology and ask for nothing in return. They financially tamper with
the reelection of an American President, and we sweep it under the rug.
We open our markets to their products, but they slam their markets
closed to America. Now, almost like a parody, the United States is
practically training the People's Liberation Army. It is past time that
we say enough is enough.
Opening our markets is different than opening our laboratories and
military facilities, and the line should now be drawn. The Chinese
Communists will not leave any stones unturned in their quest for
military domination. There is absolutely no reason for the United
States to enhance the PLA's war-making capabilities. It was not that
long ago that a high ranking PLA official threatened to nuke Los
Angeles if America interfered in the Taiwan Straits. There could be no
clearer warning to their intentions, and we must defend ourselves from
such a threat.
Now, this amendment is very simple, Mr. Chairman. It prohibits the
United States Secretary of Defense from authorizing military exchanges
with Communist China that reveal American classified, nuclear,
logistical, technological, intelligence and other war fighting secrets.
Mr. Chairman, this Congress must vote against military-to-military
exchanges with the Communist Chinese now. American security is
definitely at stake.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment
offered by the gentleman from Texas, and I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I must point out this amendment is unnecessary. The
committee did its work. The language in section 1203 of our bill more
than adequately protects American national security in the area of
military-to-military exchanges with the Chinese People's Liberation
Army. The majority wrote this language, we agreed to it, it is good
language.
Let me tell you what it does, what is already in the bill. First, it
provides that these contacts be governed by the principles of
reciprocity and transparency.
Second, it establishes limits that would prevent Members of the PLA
from inappropriate access to advanced technologies and capabilities of
the United States Armed Forces.
Third, it requires the Secretary of Defense to certify prior to the
start of any operation that military-to-military contacts with the PLA
will be conducted in accordance with such principles of reciprocity and
transparency that such contacts are in the national security interests
of the United States, and prohibits members of the U.S. Armed Forces
from participating in any military-to-military contacts until such
certification is given to Congress.
Fourth, it requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a detailed
annual report to Congress that provides an assessment of the military-
to-military contacts with the PLA.
In addition to being unnecessary, this amendment would actually harm
American security interests. The truth is that military-to-military
contacts are more beneficial to the U.S. than to the PLA. Our military
operates every day in an open, democratic society. The PLA operates in
China's closed society. With military-to-military contacts we gain
insight in the PLA's structure, its culture, its mode of operation and
its influence on Chinese internal politics and foreign policy
decisionmaking.
It is a matter of intelligence. We enhance our understanding of
China's strategic doctrine and can reduce the potential for
miscalculations and access between the PLA and U.S. or other Western
forces.
Moreover, routine senior level defense contact in times of relative
calm can help ensure open communications during times of tension. The
language that is already in the bill, that is already there, written by
the majority and agreed to by the minority, protects U.S. national
security, while keeping open lines of communication, which is very
essential to the American national interests.
I intend to vote against the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence), the chairman of the
Committee on Armed Services.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the DeLay amendment to limit
military-to-military contact between members of the United States Armed
Forces and the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The DeLay amendment
would strengthen the limitation already carried in the committee bill
that would attempt to better protect our military secrets while not
prohibiting VIP level exchanges from continuing.
Make no mistake about it, there is a need for increased vigilance. As
the bipartisan Cox committee report reminds us, the Chinese are engaged
in a long-term effort to modernize their military, and, in particular,
to understand and acquire the power projection capabilities that are
the hallmark of our military forces.
In addition to acquiring United States and Western technology to
improve their power projection capabilities, the Chinese are also
attempting to understand and even adopt United States military tactics,
techniques and

[[Page H3982]]

procedures, the essential how-to knowledge necessary for effective
military operations.
Increasingly, the Department of Defense is being pressured by other
elements of our government to work with the Chinese military in ways
that increase the chances these vital trade secrets might be revealed.
For example, just recently the Chinese asked to send a delegation of 20
officers to the United States Army Training Center to be fully
integrated into operations there. Although the Chinese were eventually
denied full access to the center, the Army was under pressure from
other parts of the administration to give the Chinese, quoting from an
Army source, ``a level of involvement that was beyond what we had
granted to any other country,'' according to these Army documents. The
Army believed the Chinese had an ulterior motive for their request, the
desire to gain insight into advanced Army tactics.
Mr. Chairman, the United States would be foolish to place a higher
value on the policy of engagement with China than on protecting the
tactics and technologies that are the cornerstone of our national
security, especially capabilities for power projection that China might
well turn on Taiwan or our other allies in the Asia-Pacific region.
I agree with the DeLay amendment, and urge my colleagues to support
it.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
Guam (Mr. Underwood).
Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey
for yielding me time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Texas, which has been characterized as a limitation on
military to military exchanges with China's People's Liberation Army.
However, if one takes the time to read the amendment, they will soon
discover the limitation is a little inaccurate. What the amendment
actually does is destroy the cornerstone of an effort to try to work to
some extent with the military on a reciprocal basis with the Chinese
military.

{time} 1800

I think the amendment represents a misunderstanding about what
military-to-military exchange programs are all about.
At first glance it would appear that the DeLay amendment would have
us believe that the U.S. military is currently engaged in some
sophisticated military exercises with the Chinese PLA, or has done so
in the past. This is not the case. This amendment would prohibit all
military contacts with the PLA for logistics operations, field
operations, chemical and biological defense, force projection
operations, and arms sales.
Ironically, we have not participated in this level of cooperation
with China since Chiang Kai Shek, and the DeLay amendment sets up the
premise that our military is sharing vital tactical and operational
techniques with the PLA.
This is a little bit exaggerated. If any American commander was to
engage in the kind of substantive exchange type of activities
enumerated in the DeLay amendment, that commander should be in deep
trouble. The language of the amendment of the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
DeLay) is redundant in that he is outlawing what is already not
practice.
In reality, the military exchange program, through this program as it
currently exists, both China and the U.S. have embarked on a series of
measured steps aimed at achieving increasingly higher levels of mutual
confidence and understanding.
Let no mistake be made, our current military engagement program with
China is leagues away from any level of cooperation we have with any
other nation on the face of the earth. The basic substance of our
existing military contact with the Chinese is based around naval port
visits, exchange visits by top military leaders, and working level
talks and meetings.
Indeed, during his tenure as commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific,
Admiral Joseph Prueher, now retired, had several productive exchanges
with the Chinese military leadership which focused on discussions on
Asia-Pacific security issues and bilateral defense relations.
Admiral Prueher's exchanges also provided for an opportunity for us
to learn about what is going on in China and their efforts at so-called
economic reforms, and the PLA's modernization. Our intelligence of this
information would be scant, at best, if it were not for the
relationships established by such military-to-military exchanges.
Even if we were to treat the Chinese as an adversary or potential
adversary, continued and measured military-to-military exchanges
provide invaluable intelligence and access to China's military leaders
that we otherwise would be cut off from.
The British in the early part of this century promoted military and
academic exchanges with their adversaries, the Germans, in order to
know their enemy. We, too, engaged in this practice with Japanese
admirals in the 1920s and '30s. Ceasing this intelligence practice
would be cutting off our nose to spite our face.
The essential point is that in our society, we encourage the free
exchange of ideas. This is one of the reasons why our Nation annually
and publicly releases reports on the posture and strategy of our armed
forces.
In fact, the U.S.-China military exchanges have created an
environment where China has finally published its first white paper on
defense, and although we know it is not comprehensive and not entirely
accurate, I think through this contact we are breaking a barrier.
Mr. Chairman, furthermore, the DeLay amendment ignores the key
current practice that governs our military-to-military exchanges with
the PLA. In response to unequal treatment of access with regard to
Chinese military equipment and installations as well as exercise
viewing privileges, the Secretary of Defense has established a quid pro
quo procedure. In other words, our military exchanges mirror the level
of access that is granted to our officers and troops on exchange in
China. Thus, I think our fears of unequal access are moot.
Through this evenhanded and measured commonsense initiative, we do
not risk exposing ourselves to charges of weakness and
disingenuousness, but at the same time we remain engaged with China's
military to achieve the greater goal of mutual understanding.
This amendment is simplistic, I believe a knee-jerk reaction that
feebly attempts to stem a genuine problem, but a problem that exists in
an entirely different area. This amendment fails to consider the entire
picture and constellation of elements that comprise our national
security apparatus. The DeLay amendment seeks to create an enemy out of
China by naively tossing out the baby with the bath water.
We need to create a balanced legislative approach that will yield a
well-conceived response to foreign espionage.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
North Carolina (Mrs. Myrick).
Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Chairman, this amendment makes sense. I can
understand why a cultural and economic relationship with China can
improve human rights, but China is not a military friend. The events of
last month have made that clear.
After the Tiananmen Square massacre, we discontinued military
cooperation with China, and then in 1993 President Clinton reinitiated
military-to-military contacts. Now we have learned that as early as
1996, national security adviser Sandy Berger knew that the Chinese had
stolen our nuclear secrets and were continuing to practice espionage in
the United States.
Yet, in 1998, for the first time ever, we engaged in a joint military
exercise with China's Peoples' Liberation Army. What has occurred
during these military-to-military contacts scares me almost as much as
the Cox report.
We have recently learned China is now attempting to purchase
torpedoes specifically designed to explode directly under our ships.
Why? Because at one of the visits last year they learned that our U.S.
aircraft carriers had a thin hall and were vulnerable to these types of
torpedoes.
At these exercises the Chinese saw our military's dependence on
satellites and digital systems and AWACs aircraft. It does not surprise
me that they are now seeking new ways to attack American satellites and
to disrupt communications. We should not be allowing any national
security secrets to

[[Page H3983]]

be given away to any potential adversaries, much less China. We would
not invite a thief to observe our home security system as it was being
installed and tested.
This administration continues to show its inability to even attempt
to keep our national security secrets from China. As a result of this
ineptness, I support the amendment of the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Delay) to prohibit most military-to-military contacts with the People's
Liberation Army.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
New Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
(Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
time.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly oppose this amendment. No one can deny that
there is a serious breach of U.S. security with respect to the leak of
military secrets to the People's Republic of China. The answer in my
view to address that problem is to plug the leaks, punish the
violators, prevent this from happening again, and to outsmart the
technology which the Chinese have wrongfully obtained.
The answer is not to change our form of government and replace one
Secretary of Defense and one Commander in Chief with 435 Secretaries of
Defense or Commanders in Chief. I believe that is the fundamental error
behind this ill-conceived amendment.
I would like my colleagues to consider the following not-too-unlikely
scenario: A rogue state, let us say Iraq, decides it wants to plan and
execute an attack on a U.S. corporation located in Beijing, in the
People's Republic of China. Our intelligence community learns of this
planned attack.
If the DeLay amendment were the law, as I read it, the Secretary of
Defense and the military would be prohibited from talking to the
People's Republic of China military about responding to prevent that
attack, prevented from sharing any information as to what to do about
it.
The principal flaw in this very flawed proposal is not simply what I
believe to be its political motivation, it is also its absolute
unreasonableness in implementation. People have to make decisions in
times of crises with limited information and with peoples' lives on the
line. It is wholely inappropriate for us to require that those
decisions be bound up in the deliberations of a legislative branch.
There is not one Member here, certainly not I, that would say that
the conduct of the Chinese military is exemplary. But history teaches
us that there are times when we cannot choose our partners or our
allies. There are times when we must act and seek the help of anyone
who is willing and prepared to help us.
I agree that those circumstances would be very limited, indeed, given
the history of the last few years and months and weeks on this issue.
But for us to rule it out with the exception of search and rescue
exercises or humanitarian exercises, whatever that means, I believe is
imprudent and reckless, and is an abrogation of the rightful
constitutional power of the executive branch.
For these reasons, I would urge my colleagues, both Republicans and
Democrats, to reject this ill-conceived amendment.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Rohrabacher).
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay).
Mr. Chairman, we were just looking at what happened with Secretary
O'Leary a few years ago. We found out recently that she has been, when
she was Secretary of Energy, she was shovelling out the door our
nuclear secrets, just shovelling out the door. In retrospect, it looked
like a going out of business sale. It was probably more like a going
out of sanity sale. This is insane. The policies this administration
has had towards Communist China, our worst, our most deadly potential
enemy, is insane.
We have heard, we can just plug the leaks, change a little here,
change a little there, and that is the way to approach it. No. What we
need to protect the interests of the United States and ensure that our
people are not incinerated with our own weapons or destroyed or killed,
or having our defenders destroyed or killed by tactics that they have
learned from us, that our enemy has learned from us, the way we do that
is change the fundamental policies that we have toward Communist China.
Communism should not be treated as a potential friend. It is being
treated as a friend now. It should be treated as a potential enemy. It
is a hostile power, it is not a friendly power. Until we start treating
communism this way, we will continue to do nonsensical things like
training their military on how to better run a military.
I have a list here, as of February of this year, of the proposed
military exchanges between the United States and the Communist Chinese.
It includes quartermaster training, acquisition training, logistics
training. It includes special forces training. It includes having their
top officers to come for briefings.
Here we have what this administration's policies are. This is after
they knew, this is after this administration knew that the Communist
Chinese had acquired our most deadly weapons secrets, weapons that
could incinerate millions of Americans, and this administration was
still proposing that we have a military exchange program to teach them
how our military functions and how their military can better function.
This is insanity. This is total insanity. I strongly support the
DeLay amendment, and would request the American people to pay close
attention to this vote.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson).
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I think the descriptive term that was
used by my colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher)
may be the right one, but it is about the underlying amendment, not
opposition to it.
As I read this, yes, and again, I like the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
DeLay), I get along with him well, I know his intentions are noble. But
would the author of the legislation prohibit the American military from
sitting down with the Chinese to deal with nonproliferation issues? If
we had not just reached this conclusion in Kosovo, it would be illegal
under the language of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) to sit down
and talk about logistics with the Chinese.
The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Delay) apparently does not trust our
American military, that they are either too naive or simple, that
somehow the Chinese are going to take advantage of them.
Let me tell the Members, we live in a free and open society. Anybody
who wants to talk to the American military can look in the phone book
and call them up and talk to them. We do not get to talk to Chinese,
generally, because it is a closed society.
I would argue that whether it was the Soviet Union or any of the
satellite states, that any time there was contact, at the end of the
day, America and freedom won. I believe our system is stronger, our
military is more capable, and every time they come in contact with
America and what it does, they crumble a little more.
The Chinese are probably praying that we go into an isolationist
mode. It could be the best thing for the leaders in Beijing, because
when they meet and see what Americans are all about, our strength comes
across clearly.
Let us see what the Department of Defense says about this amendment.

{time} 1815

For example, an attempt by U.S. open military-to-military channels
regarding nonproliferation by definition involved contacts or exchanges
with the PLA strategic missile and/or chemical defense personnel.
Proliferation is a key area of U.S. Chinese relations, yet DoD would be
barred from participating in that discussion. I would think the
gentleman would demand that if there were discussions on
nonproliferation that he would have members of the American military
there.
Listening to the debate today, no one fools themselves that this
world is not a dangerous place, even without the Soviet Union and its
former empire situation. But we are the most powerful

[[Page H3984]]

country on the face of this Earth. There is no one in second place
compared to our capabilities, our men and women who represent us in the
service.
I say to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay), for this country to be
shivering here, trying to stop dialogue that achieves our goals, is a
mistake. It is a mistake to say we cannot talk about proliferation
issues. It is a mistake not to have these military-to-military contacts
when it suits our interests, when America decides it is the right thing
to do.
I am not sure what is going on here, frankly. I see a debate that
creates the image of a weak and failing America. It is the wrong
message to our countrymen. It is the wrong message to our adversaries.
America is strong and capable. I would bet the lowest-ranking member of
our Armed Forces, in a discussion with the Chinese, that we win that
discussion, that we gain from that discussion.
When they see what we live like here, it undermines them. My parents
fled the Soviet Union. What they told me was when Khrushchev visited
here, they believed and I believe it, too, that Khrushchev thought we
built a Potemkin Village, that we created these great grocery stores
for him to see. Then Khrushchev went back.
But by the time Gorbachev came, they knew from military-to-military
contacts, from private contacts, that every American had a better life
than the top brass of the Soviet union.
It is foolish to put in permanent law a ban on these kind of
contacts. It defies our own national interests. This is not about doing
the Chinese a favor. We do not have these meetings to help the Chinese.
We do this for our interests.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, could I ask how much time is remaining on
each side?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) has 16\1/2\
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) has 15
minutes remaining.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, let me just say this side believes that we have a
strong America, but we have a weak administration. Nothing in my
amendment has anything to do with talking about proliferation or
treaties or anything else. It has everything to do with exchange of
operations, letting the communist Chinese observe what we do so they
can take it back to China and copy it, if not steal it.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr.
Calvert).
Mr. CALVERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support this important
amendment. I hope that it sends a wake-up call to both the leaders of
the People's Republic of China and our current administration.
I am shocked and dismayed by the casual attitude of our current
administration to the efforts of the Chinese Government to infiltrate
our Nation's political and military infrastructure. I do not take these
actions against our Nation lightly, and I hope my colleagues will not
either.
I thought it was a proper course of action in 1989 when President
Bush suspended joint training exercises following Tiananmen Square.
Given the findings of the Cox report and our administration's admitted
failure to respond to massive security breaches, I believe we should
suspend all joint military exercises with China at once.
I believe that someday a peaceful Chinese nation can contribute
positively to the international community. But at the present time, it
is very difficult to place trust in the Chinese Government and expect a
change in our current administration's seemingly willful acceptance of
China's deceptive tactics and aggressive posture. I think that our
current policy toward China should mirror that of President Reagan's
engagement with the Soviet Union by containing their military
aggression, preaching the moral superiority of freedom, and influencing
the ideas of their people through trade and exposure to western
political values.
Mr. Chairman, I encourage my colleagues to vote in favor of this
amendment. Stop joint military activities with China until their
leaders are willing to participate as an honest world power and until
our administration is willing to make our national security a top
priority.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Mississippi (Mr. Taylor).
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the
gentleman from Missouri for granting me this time and particularly
since he has given me time to speak in support of the DeLay amendment.
I think the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) is right on this. I
think between the revelations of the two 40-foot container loads of
automatic weapons being shipped to our West Coast, the now control of
two ports on the Panama Canal by a company called Hutchinson, which is
owned by the Chinese, the things that have come out as a result of the
Cox report as far as the Chinese either being given in some instances
by dumb Americans, in some instances being sold technology and some
instances stealing technology.
But I would like to ask the sponsor of this bill to let us take this
a step further. See, next month this body is going to vote on something
called most-favored-nation status for China. Technology is one thing.
But in order to build the weapons that threaten America, China needs
money. They get that money from America. They get that money from trade
with America where they sell their goods to America with 2 percent or
less tariff as a result of the most-favored-nation status. Yet, our
country, our goods, when sold in China, have to pay anywhere from 20 to
40 percent.
I find it strange that the gentleman who is so right on this issue, 1
year ago, on July 22, when we voted to disapprove most-favored-nation
status voted with the Chinese. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay)
voted to grant the Chinese unlimited access to the American market and
to continue this $60 billion trade surplus on behalf of China.
In fact, I think I have gone so far as to break the code. See, MFN
does not really stand for most favored nation. It stands for money for
nukes. When some people very cleverly changed the name of it to NTR,
thinking it would stand for normal trade relations, I think the truth
of the matter is it stands for nuclear tipped rockets that they are
going to buy with American money.
So I am going to vote with the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay)
today, but a month from now when we vote on MFN, money for nukes, I
hope he will be voting with me to vote no.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Sweeney).
(Mr. SWEENEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
DeLay) for yielding me this time.
I rise in strong support today of the DeLay amendment. The time has
come to base our relationship with China on realism rather than wishful
thinking. The DeLay amendment sends a necessary message to the People's
Republic of China that the communist government is an untrustworthy
military partner.
China's overall military modernization is striking. The PLA's
abandonment of a traditional land-based people's army in favor of
forming comprehensive strategic and nuclear strike capability by land,
sea, and air has profound consequences on our relationship with China,
and we ought to let them know that.
Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt that the PRC has been pursuing a
rapid escalation of its military modernization, of both its strategic
and conventional forces, and it is utilizing American technology to do
so.
As a result, I believe a military confrontation with the PRC is not
out of the question. Let us remember it was just 3 years ago that we
were forced to send two aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Strait to
respond to PRC menacing the region.
Military-to-military exchanges are in some cases cornerstones of
important peaceful relationships with our allies. The People's Republic
of China is not an ally. To be successful, these exchanges must employ
real transparencies so that each partner gains insights into the
capabilities of the others.
There is no mutual transparency here, Mr. Chairman, in our exchanges
with the PLA. Instead, the information obtained by the Chinese is being
used

[[Page H3985]]

by its military to isolate our vulnerabilities and position the PLA for
a future conflict, and our military experts observe nothing of value in
return. This is not the goal of military exchanges. This amendment
ensures that our leading military technology and know-how are not
turned against us in the form of an advanced military threat.
Mr. Chairman, Henry Kissinger recently stated ``that the critics of
our `strategic relationship' with China have an obligation to develop a
vision commensurate with the vastness of the historical sweep of the
challenge.''
I believe he was addressing people like the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
DeLay) and myself. I would answer Mr. Kissinger by pointing to the
document which is the foundation of our American vision, our
Constitution. It is, after all, a vision which requires minimum rights
and protections for all individuals.
As we know, if Mr. Kissinger were a Chinese citizen and espoused the
principles of the Constitution, he would be quickly in prison. Our
vision, Mr. Kissinger, is the vision of Franklin, Adams, and Jefferson,
and preserving it is important.
Mr. Chairman, with respect to China, our country has looked the other
way for too long. The DeLay amendment tells China that we expect a
relationship based on truth and realism. I urge all my colleagues to
support the DeLay amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the DeLay amendment to
restrict military exchanges with China's People's Liberation Army. The
time has come to base our relationship with China on realism rather
than wishful thinking.
Since 1994 the P.R.C. has been constructing military facilities in
the Spratly Islands. The size and nature of these facilities suggest
that the P.R.C. is attempting to establish a permanent strategic
presence in the area, from which it could patrol the South China Sea,
the waterway through which one sixth of the world's trade is shipped.
Two years ago, in March 1997 a Chinese controlled company was able to
obtain, from Panama, the rights to the port facilities that flank the
canal zone.
Then there is the matter of the democratic nation of Taiwan. The
P.R.C.'s 1995 military exercises and 1996 missile firings in the Taiwan
Strait have been followed by an offensive military buildup on the
Chinese mainland itself that includes tripling the number of missiles
(to more than 100) already deployed against Taiwan.
These developments are all the more alarming when seen against the
backdrop of:
(1) China's overall military modernization, its abandonment of a
traditional, land-based ``people's army'' in favor of a comprehensive
strategic and nuclear strike capability by land, sea, and air;
(2) China's clandestine efforts to acquire the most secret and
sensitive of United States military technologies, including the know-
how to replicate the W 88 warhead, the most dangerous security breach
in 50 years; and
(3) allegations that China has assisted the North Korean missile
program, on top of its known and suspected sales of missile and nuclear
technologies to terrorist states.
With respect to China, our country has looked the other way for too
long.
Human rights violations in China and Tibet are another point of
contention since the Tiananmen Square crackdown. Among these violations
are the recent excessive jail and labor camp sentences for pro-
democracy activists.
A future military confrontation with the P.R.C. is not out of the
question. Just three years ago President Clinton was forced to send two
American aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Strait.
United States policy toward the P.R.C. has been based on wishful
thinking for far too long. Policy makers in the Administration of both
parties have time and time again been willing to give Chinese leaders
the benefit of the doubt only to be consistently let down.
The DeLay amendment tells China that we expect a relationship based
on truth and realism.
Mr. Chairman, Henry Kissinger recently stated and I quote, ``that the
critics of our ``strategic relationship'' with China have an obligation
to develop a vision commensurate with the vastness and historical sweep
of the challenge''.
I believe he was addressing people such as Congressman DeLay and
myself. I would answer Mr. Kissinger's challenge by pointing to the
document which is the foundation of America's vision. Our constitution.
A vision which requires minimal rights and protections for all
individuals.
As we all know, if Mr. Kissinger were a Chinese citizen and espoused
the principals of our constitution he would quickly be imprisoned. Our
vision, Mr. Kissinger is the vision of Franklin, Adams and Jefferson.
I ask support for the DeLay amendment.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
North Carolina (Mr. Jones).
Mr. JONES of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support
of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay). I
commend him for bringing attention to this extremely important national
security issue.
I first learned last summer that the Pentagon was considering a plan
for our elite special forces to engage in joint training exercises with
Chinese PLA troops. At the time, I was outraged because our lax U.S.
policy of constructive engagement toward China had already proven too
dangerous.
Mr. Chairman, that was before the advent of the Cox report. What once
seemed outrageous is now beyond belief. We have known for years that
China cannot be trusted. In 1995, the United States made a futile
agreement to extend most-favored-nation status to China, providing it
would stop exporting nuclear weapons, and it would stop its abusive
human rights practices. It has failed on both accounts, Mr. Chairman,
and yet the administration continues to turn a blind eye to China's
blatant suppression of human rights and its role as a global supply of
weapons of mass destruction and technology to foreign countries.
We have learned the hard way that we have no reason to trust China.
Last year the CIA reported that China had at least 13 missiles targeted
at United States cities, and the Rumsfeld Commission indicated that
China's proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction threatens the security of the United States.
Mr. Chairman, while China was busy selling technology to rogue
nations and amassing its own nuclear stockpile, the Defense Department
was drawing up a game plan to engage the United States in military-to-
military contacts with China in hopes of establishing a relationship of
trust and confidence. How much more can we afford to give?
The Defense Department even developed and implemented a United
States-China military exchange program for 1999 that includes visits
from PLA officials to tactical and strategic facilities in the United
States. Encouraging such exchanges is another way to potentially expose
U.S. military information to a communistic nation.
Mr. Chairman, China has proved itself a threat to United States
national security. The DeLay amendment would prohibit military
exchanges involving U.S. forces training PLA forces and help prevent
China's capability for invasion and long-range operations.
I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the DeLay amendment. The
security of our Nation may depend on it. I repeat, Mr. Chairman, the
security of our Nation may depend on it. Vote for the DeLay amendment.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cunningham), a top gun.

{time} 1845

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
this time, but I am old gun now.
I would tell my colleagues that if I were to see a cobra, and the
cobra was mounted, I might catch it and milk his venom and use that
venom for good. And I think in some ways we need to, whether it is the
Middle East, whether China or Russia, we have to engage them both
economically and in other ways and milk that. But at the same time, I
think we do not let that cobra loose where we have children playing in
a room, and we do not teach that cobra how to bite.
The Navy Fighter Weapons School, which is known as the Top Gun, and
the Air Force has the 414th, which is their fighter weapons school, and
the adversary squadrons, every single day of my life in the service I
flew Russian and Chinese tactics against our fighters so we would know
how to fight them. How do we defeat their jammers? How do we defeat
their tactics.
For example, they have high-low pairs and they have pincer tactics.
They will take a pair up, up high, of MiG 23s or MiG 25s or even MiG
29s, and they will run sections of pairs, high-low pairs so that we
cannot pick out the low pair or the high pair on one

[[Page H3986]]

radar, and they want the enemy to go after the high pair. Then they
will come around in a double pince or a single pince. If the high
section sees that the enemy is going after them, they will turn and run
and the pince will come in and shoot the enemy down.
The White House allowed the Chinese and the Russians into the 414th,
into Navy Fighter Weapons School in Fallon, and let them watch how we
defeat their tactics and their jammers. That is wrong. That is like
teaching the cobra how to bite. And I guarantee my colleagues, Russia
and China will bite us if they have the opportunity. And the reason I
am supporting this amendment is I do not want to give that cobra the
chance to bite the kids that are up there in the air or on the ground
with other things. I think that is wrong.
When I was a lieutenant in the United States Navy, I was just as
outspoken then as I am now. And when our government, with a Republican
President, let the Shah of Iran have F-14s, I pounded my fist on the
table and said I do not want to have to look down the barrel of those
F-14s some day, because the Shah may not be here. And I knew the
history of Iran and that someday we were going to look down those
barrels. And we even trained some of their fighter pilots. And guess
what? I felt like Billy Mitchell.
We must not give our enemies our deep secrets or let them play in the
baby crib. And that is what we are doing, and that is what the
gentleman from Texas, in his amendment, is trying to stop. How more
common sense can we get? We cannot give the enemy the tactics that he
can kill us with. And that is the reason I support the gentleman's
amendment.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, there is no one I respect more in this House than the
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton). His work on this committee is
outstanding, his leadership in trying to stop the devastation and the
hollowing out of our defense is next to none. The gentleman, we say
from Texas, knows from where he comes, and I do respect the gentleman,
but in this case I respectfully disagree with him.
The gentleman says that my amendment is redundant because the
committee has worked very hard at putting language in the bill that
does basically the same thing I do. Where I disagree is the
transparency and the reciprocity part of their portion of the bill,
which, in my opinion, gives a huge loophole to this administration,
this administration that has already exhibited incredible weakness when
it comes to China.
Foreign relations with China are very difficult in the best of
circumstances. They were difficult during the Reagan administration,
they were difficult under all the administrations before this
administration. But when we have an administration that kowtows to the
Chinese, that lets them bamboozle them, that out-negotiates them, it
leads to these kinds of problems that we are talking about here today.
The President of the United States went to China. He was received in
Tiananmen Square, where hundreds were killed fighting for democracy.
The President, while he was in China, was embarrassed when the
Communist Chinese decided that that they would test an ICBM missile
while the President of the U.S. was in-country. Just recently, after
the huge mistake of bombing the Chinese embassy, this President
apologized I do not know how many times. And I will tell my colleagues
something, I will never forget the picture that I saw on CNN network of
the ambassador to China and his aide standing over the President of the
United States while he was sitting at his desk in the oval office
signing a book of apology. Now, we should have apologized once, and
that is enough.
But this administration has kowtowed to the Communist Chinese over
and over again. And now we find that they are using all types of ways
for exchanges to show the Communist Chinese and the People's Liberation
Army how we do things so they can copy it. It has got to stop.
There is no reciprocity. The only thing that transparency will show
is that we give them the key to the penthouse and they give us the key
to the outhouse. We have got to stop it for the sake and security of
the American people. And my amendment makes no mistake, leaves no door
open, leaves no crack open. My amendment says we are going to stop it
and we are not going to show the Chinese how the SEALS operate; we are
not going to show exercises using two divisions of our army; we are not
going to let them on our aircraft carriers so they can take notes of
how to destroy them; we are not going to do these kinds of things. That
is what my amendment does.
The gentleman from Guam says that the program improves our knowledge
of Chinese methods and tactics. We are going to learn 1950s and 1960s
and 1970s military tactics from the Chinese. We gather intelligence
from them. The U.S. Armed Forces are superior to the People's
Liberation Army. There is nothing we can learn from them nor is there
parity between these exchanges. We offer the Chinese our national
laboratories while they offer us empty barracks.
Let me just cite a couple of examples that were put in an article in
The New Republic written by Jason Zengerle, I believe it is. A group of
officers from the Chinese People's Liberation Army happened to drop in
on an American naval base. Over steaks, beer, two kinds of wine and
apple pie, the Chinese peppered their American counterparts with
questions about the American aircraft carrier they were on and its
vulnerabilities. Wanting to be a gracious host, like the admiral, an
American lieutenant commander proceeded to tell the Chinese about the
carrier's Achilles heel, its hull is too thin on the bottom, the
commander explained. So a torpedo that exploded underneath the carrier
could easily penetrate the carrier's skin. That is why they are buying
torpedoes that explode under our ships because we gave them the
information.
In another incident, not surprisingly then, when then chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, visited a Chinese
military installation in 1997, and this is incredible, he was shown a
routine marksman demonstration, at a distance, through binoculars. Now,
this is an exchange. And he was given a tour of empty barracks and mess
halls. And similar things have happened to other visiting American
officers. We see the same tired old factories, the same divisions we
have seen before, gripes a Pentagon official. We do not get into their
crack divisions and factories.
We have to stop this. We have to stop it now. Enough is enough. The
security of this country is at stake. I ask for a ``yea'' vote for the
DeLay amendment.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I first must say to my friend, the gentleman from California (Mr.
Cunningham), that no one in this Chamber admires more what he has done
and what he does for his country, so I compliment him in his past and
present actions, though from time to time we will vary on issues. And I
appreciate the gentleman's comments earlier.
But let me say this to my friend from California, as well as my
friend from Texas. When we first started the debate on this bill, I
stated that this was the best bill that we have put forward to the
Congress of the United States since the early 1980s. That included the
language regarding the military-to-military contacts regarding China
drafted by the majority under the guidance of our chairman, the
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence). We have done the job. It is
well worth it. We have protected the interests of the United States. I
do not think it could be better.
The amendment that the gentleman from Texas offers, in my opinion,
gilds the lily. I think that what is in there is excellent. I stand by
it, I embrace it, I compliment the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr.
Spence) and those that worked it out and I agree with it. I hope that
we stand by it and approve it.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of
Representative Delay's amendment. This amendment would prohibit the
military to military exchanges that train the People's Liberation Army
of China.
I support this amendment for several reasons. First in light of the
Cox report on the extent of China's espionage and theft of America's
national security secrets, I feel that further contact is unwise. It
would be imprudent to foster a relationship, which is not beneficial to
our nation's interests and further extends

[[Page H3987]]

the risk of exposure of U.S. technologies and capabilities.
This bill would ensure that exchanges and contacts between our
military and the People's Liberation Army would be beneficial to both
nations. It would prohibit exchanges and contacts which involve
nuclear, chemical or biological operations; intelligence activities;
war-fighting exercises, military space operations; arm sales or
military related technology transfers. This amendment would preserve
our two nation's ability to perform search and rescue or humanitarian
exercises.
Mr. Chairman, June 4th marked the ten-year anniversary of the tragedy
in Tiananmen Square. The images of the crackdown on the student
democratic movement are still fresh in my mind even after ten years.
The failure to recognize the mistake of ten years ago continues, as
last week over 100 dissidents were detained to prevent the public
marking of this anniversary.
I offer this recollection because, I believe that China has not
recognized that stability is not something which can be demanded but
rather it must come from the people freely expressing their own ideas.
The United States should not have military to military contact with the
People's Liberation Army because the Chinese government continues to
use in military to restrict the notions of democracy within its own
people.
I urge the members of this body to vote--``yes'' and support
Representative DeLay's amendment.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. DeLay).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) will
be postponed.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 13 printed in House
Report 106-175.

Amendment No. 13 Offered by Mr. Goss

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Part A amendment No. 13 offered by Mr. Goss:
At the end of title XII (page 317, after line 17), insert
the following new section:

SEC. 1206. LIMITATION ON DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED
FORCES IN HAITI.

(a) Limitation on Deployment.--Except as provided in
subsection (b), no funds available to the Department of
Defense may be expended for the deployment of United States
Armed Forces in Haiti.
(b) Exceptions.--Subsection (a) does not apply to the
deployment of United States Armed Forces in Haiti for any of
the following purposes:
(1) Deployment pursuant to Operation Uphold Democracy until
December 31, 1999.
(2) Deployment for periodic, noncontinuous theater
engagement activities on or after January 1, 2000.
(3) Deployment for a limited, customary presence necessary
to ensure the security of United States diplomatic facilities
in Haiti and to carry out defense liaison activities under
the auspices of the United States embassy.
(c) Report Requirement.--Whenever there is a deployment of
United States Armed Forces described in subsection (b)(2),
the President shall, not later than 48 hours after the
deployment, transmit a written report regarding the
deployment to the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to restrict in any way the authority of the
President in emergency circumstances to protect the lives of
United States citizens or to protect United States facilities
or property in Haiti.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss) and a Member opposed each will control 10 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I am expecting the arrival at any time of the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Gilman), who is my co-colleague on this subject. Mr. Chairman,
over the last several years, the Clinton-Gore administration has asked
the military to do more with less, and I think that deserves our time,
so I am going to discuss this matter pending the arrival of the
gentleman from New York.
The result of having to do more with less, I think, is very plain to
see. Declining morale and a military on the verge of being hollowed out
confront us just at the time when we seem to have more demands on our
military in so many other places.
The solution seems simple, as even President Clinton's Secretary of
Defense William Cohen admits when he said, ``We have to find a way to
either increase the size of our forces or decrease the number of our
missions.'' I could not agree more.
Earlier this year the commander of U.S. forces in Latin America, that
would be General Charles Wilhelm, recommended we end our permanent
troop presence in Haiti. In its place General Wilhelm recommends the
periodic deployment of troops, as is the norm throughout the Western
Hemisphere and the Caribbean. General Wilhelm's recommendation is sound
on a number of counts, and I believe Congress should endorse it.
Maintaining a permanent presence in Haiti unnecessarily puts our
troops at risk. A clear indication of this is the fact that about half
our soldiers in Haiti do nothing more than protect their fellow
soldiers. The situation is that tense. That is what is happening. The
deployment to Haiti strains military resources. We already know there
is a call for those resources elsewhere. The financial cost is
approximately $20 million per year. We also know there is a need for
those resources elsewhere. The training, readiness and operational
tempo are affected as well, as the military has clearly stated in much
testimony before the United States Congress.
Our presence in Haiti duplicates work more appropriately done by
nongovernmental organizations. Even our commander in Haiti, the person
on the front line, the person responsible, Colonel Morris, frankly
admits that much of his troop's work could be done by private sector
groups. We are talking about building schools, building wells, doing
other humanitarian work which desperately needs to be done in Haiti.

{time} 1845

Finally, and from my perspective most importantly, our military
planners clearly believe that the permanent deployment is less
effective than periodic deployments would be. In other words, we get
more bang for the buck, do more for Haiti, and do more for ourselves if
we go to our norm of periodic deployments.
General Wilhelm's recommendation is right on target: End the
permanent troop presence but allow the military to conduct routine
periodic deployments as the situation warrants. Unfortunately, our
military's pleas for a commonsense approach seem to have fallen on deaf
ears among the Clinton administration's policymakers and political
advisers.
It is time to restore Haiti to the norms in the hemisphere and end
the permanent troop presence there. I think it is good for America. And
in the end, I think it is a much more effective way to help the Haitian
people, which is what we are trying to do.
For these reasons, I am very pleased to join the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Gilman), chairman of the Committee on International
Relations, in offering an amendment that would essentially formalize
General Wilhelm's recommendation. And I strongly urge my colleagues to
support it.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the
amendment, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, it is astounding to me when I see this constant assault
on any progress President Clinton has made. It almost seems an argument
ad hominem; if it was a Clinton administration policy and it seems to
be succeeding, let us see if we can cause some trouble here.
Other sections of the bill today, as we have an agreement from Mr.
Milosevic to pull out, other sections of this bill will make it
impossible to keep peacekeeping troops in Kosovo in the former
Yugoslavian areas.
Let us take a look at the history of Haiti. It has never exactly been
the Switzerland of the world. There has been dictator after dictator.
And between 1992 and 1994, there were 60,000 refugees coming out of
Haiti.

[[Page H3988]]

The gentleman and many from the Florida delegation came to the floor
expressing their concern for social services that were being overrun by
Haitian refugees. 60,000 in 3 years. And every day we saw members of
the Florida delegation complaining about the pressures on their State
that somehow we had to end this massive immigration, people risking
their lives in bathtubs virtually, to come to the United States, it was
so bad in Haiti.
In the last 3 years, we have had 3,000 refugees coming in from Haiti.
Is that a failed policy? Do we want to go back to the kind of policy we
had before? In the last several months here, we have pulled out the
peacekeeping forces at the insistence of the chairman of the Committee
on International Relations. We are not training their police. They have
no trained police.
And now these people who are helping the poorest people in our
hemisphere, some of the poorest people on the planet, we are going to
pull them out too? Why? We are not getting enough refugees coming
across the ocean? They are not taking their little boats and risking
their lives and their families to come to Florida? Is that what the
gentleman wants?
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEJDENSON. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman is addressing me as ``the
gentleman from Florida,'' is the gentleman asking, do we want to keep
the troops in Haiti to stop Haitians from leaving the oppression in
Haiti? Is that what this is about?
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, it seems to me that
if we squander this opportunity where we are in the developmental
process of a democracy, maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow, but I will
guarantee my colleague, dictatorship will return and those refugees
will be coming again.
It is better for the Haitians, it is better for the U.S. if we are
able to help these people have a decent living at home. The violence
has been reduced. The Toutons Macoute is almost out of business. There
are not 60,000 refugees coming here to the United States in a 3-year
period. Let us continue the good work we have started.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of the Chairman how much time
is remaining on either side?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) controls 6\1/2\
minutes. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) controls 7
minutes.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the distinguished chairman of the
House Committee on International Relations.
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
time.
Mr. Chairman, our military did a superb job when they were sent to
Haiti back in 1994. However, their mission of restoring the elected
civilian government of former president Jean Bertrand Aristide was
accomplished some time ago. I imagine that many Americans are not aware
that we still have troops in Haiti.
The Clinton administration informs Congress that we have maintained
our permanent troop presence in Haiti to provide humanitarian relief
and to give our Army Corps of Engineers and medical personnel
opportunities to be trained. However, I do not believe it is now
necessary to keep a permanent troop presence in Haiti to accomplish
those goals.
Obviously, humanitarian relief activities can be conducted at far
less expense to our taxpayers by civilian contractors working for our
Agency for International Development.
It is obvious that Haiti is becoming a dangerous place. Our local
commander in Haiti has had to raise his assessment of the threats
against our troops from both common crime and, increasingly, political
unrest.
In an ominous development, on June 4, press reports revealed that
civilian employees of the U.S. military support group in Haiti
abandoned their all-terrain vehicle in a hail of rocks. Protesters then
torched the vehicle.
Our troops are increasingly unable to conduct their stated
humanitarian mission. They are hunkered down and there are clear signs
that they may become direct targets of attack. The presence of the
troops has certainly not stopped nor in any way deterred numerous
political murders or recent rioting.
Despite the administration's insistence that U.S. troops do not have
a security role, we can see U.S. troops mired in a dangerous, open-
ended commitment in Haiti.
The chairman of our Committee on Intelligence, the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss), and I offered this amendment in an effort to
support the Defense Department's sensible recommendations that the
permanent U.S. military presence in Haiti under Operation Uphold
Democracy should be brought to an end.
Normal stationing of U.S. troops to protect our embassy and to
provide diplomatic representation in Haiti would, of course, be
permitted at all times. The President's authority to protect American
lives and property in Haiti are also explicitly protected by this
amendment.
The intent of this amendment is to make certain that our U.S. troops
permanently deployed in Haiti under Operation Uphold Democracy through
the U.S. support group will be completely withdrawn by December 31,
1999. The administration has fully 7 months to complete an orderly
drawdown of our troops who are permanently stationed in Haiti.
Until such time as they are completely removed, our troops will
continue to conduct their currently scheduled humanitarian missions.
After the permanently deployed troops are completely withdrawn, U.S.
forces will be permitted to deploy to Haiti for short-term
expeditionary missions.
There are serious concerns about the security of our troops in Haiti
which we should consider. Moreover, it is not fair to our men and women
in uniform to leave them in Haiti in an open-ended deployment.
Accordingly, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1401 and urge our
colleagues to support the Gilman-Goss amendment.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Conyers).
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I was privileged to join the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss),
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Charles Rangel), and we went to Haiti
quite recently. We met with Pierre Denize, the national police chief of
Haiti.
Remember, Haiti does not have an army now because we have agreed and
they have agreed to get rid of them. We met with Bob Manuel, the
Secretary of State for Public Security in Haiti. We got what I
considered an excellent report about that.
Our troops are not in jeopardy. How many troops are we talking about,
I ask my esteemed chairman of the Committee on International Relations?
Two hundred seventy; 270 troops. Psychologically, they are performing
an immensely important task of working and development. They are not
there for security. I found them not to be in jeopardy. They are
working with Department of Justice and Department of Defense people in
the Isatat training program, in the U.N. SITPOL agreement. Things are
moving.
If we try to legislate them out of Haiti before the administration,
the Department of Defense, and the State Department, which have all
agreed that they should go, the question is the timing and whether the
House of Representatives should now become the executive branch of
Government.
Please, I beg my colleagues not to intrude this amendment, which is
potentially dangerous, into the subject matter of Haiti. Haiti has
problems. It is coming along very well.
I am glad that I was invited by my esteemed colleagues from New York
and Florida to witness and talk in depth with them about this subject.
Those troops are important there. They are not in jeopardy. And let us
not pull them out prematurely.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) has 4\1/
2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman

[[Page H3989]]

from Florida (Mr. Goss) has 3 minutes remaining.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Meek).
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, this amendment should be
defeated. It represents a double standard.
Why treat Haiti different than what we treat anyone else? There are
only 500 troops in Haiti, thirty-six thousandths of 1 percent of our
active force. Now, anyone who has any kind of sense at all knows that
there is very little in Haiti.
This is about two things, as I perceive it: Haiti bashing, and it is
not the first time, and bashing the President. It is time some of this
stuff stopped.
We are talking about a small country here. The people are poor. And I
say again, why not help continue what the President has started? How
can we expect more from Haiti than we do from some of the rest of them?
Why do we expect more from Haiti than we do any of the other countries
that we are trying to help?
So there is a double standard. $288 billion. We are only spending $20
million to support the troops in Haiti, 500 of them. And I appeal to my
colleagues to please kill this Goss amendment. The gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss) has a very good way of approaching Haiti, always on
the negative.
Please kill this amendment. It is not worth being in this good bill.
So please go against this. It is bad for America and it is bad for
Haiti.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the distinguished
gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham).
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I would like to address my good friend
the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Meek).
I do not know of a sweeter lady in this body than the gentlewoman
from Florida. But I say to the gentlewoman, because there is payback;
500 troops and $20 billion a year.
Look at Kosovo. We are lucky if we are going to get out with $100
billion. Bosnia cost us $16 billion.
When the Progressive Caucus comes up in the Labor-HHS bill and wants
to increase money in Medicare and health care and education and not
talk Social Security, if we want to do these things, the Progressive
Caucus has got to support it and not want to cut defense by 50 percent
of what it is now. There is a payback.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Davis).
(Mr. DAVIS of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the
Gilman-Goss amendment.
I do so because we know that Haiti has been unstable. We are not
really providing that much to them. But to take away the little bit
that we are providing is unconscionable.

{time} 1900

All that we are talking about is helping the poorest country in this
hemisphere continue to have some hope for stability, economic
development, for growth and progress. I would urge, Mr. Chairman, that
we vote in the best interests, not only of Haiti but that we vote in
the best interests of humanity, a little bit of humanitarian effort. I
urge that we vote ``no'' to the Gilman-Goss amendment.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Owens).
(Mr. OWENS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, why are we obsessed with Haiti? If there is
going to be a standard for spreading our generosity, and we are the
indispensable Nation, we are the last superpower, I think it is
important that we should help out wherever we can in crises throughout
the world, but why not have a single standard? Why do we not establish
a standard? Where we have been in Bosnia, I do not think it has been
$16 billion as I heard before, but at least we have spent $8 billion in
Bosnia. We have been in Korea forever. Korea has a strong economy. They
could support their own defense. We have been in Europe with bases for
a long time and in Japan. We are spread out all over the world in
places spending billions of dollars over long periods of time. Why
would we not help a nation in this hemisphere, and the commitment there
is relatively pennies now compared to the kind of commitments we have
with the bases in Europe and Japan and Bosnia. I am not saying we
should pull out of Bosnia overnight, but I think there ought to be some
kind of formula whereby we go in to help, we spend a preestablished
amount of money, we do it with some kind of standard equally throughout
the world.
If you pick out Haiti alone and you go after Haiti, then the only
conclusion we can come to is that it is because Haiti is a black
nation. Why else are we obsessed with Haiti?
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Meeks).
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to oppose the
Gilman-Goss amendment. Haiti is on the eve of democratic elections. We
say that we have the moral authority to try to make sure that democracy
is across this world. Yet the smallest and the poorest country in this
world, we do not want to aid. We have less than 3 to 400 troops in
Haiti. Yet we are trying to pull them out on the eve of elections when
we may restore hope and dignity to people who are our neighbors. Yet we
go all over the place for others. There seems and there is a double
standard. We must not let this amendment stand. We must make sure that
the bill is not poisoned by this terrible, terrible amendment and help
the people who need most the help. To whom much is given, as this
country has, much is required.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt).
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized for 30
seconds.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, this is a very dangerous amendment. This
sends a message to the antidemocratic forces in Haiti that America is
ready to disengage. This coupled with a hole that was placed by the
majority in terms of human rights observers. This amendment should be
defeated and it should be defeated overwhelmingly.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida is recognized for 2\1/2\
minutes.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I want to read part of a Charleston Post and
Courier editorial:

General Wilhelm did not suggest that the United States
should give up and walk away. He proposed U.S. military
forces should visit Haiti periodically. Unfortunately, as the
General told Congressmen, the 500 American soldiers--that
number is actually 503 American soldiers--who remain have to
spend much of their time defending themselves from attack.
They should not be exposed in this way. Instead, detachments
of troops, ready for combat if required, should be sent to
Haiti to demonstrate U.S. commitment to upholding the rule of
law. It would be wrong to keep troops in Haiti merely to
disguise the fact that U.S. intervention, hailed as one of
President Clinton's major foreign policy achievements, has
failed.

I would point out that that editorial absolutely parallels the advice
we are getting from the military. Now, we have heard testimony that
Haiti needs to be treated the same as everybody else. I agree. That is
what we are trying to do is take out the permanent troops and replace
them with the periodic deployments which are characteristic for the
area.
Secondly, we are trying to reduce the strain on the readiness of our
troops because, Lord knows, we need them and the reduced strain would
be helpful to the military. Thirdly, we are trying to increase troop
safety. In fact our troops have been fired on in Haiti. Many people do
not know that. Fourthly, many of the activities that are going on in
Haiti that we need to help with are better suited with other NGOs. We
will help those other NGOs as we have in the past and will continue to
do in the future. That is where the help should be coming for the
Haitians.
There are other reports coming from Haiti, well founded at this time,
of new brutality and unfortunately involves brutality by people in
Haiti, Haitians who are trained by the U.S. This is not good. Things
are going sour in Haiti. The gentleman from Connecticut has pointed out
that we have now got a problem in Haiti. I do not know if the

[[Page H3990]]

gentleman has noticed that we have got a dictatorship returning to
Haiti in the past several months and that we no longer have all the
elements of democracy down there that we seek to have. The dictatorship
has in fact returned. But that is not the reason for the amendment. The
reason for the amendment is to give Haiti a better chance to treat it
the same as everybody else, to get the right kind of help going to
Haiti and to get our troops back where they need to be.
This is the defense authorization bill. This is not the Haiti relief
bill. This is the defense authorization bill. The military has
recommended we get those troops out of there on a permanent basis. We
should listen to the military. Mr. Chairman, I urge support of the
amendment.
Ms. BROWN of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the
Gilman-Goss amendment, which limits funds for deployment of US Armed
Forces in Haiti.
There are about 400 US military personnel in Haiti, who make up the
US-Haiti support Group. This mission is humanitarian in nature, and
provides engineering and other infrastructure assistance, and it is
important to note that their presence is not permanent.
The role our troops play in Haiti is critical. If this amendment
passes; however, we would send a negative message to the people of
Haiti; namely, that the United States is leaving them at a critical
time in the country's movement toward democracy.
I would like to point out that no other statute requires that the
President report to Congress before a training deployment, as would be
required if this passes.
I urge you to vote ``no'' on this amendment.
Lastly, it is unfortunate that a Member from Florida continues to
attack our policy in Haiti. What we need to understand is that when the
problems of Haiti go unresolved, these problems in turn, become ours as
well.
Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong opposition to this
amendment. The Gilman/Goss amendment sends the wrong signal to the
people of Haiti. It says that we don't care about democracy and we
don't care about the rule of law and certainly we don't care about the
people of Haiti.
This amendment would mandate a congressionally-imposed deadline for
the withdrawal of troops which could send a destructive signal to
opponents of democratic reform in Haiti. We are not talking about many
troops--just 270 troops. That is vastly different from the 25,000
troops that went to Haiti 5 years ago. The 25,000 troops didn't have a
single causality and you wanted to end that. Now the 270 troops that
help in the areas of health care and rehabilitation program--you want
to cut that also. This is ludicrous.
This is just another tactic to embarrass this Administration and to
call into question smart, quick and decisive action we took in 1994
when we restored democracy back to Haiti by taking out Raoul Cedras and
restoring the democratic government of then President Jean Bertrand
Aristide.
Don't you remember what it was like 7 years ago when boat people
drowned just to flee persecution and repression.
60,000 refugees left and fled for their lives. Many died trying to
escape. This amendment would cut off badly needed money to the defense
program. This program allows children to be vaccinated and also allows
engineers to train in building roads and bridges.
Mr. Speaker, this is the last program we have in Haiti and now that
is in jeopardy. What exactly do you want to happen in Haiti. You cut
off the training program, you effectively ended the MICIVIH program and
now this humanitarian program.
The MICIVIH program was established in 1993 jointly by the United
Nations General Assembly and the Organization of American States. Since
that time, it has made critical contributions to Haiti's political
development by assisting judicial reform efforts, conducting credible
human rights monitoring and carrying out impartial investigations into
human rights violations. Now that's gone.
Elections are coming up soon. This amendment would end what is a
small and worthwhile humanitarian support program in Haiti.
The U.S. Military Support Group in Haiti--a 400 strong presence of
engineers, humanitarian civil affairs and other personnel--serves as a
visible manifestation of U.S. support for Haiti's democratic transition
and economic development.
The presence of U.S. military personnel in Haiti also has a positive
effect on the security and stability of Haiti. This is not a permanent
presence in Haiti. The role our troops play there is critical, giving
Haitians reason to be hopeful by building schools, providing health
care, digging wells, and being a visible sign of the U.S. commitment to
democracy in that country. The President has made it clear that he is
paring down on the deployment and this is not the time to pull our
troops out of Haiti.
Let's not pick on Haiti. I rise in opposition to this amendment and
urge my colleagues to do the same.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) will
be postponed.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 14 printed
in House Report 106-175.

Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mrs. Meek of Florida

Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Part A amendment No. 14 offered by Mrs. Meek of Florida:
At the end of title VII (page 238, after line 22), insert
the following new section:

SEC. 726. RESTORATION OF PRIOR POLICY REGARDING RESTRICTIONS
ON USE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MEDICAL
FACILITIES.

Section 1093 of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``(a) Restriction on Use of Funds.--''; and
(2) by striking subsection (b).

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentlewoman from
Florida (Mrs. Meek) and the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Buyer) each
will control 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Meek).
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I am offering an amendment that simply repeals the statutory
prohibition on privately funded abortions in overseas military
facilities and restores the law to what it was for many years. This
amendment would permit servicewomen stationed overseas to use their own
funds to obtain reproductive health care. No Federal funds would be
used and health care professionals opposed to performing abortions as a
matter of conscience or moral principle would not be required to do so.
Earlier this month, this amendment was endorsed on a bipartisan basis
by the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the Committee on Armed
Services, the committee of jurisdiction. This was a major victory for
women serving in our armed forces. Unfortunately, the full committee
failed to follow the recommendation of the subcommittee and deleted the
language from the bill. As one of the ranking women here, I strongly
feel that this ill-advised policy must be overturned. Women in our
armed forces already give up many freedoms and risk their lives to
defend our country. They should not have to sacrifice their privacy,
their health and their basic constitutional rights for a policy with no
valid military purpose.
Many of my colleagues will recognize this amendment as the former
Harman amendment. I am proud to attempt along with the Women's Caucus,
those of us who support this, to continue the good work of my friend
and my colleague Congresswoman Jane Harman. I urge my colleagues to
vote for this amendment. We owe our women serving our Nation no less,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, over the last 30 years the availability of abortion
services at military medical facilities has been subjected to numerous
changes and interpretations. In January 1993, President Clinton signed
an executive order directing the Department of Defense to permit
privately funded abortions in military treatment facilities. The
changes ordered by the President, however, did not greatly increase the
access to abortion services. Few abortions were performed at military
treatment facilities overseas for a number of reasons. First, the
United States military follows the prevailing laws and rules of the
host nations regarding abortions. Secondly, the military has had a
difficult time finding health care professionals in uniform willing to
perform the procedures. Third, the real purpose of military medical
treatment

[[Page H3991]]

facilities is for military medical readiness and the training of
lifesaving instead of the taking of life. Current law allows military
women and dependents to receive abortions in military facilities in the
cases of rape, incest or when necessary to save the life of the mother.
The House voted several times to ban abortions at overseas military
hospitals. A similar amendment offered by Representative Jane Harman in
the fiscal year 1998 Defense Authorization Act was rejected 196-224. In
1998, the House National Security Committee rejected another attempt to
allow privately funded abortions at these facilities. When considering
the fiscal year 1996 defense authorization and appropriations bills,
the House voted eight times in favor of the present ban.
In overseas locations where safe, legal abortions are not available,
beneficiaries have the option of using space available travel for
returning to the United States or traveling to another overseas
location for the purpose of obtaining an abortion.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to turn
over control of the time in the management of this amendment to the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Sanchez). She is the originator of
this amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman
from Florida?
There was no objection.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs.
Meek) for her help on this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.
Andrews).
(Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ANDREWS. I thank my friend from California for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, this is a question of constitutional rights. When
someone puts on the uniform of the United States military, she should
not forfeit her constitutional rights. If a different constitutional
right were at stake here, I suspect that the attitude of those who
oppose this amendment would be very different. They may not like the
fact that the Constitution guarantees the right to choose, but it does.
If we had a policy that said that you could not freely exercise
religion at your own expense on military property in foreign countries,
people would object vociferously to that because they would understand
that there was something fundamentally wrong to denying people in the
military their constitutional rights.
You may not like this constitutional right. You are free to try to
change it. But it is a constitutional right. And to deny it to women
who serve in uniform is just wrong. The Sanchez amendment corrects that
wrong. I would urge everyone to support it strongly as I do.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds to respond. I
assure the gentleman that the United States Supreme Court permits the
Congress to discriminate and for us to make decisions with regard to
the military. If you are too tall, if you are too short, if you are too
heavy, if you are colorblind, if you are diabetic. We are permitted to
decide how we can shape the force and we can also decide on rules and
procedures for the military.
Mr. Chairman I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania
(Mr. Pitts).
Mr. PITTS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Meek amendment.
The House has spoken on this issue many times. Each time it has
rejected this amendment. Just last year the House rejected this same
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Lowey) by a
vote of 190-232.

{time} 1915

By requiring U.S. military facilities to provide elective abortion on
demand to uniformed personnel dependents, the Meek amendment would turn
DOD medical treatment facilities into abortion clinics.
When the 1993 Clinton administration policy permitting abortions to
be performed in military facilities, which was reversed in 1996 except
in the cases of rape, incest and the life of the mother, when that was
first begun, all military physicians as well as many nurses and
supporting personnel refused to perform or even to assist in elective
abortions.
Our troops already are demoralized enough. Why should we again ask
them to do something to which they object?
I received a couple of letters on this issue. I just want to read a
couple of quotes.
The National Right to Life Committee in a letter summed it up well by
saying, ``Facilities and personnel of the Federal Government should not
be utilized to deliberately destroy the lives of innocent human
beings.''
And I received a letter from the Archdiocese for the Military
Services which echoes this message by saying, ``Military medical
personnel have refused to take part in the procedure of life destroying
abortion, citing the primary responsibility of our Nation's military
services to preserve human life.''
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to oppose again the Meek
amendment.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would just remind the gentleman who just spoke that
there is already an objection clause and that no military personnel are
forced to perform any of this.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California
(Mrs. Tauscher), my friend.
Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I guess I am a little confused about the
subcommittee chairman's assertion that the military discriminates right
now against people that are too tall and too other things when in fact
I think what we would actually call those would be minimum standards
for qualification to qualify to be a good soldier, airmen, Marine. The
question I have is: Is there such a thing as being too female, because
this is a specific issue for American fighting men and women, and this
is about American women who have the right to have the right to choose
as American citizens, but because they are on military duty overseas
our colleagues are suggesting that they forfeit that right.
I think that is discriminatory, I think that is inappropriate, and I
urge my colleagues to support the Sanchez amendment.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Connecticut (Mrs. Johnson).
Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from
Indiana for yielding this time to me knowing that we do not agree on
the subject. I just want to make a couple of points:
First of all, these are privately funded, these are not taxpayer
funded. Secondly, we have the personnel to perform these procedures
because they perform them in the case of rape, incest and the life of
the mother. Thirdly, our men and women under arms serve under American
law and American command, and like it or not, they have the same right
to legal medical procedures as women throughout America. And fourthly,
this is terribly discriminatory. If someone is an officer, they can
afford to have their wife fly home or their daughter who got in trouble
fly home. If someone is a common enlisted guy, they cannot, and space
available does not necessarily work.
Do my colleagues really want them to go out on the medical economy of
some of these foreign deployments where death is just about as likely
as any other outcome? Do they not have a right as service men and women
to have either their wives safe or, as women, to have a safe procedure?
Mothers have a right to live for their children even if they have to
elect this procedure.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Davis), my colleague.
Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my strong
support for the Meek Sanchez amendment. I find it ironic that strong
women, brave women, who enter the military to fight for their country
then cannot get the same basic rights that people back home already
have, rights they are fighting to protect. I think that this policy is
the height of hypocrisy, and this amendment should not even be debated,
it should not even be a question. It even should not be a
consideration.
Mr. Chairman, let us extend to the fighting women in the military the

[[Page H3992]]

same choice options that others have back home. I thank the gentlewoman
for having yielded this time to me.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
New Jersey (Mr. Smith).
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my good friend
for yielding this time to me and congratulate him on his courage in
embracing this important human rights issue. Let me begin by noting
that I have the utmost respect for my friends on the other side of this
issue, but in all honesty I continue to struggle with how so many
bright and otherwise enlightened people can continue to demand a course
of action that literally kills children and emotionally wounds so many
of their mothers.
As my colleagues know, the national debate on partial-birth abortion
has demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that abortion is violence
against children. Can our friends on the other side of this issue not
appreciate the inherent cruelty towards babies in sanctioning the
stabbing to death of a partially born child followed by the suctioning
of his or her brains and then calling that choice? I believe that such
child abuse is beyond words, Mr. Chairman.
As my colleagues know, abortion methods often involve the literal
dismemberment of children with razor-blade-tipped curettes. They are
really just knives hooked up to a hose, a suction device that is some
20 to 30 times more powerful than the vacuum cleaner my colleagues have
in their homes today. Well, the baby's body is literally hacked apart.
The arms and the legs are cut off. Next time my colleagues go home and
look at their child, they should remember this. And they can make faces
and roll their eyes, but that is what abortion actually entails; it
hacks off the arms, it decapitates the head.
I do not know if my colleagues have ever seen The Silent Scream put
out by Dr. Nathanson, a former abortionist and founder of NARAL. He
shows with ultrasound a baby being hacked to death, the commonplace
abortion method that is utilized in this country. If the Sanchez-Meek
amendment becomes law, it would facilitate that kind of cruelty towards
children in our overseas military hospitals.
There are chemical abortions where highly concentrated salt solutions
and other kinds of poisons are literally injected into the amniotic sac
or into the baby so as to procure that baby's death. That is child
abuse.
A humane and a compassionate society will embrace those children with
prenatal care and love even when they are, quote, unwanted and would
say that that kind of violence cannot be sanctioned.
I chair the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human
Rights. I have had about a hundred hearings in that Subcommittee and in
the Helsinki Commission which I also chair, many of which have focused
on torture. I have to tell my colleagues there is an unsettling
similarity between the mangled badly bruised bodies of people who have
endured torture and the victims of saline or salting-out abortions
where they are covered with bruises. Very often the only part not
bruised is the palms of their hands because it takes 2 hours for the
baby to die, and the babies clench their fists because they feel the
pain.
Abortion is child abuse. The Sanchez-Meek amendment would allow and
facilitate abortion on demand in our military hospitals, the ultimate
violation of human rights. We need to stand for the innocent unborn
children and for their mothers. The emphasis should be on prenatal
care, not on a course of action that maims, chemically poisons, and
otherwise destroys human beings.
Please vote no on the Sanchez-Meek amendment.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Waters).
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the
Sanchez amendment, a bill that would restore women the right to equal
access in health services at military hospitals. This amendment is
first and foremost about protecting women's health. It would give
military women the access to the health care they need and deserve.
Soldiers in our Armed Forces already give up many freedoms and risk
their lives in defending our country. They should not be asked to
sacrifice their health, their safety and their basic constitutional
rights for a policy with no valid military purpose.
Let me clarify that the amendment does not allow taxpayer-funded
abortions at military hospitals, nor does it compel any doctor who
opposes abortion to perform an abortion. The amendment merely
reinstates the policy that was in effect from 1973 to 1988 and again
from 1993 to 1996. This policy gives women in the military who are
stationed overseas the same rights as military women in their own
country, the right to pay for a safe and legal abortion with their own
private money.
Enough is enough. Every woman should be guaranteed the same rights as
any other woman, particularly if those same women are fighting to
protect the freedoms of this country. How can we in good conscience
deny our service women any right at all?
We will hear a lot of inflammatory language and a lot of discussions
designed to frighten and intimidate. That is not what it is all about,
Mr. Chairman. It is about women who want to take their own money and
pay for a service that should be available. It is not, but they are
paying their own money to have this service, one of the health care
benefits that they should be afforded that they are not being afforded.
How can we say to a military woman who is out there risking her life
for us in our Armed Services that we are going to deny access to
service? We do not do that to men in any shape, form or fashion; do not
do it to women.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I am just not sure I remember the last time a man
received an abortion. I do not think it has ever happened. I do not
think it is humanly possible. I am not sure how gender even became
injected in this debate.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.
Hyde).
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, a lot of talk about rights, about women's
rights, and properly so. Not a word, not a syllable, not a phrase is
spoken about the rights of the unborn child. Because the unborn child
in the process we call abortion or euphemistically we call choice,
which is an interesting subject, but nonetheless the rights of the
unborn are never considered whatsoever.
Now I have heard people on the other side say that there is a
constitutional right to choose. It is really not in the Constitution,
but the court found it there in 1973, 7 to 2, the right to an abortion.
But there is no right to have the taxpayers pay for that abortion.
Now our colleagues will say but under the Meek amendment, which we
are debating here, under this amendment the pregnant woman will pay her
own expenses. But they are using a medical facility of the United
States military, and thus they are turning that into not a place for
healing, but an abortion mill, an abortion clinic.
Now there are people whose tax dollars go to pay for that hospital
who are morally opposed to abortion, who do not think it is a good
thing, who think it is a tragedy to take an innocent little human life,
and before it gets a chance to laugh or cry, exterminate it. They do
not terminate a pregnancy, they exterminate. All pregnancies terminate
after 9 months.
Now this has been the policy of our country and our government for
some time, and it ought to stay there. Do not turn military hospitals
into abortion clinics. Do not use the facilities that are paid for by
taxpayers to kill an unborn child.
Our colleagues say they want to make abortion safe, legal and rare.
We can make it legal, we cannot make it moral, and we cannot make it
safe for the unborn, and by facilitating abortions we are not making it
rare.
So think of the child, put the child in the picture, think of the
unborn life that is entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness, and do not turn our military hospitals into abortion
clinics.

{time} 1930

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds.
Mr. Chairman, I would just like to remind my colleagues that there
are already abortions performed at military

[[Page H3993]]

hospitals, and that a woman who chooses to have one under this
amendment would pay all the costs of having that procedure done in a
military hospital. So it is at no expense to the taxpayer.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from California
(Mr. Sherman).
(Mr. SHERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Sanchez amendment. I hope this
amendment has the support of all but the most extreme of the anti-
choice Members of this body, because this is indeed a very moderate
approach. It simply says that women stationed overseas will be allowed
to have abortions in safe military facilities at their own expense, at
an expense that covers the full cost, not just the marginal cost,
including, I would assume, a charge for the facility itself.
It says that no doctor would have to perform the procedure if or she
did not want to because of moral or religious or ethical objections. It
simply reinstates the policy of this country from 1973 to 1988 and
again from 1993 to 1996.
We are about to deploy servicewomen even into the Balkans, where the
hospitals have been damaged, where the Albanian hospitals are overrun
or are having to deal with refugees, where all of the hospitals are
overburdened, and we are turning to American servicewomen and saying,
``Yes, you might risk your life because of a sniper or a land mine,
but, in addition, you must risk your life to an unsanitary operation
performed in whatever hospital or whatever illegal facility is
available.''
The other alternative available to our servicewomen is to wait.
Instead of the abortion taking place in the first month, it would take
place in some later month. Is that what the so-termed pro-life forces
want?
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield one minute to the gentlewoman from
Wisconsin (Ms. Baldwin).
Ms. BALDWIN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this
amendment. Our servicewomen and the wives and daughters of our
servicemen stationed abroad do not expect special treatment, but they
are entitled to receive the same rights guaranteed all Americans under
Roe v. Wade.
This bill penalizes women who have volunteered to serve their country
by unduly interfering with their constitutionally protected right to
choose. The Sanchez-Morella amendment assures that servicewomen and the
wives and daughters of our servicemen do not become second-class
citizens or subject to a two-tiered health care system. This amendment
provides access for our servicewomen to medical care, to legal medical
care.
Individuals who volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces already give
up many freedoms and they risk their lives defending our country. In
exchange, we offer our military personnel a full array of health care
services; that is, except in the case of comprehensive reproductive
health care.
I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the amendment.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cunningham).
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I respect immensely my friend that
spoke about abortion, but that is not really what this whole issue is
about. Most of the women in the military overseas are very, very young.
Even someone that voluntarily wants an abortion, I can imagine there is
quite an emotional scar, whether you choose to or not. The military
does not want these young women having an abortion overseas. They do
not want someone in a military unit overseas that is going to go
through this emotional trouble that has to work with a team.
There is not a single woman that has ever been forced in the military
to have that abortion overseas. The military will bring that woman
back, and, under Roe v. Wade, they are not denied, not one single item,
and they are protected.
So they are not abused, they are not discriminated against, because
they have the same rights back here in the United States once they get
in CONUS. But the military does not want young impressionable women to
have to go through an abortion overseas.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to let our colleague know I have a letter
here from the Department of Defense that strongly support this
amendment. In fact, our military does want this. They do want this
amendment to pass.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Woolsey).
(Ms. WOOLSEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this
amendment. This issue is about equal treatment for servicewomen
stationed overseas. This amendment is not about Federal support for
abortion services, it is about giving women who have volunteered to
serve their country abroad the same protections and choices they would
have here at home.
When a woman in the military is stationed overseas, the best medical
facility is most often the base hospital, a hospital that is clean and
safe with well-trained doctors. However, this amendment denies military
women, those who serve and protect our country, access to this base
medical facility, even when the woman pays for and is willing to pay
for the treatment.
Regardless of your position on choice, ask yourself a question: What
would you want for your daughter, for your sister or your wife? If she
were stationed overseas, would you not want her to go to the hospital
of her choice? Would you not want her to go to an American military
facility?
Mr. Chairman, these women fight for our freedom every day. Let us not
take their freedom away. Vote ``yes'' on this amendment.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Nadler).
(Mr. NADLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is about recognizing the
rights and dignity of our women in the armed services. It is really a
very limited attempt to correct the policy that never should have been
enacted in the first place. It simply allows women to obtain safe
abortion services using their own money at U.S. military hospitals
overseas.
The current ban increases women's health risks and denies women their
basic constitutional right to privacy. A woman must inform her
superiors of her need for an abortion and wait until there is space
available on a military flight back to the United States. The delay
puts women's lives in jeopardy. The need to inform her superiors
violates her privacy rights.
Furthermore, women serving overseas depend on the base hospital for
medical care in areas where local health care facilities are
inadequate. The health of a servicewoman is threatened when she has to
look outside of the base for a safe provider of the medical attention
she needs. The current policy may even force a woman to seek an illegal
or unsafe abortion when facing a crisis pregnancy.
The ban discriminates against the women serving our country overseas.
This amendment would ensure equal access to comprehensive reproductive
health care for all U.S. servicewomen and dependents, regardless of
where they are stationed, and therefore should be enacted.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Maryland (Mrs. Morella), the cosponsor of this amendment.
(Mrs. MORELLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to cosponsor this amendment.
Much has already been said about what the amendment does, but it does
allow women serving in the military overseas who depend on their base
hospitals for medical care and may be stationed in areas where local
health care facilities are inadequate to be able to avail themselves at
their own cost of an abortion that may be very necessary.
Women who volunteer to serve in our Armed Forces already give up many
freedoms, and they risk their lives to defend our country. They should
not have to sacrifice their privacy, their health and their basic
rights for a policy that does not have any valid military purpose.

[[Page H3994]]

Mr. Chairman, I think the amendment is about women's health. I
believe that. I believe it is also about fairness. The amendment also,
and this has been repeated over and over again, it does not allow
taxpayer-funded abortions at military hospitals, nor does it compel any
doctor who opposes abortion on principle or as a matter of conscience
to perform an abortion. It reinstates the policy we had before.
Finally, please know the amendment has the strong support of health
care providers, organizations like the American Nurses Association,
American Public Health Association, Medical Women's Association and the
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. The litany goes on. These
are medical people who know.
Please support the amendment.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
New York (Mrs. Maloney).
Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the
Sanchez amendment. Only in a Republican Congress can a woman sign up to
serve her country and have her rights denied in return. While a female
soldier is busy defending her country overseas, her country in this
Congress is working to take away her rights.
If a male member of the armed services needs medical attention
overseas, he receives the best. If a female member of the armed
services needs a specific medical procedure, she is forced to either
wait until she can travel to the United States or go to a foreign
hospital, which may be unsanitary and dangerous.
This bill will cost the American taxpayer nothing. Each woman will
pick up her own tab. All she wants is the right to do it.
Women have waited long enough to receive equal treatment in the
military. I hope my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will vote for
this amendment, and give these most deserving soldiers back what is
rightfully theirs.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds to respond.
Mr. Chairman, it is quite disappointing for the gentlewoman who just
spoke to talk about a Republican Congress denying.
Let me just state this: The purpose of the military is to fight and
win the Nation's wars. The gentlewoman's comments also impugn the
dignity of Democrats who are pro-life advocates, those whose passion is
about saving life, not taking the life of the innocent unborn child, as
she is walking off the floor and does not want to hear this debate. I
am speaking directly to you.
There are Members of both sides of this aisle that speak passionately
about saving the life of the unborn. For you to try to rein in politics
is completely unnecessary.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 seconds to the gentlewoman from
New York (Mrs. Maloney) to respond.
Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, this is a constitutional
right, a right that is legal in the United States. You are depriving a
woman who is defending her country, putting her life on the line to
defend her country. You are taking away a right that men have. It is a
right that she would have if she were in her own country. I think it is
outrageous. It is wrong. Everyone should vote against this amendment.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Lowey).
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from New York is recognized for 50
seconds.
Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Sanchez-
Morella-Lowey amendment, and I thank the gentlewoman from California
(Ms. Sanchez) and my colleagues for their important work on this issue.
In closing, I just want to say, please do not be fooled. This is not
an issue of taxpayer dollars funding abortion. This is about American
women in private with their own money exercising their constitutional
right to choose.
Over 100,000 women live on American military bases. These women work
to protect the freedom of our country. These women risk their lives and
security to protect our great and powerful Nation. These women for the
past 4 years have been denied the right to a safe and legal abortion at
the bases where they are stationed.

{time} 1945

Just yesterday, when we debated the anti-choice majority's latest
effort to restrict access to legal abortion, I said I was tired of
these attempts to chip away at a woman's right to choose. I ask my
colleagues to please support the Sanchez-Morella-Lowey amendment.
Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of the time to the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon) to close in opposition to the
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Meek).
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon) is recognized
for 3 minutes to close.
Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in very strong opposition
to this amendment. I would encourage all of my colleagues on both sides
of the aisle to vote against this amendment.
I bring a somewhat unique perspective to this debate in that not only
prior to coming to the Congress did I practice medicine, but for many
years prior to coming to the Congress I practiced medicine in the
military. I was actually in the Army Medical Corps at the time when
pro-life President Ronald Reagan passed an order that said we were not
going to have abortions in military hospitals anymore.
It was very interesting for me at the time, I was a medical resident,
to see the reaction to that order. It was sort of a sigh of relief.
Everybody that I spoke to, the doctors and nurses, were very pleased
that they were going to take that very, very controversial issue and
move it out of the military hospitals.
Some people have been arguing that this is a constitutional right.
There is no constitutional right to have an abortion in a military
hospital. Indeed, the reason all of those doctors and nurses, even many
of whom considered themselves to be ``pro-choice'', liked getting it
out is because they did not like to have anything to do with it.
It is one of the most fascinating things to me, when I talk with my
medical colleagues, many of whom say, you know, I am pro-choice, but
they always follow it with this. They say, I would never perform an
abortion, I would never assist in an abortion. The reason why they say
that is they know exactly what an abortion is. It is the taking of an
innocent human life. It has a beating heart. It has brain waves. Those
are the things that I used to use to make a determination as to whether
or not somebody was dead.
This is a very, very controversial issue. Even if Members do stand on
the pro-abortion side of this issue, Members have to acknowledge that
it is so incredibly controversial within the population in general that
this would be something that we would be well served as a Congress to
keep outside of Federal facilities, outside of Federal hospitals.
To say that the women will pay for the abortion, we all know that
that issue is just part of the story. Having that infrastructure,
having those medical professionals there, it represents a certain
amount of Federal support.
For the millions and millions of pro-life Americans, I think
certainly if Members are pro-life, they should vote against this
amendment. I think if Members are undecided, they should vote against
this amendment.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the
amendment, which will restore regulations permitting abortions for
service members and their dependents at overseas defense department
medical facilities.
Without this amendment women who have volunteered to serve their
country will continue to be discriminated against by prohibiting them
from exercising their legally protected right to choose abortion simply
because they are stationed overseas.
While the department of defense policy respects the laws of host
nations regarding abortions, service women stationed overseas should be
entitled to the same services, as do women stationed in the U.S.
Prohibiting women from using their own funds to obtain abortion
services at overseas military facilities endangers women's health.
Women stationed overseas depend on their base hospitals for medical
care, and are often situated in areas where local facilities are
inadequate or unavailable. This policy may cause a woman facing a
crisis pregnancy to seek out an illegal and potentially unsafe
abortion.
Since 1996, the ban on DOD abortions was made permanent by the DOD
authorization bill. I have fought to restore the female service
member's constitutional right of choice.

[[Page H3995]]

This amendment does not require the department of defense to pay for
abortions; it simply repeals the current ban on privately funded
abortions at U.S. military facilities overseas. Absolutely no federal
funds will be used for abortion services. In addition, all three
branches of the military have a ``conscience clause'' provision which
will permit medical personnel who have moral, religious or ethical
objections to abortion or family planning service not to participate in
the procedure. These provisions will remain intact as well.
Access to abortion is a crucial right for American women, whether or
not they are stationed abroad. This amendment must be supported, as
women who serve our country must be able to exercise their choice
whether or not they are on American soil.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from
Florida (Mrs. Meek) as the designee of the gentlewoman from California
(Ms. Sanchez).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Meek)
will be postponed.

Sequential Votes Postponed in Committee of the Whole

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, proceedings will now
resume on those amendments on which further proceedings were postponed
in the following order:
Amendment No. 12 offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay);
Amendment No. 13 offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss);
Amendment No. 14 offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Meek)
as the designee of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Sanchez).
The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for any electronic vote
after the first vote in this series.

Amendment No. 12 Offered by Mr. De Lay

The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) on
which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes
prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 15-minute vote, followed by two 5-minute
votes.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 248,
noes 143, not voting 7, as follows:

[Roll No. 182]

AYES--284

Aderholt
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bentsen
Berkley
Berry
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Bono
Brady (TX)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canady
Cannon
Capuano
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Clement
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Condit
Cook
Cooksey
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crowley
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLay
DeMint
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dingell
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Etheridge
Everett
Ewing
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Fowler
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill (MT)
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Hooley
Hostettler
Houghton
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inslee
Isakson
Istook
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jenkins
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Kelly
Kildee
King (NY)
Kingston
Knollenberg
Kucinich
Kuykendall
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manzullo
Mascara
McCollum
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Menendez
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller, Gary
Minge
Moakley
Moore
Moran (KS)
Morella
Myrick
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Pascrell
Paul
Pease
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Reynolds
Riley
Rivers
Roemer
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roukema
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Salmon
Sanders
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaffer
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Shimkus
Shows
Shuster
Simpson
Skeen
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Spence
Stabenow
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sununu
Sweeney
Talent
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Tierney
Toomey
Traficant
Turner
Upton
Vitter
Walden
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Weygand
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Wu
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOES--143

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baird
Baldwin
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Bereuter
Berman
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (FL)
Capps
Cardin
Carson
Clay
Clayton
Clyburn
Conyers
Coyne
Cummings
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dicks
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Ford
Frank (MA)
Gejdenson
Gonzalez
Gutierrez
Hastings (FL)
Hill (IN)
Hilliard
Hinojosa
Hoeffel
Horn
Hoyer
Jackson (IL)
Jefferson
John
Johnson, E. B.
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Klink
Kolbe
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Larson
Lee
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lowey
Luther
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDermott
McGovern
McKinney
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Mink
Mollohan
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Ose
Owens
Pastor
Payne
Phelps
Pickett
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez
Sandlin
Sawyer
Schakowsky
Scott
Serrano
Sisisky
Skelton
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Spratt
Tauscher
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thurman
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Velazquez
Vento
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (PA)
Wexler
Woolsey
Wynn

NOT VOTING--7

Brown (CA)
Hinchey
Jones (OH)
Kasich
Sherwood
Stark
Visclosky

{time} 2016

Mrs. THURMAN, Ms. DANNER, and Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, and Messrs. WEINER,
HORN, and DAVIS of Florida changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Messrs. HOLDEN, WISE, LUCAS of Kentucky, HALL of Ohio, MOAKLEY,
LARGENT, KILDEE, MASCARA, STUPAK, DINGELL, COSTELLO, MOORE and SHERMAN,
and Ms. PELOSI, Ms. SLAUGHTER and Mrs. MALONEY of New York changed
their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

{time} 2015

Announcement by the Chairman

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the Chair announces
that he will reduce to a minimum of 5 minutes the period of time within
which a vote by electronic device will be taken on each amendment on
which the Chair has postponed further proceedings.

Amendment No. 13 Offered by Mr. Goss

The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) on
which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes
prevailed by voice vote.

[[Page H3996]]

The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 227,
noes 198, not voting 9, as follows:

[Roll No. 183]

AYES--227

Aderholt
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brady (TX)
Bryant
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cannon
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Coble
Collins
Combest
Condit
Cook
Cooksey
Cox
Crane
Cubin
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeFazio
DeLay
DeMint
Dickey
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Everett
Ewing
Fletcher
Foley
Fossella
Fowler
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill (MT)
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Isakson
Istook
Jenkins
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Kelly
Kingston
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuykendall
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
McCollum
McCrery
McInnis
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Metcalf
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller, Gary
Minge
Moran (KS)
Morella
Myrick
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Ose
Oxley
Packard
Paul
Pease
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Reynolds
Riley
Roemer
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Roukema
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaffer
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sununu
Sweeney
Talent
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Toomey
Traficant
Upton
Vitter
Walden
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOES--198

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baird
Baldacci
Baldwin
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Bentsen
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Bonior
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Campbell
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Forbes
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green (TX)
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hastings (FL)
Hill (IN)
Hilliard
Hinojosa
Hoeffel
Holden
Holt
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
John
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kleczka
Klink
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Lantos
Larson
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDermott
McGovern
McHugh
McKinney
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Phelps
Pickett
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rivers
Rodriguez
Ros-Lehtinen
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Schakowsky
Scott
Serrano
Sherman
Shows
Sisisky
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Strickland
Stupak
Tauscher
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thurman
Tierney
Towns
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Velazquez
Vento
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Weygand
Wise
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn

NOT VOTING--9

Brown (CA)
Coburn
Hinchey
Kasich
Lewis (CA)
Rush
Sherwood
Stark
Visclosky

{time} 2024

Mr. METCALF changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mrs. Meek of Florida

The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote
on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Meek) as
the designee of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Sanchez) on which
further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by
voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The CHAIRMAN. A recorded voted has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 203,
noes 225, not voting 6, as follows:

[Roll No. 184]

AYES--203

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baird
Baldacci
Baldwin
Barrett (WI)
Bass
Becerra
Bentsen
Berkley
Berman
Biggert
Bishop
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Boehlert
Bonior
Bono
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Campbell
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson
Castle
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Condit
Conyers
Coyne
Cramer
Cummings
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Dunn
Edwards
Ehrlich
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Foley
Ford
Fowler
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gilchrest
Gilman
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green (TX)
Greenwood
Gutierrez
Hastings (FL)
Hill (IN)
Hilliard
Hinojosa
Hoeffel
Holt
Hooley
Horn
Houghton
Hoyer
Inslee
Isakson
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kelly
Kennedy
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Kolbe
Kuykendall
Lampson
Lantos
Larson
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McDermott
McGovern
McKinney
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Miller, George
Minge
Mink
Moore
Moran (VA)
Morella
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Obey
Olver
Ose
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Pickett
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Ramstad
Rangel
Reyes
Rivers
Rodriguez
Rothman
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Schakowsky
Scott
Serrano
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sisisky
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Spratt
Stabenow
Strickland
Tanner
Tauscher
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thurman
Tierney
Towns
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Velazquez
Vento
Walden
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Wise
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn

NOES--225

Aderholt
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Bereuter
Berry
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blunt
Boehner
Bonilla
Borski
Brady (TX)
Bryant
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cannon
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Coble
Coburn

[[Page H3997]]

Collins
Combest
Cook
Cooksey
Costello
Cox
Crane
Crowley
Cubin
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeLay
DeMint
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Emerson
English
Everett
Ewing
Fletcher
Forbes
Fossella
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gillmor
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green (WI)
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill (MT)
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Istook
Jenkins
John
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kildee
King (NY)
Kingston
Klink
Knollenberg
Kucinich
LaFalce
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
Mascara
McCollum
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Metcalf
Mica
Miller, Gary
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran (KS)
Murtha
Myrick
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Oberstar
Ortiz
Oxley
Packard
Paul
Pease
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Phelps
Pickering
Pitts
Pombo
Portman
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Regula
Reynolds
Riley
Roemer
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaffer
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shimkus
Shows
Shuster
Simpson
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Stupak
Sununu
Sweeney
Talent
Tancredo
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Toomey
Traficant
Upton
Vitter
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Weygand
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

NOT VOTING--6

Brown (CA)
Hinchey
Kasich
Sherwood
Stark
Visclosky

{time} 2033

Ms. McKINNEY changed her vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Ney) having assumed the chair, Mr. Nethercutt, Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1401) to
authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 for military
activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, and for other
purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

____________________