[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 81 (Wednesday, June 9, 1999)]
[House]
[Pages H3964-H3997]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 200 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, 
H.R. 1401.

                              {time}  1522


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of 
the bill (H.R. 1401) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2000 
and 2001 for military activities of the Department of Defense, to 
prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, 
and for other purposes, with Mr. Nethercutt in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today, the 
amendment by the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) printed in the 
Congressional Record of June 8, 1999, had been disposed of.
  The Chair understands that amendment No. 2 will not be offered.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed in House 
Report 106-175.


                Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Costello

  Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Part A Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Costello:
       At the end of title XXXI (page 453, after line 15), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 3167. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY REGULATIONS RELATING TO THE 
                   SAFEGUARDING AND SECURITY OF RESTRICTED DATA.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 18 of title I of the Atomic Energy 
     Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.) is amended by inserting 
     after section 234A the following new section:
       ``Sec. 234B. Civil Monetary Penalties for Violations of 
     Department of Energy Regulations Regarding Security of 
     Classified or Sensitive Information or Data.--
       ``a. Any person who has entered into a contract or 
     agreement with the Department of Energy, or a subcontract or 
     subagreement thereto, and who violates (or whose employee 
     violates) any applicable rule, regulation, or order 
     prescribed or otherwise issued by the Secretary pursuant to 
     this Act relating to the safeguarding or security of 
     Restricted Data or other classified or sensitive information 
     shall be subject to a civil penalty of not to exceed $100,000 
     for each such violation.

[[Page H3965]]

       ``b. The Secretary shall include in each contract with a 
     contractor of the Department provisions which provide an 
     appropriate reduction in the fees or amounts paid to the 
     contractor under the contract in the event of a violation by 
     the contractor or contractor employee of any rule, 
     regulation, or order relating to the safeguarding or security 
     of Restricted Data or other classified or sensitive 
     information. The provisions shall specify various degrees of 
     violations and the amount of the reduction attributable to 
     each degree of violation.
       ``c. The powers and limitations applicable to the 
     assessment of civil penalties under section 234A, except for 
     subsection d. of that section, shall apply to the assessment 
     of civil penalties under this section.''.
       (b) Clarifying Amendment.--The section heading of section 
     234A of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2282a) is amended by inserting 
     ``Safety'' before ``Regulations''.
       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for that Act 
     is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 
     234 the following new items:

``Sec. 234A. Civil Monetary Penalties for Violations of Department of 
              Energy Safety Regulations.
``Sec. 234B. Civil Monetary Penalties for Violations of Department of 
              Energy Regulations Regarding Security of Classified or 
              Sensitive Information or Data.''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Costello) and a Member opposed each will control 15 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Costello).
  Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the Committee on Rules for making 
my amendment in order. I applaud the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Cox) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) for their amendment. 
However, I believe there is a loophole in their amendment.
  The Cox-Dicks amendment does not cover all contractors and it does 
not cover not-for-profit contractors. My amendment addresses this 
problem by ensuring that any lab contractor who violates rules relating 
to the safeguarding and security of sensitive information or data will 
be held accountable.
  My amendment to the Atomic Energy Act gives the Secretary of Energy 
the discretion to decide when and how the fines for national security 
breaches would be imposed. If the breach of national security is 
unintentional and without consequence, the Secretary could choose to 
impose a small fine or waive the fine and issue a warning instead.
  The Act also gives the Secretary the flexibility to promulgate a 
different rule from the collection of fees for not-for-profit 
contractors. My amendment has not removed any of the flexibility 
afforded the Secretary in the Atomic Energy Act. Instead, I have given 
the Secretary the discretion to impose fines on all liable contractors. 
When a contractor employee knowingly, willfully, or repeatedly breaks 
the rules, the contractor should be held accountable and not 
automatically exempted.
  Last month when I offered this amendment in the full Committee on 
Science to H.R. 1656, the DOE authorization bill, it passed 
unanimously.
  When Secretary Richardson testified before the Committee on Science 
last month, he agreed with me that penalties should be imposed for 
national security infractions for all lab contractors, including not-
for-profit contractors.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment is very simple. It is to the point. It 
levels the playing field and, in my opinion, provides accountability to 
anyone working at any of our labs throughout the United States, be they 
for-profit or not-for-profit contractors.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask my colleagues to adopt the amendment.
  Mr. CALVERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. COSTELLO. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. CALVERT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I certainly support the intent of this amendment. It is a good 
amendment. There is some language that I would like to work with the 
gentleman from Illinois prior to going to conference. There are some 
concerns regarding fines and how it affects the taxpayers of California 
because the University of California and other public institutions.
  I would like the assurance of the gentleman that we will work 
together to come to some agreeable language that will work for everyone 
concerned.
  Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I would be happy to 
work with the gentleman. And I not only have had conversations with him 
concerning this issue, but also the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. 
Tauscher) who I would like to yield to now to express some concerns, as 
well.
  Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise for the purpose of a colloquy 
with the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Costello).
  As I understood it, the Costello amendment would subject Department 
of Energy laboratory contractors to financial penalties for violations 
of security procedures. I agree with my colleague that laboratory 
contractors must be held accountable for security lapses by their 
employees. Such accountability is necessary if we are to ensure that 
the security procedures that we put in place are properly administered. 
Protecting our Nation's secrets must be a top priority of our national 
laboratories. I am pleased that the House just voted to adopt the Cox-
Dicks amendment that enhances security at the labs.
  I am concerned, however, that the amendment of the gentleman makes no 
distinction between laboratory contractors that are for-profit 
organizations and those that are not-for-profit organizations.

                              {time}  1530

  There are key differences between how these two types of 
organizations function. For example, subjecting the University of 
California, which is a public institution, to the same fines and 
penalties as a for-profit corporation would potentially penalize all of 
the tax-paying residents of the State of California for the operations 
of a Federal facility in pursuit of a national mission. I believe that 
in leveling civil penalties against these contractors, we must account 
for the differences inherent in their organizations. I am hopeful that 
this legislation moves forward and as it moves forward we can continue 
to work together to address concerns about applying civil penalties 
against not-for-profit laboratory contractors.
  Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I appreciate the 
gentlewoman's comments and concerns. I assure her, as I do my other 
friend from California and the California delegation, that I intend to 
work with them to address this issue in conference. The goal of my 
amendment is to create a level playing field for both for- and not-for-
profit contractors. The goal in our Committee on Science, of course, 
was to try and level the playing field and as we move this legislation 
forward and hopefully if this amendment is adopted by the committee, we 
will work in conference to address the issues that you have raised 
here.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman 
from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very 
much for yielding me this time. I rise to support the legislation. I 
believe that we have a challenge to promote good scientific research, 
to do it in a manner that includes many of our citizens here in the 
United States, to reflect the diversity of this Nation, to promote 
collaboration but also to secure the important security issues of this 
country.
  With that, I would simply ask, since I happen to come from a 
community that has a great emphasis on scientific research, NASA is 
located in my area, many of my universities like the University of 
Houston, Texas Southern University, Rice University and many others who 
I have not called their names, collaborate with the Department of 
Energy and other such entities such as the Department of Defense. I 
would simply like to yield to the gentleman to inquire whether his 
amendment would in any way inhibit or put a particular hardship on the 
very good research that many of our not-for-profit, nonprofit 
institutions are engaged in.
  I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. COSTELLO. I would say to the gentlewoman that the intent of the 
amendment is not to penalize in any way any university in the State of 
Texas or for that matter in my State of Illinois that are involved in 
research at

[[Page H3966]]

 our national labs. But it is intended to give the Secretary of Energy 
the ability to penalize any not-for-profit corporation that is doing 
work for our labs that repeatedly and intentionally violates the 
security regulations and rules that we have adopted. So I would assure 
her as I have the members of the California delegation that we will 
work in conference to address the issue.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Reclaiming my time, I want to thank the 
gentleman and particularly for the fact that he has given this issue 
over to the Secretary of Energy in his wisdom and discretion, I think 
that is very important. I thank the gentleman very much for his 
amendment. I look forward to supporting this amendment.
  Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to 
the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence).
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend the gentleman for 
his amendment. It is a good one. As the chairman I am prepared to 
accept it.
  Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to 
the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking Democrat on the 
committee.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Illinois for 
yielding me this time. We have examined the amendment on this side, we 
fully understand it and find it acceptable.
  Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the House adopt my amendment, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Costello).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed 
in House Report 106-175.


                 Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Hunter

  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Part A amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Hunter:
       At the end of title XXXI (page 453, after line 15), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 3167. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE POLYGRAPH 
                   PROGRAM.

       (a) Program Required.--The Secretary of Energy, acting 
     through the Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of 
     the Department of Energy, shall carry out a 
     counterintelligence polygraph program for the defense-related 
     activities of the Department. The counterintelligence 
     polygraph program shall consist of the administration of 
     counterintelligence polygraph examinations to each covered 
     person who has access to high-risk programs or information.
       (b) Covered Persons.--For purposes of this section, a 
     covered person is one of the following:
       (1) An officer or employee of the Department.
       (2) An expert or consultant under contract to the 
     Department.
       (3) An officer or employee of any contractor of the 
     Department.
       (c) High-Risk Programs or Information.--For purposes of 
     this section, high-risk programs or information are any of 
     the following:
       (1) The programs identified as high risk in the regulations 
     prescribed by the Secretary and known as--
       (A) Special Access Programs;
       (B) Personnel Security And Assurance Programs; and
       (C) Personnel Assurance Programs.
       (2) The information identified as high risk in the 
     regulations prescribed by the Secretary and known as 
     Sensitive Compartmented Information.
       (d) Initial Testing and Consent.--The Secretary may not 
     permit a covered person to have any access to any high-risk 
     program or information unless that person first undergoes a 
     counterintelligence polygraph examination and consents in a 
     signed writing to the counterintelligence polygraph 
     examinations required by this section.
       (e) Additional Testing.--The Secretary may not permit a 
     covered person to have continued access to any high-risk 
     program or information unless that person undergoes a 
     counterintelligence polygraph examination--
       (1) not less frequently than every five years; and
       (2) at any time at the direction of the Director of the 
     Office of Counterintelligence.
       (f) Counterintelligence Polygraph Examination.--For 
     purposes of this section, the term ``counterintelligence 
     polygraph examination'' means a polygraph examination using 
     questions reasonably calculated to obtain counterintelligence 
     information, including questions relating to espionage, 
     sabotage, unauthorized disclosure of classified information, 
     and unauthorized contact with foreign nationals.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Hunter) and the gentlewoman from Hawaii (Mrs. Mink) 
each will control 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter).
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. 
This amendment expands and I think makes somewhat more concise the 
polygraph provision in the umbrella Cox-Dicks amendment that was just 
passed. We are all concerned obviously with the losses that have been 
categorized before us throughout the media, that have been the subject 
of this major piece of legislation, and one answer to that, of course, 
is to do more polygraphs, do them on a regular basis. In looking at the 
language that was proposed by the special committee, that language 
directs itself to what are known as special access programs. What my 
amendment does is expand that to include people who have access to 
nuclear weapons design, which is the very subject of the technology 
that was stolen, and fissile material, that is nuclear weapons 
material. So people who have access in those very important areas are 
similarly subjected to polygraphs.
  The other aspect of our amendment is that the amendment also 
designates that these polygraphs should be given every 5 years, no less 
than every 5 years, which we think is a reasonable rate. That is the 
difference.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume. I discussed this amendment with the offeror of the amendment, 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter). While he assured me that 
this requirement of the counterintelligence polygraph would be 
universal in the sense that it would apply to all employees that fit 
into the category of being an employee of a high-risk program in the 
Department of Energy, I just wanted to confirm with the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Hunter) at this point if that is the real intent and 
meaning of this amendment.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. HUNTER. I would say to my colleague, yes, that is the intent of 
the amendment and the amendment very clearly states that the 
counterintelligence polygraph program shall be administered to each 
covered person who has access to these high-risk programs. And those 
high-risk programs are, of course, the nuclear weapons design programs, 
special access programs, and access to the material that we make 
nuclear weapons out of. Very clearly this is totally ethnic neutral, it 
is race neutral, it has no reference to the backgrounds of these 
people. If you qualify and are given a clearance under one of these 
high-risk programs, you have to take the polygraph test. So it is very 
fairly in this particular amendment, very fairly delineated to apply to 
all people who have to get those particular clearances.
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Chairman, I have a further question of my 
colleague. Who is to manage the polygraph program? Who is to design it? 
And how is it to be applied to these employees in these high-risk 
programs? Whose guidance will the Department of Energy be following? 
The CIA, the FBI or exactly who?
  Mr. HUNTER. No, the director of the Office of Counterintelligence of 
the Department of Energy shall administer this program for the 
Secretary of Energy.
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Now, the polygraph would be directed 
specifically to questions referring to leaks of sensitive information 
and not those things that refer to the privacy of the individuals or 
their associations in private life outside the context of the 
laboratory, or will it go into matters of their social behavior, their 
family relationships with other persons who may not be employed in the 
labs? How extensive is this polygraph going to be in its search for 
information which would be critical to the national security of these 
laboratories?
  Mr. HUNTER. Of course, there is a certain discipline and a certain 
structure to polygraphs that are directed to people who have access to 
highly secret

[[Page H3967]]

material. And, of course, one very important point, and I know the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) is concerned about this, too, is 
that the polygraph and the polygraph examination and the people who 
undertake it do so with a high degree of integrity, that is, that they 
limit it to intelligence areas that will give them information, only 
information as to whether or not the subjects may have been subject to 
a security breach. And, secondly, that the polygraph is given in a very 
professional manner and is given by very professional people with a 
high degree of integrity. I know that is a concern, and I think that is 
something that we simply have to monitor very closely. But again the 
Secretary of Energy is charged with this program. He is charged with it 
and he carries it out through his director of the Office of 
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy. So you have the 
President's Cabinet member overseeing this particular program. I think 
we should pay a great deal of attention to make sure that it is 
administered with a high degree of integrity but I think we can achieve 
that.
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. A question by one of our colleagues, who 
unfortunately could not be here because there is another pressing 
meeting, raises the point of many of these employees are not fully 
conversant in English. They are limited English speakers. Many of them 
are highly skilled, very, very important technical scientists in this 
field. Is the polygraph examination going to be given in different 
languages so that the failure of communication in English is not going 
to tag this individual as being a risk because they could not relate to 
the types of questions that are coming at them in the English language 
nor could they respond in English in an adequate way?
  Mr. HUNTER. First, I think obviously that is a very important part of 
the integrity of the polygraph examination. It has to be given in a way 
that is fully communicated to the person who is the subject of the 
examination and once again that is a part of the professionalism of the 
examination. Of course if you have a person who does not communicate 
fully in English, it must be communicated in the language that they are 
conversant with. We will certainly expect that that is the way that it 
would be administered. I think we can have conversations with the 
Secretary of Energy to make sure that that occurs.
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Does the amendment in any way set down the 
monitoring mechanism so that we can be assured that the responses that 
you have given to my inquiries will actually be the process followed by 
the Department of Energy?
  Mr. HUNTER. The answer to that is I would say to my colleague that 
giving polygraph tests is a science that has been built up over the 
years. The Department of Energy, because this is such an important 
area, and the gentleman from Indiana has mentioned this, we have had 
actual failures of polygraph in the past who register a positive when 
in fact it should have, but because this is such a critical area, I 
think we can expect the Secretary of Energy to adopt, A, the highest 
standards, and, B, use the best trained professionals to do this, 
because this is so serious. And I think we should ensure that that 
occurs, but I think we can.
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to 
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer).
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend from Hawaii for 
yielding me this time. I rise not in opposition at all to the author of 
the amendment but to commend him especially for two areas that he has 
covered in this amendment. First of all, those individuals covered and 
also how often this is administered and to what programs are 
administered. I think the gentleman has done a thorough job. My 
concerns and caveats come to who is administering this and how they 
administer it in a professional, scientific way with thorough analysis 
and comprehensive integrity.
  The Washington Post had an interesting story on this several weeks 
ago looking at the credibility of polygraphs, about the validity of the 
system, the analysis of answers using output of flawed polygraphs, the 
issue of false positives. What we want to do, I think, and the 
gentleman from California very much wants to do this, too, and 
accomplish this, is establish uniform standards.

                              {time}  1545

  Now I do not know that we should contract these out. Maybe the FBI 
has the ultimate science and professionalism and integrity. We have 
seen that we have had some problems in contracting this out in the 
past, that there have been some unreliable polygraphs produced; and I 
want to work with the gentleman in conference to make sure that not 
only have we got the parts right that he has done such an effective job 
on who is covered, how often, what special access programs are covered, 
but who administers this, and should we allow a contracting out of 
this.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I would say to 
my friend he has raised excellent questions, that this is a subject 
that we need to sit down and discuss with the Secretary of Energy, and 
I would say that I can assure him that I will ask our chairman, the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence), because this is a very 
important area to him also, to participate with us and with the 
gentleman and with the Secretary of Energy and have some discussions 
during the conference to make sure that we have two things: the highest 
professionalism, and, No. 2, the best standards.
  If those best standards fall in the area of government-given 
polygraphs, and perhaps they are not in the private sector, then let us 
go with the best standards if they are in the government. If the best 
standards and the best science has been developed on the outside, let 
us use that capability, but certainly let us make sure we have the 
best.
  Mr. ROEMER. As long as the gentleman says the best standards are in 
the private sector and everybody agrees on that, that we do not then 
have this jumping back and forth between established best standards for 
one and their administering 50 or 60 percent of the polygraphs and the 
FBI or somebody else is doing the remaining 40 percent, and we know 
there is a discrepancy between or differences between the 
administration of those tests. I think it is very important that we 
establish a uniform standard of policy here as to who is administering 
it, and if it is the FBI, maybe we do not contract out. If the 
established science is in the private sector, then that is the uniform 
standard that we establish, and I look forward to working with the 
gentleman. I am not going to oppose this amendment.
  Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman, and let me just respond that I 
will work also to see that we have uniformity. I think that is a key.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed 
in House Report 106-175.


                 Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Roemer

  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:
  Part A amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Roemer:
       At the end of title XXXI (page 453, after line 15), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 3167. REPORT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY 
                   PRACTICES AT NATIONAL LABORATORIES.

       (a) In General.--Not later than March 1 of each year, the 
     Secretary of Energy shall submit to the Congress a report for 
     the preceding year on counterintelligence and security 
     practices at the facilities of the national laboratories 
     (whether or not classified activities are carried out at the 
     facility).
       (b) Content of Report.--The report shall include, with 
     respect to each national laboratory, the following:
       (1) The number of full-time counterintelligence and 
     security professionals employed.
       (2) A description of the counterintelligence and security 
     training courses conducted and, for each such course, any 
     requirement that employees successfully complete that course.
       (3) A description of each contract awarded that provides an 
     incentive for the effective performance of 
     counterintelligence or security activities.
       (4) A description of the services provided by the employee 
     assistance programs.
       (5) A description of any requirement that an employee 
     report the foreign travel of that

[[Page H3968]]

     employee (whether or not the travel was for official 
     business).
       (6) A description of any visit by the Secretary or by the 
     Deputy Secretary of Energy, a purpose of which was to 
     emphasize to employees the need for effective 
     counterintelligence and seurity practices.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Roemer) and a Member opposed each will control 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer).
  (Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I have been a member of the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence since the beginning of this Congress. I have been 
especially interested in the issues surrounding the compromise of 
nuclear weapons design information and the security and 
counterintelligence programs at the national laboratories. I do not 
believe that all of the facts surrounding what happened and how it 
happened with respect to the compromise of sensitive weapons 
information to the PRC have yet been sorted out.
  Problems clearly existed for 2 decades, and for reasons that are 
still inexplicable, very little appears to have been done on a 
systematic basis until the press reports, the promulgation of 
Presidential Decision Directive 61. While I commend Director Freeh and 
the Director of Central Intelligence Tenet for pushing PDD 61, and 
Secretary Richardson for his commitment to fully implement 
counterintelligence and security reforms, and just recently to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from Washington 
(Mr. Dicks) for their amendment today, I am not yet convinced all 
specific reforms have been considered addressing the culture and 
leadership between our national labs and the Department of Energy.
  Nevertheless, I am convinced that counterintelligence and security 
reforms will only succeed if good counterintelligence and security 
practices become ingrained, ingrained in the daily business of those 
who have the duty to protect national security information and if there 
is continued high-level attention being made to security and 
counterintelligence discipline from the leadership and the national 
security agencies of the United States Congress. The keys, Mr. 
Chairman, are ingrained in the daily business, continued high-level 
attention, and disciplined leadership and direct communication between 
DOE and their employees and the United States Congress.
  I have thus proposed in this amendment that the Secretary of Energy 
provide the Congress with a report each year on certain matters related 
to counterintelligence and security that would give one indication that 
there is keen attention and involved leadership to security and 
counterintelligence practices at the national laboratories. I would 
expect the report to be sent each year to the Armed Services and 
Intelligence Committees of the Congress with classified attachments, if 
necessary. There were three reports in the Cox and Dicks amendment just 
voted on. This amendment does not produce any kind of duplication 
between those other reports. I would hope that the committees would 
then use the report as one springboard for oversight.
  Again, I believe Congress must send the strongest constructive 
message about counterintelligence and security, and the message must be 
sustained over the long term, not just in the heat of revelations about 
espionage with sufficient appropriations from our oversight committees 
to ensure that the job gets done.
  I would like to thank the House committee staff on intelligence, 
current members of the intelligence and counterintelligence communities 
and former members, such as the Director of Intelligence Jim Woolsey 
and experts on counterintelligence matters such as Paul Rudman and John 
Feron for their help in putting this amendment together.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle) who 
has also been helpful in putting together the bipartisan amendment.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Indiana for 
yielding, and I do rise in strong support of his amendment, of which I 
am a cosponsor, which would require the Secretary of Energy to report 
to Congress annually regarding the counterintelligence and security 
practices at our national laboratories.
  I will not belabor this too much, because a lot of what I would say 
would be repetitious of what the gentleman from Indiana has already 
stated; but as a member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, I do have a distinct interest, as I think we all do, but 
perhaps it is a little more focused on the intelligence committee in 
safeguarding our national labs, especially considering the recent 
release of the details of the Cox-Dicks report regarding United States 
national security and the People's Republic of China.
  The facts obviously are still emerging, the consequences of that are 
still emerging, and efforts are being made to address it, but I think 
we have come to the conclusion that something needs to be done on a 
longer term regular basis, if my colleagues will, is what this 
amendment is all about, requiring the Secretary of Energy to issue an 
annual report on certain matters related to counterintelligence and 
security, in those particular labs.
  So I am strongly supportive of this. I think we need to remain ever 
vigilant on this. We need to learn from the past, and we need to make 
sure that whatever it is that we do to cure these things will be 
continued into the future, and in my judgment some sort of annual 
review is exactly what is needed, and so for that reason I strongly 
support this amendment.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend from Delaware for 
his strong bipartisan support for the amendment, and again come back to 
the many hearings and the many reports that we have had from the Cox-
Dicks Commission, the many meetings that we have set up with members of 
the counterintelligence community. They stress over and over and over 
again that the culture in our laboratories has to change; that we have 
to have ingrained in the daily business a concern and riveted attention 
to the details of security; that we have to have this as a continuum; 
that we have to continue to stress this at the highest levels; 
Secretary of Energy Richardson, who has got a good start on this, 
continue to visit the national laboratories and make this a top-down 
and bottom-up change in the culture.
  The Chinese have probably been spying on the United States for 30 
years since they started a nuclear program. We need to be more 
vigilant, we need to be more detailed about securing the most sensitive 
secrets we have, some of which are at our national laboratories.
  So I would hope that this amendment would be accepted, that we can 
change the culture, we can keep attention to this, and that we will 
continue to put the necessary appropriations forward to keep ever 
vigilant in protecting our national security secrets.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) 
for any comments he may have on the amendment.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I would merely say it is a good amendment, 
and we examined it on this side. We have no problem with it and endorse 
it.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend from Missouri and 
would ask that the House adopt the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. 
Spence).
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend the gentleman for 
his amendment, too, and as chairman of the committee I am prepared to 
accept it.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend from South Carolina, 
and with those two resounding endorsements I know when to stop talking, 
Mr. Chairman, and I would ask the House to adopt the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does any Member claim time in opposition to the 
amendment?
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Roemer).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed 
in House Report 106-175.


                 Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Sweeney

  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

[[Page H3969]]

  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Part A amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Sweeney:
       At the end of title XII (page 317, after line 17), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 1206. ANNUAL AUDIT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND 
                   DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO 
                   TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
                   OF CHINA.

       (a) Annual Audit.--The Inspectors General of the Department 
     of Defense and the Department of Energy, in consultation with 
     the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall each conduct an annual 
     audit of the policies and procedures of the Department of 
     Defense and the Department of Energy, respectively, with 
     respect to the export of technologies and the transfer of 
     scientific and technical information, to the People's 
     Republic of China in order to assess the extent to which the 
     Department of Defense or the Department of Energy, as the 
     case may be, is carrying out its activities to ensure that 
     any technology transfer, including a transfer of scientific 
     or technical information, will not measurably improve the 
     weapons systems or space launch capabilities of the People's 
     Republic of China.
       (b) Report to Congress.--The Inspectors General of the 
     Department of Defense and the Department of Energy shall each 
     submit to Congress a report each year describing the results 
     of the annual audit under subsection (a).

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Sweeney) and a Member opposed each will control 10 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Sweeney).
  (Mr. SWEENEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I do not expect to use all my allotted time, and I want 
to thank both the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) and the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence) for the opportunity to 
present this amendment.
  As my colleagues know, the past several years have revealed two major 
breaches in the national security interests of this great Nation, and 
we have heard a lot of debate and discussion on the floor today about 
one of those. And the Chinese nuclear espionage and the transfer of 
militarily-sensitive technology to satellite trade have now proven 
beyond a doubt to have significantly enhanced the military capability 
of communist China.
  Since the end of the Cold War, I believe, Mr. Chairman, we have taken 
our military strength and in turn our national security a bit for 
granted. Sadly, the recent events have revealed that American strength 
is not automatic and we must take positive steps to preserve our role 
as the only remaining superpower.
  Today I offer my amendment to reestablish that it is the policy of 
the United States to ensure that our technological advances and 
military knowhow are not turned against us in the form of advanced 
military threat. My amendment and the real value of my amendment, I 
believe, is that it would provide an additional and very necessary 
layer of security and scrutiny to ensure that Chinese espionage 
experienced in the Department of Energy labs is not repeated in the 
Departments of Defense and Energy and that they regularly monitor their 
policies with respect to the technological transfers with China. The 
amendment requires that the Inspector General of Defense and Energy 
assess in consultation with our intelligence community their 
departments' policies and procedures with respect to the exchange of 
technology and scientific information that could be used to enhance the 
military capabilities in China. This audit must be conducted on an 
annual basis and is continuing with a report to Congress.
  Mr. Chairman, I offered a similar amendment to the NASA authorization 
just a few weeks ago that passed the House, calling for an annual audit 
of policies regarding the transfer of technology to China from our 
space program. I believe this is a commonsense review and it should 
exist in all relevant departments throughout the Federal Government. 
Surely I recognize that the Department of Energy has taken steps to 
correct some of the problems that led to the compromise of our most 
critical military secrets.

                              {time}  1600

  I also recognize that there have been a number of amendments 
presented, and there will be more that will be presented today, that 
also provide for some answers and some solutions, and Congress has made 
this a priority as we address these security issues.
  A few years ago we were pretty certain that the top secret scientific 
information at our nuclear labs was secure. We now know that was not 
the case. I think it is entirely appropriate and I would suggest 
essential that the agencies of the U.S. Government engaging in national 
security related matters be required to regularly conduct comprehensive 
evaluations of their policies for protecting militarily sensitive 
technology.
  Again, the amendment simply provides an extra layer of protection at 
the Departments of Defense and Energy to prevent the repeat of the 
breach of our nuclear labs. America can no longer take our national 
security for granted and we in Congress can no longer take our national 
security for granted. I believe this is a common sense oversight 
amendment, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from South Carolina (Mr. Spence).
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I find no fault with the amendment, and I 
commend the gentleman for offering it. On behalf of the committee, I 
accept it.
  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton).
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I have examined the amendment on our side 
and find it commendable.
  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does any Member claim time in opposition?
  If not, the question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Sweeney).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed 
in House Report 106-175.


             Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Ryun of Kansas

  Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Part A amendment No. 7 offered by Mr. Ryun of Kansas:
       At the end of title XXXI (page 453, after line 15), insert 
     the following new subtitle:

  Subtitle F--Department of Energy Foreign Visitors Program Moratorium

     SEC. 3181. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Department of Energy 
     Foreign Visitors Program Moratorium Act''.

     SEC. 3182. MORATORIUM ON FOREIGN VISITORS PROGRAM.

       (a) Moratorium.--Until otherwise provided by law, the 
     Secretary of Energy may not, during the foreign visitors 
     moratorium period, admit to any facility of a national 
     laboratory any individual who is a citizen of a nation that 
     is named on the current Department of Energy sensitive 
     countries list.
       (b) Waiver Authority.--(1) The Secretary of Energy may 
     waive the prohibition in subsection (a) on a monthly basis 
     with respect to specific individuals whose admission to a 
     national laboratory is determined by the Secretary to be 
     necessary for the national security of the United States.
       (2) On a monthly basis, but not later than the 15th day of 
     each month, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on 
     Armed Services of the Senate and Committee on Armed Services 
     of the House of Representatives a report in writing providing 
     notice of the waivers made in the previous month. The report 
     shall identify each individual for whom such a waiver was 
     made and, with respect to each such individual, provide a 
     detailed justification for the waiver and the Secretary's 
     certification that the admission of that individual to a 
     national laboratory is necessary for the national security of 
     the United States.
       (3) The authority of the Secretary under paragraph (1) may 
     be delegated only to the Deputy Secretary of Energy or an 
     Assistant Secretary of Energy.
       (c) Foreign Visitors Moratorium Period.--For purposes of 
     this section, the term ``foreign visitors moratorium period'' 
     means the period beginning on the date of the enactment of 
     this Act and ending on the later of the following:
       (1) The date that is 2 years after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (2) The date that is 90 days after the date on which the 
     Secretary of Energy, after consultation with the Director of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation, submits to the Committee 
     on Armed Services of the Senate and

[[Page H3970]]

     the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives a certification in writing by the Secretary 
     of each of the following:
       (A) That the counterintelligence program required by 
     section 3183 is fully implemented, and fully operating, at 
     each of the national laboratories.
       (B) That such counterintelligence program complies with the 
     requirements of Presidential Decision Directive number 61.
       (C) That the Secretary is in compliance with the provisions 
     of subsection (b).

     SEC. 3183. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       (a) Establishment at Each Laboratory.--The Secretary of 
     Energy shall establish a counterintelligence program at each 
     of the national laboratories. The counterintelligence program 
     at each such laboratory shall have a full-time staff assigned 
     to counterintelligence functions at that laboratory, 
     including such personnel from other agencies as may be 
     approved by the Secretary. The counterintelligence program at 
     each such laboratory shall be under the direction of, and 
     shall report to, the Director of the Office of 
     Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.
       (b) Investigation of Past Security Breaches.--The Secretary 
     shall require that the counterintelligence program at each 
     laboratory include a specific plan pursuant to which the 
     Director of the Office of Counterintelligence of the 
     Department of Energy shall--
       (1) investigate any breaches of security discovered after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act that occurred at that 
     laboratory before the establishment of the 
     counterintelligence program at that laboratory; and
       (2) study the extent to which a breach of security may have 
     occurred before the establishment of the counterintelligence 
     program at that laboratory with respect to a classified 
     project at that laboratory by the admittance to that 
     laboratory, for purposes of a nonclassified project, of a 
     citizen of a foreign nation.
       (c) Required Checks on All Non-Cleared Individuals.--(1) 
     The Secretary, acting through the Director of the Office of 
     Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy, shall ensure 
     the following:
       (A) That before any non-cleared individual is allowed to 
     enter any facility of a national laboratory, a security 
     investigation known as an ``indices check'' is carried out 
     with respect to that individual.
       (B) That before any non-cleared individual is allowed to 
     enter a classified facility of a national laboratory or to 
     work for more than 15 days in any 30-day period in any 
     facility of a national laboratory, a security investigation 
     known as a ``background check'' is carried out with respect 
     to that individual.
       (2) Non-Cleared Individual.--For purposes of paragraph (1), 
     a non-cleared individual is any of the following:
       (A) An individual who is a citizen of a nation that is 
     named on the current Department of Energy sensitive countries 
     list.
       (B) An individual who has not been investigated by the 
     United States, or by a foreign nation with which the United 
     States has an appropriate reciprocity agreement, in a manner 
     at least as comprehensive as the investigation required for 
     the issuance of a security clearance at the level designated 
     as ``Secret''.

     SEC. 3184. EXCEPTION TO MORATORIUM FOR CERTAIN GRANDFATHERED 
                   INDIVIDUALS.

       (a) Grandfathered Individuals.--Notwithstanding section 
     3182(a), the Secretary may, during the foreign visitors 
     moratorium period described section 3182(c), admit to a 
     facility of a national laboratory an individual who is a 
     citizen of a nation that is named on the current Department 
     of Energy sensitive countries list, for a period of not more 
     than 3 months for the purposes of transitional work, if--
       (1) that individual was regularly admitted to that facility 
     before that period for purposes of a project or series of 
     projects;
       (2) the continued admittance of that individual to that 
     facility during that period is important to that project or 
     series of projects; and
       (3) the admittance is carried out in accordance with 
     section 3183(c).
       (b) Report on Grandfathered Individuals.--Not later than 30 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of 
     the Senate and Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives a report on each individual admitted to a 
     facility of a national laboratory under subsection (a). The 
     report shall identify each such individual and, with respect 
     to each such individual, provide a detailed justification for 
     such admittance and the Secretary's certification that such 
     admission was carried out in accordance with section 3183(c).

     SEC. 3185. DEFINITIONS.

       For purposes of this subtitle:
       (1) The term ``national laboratory'' means any of the 
     following:
       (A) The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, 
     California.
       (B) The Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New 
     Mexico.
       (C) The Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New 
     Mexico, and Livermore, California.
       (2) The term ``sensitive countries list'' means the list 
     prescribed by the Secretary of Energy known as the Department 
     of Energy List of Sensitive Countries.
       (3) The term ``indices check'' means using an individual's 
     name, date of birth, and place of birth to review government 
     intelligence and investigative agencies databases for 
     suspected ties to foreign intelligence services or terrorist 
     groups.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from 
Kansas (Mr. Ryun) and a Member opposed each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun).
  Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I offer my amendment today because I believe its strong 
moratorium language will enable the Department of Energy to enact the 
previously debated and passed intelligence programs.
  Mr. Chairman, I have worked with the bipartisan group that wrote the 
Cox-Dicks amendment, and I voted for it. I agree with the series of 
strong security provisions that the amendment offers. However, I also 
believe putting these security provisions in place cannot be achieved 
overnight.
  Until a comprehensive counterintelligence program is up and running 
at each laboratory, access must be limited to ensure that enhanced 
security is functioning properly.
  Mr. Chairman, as you can see, I would have had a chart just a moment 
ago, but it would have shown that 16 percent of our foreign visitors 
from sensitive countries were not given any kind of background check 
between 1994 and 1996. Congress needs to make sure that every effort is 
made in our power to limit that access until we discover the full 
extent of the revealed security breaches. It is pretty extensive when 
you look at the numbers between 1994 and 1996.
  Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson in a letter written today to all 
Members of Congress states that the Ryun amendment ``effectively kills 
several important national security programs at the DOE laboratories.'' 
However, the amendment allows the Secretary of Energy to waive the 
moratorium for individuals deemed necessary to our national security, 
so we have a waiver provision in there with the moratorium that allows 
if we have a national security problem allowing necessary people to 
come in and be able to perform in those laboratories. For each waiver, 
the secretary must report which individuals were admitted, along with 
the justification for their admittance to the House and Senate Armed 
Services Committees on a monthly basis.
  Mr. Chairman, after the two-year moratorium is complete and after 
consultation with the Director of the FBI, the Secretary of Energy is 
required then to certify in writing that the new counterintelligence 
programs are running effectively before giving Congress a 90-day review 
period for the lifting of the moratorium.
  This amendment puts accountability and Congressional oversight back 
into the security process at our nuclear labs. We must establish 
procedures to ensure that the theft of our national security secrets 
never happens again.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri is recognized to control 20 
minutes.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, were it not for the Cox-Dicks amendment, this would be 
a different case. We not only are replowing the same ground, we find 
this amendment in conflict with that amendment which we have already 
passed unanimously in this body.
  Mr. Chairman, let me commend my friend from Kansas, who is a very 
sincere and dedicated member of our committee. However, this amendment 
is not necessary because of the reasons that I heretofore stated.
  Mr. Chairman, the protection of critical nuclear information is a 
very serious matter. There has been a compromise, and some changes are 
required in the manner in which security and counterintelligence 
matters are handled. The amendment does provide some increased emphasis 
on counterintelligence and potential for enhanced protection, but would 
codify the counterintelligence program mandated by Presidential 
Directive 61 in the least restrictive manner thus far proposed that 
provides a waiver by the Secretary of Energy during moratorium.

[[Page H3971]]

  However, since the Cox-Dicks amendment has been accepted by this 
body, as I point out, by unanimous vote on a rollcall vote, this 
amendment is not needed. It flies in the face, sadly, with the Cox-
Dicks amendment, so we would have two standards set forth in the bill 
should this be adopted. That, of course, is a very serious problem for 
anyone to follow when you have two standards, two ways of doing 
something, two time limits. It would be very difficult, and, frankly, 
unworkable.
  Regretfully, because the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) is such a 
dedicated member of the committee, I find that I really in all 
sincerity must oppose this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, it is important to draw the distinction here, because 
while the Cox report allows for a moratorium, it is a very limited 
moratorium. It is a 90-day moratorium. In actually reading the report 
by the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), who is a part of this 
amendment, and Mr. Cox, it is very clear to me that is a very limited 
period of time.
  My amendment allows for a two-year moratorium, which is sufficient 
time to put a counterintelligence program in place and ensure that we 
genuinely protect those national secrets. That is the reason for the 
length. Under the Cox report it has a 90-day period with a 30-day 
reporting period, so conceivably at the end of 60 days there would not 
be a need for any further moratorium.
  So I believe the extension is necessary if we are going to make sure 
that we have a counterintelligence program in place and to ensure our 
national secrets.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Hunter).
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to rise in strong support of the Ryun amendment, 
and I want to say at the outset that I very much respect the position 
of folks on the other side. I know the gentlewoman from New Mexico 
(Mrs. Wilson) is very dedicated, very bright, and has the best 
interests of our country at heart and serves her constituents very 
well. I have though a difference of opinion on this issue with the 
folks that limited the scope of the foreign visitors cutoff.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HUNTER. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make sure we have this 
understood here. Nothing happens. There is a moratorium until Ed 
Curran, the new Director of Counterintelligence, certifies that we now 
have in place an effective counterintelligence program. Then, under the 
Cox-Dicks amendment you would have 45 days, and Congress would then 
have a chance to review it. So you would have 60. But this is 60 days 
after the new head of counterintelligence certifies that we have an 
effective plan in place.
  Why would we want to keep it on for two years after that? That does 
not make any sense.
  Mr. HUNTER. Reclaiming my time from my B-2 friend, let me tell----
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the B-2 did very well over there, by the 
way, in Kosovo.
  Mr. HUNTER. I know the B-2 did very well in Kosovo. Let me say why 
the Ryun amendment makes a lot of sense. It is for this reason. I 
understand under both provisions we establish a counterintelligence 
office. That is, of course, a must. It is a mandate.
  But the issue should go beyond how we establish the 
counterintelligence operation. It should also include the issue of 
this: Does it make sense for us to have visitors and to allow Algeria, 
Cuba, and I am looking at the GAO report on foreign visitation to our 
nuclear weapons complex, Cuba, Iran, Iraq and China in our nuclear 
laboratories at all? What advancement is Cuba giving us to our nuclear 
weapons program? What is the reasoning whereby we feel that we need to 
make, and I have added them up here, six visits by the states of 
Algeria, Cuba, Iran, Iraq and China to our nuclear weapons 
laboratories?
  I think, and I say to my friend in all sincerity, I think we have 
missed part of the debate. I think when we do counterintelligence 
background checks on people from Iraq, you know what our 
counterintelligence people are going to give us on these particular 
agents and scientists? They are going to give us blank pieces of paper, 
because it is very difficult for us to get background information on 
those folks.
  Now, I do not think that people from those states and many of the 
other controlled access states have anything to give to our nuclear 
weapons complex that helps us either build nuclear weapons or do 
stockpile stewardship on nuclear weapons, which is our primary purpose.
  I would simply say this to my friend: The Secretary of Energy can 
execute waivers, but this is all about accountability. Under both 
provisions, the Ryun amendment and the base bill, the Secretary of 
Energy can execute waivers. I think if you look at this list of people 
from controlled countries that had no business being at our national 
labs, and you see the percentage of people that, in the cases of Iran 
and Iraq who were even given background checks, and it is down to 10 
and 20 percent of people from Iraq were given background checks to come 
into our nuclear weapons complex, I think it is appropriate for us to 
say to the Secretary of Energy, listen, for the next two years, you can 
have people come in, and if it is the Nunn-Lugar program that affects 
the Soviet Union, if it is one of our missile control regimes, if it is 
a fissile material control regime, all you have to do is sign a piece 
of paper and you bring those scientists in. But we want you to look at 
these applicants for admission to our national weapons complex. The 
Ryun amendment does that.
  I think, in light of that, the two-year moratorium makes a lot of 
sense. These people have not been paying attention. I think the 
gentleman would agree with me, when you let people come in from 
Algeria, Cuba, Iran and Iraq, and they are supposed to be contributing 
to our nuclear weapons development or stockpile stewardship, it makes 
us realize the leadership in DOE has not been reflecting on these 
admissions. We want to make them reflect.
  Lastly, I would say what Leo Thorsen has said, the great Medal of 
Honor winner. He said in areas of national security, he said, go with 
strength. Go the extra mile. We are going the extra mile with the Ryun 
amendment.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Guam (Mr. Underwood).
  Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I stand in opposition to the Ryun amendment, although I 
understand the sincerity with which he offers it.

                              {time}  1615

  This amendment is entirely unnecessary, as has been already pointed 
out. The concerns that are pertaining to the moratorium and checking 
out all the foreign scientists who come have been dealt with adequately 
in the Cox/Dicks amendment that has already passed.
  This amendment places a 2-year moratorium on the entry of foreign 
visitors from sensitive countries, and it presents what seems to me to 
be a very simplistic solution to a wave of espionage that has already 
occurred in our weapons labs.
  I know that the sponsor indicated that between 1995 and 1996, that 
some 16 percent of the foreign scientists did not receive any 
background checks. If we had a 2-year moratorium for that time period, 
then it would make a lot of sense. But what we have in the situation 
here is that we are trying to solve a problem that we are already aware 
of, and it is like locking the barn door after the horses have escaped.
  The free exchange of scientists in unclassified research areas at our 
nuclear weapons lab is important for recruiting and retaining a world 
class staff. We need to help maintain the U.S. nuclear stockpile and 
maintain American scientific leadership. A quarantine at our national 
laboratories in effect will insulate us from some of the world's finest 
minds in many scientific fields, and has the effect of undercutting our 
own progress, development, and superiority in nuclear weapons 
development and scientific advancement.
  Imagine if this moratorium had existed during the U.S. development of

[[Page H3972]]

the atom bomb. Dozens of scientists and physicists, people like 
Einstein and Fermi, who were citizens of enemy nations, would have been 
prohibited from research and development of a weapon that helped end 
World War II. These exceptional minds who labored tirelessly for their 
adopted country would be barred from that work today.
  Secretary Richardson has responded to this. The Cox/Dicks amendment 
has responded to this. This amendment is entirely unnecessary.
  Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, in response to the gentleman who just spoke, we have a 
waiver provision that allows for national security, to allow certain 
scientists to come in if necessary.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina 
(Mr. Spence), the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed 
Services.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered 
by the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun). I think it is a good 
amendment.
  I have listened intently to all of the opposition. It does not make 
sense. It takes years to learn the scope of espionage that has already 
occurred in our nuclear labs. We still may not know the full extent of 
the problem.
  As a matter of fact, the Cox report has only been able to offer up 
for the public view certain portions of what they found out. Many parts 
of it are still classified, and we would not know what has been learned 
there.
  In March, the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory 
wrote in the Washington Post that during his tenure at the lab a great 
number of individuals from sensitive countries visited, but there was 
``. . . no indication that these contacts compromised our security.''
  Unfortunately, it was during this same period of time that classified 
information on the W-88 warhead designed at Los Alamos was stolen by 
the Chinese. In this case, what we did not know has certainly hurt us.
  Espionage by definition is not conducted in plain sight. We did not 
know that China was obtaining our nuclear secrets from laboratory 
employees, and my theory is that we do not know of losses that have 
occurred because of the foreign visitor program.
  The Government Accounting Office has reported that during the period 
1994 through 1996 there were 5,472 visits from sensitive countries to 
the three weapons laboratories. Of that number, 2,237 were from Russia; 
1,464 were from China; and 814 were from India. That high visitation 
rate continues, with Los Alamos recently reporting 1,040 visits from 
sensitive countries in 1997 alone.
  In view of this high volume of visitation from countries of 
proliferation concern, at least one of which has illicitly obtained our 
nuclear weapons secrets, I do not think it is inappropriate to place 
strict limits on these visitations.
  I would point out what has already been pointed out to a lot of the 
concerns of our opponents in this matter, that the moratorium imposed 
by this amendment would not be permanent, nor would it be absolute. The 
amendment provides for waivers by the Secretary of Energy, allowing the 
admission to a national laboratory of specific individuals from a 
sensitive country if the Secretary determines the visit to be necessary 
for the national security interests of the United States.
  The amendment also includes a sunset provision that has not been 
mentioned which would, under certain conditions, make it possible for 
termination of the moratorium within 2 years.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a good amendment. It should be adopted.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson).
  Mrs. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I find parts of this amendment to be 
difficult to understand, at least in the real world and the way the 
laboratories operate.
  Sandia National Laboratory in my district is a multi-program 
laboratory. Yes, it does nuclear defense work, but it also does a whole 
lot of other things. This amendment would prohibit foreign visitors 
from sensitive countries to any facility on Sandia National 
Laboratories, and the only exceptions are for when it is necessary for 
national security.
  This means we are no longer going to have any foreign visits that 
deal with the solar energy farm or the micromachines program or nuclear 
fusion or semiconductors or lithography, or a whole range of scientific 
developments arrayed with computing.
  We need our scientists to be engaged in the most advanced science in 
the world, and the reality in this country today is that half of the 
graduate students in engineering in American universities are not 
American citizens.
  We need to stay on the cutting edge of science, and we would make a 
mistake if we cut ourselves off from that science.
  Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my friend and 
distinguished colleague, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Hayes).
  (Mr. HAYES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HAYES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment 
introduced by my friend, the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun), fellow 
member of our Committee on Armed Services. I have the utmost respect 
for the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) and Members on that side 
of the aisle. I appreciate what is being done by the Cox/Dicks 
amendment.
  There are many steps in the right direction. My friend, the 
gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson) has great concern for her 
district, country, and her labs, and she very carefully and 
meticulously explained to me her views on the bill. I appreciate her 
willingness to talk with me at length about this.
  But as I evaluate the situation from my perspective as a member of 
the Committee on Armed Services, it is apparent to me that to simply 
rely on the Cox/Dicks amendment is a potential underreaction to an 
extremely serious situation.
  With that in mind, I strongly support the efforts of the gentleman 
from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) to put our security first, to put the future 
security of our Nation at the absolute top of our priority list. I have 
listened to a number of colleagues. The amendment of the gentleman from 
Kansas (Mr. Ryun) does nothing but strengthen the recommendations put 
forth by the Cox commission.
  It is clear from our debate that we are all in agreement over the 
seriousness of what is at stake. Events at Los Alamos reflect a 
collapse in DOE counterintelligence and a compromise of national 
security. Again, the Cox/Dicks amendment is crafted to address these 
counterintelligence lapses, and outlines no less than 13 new 
initiatives for DOE implementation. This is good.
  There is no doubt that the measures, if properly executed, will close 
loopholes exploited by Chinese spies. It seems to me, however, 
impossible to set in place an extensive, verifiable counterintelligence 
system in a mere 90 days.
  I would remind my colleagues, and there is not a member in this 
Chamber that did not support the Cox/Dicks amendment, that this 
amendment establishes three new agencies of counterintelligence 
oversight. Do we really believe these new agencies will be operational 
in 3 short months? I submit the answer is no.
  The gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) is simply providing the DOE 
adequate time to ensure that some of America's most sophisticated 
technology is safe from foreign espionage. I contend any Member that is 
troubled by events at Los Alamos and is interested in legitimate 
solutions will support this amendment.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Dicks).
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I very reluctantly rise in opposition to the 
Ryun amendment. I want to commend the gentleman for his work on this 
issue. He was an early proponent of tightening security at DOE, and his 
realization of the problems there have been proven correct.
  We attempted in the drafting of the original Dicks amendment to 
address the problems he identified and, to a large measure, we were 
successful. The Dicks-Ryun amendments are now almost identical except 
for one major

[[Page H3973]]

point. However, in my view, this point is a major difference. I must 
reluctantly oppose his amendment.
  The Ryun amendment, like the Cox/Dicks amendment, imposes a 
moratorium on foreign visitors to the dose national laboratories. But 
under the Ryun amendment, this moratorium would extend for at least 2 
years, regardless of whether or not all possible security measures 
needed to protect the labs are in place.
  This is a serious concern to me because Ed Curran, chief of 
counterintelligence at DOE, assures me that it will not take that long 
to fix the problems at the labs. Frankly, I do not think the House 
could accept any answer from DOE that said it would take 2 years to fix 
these problems. To let problems continue for that long once they have 
been identified would be totally unacceptable.
  Because the Ryun moratorium would last well after the amount of time 
needed to fix the problem, I am concerned that it will actually reduce 
the incentive for DOE to react quickly. I believe the amendment of the 
gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) will slow down the improvement of 
security at DOE.
  The Cox/Dicks amendment already adopted by the House provides ample 
time for congressional oversight of DOE's changes to security at the 
labs, and it provides DOE the incentive to act quickly. I urge Members 
to oppose the Ryun amendment.
  I just want to underline, our amendment is in place until the 
director, Mr. Curran, and the director of the FBI certify to the 
president, to the Congress, to the DOE that they have a security 
program in place. Then there will be 45 days of congressional review 
after that to make certain we agree with that.
  But to put a 2-year lock on this thing, as the gentleman from Kansas 
(Mr. Ryun) does, will undermine any incentive to act quickly, which is 
what we want. We want Richardson, Curran, and Freeh out there 
implementing this program as quickly as possible.
  I do not think the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) intended this. I 
think it is an unintended consequence, but I think it really undermines 
our effort to get a quick solution to this problem.
  Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Georgia (Mr. Kingston).
  Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I stand in strong support of the Ryun amendment. This 
is a commonsense amendment. To quote the amendment of the gentleman 
from Kansas (Mr. Ryun), the letter of June 8, it says his amendment 
simply prohibits foreign visitors from sensitive countries, and those 
are constituents that are such staunch U.S. allies as China, Cuba, 
North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Russia, from entering national laboratories 
unless the Secretary of Energy grants a waiver to individuals deemed 
necessary to our, the United States', national security.
  Frankly, given the track record of this administration, I hate to see 
them have the ability to grant waivers. I would love to have some 
language in there that said unless they have been giving to the 
campaign, but I do not want to go that route.

                              {time}  1630

  I think we have already hashed that out. We know the relationships 
that have caused some of these breaches in security. But let us look at 
some of the statistics: 742 Chinese scientists visited Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, but only 12 were given background checks; 23 Iraqi 
and Iranian scientists visited the Sandia National Laboratory, none 
were given background checks; 1,110 Russian scientists visited Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, yet only 116 were given background checks.
  Come on. This is national security. What is it that these people from 
sensitive countries offer that people are opposing the Ryun amendment 
over? I am not sure. What was it that the scientists from Cuba or North 
Korea or Iran or Iraq or Russia gave that we are afraid to give up for 
2 years? Really we are not giving it up for 2 years. The Secretary of 
Energy would have the right to waive the requirement.
  This is a common sense amendment. Our national security has been 
breached because of the sloppiness of the current administration. This 
tries to correct it. I stand in strong support of the Ryun amendment.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Mrs. Tauscher).
  Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for yielding 
me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, when the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) released their report last month, 
I feared amendments like this one offered by the gentleman from Kansas 
(Mr. Ryun) today.
  This amendment is nothing more than a misdirected overreaction. 
Instead of making constructive changes to improve our 
counterintelligence operations, this amendment blindly cuts off our 
labs to foreign scientists, scientists who work in many nonclassified, 
nonweapons-oriented areas of the labs.
  Specifically, this amendment fails to distinguish between the 
smuggling of our classified national secrets by American citizens from 
nonclassified disarmament-oriented exchanges with countries such as 
Russia.
  Among our country's greatest national security threat is the spread 
of nuclear chemical and biological weapons. In February I spent a week 
in Moscow, meeting with U.S. and Russian scientists who administer 
programs designed to stop Russian scientists and their nuclear 
materials from going to countries such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.
  Given the State of the Russian economy and the fact that Russia's 
uranium stockpiles are not locked down, we have no choice but to engage 
our Russian counterparts on a scientist-to-scientist level.
  The Ryun amendment would end this cooperative effort. It would 
prevent Russian scientists from visiting our laboratories for 2 years 
and would severely damage U.S.-Russian relations.
  Mr. Chairman, for those who are concerned about visits to our 
national labs, let me say just this. Earlier today, as part of the Cox 
and Dicks amendment, this House took steps that would reasonably 
address the need to protect classified materials at our national labs 
from foreign visitors.
  It would provide for the lifting of a moratorium when DOE's Director 
of Counterintelligence, with the concurrence of the FBI Director, 
determines that the proper counterintelligence measures are in place.
  Let us embrace this measured approach offered by the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks). Let 
us reject the reactionary approach before use. Let us not blindly shut 
down vital national security programs that have nothing to do with 
classified secrets.
  Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I have no further speakers, but I 
would like to reserve the right to close.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) has the right 
to close.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentleman from Kansas 
(Mr. Ryun) for the serious work he has done in this effort. It is 
certainly rare that I would have a different opinion from my committee 
chairman, but I believe that the Cox-Dicks approach is better.
  I think it is important for us to focus on the important parts of 
these security problems. There has been no indication whatsoever that 
the foreign visitor program has been in any way related to any of the 
security lapses that we have had at the national laboratories. Now 
other things are related, management of DOE and the number of other 
areas where more work is required, but not the foreign visitor program.
  I would further say that the numbers that we hear talked about do not 
really tell us very much. For example, the Governor of California once 
called Lawrence Livermore and asked that a busload of Chinese tourists 
be able to visit Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and go to the publicly 
open museum. Every person on that bus counts as a foreign visitor. I do 
not think we wanted to have the Secretary of Energy sign a waiver for 
each and every one of those tourists on a bus going to a public 
building.

[[Page H3974]]

  I think the Cox-Dicks approach is better and ask that this amendment 
be defeated.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
  (Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I want to repeat the commendation of the 
last speaker to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun), because he served 
a purpose in raising this issue to the forefront. He caused us to take 
what he was proposing, to consider it in depth; and that was the 
genesis of the amendment we adopted unanimously today, the Cox-Dicks 
amendment.
  While it included other things, that was our initial purpose, to take 
the foreign visitors program and add strictures to it, but not stifle 
it so much that we would literally suffocate and kill it, because this 
particular proposal would simply wipe out the foreign visitors program 
except for perhaps a few singular individuals who might be certified 
into it.
  Now, what does that mean? What is the foreign visitors program? The 
foreign visitors program exists on reservations like Los Alamos, which 
is about the size of the District of Columbia. It is not just some 
small laboratory. It is a huge complex of facilities, an enormous site. 
It includes secure areas to which they do not have access and lots of 
other areas and labs and work spaces.
  It would include an Israeli scientist there working on solar energy, 
a Swedish chemist who has come to work on plutonium issues, because 
there is a lot we still do not know about plutonium. The Swedish 
chemist, an actual case, is one of the world's experts. We need his 
insights and advice into the nature of plutonium, how it ages and what 
its effects are.
  It includes lots of foreign citizens who will soon be American 
citizens who post-doc'd from American universities and are working 
there, working at Los Alamos, or Livermore. They are the scientific 
talent of the present or the future.
  It includes a lot of Russians and lab-to-lab exchanges. Why are they 
there? Their knowledge is just about on parity with us anyway, but it 
is reciprocal. We do not talk a lot about this. That is part of the Cox 
report that was not published. We have gained a great deal through 
these exchanges. That reciprocity has enhanced our knowledge of what 
they are doing and enabled us to get a better grip on the spread or 
misuse of nuclear materials and nuclear devices.
  It could include IAEA trainees, because this is the perfect place to 
come where the knowledge resides. It could include nonnuclear 
exchanges. As the gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson) stated, 
lots of other things have nothing to do with nuclear weapons, 
lithography for inscribing ships, for example, micromachinery, and 
stuff like that.
  We will wipe out this program. Why is it important? Why does it have 
to occur at the labs? We set it up years ago when we created the 
stockpiles stewardship program so that we could have at these labs, 
which are national treasure houses, scientific talent that is second to 
none, so that we could attract excellent scientists there and maintain 
our excellence in nuclear weapons.
  This is an important program. The strictures we need for the security 
and counterintelligence have already been passed and put into effect by 
the Cox-Dicks amendment. This is not necessary. In fact, it is a 
dangerous precedent.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member 
for yielding me this time, and I certainly thank the gentleman from 
Kansas (Mr. Ryun) for his leadership on these important issues.
  Mr. Chairman, we have been through some troubling times. We have been 
sometimes amazed, sometimes fearful, and sometimes deliberating what 
can we do to protect the national security issues of this government, 
and how can we combine that with the necessities of research and 
collaboration and our own intrinsic spirit of a country that welcomes 
those into our borders.
  I believe there is good intent behind this particular amendment, but 
I rise in opposition because of the importance of our national labs and 
the relevance that they have to part of the collaborative effort we 
have on very important research.
  While the intent of preserving our national security secrets is one 
that I am committed to accomplishing and will be supporting several 
amendments dealing with the recent incident that we had in our national 
labs, I feel that this amendment imposes an unnecessary burden on the 
ability of our national labs to function.
  In fact, we have already addressed many of these issues. The Cox-
Dicks amendment gives DOE incentive to rapidly fix security problems. 
Under the Ryun amendment DOE has a 2-year moratorium, no matter what 
they do, because they are forbidding those who are foreign nationals 
from even coming near our national labs.
  I think the American ingenuity is better than that. I think we are 
smart people. I think we can address this question right now; and we 
can not or will not, by addressing it right now, prohibit the 
collaborative research that is important by most of those who come to 
our national labs, who have no intent of spying.
  We had a terrible series of events which have been noted by the Cox-
Dicks report, started under Republican administrations, continued under 
Democratic administrations, went under a Republican administration. 
There is no one that can claim that one party over another has not had 
some responsibility for what has happened.
  I would ask we vote down the Ryun amendment and support the measures 
that have already been done and support the Department of Energy's 
works that they have already begun to do, and make sure that we 
continue in the attitude that we have that good research is good and 
spying is bad.
  Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of the Chair how much 
time is remaining on both sides, please.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) has 2\1/2\ minutes 
remaining. The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) has 3\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman 
from Kansas (Mr. Tiahrt), my friend and colleague.
  Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Kansas for 
yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, it is apparent that the Department of Energy has no 
culture for keeping secrets. They keep secrets about like a sieve holds 
water. Personally, I think that we should move all nuclear functions 
from the Department of Energy to the Department of Defense under 
civilian control. At least in the Department of Defense we have a 
culture for keeping secrets, a culture for protecting our Nation's 
secrets.
  Now, what is being asked by the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) is 
not outside the realm of possibility. It is a very reasonable 
consideration, a small step in the giant trip we need to take towards 
recovering our Nation's secrets and putting into place a system that 
would prevent them from being lost in the future.
  We simply have a counterintelligence function being put in place, a 
2-year moratorium, and start the process of protecting the secrets that 
our country has invested billions of dollars in developing, and the 
loss of our secrets places our Nation in jeopardy. Our children's 
safety is very important to us. Whether they are in school or on the 
streets, it is important.
  The Ryun amendment is a good first step, and I would encourage my 
colleagues to vote for it.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\3/4\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Arkansas (Mr. Snyder).
  Mr. SNYDER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment of 
the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun), my friend and personal hero.
  A year ago, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry) and I traveled 
to Russia and visited several classified Russian nuclear labs. While we 
were there, we saw a demonstration, a cooperative venture that was set 
up between Sandia lab back in the United States and Russia.
  We actually looked on TV screens and were looking at this Sandia lab. 
It was an experiment on how to most efficiently control nuclear 
materials, how

[[Page H3975]]

to most efficiently verify that respective Nations are following treaty 
requirements.
  What will happen if this amendment passes? First of all, there will 
be retaliation. Any nation that is on this sensitive nations list, they 
are going to retaliate against us. Of course, they are not going to let 
people like the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry) and I continue to 
visit their complexes.
  Second, the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) a while ago gave a 
list of the nations that are on the list of sensitive countries, and he 
mentioned Cuba and Algeria. I mean, who can complain about not letting 
Cuban baseball players into our nuclear facilities?
  The problem is that is an incomplete list. The list I received from 
staff also mentions that are on the list of sensitive countries, 
Israel, Taiwan, India, Pakistan. Surely we would all acknowledge that 
these are countries that we do have need for cooperative scientific 
venture even in some classified areas.
  The third point I would make is that this amendment is too broad. The 
specific language puts this 2-year moratorium on ``any facility of a 
national laboratory.''
  Now, the doctor in me, when I hear the word ``laboratory,'' I think 
it talks about some one little small space or one room. These 
laboratories, like Sandia lab, Los Alamos, are large, sprawling, many, 
many acres, many, many buildings, doing all kinds of work with all 
kinds of different scientists, much of which is not classified.
  We would be cutting off all of this material and all of those 
opportunities by passing this amendment.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Costello).
  (Mr. COSTELLO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Missouri for 
yielding me this time, and I rise in opposition to the Ryun amendment.
  I rise today in strong opposition to the Ryun amendment.
  Last month Congressman Nethercutt offered an amendment to the DOE 
authorization bill in the Science Committee that would have imposed a 
moratorium on the Department of Energy's foreign visitor program. I 
amended Mr. Nethercutt's amendment to include a sunset provision. My 
amendment was unanimously accepted.
  I offered my amendment in the Science Committee because I am very 
concerned about national security at our labs. My amendment called for 
a moratorium on foreign visitors from sensitive countries to all labs 
when the visit is to a classified facility, and topics involve export 
control and nonproliferation. However, it included a
  1. Waiver of the moratorium on visits related to the U.S.-Russia 
nonproliferation programs that are important to our national security.
  2. Similar to the bipartisan bill passed by the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, the Secretary can issue waivers as long as the Secretary 
reports to Congress within 30 days.
  3. Contained a sunset to the moratorium. After all applicable 
portions of the Presidential Decision Directive 61 are in place, 
additional counterintelligence, safeguards and security measures 
announced by Secretary Richardson are in place and that DOE's current 
export controls on nonproliferation that govern foreign visits is in 
place.
  4. Annual report by DOE and FBI to Congress assessing security at 
each lab.
  Mr. Ryun's amendment would effectively kill several important 
security programs at the DOE labs including the nonproliferation 
programs that are so important to our national security.
  I went before the Rules Committee to offer my amendment that was 
unanimously passed by the full Science Committee, however, my amendment 
was not made in order. Therefore, I will vote against the Ryun 
amendment and urge my colleagues to also vote against the amendment.

                              {time}  1645

  Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my 
time.
  Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, the current administration has used 
words like unnecessary, overdramatize, and overreaction when discussing 
this legislation that tightens security at our nuclear labs.
  Security at the Department of Energy nuclear laboratories has been a 
systematic problem for over two decades. To blame one agency, one 
administration, or one individual would certainly be inappropriate. 
However, the discovery of all the thefts that have taken place in our 
most sensitive secrets does indeed warrant prompt and decisive action.
  The recent security proposals by the Department of Energy will leave 
visitors from China, Iran, Iraq, and Russia, many of these sensitive 
countries, back in the status quo. Congress must enter in and make the 
change so that we no longer have the status quo.
  I ask that my colleagues vote in support of this amendment and in 
support of the chairman, the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox), who 
intends to vote ``yes''.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Pallone).
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun). This amendment could 
have the potentially destructive effect of cutting off important 
exchanges for 2 years between American scientists and their 
counterparts from other countries.
  The amendment attempts to respond to compromises to our national 
security with regard to the People's Republic of China, obviously, a 
worthy goal, but it goes too far, extending the moratorium for 2 years 
instead of the 90 days specified in the Cox-Dicks amendment.
  The sensitive country list, as has been mentioned, includes many 
friends of the United States, including Israel. The list includes most 
of the former Soviet republics, including countries like Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia that are part of NATO's Partnership For Peace, 
and whose presidents took part in the recent 50th anniversary 
celebrations for NATO here in Washington. It includes India, the 
world's largest democracy. The stated reason for putting India on the 
list is it has not yet signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. But 
it needs to be made clear that India's nuclear program is an indigenous 
one, developed by India's own scientists.
  Export controls on supercomputers and other dual-use technologies 
have been in effect against India for years, forcing India to develop 
its own highly advanced R&D infrastructure. There is no evidence or 
even suggestion that India has been involved in the kinds of espionage 
activities that have been documented with regard to China.
  And we must be careful not to cut off scientific exchanges for as 
long as 2 years. And I know, Mr. Chairman, there is a waiver provision 
for national security reasons, but I would suggest that that is a very 
difficult test. Experience shows these types of waivers are rarely 
used.
  And I just want to say that I agree that China's espionage activities 
should cause us to be more vigilant, but the Cox-Dicks amendment 
addresses many of these concerns, including a much more measured 
approach to dealing with the Department of Energy's foreign visitors 
program. So I think that for that reason we should oppose this 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas 
(Mr. Ryun).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. RYUN of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) will 
be postponed.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8, printed 
in House Report 106-175.


                 Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Gilman

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Part A amendment No. 8 offered by the gentleman from New 
     York (Mr. Gilman):
       At the end of title XII (page 317, after line 17), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 1206. RESOURCES FOR EXPORT LICENSE FUNCTIONS.

       (a) Office of Defense Trade Controls.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall take the 
     necessary steps to ensure that, in any fiscal year, adequate 
     resources are allocated to the functions of the Office of

[[Page H3976]]

     Defense Trade Controls of the Department of State relating to 
     the review and processing of export license applications so 
     as to ensure that those functions are performed in a thorough 
     and timely manner.
       (2) Availability of existing appropriations.--The Secretary 
     of State shall take the necessary steps to ensure that those 
     funds made available under the heading ``Administration of 
     Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic and Consular Programs'' in title 
     IV of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the 
     Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, as 
     contained in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency 
     Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277) 
     are made available, upon the enactment of this Act, to the 
     Office of Defense Trade Controls of the Department of State 
     to carry out the purposes of the Office.
       (b) Defense Threat Reduction Agency.--The Secretary of 
     Defense shall take the necessary steps to ensure that, in any 
     fiscal year, adequate resources are allocated to the 
     functions of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the 
     Department of Defense relating to the review of export 
     license applications so as to ensure that those functions are 
     performed in a thorough and timely manner.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Gilman) and a Member opposed each will control 10 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to join with the distinguished chairman of 
the Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. 
Spence), in offering an amendment which requires the Secretary of State 
and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that adequate resources are 
allocated to the Office of Defense Trade Controls and the Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency for the purpose of reviewing and processing 
export license applications.
  The Office of Defense Trade Controls, the ODTC, within the Department 
of State, currently processes about 45,000 licenses each year, which is 
nearly four times what the Bureau of Export Administration in the 
Department of Commerce deals with, with only one-fourth of the 
personnel.
  With the transfer in jurisdiction of satellites and related 
technology from the commodity control list to the munitions list, ODTC 
will be taxed even greater to meet its obligations to review and 
process munition licenses as well as meeting its mandate to ensure 
compliance with our export control laws. That is why the gentleman from 
South Carolina (Mr. Spence) and I worked together to ensure that last 
year's Omnibus Appropriations Act contained $2 million for the Office 
of Defense Trade Controls to carry out its responsibilities.
  Regrettably, the State Department has refused to allocate the 
necessary funds to ODTC. Therefore, additional language was placed in 
last month's emergency supplemental as report language directing State 
to provide the monies that are needed. The State Department still 
refuses to provide all of the $2 million to ODTC, citing other pressing 
needs. Given the State Department's refusal to provide these needed 
funds, this amendment directs the Secretary of State to provide the 
balance of the funds needed to ODTC.
  This amendment ensures that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency is 
going to be adequately resourced by the Department of Defense. 
Accordingly, I urge support for this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from South Carolina (Mr. Spence), the chairman of the Committee on 
Armed Services.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Gilman) and myself would require both the Secretary of State and 
Secretary of Defense to provide sufficient resources to the offices 
within their respective departments that are responsible for reviewing 
and processing export license applications, as the gentleman from New 
York has said. This is premised on the strong belief that review of the 
export licenses should be carried out in a thorough and timely manner.
  This amendment builds upon the provision in last year's Defense 
Authorization Act that transfers licensing jurisdiction for the export 
of United States satellites from the Commerce Department back to the 
State Department. Last year's legislation also mandated a greater 
Defense Department role in ensuring that sophisticated military-related 
technology is not inappropriately transferred to dangerous countries 
and countries of proliferation concern.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a common sense amendment that simply requires 
both secretaries to commit sufficient resources to carry out their 
department's licensing activities. In particular, it calls on the 
Secretary of State to immediately allocate those funds provided last 
year for this purpose. As the Cox report indicated, the relaxation of 
export controls on sensitive dual-use technologies has had a 
devastating consequence for United States national security. Combined 
with the actions taken by the Congress last year to tighten our export 
control process, this amendment will help to see to it that American 
national security interests are protected.
  The amendment's requirement that all export license reviews be 
carried out in a timely manner addresses industry's concerns regarding 
possible delays in the licensing process.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Gilman).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed 
in House Report 106-175.


         Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania

  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Part A amendment No. 9 offered by Mr. Weldon of 
     Pennsylvania:
       At the end of title IX (page 265, after line 11), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 910. DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY ENHANCEMENT.

       (a) Reorganization of Technology Security Functions of 
     Department of Defense.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     establish the Technology Security Directorate of the Defense 
     Threat Reduction Agency as a separate Defense Agency named 
     the Defense Technology Security Agency. The Agency shall be 
     under the authority, direction, and control of the Under 
     Secretary of Defense for Policy.
       (b) Director.--The Director of the Defense Technology 
     Security Agency shall also serve as Deputy Under Secretary of 
     Defense for Technology Security Policy.
       (c) Functions.--The Director shall advise the Secretary of 
     Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, through the 
     Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, on policy issues 
     related to the transfer of strategically sensitive 
     technology, including the following:
       (1) Strategic trade.
       (2) Defense cooperative programs.
       (3) Science and technology agreements and exchanges.
       (4) Export of munitions items.
       (5) International Memorandums of Understanding.
       (6) Industrial base and competitiveness concerns.
       (7) Foreign acquisitions.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and a Member opposed each will control 10 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon).
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as 
I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I think this amendment and the one that will follow are 
noncontroversial amendments. I have discussed them with my colleagues 
on the other side. I have discussed them with the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Dicks), the ranking member on the Select Committee on 
U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the 
People's Republic of China.
  My colleagues, these are perfecting amendments to try to deal with 
the internal operations of DOD to make sure that we have in place the 
appropriate role for our agency personnel who are charged with the 
responsibility of monitoring input on potential technology transfers in 
licensing so that we have maximum effort available to raise the

[[Page H3977]]

potential threats that these technologies might bring to bear on the 
U.S. This change would take DTSA and the Technology Security 
Directorate out from under the control of DTRA, which is the Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency, and allow it to operate as a separate entity.
  The reason why this is important is that in a reorganization that 
occurred in the fall of last year, DTSA was placed under the 
acquisition side of the Department of Defense, thereby providing undue 
influence on those technical people whose job it is to monitor 
technologies that, in fact, may be requested for licensing.
  It is true that the DTSA organization also reports to the policy side 
of the Department of Defense, but there is a conflict in that dual 
reporting relationship. What we simply do with this amendment is have 
DTSA report directly to the policy side alone so that the technical 
people in DTSA, who are those that are best able to make key decisions 
relative to technology licensing in exports to the upper levels of the 
Pentagon, so they can have the appropriate response for the decision-
making process involving Commerce and State on technologies that in 
fact may be exported.
  It is a technical amendment, but it is one that I think is consistent 
with what was done by the Select Committee on U.S. National Security 
and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China. 
It is consistent with the goals and objectives of the chairman and the 
ranking member, and I ask my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does any Member claim time in opposition to the 
amendment? If not, all time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10 printed 
in House Report 106-175.


         Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania

  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Part A amendment No. 10 offered by Mr. Weldon of 
     Pennsylvania:
       At the end of title XII (page 317, after line 17), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 1206. NATIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT OF EXPORT LICENSES.

       (a) Report to Congress.--The Secretary of Defense, in 
     consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall provide to 
     Congress a report assessing the cumulative impact of 
     individual licenses granted by the United States for exports, 
     goods, or technology to countries of concern.
       (b) Contents of Report.--Each report under subsection (a) 
     shall include an assessment of--
       (1) the cumulative impact of exports of technology on 
     improving the military capabilities of countries of concern;
       (2) the impact of exports of technology which would be 
     harmful to United States military capabilities, as well as 
     countermeasures necessary to overcome the use of such 
     technology; and
       (3) those technologies, systems, and components which have 
     applications to conventional military and strategic 
     capabilities.
       (c) Timing of Reports.--The first report under subsection 
     (a) shall be submitted to Congress not later than 1 year 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall assess 
     the cumulative impact of exports to countries of concern in 
     the previous 5-year period. Subsequent reports under 
     subsection (a) shall be submitted to Congress at the end of 
     each 1-year period after the submission of the first report. 
     Each such subsequent report shall include an assessment of 
     the cumulative impact of technology exports based on analyses 
     contained in previous reports under this section.
       (d) Support of Other Federal Agencies.--The Secretary of 
     Commerce, the Secretary of State, and the heads of other 
     departments and agencies shall make available to the 
     Secretary of Defense information necessary to carry out this 
     section, including information on export licensing.
       (e) Definition.--As used in this section, the term 
     ``country of concern'' means--
       (1) a country the government of which the Secretary of 
     State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the 
     Export Administration Act of 1979 or other applicable law, to 
     have repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
     terrorism; and
       (2) a country on the list of covered countries under 
     section 1211(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1998 (50 U.S.C. app. 2404 note).

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and a Member opposed each will control 10 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon).

                              {time}  1700

  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as 
I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I will also make this brief. This is also 
noncontroversial. This also is an outgrowth of the Cox committee and a 
recommendation that I brought forward because of the findings that we 
made in looking at the damage done to our security.
  We came to a bipartisan conclusion that U.S. international export 
control regimes have actually facilitated China's efforts to obtain 
militarily useful technology. And, therefore, what this amendment does 
is, I think, go a long way toward addressing the problem of monitoring 
what countries like China are attempting to acquire by ensuring that an 
annual comprehensive assessment of export licenses to countries of 
concern be prepared by the Department of Defense.
  In other words, when an export license is granted to what we call a 
tier-three country, which is a country that the State Department 
identifies as one that is a potential threat to us, or when an export 
license is given perhaps to a country listed as a terrorist state, 
there is no requirement today that there is a process in place to 
monitor the cumulative effect of those licenses.
  What my amendment says is that the Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has to submit to the 
Congress an annual report. That annual report will reveal to us the 
cumulative impact of individual exports to countries of concern. It 
does not say that any action will occur in a negative sense. It simply 
provides for the Congress to be given an annual report by DOD of these 
exports.
  I think it is a common sense amendment. It will increase our 
effectiveness in this area. I would ask my colleagues to support this.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment, 
and I yield myself such time as I may consume. I do so to ask my friend 
some questions.
  I am sure that his intentions are very solid, but my question on the 
wording of the amendment is that, what if they do the study and they 
find out it has actually aided America's defense? Are they allowed to 
record that?
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GEJDENSON. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, that would be fine. That 
would be outstanding, and we would be happy to receive that report.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, as I understand the 
language, I do not have it in front of me, it says to report the 
adverse impacts of international trade in high-technology items.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will 
continue to yield, actually, if he will real my amendment, he will see 
that section 2 says ``the impacts of exports of technology which would 
be harmful.'' It says, ``which would be harmful.''
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Right. So in that, would it be okay, for the record, 
if they assess something and they found out it would be helpful?
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to accept 
that.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, excellent.
  Let me just say again, we have taken a spying case that started in 
the 1980s and we are trying in the process, I am fearful, of destroying 
the future economic and military strength of the country.
  All these amendments are well-intentioned. But the reality is that 
most of this technology is not exclusively American, that American 
industry that has led the world with modern technology will not 
continue to do so if we unilaterally stop selling things, especially 
when they are generally available.
  There are tens of companies that have most of these products. And if 
we

[[Page H3978]]

continue to look through this in the same way we looked at machined 
tools, we will do to the computer industry and to other high-tech 
industries what we did to the machine tool industry.
  Some of the same Members here would not allow American machine tool 
companies to sell abroad for fear it would end up in Russia's hands. 
What happened? The American machine tool industry continued to degrade 
to the point where the Defense Department wanted Japanese machines. And 
when the Soviets in those days were looking for a machine tool to 
create the kind of quality they needed for their submarine program, 
they bought a Toshiba.
  So let us not sit here and believe that we exist in a vacuum of total 
control of this technology. What we are going to set up with this 
stampede before any of the committees of jurisdiction have dealt with 
the issues is create the only restrictive process in the world. None of 
our allies are with us. They are selling everything they can to 
everybody who will put money on the table. And we are about to restrict 
things that are not in our national interest.
  We need to deal with choke-point technologies. We need to deal with 
fissionable material, chemical and biological weapons, not with every 
piece of technology that leaves this country. And it seems to me that 
unless we calm down here a bit, we are going to do fundamental damage 
to a critical industry for the future of this country.
  The choice is ours. Are we going to continue to add these amendments 
whose cumulative weight will create an export licensing process so 
complex that no one will believe America is a reliable supplier?
  And again, these are not generally technologies that we hold 
unilaterally. These are technologies that exist all across the planet. 
Other countries, other companies have them.
  I will close with this: In the early days of this Clinton 
administration, they were refusing a license for telephone switches to 
China. These switches operated at 565. And so, I took a look at that. 
And again, I am saying none of these things are made in my district, to 
my dismay, but this is an American product by AT&T. It was a 565 
switch.
  The Clinton administration refused to sell it. The Chinese made their 
own 565s. So we forced them to create a competitive technology. And a 
third country sold them 625 switches even faster. We have to understand 
the reality of the world and what really helps us.
  The mistakes we have to date I think are clearly of the kind that 
this new approach will only exacerbate. Do not try to cast the wide 
net. Focus on the critical technologies, on things that are fundamental 
to weapons and other secrets that are critical to national security.
  Trying to have this broad net across the globe on computers when a 
Sony Playstation, our kids' Sony version of Nintendo, operates at a 
greater speed than what we consider a super computer today is 
unachievable. It will only have one result. It will not increase 
national security. It will do damage to America's forward-looking 
industries.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as 
I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I was not going to do this but I cannot let those 
comments go unanswered. Here is a chart that I prepared, starting in 
1993 until 1999. This chart has been made available to every one of my 
colleagues; and for the past two nights, I have done one-hour special 
orders here each night in detail about these charts. I cannot go 
through all of that today, but I would encourage my colleagues to read 
what I said and then come on the floor and dispute what I have said.
  These charts were prepared by employees of the Federal Government 
that I have been working with from those agencies whose responsibility 
has been to monitor our technology, not to stop it, as the gentleman is 
trying to say, but to monitor it, so the DOD has at least the ability 
to know what it is we are selling.
  Now, let us look at what has happened. And why did I pick 1993? Was 
it because Bill Clinton was elected? No. It is because in 1993 this 
administration decided to end COCOM.
  COCOM was a process that was in place with our allied nations to 
monitor technology to make sure that in fact that technology, if it was 
going to be sold, we would understand the implications. This 
administration ended it. And I do not want to hear that it was started 
by the Bush administration.

  Our Select Committee on China went into detail. We called in the 
witnesses. The final decision and the ultimate demise was, by this 
administration, they replaced it with something called Wassenaar, which 
is a total and complete failure. It has done nothing to stop technology 
or to give us the ability to monitor it.
  Look at what happened since this administration ended COCOM. Each of 
these red dots are decisions that we took unilaterally to allow 
technology to flow overseas.
  Now, in the case of high-performance computers, let us take that for 
a moment. Because the story is, well, every nation builds them today. 
Wait a minute. Up until 1995, only two countries built them, Japan and 
the U.S. There was an unwritten understanding between Japan and the 
U.S. that neither country would export high-performance computers to 
tier-three countries. We unilaterally ended that. We did it.
  DTSA, the agency that I just talked about, said that is a bad 
decision. The administration said, we do not care. We are going to sell 
these computers anyplace. Within 2 years, China had acquired 350 high-
performance computers.
  What is the industry saying today? Oh, Japan is selling these. We 
have to compete with them. Well, why are they selling them? Because our 
Government stripped away the process, stripped away the process to 
allow the input by defense experts on the implications of these 
technology transfers.
  Now, I cannot help it if my colleague does not believe employees of 
his administration. That is where I got this information from. But it 
goes beyond that also during this time period. These are export 
violations by this administration that occurred by China that this 
administration ignored and did not impose sanctions required under arms 
control regimes.
  Where did these technologies go? They did not go to normal countries. 
They went to Libya. They went to Iraq. They went to Iran. They went to 
North Korea. This administration ignored the violations. This 
administration 20 times in the last 7 years, when we caught these 
violations occurring, said, we are not going to do anything because we 
do not want to upset our relationship with China. This combination of 
factors, along with these numerous visits by Chinese influence 
peddlers.
  I wish my Democrat constituents could visit the President 12 times in 
one year like John Huang did. I wish my constituents could have 
personal meetings with President Clinton 12 times in one year to 
influence peddle. But my constituents do not have that opportunity.
  So when the gentleman says we are going too far, I say to the 
gentleman, we had a 9-0 vote in the China committee for recommendations 
to improve our security. It was this administration who removed the 
laboratory security color coding at our Federal labs in 1993.
  It was Hazel O'Leary who removed the FBI background checks in 1993. 
It was Hazel O'Leary who overruled Lawrence Livermore Laboratory when 
they caught a retired employee giving classified information, and she 
reinstated. And it was Hazel O'Leary in 1995 who gave the design for 
the W-87 warhead to U.S. News and World Report the same year they said 
we caught China.
  This administration has been the problem with export policy, and we 
are trying to make some modest changes sensitive to the concerns of 
business to allow us to get a control on what it is we are selling. We 
are not trying to hurt business.
  I will put my record against that of the gentleman on free market 
support of our business any day of the week. For him to stand up here 
and say we are trying to hurt our business is nothing less, in my 
opinion, than totally distorting our reputation and what we support.
  We are concerned about America's security, and we are concerned about 
giving our employees in the Defense Department the chance to have input 
into what is happening.

[[Page H3979]]

  I wish the gentleman on the Committee on International Affairs would 
have done more on the elimination of COCOM or the other things that 
occurred over the past several years that this administration gave away 
the complete ability of our country to monitor the kinds of technology 
that we are selling. Because if we would have stopped these things, we 
would not have had to have a China commission, we would not have had to 
have a Cox committee. But none of those things occurred.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Hawaii.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, I ask the gentleman, would it be fair 
to characterize some of the discussion that took place in the Committee 
on Armed Services since 1993 as addressing some of the very problems 
that the gentleman has outlined in that chart?
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, 
absolutely. And the gentleman and my friend was in the leadership in 
some of those debates.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield further, 
has it not been a topic of discussion among Democrats and Republicans 
that these questions that have been raised and which are addressed in 
the amendments now before us have been, if anything, stated in just as 
strong if not stronger terms in trying to deal with the question of 
technology transfer in the security interests of this Nation?
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely. And Democrats have been on 
the forefront of that in this body, as have Republicans. Our battle has 
not been within this Congress.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And would it not be fair to say that the question we 
had in the Committee on Armed Services was as to whether the Commerce 
Department was the best area to be making decisions with respect to 
national security interests of this country and technology transfer?
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And so, I think it would be also fair to indicate 
that these two amendments that appear before us today, if anything, 
would be characterized by individuals on the Committee on Armed 
Services, such as myself, as possibly being even a little light in 
terms of what we might reasonably expect to impose given the sorry 
record that has appeared before us over the last 6 years.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I would say the gentleman 
is correct.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, some interesting things have been said, not all of them 
completely accurate. And I am sure it is unintentional.
  The reality is that COCOM died and it died for a very simple reason. 
None of our European, Japanese, and other partners would sit by any of 
the rules. Even when we had the Soviet Union, we could not get the 
French, Germans, and others to restrict sales.
  Once the Soviet Union fell apart, in 1991, not when Bill Clinton got 
to be President, but in 1991, COCOM stopped functioning. And the reason 
there is not a COCOM today is because we cannot get an agreement from 
any of our allies or former members of COCOM on any restrictions 
whatsoever. The most that they are willing to do is to have their own 
set of rules essentially.
  So they can dream about blaming Bill Clinton for everything, even 
when he wins. They can use his name here on a regular basis as some 
kind of scoundrel. But the reality is, in 1991, when he was not 
President, COCOM already stopped working.

                              {time}  1715

  What he tried to do with a follow-on organization is try to get our 
allies to have some semblance of a united position on exports. He has 
not been able to do it. The next President will not be able to do it. 
And not if the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) were the 
President would he be able to do it because the Europeans will not 
enter into that agreement with us.
  Supercomputers, the Bulgarians made supercomputers when they were 
still communists. It is impossible to think that we are somehow going 
to strengthen America's security by degrading the industries that are 
giving us a new generation of computers every 6 months. So what you are 
going to do is, you are going to try to slow this process down. When a 
shelf life of a product is 6 months, you have basically disposed of 
that product's value.
  When we look at where the future is, the future is very clear. The 
societies that take advantage of their leads and invest in future 
research and development will be the societies that succeed. American 
industry is not always right but in this area they are and the 
gentleman is wrong. American industry is competing globally. There are 
competitors making high speed computers and others of these products 
across the globe. And in every system, the present system and the 
previous system, the Defense Department was at the table. But if you 
ask people whose sole responsibility is defense, I guess they would not 
sell grain, they would not sell cars, they would not sell anything, 
because in some way that does assist your adversary.
  Mr. Chairman, if we do not develop the technology for the future, we 
will be begging the Japanese or the Germans to sell us the computers we 
need and then tell me about American national security, when we no 
longer make the best in this country. It happened in electronics, it 
happened in machine tools, and with this kind of attitude, it is going 
to happen in the most forward industry we have had in this country in 
some time, in telecommunication and computers.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance 
of my time.
  In closing, the gentleman would make a fine fantasy writer for 
fantasy books. We are dealing in substance here. There have been 
serious security concerns brought before this Congress by nine of the 
most solid Members of this institution, four members of the Democrat 
Party who I have the highest respect for, who understand security 
issues and understand the implications of them and do not get on this 
floor and rail with a bunch of uninformed and unbacked-up rhetoric 
about what we are trying to do. This is a serious issue that deserves a 
serious response. This amendment takes that step. I would encourage and 
ask my colleagues to support this bipartisan effort to provide one more 
tool to allow us to monitor our technology before it is sold to a rogue 
nation or a terrorist state.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon).
  The amendment was agreed to.


             Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Ryun of Kansas

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) on 
which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes 
prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 159, 
noes 266, not voting 9, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 181]

                               AYES--159

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Blunt
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Bryant
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Camp
     Campbell
     Cannon
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Duncan
     Everett
     Fletcher
     Fossella
     Franks (NJ)
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Granger
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hoekstra
     Hostettler
     Hulshof

[[Page H3980]]


     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kelly
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     LaHood
     Latham
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Packard
     Paul
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Upton
     Walden
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wolf
     Wu
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--266

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bass
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Bliley
     Blumenauer
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Burr
     Calvert
     Canady
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Castle
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Combest
     Condit
     Conyers
     Cook
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (VA)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     Kuykendall
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Largent
     Larson
     LaTourette
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Owens
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Regula
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schaffer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Shows
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Towns
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walsh
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (PA)
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--9

     Brown (CA)
     Ewing
     Hinchey
     Kasich
     Luther
     McHugh
     Quinn
     Sherwood
     Waters

                              {time}  1741

  Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. ABERCROMBIE, Ms. BERKLEY, Mr. 
BRADY of Texas and Mr. OWENS changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. WALDEN of Oregon and Mr. HULSHOF changed their vote from ``no'' 
to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  (By unanimous consent Mr. Skelton was allowed to speak out of order).


Announcement of Agreement by Military Forces of Yugoslavia to Withdraw 
                       From Kosovo Within 11 Days

  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief.
  Some in the House may know this, but many may not:
  Secretary of Defense Cohen just a few moments ago announced that 
there is a withdrawal agreement by the military forces of Yugoslavia 
back to Serbia, and the agreement is that they will be completely out 
of Kosovo in 11 days.
  I thought the House should know that.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider Amendment No. 11 printed 
in House Report 106-175.
  The Chair understands that it will not be offered.
  It is now in order to consider Amendment No. 12 printed in the House 
Report 106- 175.


                 Amendment No. 12 Offered by Mr. DeLay

  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Part A amendment No. 12 offered by Mr. DeLay:
       Strike section 1203 (page 310, line 22 through page 314, 
     line 7) and insert the following:

     SEC. 1203. LIMITATION ON MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGES WITH 
                   CHINA'S PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY.

       (a) Limitation.--The Secretary of Defense may not authorize 
     any military-to-military exchange or contact described in 
     subsection (b) to be conducted by the Armed Forces with 
     representatives of the People's Liberation Army of the 
     People's Republic of China.
       (b) Covered Exchanges and Contacts.--Subsection (a) applies 
     to any military-to-military exchange or contact that includes 
     any of the following:
       (1) Force projection operations.
       (2) Nuclear operations.
       (3) Field operations.
       (4) Logistics.
       (5) Chemical and biological defense and other capabilities 
     related to weapons of mass destruction.
       (6) Surveillance, and reconnaissance operations.
       (7) Joint warfighting experiments and other activities 
     related to warfare.
       (8) Military space operations.
       (9) Other warfighting capabilities of the Armed Forces.
       (10) Arms sales or military-related technology transfers.
       (11) Release of classified or restricted information.
       (12) Access to a Department of Defense laboratory.
       (c) Exceptions.--Subsection (a) does not apply to any 
     search and rescue exercise or any humanitarian exercise.
       (d) Certification by Secretary.--The Secretary of Defense 
     shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate 
     and the Committee on Armed Service of the House of 
     Representatives, not later than December 31 of each year, a 
     certification in writing as to whether or not any military-
     to-miltary exchange or contact during that calandar year was 
     conducted in violation of subsection (a).
       (e) Annual Report.--Not later than June 1 each year, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed 
     Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Service of 
     the House of Representatives a report providing the 
     Secretary's assessment of the current state of military-to-
     military contacts with the People's Liberation Army. The 
     report shall include the following:
       (1) A summary of all such military-to-military contacts 
     during the period since the last such report, including a 
     summary of topics discussed and questions asked by the 
     Chinese participants in those contacts.
       (2) A description of the military-to-military contacts 
     scheduled for the next 12-month period and a five-year plan 
     for those contacts.
       (3) The Secretary's assessment of the benefits the Chinese 
     expect to gain from those military-to-military contacts.
       (4) The Secretary's assessment of the benefits the 
     Department of Defense expects to gain from those military-to-
     military contacts.
       (5) The Secretary's assessment of how military-to-military 
     contacts with the People's Liberation Army fit into the 
     larger security relationship between United States and the 
     People's Republic of China.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. DeLay) and a Member opposed each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay).

                             {time}  1745.

  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to offer an amendment to bar the United 
States from training the Communist Chinese military. Now, at first this 
amendment may sound unnecessary, especially after all the revelations 
about the Red

[[Page H3981]]

Chinese spying that was found in the Cox report. It seems almost crazy 
to even suggest that the American government might tutor its ambitious 
nemesis in military strategy, but that is exactly what the United 
States Department of Defense under Bill Clinton has planned.
  Unless this Congress acts to stop it, the Pentagon will go ahead with 
military to military exchanges and other sensitive information sharing 
with the People's Liberation Army. Such cooperation between American 
and Red Chinese Armed Forces has been both hot and cold for the better 
part of two decades. President Bush ended military exercises 10 years 
ago after the communist government violently suppressed the peaceful 
protest for democracy in Tiananmen Square. But consistent with his 
administration's habitual appeasement of Communist China, President 
Clinton jump-started American cooperation with the PLA soon after 
taking office in 1993. The imbalance in these so-called exchanges is 
extreme and predictably benefits the PRC.
  Just this year, more than 80 cooperative military contacts were 
planned between the U.S. and Red China. Proposals for these training 
exercises include American operation on advice from Special Forces 
units, from the Navy Seals, the Army Green Berets and the Air Force.
  Last December a ship from Communist China participated for the first 
time ever in complex exercises with America in Hong Kong. Plans were 
hatched this year for the PLA to engage in Code Thunder, the largest 
U.S. Air Force exercise in the Pacific, and, remarkably, the United 
States Army has already hosted communist troops for training exercises, 
and it just recently squelched a visit by PLA observers to view the 
entire American air and infantry divisions that were practicing at the 
Army's National Training Center.
  Such suicidal national behavior has to come to an end. The role of 
our military is to defend America from hostile foreign powers, not to 
train them. This amendment protects the American military from its own 
expertise.
  The United States has the most sophisticated military equipment in 
the world, bar none. Rogue nations and other aggressors are permanently 
discouraged from wreaking havoc around the globe because they fear the 
wrath of American retaliation.
  One key to this influence is our unmatched technological and 
strategic supremacy. Why on earth would we want to share our most 
valuable secrets with any nation, let alone a potential aggressor? The 
Cox report went into painful detail about the extent to which our 
arsenals have already been compromised to Communist China. The massive 
depth of the PRC's operation to infiltrate American security should 
teach us many lessons about our relationship with the growing power in 
Asia.
  Primarily our relationship is not a two-way street. The PRC steals 
our nuclear secrets and we do nothing. We give them industrial 
technology and ask for nothing in return. They financially tamper with 
the reelection of an American President, and we sweep it under the rug. 
We open our markets to their products, but they slam their markets 
closed to America. Now, almost like a parody, the United States is 
practically training the People's Liberation Army. It is past time that 
we say enough is enough.
  Opening our markets is different than opening our laboratories and 
military facilities, and the line should now be drawn. The Chinese 
Communists will not leave any stones unturned in their quest for 
military domination. There is absolutely no reason for the United 
States to enhance the PLA's war-making capabilities. It was not that 
long ago that a high ranking PLA official threatened to nuke Los 
Angeles if America interfered in the Taiwan Straits. There could be no 
clearer warning to their intentions, and we must defend ourselves from 
such a threat.
  Now, this amendment is very simple, Mr. Chairman. It prohibits the 
United States Secretary of Defense from authorizing military exchanges 
with Communist China that reveal American classified, nuclear, 
logistical, technological, intelligence and other war fighting secrets.
  Mr. Chairman, this Congress must vote against military-to-military 
exchanges with the Communist Chinese now. American security is 
definitely at stake.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Texas, and I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I must point out this amendment is unnecessary. The 
committee did its work. The language in section 1203 of our bill more 
than adequately protects American national security in the area of 
military-to-military exchanges with the Chinese People's Liberation 
Army. The majority wrote this language, we agreed to it, it is good 
language.
  Let me tell you what it does, what is already in the bill. First, it 
provides that these contacts be governed by the principles of 
reciprocity and transparency.
  Second, it establishes limits that would prevent Members of the PLA 
from inappropriate access to advanced technologies and capabilities of 
the United States Armed Forces.
  Third, it requires the Secretary of Defense to certify prior to the 
start of any operation that military-to-military contacts with the PLA 
will be conducted in accordance with such principles of reciprocity and 
transparency that such contacts are in the national security interests 
of the United States, and prohibits members of the U.S. Armed Forces 
from participating in any military-to-military contacts until such 
certification is given to Congress.
  Fourth, it requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a detailed 
annual report to Congress that provides an assessment of the military-
to-military contacts with the PLA.
  In addition to being unnecessary, this amendment would actually harm 
American security interests. The truth is that military-to-military 
contacts are more beneficial to the U.S. than to the PLA. Our military 
operates every day in an open, democratic society. The PLA operates in 
China's closed society. With military-to-military contacts we gain 
insight in the PLA's structure, its culture, its mode of operation and 
its influence on Chinese internal politics and foreign policy 
decisionmaking.
  It is a matter of intelligence. We enhance our understanding of 
China's strategic doctrine and can reduce the potential for 
miscalculations and access between the PLA and U.S. or other Western 
forces.
  Moreover, routine senior level defense contact in times of relative 
calm can help ensure open communications during times of tension. The 
language that is already in the bill, that is already there, written by 
the majority and agreed to by the minority, protects U.S. national 
security, while keeping open lines of communication, which is very 
essential to the American national interests.
  I intend to vote against the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence), the chairman of the 
Committee on Armed Services.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the DeLay amendment to limit 
military-to-military contact between members of the United States Armed 
Forces and the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The DeLay amendment 
would strengthen the limitation already carried in the committee bill 
that would attempt to better protect our military secrets while not 
prohibiting VIP level exchanges from continuing.
  Make no mistake about it, there is a need for increased vigilance. As 
the bipartisan Cox committee report reminds us, the Chinese are engaged 
in a long-term effort to modernize their military, and, in particular, 
to understand and acquire the power projection capabilities that are 
the hallmark of our military forces.
  In addition to acquiring United States and Western technology to 
improve their power projection capabilities, the Chinese are also 
attempting to understand and even adopt United States military tactics, 
techniques and

[[Page H3982]]

procedures, the essential how-to knowledge necessary for effective 
military operations.
  Increasingly, the Department of Defense is being pressured by other 
elements of our government to work with the Chinese military in ways 
that increase the chances these vital trade secrets might be revealed. 
For example, just recently the Chinese asked to send a delegation of 20 
officers to the United States Army Training Center to be fully 
integrated into operations there. Although the Chinese were eventually 
denied full access to the center, the Army was under pressure from 
other parts of the administration to give the Chinese, quoting from an 
Army source, ``a level of involvement that was beyond what we had 
granted to any other country,'' according to these Army documents. The 
Army believed the Chinese had an ulterior motive for their request, the 
desire to gain insight into advanced Army tactics.
  Mr. Chairman, the United States would be foolish to place a higher 
value on the policy of engagement with China than on protecting the 
tactics and technologies that are the cornerstone of our national 
security, especially capabilities for power projection that China might 
well turn on Taiwan or our other allies in the Asia-Pacific region.
  I agree with the DeLay amendment, and urge my colleagues to support 
it.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Guam (Mr. Underwood).
  Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey 
for yielding me time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Texas, which has been characterized as a limitation on 
military to military exchanges with China's People's Liberation Army. 
However, if one takes the time to read the amendment, they will soon 
discover the limitation is a little inaccurate. What the amendment 
actually does is destroy the cornerstone of an effort to try to work to 
some extent with the military on a reciprocal basis with the Chinese 
military.

                              {time}  1800

  I think the amendment represents a misunderstanding about what 
military-to-military exchange programs are all about.
  At first glance it would appear that the DeLay amendment would have 
us believe that the U.S. military is currently engaged in some 
sophisticated military exercises with the Chinese PLA, or has done so 
in the past. This is not the case. This amendment would prohibit all 
military contacts with the PLA for logistics operations, field 
operations, chemical and biological defense, force projection 
operations, and arms sales.
  Ironically, we have not participated in this level of cooperation 
with China since Chiang Kai Shek, and the DeLay amendment sets up the 
premise that our military is sharing vital tactical and operational 
techniques with the PLA.
  This is a little bit exaggerated. If any American commander was to 
engage in the kind of substantive exchange type of activities 
enumerated in the DeLay amendment, that commander should be in deep 
trouble. The language of the amendment of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
DeLay) is redundant in that he is outlawing what is already not 
practice.
  In reality, the military exchange program, through this program as it 
currently exists, both China and the U.S. have embarked on a series of 
measured steps aimed at achieving increasingly higher levels of mutual 
confidence and understanding.
  Let no mistake be made, our current military engagement program with 
China is leagues away from any level of cooperation we have with any 
other nation on the face of the earth. The basic substance of our 
existing military contact with the Chinese is based around naval port 
visits, exchange visits by top military leaders, and working level 
talks and meetings.
  Indeed, during his tenure as commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific, 
Admiral Joseph Prueher, now retired, had several productive exchanges 
with the Chinese military leadership which focused on discussions on 
Asia-Pacific security issues and bilateral defense relations.
  Admiral Prueher's exchanges also provided for an opportunity for us 
to learn about what is going on in China and their efforts at so-called 
economic reforms, and the PLA's modernization. Our intelligence of this 
information would be scant, at best, if it were not for the 
relationships established by such military-to-military exchanges.
  Even if we were to treat the Chinese as an adversary or potential 
adversary, continued and measured military-to-military exchanges 
provide invaluable intelligence and access to China's military leaders 
that we otherwise would be cut off from.
  The British in the early part of this century promoted military and 
academic exchanges with their adversaries, the Germans, in order to 
know their enemy. We, too, engaged in this practice with Japanese 
admirals in the 1920s and '30s. Ceasing this intelligence practice 
would be cutting off our nose to spite our face.
  The essential point is that in our society, we encourage the free 
exchange of ideas. This is one of the reasons why our Nation annually 
and publicly releases reports on the posture and strategy of our armed 
forces.
  In fact, the U.S.-China military exchanges have created an 
environment where China has finally published its first white paper on 
defense, and although we know it is not comprehensive and not entirely 
accurate, I think through this contact we are breaking a barrier.
  Mr. Chairman, furthermore, the DeLay amendment ignores the key 
current practice that governs our military-to-military exchanges with 
the PLA. In response to unequal treatment of access with regard to 
Chinese military equipment and installations as well as exercise 
viewing privileges, the Secretary of Defense has established a quid pro 
quo procedure. In other words, our military exchanges mirror the level 
of access that is granted to our officers and troops on exchange in 
China. Thus, I think our fears of unequal access are moot.
  Through this evenhanded and measured commonsense initiative, we do 
not risk exposing ourselves to charges of weakness and 
disingenuousness, but at the same time we remain engaged with China's 
military to achieve the greater goal of mutual understanding.
  This amendment is simplistic, I believe a knee-jerk reaction that 
feebly attempts to stem a genuine problem, but a problem that exists in 
an entirely different area. This amendment fails to consider the entire 
picture and constellation of elements that comprise our national 
security apparatus. The DeLay amendment seeks to create an enemy out of 
China by naively tossing out the baby with the bath water.
  We need to create a balanced legislative approach that will yield a 
well-conceived response to foreign espionage.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
North Carolina (Mrs. Myrick).
  Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Chairman, this amendment makes sense. I can 
understand why a cultural and economic relationship with China can 
improve human rights, but China is not a military friend. The events of 
last month have made that clear.
  After the Tiananmen Square massacre, we discontinued military 
cooperation with China, and then in 1993 President Clinton reinitiated 
military-to-military contacts. Now we have learned that as early as 
1996, national security adviser Sandy Berger knew that the Chinese had 
stolen our nuclear secrets and were continuing to practice espionage in 
the United States.
  Yet, in 1998, for the first time ever, we engaged in a joint military 
exercise with China's Peoples' Liberation Army. What has occurred 
during these military-to-military contacts scares me almost as much as 
the Cox report.
  We have recently learned China is now attempting to purchase 
torpedoes specifically designed to explode directly under our ships. 
Why? Because at one of the visits last year they learned that our U.S. 
aircraft carriers had a thin hall and were vulnerable to these types of 
torpedoes.
  At these exercises the Chinese saw our military's dependence on 
satellites and digital systems and AWACs aircraft. It does not surprise 
me that they are now seeking new ways to attack American satellites and 
to disrupt communications. We should not be allowing any national 
security secrets to

[[Page H3983]]

be given away to any potential adversaries, much less China. We would 
not invite a thief to observe our home security system as it was being 
installed and tested.
  This administration continues to show its inability to even attempt 
to keep our national security secrets from China. As a result of this 
ineptness, I support the amendment of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Delay) to prohibit most military-to-military contacts with the People's 
Liberation Army.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
New Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
  (Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I strongly oppose this amendment. No one can deny that 
there is a serious breach of U.S. security with respect to the leak of 
military secrets to the People's Republic of China. The answer in my 
view to address that problem is to plug the leaks, punish the 
violators, prevent this from happening again, and to outsmart the 
technology which the Chinese have wrongfully obtained.
  The answer is not to change our form of government and replace one 
Secretary of Defense and one Commander in Chief with 435 Secretaries of 
Defense or Commanders in Chief. I believe that is the fundamental error 
behind this ill-conceived amendment.
  I would like my colleagues to consider the following not-too-unlikely 
scenario: A rogue state, let us say Iraq, decides it wants to plan and 
execute an attack on a U.S. corporation located in Beijing, in the 
People's Republic of China. Our intelligence community learns of this 
planned attack.
  If the DeLay amendment were the law, as I read it, the Secretary of 
Defense and the military would be prohibited from talking to the 
People's Republic of China military about responding to prevent that 
attack, prevented from sharing any information as to what to do about 
it.
  The principal flaw in this very flawed proposal is not simply what I 
believe to be its political motivation, it is also its absolute 
unreasonableness in implementation. People have to make decisions in 
times of crises with limited information and with peoples' lives on the 
line. It is wholely inappropriate for us to require that those 
decisions be bound up in the deliberations of a legislative branch.
  There is not one Member here, certainly not I, that would say that 
the conduct of the Chinese military is exemplary. But history teaches 
us that there are times when we cannot choose our partners or our 
allies. There are times when we must act and seek the help of anyone 
who is willing and prepared to help us.
  I agree that those circumstances would be very limited, indeed, given 
the history of the last few years and months and weeks on this issue. 
But for us to rule it out with the exception of search and rescue 
exercises or humanitarian exercises, whatever that means, I believe is 
imprudent and reckless, and is an abrogation of the rightful 
constitutional power of the executive branch.
  For these reasons, I would urge my colleagues, both Republicans and 
Democrats, to reject this ill-conceived amendment.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Rohrabacher).
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay).
  Mr. Chairman, we were just looking at what happened with Secretary 
O'Leary a few years ago. We found out recently that she has been, when 
she was Secretary of Energy, she was shovelling out the door our 
nuclear secrets, just shovelling out the door. In retrospect, it looked 
like a going out of business sale. It was probably more like a going 
out of sanity sale. This is insane. The policies this administration 
has had towards Communist China, our worst, our most deadly potential 
enemy, is insane.
  We have heard, we can just plug the leaks, change a little here, 
change a little there, and that is the way to approach it. No. What we 
need to protect the interests of the United States and ensure that our 
people are not incinerated with our own weapons or destroyed or killed, 
or having our defenders destroyed or killed by tactics that they have 
learned from us, that our enemy has learned from us, the way we do that 
is change the fundamental policies that we have toward Communist China.
  Communism should not be treated as a potential friend. It is being 
treated as a friend now. It should be treated as a potential enemy. It 
is a hostile power, it is not a friendly power. Until we start treating 
communism this way, we will continue to do nonsensical things like 
training their military on how to better run a military.
  I have a list here, as of February of this year, of the proposed 
military exchanges between the United States and the Communist Chinese. 
It includes quartermaster training, acquisition training, logistics 
training. It includes special forces training. It includes having their 
top officers to come for briefings.
  Here we have what this administration's policies are. This is after 
they knew, this is after this administration knew that the Communist 
Chinese had acquired our most deadly weapons secrets, weapons that 
could incinerate millions of Americans, and this administration was 
still proposing that we have a military exchange program to teach them 
how our military functions and how their military can better function.
  This is insanity. This is total insanity. I strongly support the 
DeLay amendment, and would request the American people to pay close 
attention to this vote.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson).
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I think the descriptive term that was 
used by my colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher) 
may be the right one, but it is about the underlying amendment, not 
opposition to it.
  As I read this, yes, and again, I like the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
DeLay), I get along with him well, I know his intentions are noble. But 
would the author of the legislation prohibit the American military from 
sitting down with the Chinese to deal with nonproliferation issues? If 
we had not just reached this conclusion in Kosovo, it would be illegal 
under the language of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) to sit down 
and talk about logistics with the Chinese.
  The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Delay) apparently does not trust our 
American military, that they are either too naive or simple, that 
somehow the Chinese are going to take advantage of them.
  Let me tell the Members, we live in a free and open society. Anybody 
who wants to talk to the American military can look in the phone book 
and call them up and talk to them. We do not get to talk to Chinese, 
generally, because it is a closed society.
  I would argue that whether it was the Soviet Union or any of the 
satellite states, that any time there was contact, at the end of the 
day, America and freedom won. I believe our system is stronger, our 
military is more capable, and every time they come in contact with 
America and what it does, they crumble a little more.
  The Chinese are probably praying that we go into an isolationist 
mode. It could be the best thing for the leaders in Beijing, because 
when they meet and see what Americans are all about, our strength comes 
across clearly.
  Let us see what the Department of Defense says about this amendment.

                              {time}  1815

  For example, an attempt by U.S. open military-to-military channels 
regarding nonproliferation by definition involved contacts or exchanges 
with the PLA strategic missile and/or chemical defense personnel. 
Proliferation is a key area of U.S. Chinese relations, yet DoD would be 
barred from participating in that discussion. I would think the 
gentleman would demand that if there were discussions on 
nonproliferation that he would have members of the American military 
there.
  Listening to the debate today, no one fools themselves that this 
world is not a dangerous place, even without the Soviet Union and its 
former empire situation. But we are the most powerful

[[Page H3984]]

country on the face of this Earth. There is no one in second place 
compared to our capabilities, our men and women who represent us in the 
service.
  I say to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay), for this country to be 
shivering here, trying to stop dialogue that achieves our goals, is a 
mistake. It is a mistake to say we cannot talk about proliferation 
issues. It is a mistake not to have these military-to-military contacts 
when it suits our interests, when America decides it is the right thing 
to do.
  I am not sure what is going on here, frankly. I see a debate that 
creates the image of a weak and failing America. It is the wrong 
message to our countrymen. It is the wrong message to our adversaries. 
America is strong and capable. I would bet the lowest-ranking member of 
our Armed Forces, in a discussion with the Chinese, that we win that 
discussion, that we gain from that discussion.
  When they see what we live like here, it undermines them. My parents 
fled the Soviet Union. What they told me was when Khrushchev visited 
here, they believed and I believe it, too, that Khrushchev thought we 
built a Potemkin Village, that we created these great grocery stores 
for him to see. Then Khrushchev went back.
  But by the time Gorbachev came, they knew from military-to-military 
contacts, from private contacts, that every American had a better life 
than the top brass of the Soviet union.
  It is foolish to put in permanent law a ban on these kind of 
contacts. It defies our own national interests. This is not about doing 
the Chinese a favor. We do not have these meetings to help the Chinese. 
We do this for our interests.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, could I ask how much time is remaining on 
each side?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) has 16\1/2\ 
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) has 15 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, let me just say this side believes that we have a 
strong America, but we have a weak administration. Nothing in my 
amendment has anything to do with talking about proliferation or 
treaties or anything else. It has everything to do with exchange of 
operations, letting the communist Chinese observe what we do so they 
can take it back to China and copy it, if not steal it.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Calvert).
  Mr. CALVERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support this important 
amendment. I hope that it sends a wake-up call to both the leaders of 
the People's Republic of China and our current administration.
  I am shocked and dismayed by the casual attitude of our current 
administration to the efforts of the Chinese Government to infiltrate 
our Nation's political and military infrastructure. I do not take these 
actions against our Nation lightly, and I hope my colleagues will not 
either.
  I thought it was a proper course of action in 1989 when President 
Bush suspended joint training exercises following Tiananmen Square. 
Given the findings of the Cox report and our administration's admitted 
failure to respond to massive security breaches, I believe we should 
suspend all joint military exercises with China at once.
  I believe that someday a peaceful Chinese nation can contribute 
positively to the international community. But at the present time, it 
is very difficult to place trust in the Chinese Government and expect a 
change in our current administration's seemingly willful acceptance of 
China's deceptive tactics and aggressive posture. I think that our 
current policy toward China should mirror that of President Reagan's 
engagement with the Soviet Union by containing their military 
aggression, preaching the moral superiority of freedom, and influencing 
the ideas of their people through trade and exposure to western 
political values.
  Mr. Chairman, I encourage my colleagues to vote in favor of this 
amendment. Stop joint military activities with China until their 
leaders are willing to participate as an honest world power and until 
our administration is willing to make our national security a top 
priority.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Mississippi (Mr. Taylor).
  Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the 
gentleman from Missouri for granting me this time and particularly 
since he has given me time to speak in support of the DeLay amendment.
  I think the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) is right on this. I 
think between the revelations of the two 40-foot container loads of 
automatic weapons being shipped to our West Coast, the now control of 
two ports on the Panama Canal by a company called Hutchinson, which is 
owned by the Chinese, the things that have come out as a result of the 
Cox report as far as the Chinese either being given in some instances 
by dumb Americans, in some instances being sold technology and some 
instances stealing technology.
  But I would like to ask the sponsor of this bill to let us take this 
a step further. See, next month this body is going to vote on something 
called most-favored-nation status for China. Technology is one thing. 
But in order to build the weapons that threaten America, China needs 
money. They get that money from America. They get that money from trade 
with America where they sell their goods to America with 2 percent or 
less tariff as a result of the most-favored-nation status. Yet, our 
country, our goods, when sold in China, have to pay anywhere from 20 to 
40 percent.
  I find it strange that the gentleman who is so right on this issue, 1 
year ago, on July 22, when we voted to disapprove most-favored-nation 
status voted with the Chinese. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) 
voted to grant the Chinese unlimited access to the American market and 
to continue this $60 billion trade surplus on behalf of China.
  In fact, I think I have gone so far as to break the code. See, MFN 
does not really stand for most favored nation. It stands for money for 
nukes. When some people very cleverly changed the name of it to NTR, 
thinking it would stand for normal trade relations, I think the truth 
of the matter is it stands for nuclear tipped rockets that they are 
going to buy with American money.
  So I am going to vote with the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) 
today, but a month from now when we vote on MFN, money for nukes, I 
hope he will be voting with me to vote no.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Sweeney).
  (Mr. SWEENEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
DeLay) for yielding me this time.
  I rise in strong support today of the DeLay amendment. The time has 
come to base our relationship with China on realism rather than wishful 
thinking. The DeLay amendment sends a necessary message to the People's 
Republic of China that the communist government is an untrustworthy 
military partner.
  China's overall military modernization is striking. The PLA's 
abandonment of a traditional land-based people's army in favor of 
forming comprehensive strategic and nuclear strike capability by land, 
sea, and air has profound consequences on our relationship with China, 
and we ought to let them know that.
  Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt that the PRC has been pursuing a 
rapid escalation of its military modernization, of both its strategic 
and conventional forces, and it is utilizing American technology to do 
so.
  As a result, I believe a military confrontation with the PRC is not 
out of the question. Let us remember it was just 3 years ago that we 
were forced to send two aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Strait to 
respond to PRC menacing the region.
  Military-to-military exchanges are in some cases cornerstones of 
important peaceful relationships with our allies. The People's Republic 
of China is not an ally. To be successful, these exchanges must employ 
real transparencies so that each partner gains insights into the 
capabilities of the others.
  There is no mutual transparency here, Mr. Chairman, in our exchanges 
with the PLA. Instead, the information obtained by the Chinese is being 
used

[[Page H3985]]

by its military to isolate our vulnerabilities and position the PLA for 
a future conflict, and our military experts observe nothing of value in 
return. This is not the goal of military exchanges. This amendment 
ensures that our leading military technology and know-how are not 
turned against us in the form of an advanced military threat.
  Mr. Chairman, Henry Kissinger recently stated ``that the critics of 
our `strategic relationship' with China have an obligation to develop a 
vision commensurate with the vastness of the historical sweep of the 
challenge.''
  I believe he was addressing people like the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
DeLay) and myself. I would answer Mr. Kissinger by pointing to the 
document which is the foundation of our American vision, our 
Constitution. It is, after all, a vision which requires minimum rights 
and protections for all individuals.
  As we know, if Mr. Kissinger were a Chinese citizen and espoused the 
principles of the Constitution, he would be quickly in prison. Our 
vision, Mr. Kissinger, is the vision of Franklin, Adams, and Jefferson, 
and preserving it is important.
  Mr. Chairman, with respect to China, our country has looked the other 
way for too long. The DeLay amendment tells China that we expect a 
relationship based on truth and realism. I urge all my colleagues to 
support the DeLay amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the DeLay amendment to 
restrict military exchanges with China's People's Liberation Army. The 
time has come to base our relationship with China on realism rather 
than wishful thinking.
  Since 1994 the P.R.C. has been constructing military facilities in 
the Spratly Islands. The size and nature of these facilities suggest 
that the P.R.C. is attempting to establish a permanent strategic 
presence in the area, from which it could patrol the South China Sea, 
the waterway through which one sixth of the world's trade is shipped.
  Two years ago, in March 1997 a Chinese controlled company was able to 
obtain, from Panama, the rights to the port facilities that flank the 
canal zone.
  Then there is the matter of the democratic nation of Taiwan. The 
P.R.C.'s 1995 military exercises and 1996 missile firings in the Taiwan 
Strait have been followed by an offensive military buildup on the 
Chinese mainland itself that includes tripling the number of missiles 
(to more than 100) already deployed against Taiwan.
  These developments are all the more alarming when seen against the 
backdrop of:
  (1) China's overall military modernization, its abandonment of a 
traditional, land-based ``people's army'' in favor of a comprehensive 
strategic and nuclear strike capability by land, sea, and air;
  (2) China's clandestine efforts to acquire the most secret and 
sensitive of United States military technologies, including the know-
how to replicate the W 88 warhead, the most dangerous security breach 
in 50 years; and
  (3) allegations that China has assisted the North Korean missile 
program, on top of its known and suspected sales of missile and nuclear 
technologies to terrorist states.
  With respect to China, our country has looked the other way for too 
long.
  Human rights violations in China and Tibet are another point of 
contention since the Tiananmen Square crackdown. Among these violations 
are the recent excessive jail and labor camp sentences for pro-
democracy activists.
  A future military confrontation with the P.R.C. is not out of the 
question. Just three years ago President Clinton was forced to send two 
American aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Strait.
  United States policy toward the P.R.C. has been based on wishful 
thinking for far too long. Policy makers in the Administration of both 
parties have time and time again been willing to give Chinese leaders 
the benefit of the doubt only to be consistently let down.
  The DeLay amendment tells China that we expect a relationship based 
on truth and realism.
  Mr. Chairman, Henry Kissinger recently stated and I quote, ``that the 
critics of our ``strategic relationship'' with China have an obligation 
to develop a vision commensurate with the vastness and historical sweep 
of the challenge''.
  I believe he was addressing people such as Congressman DeLay and 
myself. I would answer Mr. Kissinger's challenge by pointing to the 
document which is the foundation of America's vision. Our constitution. 
A vision which requires minimal rights and protections for all 
individuals.
  As we all know, if Mr. Kissinger were a Chinese citizen and espoused 
the principals of our constitution he would quickly be imprisoned. Our 
vision, Mr. Kissinger is the vision of Franklin, Adams and Jefferson.
  I ask support for the DeLay amendment.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
North Carolina (Mr. Jones).
  Mr. JONES of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support 
of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay). I 
commend him for bringing attention to this extremely important national 
security issue.
  I first learned last summer that the Pentagon was considering a plan 
for our elite special forces to engage in joint training exercises with 
Chinese PLA troops. At the time, I was outraged because our lax U.S. 
policy of constructive engagement toward China had already proven too 
dangerous.
  Mr. Chairman, that was before the advent of the Cox report. What once 
seemed outrageous is now beyond belief. We have known for years that 
China cannot be trusted. In 1995, the United States made a futile 
agreement to extend most-favored-nation status to China, providing it 
would stop exporting nuclear weapons, and it would stop its abusive 
human rights practices. It has failed on both accounts, Mr. Chairman, 
and yet the administration continues to turn a blind eye to China's 
blatant suppression of human rights and its role as a global supply of 
weapons of mass destruction and technology to foreign countries.
  We have learned the hard way that we have no reason to trust China. 
Last year the CIA reported that China had at least 13 missiles targeted 
at United States cities, and the Rumsfeld Commission indicated that 
China's proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction threatens the security of the United States.
  Mr. Chairman, while China was busy selling technology to rogue 
nations and amassing its own nuclear stockpile, the Defense Department 
was drawing up a game plan to engage the United States in military-to-
military contacts with China in hopes of establishing a relationship of 
trust and confidence. How much more can we afford to give?
  The Defense Department even developed and implemented a United 
States-China military exchange program for 1999 that includes visits 
from PLA officials to tactical and strategic facilities in the United 
States. Encouraging such exchanges is another way to potentially expose 
U.S. military information to a communistic nation.
  Mr. Chairman, China has proved itself a threat to United States 
national security. The DeLay amendment would prohibit military 
exchanges involving U.S. forces training PLA forces and help prevent 
China's capability for invasion and long-range operations.
  I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the DeLay amendment. The 
security of our Nation may depend on it. I repeat, Mr. Chairman, the 
security of our Nation may depend on it. Vote for the DeLay amendment.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Cunningham), a top gun.

                              {time}  1845

  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time, but I am old gun now.
  I would tell my colleagues that if I were to see a cobra, and the 
cobra was mounted, I might catch it and milk his venom and use that 
venom for good. And I think in some ways we need to, whether it is the 
Middle East, whether China or Russia, we have to engage them both 
economically and in other ways and milk that. But at the same time, I 
think we do not let that cobra loose where we have children playing in 
a room, and we do not teach that cobra how to bite.
  The Navy Fighter Weapons School, which is known as the Top Gun, and 
the Air Force has the 414th, which is their fighter weapons school, and 
the adversary squadrons, every single day of my life in the service I 
flew Russian and Chinese tactics against our fighters so we would know 
how to fight them. How do we defeat their jammers? How do we defeat 
their tactics.
  For example, they have high-low pairs and they have pincer tactics. 
They will take a pair up, up high, of MiG 23s or MiG 25s or even MiG 
29s, and they will run sections of pairs, high-low pairs so that we 
cannot pick out the low pair or the high pair on one

[[Page H3986]]

radar, and they want the enemy to go after the high pair. Then they 
will come around in a double pince or a single pince. If the high 
section sees that the enemy is going after them, they will turn and run 
and the pince will come in and shoot the enemy down.
  The White House allowed the Chinese and the Russians into the 414th, 
into Navy Fighter Weapons School in Fallon, and let them watch how we 
defeat their tactics and their jammers. That is wrong. That is like 
teaching the cobra how to bite. And I guarantee my colleagues, Russia 
and China will bite us if they have the opportunity. And the reason I 
am supporting this amendment is I do not want to give that cobra the 
chance to bite the kids that are up there in the air or on the ground 
with other things. I think that is wrong.
  When I was a lieutenant in the United States Navy, I was just as 
outspoken then as I am now. And when our government, with a Republican 
President, let the Shah of Iran have F-14s, I pounded my fist on the 
table and said I do not want to have to look down the barrel of those 
F-14s some day, because the Shah may not be here. And I knew the 
history of Iran and that someday we were going to look down those 
barrels. And we even trained some of their fighter pilots. And guess 
what? I felt like Billy Mitchell.
  We must not give our enemies our deep secrets or let them play in the 
baby crib. And that is what we are doing, and that is what the 
gentleman from Texas, in his amendment, is trying to stop. How more 
common sense can we get? We cannot give the enemy the tactics that he 
can kill us with. And that is the reason I support the gentleman's 
amendment.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, there is no one I respect more in this House than the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton). His work on this committee is 
outstanding, his leadership in trying to stop the devastation and the 
hollowing out of our defense is next to none. The gentleman, we say 
from Texas, knows from where he comes, and I do respect the gentleman, 
but in this case I respectfully disagree with him.
  The gentleman says that my amendment is redundant because the 
committee has worked very hard at putting language in the bill that 
does basically the same thing I do. Where I disagree is the 
transparency and the reciprocity part of their portion of the bill, 
which, in my opinion, gives a huge loophole to this administration, 
this administration that has already exhibited incredible weakness when 
it comes to China.
  Foreign relations with China are very difficult in the best of 
circumstances. They were difficult during the Reagan administration, 
they were difficult under all the administrations before this 
administration. But when we have an administration that kowtows to the 
Chinese, that lets them bamboozle them, that out-negotiates them, it 
leads to these kinds of problems that we are talking about here today.
  The President of the United States went to China. He was received in 
Tiananmen Square, where hundreds were killed fighting for democracy. 
The President, while he was in China, was embarrassed when the 
Communist Chinese decided that that they would test an ICBM missile 
while the President of the U.S. was in-country. Just recently, after 
the huge mistake of bombing the Chinese embassy, this President 
apologized I do not know how many times. And I will tell my colleagues 
something, I will never forget the picture that I saw on CNN network of 
the ambassador to China and his aide standing over the President of the 
United States while he was sitting at his desk in the oval office 
signing a book of apology. Now, we should have apologized once, and 
that is enough.
  But this administration has kowtowed to the Communist Chinese over 
and over again. And now we find that they are using all types of ways 
for exchanges to show the Communist Chinese and the People's Liberation 
Army how we do things so they can copy it. It has got to stop.
  There is no reciprocity. The only thing that transparency will show 
is that we give them the key to the penthouse and they give us the key 
to the outhouse. We have got to stop it for the sake and security of 
the American people. And my amendment makes no mistake, leaves no door 
open, leaves no crack open. My amendment says we are going to stop it 
and we are not going to show the Chinese how the SEALS operate; we are 
not going to show exercises using two divisions of our army; we are not 
going to let them on our aircraft carriers so they can take notes of 
how to destroy them; we are not going to do these kinds of things. That 
is what my amendment does.
  The gentleman from Guam says that the program improves our knowledge 
of Chinese methods and tactics. We are going to learn 1950s and 1960s 
and 1970s military tactics from the Chinese. We gather intelligence 
from them. The U.S. Armed Forces are superior to the People's 
Liberation Army. There is nothing we can learn from them nor is there 
parity between these exchanges. We offer the Chinese our national 
laboratories while they offer us empty barracks.
  Let me just cite a couple of examples that were put in an article in 
The New Republic written by Jason Zengerle, I believe it is. A group of 
officers from the Chinese People's Liberation Army happened to drop in 
on an American naval base. Over steaks, beer, two kinds of wine and 
apple pie, the Chinese peppered their American counterparts with 
questions about the American aircraft carrier they were on and its 
vulnerabilities. Wanting to be a gracious host, like the admiral, an 
American lieutenant commander proceeded to tell the Chinese about the 
carrier's Achilles heel, its hull is too thin on the bottom, the 
commander explained. So a torpedo that exploded underneath the carrier 
could easily penetrate the carrier's skin. That is why they are buying 
torpedoes that explode under our ships because we gave them the 
information.
  In another incident, not surprisingly then, when then chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, visited a Chinese 
military installation in 1997, and this is incredible, he was shown a 
routine marksman demonstration, at a distance, through binoculars. Now, 
this is an exchange. And he was given a tour of empty barracks and mess 
halls. And similar things have happened to other visiting American 
officers. We see the same tired old factories, the same divisions we 
have seen before, gripes a Pentagon official. We do not get into their 
crack divisions and factories.
  We have to stop this. We have to stop it now. Enough is enough. The 
security of this country is at stake. I ask for a ``yea'' vote for the 
DeLay amendment.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I first must say to my friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Cunningham), that no one in this Chamber admires more what he has done 
and what he does for his country, so I compliment him in his past and 
present actions, though from time to time we will vary on issues. And I 
appreciate the gentleman's comments earlier.
  But let me say this to my friend from California, as well as my 
friend from Texas. When we first started the debate on this bill, I 
stated that this was the best bill that we have put forward to the 
Congress of the United States since the early 1980s. That included the 
language regarding the military-to-military contacts regarding China 
drafted by the majority under the guidance of our chairman, the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence). We have done the job. It is 
well worth it. We have protected the interests of the United States. I 
do not think it could be better.
  The amendment that the gentleman from Texas offers, in my opinion, 
gilds the lily. I think that what is in there is excellent. I stand by 
it, I embrace it, I compliment the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. 
Spence) and those that worked it out and I agree with it. I hope that 
we stand by it and approve it.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of 
Representative Delay's amendment. This amendment would prohibit the 
military to military exchanges that train the People's Liberation Army 
of China.
  I support this amendment for several reasons. First in light of the 
Cox report on the extent of China's espionage and theft of America's 
national security secrets, I feel that further contact is unwise. It 
would be imprudent to foster a relationship, which is not beneficial to 
our nation's interests and further extends

[[Page H3987]]

the risk of exposure of U.S. technologies and capabilities.
  This bill would ensure that exchanges and contacts between our 
military and the People's Liberation Army would be beneficial to both 
nations. It would prohibit exchanges and contacts which involve 
nuclear, chemical or biological operations; intelligence activities; 
war-fighting exercises, military space operations; arm sales or 
military related technology transfers. This amendment would preserve 
our two nation's ability to perform search and rescue or humanitarian 
exercises.
  Mr. Chairman, June 4th marked the ten-year anniversary of the tragedy 
in Tiananmen Square. The images of the crackdown on the student 
democratic movement are still fresh in my mind even after ten years. 
The failure to recognize the mistake of ten years ago continues, as 
last week over 100 dissidents were detained to prevent the public 
marking of this anniversary.
  I offer this recollection because, I believe that China has not 
recognized that stability is not something which can be demanded but 
rather it must come from the people freely expressing their own ideas. 
The United States should not have military to military contact with the 
People's Liberation Army because the Chinese government continues to 
use in military to restrict the notions of democracy within its own 
people.
  I urge the members of this body to vote--``yes'' and support 
Representative DeLay's amendment.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. DeLay).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) will 
be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 13 printed in House 
Report 106-175.


                  Amendment No. 13 Offered by Mr. Goss

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Part A amendment No. 13 offered by Mr. Goss:
       At the end of title XII (page 317, after line 17), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 1206. LIMITATION ON DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED 
                   FORCES IN HAITI.

       (a) Limitation on Deployment.--Except as provided in 
     subsection (b), no funds available to the Department of 
     Defense may be expended for the deployment of United States 
     Armed Forces in Haiti.
       (b) Exceptions.--Subsection (a) does not apply to the 
     deployment of United States Armed Forces in Haiti for any of 
     the following purposes:
       (1) Deployment pursuant to Operation Uphold Democracy until 
     December 31, 1999.
       (2) Deployment for periodic, noncontinuous theater 
     engagement activities on or after January 1, 2000.
       (3) Deployment for a limited, customary presence necessary 
     to ensure the security of United States diplomatic facilities 
     in Haiti and to carry out defense liaison activities under 
     the auspices of the United States embassy.
       (c) Report Requirement.--Whenever there is a deployment of 
     United States Armed Forces described in subsection (b)(2), 
     the President shall, not later than 48 hours after the 
     deployment, transmit a written report regarding the 
     deployment to the Committee on Armed Services and the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
       (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to restrict in any way the authority of the 
     President in emergency circumstances to protect the lives of 
     United States citizens or to protect United States facilities 
     or property in Haiti.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss) and a Member opposed each will control 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I am expecting the arrival at any time of the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Gilman), who is my co-colleague on this subject. Mr. Chairman, 
over the last several years, the Clinton-Gore administration has asked 
the military to do more with less, and I think that deserves our time, 
so I am going to discuss this matter pending the arrival of the 
gentleman from New York.
  The result of having to do more with less, I think, is very plain to 
see. Declining morale and a military on the verge of being hollowed out 
confront us just at the time when we seem to have more demands on our 
military in so many other places.
  The solution seems simple, as even President Clinton's Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen admits when he said, ``We have to find a way to 
either increase the size of our forces or decrease the number of our 
missions.'' I could not agree more.
  Earlier this year the commander of U.S. forces in Latin America, that 
would be General Charles Wilhelm, recommended we end our permanent 
troop presence in Haiti. In its place General Wilhelm recommends the 
periodic deployment of troops, as is the norm throughout the Western 
Hemisphere and the Caribbean. General Wilhelm's recommendation is sound 
on a number of counts, and I believe Congress should endorse it.
  Maintaining a permanent presence in Haiti unnecessarily puts our 
troops at risk. A clear indication of this is the fact that about half 
our soldiers in Haiti do nothing more than protect their fellow 
soldiers. The situation is that tense. That is what is happening. The 
deployment to Haiti strains military resources. We already know there 
is a call for those resources elsewhere. The financial cost is 
approximately $20 million per year. We also know there is a need for 
those resources elsewhere. The training, readiness and operational 
tempo are affected as well, as the military has clearly stated in much 
testimony before the United States Congress.
  Our presence in Haiti duplicates work more appropriately done by 
nongovernmental organizations. Even our commander in Haiti, the person 
on the front line, the person responsible, Colonel Morris, frankly 
admits that much of his troop's work could be done by private sector 
groups. We are talking about building schools, building wells, doing 
other humanitarian work which desperately needs to be done in Haiti.

                              {time}  1845

  Finally, and from my perspective most importantly, our military 
planners clearly believe that the permanent deployment is less 
effective than periodic deployments would be. In other words, we get 
more bang for the buck, do more for Haiti, and do more for ourselves if 
we go to our norm of periodic deployments.
  General Wilhelm's recommendation is right on target: End the 
permanent troop presence but allow the military to conduct routine 
periodic deployments as the situation warrants. Unfortunately, our 
military's pleas for a commonsense approach seem to have fallen on deaf 
ears among the Clinton administration's policymakers and political 
advisers.
  It is time to restore Haiti to the norms in the hemisphere and end 
the permanent troop presence there. I think it is good for America. And 
in the end, I think it is a much more effective way to help the Haitian 
people, which is what we are trying to do.
  For these reasons, I am very pleased to join the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Gilman), chairman of the Committee on International 
Relations, in offering an amendment that would essentially formalize 
General Wilhelm's recommendation. And I strongly urge my colleagues to 
support it.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the 
amendment, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, it is astounding to me when I see this constant assault 
on any progress President Clinton has made. It almost seems an argument 
ad hominem; if it was a Clinton administration policy and it seems to 
be succeeding, let us see if we can cause some trouble here.
  Other sections of the bill today, as we have an agreement from Mr. 
Milosevic to pull out, other sections of this bill will make it 
impossible to keep peacekeeping troops in Kosovo in the former 
Yugoslavian areas.
  Let us take a look at the history of Haiti. It has never exactly been 
the Switzerland of the world. There has been dictator after dictator. 
And between 1992 and 1994, there were 60,000 refugees coming out of 
Haiti.

[[Page H3988]]

  The gentleman and many from the Florida delegation came to the floor 
expressing their concern for social services that were being overrun by 
Haitian refugees. 60,000 in 3 years. And every day we saw members of 
the Florida delegation complaining about the pressures on their State 
that somehow we had to end this massive immigration, people risking 
their lives in bathtubs virtually, to come to the United States, it was 
so bad in Haiti.
  In the last 3 years, we have had 3,000 refugees coming in from Haiti. 
Is that a failed policy? Do we want to go back to the kind of policy we 
had before? In the last several months here, we have pulled out the 
peacekeeping forces at the insistence of the chairman of the Committee 
on International Relations. We are not training their police. They have 
no trained police.
  And now these people who are helping the poorest people in our 
hemisphere, some of the poorest people on the planet, we are going to 
pull them out too? Why? We are not getting enough refugees coming 
across the ocean? They are not taking their little boats and risking 
their lives and their families to come to Florida? Is that what the 
gentleman wants?
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GEJDENSON. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman is addressing me as ``the 
gentleman from Florida,'' is the gentleman asking, do we want to keep 
the troops in Haiti to stop Haitians from leaving the oppression in 
Haiti? Is that what this is about?
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, it seems to me that 
if we squander this opportunity where we are in the developmental 
process of a democracy, maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow, but I will 
guarantee my colleague, dictatorship will return and those refugees 
will be coming again.
  It is better for the Haitians, it is better for the U.S. if we are 
able to help these people have a decent living at home. The violence 
has been reduced. The Toutons Macoute is almost out of business. There 
are not 60,000 refugees coming here to the United States in a 3-year 
period. Let us continue the good work we have started.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of the Chairman how much time 
is remaining on either side?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) controls 6\1/2\ 
minutes. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) controls 7 
minutes.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the distinguished chairman of the 
House Committee on International Relations.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, our military did a superb job when they were sent to 
Haiti back in 1994. However, their mission of restoring the elected 
civilian government of former president Jean Bertrand Aristide was 
accomplished some time ago. I imagine that many Americans are not aware 
that we still have troops in Haiti.
  The Clinton administration informs Congress that we have maintained 
our permanent troop presence in Haiti to provide humanitarian relief 
and to give our Army Corps of Engineers and medical personnel 
opportunities to be trained. However, I do not believe it is now 
necessary to keep a permanent troop presence in Haiti to accomplish 
those goals.
  Obviously, humanitarian relief activities can be conducted at far 
less expense to our taxpayers by civilian contractors working for our 
Agency for International Development.
  It is obvious that Haiti is becoming a dangerous place. Our local 
commander in Haiti has had to raise his assessment of the threats 
against our troops from both common crime and, increasingly, political 
unrest.
  In an ominous development, on June 4, press reports revealed that 
civilian employees of the U.S. military support group in Haiti 
abandoned their all-terrain vehicle in a hail of rocks. Protesters then 
torched the vehicle.
  Our troops are increasingly unable to conduct their stated 
humanitarian mission. They are hunkered down and there are clear signs 
that they may become direct targets of attack. The presence of the 
troops has certainly not stopped nor in any way deterred numerous 
political murders or recent rioting.
  Despite the administration's insistence that U.S. troops do not have 
a security role, we can see U.S. troops mired in a dangerous, open-
ended commitment in Haiti.
  The chairman of our Committee on Intelligence, the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss), and I offered this amendment in an effort to 
support the Defense Department's sensible recommendations that the 
permanent U.S. military presence in Haiti under Operation Uphold 
Democracy should be brought to an end.
  Normal stationing of U.S. troops to protect our embassy and to 
provide diplomatic representation in Haiti would, of course, be 
permitted at all times. The President's authority to protect American 
lives and property in Haiti are also explicitly protected by this 
amendment.
  The intent of this amendment is to make certain that our U.S. troops 
permanently deployed in Haiti under Operation Uphold Democracy through 
the U.S. support group will be completely withdrawn by December 31, 
1999. The administration has fully 7 months to complete an orderly 
drawdown of our troops who are permanently stationed in Haiti.
  Until such time as they are completely removed, our troops will 
continue to conduct their currently scheduled humanitarian missions.
  After the permanently deployed troops are completely withdrawn, U.S. 
forces will be permitted to deploy to Haiti for short-term 
expeditionary missions.
  There are serious concerns about the security of our troops in Haiti 
which we should consider. Moreover, it is not fair to our men and women 
in uniform to leave them in Haiti in an open-ended deployment.
  Accordingly, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1401 and urge our 
colleagues to support the Gilman-Goss amendment.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Conyers).
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I was privileged to join the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), 
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Charles Rangel), and we went to Haiti 
quite recently. We met with Pierre Denize, the national police chief of 
Haiti.
  Remember, Haiti does not have an army now because we have agreed and 
they have agreed to get rid of them. We met with Bob Manuel, the 
Secretary of State for Public Security in Haiti. We got what I 
considered an excellent report about that.
  Our troops are not in jeopardy. How many troops are we talking about, 
I ask my esteemed chairman of the Committee on International Relations? 
Two hundred seventy; 270 troops. Psychologically, they are performing 
an immensely important task of working and development. They are not 
there for security. I found them not to be in jeopardy. They are 
working with Department of Justice and Department of Defense people in 
the Isatat training program, in the U.N. SITPOL agreement. Things are 
moving.
  If we try to legislate them out of Haiti before the administration, 
the Department of Defense, and the State Department, which have all 
agreed that they should go, the question is the timing and whether the 
House of Representatives should now become the executive branch of 
Government.
  Please, I beg my colleagues not to intrude this amendment, which is 
potentially dangerous, into the subject matter of Haiti. Haiti has 
problems. It is coming along very well.
  I am glad that I was invited by my esteemed colleagues from New York 
and Florida to witness and talk in depth with them about this subject. 
Those troops are important there. They are not in jeopardy. And let us 
not pull them out prematurely.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) has 4\1/
2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman

[[Page H3989]]

from Florida (Mr. Goss) has 3 minutes remaining.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Meek).
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, this amendment should be 
defeated. It represents a double standard.
  Why treat Haiti different than what we treat anyone else? There are 
only 500 troops in Haiti, thirty-six thousandths of 1 percent of our 
active force. Now, anyone who has any kind of sense at all knows that 
there is very little in Haiti.
  This is about two things, as I perceive it: Haiti bashing, and it is 
not the first time, and bashing the President. It is time some of this 
stuff stopped.
  We are talking about a small country here. The people are poor. And I 
say again, why not help continue what the President has started? How 
can we expect more from Haiti than we do from some of the rest of them? 
Why do we expect more from Haiti than we do any of the other countries 
that we are trying to help?
  So there is a double standard. $288 billion. We are only spending $20 
million to support the troops in Haiti, 500 of them. And I appeal to my 
colleagues to please kill this Goss amendment. The gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss) has a very good way of approaching Haiti, always on 
the negative.
  Please kill this amendment. It is not worth being in this good bill. 
So please go against this. It is bad for America and it is bad for 
Haiti.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the distinguished 
gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham).
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I would like to address my good friend 
the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Meek).
  I do not know of a sweeter lady in this body than the gentlewoman 
from Florida. But I say to the gentlewoman, because there is payback; 
500 troops and $20 billion a year.
  Look at Kosovo. We are lucky if we are going to get out with $100 
billion. Bosnia cost us $16 billion.
  When the Progressive Caucus comes up in the Labor-HHS bill and wants 
to increase money in Medicare and health care and education and not 
talk Social Security, if we want to do these things, the Progressive 
Caucus has got to support it and not want to cut defense by 50 percent 
of what it is now. There is a payback.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Davis).
  (Mr. DAVIS of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the 
Gilman-Goss amendment.
  I do so because we know that Haiti has been unstable. We are not 
really providing that much to them. But to take away the little bit 
that we are providing is unconscionable.

                              {time}  1900

  All that we are talking about is helping the poorest country in this 
hemisphere continue to have some hope for stability, economic 
development, for growth and progress. I would urge, Mr. Chairman, that 
we vote in the best interests, not only of Haiti but that we vote in 
the best interests of humanity, a little bit of humanitarian effort. I 
urge that we vote ``no'' to the Gilman-Goss amendment.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Owens).
  (Mr. OWENS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, why are we obsessed with Haiti? If there is 
going to be a standard for spreading our generosity, and we are the 
indispensable Nation, we are the last superpower, I think it is 
important that we should help out wherever we can in crises throughout 
the world, but why not have a single standard? Why do we not establish 
a standard? Where we have been in Bosnia, I do not think it has been 
$16 billion as I heard before, but at least we have spent $8 billion in 
Bosnia. We have been in Korea forever. Korea has a strong economy. They 
could support their own defense. We have been in Europe with bases for 
a long time and in Japan. We are spread out all over the world in 
places spending billions of dollars over long periods of time. Why 
would we not help a nation in this hemisphere, and the commitment there 
is relatively pennies now compared to the kind of commitments we have 
with the bases in Europe and Japan and Bosnia. I am not saying we 
should pull out of Bosnia overnight, but I think there ought to be some 
kind of formula whereby we go in to help, we spend a preestablished 
amount of money, we do it with some kind of standard equally throughout 
the world.
  If you pick out Haiti alone and you go after Haiti, then the only 
conclusion we can come to is that it is because Haiti is a black 
nation. Why else are we obsessed with Haiti?
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Meeks).
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to oppose the 
Gilman-Goss amendment. Haiti is on the eve of democratic elections. We 
say that we have the moral authority to try to make sure that democracy 
is across this world. Yet the smallest and the poorest country in this 
world, we do not want to aid. We have less than 3 to 400 troops in 
Haiti. Yet we are trying to pull them out on the eve of elections when 
we may restore hope and dignity to people who are our neighbors. Yet we 
go all over the place for others. There seems and there is a double 
standard. We must not let this amendment stand. We must make sure that 
the bill is not poisoned by this terrible, terrible amendment and help 
the people who need most the help. To whom much is given, as this 
country has, much is required.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt).
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized for 30 
seconds.
  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, this is a very dangerous amendment. This 
sends a message to the antidemocratic forces in Haiti that America is 
ready to disengage. This coupled with a hole that was placed by the 
majority in terms of human rights observers. This amendment should be 
defeated and it should be defeated overwhelmingly.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida is recognized for 2\1/2\ 
minutes.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I want to read part of a Charleston Post and 
Courier editorial:

       General Wilhelm did not suggest that the United States 
     should give up and walk away. He proposed U.S. military 
     forces should visit Haiti periodically. Unfortunately, as the 
     General told Congressmen, the 500 American soldiers--that 
     number is actually 503 American soldiers--who remain have to 
     spend much of their time defending themselves from attack. 
     They should not be exposed in this way. Instead, detachments 
     of troops, ready for combat if required, should be sent to 
     Haiti to demonstrate U.S. commitment to upholding the rule of 
     law. It would be wrong to keep troops in Haiti merely to 
     disguise the fact that U.S. intervention, hailed as one of 
     President Clinton's major foreign policy achievements, has 
     failed.

  I would point out that that editorial absolutely parallels the advice 
we are getting from the military. Now, we have heard testimony that 
Haiti needs to be treated the same as everybody else. I agree. That is 
what we are trying to do is take out the permanent troops and replace 
them with the periodic deployments which are characteristic for the 
area.
  Secondly, we are trying to reduce the strain on the readiness of our 
troops because, Lord knows, we need them and the reduced strain would 
be helpful to the military. Thirdly, we are trying to increase troop 
safety. In fact our troops have been fired on in Haiti. Many people do 
not know that. Fourthly, many of the activities that are going on in 
Haiti that we need to help with are better suited with other NGOs. We 
will help those other NGOs as we have in the past and will continue to 
do in the future. That is where the help should be coming for the 
Haitians.
  There are other reports coming from Haiti, well founded at this time, 
of new brutality and unfortunately involves brutality by people in 
Haiti, Haitians who are trained by the U.S. This is not good. Things 
are going sour in Haiti. The gentleman from Connecticut has pointed out 
that we have now got a problem in Haiti. I do not know if the

[[Page H3990]]

gentleman has noticed that we have got a dictatorship returning to 
Haiti in the past several months and that we no longer have all the 
elements of democracy down there that we seek to have. The dictatorship 
has in fact returned. But that is not the reason for the amendment. The 
reason for the amendment is to give Haiti a better chance to treat it 
the same as everybody else, to get the right kind of help going to 
Haiti and to get our troops back where they need to be.
  This is the defense authorization bill. This is not the Haiti relief 
bill. This is the defense authorization bill. The military has 
recommended we get those troops out of there on a permanent basis. We 
should listen to the military. Mr. Chairman, I urge support of the 
amendment.
  Ms. BROWN of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the 
Gilman-Goss amendment, which limits funds for deployment of US Armed 
Forces in Haiti.
  There are about 400 US military personnel in Haiti, who make up the 
US-Haiti support Group. This mission is humanitarian in nature, and 
provides engineering and other infrastructure assistance, and it is 
important to note that their presence is not permanent.
  The role our troops play in Haiti is critical. If this amendment 
passes; however, we would send a negative message to the people of 
Haiti; namely, that the United States is leaving them at a critical 
time in the country's movement toward democracy.
  I would like to point out that no other statute requires that the 
President report to Congress before a training deployment, as would be 
required if this passes.
  I urge you to vote ``no'' on this amendment.
  Lastly, it is unfortunate that a Member from Florida continues to 
attack our policy in Haiti. What we need to understand is that when the 
problems of Haiti go unresolved, these problems in turn, become ours as 
well.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong opposition to this 
amendment. The Gilman/Goss amendment sends the wrong signal to the 
people of Haiti. It says that we don't care about democracy and we 
don't care about the rule of law and certainly we don't care about the 
people of Haiti.
  This amendment would mandate a congressionally-imposed deadline for 
the withdrawal of troops which could send a destructive signal to 
opponents of democratic reform in Haiti. We are not talking about many 
troops--just 270 troops. That is vastly different from the 25,000 
troops that went to Haiti 5 years ago. The 25,000 troops didn't have a 
single causality and you wanted to end that. Now the 270 troops that 
help in the areas of health care and rehabilitation program--you want 
to cut that also. This is ludicrous.
  This is just another tactic to embarrass this Administration and to 
call into question smart, quick and decisive action we took in 1994 
when we restored democracy back to Haiti by taking out Raoul Cedras and 
restoring the democratic government of then President Jean Bertrand 
Aristide.
  Don't you remember what it was like 7 years ago when boat people 
drowned just to flee persecution and repression.
  60,000 refugees left and fled for their lives. Many died trying to 
escape. This amendment would cut off badly needed money to the defense 
program. This program allows children to be vaccinated and also allows 
engineers to train in building roads and bridges.
  Mr. Speaker, this is the last program we have in Haiti and now that 
is in jeopardy. What exactly do you want to happen in Haiti. You cut 
off the training program, you effectively ended the MICIVIH program and 
now this humanitarian program.
  The MICIVIH program was established in 1993 jointly by the United 
Nations General Assembly and the Organization of American States. Since 
that time, it has made critical contributions to Haiti's political 
development by assisting judicial reform efforts, conducting credible 
human rights monitoring and carrying out impartial investigations into 
human rights violations. Now that's gone.
  Elections are coming up soon. This amendment would end what is a 
small and worthwhile humanitarian support program in Haiti.
  The U.S. Military Support Group in Haiti--a 400 strong presence of 
engineers, humanitarian civil affairs and other personnel--serves as a 
visible manifestation of U.S. support for Haiti's democratic transition 
and economic development.
  The presence of U.S. military personnel in Haiti also has a positive 
effect on the security and stability of Haiti. This is not a permanent 
presence in Haiti. The role our troops play there is critical, giving 
Haitians reason to be hopeful by building schools, providing health 
care, digging wells, and being a visible sign of the U.S. commitment to 
democracy in that country. The President has made it clear that he is 
paring down on the deployment and this is not the time to pull our 
troops out of Haiti.
  Let's not pick on Haiti. I rise in opposition to this amendment and 
urge my colleagues to do the same.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) will 
be postponed.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 14 printed 
in House Report 106-175.


            Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mrs. Meek of Florida

  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Part A amendment No. 14 offered by Mrs. Meek of Florida:
       At the end of title VII (page 238, after line 22), insert 
     the following new section:

     SEC. 726. RESTORATION OF PRIOR POLICY REGARDING RESTRICTIONS 
                   ON USE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MEDICAL 
                   FACILITIES.

       Section 1093 of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``(a) Restriction on Use of Funds.--''; and
       (2) by striking subsection (b).

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Mrs. Meek) and the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Buyer) each 
will control 15 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Meek).
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I am offering an amendment that simply repeals the statutory 
prohibition on privately funded abortions in overseas military 
facilities and restores the law to what it was for many years. This 
amendment would permit servicewomen stationed overseas to use their own 
funds to obtain reproductive health care. No Federal funds would be 
used and health care professionals opposed to performing abortions as a 
matter of conscience or moral principle would not be required to do so. 
Earlier this month, this amendment was endorsed on a bipartisan basis 
by the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the Committee on Armed 
Services, the committee of jurisdiction. This was a major victory for 
women serving in our armed forces. Unfortunately, the full committee 
failed to follow the recommendation of the subcommittee and deleted the 
language from the bill. As one of the ranking women here, I strongly 
feel that this ill-advised policy must be overturned. Women in our 
armed forces already give up many freedoms and risk their lives to 
defend our country. They should not have to sacrifice their privacy, 
their health and their basic constitutional rights for a policy with no 
valid military purpose.
  Many of my colleagues will recognize this amendment as the former 
Harman amendment. I am proud to attempt along with the Women's Caucus, 
those of us who support this, to continue the good work of my friend 
and my colleague Congresswoman Jane Harman. I urge my colleagues to 
vote for this amendment. We owe our women serving our Nation no less, 
Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, over the last 30 years the availability of abortion 
services at military medical facilities has been subjected to numerous 
changes and interpretations. In January 1993, President Clinton signed 
an executive order directing the Department of Defense to permit 
privately funded abortions in military treatment facilities. The 
changes ordered by the President, however, did not greatly increase the 
access to abortion services. Few abortions were performed at military 
treatment facilities overseas for a number of reasons. First, the 
United States military follows the prevailing laws and rules of the 
host nations regarding abortions. Secondly, the military has had a 
difficult time finding health care professionals in uniform willing to 
perform the procedures. Third, the real purpose of military medical 
treatment

[[Page H3991]]

facilities is for military medical readiness and the training of 
lifesaving instead of the taking of life. Current law allows military 
women and dependents to receive abortions in military facilities in the 
cases of rape, incest or when necessary to save the life of the mother.
  The House voted several times to ban abortions at overseas military 
hospitals. A similar amendment offered by Representative Jane Harman in 
the fiscal year 1998 Defense Authorization Act was rejected 196-224. In 
1998, the House National Security Committee rejected another attempt to 
allow privately funded abortions at these facilities. When considering 
the fiscal year 1996 defense authorization and appropriations bills, 
the House voted eight times in favor of the present ban.
  In overseas locations where safe, legal abortions are not available, 
beneficiaries have the option of using space available travel for 
returning to the United States or traveling to another overseas 
location for the purpose of obtaining an abortion.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to turn 
over control of the time in the management of this amendment to the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Sanchez). She is the originator of 
this amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman 
from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. 
Meek) for her help on this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
Andrews).
  (Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ANDREWS. I thank my friend from California for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a question of constitutional rights. When 
someone puts on the uniform of the United States military, she should 
not forfeit her constitutional rights. If a different constitutional 
right were at stake here, I suspect that the attitude of those who 
oppose this amendment would be very different. They may not like the 
fact that the Constitution guarantees the right to choose, but it does. 
If we had a policy that said that you could not freely exercise 
religion at your own expense on military property in foreign countries, 
people would object vociferously to that because they would understand 
that there was something fundamentally wrong to denying people in the 
military their constitutional rights.
  You may not like this constitutional right. You are free to try to 
change it. But it is a constitutional right. And to deny it to women 
who serve in uniform is just wrong. The Sanchez amendment corrects that 
wrong. I would urge everyone to support it strongly as I do.
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds to respond. I 
assure the gentleman that the United States Supreme Court permits the 
Congress to discriminate and for us to make decisions with regard to 
the military. If you are too tall, if you are too short, if you are too 
heavy, if you are colorblind, if you are diabetic. We are permitted to 
decide how we can shape the force and we can also decide on rules and 
procedures for the military.
  Mr. Chairman I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
(Mr. Pitts).
  Mr. PITTS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Meek amendment. 
The House has spoken on this issue many times. Each time it has 
rejected this amendment. Just last year the House rejected this same 
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Lowey) by a 
vote of 190-232.

                              {time}  1915

  By requiring U.S. military facilities to provide elective abortion on 
demand to uniformed personnel dependents, the Meek amendment would turn 
DOD medical treatment facilities into abortion clinics.
  When the 1993 Clinton administration policy permitting abortions to 
be performed in military facilities, which was reversed in 1996 except 
in the cases of rape, incest and the life of the mother, when that was 
first begun, all military physicians as well as many nurses and 
supporting personnel refused to perform or even to assist in elective 
abortions.
  Our troops already are demoralized enough. Why should we again ask 
them to do something to which they object?
  I received a couple of letters on this issue. I just want to read a 
couple of quotes.
  The National Right to Life Committee in a letter summed it up well by 
saying, ``Facilities and personnel of the Federal Government should not 
be utilized to deliberately destroy the lives of innocent human 
beings.''
  And I received a letter from the Archdiocese for the Military 
Services which echoes this message by saying, ``Military medical 
personnel have refused to take part in the procedure of life destroying 
abortion, citing the primary responsibility of our Nation's military 
services to preserve human life.''
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to oppose again the Meek 
amendment.
  Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would just remind the gentleman who just spoke that 
there is already an objection clause and that no military personnel are 
forced to perform any of this.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California 
(Mrs. Tauscher), my friend.
  Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I guess I am a little confused about the 
subcommittee chairman's assertion that the military discriminates right 
now against people that are too tall and too other things when in fact 
I think what we would actually call those would be minimum standards 
for qualification to qualify to be a good soldier, airmen, Marine. The 
question I have is: Is there such a thing as being too female, because 
this is a specific issue for American fighting men and women, and this 
is about American women who have the right to have the right to choose 
as American citizens, but because they are on military duty overseas 
our colleagues are suggesting that they forfeit that right.
  I think that is discriminatory, I think that is inappropriate, and I 
urge my colleagues to support the Sanchez amendment.
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Connecticut (Mrs. Johnson).
  Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from 
Indiana for yielding this time to me knowing that we do not agree on 
the subject. I just want to make a couple of points:
  First of all, these are privately funded, these are not taxpayer 
funded. Secondly, we have the personnel to perform these procedures 
because they perform them in the case of rape, incest and the life of 
the mother. Thirdly, our men and women under arms serve under American 
law and American command, and like it or not, they have the same right 
to legal medical procedures as women throughout America. And fourthly, 
this is terribly discriminatory. If someone is an officer, they can 
afford to have their wife fly home or their daughter who got in trouble 
fly home. If someone is a common enlisted guy, they cannot, and space 
available does not necessarily work.
  Do my colleagues really want them to go out on the medical economy of 
some of these foreign deployments where death is just about as likely 
as any other outcome? Do they not have a right as service men and women 
to have either their wives safe or, as women, to have a safe procedure? 
Mothers have a right to live for their children even if they have to 
elect this procedure.
  Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Davis), my colleague.
  Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my strong 
support for the Meek Sanchez amendment. I find it ironic that strong 
women, brave women, who enter the military to fight for their country 
then cannot get the same basic rights that people back home already 
have, rights they are fighting to protect. I think that this policy is 
the height of hypocrisy, and this amendment should not even be debated, 
it should not even be a question. It even should not be a 
consideration.
  Mr. Chairman, let us extend to the fighting women in the military the

[[Page H3992]]

same choice options that others have back home. I thank the gentlewoman 
for having yielded this time to me.
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
New Jersey (Mr. Smith).
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my good friend 
for yielding this time to me and congratulate him on his courage in 
embracing this important human rights issue. Let me begin by noting 
that I have the utmost respect for my friends on the other side of this 
issue, but in all honesty I continue to struggle with how so many 
bright and otherwise enlightened people can continue to demand a course 
of action that literally kills children and emotionally wounds so many 
of their mothers.
  As my colleagues know, the national debate on partial-birth abortion 
has demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that abortion is violence 
against children. Can our friends on the other side of this issue not 
appreciate the inherent cruelty towards babies in sanctioning the 
stabbing to death of a partially born child followed by the suctioning 
of his or her brains and then calling that choice? I believe that such 
child abuse is beyond words, Mr. Chairman.
  As my colleagues know, abortion methods often involve the literal 
dismemberment of children with razor-blade-tipped curettes. They are 
really just knives hooked up to a hose, a suction device that is some 
20 to 30 times more powerful than the vacuum cleaner my colleagues have 
in their homes today. Well, the baby's body is literally hacked apart. 
The arms and the legs are cut off. Next time my colleagues go home and 
look at their child, they should remember this. And they can make faces 
and roll their eyes, but that is what abortion actually entails; it 
hacks off the arms, it decapitates the head.
  I do not know if my colleagues have ever seen The Silent Scream put 
out by Dr. Nathanson, a former abortionist and founder of NARAL. He 
shows with ultrasound a baby being hacked to death, the commonplace 
abortion method that is utilized in this country. If the Sanchez-Meek 
amendment becomes law, it would facilitate that kind of cruelty towards 
children in our overseas military hospitals.
  There are chemical abortions where highly concentrated salt solutions 
and other kinds of poisons are literally injected into the amniotic sac 
or into the baby so as to procure that baby's death. That is child 
abuse.
  A humane and a compassionate society will embrace those children with 
prenatal care and love even when they are, quote, unwanted and would 
say that that kind of violence cannot be sanctioned.
  I chair the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human 
Rights. I have had about a hundred hearings in that Subcommittee and in 
the Helsinki Commission which I also chair, many of which have focused 
on torture. I have to tell my colleagues there is an unsettling 
similarity between the mangled badly bruised bodies of people who have 
endured torture and the victims of saline or salting-out abortions 
where they are covered with bruises. Very often the only part not 
bruised is the palms of their hands because it takes 2 hours for the 
baby to die, and the babies clench their fists because they feel the 
pain.
  Abortion is child abuse. The Sanchez-Meek amendment would allow and 
facilitate abortion on demand in our military hospitals, the ultimate 
violation of human rights. We need to stand for the innocent unborn 
children and for their mothers. The emphasis should be on prenatal 
care, not on a course of action that maims, chemically poisons, and 
otherwise destroys human beings.
  Please vote no on the Sanchez-Meek amendment.
  Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Waters).
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the 
Sanchez amendment, a bill that would restore women the right to equal 
access in health services at military hospitals. This amendment is 
first and foremost about protecting women's health. It would give 
military women the access to the health care they need and deserve. 
Soldiers in our Armed Forces already give up many freedoms and risk 
their lives in defending our country. They should not be asked to 
sacrifice their health, their safety and their basic constitutional 
rights for a policy with no valid military purpose.
  Let me clarify that the amendment does not allow taxpayer-funded 
abortions at military hospitals, nor does it compel any doctor who 
opposes abortion to perform an abortion. The amendment merely 
reinstates the policy that was in effect from 1973 to 1988 and again 
from 1993 to 1996. This policy gives women in the military who are 
stationed overseas the same rights as military women in their own 
country, the right to pay for a safe and legal abortion with their own 
private money.
  Enough is enough. Every woman should be guaranteed the same rights as 
any other woman, particularly if those same women are fighting to 
protect the freedoms of this country. How can we in good conscience 
deny our service women any right at all?
  We will hear a lot of inflammatory language and a lot of discussions 
designed to frighten and intimidate. That is not what it is all about, 
Mr. Chairman. It is about women who want to take their own money and 
pay for a service that should be available. It is not, but they are 
paying their own money to have this service, one of the health care 
benefits that they should be afforded that they are not being afforded.
  How can we say to a military woman who is out there risking her life 
for us in our Armed Services that we are going to deny access to 
service? We do not do that to men in any shape, form or fashion; do not 
do it to women.
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I am just not sure I remember the last time a man 
received an abortion. I do not think it has ever happened. I do not 
think it is humanly possible. I am not sure how gender even became 
injected in this debate.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. 
Hyde).
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, a lot of talk about rights, about women's 
rights, and properly so. Not a word, not a syllable, not a phrase is 
spoken about the rights of the unborn child. Because the unborn child 
in the process we call abortion or euphemistically we call choice, 
which is an interesting subject, but nonetheless the rights of the 
unborn are never considered whatsoever.
  Now I have heard people on the other side say that there is a 
constitutional right to choose. It is really not in the Constitution, 
but the court found it there in 1973, 7 to 2, the right to an abortion. 
But there is no right to have the taxpayers pay for that abortion.
  Now our colleagues will say but under the Meek amendment, which we 
are debating here, under this amendment the pregnant woman will pay her 
own expenses. But they are using a medical facility of the United 
States military, and thus they are turning that into not a place for 
healing, but an abortion mill, an abortion clinic.
  Now there are people whose tax dollars go to pay for that hospital 
who are morally opposed to abortion, who do not think it is a good 
thing, who think it is a tragedy to take an innocent little human life, 
and before it gets a chance to laugh or cry, exterminate it. They do 
not terminate a pregnancy, they exterminate. All pregnancies terminate 
after 9 months.
  Now this has been the policy of our country and our government for 
some time, and it ought to stay there. Do not turn military hospitals 
into abortion clinics. Do not use the facilities that are paid for by 
taxpayers to kill an unborn child.
  Our colleagues say they want to make abortion safe, legal and rare. 
We can make it legal, we cannot make it moral, and we cannot make it 
safe for the unborn, and by facilitating abortions we are not making it 
rare.
  So think of the child, put the child in the picture, think of the 
unborn life that is entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness, and do not turn our military hospitals into abortion 
clinics.

                              {time}  1930

  Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds.
  Mr. Chairman, I would just like to remind my colleagues that there 
are already abortions performed at military

[[Page H3993]]

hospitals, and that a woman who chooses to have one under this 
amendment would pay all the costs of having that procedure done in a 
military hospital. So it is at no expense to the taxpayer.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Sherman).
  (Mr. SHERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Sanchez amendment. I hope this 
amendment has the support of all but the most extreme of the anti-
choice Members of this body, because this is indeed a very moderate 
approach. It simply says that women stationed overseas will be allowed 
to have abortions in safe military facilities at their own expense, at 
an expense that covers the full cost, not just the marginal cost, 
including, I would assume, a charge for the facility itself.
  It says that no doctor would have to perform the procedure if or she 
did not want to because of moral or religious or ethical objections. It 
simply reinstates the policy of this country from 1973 to 1988 and 
again from 1993 to 1996.
  We are about to deploy servicewomen even into the Balkans, where the 
hospitals have been damaged, where the Albanian hospitals are overrun 
or are having to deal with refugees, where all of the hospitals are 
overburdened, and we are turning to American servicewomen and saying, 
``Yes, you might risk your life because of a sniper or a land mine, 
but, in addition, you must risk your life to an unsanitary operation 
performed in whatever hospital or whatever illegal facility is 
available.''
  The other alternative available to our servicewomen is to wait. 
Instead of the abortion taking place in the first month, it would take 
place in some later month. Is that what the so-termed pro-life forces 
want?
  Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield one minute to the gentlewoman from 
Wisconsin (Ms. Baldwin).
  Ms. BALDWIN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this 
amendment. Our servicewomen and the wives and daughters of our 
servicemen stationed abroad do not expect special treatment, but they 
are entitled to receive the same rights guaranteed all Americans under 
Roe v. Wade.
  This bill penalizes women who have volunteered to serve their country 
by unduly interfering with their constitutionally protected right to 
choose. The Sanchez-Morella amendment assures that servicewomen and the 
wives and daughters of our servicemen do not become second-class 
citizens or subject to a two-tiered health care system. This amendment 
provides access for our servicewomen to medical care, to legal medical 
care.
  Individuals who volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces already give 
up many freedoms and they risk their lives defending our country. In 
exchange, we offer our military personnel a full array of health care 
services; that is, except in the case of comprehensive reproductive 
health care.
  I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the amendment.
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Cunningham).
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I respect immensely my friend that 
spoke about abortion, but that is not really what this whole issue is 
about. Most of the women in the military overseas are very, very young. 
Even someone that voluntarily wants an abortion, I can imagine there is 
quite an emotional scar, whether you choose to or not. The military 
does not want these young women having an abortion overseas. They do 
not want someone in a military unit overseas that is going to go 
through this emotional trouble that has to work with a team.
  There is not a single woman that has ever been forced in the military 
to have that abortion overseas. The military will bring that woman 
back, and, under Roe v. Wade, they are not denied, not one single item, 
and they are protected.
  So they are not abused, they are not discriminated against, because 
they have the same rights back here in the United States once they get 
in CONUS. But the military does not want young impressionable women to 
have to go through an abortion overseas.
  Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I just want to let our colleague know I have a letter 
here from the Department of Defense that strongly support this 
amendment. In fact, our military does want this. They do want this 
amendment to pass.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Woolsey).
  (Ms. WOOLSEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this 
amendment. This issue is about equal treatment for servicewomen 
stationed overseas. This amendment is not about Federal support for 
abortion services, it is about giving women who have volunteered to 
serve their country abroad the same protections and choices they would 
have here at home.
  When a woman in the military is stationed overseas, the best medical 
facility is most often the base hospital, a hospital that is clean and 
safe with well-trained doctors. However, this amendment denies military 
women, those who serve and protect our country, access to this base 
medical facility, even when the woman pays for and is willing to pay 
for the treatment.
  Regardless of your position on choice, ask yourself a question: What 
would you want for your daughter, for your sister or your wife? If she 
were stationed overseas, would you not want her to go to the hospital 
of her choice? Would you not want her to go to an American military 
facility?
  Mr. Chairman, these women fight for our freedom every day. Let us not 
take their freedom away. Vote ``yes'' on this amendment.
  Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Nadler).
  (Mr. NADLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is about recognizing the 
rights and dignity of our women in the armed services. It is really a 
very limited attempt to correct the policy that never should have been 
enacted in the first place. It simply allows women to obtain safe 
abortion services using their own money at U.S. military hospitals 
overseas.
  The current ban increases women's health risks and denies women their 
basic constitutional right to privacy. A woman must inform her 
superiors of her need for an abortion and wait until there is space 
available on a military flight back to the United States. The delay 
puts women's lives in jeopardy. The need to inform her superiors 
violates her privacy rights.
  Furthermore, women serving overseas depend on the base hospital for 
medical care in areas where local health care facilities are 
inadequate. The health of a servicewoman is threatened when she has to 
look outside of the base for a safe provider of the medical attention 
she needs. The current policy may even force a woman to seek an illegal 
or unsafe abortion when facing a crisis pregnancy.
  The ban discriminates against the women serving our country overseas. 
This amendment would ensure equal access to comprehensive reproductive 
health care for all U.S. servicewomen and dependents, regardless of 
where they are stationed, and therefore should be enacted.
  Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Maryland (Mrs. Morella), the cosponsor of this amendment.
  (Mrs. MORELLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to cosponsor this amendment. 
Much has already been said about what the amendment does, but it does 
allow women serving in the military overseas who depend on their base 
hospitals for medical care and may be stationed in areas where local 
health care facilities are inadequate to be able to avail themselves at 
their own cost of an abortion that may be very necessary.
  Women who volunteer to serve in our Armed Forces already give up many 
freedoms, and they risk their lives to defend our country. They should 
not have to sacrifice their privacy, their health and their basic 
rights for a policy that does not have any valid military purpose.

[[Page H3994]]

  Mr. Chairman, I think the amendment is about women's health. I 
believe that. I believe it is also about fairness. The amendment also, 
and this has been repeated over and over again, it does not allow 
taxpayer-funded abortions at military hospitals, nor does it compel any 
doctor who opposes abortion on principle or as a matter of conscience 
to perform an abortion. It reinstates the policy we had before.
  Finally, please know the amendment has the strong support of health 
care providers, organizations like the American Nurses Association, 
American Public Health Association, Medical Women's Association and the 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. The litany goes on. These 
are medical people who know.
  Please support the amendment.
  Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
New York (Mrs. Maloney).
  Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 
Sanchez amendment. Only in a Republican Congress can a woman sign up to 
serve her country and have her rights denied in return. While a female 
soldier is busy defending her country overseas, her country in this 
Congress is working to take away her rights.
  If a male member of the armed services needs medical attention 
overseas, he receives the best. If a female member of the armed 
services needs a specific medical procedure, she is forced to either 
wait until she can travel to the United States or go to a foreign 
hospital, which may be unsanitary and dangerous.
  This bill will cost the American taxpayer nothing. Each woman will 
pick up her own tab. All she wants is the right to do it.
  Women have waited long enough to receive equal treatment in the 
military. I hope my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will vote for 
this amendment, and give these most deserving soldiers back what is 
rightfully theirs.
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds to respond.
  Mr. Chairman, it is quite disappointing for the gentlewoman who just 
spoke to talk about a Republican Congress denying.
  Let me just state this: The purpose of the military is to fight and 
win the Nation's wars. The gentlewoman's comments also impugn the 
dignity of Democrats who are pro-life advocates, those whose passion is 
about saving life, not taking the life of the innocent unborn child, as 
she is walking off the floor and does not want to hear this debate. I 
am speaking directly to you.
  There are Members of both sides of this aisle that speak passionately 
about saving the life of the unborn. For you to try to rein in politics 
is completely unnecessary.
  Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 seconds to the gentlewoman from 
New York (Mrs. Maloney) to respond.
  Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, this is a constitutional 
right, a right that is legal in the United States. You are depriving a 
woman who is defending her country, putting her life on the line to 
defend her country. You are taking away a right that men have. It is a 
right that she would have if she were in her own country. I think it is 
outrageous. It is wrong. Everyone should vote against this amendment.
  Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Lowey).
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from New York is recognized for 50 
seconds.
  Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Sanchez-
Morella-Lowey amendment, and I thank the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Sanchez) and my colleagues for their important work on this issue.
  In closing, I just want to say, please do not be fooled. This is not 
an issue of taxpayer dollars funding abortion. This is about American 
women in private with their own money exercising their constitutional 
right to choose.
  Over 100,000 women live on American military bases. These women work 
to protect the freedom of our country. These women risk their lives and 
security to protect our great and powerful Nation. These women for the 
past 4 years have been denied the right to a safe and legal abortion at 
the bases where they are stationed.

                              {time}  1945

  Just yesterday, when we debated the anti-choice majority's latest 
effort to restrict access to legal abortion, I said I was tired of 
these attempts to chip away at a woman's right to choose. I ask my 
colleagues to please support the Sanchez-Morella-Lowey amendment.
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of the time to the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon) to close in opposition to the 
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Meek).
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon) is recognized 
for 3 minutes to close.
  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in very strong opposition 
to this amendment. I would encourage all of my colleagues on both sides 
of the aisle to vote against this amendment.
  I bring a somewhat unique perspective to this debate in that not only 
prior to coming to the Congress did I practice medicine, but for many 
years prior to coming to the Congress I practiced medicine in the 
military. I was actually in the Army Medical Corps at the time when 
pro-life President Ronald Reagan passed an order that said we were not 
going to have abortions in military hospitals anymore.
  It was very interesting for me at the time, I was a medical resident, 
to see the reaction to that order. It was sort of a sigh of relief. 
Everybody that I spoke to, the doctors and nurses, were very pleased 
that they were going to take that very, very controversial issue and 
move it out of the military hospitals.
  Some people have been arguing that this is a constitutional right. 
There is no constitutional right to have an abortion in a military 
hospital. Indeed, the reason all of those doctors and nurses, even many 
of whom considered themselves to be ``pro-choice'', liked getting it 
out is because they did not like to have anything to do with it.
  It is one of the most fascinating things to me, when I talk with my 
medical colleagues, many of whom say, you know, I am pro-choice, but 
they always follow it with this. They say, I would never perform an 
abortion, I would never assist in an abortion. The reason why they say 
that is they know exactly what an abortion is. It is the taking of an 
innocent human life. It has a beating heart. It has brain waves. Those 
are the things that I used to use to make a determination as to whether 
or not somebody was dead.
  This is a very, very controversial issue. Even if Members do stand on 
the pro-abortion side of this issue, Members have to acknowledge that 
it is so incredibly controversial within the population in general that 
this would be something that we would be well served as a Congress to 
keep outside of Federal facilities, outside of Federal hospitals.
  To say that the women will pay for the abortion, we all know that 
that issue is just part of the story. Having that infrastructure, 
having those medical professionals there, it represents a certain 
amount of Federal support.
  For the millions and millions of pro-life Americans, I think 
certainly if Members are pro-life, they should vote against this 
amendment. I think if Members are undecided, they should vote against 
this amendment.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the 
amendment, which will restore regulations permitting abortions for 
service members and their dependents at overseas defense department 
medical facilities.
  Without this amendment women who have volunteered to serve their 
country will continue to be discriminated against by prohibiting them 
from exercising their legally protected right to choose abortion simply 
because they are stationed overseas.
  While the department of defense policy respects the laws of host 
nations regarding abortions, service women stationed overseas should be 
entitled to the same services, as do women stationed in the U.S.
  Prohibiting women from using their own funds to obtain abortion 
services at overseas military facilities endangers women's health.
  Women stationed overseas depend on their base hospitals for medical 
care, and are often situated in areas where local facilities are 
inadequate or unavailable. This policy may cause a woman facing a 
crisis pregnancy to seek out an illegal and potentially unsafe 
abortion.
  Since 1996, the ban on DOD abortions was made permanent by the DOD 
authorization bill. I have fought to restore the female service 
member's constitutional right of choice.

[[Page H3995]]

  This amendment does not require the department of defense to pay for 
abortions; it simply repeals the current ban on privately funded 
abortions at U.S. military facilities overseas. Absolutely no federal 
funds will be used for abortion services. In addition, all three 
branches of the military have a ``conscience clause'' provision which 
will permit medical personnel who have moral, religious or ethical 
objections to abortion or family planning service not to participate in 
the procedure. These provisions will remain intact as well.
  Access to abortion is a crucial right for American women, whether or 
not they are stationed abroad. This amendment must be supported, as 
women who serve our country must be able to exercise their choice 
whether or not they are on American soil.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Mrs. Meek) as the designee of the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Sanchez).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Meek) 
will be postponed.


          Sequential Votes Postponed in Committee of the Whole

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, proceedings will now 
resume on those amendments on which further proceedings were postponed 
in the following order:
  Amendment No. 12 offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay);
  Amendment No. 13 offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss);
  Amendment No. 14 offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Meek) 
as the designee of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Sanchez).
  The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for any electronic vote 
after the first vote in this series.


                 Amendment No. 12 Offered by Mr. De Lay

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) on 
which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes 
prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 15-minute vote, followed by two 5-minute 
votes.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 248, 
noes 143, not voting 7, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 182]

                               AYES--284

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Bono
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Capuano
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Clement
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dingell
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kelly
     Kildee
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Kucinich
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Mascara
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Minge
     Moakley
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Morella
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Paul
     Pease
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanders
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Stabenow
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Turner
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Weygand
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wu
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--143

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Capps
     Cardin
     Carson
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Gejdenson
     Gonzalez
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Horn
     Hoyer
     Jackson (IL)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kolbe
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     Lee
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lowey
     Luther
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mink
     Mollohan
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Owens
     Pastor
     Payne
     Phelps
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sisisky
     Skelton
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (PA)
     Wexler
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Brown (CA)
     Hinchey
     Jones (OH)
     Kasich
     Sherwood
     Stark
     Visclosky

                              {time}  2016

  Mrs. THURMAN, Ms. DANNER, and Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, and Messrs. WEINER, 
HORN, and DAVIS of Florida changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Messrs. HOLDEN, WISE, LUCAS of Kentucky, HALL of Ohio, MOAKLEY, 
LARGENT, KILDEE, MASCARA, STUPAK, DINGELL, COSTELLO, MOORE and SHERMAN, 
and Ms. PELOSI, Ms. SLAUGHTER and Mrs. MALONEY of New York changed 
their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

                              {time}  2015


                      Announcement by the Chairman

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 200, the Chair announces 
that he will reduce to a minimum of 5 minutes the period of time within 
which a vote by electronic device will be taken on each amendment on 
which the Chair has postponed further proceedings.


                  Amendment No. 13 Offered by Mr. Goss

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) on 
which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes 
prevailed by voice vote.

[[Page H3996]]

  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 227, 
noes 198, not voting 9, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 183]

                               AYES--227

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Coble
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kelly
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Minge
     Moran (KS)
     Morella
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paul
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--198

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Campbell
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Forbes
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Phelps
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Shows
     Sisisky
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Towns
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--9

     Brown (CA)
     Coburn
     Hinchey
     Kasich
     Lewis (CA)
     Rush
     Sherwood
     Stark
     Visclosky

                              {time}  2024

  Mr. METCALF changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


            Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mrs. Meek of Florida

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Meek) as 
the designee of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Sanchez) on which 
further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by 
voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded voted has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 203, 
noes 225, not voting 6, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 184]

                               AYES--203

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barrett (WI)
     Bass
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Biggert
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Boehlert
     Bonior
     Bono
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Campbell
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Castle
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Cummings
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehrlich
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Foley
     Ford
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gilchrest
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Greenwood
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holt
     Hooley
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kelly
     Kennedy
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Mink
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Obey
     Olver
     Ose
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Serrano
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sisisky
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Strickland
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Towns
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Walden
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                               NOES--225

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Berry
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Borski
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Coble
     Coburn

[[Page H3997]]


     Collins
     Combest
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Crane
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gillmor
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (WI)
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kildee
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     Mascara
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller, Gary
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Ortiz
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paul
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Weygand
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--6

     Brown (CA)
     Hinchey
     Kasich
     Sherwood
     Stark
     Visclosky

                              {time}  2033

  Ms. McKINNEY changed her vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Ney) having assumed the chair, Mr. Nethercutt, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1401) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 for military 
activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military 
personnel strengths for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, and for other 
purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________