[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 77 (Wednesday, May 26, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5982-S6011]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). Under the previous order, the 
Senate will resume consideration of S. 1059, which the clerk will 
report.
  The legislative assistant read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1059) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2000 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Forces, and for other purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
  Pending:

  McCain/Levin amendment No. 393, to provide authority to carry out 
base closure round commencing in 2001.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I see no other Senator here at this moment. 
I believe there is another Senator who will be here at about 10:30 to 
offer another amendment, but I would like to submit an amendment for 
consideration at this point.


                           Amendment No. 394

(Purpose: To improve the monitoring of the export of advanced satellite 
 technology, to require annual reports with respect to Taiwan, and to 
     improve the provisions relating to safeguards, security, and 
        counterintelligence at Department of Energy facilities)

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative assistant read as follows:

       The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Lott] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 394.

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under 
``Amendments Submitted.'')
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I am pleased to offer this amendment on 
behalf of myself, and Senators Warner, Shelby, Murkowski, Domenici, 
Specter, Thomas, Kyl, and Hutchinson.
  This package is the product of the serious investigative and 
oversight work performed by the relevant committees and other Senators 
who have devoted considerable attention to the issues of satellite 
exports, Chinese espionage, lax security at DOE facilities, foreign 
counterintelligence wiretaps, and more. I commend my cosponsors and 
others for their helpful efforts in this regard.
  I have stated that the damage to U.S. national security as a result 
of China's nuclear espionage is probably the greatest I have seen in my 
entire career. And, unfortunately, the administration's inattention 
to--or even hostility towards--counterintelligence and security has 
magnified this breach.
  It is simply incredible that China has acquired sensitive, classified 
information about every nuclear warhead in the U.S. arsenal. But this 
apparently is precisely what happened.
  It is simply incredible that American companies illegally provided 
information to the Chinese that will allow them to improve their long-
range missiles aimed at American cities. But this apparently is exactly 
what happened.
  It is simply incredible that American exports were delivered to 
certain Chinese facilities that will assist their weapons of mass 
destruction program. But this apparently is exactly what happened.
  It is simply incredible that it took this administration 2 years from 
the date the National Security Adviser was

[[Page S5983]]

first briefed by DOE officials on the problem of Chinese espionage at 
the nuclear weapons laboratories, to sign a new Presidential directive 
to strengthen counterintelligence at the labs and elsewhere. But this 
apparently is exactly what happened.
  And, after all this, it is simply incredible that the President would 
claim that all this damage was a result of actions of previous 
administrations and that he had not been told of any espionage that had 
occurred on his watch. But this is exactly what the President said in a 
mid-March press conference.
  As I have stated previously, the Congress must take several steps to 
better understand what happened and how it happened, and to lessen the 
likelihood of a recurrence of such events in the future.
  First, we must aggressively probe the administration to determine the 
facts. We know much of what happened. But we don't have all the facts, 
and we certainly don't know why certain events unfolded the way they 
did. We need to get to the bottom of that.
  Several committees are exploring aspects of this scandal, and it is 
multi-faceted: DOE security; whistleblower protections; 
counterintelligence at the FBI; CIA operations; export controls; 
illegal campaign contributions; the Justice Department; the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA; DOD monitoring of satellite 
launches in China; waivers of laws for companies under investigation 
for illegal activities; and much, much more.
  Second, we must take all reasonable steps now to remedy problems we 
have identified to date. Does this mean that the actions recommended in 
this bill, or in this amendment, will solve the problem of lab security 
for all time? Of course not. But they do represent important first 
steps in addressing the myriad problems that have emerged during the 
various on-going investigations.
  For example, we know that security and counter-intelligence at the 
labs was--and is--woefully inadequate. We can take steps to begin to 
fix that problem.
  We know that the Clinton Commerce Department failed miserably to 
adequately control and protect national security information as it 
relates to commercial communications satellites and rocket launchers. 
We took steps last year in the Defense authorization bill to help 
protect national security by transferring from Commerce to State the 
responsibility for reviewing license applications for such satellites.
  Third, we must hold appropriate executive branch officials 
accountable for their actions. This means we need to understand why 
certain Clinton administration officials acted the way they did. Why, 
for example, were DOE intelligence officials told they could not brief 
the Congress on aspects of this espionage investigation and its 
implications? Why did the Reno Justice Department refuse to approve a 
wiretap request? Why was a certain suspect's computer not searched 
much, much earlier when, in fact, the suspect had agreed several years 
earlier to such a search? And why was a waiver granted for the export 
of a satellite built by an American company that was under 
investigation by the Department of Justice and whose head was the 
single largest individual contributor to the Democratic National 
Committee?
  In posing these and other questions, does this mean the Senate is on 
some partisan witch-hunt? Absolutely not. I recognize that a full 
understanding of this issue requires going back decades.
  For example, the reports recently issued by the Senate Intelligence 
Committee and the Cox Committee in the House reviewed documents from 
prior administrations.
  But simply saying that errors were made in previous administrations 
cannot and does not absolve this President and this administration from 
responsibility. In fact, this administration's record in the area of 
security and counter-intelligence, in its relations with China, and in 
several other areas, leaves much to be desired.
  As I said before, there are some steps we can and should take now. 
For example, the Defense authorization bill before us now proposes 
several important measures regarding Department of Energy security and 
counterintelligence. Likewise, the intelligence authorization bill 
includes several legislative proposals on this topic as well.
  My amendment is entirely consistent with, and indeed builds upon, 
those two vital legislative measures. Allow me to describe what this 
amendment proposes to do.
  First, it seeks to address the Loral episode, wherein the President 
approved a waiver for the export of a Loral satellite for launch on a 
Chinese rocket at the same time Loral was under investigation by the 
Justice Department for possible criminal wrong-doing.
  This amendment requires the President to notify the Congress whenever 
an investigation is undertaken of an alleged violation of U.S. export 
control laws in connection with the export of a commercial satellite of 
U.S. origin.
  It also requires the President to notify the Congress whenever an 
export license or waiver is granted on behalf of any U.S. person or 
firm that is the subject of a criminal investigation.
  I am absolutely convinced that had these ``sunshine'' provisions been 
in effect at the time of the Loral waiver decision, I doubt very 
seriously that the President would have issued his decision in favor of 
Loral.
  Second, the amendment requires the Secretary of Defense to undertake 
certain actions that would significantly enhance the performance and 
effectiveness of the DOD program for monitoring so-called ``satellite 
launch campaigns'' in China and elsewhere.
  For instance, under this amendment, the DOD monitoring officials will 
be given authority to halt a launch campaign if they felt U.S. national 
security was being compromised. In addition, the Secretary will be 
obligated to establish appropriate professional and technical 
qualifications, as well as training programs, for such personnel, and 
increase the number of such monitors.
  Furthermore, to remove any ambiguity as to what technical information 
may be shared by U.S. contractors during a launch campaign, the 
amendment requires the Secretary of Defense to review and improve 
guidelines for such discussions. Finally, it requires the Secretary to 
establish a counter intelligence program within the organization 
responsible for performing such monitoring functions.
  Third, my amendment enhances the intelligence community's role in the 
export license review process. This responds to a clear need for 
greater insight by the State Department and other license-reviewing 
agencies into the Chinese and other entities involved in space launch 
and ballistic missile programs. In this regard, it is worth noting that 
the intelligence community played a very modest role in reviewing the 
license applications for exports that subsequently were deemed to have 
harmed national security.
  This section also requires a report by the Director of Central 
Intelligence on the efforts of foreign governments to acquire sensitive 
U.S. technology and technical information.
  Fourth, based on concerns that China continues to proliferate missile 
and missile technology to Pakistan and Iran, this amendment expresses 
the sense of Congress that the People's Republic of China should not be 
permitted to join the Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR, as a 
member until Beijing has demonstrated a sustained commitment to missile 
nonproliferation and adopted an effective export control system. Any 
honest appraisal would lead one to the conclusion, I believe, that 
China has not demonstrated such a commitment and does not have in place 
effective export controls.
  Now we know, from documents released by the White House as part of 
the Senate's investigation, that the Clinton administration wanted to 
bring the PRC into the MTCR as a means of shielding Beijing from 
missile proliferation sanctions laws now on the books. This section 
sends a strong signal that such an approach should not be undertaken.
  Fifth, the amendment expresses strong support for stimulating the 
expansion of the commercial space launch industry here in America. As 
we have seen recently with a number of failed U.S. rocket launches, 
there is a crying need to improve the performance of U.S.-built and 
launched rockets. This amendment strongly encourages efforts to promote 
the domestic commercial space launch industry, including through the 
elimination of legal or regulatory barriers to long-term 
competitiveness.

[[Page S5984]]

  The amendment also urges a review of the current policy of permitting 
the export of commercial satellites of U.S. origin to the PRC for 
launch and suggests that, if a decision is made to phase-out the 
policy, then launches of such satellites in the PRC should occur only 
if they are licensed as of the commencement of the phase-out of the 
policy and additional actions are taken to minimize the transfer of 
technology to the PRC during the course of such launches.
  Sixth, the amendment requires the Secretary of State to provide 
information to U.S. satellite manufacturers when a license application 
is denied. This addresses a legitimate concern expressed by U.S. 
industry about the current export control process.
  I not that each of these recommendations was included in the Senate 
Intelligence Committee's ``Report on Impacts to U.S. National Security 
of Advanced Satellite Technology Exports to the PRC and the PRC's 
Efforts Influence U.S. Policy.'' That report was approved by an 
overwhelmingly bipartisan vote, so there is nothing partisan whatsoever 
in these recommendations.
  My amendment also requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an 
annual report on the military balance in the Taiwan Straits, similar to 
the report delivered to the Congress earlier this year. That report, my 
colleagues may recall, was both informative and deeply troubling in its 
assessment that the PRC has underway a massive buildup of missile 
forces opposite our friend, Taiwan.
  Annual submission of this report will assist the Congress in working 
with the administration in assessing future lists of defense articles 
and services requested by Taiwan as part of the annual arms sales talks 
between the U.S. and Taiwan.
  Eighth, the amendment proposes a mechanism for determining the extent 
to which then-Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary's ``Openness 
Initiative'' resulted in the release of highly-classified nuclear 
secrets. We already know, for example, that some material has been 
publicly-released that contained highly-sensitive ``restricted Data'' 
or ``Formerly Restricted Data.''
  While we are rightly concerned about what nuclear weapons design or 
other sensitive information has been stolen through espionage, at the 
same time we must be vigilant in ensuring that Mrs. O'Leary's 
initiative was not used, and any future declassification measures will 
not be used, to provide nuclear know-how to would-be proliferators in 
Iran, North Korea, and elsewhere.
  Ninth, the amendment proposes putting the FBI in charge of conducting 
security background investigations of DOE laboratory employees, versus 
the Office of Personnel Management as is currently the case. I applaud 
the Armed Services Committee for including additional funds in their 
bill for addressing the current backlog of security investigations.
  Tenth, and lastly, the amendment proposes increased 
counterintelligence training and other measures to ensure classified 
information is protected during DOE laboratory-to-laboratory exchanges, 
should such exchanges occur in the future. For example, having trained 
counter-intelligence experts go along on any and all visits of lab 
employees to sensitive countries, is a small but useful step in the 
direction of enhanced security.
  Mr. President, I readily concede that this package of amendments will 
not solve all security problems at the Nation's nuclear weapons 
laboratories. Nor will it solve the myriad problems identified to date 
in the Senate's on-going investigation of the damage to U.S. national 
security from the export of satellites to the PRC or from Chinese 
nuclear espionage.
  These are, as I mentioned before, small but useful steps to address 
known deficiencies. Most of these recommendations stem from the 
bipartisan report issued by the Intelligence Committee.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to support this important amendment.
  In summary, good work has been done by the Cox committee in the House 
of Representatives. They should be commended for the work they have 
done in this critical area. They should be commended for the fact that 
it has been bipartisan. It would have been easy for them to veer into 
areas or procedures that would have made it very partisan. They did not 
do that.
  The same thing is true in the Senate. The Senate has chosen so far 
not to have a select committee or a joint committee. The Senate has 
continued to try to do this in the normal way.
  We have had hearings by the Intelligence Committee. They have done 
very good work. Chairman Shelby has been thoughtful and relentless, and 
he continues in that way. The Armed Services Committee, under Senator 
Warner, the Energy Committee, under Senator Murkowski, Foreign 
Relations, Governmental Affairs--all the committees with jurisdiction 
in this area have been having hearings, they have had witnesses, and 
they have been coming up with recommendations.
  As a matter of fact, some of the recommendations that have been 
developed are included in this Department of Defense authorization 
bill. I understand other proposed changes to deal with these security 
lapses and with counterintelligence will be included in the 
intelligence authorization bill that will come up in early June.
  I do not believe we should rush to judgment. We should make sure we 
understand the full ramifications of what has happened. We should not 
say it has been just this administration or that administration or the 
other administration. This is about the security of our country. I 
agree with Congressman Dicks when he quoted former Senator Henry 
Jackson about how, when it comes to national security, we should all 
just pursue it as Americans.
  This amendment I have just sent to the desk is a further outgrowth of 
some of the information we have found through some of the hearings that 
have occurred. There were some provisions in it that I am sure would 
have evoked some criticism, and we have taken those out, so that we can 
take our time and deal more thoughtfully with it over a period of time.
  We are going to have to deal with the Export Administration and the 
fact that law was allowed to lapse back in 1995. But there are some 
things we can do now. To reiterate, this is what this amendment will 
do:
  First, it requires the President to notify the Congress whenever an 
investigation is undertaken of an alleged violation of U.S. export 
control laws in connection with the export of a commercial satellite of 
U.S. origin.
  It will also require the President to notify the Congress whenever an 
export license or waiver is granted on behalf of any U.S. person or 
firm that is the subject of a criminal investigation.
  Second, the amendment requires the Secretary of Defense to undertake 
certain actions that would significantly enhance the performance and 
effectiveness of the DOD program for monitoring so-called satellite 
launch campaigns in China and elsewhere.
  Third, the amendment will enhance the intelligence community's role 
in the export license review process and requires a report by the DCI 
on the efforts of foreign governments to acquire sensitive U.S. 
technology and technical information.
  Fourth, the amendment expresses the sense of Congress that the 
People's Republic of China should not be permitted to join the Missile 
Technology Control Regime as a member until Beijing has demonstrated a 
sustained commitment to missile nonproliferation and adopted an 
effective export control system.

  The amendment expresses strong support for stimulating the expansion 
of the commercial space launch industry in America. This amendment 
strongly encourages efforts to promote the domestic commercial space 
launch industry. That is why we have seen more of this activity occur 
in other countries, particularly China and even Russia, because we do 
not have that domestic commercial space launch capability here. We 
should eliminate legal or regulatory barriers to long-term 
competitiveness.
  The amendment also urges a review of the current policy of permitting 
the export of commercial satellites of U.S. origin to the PRC for 
launch.
  The amendment requires the Secretary of State to provide information 
to U.S. satellite manufacturers when a license application is denied.
  The amendment also requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an 
annual report on the military balance in the Taiwan Straits, similar to 
the report developed earlier this year and was delivered to the 
Congress.
  The amendment proposes a mechanism for determining the extent to

[[Page S5985]]

which classified nuclear weapons information has been released by the 
Department of Energy. It proposes putting the FBI in charge of 
conducting security background investigations of DOE Laboratory 
employees versus OPM. It seems to me that really is beyond the 
capabilities of the Office of Personnel Management. Surely, the FBI 
would be better conducting the security background investigations. This 
does not call for putting the FBI totally in charge of security at our 
Labs, for instance. That is something we need to think about more. I 
had thought the FBI should be in charge, and there are some limitations 
in that area. That is an area we should think about a lot more. We 
should work through the committee process. We should think together in 
a bipartisan way about how to do it.
  Clearly, the security at our Laboratories has to be revised. We have 
to have a much better counterintelligence process, and our committees 
are working on that.
  Last, the committee proposes increased counterintelligence training 
and other measures to ensure classified information is protected during 
DOE Laboratory-to-Laboratory exchanges.
  These are pieces that I think Senators can agree on across the board. 
They are targeted at dealing with the problem, not trying to fix blame, 
not claiming that this is going to solve all the problems. But these 
are some things we can do now that will help secure these Laboratories 
in the future and get information we need and give enhanced 
capabilities to the intelligence communities.
  I urge my colleagues to review it. It has been, of course, considered 
by the committees that have jurisdiction. We have provided copies of it 
to the minority, and we invite their participation. I believe this is 
something that can be bipartisan and can be accepted, after reasonable 
debate, overwhelmingly. I certainly hope so. I appreciate the 
opportunity to offer this amendment. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished majority 
leader for this initiative. We have had in his office a series of 
meetings with the chairmen, as he enumerated, and this piece of 
legislation has been very carefully crafted drawing from each of the 
committees the work they have done thus far.
  The Senate Armed Services Committee, as the majority leader has said, 
has taken an active role in addressing the issues. I refer colleagues 
to page 462 of our report, which is on each desk. In there, we have a 
subtitle (D) related to this subject. We are bringing this together.
  I thought it was important--and I consulted with the majority leader 
this morning--to lay this down so all Senators have the opportunity to 
view it. Our distinguished colleague, the ranking member, has sent it 
out to the various Departments and agencies of the Federal Government 
for comment. In the course of the day, as I am sure my colleague from 
Michigan will agree, we will basically try to allow Senators at any 
time to address this particular amendment by Senator Lott and, indeed, 
the provisions that we have in our bill.
  This is an important subject. It is a timely subject. All Senators 
hopefully will strive to achieve bipartisanship because we recognize 
that this problem goes back several administrations, although I have my 
own personal views that this administration must account for some 
actions which I find very disturbing--in other words, why corrective 
measures were not brought about more expeditiously. But time will tell.
  Also, I believe it is important to recognize that the United States 
of America in the next millennium will be faced with an ever-growing 
and ever-important nation, China. We as a nation must remain engaged 
with China, whether it is on economic, political, human rights, or 
security issues. China and the United States are the two dominant 
leaders, together with Japan and, indeed, I think South Korea, in that 
region to bring about the security which is desperately needed.
  So let us hope that in due course we can, on this bill, put together 
a bipartisan package. We already have one amendment in there, and it 
passed our committee with bipartisan support.
  Mr. LEVIN. Would the Senator yield while the majority leader is on 
the floor so I could give a 30-second comment?
  Mr. WARNER. Absolutely.
  Mr. LEVIN. We welcome the proposal of the majority leader. We have 
worked very closely, on a bipartisan basis, on the committee on what is 
in the bill already and to which the majority leader has made 
reference. We will continue and look forward to working with the 
majority leader, on a bipartisan basis, on his proposal. The committees 
of jurisdiction and I are reviewing that. We got it last night. We 
welcome very much these kinds of suggestions and will address them in 
the same kind of bipartisan approach that the good Senator from 
Virginia, our good chairman, has just made reference to.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, if the Senator would yield?
  Mr. WARNER. Of course.
  Mr. LOTT. I just say, I appreciate your comments and your attitude. 
If we have problems, we can address those problems in a bipartisan way 
to deal with the future. And that is my intent. I will be glad to work 
with you. Thank you for your comments.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the chairman for yielding.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague.
  If I may note, with a sense of humility, Senator Levin and I are now 
entering the third day on this bill. To the best of my recollection--
which is 21 years that we have been working together on authorizations 
bills--we may have set a record thus far. That record is not 
necessarily owing to the efforts of the ranking member and myself but 
all Senators in cooperating in moving this bill along; the record being 
we only had one quorum call, this being the third day.

  We started on a Monday, when ordinarily things do not move as 
quickly; but we had one single quorum call, I think, for about 3 or 4 
minutes on Monday. Yesterday, throughout, we stayed here until close to 
9 o'clock last night working on amendments. So I thank the Senator, my 
colleague, my friend from Michigan. I thank all Senators.
  We just had another Senator come on the floor in a timely way. He is 
right on the split second of when he is due to bring up his amendment.
  So with the cooperation of other Senators, I am hopeful we can finish 
this bill tonight. I have discussed that with the majority leader, and 
he is going to give us total support. We will just drive this engine, 
hopefully into the early hours of the evening, and complete it.
  But I do bring to the attention of Senators that I will place on the 
majority leader's desk here, as I manage the bill, three pages of 
amendments. There they are. We have to work our way through these 
today. My colleague, Mr. Levin, and I will be here throughout the day 
to assist Senators in accommodating them with their desire regarding 
these amendments.
  Mr. LEVIN. If the chairman would just yield for a comment?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I commend him for his leadership, which made our good 
progress possible. When he points out how few quorum calls we have had 
on this bill, the only suggestion I have in addition to the ones he has 
made is that there is a lot of wood around here to knock on, and we 
need to knock on wood that this will continue along the lines it has 
with very few quorum calls and significant progress.
  I do see the Senator from Nebraska on the floor. We look forward to 
his offering that amendment. Then I believe at 11:45, under the current 
unanimous consent agreement, we are going to return to the BRAC 
amendment and then have a vote on that. That would be the first vote, 
as I understand the UC.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is correct.
  Mr. LEVIN. That would be at 1:45.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on the subject of BRAC, again, the 
distinguished Senator from Michigan, the distinguished Senator from 
Arizona, Mr. McCain, the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. 
Reed, the distinguished Senator from Maine--my recollection is there 
was one other Senator who spoke last night in the debate on the BRAC 
process, so we have had a considerable amount of debate. There are 2 
hours allocated. I am not certain that all 2 hours will be needed. But 
I urge Senators to come over as quickly

[[Page S5986]]

as possible when that amendment comes up on the schedule, and we can 
hopefully move through that debate and on to other matters.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be 
laid aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.


                           Amendment No. 395

     (Purpose: To strike section 1041, relating to a limitation on 
   retirement or dismantlement of strategic nuclear delivery systems)

  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment of the 
Senator from Nebraska.
  The legislative assistant read as follows:

       The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Kerrey] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 395.

  Mr. KERREY. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 357, strike line 13 and all that follows through 
     page 358, line 4.

  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, first of all, let me say that this piece 
of legislation being considered right now, in my view, of all the laws 
we write and all the laws we consider, is the one that is most vital. 
If we do not have a defense that is able to defend not just the United 
States of America but our interests, all the rest of it is secondary, 
in my view.
  I am very impressed--I came to this Senate in 1989, and I came to the 
Senate without the experience of having gone to law school. I was 
trained in other matters. The longer I am here, the more impressed I am 
both with the law itself and the power of this law. I cannot help but, 
as I begin to describe my own amendment, take a little bit of time to 
describe the connection between the law and things people see in their 
lives that they may not see as having been caused by the law itself.
  We do not have an Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps without this 
piece of legislation, which is, I think--I don't know--500-and-some 
pages long, with a report with it as well. This law creates our 
military. It authorizes appropriations to be made. It authorizes us to 
go out and recruit people to serve in our Armed Forces.
  We are going into the Memorial Day weekend during which I guess many, 
if not most, of us are going to be called upon to comment upon the 
meaning of Memorial Day--what does this day mean to us in our lives.
  For me, it is a time to reflect and say that these 1,360,000 men and 
women who are currently serving our Nation, and the half million 
Reserve and Guard men and women who are out there as well, are part of 
a long tradition of American men and women who have given up their 
freedom, because in the military they have a different code than we 
have in the private sector. The standards of justice are different. The 
expectations are different.
  In the military, the command structure is such that if I have 
command--which I did many, many years ago--if I have command and do 
well, I get a medal. But if I do poorly, my fitness report will be so 
bad I will be looking for a private sector opportunity. We have a 
responsibility we cannot delegate. That imposes upon an individual who 
is in the military real burdens that are different from what we have in 
the private sector--real responsibilities that are completely 
different.
  A man or woman who serves us today, who serves the cause of freedom 
today in our Armed Forces, does something that is much different from 
most private sector citizens. I begin my comments on this amendment by 
saluting them, by thanking them for taking what, unfortunately, today 
is almost a nonmainstream action, and that is based upon their love of 
country and their love of freedom, saying: We're willing to sacrifice 
our freedom; we're willing to give up rights that most private sector 
citizens have.
  Furthermore, nobody should doubt that in normal training operations 
it is possible to be injured or to even lose your life. A lot of these 
training operations are dangerous. So they are risking their lives on a 
day-to-day basis. Obviously, they are involved today in Kosovo; they 
are involved in the Balkans; they are involved with containing Saddam 
Hussein; they are involved on the Korean peninsula; they are forward 
deployed in areas around the world where we have interests, not just 
interests that are only of the United States, but interests in values 
that we hope will spread worldwide.
  All of us had the opportunity--I did; I took advantage of the 
opportunity--to sit and listen to Presidents Kim Dae-jung of South 
Korea and Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic and Nelson Mandela of 
South Africa when each spoke at a joint session of Congress across the 
way in the House of Representatives, and looked down to every 
representative of the people and said: Thank you, American people. You 
put your lives on the line, and we are free in South Korea today as a 
consequence. You put your lives and resources on the line, and we are 
free in the Czech Republic because of it. You have put your lives and 
resources on the line in South Africa, and we are free there as well. 
Your efforts enabled us to be free, these three individuals said. Many 
others have said the same thing.
  It is not a cliche that freedom is not free. This piece of 
legislation, this important piece of legislation, has us supporting 
1,360,000 men and women in the military, and half a million Reserve and 
Guard people who are actively involved in the cause of defending 
freedom in the United States of America and throughout the world. This 
is an extremely important piece of legislation. I argue if we don't get 
this one right, all the rest of it is secondary. If this piece of 
legislation, if this law is not written correctly, all the rest of it 
doesn't matter.
  I begin my comments this morning praising Chairman Warner and the 
ranking member, Senator Levin, who have led the Armed Services 
Committee to give us this piece of legislation. They understand this 
piece of legislation keeps America safe. This is about security. We 
can't cut corners. We can't scrimp. We can't say we will just go 
partially there. We have to answer the question: What do we need to do 
to keep the people of the United States safe? How do we keep them 
secure and try to write laws that accomplish that objective?
  With great respect to the committee, there is one provision in 
subtitle D called ``Other Matters'' on page 357 that I am proposing to 
strike. That language provides a 1-year extension of a requirement that 
I think causes the United States of America to be less safe than it 
would without this provision. Let me get to it specifically.
  What this provision does is say that the United States of America 
must maintain a nuclear deterrent that is at the START I levels, that 
we have to have warheads deployed, land, sea, air, that are at START I 
levels; that the President of the United States cannot go below those 
START I levels. In the cold war, perhaps even a few years after the 
cold war was ended, when we were trying to err on the side of safety, 
this made sense because the No. 1 threat then was a bolt out of the 
blue, an attack by the Soviet Union that might occur when we least 
expected it. We had to maintain an active deterrence and prevent that. 
The capacity to survive that bolt-out-of-the-blue attack and 
counterattack was an essential part of our strategy.

  Today, the No. 1 threat is not a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack. The No. 
1 threat today is an accidental launch, a rogue nation launch, or a 
sabotage launch of a nuclear weapon. One of the things that causes me a 
great deal of concern in this new era of ours is that I think we in 
Congress and the American people as well have forgotten the danger of 
these nuclear weapons. We have been talking about new threats to 
America. We have a threat in the form of chemical weapons, a threat in 
the form of biological weapons, a threat in the form of cyber warfare, 
lots of others things like that, terrorism, that cause people to be 
very much concerned.
  My belief is that the only threat out there that can kill every 
single American, and thus the threat that ought to be top on our list 
of concerns is nuclear weapons. The nation that possesses the

[[Page S5987]]

greatest threat of all in terms of an accidental launch, a rogue nation 
launch, or a sabotage launch is Russia.
  I appreciate the fine work that Congressman Cox and Congressman Dicks 
did. They presented a report yesterday. I think they have laid out a 
roadmap that will enable us to change our laws and increase security at 
the Labs, increase the security of the satellite launches and increase 
the security, in general, with the transfer of technology through 
export licenses. I think they gave us a good roadmap, but one of the 
concerns I have with the report--I think it is unintentional--strike 
``I think.'' It is unintentional--it has left the impression that China 
is a bigger threat to the United States in terms of nuclear weapons 
than Russia is. Nothing can be further from the truth.
  In China, they prevent the possibility of an accidental launch by 
saying we are not going to put our warheads on the missile. According 
to published reports, it would take at least 24 hours and probably a 
minimum of 48 hours, from the moment an order was given to launch, to 
put the warheads on the missiles. In China they have no more, according 
to published reports, than 13 weapons headed in our direction. They are 
categorized as city busters. They are not as accurate as the Russians 
are. They are not as deadly as the Russians are. They are not as 
likely, as a consequence of organized systems, to be launched in an 
accidental fashion. Even though they can reach us, even though China is 
a serious threat as a consequence of their behavior in the 
proliferation area--and we should not have trimmed in areas of export 
licenses or satellite launches on Long March or the operations of our 
Laboratories or other areas that would put America at risk--the threat 
assessment today says that the No. 1 threat to us is the threat that is 
posed by Russia as a consequence of their having strategic weapons that 
could reach the United States in a matter of hours and could reach the 
United States in a devastating fashion not through intentional launch 
but accidental launch, rogue nation launch or sabotage launch.
  I think that part of the problem in all of this is, again, that we 
have been lulled into a false sense of security that, well, maybe these 
nuclear weapons aren't that big of a problem. Let me say that in the 
former Soviet Union, that may have been the case, because their economy 
was much stronger than it is today. They had a much greater capacity to 
control those weapons systems that they have.
  One of the reasons, the biggest reason that I want to change this is 
that I believe we are forcing Russia today to maintain a level of 
nuclear weapons beyond what their financial system will allow them to 
maintain. They are currently required at START I levels to have 6,000 
strategic warheads. Again, according to published accounts from their 
own military people, they would prefer to be at a level of 1,000 or 
lower, because they simply don't have the resources. I can go into some 
rather startling problems that are created as a consequence of that 
inability, but they simply don't have the ability, the resources to 
allocate to maintain those 6,000 warheads as we do. Ours are safe. Ours 
are secure. We have redundant switching systems and all kinds of other 
protections to make certain that we don't have an accidental launch, to 
make certain that there is no rogue transfer, to make certain that 
there is no terrorism that could take over one of these sites and be 
used either against the United States itself or against some other 
country.

  One of the baseline problems that we have as Americans is that we are 
the most open society on earth. We are the most successful society 
measured by our economy, measured by our military, measured by even our 
democracy, which can be a bit frustrating from time to time. We take 
sides on issues worldwide, which I think we have to do if we want to 
continue to fight for the freedom of people throughout this world. But 
as a consequence of all those things, there are lots of people on this 
Earth who hate Americans, who have in their hearts a desire to do 
significant damage to us. It is a problem created from our own success. 
So as we try to decide how we are going to keep our country safe, one 
of the things that I believe we need to think about when it comes to 
Russia is, is it possible for somebody who hates America, who is 
willing to do damage to America and willing to die in the act of doing 
it--what kind of risk is there as a consequence of a policy under law 
that requires Russia to maintain a nuclear force that is higher than 
either they can afford or they want to maintain?
  Well, I will describe a couple of scenarios in length here, but many 
years ago, sort of a Stone Age time for me, I was trained in the U.S. 
Navy SEAL team. I do not argue that I was an exemplary special 
operations person. I had a relatively short experience in the war 
before I was injured, so I didn't have enough time on task to become 
really good at it. But you always have these sort of imaginary 
fantasies that you are still 25 years of age, and there are times when 
you sort of think that way.
  I believe it is possible for somebody who is well trained and well 
organized to raid a silo site of a Russian missile in the Russian 
wilderness and take that site over. You will have a scenario on the 
opposite side that says that it can't be done. I believe it can be 
done.
  One of the things that you have to do when you are planning, writing 
a law to defend the people of the United States of America, is you have 
to think about that small possibility and you have to plan for it. We 
didn't expect that the Russians were high probability going to come 
through the Fulda Gap during the 40-plus years of the cold war, but we 
defended against it, and it was an expensive defense because it was 
possible that it could happen.
  Mr. President, I believe it is possible for a small band of 
discontents or terrorists to raid a silo site of a Russian missile in 
the Russian wilderness. I believe that there are soldiers today in 
Russia who are poorly trained, who are sparsely equipped, and who are 
irate at not having been paid in well over a year in some cases. I 
think they are vulnerable and easily overtaken, and as a consequence, 
willing to cooperate in things that would put the United States of 
America at risk.

  What you have to do is sort of then say to yourself: What would 
happen? Imagine what would happen if that were to occur.
  Well, I again have to underscore with a story why I think we are 
lulled to sleep by nuclear weapons. In the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, on which I have the honor of serving as a result of 
Senator Daschle appointing me to that and serving on behalf of the 
Senate, I once asked some analysts of the CIA to tell me what the 
impact would be of a single missile being launched and hitting a U.S. 
city. The answer was we are really not sure. We haven't thought it 
through lately. We don't put it up on our radar screen as being the 
sort of thing to worry about.
  I find that not only alarming but illustrative of the general 
problem. We are not thinking about this threat.
  We are not imagining what could happen in a worse case scenario and, 
as a consequence, we are sort of allowing ourselves to be dragged along 
with yesterday's policy, not thinking about how we can do this 
differently to substantially reduce the threat to the people of the 
United States of America, and I believe, by the way, in the process, 
freeing up resources that could be used on the conventional side where 
there is much more likely scenarios where American men and women are 
going to be called on to defend the cause of freedom and fight for the 
cause of freedom.
  A single Russian rocket could be launched over the top of the world 
from the north, and it would go across the Arctic pole, and in less 
than an hour it could be in over Chicago. On a bad day, it might come 
within 100 yards of its target. On a good day, it would probably come 
within 10 to 15 yards of its target. I am talking about something about 
which, again, people will say this is alarmist.
  It is not an alarmist scenario. This is what nuclear weapons do. We 
have sort of forgotten that, in my view. Back in the 80s, during the 
cold war, all of us understood the danger of nuclear weapons, but today 
I don't think we do. I think we have forgotten what kind of damage they 
can do.
  A single nuclear weapon would vaporize everything. The surrounding 
air is instantaneously heated to a temperature of 10 million degrees 
Celsius. It

[[Page S5988]]

looks brighter than the sun and shoots outward at a few hundred 
kilometers per second. It would be sufficient to set fire to anything 
in Chicago that is combustible at a distance of 14 kilometers. Anybody 
within 80 kilometers would be blinded as a consequence of the blast.
  After the fireball, the blast effect force follows, traveling out 
from ground zero. Those within 3 kilometers, who had not already been 
killed, will die from the percussive force. At 8 kilometers, 50 percent 
of the people will be killed, and every building within 2 kilometers 
will be completely destroyed. Major destruction of homes, factories, 
and office buildings would extend out to 14 kilometers.

  In the farthest reaches of the immediate blast zone--encompassing 
everything in Chicago--structures would be severely damaged, and 15 
percent of the people in Chicago would be dead, 50 percent would be 
injured, and most survivors would suffer second- and third-degree 
burns.
  This is the damage that would be done from a single Russian nuclear 
weapon exploded above an American city. This is just one city.
  Again, I point this out not to be alarmist but to say that this is a 
real threat. This is not an imaginary threat. This weapons system 
exists. There are 6,000 of these in Russia today that were needed in 
the cold war; they were needed in a deterrent strategy that the 
Russians had developed. We have drawn down, and they have drawn down to 
the 6,000 level--a bit higher than that still today. They are drawing 
down to that 6,000 level.
  But, again, if you ask either our intelligence or the Russians 
directly, they will tell you they don't have the resources to maintain 
even 1,000. They don't have the resources to maintain 1,000, let alone 
6,000-plus, and in the kind of secure environment the people of the 
United States of America will need in order for themselves to be safe 
and secure as a consequence.
  I tell the story out of what I think is a loss of focus on the danger 
of nuclear weapons. I am very concerned that the American people have 
been lulled into a false sense of security as a consequence of our 
elected leaders repeatedly telling them the threat no longer exists. In 
the Presidential campaign of 1996, the President correctly kept saying 
that for the first time in the history of the Nation we are not 
targeting the Russians and they are not targeting us.
  Well, you can retarget in a couple of minutes, max. This retargeting 
task is a fairly simple task. Critics of the President pointed that 
out, and I think correctly. It caused people to be sort of lulled into 
a sense that, gee, this wasn't a problem. If we are not targeting them 
and they are not targeting us, this is great news, so we don't have to 
worry about this threat any longer; thus, we can sort of stop worrying 
about nuclear weapons. We can worry about other threats that we have to 
the United States.
  Again, I am calling my colleagues' attention to this problem not 
because I believe there is going to be a deliberate nuclear attack from 
Russia, because I don't think that is likely, or even plausible. 
Indeed, Russia has made extraordinary progress in their effort to 
transform their economy and political system. Though they have a long 
way to go to complete the transition, they need to be applauded for it. 
But this transition is going to take decades--back, forward, stop, go. 
It is going to take a fair amount of time to transition from an old 
command economy to a market economy. In the meantime, they are finding 
it increasingly difficult to maintain the military infrastructure they 
inherited from the collapse of the Soviet Union, including, dare I say, 
their stockpile of thousands of nuclear weapons--estimated to be close 
to 7,000 on the strategic side and a comparable amount on the tactical 
side. There are 14 storage facilities, according to published reports, 
where they store fissile material. We don't know what is going on 
inside those buildings. It is a serious problem that our former 
colleague, Sam Nunn, has said is a threat not coming from Russia's 
might but from its military weakness.

  If a single one doesn't bother you, there was an incident that 
occurred recently on September 11, 1998. I appreciate that some will 
say that Kerrey is dreaming, this isn't a real danger. I don't think 
there is a greater danger than an accidental launch of a nuclear weapon 
at the United States of America. I think it is the most dangerous 
problem we face, and it is a scenario that could happen. If it happens, 
I believe we are going to regret not having developed a different 
strategy than the old arms control strategy that we have had in the 
past. I am not going to describe an alternative strategy. I think one 
is needed, and I think one is more likely to occur if we strike this 
language from the defense authorization bill and allow the President to 
go below 6,000, similar to what President Bush did in the early 1990s, 
getting a reciprocal response from Russia as a consequence.
  Let me describe a real time scenario, a situation that happened on 
the 11th of September--does the Senator want to say something?
  Mr. WARNER. I didn't mean to interrupt the Senator, but I am hopeful 
that we can listen to the important debate. I would like to have the 
opportunity to respond to the Senator so that Senators following this 
debate can have framed in their minds where we have a difference of 
views, and I would like to complete this by 11:45 so we can keep on our 
schedule. I hope our colleague will try to accommodate as best he can.
  This is a very important subject. I share some of the views that he 
has made. I think what he said is a very important reminder to Senators 
on this subject. It has somewhat drifted from the minds of the Senators 
given that, regrettably, this stalemate thus far in Russia could move 
to ratification. Let us proceed, hopefully, in a timely way.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, let me describe an event that occurred on 
September 11, 1998. Maybe colleagues didn't notice it; it was written 
up with a fairly small amount of attention. There was an 18-year-old 
Russian sailor who seized control of a Russian nuclear submarine near 
Murmansk. He killed seven fellow crewmembers and held control of the 
submarine for 20 hours. Russian authorities say that there were no 
nuclear weapons aboard the submarine. But it would not be difficult to 
imagine a scenario in which a similarly distraught member of the 
Russian navy might choose to express his frustration by seizing control 
of a submarine loaded with long-range, nuclear-tipped missiles. It is 
widely recognized that command and control of weapons on Russian 
submarines is much more problematic than even with their ground-based 
forces.
  There was a recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine, 
which conducted an analysis of the effects of an unauthorized launch 
against the United States from a--and I emphasize just one--Russian 
Delta IV submarine. This submarine is capable of carrying 16 SS-N-23 
missiles. Each of these missiles is equipped with four 100-kiloton 
warheads. The study examined the consequences of 48 warheads being 
detonated over eight major U.S. cities. It is likely that this 
scenario may not be right. It is likely that they would say we have 64 
warheads and will put one in each State in the United States of 
America--that leaves me 14 more--and they will put a couple in New 
York, a couple in Florida, a couple in other States. Imagine 64,000 
kiloton weapons being detonated within a couple of hours in the United 
States. That is a scenario that could be very real.

  Is such a scenario likely to happen? It is less likely to happen than 
the sun coming up tomorrow, but it could happen. It is a scenario that 
we need to think about as we think about the danger of these nuclear 
weapons. And because we don't think about them, it is not likely that 
we will consider an amendment like this terribly important. We will 
sort of drift along, as I think we are doing now, saying we are going 
to wait for the Duma to ratify START II. They are threatening not to 
ratify for every possible reason. I don't know what the next anger 
point is going to be. I personally don't believe that the ratification 
of START II by the Duma is necessarily terribly important.
  That we need to look for an alternative way to reduce these threats, 
to me, is painfully obvious if you examine the danger that this threat 
poses to us.
  When you think about the danger of an accidental or a rogue nation or 
a

[[Page S5989]]

sabotage launch, I think you come immediately to the conclusion that, 
my gosh, we have far more than we need to keep America safe, and the 
Russians clearly have far more than they need not only to keep their 
country safe but to reduce this risk of accidental launch. They do not 
control their weapons in the same way that we do. They don't have the 
capacity to control them in the same way that we do, as well.
  Imagine, I ask my colleagues; put it on your radar screen. You have a 
Delta IV submarine with 64 100-kiloton weapons that could be in the 
United States in 2 hours. They are not like the Chinese nuclear 
weapons. The Chinese nuclear weapons take several days to get together. 
Again, part of the published reports is that they have 13 or so aimed 
at the United States--aimed at our cities. They are nowhere near as 
accurate as the Russians, or as deadly as the Russians, and nowhere 
near as likely to be launched either through an accidental launch or 
through an organized effort to come through sabotage and take over a 
single facility, or to take over one of these submarines that are much 
more at risk as a consequence of their lax security.
  If you do not think the scenario is possible, I would like to quote 
the words of former a Russian Navy captain following this particular 
incident with the Russian sailor that I described earlier on the 11th 
of September 1998. He said, ``It is really scary that one day the use 
of nuclear arms may depend on the sentiments of someone who is feeling 
blue, who has gotten out of bed on the wrong side and who does not feel 
like living.'' The probability of this today is higher than ever 
before.

  The news has been filled recently with stories regarding nuclear 
weapons. Unfortunately, the stories have been causing us to be 
concerned about our security relative to the Nation of China. The 
findings that China, over the past 20 years, has methodically stolen 
U.S. nuclear secrets from our National Laboratories are very 
disturbing, to put it mildly. We were very lax in our security in our 
Laboratories. We are very lax in our security with our export control 
licenses. We are very lax in our security in monitoring satellites that 
are being launched on the Long March system of the Chinese, and as a 
consequence, the United States of America suffers. There is no question 
that is true. But U.S. security has suffered against a nation with 
considerably less capability than Russia and considerably less risk of 
an accidental launch as a result of the way the two nations organize 
their weapon systems.
  In the uproar surrounding this story, I fear that we may be losing 
touch with reality concerning the size of the threat we face in China 
relative to the far greater Russian nuclear threat. Press accounts 
indicate that China may have no more than 20 land-based nuclear 
missiles capable of reaching the United States.
  Also, again, according to the media, as I said, Chinese nuclear 
weapons aren't kept on continual alert. Their nuclear warheads and 
liquid fuel tanks are stored separate from their missiles. Again, it 
would take them a considerable amount of time to fuel, to arm, and to 
launch these weapons. That just one of these weapons would cause 
immense pain and devastation to the United States of America ought to 
be obvious. But, again, it is a much smaller threat than the threat of 
an accidental rogue nation, or a sabotage takeover of a Russian site 
that could be launched with a devastating impact against the United 
States of America and would put our people at considerable risk.
  As of January 1999, my colleagues, with reference to this issue--I 
remember campaigning for the Senate in 1988. In 1988, you had to know 
all of this stuff. You had to know all of these in numbers, because 
arms control advocates were asking you, and opponents of arms control 
were asking. The freeze was going on. The MX missile was being debated. 
It was a hot issue in 1988.
  In 1999, it is not a hot issue. It is not on the radar screen. You 
have to hunt around to find someone who cares about it and asks you 
about it and express a concern about what I, again, consider to be the 
most dangerous threat to the people of the United States of America.
  I repeat that this is the only threat that could kill every single 
American. Just a single Delta IV submarine that I talked about 
earlier--you put 64 100-kiloton weapons on top of 64 sites in the 
United States of America, and you are no longer the strongest economy 
on Earth.
  We would have considerably more, to put it mildly, than 4.2 percent 
unemployment. We would not be screaming along with an economic 
recovery. The stock market would react, I would hazard a guess, rather 
adversely to that piece of news. There would be devastation and 
destruction and considerable loss of life, and the United States of 
America would be set back a considerable amount of time. We would not 
be as safe and as secure as we once were, and the world, as 
consequence, would suffer the loss of our leadership.
  A single Delta IV submarine owned by the Russians in a very insecure 
environment, in my judgment, would set the U.S. back considerably.
  I keep citing it only because I believe that we have taken nuclear 
weapons, unfortunately, off our radar screen, and we don't think about 
this much. I say to the distinguished chairman and to the ranking 
member, Senator Levin, and Senator Smith, who is the chairman of the 
Strategic Subcommittee, that I know each of you are very concerned 
about this. I am talking about the general population. I would hazard a 
guess that if one of these news media outlets that does polls all the 
time did a poll and asked the question about whether the Chinese 
nuclear threat is a greater threat to the United States of America than 
the Russian nuclear threat, it is likely to be that a large number of 
the people would say yes, given what they have heard recently in the 
news.
  China may evolve into a serious military threat to the United States 
in the future. They are unquestionably a proliferator of weapons, and 
all of us should be dismayed and angry at the lax security that we have 
discovered through the Cox report and other reports over the last 20 
years, and should move with legislation and action to tighten up and 
make sure that we reduce that threat. But the Chinese threat is nowhere 
near the danger that the Russian nuclear threat poses to the people of 
the United States of America.
  What I am attempting to do with this amendment by striking the floor 
that we have imposed for 3 years in a row in the defense authorization 
bill--this provision that prohibits the United States from going below 
START I force levels until START II enters into force--is that I am 
suggesting that this floor increases the threat to the United States of 
America because we are waiting for the Russian Duma to ratify START II. 
We are still, in my view, in the old way of thinking about how to deal 
with nuclear weapons and how to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons 
and keep the people of the United States of America safe.
  Let me provide a little bit of history of arms control.
  Again, the chairman of the committee asked for some time to respond. 
Earlier, I was asked if I was going to wrap this thing up at 11:45. I 
say to my friend from Virginia that I had much more to say on this 
matter, and it may be that I am not able to agree to a time agreement 
and have the vote at 11:45. I would like to be able to do that. Maybe 
what I should try to do is abbreviate my comments and give the chairman 
a chance to respond briefly, if he chooses to do so.
  I see the chairman of the subcommittee is here. He may have some 
opposing points of view that he would like to offer. I want to give him 
a chance to do that. I think it is highly unlikely that I will be able 
to agree to a vote immediately after the BRAC vote at 11:45.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are under a time agreement, are we not?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no time agreement.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct. We want to give the Senator as much 
latitude as we can. We will find such time as I believe the Senator 
desires. I am just anxious to frame this issue, because the Senator has 
given a brilliant speech, as he always does. I do not say that 
facetiously. I enjoy listening to my good friend and colleague and 
fellow naval person. But I was listening, and he is making a good 
speech for ballistic missile defense, which is splendid. I hope that we 
are going to draw

[[Page S5990]]

on this Record for future debates on ballistic missile defense systems. 
I take note of Senator Cochran's bill now that has become law.
  But the point I wish to make is that this provision, which the 
Senator wishes to strike, has been in five successive defensive bills. 
It is in there in accordance with the administration's wishes to try to 
show to Russia that we mean business about getting START II ratified. 
Were we to strike it, it is this Senator's opinion--I think it is 
shared by the Secretary of Defense, and others--it would weaken the 
efforts to get START II ratified.
  We have here the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Strategic Forces. All I would ask is, if we could just have a few 
minutes to frame the debate into a focus of Senators following it, I 
think they can come to some sort of closure in their own minds on this 
issue.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I appreciate that. Why don't I take 
another 5 or 10 minutes here.
  Mr. WARNER. We interrupted the Senator. Would he yield for an 
additional question on procedure?
  Mr. KERREY. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I believe this debate will take longer than 35 minutes, 
and there is no time agreement on this debate. There are others who 
want to speak on both sides.
  I address this to the chairman, because this seems to me likely to 
take more than 35 additional minutes. Since the debate is scheduled to 
restart on BRAC at 11:45, I wonder whether the chairman might want to 
delay that for perhaps 15 minutes or half an hour.
  Mr. WARNER. Fifteen minutes. We had such great cooperation from all. 
We have a string of Senators ready to be here at 11:45. Let's say we 
will conclude at 12 noon; is that agreeable?
  Mr. LEVIN. I am not suggesting we have a time limit of 12 noon. I am 
suggesting if we delay the beginning of the BRAC debate until noon, 
there is at least a chance that this debate could conclude by then. If 
it does, we could vote on this amendment immediately after BRAC.
  I don't think the Senator from Nebraska is willing or should be 
willing to agree to a time agreement yet because he has not heard the 
debate on the other side.
  I suggest the debate on BRAC begin at noon--we change the unanimous 
consent--instead of 11:45, and hope that at least there is a chance 
that this debate could in 35 minutes be completed but not ``bake'' that 
into the unanimous consent.
  Mr. WARNER. I want to accommodate our distinguished colleague. If we 
don't proceed, I say to my copartner, in getting time agreements, we 
are likely to get this whole bill slowed down.
  I wonder if we could just enter into a time agreement to debate on 
this amendment, that it would conclude at 12 noon.
  Mr. KERREY. I would very much like to accommodate and do that, but my 
problem is----
  Mr. WARNER. Let me help. The distinguished chairman of the 
subcommittee says 10 minutes; I may take 2 minutes. That is 12 minutes. 
The Senator would have a full half hour left.
  Mr. LEVIN. Before the Senator from Nebraska answers, if he yields, I 
will speak for perhaps 5 or 10 minutes on the subject. I know the 
Democratic leader wants to speak on this amendment, I believe, if 
possible, around 11:30. There may be others, too. We ought to find out 
if there are others before any such agreement is propounded.
  Mr. KERREY. Again, I appreciate very much what the chairman is trying 
to do. I certainly have no intent to sit out here forever talking. 
Eventually I will agree to a time agreement. I am not willing to do 
that at the moment. I am beginning to lay out a case that has not been 
laid out before.
  Mr. WARNER. We will continue with the debate and hope we can begin to 
bring this thing to some proportion of closure. We will take a 
relatively short time on our side, because it is a bill provision; the 
Senator is on a motion to strike. It is very clear what we are trying 
to do on this side, to help this administration get ratification, help 
America get ratification of START II.
  That is the sole purpose for this provision. It has been in there 5 
years for that purpose.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, again I am not trying to make an argument 
here for or against strategic defense. I will work with Senator Cochran 
to try to fashion some assistance to bring additional Democrats. I 
supported what Senator Cochran was trying to do.
  The problem is, missile defense is not prepared today. The problem 
is, we don't have missile defense today. We are not sure when we will 
have it. I don't want to get into necessarily arguing that. I am saying 
that within a matter of hours it is possible for the United States of 
America to suffer an attack the likes of which I think very few people 
are imagining.
  It is a real threat. It is not an imaginary threat. It is a real 
threat, and it is a threat that is getting larger, not a threat that is 
getting smaller. It is not the old threat. The old threat--and I 
appreciate what I think the administration's stated policy says. They 
prefer repealing the bill's general provisions that maintain this 
prohibition first enacted in 1998, but maybe the administration 
supports this amendment and maybe they don't support the amendment.
  I believe this floor makes it less likely that we will consider an 
alternative to arms control as a method to reduce this threat. I am 
willing to look at alternatives such as star wars for which I voted. 
The strategic defense system is not in place today. I don't know when 
it will be in place.
  In the meantime, the capacity to control Russia's nuclear system is 
declining and putting more and more Americans at risk as a consequence.
  This is the third year, as I understand it, that this provision has 
been here.
  Let me talk about strategic arms reduction. It has been the leading 
edge of our effort to try to reduce the threat. Back in the cold war, 
it was considered to be the only way that we will do it. I am not going 
to go through all the details of the history, but the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty was signed between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, START I, in 1991 and entered into force in 1994. It commits both 
sides to reducing their overall force level to 6,000 deployable 
warheads by December of 2001. Both sides are well on the way to meeting 
this deadline. The START II treaty signed in January 1993 and requires 
both the United States and Russia to deploy no more than 3,500 warheads 
by no later than December of 2007. The Senate ratified START II in 
1996, but the Russian Duma has yet to take up the treaty.
  Section 1041 of this authorization bill extends for another year the 
limitation on retirement or dismantlement of strategic nuclear weapon 
systems until the START II treaty enters into effect. Let me put this 
another way: The bill we are debating allows a foreign legislative body 
the final say on U.S. nuclear force levels. I do not believe this is 
how we should set our defense policies. Our military decisions should 
be based solely on what we need to protect and maintain our national 
security interests.
  While I understand this provision was originally intended to 
encourage Russian ratification of START II, I think it is time to begin 
to rethink our strategy. For the foreseeable future, START II is dead. 
We can all make the case that the Duma should have acted, that 
ratification was more in their interests than in ours, or that the 
reason it failed was domestic Russian politics. All that is true. But 
we now need to begin to ask ourselves if the current policy of waiting 
for Russian action on START II is the best way to confront the dangers 
presented by the Russian nuclear arsenal.
  I believe the answer is emphatically no. The provision in this bill I 
am trying to strike is forcing the United States to maintain an 
unnecessarily large nuclear arsenal. By keeping more weapons than we 
need to defend ourselves, we are encouraging the Russians to keep more 
weapons than they can control. That is the heart of the argument that I 
am making.
  We are keeping more in our arsenal than we need, and as a 
consequence, forcing the Russians to keep more in their arsenal than 
they can control, increasing the risk of an accidental launch, a rogue 
nation launch, or a launch that comes as a consequence of an act of 
sabotage.
  The determinant of adequate U.S. force levels should be left up to 
the men and women who are in charge of protecting the United States. 
While Pentagon officials have said they have

[[Page S5991]]

no plans to go below START I levels during fiscal year 2000, they have 
clearly stated their preference for lifting these artificial 
restrictions. In the recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, the current commander in chief of the Strategic Command, 
Adm. Richard Mies, said:

       We believe that we ought to report to you on an annual 
     basis on exactly what we plan to do, but we would prefer not 
     to have the specific mandating of the force levels by 
     delivery systems.

  Our Armed Forces are more than capable of protecting U.S. national 
security with significantly fewer strategic nuclear weapons. In fact, 
Gen. Eugene Habiger, former commander of STRATCOM, said:  ``There is no 
reason to stay at the START I level from a military perspective.'' Our 
nuclear policy has become completely detached from the military 
requirements of defending America, and is now being used simply as a 
bargaining chip with Russian politicians.

  Ironically, this is occurring at a time in which the Russian military 
is having problems maintaining its current force levels. The Russians 
foresee a time, in the near future, when drastic cuts will have to be 
made. In fact, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev has said publicly 
he sees the future Russian strategic nuclear arsenal in terms of 
hundreds, not thousands, of warheads. There are even some U.S. analysts 
who have calculated within 10 to 15 years Russia will be able to 
maintain a force no longer than 200 warheads.
  I believe it is clearly in the Russian interest to work with the 
United States to achieve reciprocal reductions in forces, and I am 
disappointed the Russian Duma has chosen domestic politics over its 
best interests. However, it is just as clear that it remains in our 
interests to work with Russia to find new ways to reduce the number of 
nuclear weapons in a parallel, reciprocal, and verifiable manner.
  We have a historical precedent to show that an adjustment in our 
nuclear forces, based solely on an evaluation of our defense needs, can 
help achieve the goal of reducing nuclear dangers. There is a precedent 
for this. On September 27, 1991, then President George Bush announced a 
series of sweeping changes to our nuclear force posture. After 
assessing our national security needs, Bush ordered all strategic 
bombers to stand down from their alert status, he de-altered all ICBMs 
scheduled for deactivation under START I, and he canceled several 
strategic weapons development programs.
  On October 5--just one week later--President Gorbachev responded with 
reciprocal reductions in the Soviet arsenal.
  President Bush acted, not out of altruism, but because it increased 
U.S. national security. In his announcement, he said:

       If we and the Soviet leaders take the right steps--some on 
     our own, some on their own, some together--we can 
     dramatically shrink the arsenal of the world's nuclear 
     weapons. We can more effectively discourage the spread of 
     nuclear weapons. We can rely more on defensive measures in 
     our strategic relationship. We can enhance stability, and 
     actually reduce the risk of nuclear war. How is the time 
     to seize this opportunity.

  I believe the same is true today in 1999. The longer we wait to act--
the more years in which we extend this legislative restriction--the 
more likely it is one of these weapons will fall into the hands of a 
person willing to use it to kill American citizens.
  In addition to endangering the safety of the American people, our 
continued insistence on staying at START I levels is costing the 
American taxpayer. They are paying more to be less safe.
  Estimates on the annual cost of maintaining our nuclear arsenal vary 
widely. The Pentagon contends the total cost is in the neighborhood of 
$15 billion a year. A more inclusive figure would put the cost in the 
area of $20 to $25 billion. This represents a significant portion of 
our yearly national security spending. For now, it continues to be 
necessary to maintain an effective, reliable nuclear force--a force 
capable of deterring a wide array of potential adversaries.
  But if, as our military leaders have indicated, we can maintain that 
deterrent capability at much lower force levels, I am concerned we are 
wasting precious budgetary resources. The Congressional Budget Office 
recently conducted a study in which it found we could have between 
$12.7 billion and $20.9 billion over the next ten years by reducing 
U.S. nuclear delivery systems within the overall limits of START II. 
Both the Pentagon and the Armed Services Committee have already 
recognized that potential savings exist in this area. The bill before 
us allows the Defense Department to decrease the number of Trident 
Submarines from 18 to 14--producing a significant cost savings in our 
deterrent.
  I am sure further savings could be realized with further cuts. I am 
certain our military has the ability to determine the proper formula in 
which we can reduce our nuclear arsenal, save money, and still maintain 
a healthy triad of delivery systems that will maintain our deterrent 
capabilities. I am confident much of this planning has already 
occurred.
  I am also confident the distinguished members of the Armed Services 
Committee would be able to find ways in which to redirect these savings 
into other defense priorities such as preventing the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism and narco-trafficking, 
or improving the readiness of our conventional forces to confront the 
challenges of the 21st century.

  My amendment does not mandate any reductions in the U.S. strategic 
nuclear arsenal. Rather, it simply eliminates the provision in this 
bill requiring us to maintain our forces at START I levels--a level 
that is unnecessarily high.
  The greatest danger facing the American people today is Russian 
nuclear weapons. We have been given a moment in history to reduce this 
threat. Rather than acting on this opportunity, we are preparing once 
again to tie our own hands. The rapid pace of change in Russia and 
around the world will not wait for us in the United States Senate to 
debate for another year whether or not to seize this opportunity. We 
know what our relationship with Russia is today, We can predict, but we 
cannot know what it will be like in a year, or two, or ten. 
Circumstances may never again be this favorable for reducing the threat 
posed by nuclear weapons. We must act. If we do not, history may judge 
us harshly for our failure.
  I see the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire is here, the 
chairman of the subcommittee. I think what I will do is yield the floor 
and allow my friend to speak for a while, and listen to what is likely 
to be his considered and well-spoken words.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I thank my colleague. I 
indicated I am more than happy to have the Senator from Nebraska finish 
his remarks, but if he chooses to have me proceed now, I will be happy 
to do that.
  Section 1041 of this bill, which is in question here in the amendment 
of Senator Kerrey, does prohibit the retirement of certain strategic 
delivery systems unless START II enters into force. The amendment by 
the Senator from Nebraska just strikes that entire section, section 
1041.
  For the last several years, the Defense Authorization Act has 
included a provision limiting the retirement of strategic delivery 
systems. Recently, it has specifically prohibited reductions below 18 
Trident submarines, 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, and 
71 B-52s. This year the provision has been modified to allow the Navy 
to reduce the number of Trident submarines from 18 to 14. This change 
was made after close consultation with U.S. Strategic Command, the 
Navy, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. On April 14, 1999, 
the Strategic Subcommittee conducted a hearing on this matter. We did 
agree to reduce the number of Tridents from 18 to 14, with my support.
  The overall intent of the provision is to send a signal to Russia, 
that if they want the benefits of START II, then they ought to ratify 
the treaty. I think this is where I part ways, respectfully, with my 
colleague. This really is a unilateral implementation of START II--or 
to make even deeper reductions that would fundamentally undermine the 
arms control process and our national security.
  I believe I am correct, the Senator supported START II. If he is 
going to make unilateral reductions as part of our policy, I do not 
think it leaves much incentive for the Russian side to do what they 
have to do to get to START II.

[[Page S5992]]

  But section 1041 is a very flexible provision. Since it must be 
renewed each year, there is ample opportunity to take into 
consideration proposals by the administration and to make our force 
structure adjustments as necessary.
  This was demonstrated this year in the way the Armed Services 
Committee responded to the Navy's proposal, which was to retire four of 
the oldest Trident submarines.
  With all due respect, the adoption of the Senator's amendment I 
believe could be interpreted as a sign that Congress no longer supports 
the policy of remaining at START I levels until START II enters into 
force. It seems to me the Senator is advocating that explicitly, but I 
could be wrong. I note that the administration does not support such a 
change in policy and, indeed, the administration's budget request fully 
funds the forces at the levels specified in the section in question 
that the Senator wishes to strike, section 1041.
  The provision does not preclude the administration from making any 
changes in U.S. force structure that it is currently planning to make. 
Section 1041 does not require the administration to retain any 
strategic delivery system that it otherwise would retire. It is clear 
that the principal objective of this amendment is to encourage 
unilateral arms reductions outside the framework of existing arms 
control agreements.
  My concern is this is a very dramatic departure from existing U.S. 
policy. Essentially, this approach would amount to an abandonment of, 
or certainly a significant deviation from, the formal arms control 
process.
  I may support a change in U.S. policy that would base our strategic 
force posture on a unilateral definition of U.S. military requirements 
rather than on the arms control framework, but I believe that as long 
as formal arms control agreements govern our force posture, we ought to 
adhere to a policy of not unilaterally implementing such agreements.
  Also, just as a bit of a side discussion here, the issue of what has 
happened now with China may also sound an alarm bell that these 
agreements with the Russians--were the Soviets, now the Russians--may 
not be the major issue before us if things keep going.
  One has to remember that an agreement, START I, START II agreements 
with the then Soviets, now Russians, for arms control reductions 
between two countries in a bilateral world, could very well now expand 
to something beyond just the bilateral agreements with the Russians to 
the Chinese and perhaps to Syria and Libya and even Iran, or some other 
nice countries out there that are now, thanks to the Chinese, going to 
be receiving a lot of our secrets, if you will, nuclear weapons. That 
furthers the case for not unilaterally reducing these systems without 
the Russians agreeing first.
  I therefore urge my colleagues to oppose the Kerrey amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I just spoke with Senator Kerrey. I know he 
will want to say something in response to Senator Smith and what I will 
have to say. I will take my 5 minutes right now, with his indulgence.
  I appreciate the spirit of his amendment. In fact, I just advised 
Senator Kerrey I regretted very much having to speak in opposition to 
his amendment because I admire him as vice chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee on which I sit. We agree on a great many things. In fact, we 
are introducing legislation as cosponsors today on another matter.
  But on this matter, I do differ with his approach because it to me 
reflects the approach to defense preparedness, to national security, 
that has been characterized, as Charles Krauthammer has said, as 
``peace through paper'' rather than peace through strength, which 
Ronald Reagan made popular and which we think helped to win the cold 
war--the notion, in other words, that treaties should define what the 
United States of America does to provide for its defense rather than 
the United States deciding what it must do to provide for its defense 
and then seek through treaties to limit what other countries might do 
and what we might do in the future as a part of that but following what 
our initial determination is with respect to necessities for our 
national security.
  This is true with respect to the START I and START II levels of 
nuclear weaponry, our strategic deterrents. The START I levels are 
where we are right now, and historically the administration and the 
Congress have taken the view that we need to maintain our START I 
levels as long as that is the prevailing status of treaties, and that 
is precisely where we are today.
  START II has not been ratified by the Russian Duma, and until it is 
and until Russia begins to comply with its obligations under START II 
to bring the number of warheads permitted under START I down to levels 
authorized by START II, we have viewed it important not to unilaterally 
bring our levels from START I down to START II, because holding out the 
possibility that we would stay at START I has been an effective way for 
us to deal with the Russians.
  Robert Bell, speaking for the administration, has testified that it 
has been helpful for us to let the Russians know that we are going to 
maintain our forces at the current levels. While we are willing to 
reduce them to START II levels, it is going to require concomitant 
action by the Russians for us to do that. In other words, if the 
Russians are prepared to go from START I down to START II, then the 
United States will be prepared to do that. But until then, we should 
not be taking the action unilaterally.
  As a matter of fact, I was going to offer an amendment to this bill 
which would ensure that our Trident forces would not be reduced, 
because that is also permitted under this bill. The Trident submarine 
forces are the most robust leg of our triad of strategic deterrence 
because they are the most secure. Our submarines are nearly impossible 
to track, so they are clearly the most survivable leg of the triad. The 
majority of our boats in the fleet can carry the D-5 missile, the most 
advanced missile we have.
  What I have focused on here is trying to make sure that our country 
maintains our START I level capability and that we do not begin to 
erode that, simply because it is expensive to do as long as Russia is 
not willing to reach those same levels.
  An example of why this is important is that if we were to reduce the 
Trident force, for example, we would be relying upon the B-52s--as a 
matter of fact, our plan, and I hope our American citizens appreciate 
that the current defense plan is to use an 80-year-old B-52 bomber into 
the future as part of the triad for our nuclear deterrence. That is 
relying upon a very old and not very survivable system, which is why I 
think we have to maintain the Trident system.
  Our vulnerable land-based ICBMs are the other leg, and they are also 
quite vulnerable to attack. We ought to be maintaining rather than 
giving up our Trident forces.
  Were it not for arms control considerations and a desire for the 
United States to implement the START II agreement that has not even 
been ratified by the Russian Duma, I do not think we would be taking 
the step that is being suggested by the Armed Services Committee today 
and the even larger or further step that Senator Kerrey takes to have 
it apply to all of our strategic forces.
  I have been concerned for a long time about the administration's 
desire to protect our Nation's security primarily by relying on arms 
control measures, and I said this has been described by Charles 
Krauthammer as ``peace through paper.'' Let me use the words of the 
administration. Under Secretary of State John Holum explained the 
administration philosophy in 1994. This is a revealing explanation. He 
said:

       The Clinton administration's policy aims to protect us 
     first and foremost through arms control--by working hard to 
     prevent new threats--and second, by legally pursuing 
     development of theater defenses for those cases where arms 
     control is not yet successful.

  That is exactly backward. First, you develop your security forces, 
and then, to the extent that you can do so, you cut back on those 
through arms control treaties that are agreed to and implemented by the 
other side. But what you do not do is start out by saying arms control 
is going to drive your development and deployment of national security 
measures. It is exactly backward.

[[Page S5993]]

  Arms control is not a new idea. In 1139, the Catholic church tried to 
ban the crossbow. Like a lot of other well-intentioned arms control 
measures, it did not work. The Kellogg-Briand treaty--I know the 
Senator from Virginia, the distinguished, esteemed chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee, is not quite old enough to remember that--in 
1929 outlawed war.
  Well, it does not work. Peace through strength works. Then you do 
what you can with arms control.
  The main point I want to make is that our defense planning should 
proceed on the basis of assessing the threat, evaluating alternative 
means to defeat the threat, and funding the requisite weapons systems 
and force structure. We should not permit arms control agreements to 
drive our defense programs and our force structure. It is particularly 
true with respect to the START II treaty which this Senate ratified in 
December of 1995. Despite our action, the Russian Duma has refused to 
take action on it. The likelihood it will do so is highly uncertain. 
START II has become a political liability in Russia in spite of its 
advantages to them.
  As I said before, I would apply this not only to the amendment 
offered by Senator Kerrey but also to the language in the Senate bill 
which would permit the administration to withdraw our nuclear Trident 
force down to 14 boats. I quoted Robert Bell who stated that the 
provisions in law requiring the maintenance of the U.S. forces at START 
I levels are helpful in convincing the Russians that the only way that 
U.S. force levels will decline is if the Russian Duma ratified START 
II. While I understand he is going to be taking a new position soon, 
Bell is the President's Special Assistant for Arms Control and Defense 
Policy.
  I was going to offer an amendment to highlight my concern about a 
provision of the Defense authorization bill that I believe undermines 
the strength of America's strategic nuclear deterrent. The specific 
provision that I am concerned about is paragraph (2) of section 1041 of 
the bill, which would allow the Clinton administration to reduce the 
number of Trident nuclear submarines operated by the U.S. Navy from 18 
to 14 boats. Unfortunately, I fear the acceptance of this cut by the 
Defense Department was driven primarily by a desire to conform to 
prospective arms control agreements rather than a hard-nosed assessment 
of the best way to respond to current threats, and the best means of 
compelling Russia to meet its commitments to reduce its nuclear 
arsenal.
  The Trident force, armed with nuclear-tipped submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles, forms a critical part of the United States nuclear 
triad, which also includes long-range bombers and land-based 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. When deployed at sea, Trident 
submarines are nearly impossible to track, making them most survivable 
leg of our nuclear triad. Furthermore, the majority of the boats in our 
Trident fleet carry America's most modern missile, the D-5, and our 
most advanced nuclear warhead, the W88.
  The bill before the Senate calls for the maintenance of U.S. nuclear 
forces at a level that closely approaches the limits imposed by the 
START I treaty. The bill, however, allows the Administration to reduce 
the number of Trident submarines and instead to rely more heavily on 
the current fleet of aging B-52 bombers and more vulnerable land-based 
ICBMs to maintain U.S. nuclear forces at START I levels.
  I do not believe a reasonable person could argue that placing greater 
reliance on the venerable fleet of B-52 bombers, which are approaching 
one half century old, instead of maintaining the current force of 
Trident submarines would enhance the effectiveness and survivability of 
the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent. Were it not for arms control 
considerations and a desire to implement the START-2 agreement that has 
not even been ratified by our Russian treaty partners, I do not believe 
we would be taking this step.
  As many of my colleagues know, I have been concerned for some time 
about the Clinton administration's desire to protect our nation's 
security primarily by relying on arms control measures in a philosophy 
that Charles Krauthammer aptly describes as ``Peace thru Paper.'' Under 
Secretary of State John Holum explained this philosophy during a speech 
in 1994, stating,

       The Clinton Administration's policy aims to protect us 
     first and foremost through arms control--by working hard to 
     prevent new threats--and second, by legally pursuing the 
     development of theater defenses for those cases where arms 
     control is not yet successful.

  Of course, as I said before, arms control is not a new idea. After 
all, in the year 1139, the Catholic Church tried to ban the crossbow. 
Like so many other well intentioned arms control measures, this one was 
doomed to failure from the start. And who can forget the Kellogg-Briand 
treaty, ratified by the U.S. in 1929, that outlawed war as an 
instrument of national policy. This agreement and others spawned in its 
wake left the United States and Britain unable to deter and unprepared 
to fight World War II. Yet despite these and many other notable 
failures, the Clinton administration still looks to arms control as the 
best way to safeguard our security.
  The main point that I want to make is that our defense planning 
should proceed on the basis of assessing the threat, evaluating 
alternative means to deter and defeat the threat, and funding the 
requisite weapons systems and force structures. We should not permit 
arms control agreements to drive our defense programs and force 
structure. This is particularly true with respect to the START II 
treaty, which the Senate ratified in December, 1995. Despite the 
Senate's action, the Russian Duma has refused to take action on the 
accord. The likelihood that it will do so is highly uncertain. START II 
has become a political liability in Russia in spite of its advantages 
to them.
  Adherence to START I warhead limits, as called for by the Senate in 
its Resolution of Ratification for the START II treaty, and retention 
of the Trident fleet at 18 boats, gives us the best leverage we are 
likely to have to persuade Russia to move toward ratification and 
implementation. And the Clinton administration agrees with this point. 
During a briefing for Senate staff in January, the President's Special 
Assistant for Arms Control and Defense Policy, Robert Bell stated that 
the provisions in law requiring the maintenance of U.S. forces at START 
I levels are helpful in convincing the Russians that the only way U.S. 
force levels will decline is if the Duma ratifies START II.

  The U.S. repeatedly purchased START II ratification with aid or with 
concessions permitting Russia non-compliance with other arms control 
agreements or with unilateral limits on our own defense programs. In 
fact, Russia seems to be moving even further from the arms control 
framework so dear to this administration. Russian leaders have recently 
spoken of reconstituting Russia's tactical nuclear forces, potentially 
reversing moves that the U.S. and Russia undertook during the Bush 
administration. On April 30th of this year, the Washington Times 
reported that Russia's Security Council ordered its military to draw up 
plans for the development and use of tactical nuclear weapons in what 
may be a response to NATO's heightened profile due to its involvement 
in Kosovo. Russia also continues to channel a high proportion of its 
declining military budget into its strategic nuclear forces and now 
places greater reliance on nuclear forces in its military doctrine. And 
furthermore, Russia appears to be conducting tests on new nuclear 
weapons. As the Washington Post reported on January 24th of this year, 
``Three small underground nuclear tests Russia conducted last fall have 
prompted some government intelligence analysts to suggest that Moscow 
may be trying to design a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons.''
  Nor is Russia the only concern. China is also modernizing its 
strategic nuclear forces with the benefit of warhead designs stolen 
from our nuclear labs and missile technology sold by the Clinton 
administration. The Cox committee had concluded that these thefts 
enabled China to design, develop, and successfully test modern 
strategic nuclear weapons and that these designs will make it possible 
to develop multiple independent reentry vehicles or MIRV warheads for 
their missiles. As the summary of the Cox committee report notes, ``The 
People's Republic of China has stolen design information on the United 
States' most advanced thermonuclear warheads. Specifically, the

[[Page S5994]]

W-88 (Trident D-5 SLBM); W-87 (Peacekeeper ICBM); W-78 (Minuteman III, 
Mark 12A, ICBM); W-76 (Trident C-4 SLBM); W-70 (Lance SRBM); W-62 
(Minuteman III ICBM); W-56 (Minuteman II ICBM). These thefts, primarily 
from our national laboratories, began in the 1970s, continued in the 
1980s and 1990s and almost certainly continue today.'' The Cox report 
concludes by saying, ``These thefts enabled the PRC to design, develop 
and successfully test modern strategic nuclear weapons.''
  Furthermore, I would point out to my colleagues that rogue states and 
gangster regimes are also working hard on nuclear weapons and the means 
to deliver them. As the Rumsfeld Commission noted last year, the 
strategic threat to the U.S. from rogue nations is growing rapidly. And 
one need only look at last summer's launch of a North Korean missile 
that overflew Japan that has sufficient range to reach the United 
States for validation of the Rumsfeld Commission's conclusions.
  Mr. President, I have offered an amendment to retain the Trident 
fleet at 18 boats. We should remember that the world remains a 
dangerous place and should size our nuclear forces accordingly. As I 
have outlined before, the Trident fleet is vital to the maintenance of 
our strategic nuclear deterrent. This is too important a step to be 
entrusted to an administration in thrall to its bankrupt Russia policy 
and its naive approach to arms control.
  I ask unanimous consent that a copy of my amendment be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       Beginning on page 357, strike line 23 and all that follows 
     through page 358, line 4, and insert the following:
       (b) Minimum Level for B-52H Bomber Aircraft.--Subsection 
     (a)(1) of such section is amended by striking ``71'' and 
     inserting ``76''.

  Mr. KYL. Again, I fully respect the vice chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee and what he is attempting to accomplish. It is my view you 
first build your defense structure, and you stick with it until you see 
signs that the potential adversary has reduced his force structure in a 
competent way. Until you do that, you are better off keeping what you 
have in place rather than unilaterally giving it away.
  Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, let me say that although we reach 
different conclusions, I completely agree with the Senator from 
Arizona. I do not think we should tie our defense policies to arms 
control agreements. I do not think we should do anything other than 
assess the threat and then try to put a force structure together that 
meets that threat, that keeps that threat as low as is possible. We 
should not cut corners. We should not get tied up in ideological knots.
  We should decide what is necessary to keep Americans safe. I do think 
that it is much more likely that will occur if the U.S. military is as 
strong as we can possibly make it. There are significant new threats in 
the world that need to be met. I support the budget that has been 
proposed here.
  I supported earlier the rampup in pay and other benefits. I think all 
that needs to be done. I think we have less in our intel budget than is 
necessary to both collect and analyze and disseminate the information 
to our warfighters and national policymakers.
  What we are doing, as I see it, with this proposal is saying we are 
not going to do anything that might be in our interest, that might keep 
our country safer, because the Russians have not ratified START II. We 
are letting the Russians decide what our force structure is going to 
be.
  We have been told by former General Habiger, who was the head of 
STRATCOM, that he thinks the United States of America will be safer and 
more secure if we went below START I levels. That is his assessment. He 
did not care what the Russians think about that. He thinks America 
would be safer and more secure if we did.

  I am not going to read all through it. I will do it later because I 
see the distinguished Democratic leader is here and would like to make 
some comments. I am going to read some things that ought to give 
Americans a great deal of concern about this ``loose nuke'' issue where 
the Russians are experiencing a deterioration in their capacity to 
control their nuclear weapons, and we are requiring them to be not only 
at a higher level than they need but we are requiring ourselves to be 
at a higher level than we need to be as a consequence of saying we are 
not going to do anything until the START II Treaty is ratified.
  Let me set the record clear about the administration's position.
  Senator Levin, for the record, in the Armed Services Committee, on 
the 3rd of February, asked General Shelton:

       Would you oppose inclusion of a provision in the Fiscal 
     Year 2000 Defense Authorization Act mandating strategic force 
     structure levels--specific numbers of Trident Submarines, 
     Peacekeeper Missiles and B-52 bombers?

  He said:

       Yes, I would definitely oppose inclusion of [that].

  And a further statement of the administration about their attitude 
towards the defense authorization bill said:

       The Administration [would] appreciate the bill's 
     endorsement of our plan to reduce the Trident submarine force 
     from 18 to 14
     boats. . . .

  But they go on to say:

       [W]e prefer repealing the bill's general provision that 
     maintains the prohibition, first enacted in the FY 1998 
     Defense Authorization Act, against obligating funds to retire 
     or dismantle any other strategic nuclear delivery system 
     below specified levels unless START II enters into force. The 
     Administration believes this provision would unnecessarily 
     restrict the President's national security authority and 
     ability to structure the most capable, cost-effective force 
     possible.

  They have announced no intent to go below START I levels, but they 
have indicated they prefer not to have this prohibition in there.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator will withhold, we have a 
previous order at this time to begin debate on amendment No. 393.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Democratic leader.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to speak on 
the Kerrey amendment. Did the Senator from Nebraska want additional 
time as well?
  Mr. KERREY. After the other amendment is disposed of, we will come 
back to it, and I will have time then.
  Mr. DASCHLE. If it would be appropriate, I ask unanimous consent to 
address the Kerrey amendment at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from 
Nebraska for his advocacy and his leadership on this issue. This is 
probably one of the most important debates that we are going to have 
this year with regard to nuclear proliferation. This amendment could be 
one of the most important amendments that we will have the opportunity 
to vote on this year with regard to nuclear proliferation. So his 
advocacy of this issue and this amendment is greatly appreciated. I am 
very impressed with his command of the facts as we consider its 
advocacy this morning.
  Much of the current debate on national security issues these past 
several weeks has focused on two issues, as we all know: Kosovo and the 
alleged Chinese espionage of our national weapons laboratories. That 
concentration is very understandable.
  In the first instance, the courageous men and women who make up 
America's military forces are risking their lives daily in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia to reverse the genocidal policies practiced by 
that country's leader. That is a just cause.
  For the sake of hundreds of thousands of refugees made homeless by 
Milosevic's reign of terror, as well as the future of NATO, we simply 
cannot afford to fail.
  As for the safety of our nuclear secrets, this, too, is an issue of 
vital national security. It is alleged that for the last two decades 
the Chinese Government has systematically engaged in efforts to gain 
access to some of our most important nuclear weapons scientists and the 
knowledge they possess.
  Although all agree that classified information has fallen into the 
hands of the Chinese Government, it certainly

[[Page S5995]]

remains unclear who is involved and exactly how much of our national 
security suffered as a result of these activities. The administration, 
the Congress, and law enforcement agencies are vigorously exploring 
answers to these troubling questions.
  But as important as these issues are, as I noted just a moment ago, I 
submit there is an issue of equal or greater importance to America's 
immediate and long-term national security interests, and this amendment 
addresses it. The issue is the U.S.-Russia relationship and the fate of 
tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, and hundreds of tons of nuclear 
weapons material possessed by each side.
  The Kerrey amendment recognizes the importance of that relationship. 
The Kerrey amendment proposes that the United States take a small step 
to improve this relationship by acknowledging that the Russian nuclear 
arsenal is shrinking, and adopting the view of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff that our security will not be jeopardized if we do the same.
  I strongly support this amendment and ask my colleagues to join me.
  It is difficult to point to a period of time since the end of the 
cold war when relations between the United States and Russia have been 
under greater stress. Protests and public opinion polls in Russia 
demonstrate that anti-American feeling is on the rise in that country. 
The tension in this critical relationship has grown as a result of both 
Russia's internal economic and political troubles and actions by this 
Government.
  At the very time the U.S.-Russia relationship is under unprecedented 
stress, the need to work with Russians to reduce the threat posed by 
nuclear weapons and the spread of nuclear weapons material and 
expertise has never been greater.
  Nearly a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States 
and Russia still possess roughly 12,000 strategic nuclear weapons, 
thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, and hundreds of tons of nuclear 
weapons material. Even more alarming, both sides keep the majority of 
their strategic nuclear weapons on a high level of alert--something I 
addressed in past comments and, for the life of me, cannot understand.
  And reports are growing that Russia's government lacks the resources 
to properly maintain and control its nuclear weapons, nuclear 
materials, and nuclear know-how. Consider these recent events.
  In September of 1998, roughly 47,000 nuclear workers protested at 
various locations around Russia over the Atomic Energy Ministry's 
failure to provide them their wages for several months. Russian Atomic 
Energy Minister Adamov told the workers that the government owed the 
ministry over $170 million and had not provided a single ruble in two 
months.
  Again late last year, Russian radio reported that the mayor of 
Krasnoyarsk-45, one of Russia's closed nuclear cities, where enough 
nuclear material to build thousands of bombs is stored, warned that 
unless urgent action was taken, a social explosion in the city was 
unavoidable.
  More recently, guards at nuclear facilities reportedly left their 
posts to forage for food. Others have been reluctant to patrol facility 
perimeters because they did not have winter uniforms to keep them warm 
on patrol.
  At some nuclear facilities, entire security systems--alarms, 
surveillance cameras, and portal monitors--have been shut down because 
the facilities' electricity was cut off for non-payment of bills.
  According to recent testimony by senior Pentagon officials and 
statements by senior Russian defense officials, Russia's nuclear 
stockpile is faring no better than the workers hired to maintain and 
guard it. According to Assistant Secretary of Defense Ted Warner, 
Russia's force of roughly 6,000-7,000 strategic nuclear weapons will be 
dramatically reduced regardless of whether Russia ratifies START II.
  By 2005, according to Warner, ``[Russia] will be hard pressed to keep 
a force of about 3,500 weapons * * * and by about the year 2010, they 
will be hard pressed to even meet a level of about 1,500 weapons.'' 
Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev recently stated that Russia is 
``likely to have no more than 500 deployed strategic warheads by 2012 
for economic reasons.'' Finally, in this weekend's newspapers comes the 
latest evidence of Russia's nuclear troubles. Under the headline, 
``Russia Faces `New Chernobyl' Disaster,'' the London Sunday Telegraph 
reports,

       What a Russian energy minister has called a Chernobyl in 
     slow motion is unfolding in [Russia's] far north where 
     nuclear submarines are falling to pieces at their moorings 
     and a decaying nuclear power station has been refused 
     European Commission aid to buy vital safety equipment.

  According to the Russian chief engineer at the nuclear plant, ``We 
are in despair.''
  Mr. President, while U.S.-Russia relations approach their nadir and 
Russia struggles to keep the lid on its nuclear forces and workers, 
what has been the response of the majority of the United States Senate?
  Unfortunately, for the last several years, a majority of the Senate 
opted to legally prohibit the United States government from responding 
by making modest reductions in our forces. A majority in the Senate has 
prevented the U.S. government from reducing our nuclear forces below 
the START I level until Russia has ratified START II. This majority has 
chosen to include a similar provision in this year's defense 
authorization. This provision further damages U.S.-Russia relations, 
locks us in at nuclear weapons levels not needed for our security, and 
drains much-needed resources away from higher priority defense 
programs. Senator Kerrey's amendment wisely strikes this provision.
  As I noted earlier, our relationship with the Russian government and 
Russian people is at a low point. Russians fail to understand our 
actions on several fronts--from NATO enlargement to ballistic missile 
defense. As Russians look at the inevitable decay of their own 
strategic nuclear forces, they question why the United States insists 
on holding firm at weapons levels Russia can never hope to match, let 
alone exceed.
  As for whether mandating by law that we retain 6,000 strategic 
weapons, our senior military leaders--current and former--have 
decisively expressed their opinions on this issue. In testimony before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year, General Hugh 
Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and this country's 
senior military leader, opposed just such a requirement. According to 
General Shelton, ``I would definitely oppose inclusion of any language 
that mandates specific force levels.'' General Eugene Habiger, former 
chief of all U.S. strategic nuclear forces, agreed with General Shelton 
and went farther. General Habiger stated, ``There is no need to stay at 
the START I level from a military perspective.''
  The Republican decision to keep our strategic weapons levels at an 
artificially high level also has budgetary ramifications. The 
Congressional Budget Office estimates that keeping U.S. strategic 
nuclear weapons totals at START I levels will cost the Defense 
Department $570 million in FY2000 and nearly $13 billion over the next 
10 years. Resources are incredibly scarce, both in the Defense 
Department and in other areas of the government. We should spend every 
nickel necessary to ensure a strong defense. But we shouldn't spend a 
nickel on weapons systems the military tell us they do not need.
  For all of these reasons, I oppose the provision in the underlying 
bill. I support Senator Kerrey's amendment to strike this provision and 
restore a modicum of sanity to an increasingly troubled state of 
affairs. I ask my colleagues to do right by this important 
relationship, by our senior military leaders, and by the U.S. taxpayers 
who foot the bill for all we do. I ask for our colleagues' support on 
the Kerrey amendment. I yield the floor.


                           Amendment No. 393

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Roberts). Under the previous order, debate 
will now begin on amendment 393.
  The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I understand that Senator Warner may wish 
to speak on the Kerrey amendment for perhaps 5 minutes before we move 
to the BRAC amendment. If so, we are trying to reach Senator--Mr. 
President, I withdraw that. Are we now on the BRAC amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are now on the BRAC amendment No. 393.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from 
Nevada.

[[Page S5996]]

  Mr. BRYAN. I thank the Chair, and I thank my colleague from Michigan.
  I rise today as a strong supporter and original co-sponsor of the 
amendment offered by my colleagues, Senator McCain and Senator Levin, 
to consolidate our defense infrastructure and authorize an additional 
round of base closures.
  For months, Pentagon officials, military leaders and key Members of 
the House and Senate have painted a picture of an American military 
force seriously compromised by years of declining or flat-budgets.
  No one questions that the integrity of our force structure must be 
fortified, and I strongly support efforts to divert greater funding to 
modernization and readiness priorities--funding which, in my judgment, 
is critical if we are to continue to maintain the most powerful and 
proficient military force on the planet.
  And I think we are all cognizant of the grave retention and 
recruitment problems prevalent throughout the military and the serious 
morale impacts of this lack of funding. These are real problems in our 
military.
  Every recent defense-related appropriations measure--including last 
year's omnibus appropriations bill, the FY 1999 supplemental bill 
passed by this body just last week, and the legislation that is before 
us today--has included billions of dollars that the Pentagon did not 
request nor want.
  Unquestionably, a large part of the problem has been the insistence 
of the Congress to continue the time-honored practice of forcing the 
Pentagon to purchase aircraft it does not want, to build ships it does 
not need, and to maintain military bases that have long outlived their 
usefulness.
  And every dollar that we spend on these wasteful and unnecessary 
programs and infrastructure is a dollar that we cannot spend on such 
critical needs as readiness and quality of life programs for our 
military personnel.
  Last year, a bipartisan coalition of Senators, led by Senator McCain, 
and others, offered a proposal supported by the Secretary of Defense 
and the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, to shut down military bases that 
had outlived their usefulness and to save the Pentagon billions of 
dollars. And Remarkably, the Senate said no.

  I am hopeful this body will not make the same mistake twice.
  The manner in which we fund the Department of Defense borders on the 
absurd, and continues to undermine our credibility with the American 
people when it comes to our ability to exercise fiscal responsibility.
  I am confounded by a Congress that on one hand bemoans the state of 
readiness of our military, and fights tooth and nail to add billions of 
unrequested dollars to the Pentagon's budget, and yet refuses to heed 
the advice of our military leaders and make sensible changes to our 
defense infrastructure.
  We micromanage the Defense Department to the point where we tell the 
generals and the admirals not only how many ships and planes they need 
to provide for our national security, but also where to place these 
ships and planes once they are built.
  It is armchair quarterbacking at its worse.
  Two years ago, the Congress passed--with great fanfare I might add--a 
balanced budget agreement that put in place a series of tough spending 
caps, requiring the Congress to reform its free-spending ways and make 
the tough decisions that are necessary to maintain fiscal 
responsibility.
  Over the past two years, I have watched countless members of Congress 
duck, dodge, and evade those tough spending decisions as part of a 
systematic effort to sustain programs that have no justification and no 
purpose other than to divert funding from other more critical defense 
needs.
  The examples are boundless.
  Last year, we included a $45 million down payment on a $1.5 billion 
amphibious landing ship that the Navy told us they had no need for.
  This year, the Pentagon asked for ten new MV-22 Osprey aircraft, and 
the bill before us tells them to buy twelve.
  The Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs tell the Congress that we have over 
23 percent excess capacity in our current base structure and that it is 
time to consolidate our infrastructure and use the savings to shore up 
our readiness deficiencies.
  And the Congress says no.
  We shuttle precious defense dollars to shipbuilding, aircraft, and 
weapon systems programs that the Pentagon has deemed unnecessary and 
unimportant.
  And unless the pending amendment is passed today, the Senate will 
continue to shun the advice of our military leaders, and divert 
precious dollars away from readiness and modernization programs to 
support an infrastructure that is clearly in excess of our needs.
  Today, we have a modest, bipartisan proposal offered by Senators 
McCain and Levin, supported by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, that would unquestionably save billions of dollars 
that could be used to improve readiness, enhance pay, retirement, 
family housing, and other benefits for our military personnel, and 
bolster our national security.
  For three consecutive years, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff have asked us to allow the Pentagon to close those 
military bases it believes no longer hold operational value.
  And for three years, the Congress has punted this political football, 
refusing to make the tough choices that we promised the American people 
we would make just two years ago.
  Senator after Senator has come to the Senate floor to lament the lack 
of adequate funding for our Nation's defense.
  We have heard that the readiness of our forces is at severe risk, 
that we do not have the funding we need to invest in the weapons 
technology of tomorrow, and that personnel problems threaten the 
integrity of our force structure, both at home and abroad.
  This Senator believes those concerns are real and legitimate. Just 
last week, my colleagues approved some $13 billion from the Social 
Security trust funds to address some of these needs, I do not question 
the urgency in addressing all of our modernization, readiness and 
personnel shortfalls.
  With that in mind, I cannot understand how the Senate, with a clear 
conscience, can fail to adopt the amendment that is pending before us, 
which was requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and which would save 
an estimated $3 billion a year.
  Not just this year, but $3 billion every year, for years to come.
  My colleagues, Senator Levin and Senator McCain, have already made 
reference to a letter sent by the Joint Chiefs in support of this 
amendment.
  In that letter, the Joint Chiefs characterize an additional round of 
base closures as ``absolutely necessary.''
  Not just a ``good idea,'' Mr. President, but ``absolutely 
necessary.''
  While legions of men and women have courageously stepped forward to 
defend this Nation and serve their fellow Americans, the Congress has 
continued to shortchange readiness and quality of life programs to 
finance questionable programs and weapons systems unrequested and in 
some cases outright opposed by the Pentagon.
  There is no greater national security issue at stake than the 
readiness of our military and our ability to respond to global crisis.
  Mr. President, the amendment before us is politically unpleasant, but 
fiscally prudent and imperative and I urge my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and ask unanimous consent that the 
remainder of time be allocated to the Senator from Michigan, who 
controls the time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, at this time, it is my understanding that 
the Senator from Kansas will address the Senate regarding the BRAC 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas is recognized.
  Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the distinguished chairman, and I thank the 
distinguished Presiding Officer for taking my place while I make these 
comments.
  Mr. President, I rise to again state my opposition to the BRAC 
amendment as it is proposed. Let's get it clear. I understand that my 
colleagues who are offering this amendment are very sincere in their 
efforts to address the problem of an excess infrastructure, certainly 
within the Department of Defense.
  Let me be absolutely clear that I agree with the assertion that there 
is

[[Page S5997]]

excess infrastructure. I have no quarrel with that. But let me be 
equally clear that until I am confident we can focus the BRAC where 
there is excess infrastructure and until we can ensure that any savings 
from such a BRAC--a lot has been said about the savings--will go toward 
modernization, or readiness, or procurement, as opposed to funding the 
numerous expeditions this administration continues to assign our 
military, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, I can't support any additional 
rounds of BRAC at this time.
  Let me explain in a little bit more detail. ``They'' all understand 
that there is too much infrastructure for the current force strength. 
``They'' know they need to act to reduce it. But the political costs 
are too high, and ``they'' know the blame for not having another BRAC 
can be easily passed off to others. We heard a lot of talk about 
``they'' from the proponents of BRAC. Unfortunately, the readiness of 
our Armed Forces suffers because ``they'' are unwilling to act. I would 
like to get to the definition of who ``they'' are.
  Most people who follow the excess military infrastructure issue--the 
BRAC issue, if you will--would say that ``they'' are the U.S. Congress. 
Senator after Senator has come to the floor with not really arms 
waving, but with some pretty tough commentary, pointing the finger at 
the Congress as being ``they.'' However, let me also point out that a 
strong case can be made that ``they'' are also the civilian and 
uniformed leadership of the Department of Defense.
  I am not trying to pick on anybody. I just want to share the 
responsibility in a fair way. Of course the Congress must approve the 
additional funds of BRAC, and therefore the responsibility is clearly 
on the shoulders of the Senate and the House. I accept that 
responsibility. The distinguished Presiding Officer does as well. Every 
Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the comparable 
committee in the House does as well. But the leadership of DOD has not 
shouldered the responsibility, in my personal opinion, to adequately 
prepare for future BRAC rounds. They could, by requiring each service 
to develop a prioritized listing of bases and facilities that are in 
excess, or the generic description of same, more especially in regards 
to the mission of the base.
  I know what they are going to say. Their defense is such as, that 
would be impossible because of the politics of it; it would bias any 
future BRAC rounds, and therefore they should not be done until a BRAC 
is authorized.
  By ``they'' I am talking about the DOD. ``They'' in this particular 
instance further state that it would be impractical to categorize the 
facilities by mission since most facilities are multifunctional, and 
therefore any future BRAC should, as in theory they have in the past, 
include all military facilities regarding the BRAC criteria.
  If we are talking about BRAC, everybody is going to be on the same 
criteria. Everybody is on the table.
  Of course, most bases and facilities are multifunctional. After all, 
they all train, they all have administrative functions, they all have 
public works tasks, but they all have a clear, primary mission.
  Additionally, it is a bit disingenuous for the Department of Defense 
to say that all bases would be included, all are on the chopping block 
for consideration in any future BRAC round. That is rather disingenuous 
it seems to me, even if, for example, the service academies would be on 
the table, or the Norfolk Naval Base, or Andrews Air Force Base, or 
Fort Hood, or Camp Pendleton were on the table for BRAC consideration. 
That is not reasonable. That is not going to happen. It is not 
reasonable to expect that those, or other key facilities where we must 
have a primary mission, would be seriously considered for closure or 
for realignment.
  It is not unreasonable to expect that a similar listing of definable 
excess capacity could and should be developed and be the focus of 
future reductions of infrastructure rather than, as I have said, before 
the ``everything is on the table'' approach in regard to BRAC.
  Many of my colleagues have heard me voice my concern over what I call 
``BRAC purgatory.'' That is, quite simply, what every city in America 
with a military facility goes through every time a BRAC round is 
mentioned. What that means in real terms is that the city or the 
community involved spends a lot of money from their very limited budget 
to hire so-called ``experts'' or ``consultants'' to help to really 
protect their base from any future BRAC round.
  If we can focus BRAC on the primary mission of bases and generically 
define what we need, and what we don't need, we will spare many 
communities from ``BRAC purgatory.'' We will let them off the BRAC hook 
if their facility is not on the excess infrastructure list. We are 
going to save a lot of communities from ``BRAC purgatory,'' and we are 
going to save a lot of headaches and a lot of money.
  I am equally concerned that the Department has failed to develop a 
strategy for the next round of BRAC. Let me emphasize ``strategy.'' You 
just can't go to a BRAC and put bases on the chopping block. A specific 
infrastructure strategy is required for at least three reasons.
  First, as the military approaches the optimum infrastructure, great 
care is going to have to be made. It will be required to prevent the 
cutting of the essential infrastructures.
  Second, since the military missions and roles are changing --and, 
boy, are they changing; for example, the Air Force sees itself becoming 
an expeditionary force rather than a garrison force, and that is 
happening; the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps are all searching for a new 
mission and a new role--I think the Department of Defense-wide 
assessment of the types and the number and the location of the military 
facilities needed to support the national strategy must be developed. 
There must be a strategy there.
  Third, both the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Defense 
Panel strongly recommended consolidation and joint basing for the 
military to optimize their capability in an atmosphere of reduced 
budgets and reduced force structure military environment.
  In isolation, each of those three requirements represents a 
difficult, a complex, and a contentious undertaking within the military 
and the Department of Defense. However, when taken as a collective 
mandate to shape the future infrastructure needs of the military, such 
an important imperative cannot possibly be accomplished within the 
guidelines of just a simple BRAC. It seems to me that the Department of 
Defense has to have the courage and will to oversee the services and 
direct actions be taken that would set the correct approach to reducing 
our excessive infrastructure to match our future military strategy. 
They should do that--not a BRAC commission.
  The third action that DOD must find the will to take is defining the 
savings associated with BRAC and establishing a way to funnel those 
moneys into readiness, modernization, or the procurement or quality-of-
life programs. In the April 1998 Department of Defense report on BRAC, 
they admitted that, ``by their very nature, estimates of savings are 
subject to some uncertainty.'' That is probably the understatement of 
this debate. The Department further stated that, ``No audit trail, 
single document, or budget account exists for tracking the end use of 
each dollar saved through BRAC.''
  Let me repeat that. Senator after Senator has come to the floor and 
said: Look at the money we are going to save in regard to BRAC. Then 
they look at the problems with modernization, and procurement, and 
readiness. Yet no audit trail, no single document, no budget account 
exists for tracking the end use of each dollar saved through BRAC. 
However, they assured Congress that, ``The Department is committed to 
improve its estimates of costs and savings in future rounds of BRAC.'' 
``Oh, we are going to get it right next time.''
  It seems to me it takes courage to solve that problem, and it takes a 
dedicated effort to set up the processes to track and direct the BRAC 
savings into the promised accounts. And it will take more than a 
``trust me, it will be much better next time'' assurance before many 
Members of Congress will let the reported savings, the estimated 
savings, the reported savings of another round of BRAC simply remain 
unaccounted for, be lost in the bookkeeping of the Department of 
Defense, or, in fact, if there are savings, if we can account for 
savings, they end up in such

[[Page S5998]]

missions as Kosovo or Bosnia--which have to be funded, by the way, and 
which we addressed in regard to emergency funding.

  That is the proper way to fund the final act of courage on the part 
of the uniformed and civilian leadership of DOD--I use the word 
``courage'' in quotes here--that directly impacts the future rounds of 
BRAC politics of the last round.
  A lot has been said about this. I understand it. I am not going to 
rehash that today. But based on a recent memorandum from the Department 
of the Air Force, it seems to me there is some acquiescence to such 
pressure to not really carry out the BRAC action directed in the last 
round. BRAC is a hard sell in Congress under normal times and under the 
purest of motives. But when actions are taken that clearly disadvantage 
others and violate the BRAC process for political gain, BRAC is a ``no 
sell'' in Congress.
  For the Department of Defense to simply say that all we need is for 
Congress to authorize additional rounds of BRAC is an easy way to avoid 
the responsibilities for actions that must be taken by the Department 
of Defense well in advance of any congressional action.
  It seems to me the Department of Defense can go a long way to helping 
us in regard to the BRAC process if they simply develop the fortitude 
and the decisionmaking to start the process now to correctly and 
accurately shape and define the infrastructure--not to simply put 
everything on the table to save money but be required to support the 
military of the 21st century even if they risk pressure from the White 
House or Capitol Hill. Without such a strategy, I cannot support 
another BRAC round that has a poorly prepared and inadequately staffed 
approach to reducing the excess infrastructure.
  I urge a ``no'' vote from my colleagues on this matter.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Kevin Zumbar, a military 
fellow, and Zach Terwilliger, a legislative intern, in the office of 
Chairman Warner, be granted floor privileges for the duration of the 
Senate's debate on S. 1059, the National Defense Authorization Act.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, how much time remains on the BRAC matter?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The proponents of the amendment have 51 
minutes and the opponents have 46 minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield myself 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Roberts). The Senator is recognized for 10 
minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, from 1989 to 1997 the Department of Defense 
reduced the total active-duty military end strength by 32 percent. That 
figure is going to grow to 36 percent by 2003, over a third reduction 
in our end strength will be achieved by 2003. We are already about a 
third.
  Even after four base closure rounds, the reduction in the 
Department's base structure in the United States has been reduced only 
21 percent. The Department of Defense analysis concluded that the 
Department has about 23 percent excess capacity in its current base 
structure.
  Let me give a few examples of that excess that we are now funding, 
spending taxpayers' money supporting, which is no longer needed.
  The Army will have reduced the personnel at its classroom training 
commands by 43 percent, but the classroom space has only been reduced 
by 7 percent--personnel reductions, 43 percent in classroom training 
commands but the space only by 7 percent.
  Why do we want to maintain all that excess classroom space that is 
not being used? What is the point of doing that? The answer to me; it 
is pointless. The uniformed military are saying: Please let us close 
it.
  The Air Force will have reduced the number of fighters and other 
small aircraft by 53 percent since 1989, but the base structure for 
those aircraft will be only 35 percent smaller. The Navy will have 33 
percent more hangers for its aircraft than it requires.
  And on and on.
  Secretary Cohen's report to us documents substantial savings that 
have been achieved from past base closure rounds. It has been argued 
that those savings can't be audited. What the CBO says about that 
argument is that firm measures of BRAC savings that were requested by 
the Congress do not and, indeed, cannot exist. That is because BRAC 
savings are really avoided costs. They are the difference between what 
the Department of Defense actually spent and what it would have had to 
have spent in the absence of the BRAC action. Because the latter is 
never actually observed, the figures for BRAC savings that the 
Department of Defense provides will never be firm measures; they must 
always be estimates.
  Then the CBO says--talking about the Department of Defense report on 
savings--that the report's basic message is consistent with the CBO's 
own conclusion: Past and future BRAC rounds will lead to significant 
savings for the Department of Defense.
  That, it seems to me, is the heart of the measure.
  This is a Congressional Budget Office letter, which I ask unanimous 
consent to have printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                    U.S. Congress,


                                  Congressional Budget Office,

                                     Washington, DC, July 1, 1998.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 
         Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator: Section 2824 of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requests a report from 
     the Department of Defense on the costs and savings associated 
     with the four previous rounds of base closures and 
     realignments. The legislation also requires the Congressional 
     Budget Office (CBO) to review that report. The enclosure 
     fulfills that requirement. In addition, I have enclosed a 
     copy of CBO's response to a letter of April 17, 1998, from 
     Senators Daschle and Lott and Congressman Gephardt.
       Please contact me if you have any questions. The CBO staff 
     contact is Lauri Zeman, who can be reached at (202) 226-2900.
           Sincerely,
                                                  June E. O'Neill,
                                                         Director.
       Enclosures.

 Review of the Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment 
                              and Closure

       The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has completed its 
     review of The Report of the Department of Defense on Base 
     Realignment and Closure, as required by section 2824(g) of 
     the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998. 
     CBO finds that the report provides a clear and coherent 
     summary of why the Department of Defense (DoD) believes that 
     future BRAC rounds are necessary. Moreover, the report's 
     basic message is consistent with CBO's own conclusions: past 
     and future BRAC rounds will lead to significant savings for 
     DoD. Nonetheless, the report is useful primarily as a summary 
     of DoD's position, rather than as an analysis of BRAC issues. 
     Although the roughly 2,000 computer-generated tables that 
     accompany the report contain most of the specific data on 
     past BRAC rounds that the Congress requested, the main text 
     provides little analysis of those data or insight into the 
     number and types of installations that might be closed in the 
     event of future BRAC rounds.


                     data provided by dod's report

       DoD's report provides most of the data requested by the 
     law. Yet there were a few instances in which the department 
     was unable to locate specific data or lacked information 
     systems that were flexible enough to organize the data in the 
     form that the Congress requested. For example, DoD was unable 
     to locate the cost and savings estimates that it had 
     originally given to the BRAC commissions, and it was unable 
     to identify the BRAC funds spent on each type of Navy and 
     defense agency installation.
       The report also omits any specific information about the 
     types and number of bases that might close as the result of 
     future BRAC rounds. One explanation is that DoD may have been 
     unwilling to make such projections because doing so might 
     appear to prejudge the results of the BRAC process.
       In addition, the firm measures of BRAC savings that were 
     requested by the Congress do not--and indeed cannot--exist. 
     That is because BRAC savings are really avoided costs: they 
     are the difference between what DoD actually spent and what 
     it would have had to spend in the absence of BRAC action. 
     Because the latter is never actually observed, the figures 
     for BRAC savings that DoD provides will never be firm 
     measures, but must always be estimates.


            The Cost of Implementing Previous BRAC Decisions

       CBO did not attempt to verify DoD's estimates of the one-
     time costs of implementing past BRAC decisions. Those one-
     time costs (which include the costs of transferring or 
     separating personnel, moving equipment, and constructing new 
     facilities) represent actual expenditures and thus are easier 
     to track than savings. Based on its current financial data, 
     DoD concludes that the actual costs of implementing past BRAC 
     decisions

[[Page S5999]]

     will be very close to those that it projected at the start of 
     each round. DoD's initial estimate was that it would cost $23 
     billion to fully implement the four BRAC rounds; today, that 
     estimate is $22 billion.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ Footnotes at end of review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Although DoD might be capable of estimating the costs of 
     BRAC decisions very accurately early in the BRAC process, CBO 
     finds that the similarity between DoD's initial BRAC cost 
     estimates and the current ones may be, in part, a self-
     fulfilling prophecy. The Congress appropriates funds for one-
     time implementation costs based largely on DoD's budget 
     estimates. Because those BRAC funds are in designated 
     accounts and cannot be used for non-BRAC purpose, BRAC 
     expenditures may adjust to some extent to match the funds 
     available.
       In addition, not all BRAC-related costs are included in the 
     $22 billion estimate. For example, operating units sometimes 
     bear unexpected costs when services at DoD facilities, such 
     as equipment maintenance, are temporarily disrupted by BRAC 
     actions. The $22 billion figure also excludes any 
     environmental cleanup or caretaker costs that DoD might incur 
     after 2001, when the implementation periods specified by the 
     Congress for the past four BRAC rounds will be complete. 
     Payments made to assist communities and workers adversely 
     affected by based closures are also omitted. (DoD estimates 
     that those costs, which are paid by the Department of Labor, 
     DoD's Office of Economic Adjustment, the Economic Development 
     Administration in the Department of Commerce, and the Federal 
     Aviation Agency, totaled about $1 billion as of 1997.)


                   The Savings from Past BRAC Rounds

       Consistent with current BRAC budget documents, DoD's report 
     indicates that when the past four rounds are fully 
     implemented, they will provide annual recurring savings of 
     about $5.6 billion (in constant 1999 dollars). That figure 
     appears to be reasonable. By comparison, CBO estimates that 
     savings could be about $5 billion annually.\2\
       However, DoD's report does not document how the services 
     and defense agencies derived the BRAC savings estimates that 
     underlie the aggregate $5.6 billion figure. Nor does it show 
     that those estimates are consistent with the quantitative 
     model (DoD's COBRA model) that DoD used during past BRAC 
     deliberations and might use in any future BRAC round. 
     Instead, DoD tries to show that its aggregate estimate is 
     credible by presenting a new analysis based on aggregate data 
     and by citing recent audit reports. Neither approach is very 
     successful. For example, the new analysis in DoD's report 
     (which identifies recurring annual savings of $7 billion) is 
     based on the same undocumented estimates of personnel 
     reductions that the defense agencies and military departments 
     use in their BRAC budgets. Because reductions in personnel 
     costs account for over 80 percent of estimated BRAC savings, 
     using those personnel numbers ensures that DoD's new estimate 
     of savings will not differ widely from the estimates in the 
     BRAC budget documents. Because the new analysis depends on 
     those budget estimates it cannot be used to verify them.
       DoD's use of audits to verify BRAC savings also suffers 
     from serious weaknesses. For example, the DoD Inspector 
     General's audit of 1993 BRAC actions found that savings 
     exceeded DoD's budget estimates by about $1.7 billion over 
     the six-year implementation period.\3\ Yet almost all of that 
     $1.7 billion in additional savings came from a few special 
     situations in which the effects of BRAC actions were 
     confounded with those of imposed budget cuts, reductions in 
     workload, or reductions in force structure. An audit can 
     compare what DoD spent at different bases before and after 
     BRAC actions, but--unlike models such as COBRA--it cannot 
     disentangle the effects of BRAC from those of other factors.


                      estimates of excess capacity

       DoD's report indicates that the department will have excess 
     capacity of over 20 percent at its U.S. bases after 
     completing the four BRAC rounds. In its analysis, DoD 
     compared the size of specific types of forces or workloads 
     (measured, for example, by the number of aircraft or assigned 
     personnel) with the size of the base structure that supports 
     those forces or workloads (measured by the square feet 
     of buildings or of apron space at airfields). DoD then 
     estimated the amount of excess capacity by calculating the 
     percentage reduction in the base structure that would 
     result in the same ratios of forces to base structure that 
     existed in 1989.
       That approach is reasonable and, at least in the aggregate, 
     yields a credible estimate. Yet it may not provide good 
     estimates for particular categories of installations. DoD's 
     estimates of the excess capacity for different categories of 
     bases would be more credible if they were tested using a 
     wider variety of indices for the size of forces and the base 
     structure. The department's use of 1989 as a baseline may 
     also be inappropriate for some types of installations. On the 
     one hand, that approach could overstate the size of the 
     required base structure--DoD might have had excess capacity 
     in 1989, or it might need fewer bases today because it has 
     consolidated service programs into defensewide activities. On 
     the other hand, the approach could understate the amount of 
     capacity required if some types of base support are truly a 
     fixed cost, required regardless of the size of the force.


         The Costs and Savings from Possible Future BRAC Rounds

       According to DoD's report, additional BRAC rounds in 2001 
     and 2005 would, together, save $3.4 billion (in constant 1999 
     dollars) every year after 2011. In addition, the report 
     implies that the cumulative savings from those rounds would 
     outweigh the one-time implementation costs before 2011. To 
     make those estimates, DoD assumed that the annual profile of 
     costs and savings for each of the two proposed BRAC rounds 
     over their six-year implementation periods would match the 
     average profile for the 1993 and 1995 BRAC rounds combined, 
     adjusted for inflation.
       Those assumptions are reasonable for planning. DoD may not 
     be able to provide better estimates until the specific bases 
     that would be affected by proposed future BRAC rounds are 
     identified. Yet savings from future rounds could be less than 
     DoD predicts if the excess bases that have not already been 
     closed are those for which closure costs would be relatively 
     high or recurring annual savings relatively low. Such a 
     pattern could also extend the time required before the 
     savings from the additional BRAC rounds would outweigh the 
     costs. Yet even in that case the ultimate savings from future 
     rounds could still be significant.


       Improving Estimates of Costs, Savings, and Excess Capacity

       DoD's report provides a clear summary of the department's 
     perspective on BRAC issues and on the need for additional 
     base closures. But it provides little new evidence or insight 
     into those issues. A more substantive report would have 
     provided documentation for the estimates of BRAC savings that 
     were submitted with the budget for fiscal year 1999 and a 
     more detailed analysis of capacity issues.
       In the future, DoD plans to keep better track of BRAC 
     documents and of expenditures at bases before and after BRAC 
     actions. Those steps would be useful. To the extent that 
     implementation costs reflect actual DoD expenditures, 
     improved financial records could contribute directly to the 
     department's ability to assess BRAC costs. For example, DoD 
     could extend its efforts to track the costs of BRAC rounds 
     beyond the six-year implementation period in order to fully 
     account for long-term caretaker and environmental costs.
       Yet better recordkeeping, by itself, will not allow DoD to 
     identify the extent of BRAC savings in a period when bases 
     are undergoing large changes in budgets, forces, and 
     workloads unrelated to BRAC. Instead, formal statistical 
     models are needed to disentangle the effects of BRAC and non-
     BRAC factors on expenditures. In addition, DoD could improve 
     the credibility of its savings estimates by better 
     documenting the assumptions and methodologies used to 
     generate them. The DoD Inspector General's audit of the 
     savings from 1993 BRAC actions revealed that the services and 
     defense agencies were often unable to explain how they 
     derived the savings estimates submitted in their budget 
     documents. The Congress might want to request that such 
     documentation accompany all future BRAC budget exhibits. Such 
     a requirement might encourage DoD to place greater emphasis 
     on the quality and consistency of its estimating procedures.
       In addition, DoD could provide better insight into capacity 
     issues by developing a master plan for its base structure. 
     Such a plan might be based on explicit estimates of 
     requirements rather than presuming that the ratio of forces 
     to base structure that existed in 1989 remains appropriate. 
     For example, the plan could use standards reflecting the 
     number of acres of land that combat units need for training 
     or the number of square feet of office space an 
     administrative worker requires. Standards could be developed 
     that are appropriate to different types of forces and for 
     forces stationed in the United States and overseas.
       DoD's report would have been stronger had it provided well 
     documented estimates of the savings from past BRAC rounds and 
     estimates of excess capacity based on requirements. Yet 
     despite those limitations, the report provides rough but 
     credible estimates of the total recurring savings from past 
     BRAC rounds, the aggregate level of excess capacity in the 
     United States, and the potential savings from future BRAC 
     rounds.


                               footnotes

     \1\ Those figures are in current dollars, not adjusted for 
     inflation. They represent the one-time costs that DoD expects 
     to incur in closing and realigning bases during the six-year 
     implementation period that the Congress has allowed for each 
     BRAC round. They include environmental costs but exclude any 
     revenues from land sales that result from BRAC actions. 
     Although DoD initially expected to receive about $4.1 billion 
     in revenue from land sales as a result of past BRAC actions, 
     it now expects that figure to be only $0.1 billion.
     \2\ DoD's estimate is based on the sum of the savings shown 
     in the budget for the last year of the implementation period 
     for each BRAC round. CBO's figure, which is in constant 1998 
     dollars, reflects trends in base support costs, adjusted for 
     changes in the size of military forces. Past CBO reviews have 
     also concluded that the savings from base closures and 
     realignments are substantial. See Congressional Budget 
     Office, Closing Military Bases: An Interim Assessment, CBO 
     Paper (December 1996).
     \3\ Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, 
     Costs and Savings for 1993 Defense Base Realignments and 
     Closures, Report No. 98-130 (May 6, 1998).

[[Page S6000]]

     
                                  ____
                                                    U.S. Congress,


                                  Congressional Budget Office,

                                     Washington, DC, July 1, 1998.
     Hon. Thomas A. Daschle,
     Democratic Leader, U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leader: In your April 17 letter, you pose 10 
     questions about base realignment and closure (BRAC) actions. 
     This letter responds to those questions. In addition, I have 
     enclosed the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO's) review of 
     The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment 
     and Closure, which elaborates on many of the issues you 
     address in your letter.
       Actual BRAC Savings. The Department is able to provide 
     reasonable estimates of BRAC savings. Yet the firm measures 
     of BRAC savings that were requested by the Congress do not--
     and indeed cannot--exist. BRAC savings are really avoided 
     costs--costs that DoD would have incurred if BRAC actions had 
     not taken place. Because those avoided costs are not actual 
     expenditures, DoD cannot observe them and record them in its 
     financial records. As a result, DoD can only estimate savings 
     rather than actually measure them.
       DoD Information Systems. It is not possible for DoD to 
     establish an information system to track actual savings. The 
     BRAC budget justification books track only estimated savings. 
     DoD is more successful in tracking one-time implementation 
     costs, which typically reflect actual expenditures made from 
     BRAC accounts. Its information systems, however, cannot 
     always categorize those expenditures in the most useful way. 
     For example, in its report, DoD could not provide BRAC 
     obligations by base type for the Navy and the defense 
     agencies. To comply with the spirit of the request in section 
     2824(g), DoD might try to provide better documentation of how 
     the budget estimates for savings are made and to maintain 
     more accessible records of BRAC costs on an installation-by-
     installation basis.
       Economic Effects of Future BRAC Rounds. DoD's report does 
     not make detailed projections of the specific outcomes of 
     future BRAC rounds. The economic impact of base closures on 
     communities depends on many factors, including the size and 
     strength of the local economy and whether the community is 
     urban or rural. An analysis of the likely impact of future 
     base closures on local communities cannot be attempted 
     until the specific communities are identified; even then, 
     it would be very difficult to do.
       Information Provided in DoD's Report. The DoD report 
     provides most, but not all, of the information that the 
     Congress requested. As noted above, it does not provide data 
     that would require projecting the specific outcomes of future 
     BRAC rounds. In addition, DoD was unable to locate some of 
     the requested data, including the original cost and savings 
     estimates that it gave to the BRAC commissions.
       DoD's Analysis of Excess Capacity. DoD's report determines 
     excess capacity based on the change in the ratio of forces to 
     supporting bases since 1989. Although that approach is not 
     unreasonable, the resulting estimates of excess capacity 
     depend heavily on what specific indices are used for the size 
     of the forces and of their supporting bases. In addition, 
     that approach can understate or overstate the current level 
     of excess capacity for particular types of bases depending on 
     whether DoD had too many or too few bases of those types in 
     1989.
       Overseas Base Capacity. DoD's capacity analysis does not 
     address overseas forces or bases. The estimates of excess 
     capacity presented in DoD's report refer to the percentages 
     of excess capacity in the United States. The extent to which 
     there may be a shortage or an excess of bases overseas 
     relative to U.S. forces overseas does not affect the accuracy 
     of those estimates or the need for base closures within the 
     United States.
       Savings from Past BRACs and Future Personnel Reductions. 
     CBO found that the methodology used by DoD to show annual 
     recurring savings of $7 billion from the four prior BRAC 
     rounds is relatively weak. Nonetheless, CBO believes that 
     recurring savings from those BRAC rounds will be 
     substantial--about $5 billion annually, as is indicated by 
     the services' BRAC budget documents.
       DoD's current spending plan, which extends only to 2003, 
     shows small reductions in the number of personnel in 2001 and 
     beyond. Such reductions are not inconsistent with additional 
     BRAC rounds in 2001 and 2005, because most of the savings and 
     personnel reductions from those rounds would not be seen 
     until after 2003. However, DoD will have to make significant 
     reductions in personnel after 2001 to realize the level of 
     BRAC savings that it projects from future rounds.
       Future Savings Estimate. In its review of DoD's report, CBO 
     concludes that the department's estimate of savings from 
     future BRAC rounds is not unreasonable for planning. A more 
     accurate estimate would require detailed projections about 
     the outcomes of future BRAC rounds.
       Costs Beyond the Implementation Period. DoD will incur 
     environmental and caretaker costs for some bases after the 
     six-year implementation period is over. In its review, CBO 
     suggests that estimates of BRAC costs and savings would be 
     more accurate if they included those costs.
       Data Included in DoD's Report. Most of the data in the 
     appendices to the DoD report are not new. Rather, they were 
     compiled from several existing sources, including BRAC budget 
     justification documents and other documents that DoD has 
     submitted to the Congress. However, the report aggregates the 
     data in new ways and presents them at levels of detail not 
     previously available in a single document.
       As your letter indicates, the issues surrounding military 
     base closures are difficult ones. One problem is that if the 
     BRAC process is going to work, the Congress must decide on 
     the advisability of additional rounds without knowing in 
     advance which bases would be affected and what the specific 
     effects of those closures would be. Another difficulty is 
     that the Congress must make those decisions even though the 
     savings from previous rounds can only be estimated rather 
     than tracked in DoD's financial records. The amount of 
     savings from BRAC actions will always be impossible to 
     estimate precisely. The reason is that the effects of BRAC 
     actions are not easily disentangled from those of non-BRAC 
     actions, such as mandated budget reductions or cuts in forces 
     and workloads.
       I hope that this response is helpful. Please contact me if 
     you have any questions or if you would like to request 
     additional work by CBO on BRAC issues. CBO's staff contact is 
     Lauri Zeman, who can be reached at (202) 226-2900.
           Sincerely,
                                                  June E. O'Neill,
                                                         Director.

  Mr. LEVIN. The heart of the matter, it seems to me, is that our 
auditors, our budget experts, have said that it is their conclusion 
that ``past and future BRAC rounds will lead to significant savings for 
the Department of Defense.''
  What are those estimates of savings? By 2001, the Department 
estimates that BRAC actions will produce a total of $14.5 billion in 
net savings. After 2001, when all BRAC actions must be completed, 
steady State savings will be $5.7 billion per year. This is just from 
past base closure rounds, which some Members say can't be audited in 
terms of precise savings.
  That is a lot of money, $5.7 billion per year--steady State savings. 
Is it possibly $5.6 billion or $5.8 billion? Nobody can state with 
certainty. It is significant.
  What can be stated is what the CBO's conclusion is, that these are 
significant savings and are similar to the kind of savings that the CBO 
believes are achieved with base closing.
  Last July, as I indicated, the CBO gave their own conclusions, so 
while we can debate this issue on the floor about audit trails and how 
precise the estimates are, our auditors, our experts, have reached the 
critical conclusion that the savings, indeed, are significant.
  Earlier this month we received letters from Secretary Cohen, from the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, from all of the Joint Chiefs, from the 
Secretaries of the Army and the Navy and the Air Force. In his letter, 
Secretary Cohen says the Department's ability to properly support 
America's men and women in uniform today and to sustain them into the 
future hinged in great measure on realizing this critical savings that 
only BRAC can provide.
  Our ability to support the men and women in uniform depends on future 
savings from BRAC rounds.
  A letter which we just received, signed by all six members of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, makes their views crystal clear:

       Simply stated, our military judgment is that further base 
     closures are absolutely necessary.

  Those are pretty strong words and these are our uniformed military 
leaders. On the Armed Services Committee, we put a lot of stock in 
their judgment on most issues. Once in a while we may disagree with 
them, as is our right and our duty, but when the top military 
leadership, civilian and uniform, in this Nation tell Members that more 
BRAC rounds are ``absolutely necessary'' we should take heed.
  General Shelton said in last year's Department of Defense report:

       I strongly support additional base closures. Without them, 
     we will not leave our successors the war-fighting dominance 
     of today's force.

  That is not a political statement; that is a military man's 
statement. That has to do with warfighting dominance.
  We can argue about audit trails or specifics on this floor, but when 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs says we will not leave our successors 
the warfighting dominance that we have in today's force without 
additional base closures, those are words which have a special meaning, 
it would seem to me, to all of the Members who have this special 
responsibility.

[[Page S6001]]

  We have to face up to this responsibility. A decade ago, after years 
of prodding by Senator Goldwater and under the leadership of Senator 
Nunn and Senator Warner, Congress had the vision and the courage to 
start the BRAC process. Just imagine the financial problems that we 
would have today if we could not count on the savings from previous 
BRAC rounds. If the Senators a decade ago did not succeed in persuading 
us to start the BRAC process, think of the problems we would have 
today. Those are the problems we are going to have 4, 5, 6, 7 years 
from now if we do not continuing a process, if we do not continue the 
process, if we do not shed the excess infrastructure which is no longer 
needed.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator allow me to address the 
Senate with regard to a unanimous consent request which he and I have 
shared? I will just present it.
  I ask unanimous consent that time until 1:45 today be equally divided 
on the BRAC amendment between the proponents and opponents, with the 
vote beginning, as under the previous order, at 1:45 today.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Michigan 
and I had discussed the possibility of Senator Kerrey coming in. I am 
committed to the 1-hour time agreement. We are advised by Senator 
Kerrey he would not be available to utilize that time period after the 
1:45 vote. I will be working to determine what we can bring up 
following the 1:45 vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Virginia for his efforts to 
accommodate Senator Kerrey. An additional hour is needed for his 
amendment, but because of his vice chairmanship on the Intelligence 
Committee which begins meeting right now, he is unable to be here.
  Mr. WARNER. The most I can advise the Senate is we will have the vote 
at 1:45 today on the BRAC amendment. Thereafter, as quickly as I can, I 
will advise the Senate, after consultation with the ranking member, as 
to what the next amendment will be.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, how much time do I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Michigan has 1 
minute 14 seconds.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield myself an additional 2 minutes. I will finish and 
then ask unanimous consent that after I am completed, in 3 minutes or 
so, Senator Robb be recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, Congress likes to ask the Joint Chiefs 
every once in awhile how much more money they think they need and where 
should we add it? What are their priorities?
  Those are legitimate questions for us to ask. But they are also 
relatively pretty easy issues to address. Our duty as Members of 
Congress extends far beyond pitching and hitting softballs. We have an 
obligation to the men and women in uniform to listen to the Chiefs when 
they ask us to do something that is hard to do.
  The Chiefs' opinions are important to us when following them is easy 
to do, when they give us their priorities if we can find some 
additional funds. But now they are asking us to do something that is 
hard politically to do, and that is to heed their advice, to close some 
additional bases. I do not know of anybody in the Department of Defense 
or anybody in this Chamber who likes closing bases. Not many people 
like going to the dentist or losing weight either. It is just a lot 
more fun to eat dessert than to look after your health. But we have an 
obligation--and it is difficult--in the best interests of this Nation, 
and for the health of our military, to do not what is easiest, but to 
do what is essential.
  What is essential has been told to us very eloquently in these 
letters from the Chiefs, in this letter from the Secretary of Defense, 
in this letter from the three Service Secretaries. These letters tell 
us as pointedly, dramatically, strongly, forcefully as they can, that 
it is essential that additional bases be closed. ``Our military 
judgment is that further base closures are absolutely necessary.''

  I began my few minutes of comments with that quote and I end them 
with that quote, because I hope we will all think about that as we make 
a politically tough decision on how to vote on the pending McCain-Levin 
amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Virginia is 
recognized.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished friend and 
colleague from Michigan for his leadership on this issue, as well as my 
colleague and friend from Arizona for his leadership on this issue. It 
is a difficult issue.
  This year, we have added billions of dollars to improve the readiness 
of our Armed Forces. It does not take a budget expert to realize how 
much more we could accomplish for our men and women in uniform if we 
had the billions in savings that would accrue from just one additional 
round of base closures in the year 2001.
  Last year and the year before that, I argued that not giving the 
Department of Defense the authority it has asked for to close unneeded 
bases makes the Congress look shortsighted and indecisive. I argued 
then that every dollar used to maintain excess infrastructure is a 
dollar diverted from resources we so badly need to modernize our 
equipment and to improve the quality of life of our hard-working 
military personnel and their families.
  Sadly, those BRAC efforts failed for nearly the same reasons the 
emergency supplemental succeeded last year, reasons that have more to 
do with politics than with making the right choices when it comes to 
protecting this Nation's interests, both now and into the next century.
  Admittedly, the emergency supplemental had plenty of legitimate 
emergency spending, emergency spending for our troops, for our farmers, 
and for hurricane and tornado victims. But it threw fiscal discipline 
out the window by also spending billions in nonemergency spending. In 
my view, we have acted just as irresponsibly over the past 3 years by 
refusing to close bases we no longer need. If we fail to pass this 
latest BRAC proposal once again, we will have failed not only the 
taxpayer but also the men and women who comprise the finest fighting 
force the world has ever known.

  I come back to this point, one I have made time and time again, to 
ask, who really suffers if we force the Department of Defense to keep 
open bases it does not need? In the end, we only punish those who most 
need the benefits of infrastructure savings. First, we punish the 
Nation's taxpayers when we fail to make the best use of the resources 
with which we are entrusted. Second, we punish today's soldiers, 
sailors, and marines, because current readiness requires having 
sufficient reliable resources for equipment, training, and operations. 
Finally, we punish tomorrow's force, our future readiness, as we 
continue to mortgage the research, development, and modernization of 
the platforms and equipment that will be necessary to keep America 
strong into the 21st century.
  As the Joint Chiefs of Staff have testified, there is no shortage of 
legitimate programs to apply BRAC savings towards including Navy 
shipbuilding. Years of relatively low procurement rates have created a 
shortfall so significant that the fleet size will shrink to 
substantially less than the 300 ships of the Navy's stated goal in the 
2020s, if procurement rates of 8 to 10 ships do not start materializing 
now. The Navy is stretched thin enough right now, with 324 ships. Do we 
really want to risk not having enough ships to meet our commitments in 
the next century?
  It does not have to be this way. The 300-ship Navy, the Army after 
next, and the Air Force and Marine Corps of tomorrow can be funded, at 
least in part, from BRAC savings. The savings from the first four 
rounds of base closures alone are estimated to be on the order of $25 
billion over the next 4 years. It should come as no surprise that 
scores of studies and organizations such as the Quadrennial Defense 
Review, the Defense Restructure Initiative, the National Defense Panel, 
and Business Executives for National Security have all concluded that 
more base closures are crucial to the future of our Armed Forces.
  It is time to put politics behind us. We have an obligation to change 
the way we do business and to do what is right for our Armed Forces and 
what is right for the taxpayer. I urge my colleagues to support this 
critically important amendment.

[[Page S6002]]

  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Feingold be added as a cosponsor of the pending amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent 
that Mr. Lesley Spraker, a military affairs fellow in the office of 
Senator DeWine, be granted the privilege of the floor during the 
consideration of S. 1059.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous 
consent that Paul Barger, a national defense fellow in Senator Inhofe's 
office, be given the privilege of the floor during the remainder of the 
debate on the defense authorization bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, at this time, I yield 
whatever time he may consume to the Senator from Wyoming.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Wyoming is 
recognized.
  Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank the Senator from New 
Hampshire. I will take just a couple of minutes.
  I rise in opposition to the McCain-Levin amendment on base closure. 
It is a difficult decision for me because I am persuaded there could be 
some closures that would make us more efficient in terms of our mission 
in defense. I remember my friend, Dick Cheney, whose place I took in 
the House, said that defense is not for economic development; it is for 
defense. I appreciate that, and I believe that.
  I was not at all impressed with the last process. I was not at all 
impressed with the way the administration handled it, so I do not 
believe that it is appropriate at this time to bring in the politics 
again of base closure. Frankly, the military ought to come forward with 
their views as to what is necessary to carry out their mission. That, 
of course, should be our particular desire.


                           Amendment No. 395

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I also rise in opposition to the Kerrey 
amendment. It seems to me that it would be a mistake to begin to 
downgrade our position with regard to missiles until START II is agreed 
to by the Russians. We have already approved that treaty; the Russians 
have not. I do not think we should weaken our position.
  I appreciate the opportunity to share my views on those two 
amendments. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 393

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, during the markup of the 
defense authorization bill in committee, we twice rejected base closure 
amendments. So it does seem anticlimatic to be out here on the floor 
again for the very same proposal. But such is the way of the Senate 
sometimes.
  Senators McCain and Levin did offer an amendment to have two rounds 
of base closures in 2001 and 2003. The process was adjusted to ensure 
that the next incoming President would appoint the commissioners. 
Everything else was identical to the amendment now being offered, and 
the amendment was defeated by a vote of 12-8, with members on both 
sides of the aisle voting one way or the other. Then Senators Levin and 
McCain offered another amendment that called for only one round of base 
closures in 2001.
  The House version of the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Authorization bill 
is silent on base closures. Opposition to base closure in the House is 
much stronger than it is in the Senate, and the Membership has let it 
be known that they will oppose any base closure legislation in 
conference, even though the administration proposes these two rounds in 
2001 and 2005. We are in a debate on the floor taking a lot of the 
Senate's time on a proposal that probably lacks the support in both the 
House and the Senate to get this to the President's desk.

  There have been a lot of arguments made on both sides. Let me offer a 
few of my own.
  During previous rounds, the Department had the opportunity to reduce 
the infrastructure to the extent that it believed necessary. That was 
the purpose of the previous rounds. The bottom line is that the 
Department failed to do that.
  When first announced, the 1995 BRAC round was proclaimed to be ``the 
mother of all BRACs.'' But the outcome was just a whimper; it was a 
little daughter rather than a mother.
  Any purported savings of another round of these closures would not be 
available in the near-to-medium term for the procurement of equipment 
and weapons modernization or any other purpose. That is really what we 
care about. We want money for new equipment. We want money for 
readiness and modernization.
  The bottom line, as most of my colleagues know, is that it is going 
to cost us in the immediate future money that we desperately need right 
now for readiness. No one disputes that if you close down 
infrastructure, in the long run it is going to save money. That is 
obvious. But it is going to cost us somewhere in the vicinity of $3.2 
billion right up front to begin the closing, with the environmental 
issues and all the changes that have to be made: the upfront cost 
transfer of units and equipment, new facilities at receiving 
installations, buyouts of civilian employees and environmental cleanup. 
If we do not have the dollars now to do what we need to modernize our 
troops, to get the equipment they need, to get them up to the readiness 
level at which they should be--how will we be able to pay these initial 
costs?
  Arguments that have been made, rightfully so, by Senator Inhofe and 
others, concerning the politicization of the last BRAC process. We all 
know that the administration seriously damaged the base closure process 
by its handling of the Commission's 1995 recommendations concerning 
McClellan Air Force Base in California and Kelly Air Force Base in 
Texas. We need to let these issues settled. There are a lot of hard 
feelings left over from that. We need to fully resolve these issues 
before we attempt another round.
  BRAC should be focused on excess capacity, but it should not be an 
excessively broad approach. We ought to target any future BRAC 
legislation--we do not want every single installation in America to be 
in BRAC purgatory. I believe the Senator from Kansas, who is in the 
Chair now, has used that term. And that is what happens. Everybody gets 
put in this purgatory and everybody has to hire all these consultants 
and experts to try to get out of purgatory and hopefully not go to 
Hell, but hopefully wind up in Heaven, with their base preserved.
  As the number of worldwide commitments increases for the Armed 
Forces, we should be considering increasing the size of the Armed 
Forces. We can make a very compelling case for that. I am willing to 
make it. Further base closures could preclude that eventuality. What we 
lose, we never get back. For example, if we close a shipyard, imagine 
how much time and effort and money we would have to expend, and how 
many environmental hoops we would have to jump through to open another 
shipyard after it has been developed into condominiums along the harbor 
somewhere. We will never be able to do it. Once it is gone, it is gone. 
We need to understand that.
  I think we have to look at it and ask ourselves this basic question: 
Is it now the time to reduce further our infrastructure for the purpose 
of some long-term savings that are going to cost us in the short term 
when there is all this uncertainty out there?
  The Senator from Michigan very eloquently, in his statement, talked 
about the percentage argument--that force structure has gone down 36 
percent, personnel has gone down 40 percent, and base closings are only 
down 18 percent. That sounds like a fair argument, and it sounds like 
you ought to be able to put it all together, and there ought to be an 
even 36 or 40 percent cut in all areas. But that is not the case.
  If you use an analogy of a football team, your team may be half the 
size it used to be, but you still have to have a stadium to play in. So 
you can reduce helmets and you can reduce personnel

[[Page S6003]]

and you can reduce support, bandages, or whatever you need for the 
players, but you still have to have a stadium.
  So I do not think you can break it down that simply. It does not 
matter whether you have a good team or a bad team, or whether you have 
75 players as backup or 12 players as backup, you still need a stadium, 
you still need to have a certain amount of infrastructure to run the 
team.
  So I say this is very ill-advised. We do not know where we are going. 
I personally believe that right now, the way things are going in the 
world, we are going to have to increase, not decrease, our personnel, 
increase, not decrease, our forces, and if we are going to do all that, 
we are going to have to have the infrastructure to support it.
  So I hope this amendment will be defeated for those reasons alone, 
not to mention the anguish the communities would have to go through.
  I think it is important to understand that the President of the 
United States is calling up reserves right now, in great numbers, to be 
deployed, Lord knows where--perhaps Bosnia, perhaps Kosovo; we do not 
know just where. We do not know what other crisis may break out.
  I just think it is a terrible time to think about taking down 
infrastructure. What message does that send to the troops out there and 
to the people who support those troops all across the country in the 
bases and the infrastructure around those bases? What message does it 
send to those people if we say, in spite of all of this increase in 
activity around the world, we are now still going to eliminate more 
infrastructure, not knowing what we need for the next crisis?
  We can eliminate it at some point, if it is necessary. We are not 
saving that much now to do it. As a matter of fact, even in the short 
term it is costing us. So there is no rush here. I think we ought to 
just settle down, take a careful look at what we are doing, reevaluate 
our entire military structure--and in my view, increase the size of our 
forces--and not rush to judgment here with some additional base 
closings.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. How much time does the Senator need?
  Mr. INHOFE. Five minutes.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
Oklahoma.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Oklahoma is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator for yielding time.
  I think just about everything has been said here, but there are some 
concerns I have that I would state in a little different way than the 
Senator from New Hampshire has stated them.
  One is that we have gone through an artificial downsizing that is not 
commensurate with the threat that is out there. The myth that has 
floated around that the cold war is over, there is no longer a threat, 
is something that finally the American people are waking up and 
realizing is not true. We are in the most threatened position today 
that we have been in probably in the history of this country, with the 
diverse types of opposition out there, the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and abilities to transport those weapons.
  So I say, one of the strongest arguments against a BRAC round at this 
time is, we have gone through four BRAC rounds. If we take the level of 
our infrastructure down to meet the level of the force strength, then 
when we start back up with the force strength, we will not have the 
infrastructure that is necessary.
  So we need to be looking at our rebuilding process. It would be like 
going through extensive BRAC processes back in the late 1970s--right 
before rebuilding, which is imminent. We are going to have to do it 
with the new administration.
  Secondly, as I think the Senator from New Hampshire articulated quite 
well, we are in a really severe situation right now in terms of 
readiness. Later on today I want a chance to elaborate on this and talk 
about the fact that we are now at approximately one-half the force 
strength that we were in 1991. In other words, we could not repeat our 
effort in the Persian Gulf war today.
  This is being complicated by all these deployments to places where we 
should not be. We should never have sent a troop or any effort or any 
assets into Bosnia; we should not have done that in Kosovo or Albania, 
or to Haiti, for all practical purposes, because that dilutes the 
already scarce military assets we have.
  I say this relates to this subject because we have a military system 
that is hemorrhaging today. This is not something that we can wait 
until later to take care of. As the Senator from New Hampshire pointed 
out, anything that comes from a BRAC round, a new BRAC round, is going 
to cost money, not save money.
  Now is when we are going to have to try to do something with our 
readiness so that if General Hawley has to stand up and say something 
has happened either in the Pacific theater, North Korea, or the Persian 
Gulf, Iraq or Iran, we would be able to meet that. We cannot do that 
today. So this certainly would be ill-timed, even if you believe that 
it was a good idea to have future BRAC rounds.
  I think also we need to look at the budget we are passing. I want to 
talk about the inadequacy of what we are talking about in our 
authorization bill. We are increasing by about $9 billion what the 
President's budget was. We have had testimony from the CINCs and from 
others in the field and from the four-stars that this is totally 
inadequate. We are going to have to have at least a minimum increase of 
$24 billion each year for approximately 6 years.
  Lastly, I would like to remind everybody of what happened in the last 
round, I believe, in the BRAC process. I was elected to the House in 
1986, and that is when we put this idea together. It was a Congressman 
from Texas, Dick Armey, who did it. The idea was to get politics out of 
the BRAC process. Through round 1 and round 2 and round 3, there were 
no politics involved. They were not political decisions; they were 
rational decisions.
  However, in the last round--and we all know what happened; no one is 
going to question this--the President went out there prior to the 1996 
election, to McClellan in California and to Kelly in Texas, in order to 
get votes and politicize the system.
  You might say: Well, this is going to come along after he is gone. I 
am a little bit concerned about the fact that there is a possibility, a 
very outside possibility, that Al Gore will succeed him. That being the 
case, he was involved in politicizing this, too.
  For those who believe we still have excess infrastructure, I would 
like to have you consider that maybe we should wait until we see what 
the new administration is going to look like, what kind of commitments 
are going to be made. As chairman of the committee that has oversight 
over the BRAC process, I suggest we wait and not pass this BRAC 
recommendation today.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bunning). The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. How much time does the Senator require?
  Ms. SNOWE. Five minutes.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Is there a UC on the time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine has 5 minutes.
  Ms. SNOWE. I thank the Chair.
  I gave a lengthy statement last night. I will not go into everything 
that I referred to, but I think there are several points that need to 
be reiterated with respect to base closing.
  I strongly oppose the base closing amendment that has been offered by 
Senator McCain and Senator Levin that would initiate another round in 
the year 2001. We come back to the same issues that have yet to be 
addressed by the Department of Defense with respect to creating a 
comprehensive analysis in terms of matching our infrastructure with our 
assets and the security threat mix that we can anticipate into the 21st 
century.
  This is an analysis, in fact, that has been suggested and recommended 
by the National Defense Panel in order to have an overall assessment 
and accounting of exactly what we are going to need with respect to our 
domestic infrastructure into the 21st century.
  I think everybody acknowledges that we are facing different types of 
threats today, more asymmetric, more unpredictable, more uncertain, far 
more diverse, regional threats than we have

[[Page S6004]]

ever encountered before. So as a result, it seems to me we need to have 
an accounting from the Defense Department as to exactly what are their 
needs.
  They keep telling us over and over again from the previous four 
rounds that we have achieved and realized billions and billions of 
dollars in savings. Yet we have been unable to track those savings. In 
fact, in the reports by the General Accounting Office in 1996 and then 
again in 1997 and in addition to the Congressional Budget Office 
reports, all indicate the very same thing. It is very difficult to 
ascertain the amount of savings derived from the previous base closing 
rounds, because the Department of Defense has never established a 
mechanism for tracking those savings.

  I think it is important for us to have that data so we can document 
what has exactly been saved as a result of those four previous rounds.
  When you look at this chart, this is in the General Accounting Office 
report: Why BRAC Savings are Difficult to Track and Estimate Changes 
Over Time. DOD accounting systems are not designed to track savings. 
Some costs are not captured initially; i.e. the environmental costs.
  Well, we now find out that they are going to have to spend at least 
$3 billion more in environmental mitigation than they anticipated.
  Some savings cannot be fully captured--long-term recapitalization 
costs. Again, we have found out in terms of sales, they anticipated 
they would realize $3 billion in sales, and they have only received 
about $65 million. So that is a great gap between what they projected 
for revenues of sales and what they actually realized.
  DOD components do not have incentives to track savings because 
budgets may be reduced. Over time events may impact costs and savings 
that could not have been known when estimates were developed.
  On and on it goes. We have no way of knowing.
  Then the Department of Defense has said, well, we have cut back on 
personnel by 36 percent so, therefore, we should be reducing 
infrastructure by 36 percent. Since we haven't done that, it should be 
one on one, essentially, we should be reducing our infrastructure. But 
again, these determinations should not be made by arbitrary percentages 
but, rather, a documentation of exactly what we need for the future.
  We have unpredictable challenges and, therefore, I think we should 
make those decisions based on the assessment of what should be our 
military infrastructure for the 21st century. Yet we have not had that 
kind of accounting.
  I hope the Senate will not approve another round until we have the 
opportunity to have this kind of analysis from the Department of 
Defense they have resisted providing over the years.
  In fact, in the 1998 Secretary's report on BRAC, it said additional 
rounds of BRAC in the years 2001 and 2005--that would be contingent on 
two rounds--would yield $21 billion in the years 2008 to 2015, the 
period covered by the QDR, and $3 billion every year thereafter.
  But that is contradicted by the report by the Defense Department in 
1999 with respect to BRAC savings. It says with four BRAC rounds 
between 1995 and 1998, DOD invested approximately $22.5 billion to 
close and realign 152 installations. So it costs as much to close those 
bases as what they are projecting for savings from another two rounds 
in the future.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Ms. SNOWE. One additional minute.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I yield the Senator 1 additional minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection.
  Ms. SNOWE. The real challenge and the problem with these base closing 
rounds has been the fact that they are costing far more than what the 
Defense Department anticipated. I think it is important for us to have 
the information and the verification from the Defense Department as to 
exactly what they have saved and how much it has cost and what they 
anticipate in the future. In addition, they have not even completed the 
four previous rounds. They have yet to be totally implemented. So we 
could be incurring additional costs.

  Of course, the final dimension to the whole problem is all of the 
contingency operations. We have had 25 contingency operations that have 
cost the Defense Department more than $20 billion. That has impacted 
readiness and modernization.
  I say to this administration that perhaps if they had more clear 
objectives with respect to these operations, we could contain the 
costs, but we should not put pressure on reducing our domestic 
infrastructure if we are going to have more contingency operations in 
the future that demand the use of our domestic installations.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired
  The Senator from Nebraska is recognized for 12 minutes.
  Mr. HAGEL. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I rise to strongly support the McCain-Levin amendment. 
The arguments that have been made this morning and this afternoon, I 
believe, speak rather clearly and directly to why this amendment is 
worthy of our colleagues' support today.
  I also wish to express my strong support for S. 1059, the fiscal year 
2000 Department of Defense authorization bill being debated here on the 
floor of the Senate.
  The first responsibility of our Government is to provide for a strong 
national defense to protect America's security interests. The primary 
responsibility of elected officials is to provide the leadership and 
the wisdom to ensure it is used in the best interests of the American 
people.
  The percent of the gross domestic product we spend today on defense 
is lower than what it was just prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor. At the end of the cold war, there was excited talk about the 
peace dividend that would come, of course, from the decline in East-
West conflict as a result of the implosion of the Soviet Union and the 
reduction in defense spending that, of course, would logically follow.
  There was also talk about a new global order. Some suggested that war 
might be obsolete, thanks to the breakout of democracy around the 
globe. This all sounded hauntingly familiar to the end of World War I 
and other periods in the history of the world. But there is a peace 
dividend. That dividend is the new freedoms and opportunities that have 
resulted from the peace and stability America and her allies won over 
the last 50 years.
  If we step back for a moment and review Korea, Vietnam, the Persian 
Gulf, we understand in some rather direct terms what our stand and our 
allies' stand in those three areas of the world meant to stability, to 
commitment, to using our forces in a positive way that, in fact, stood 
for what was right in the world.

  I am a veteran of Vietnam. I served in Vietnam in 1968, and I have 
heard many times of the stories written and the debate about whether it 
was a wasted effort in Vietnam. I have responded this way: If America 
had not taken a stand in Vietnam, aside from how we executed and 
prosecuted the war--if we had not taken a stand in Korea, Vietnam, and 
the Persian Gulf, does anyone doubt that the face of Asia, the face of 
the Middle East would be different than it is today? Of course it would 
be. Would it be more in the interest of freedom and stability and 
democracy and market economies than it is today? I don't think so.
  So, you see, it is not only having the ability to protect our 
interests and preserve freedom and democracy, but the will and the 
leadership to make that commitment is just as important. There are new 
challenges and new responsibilities today that we face, as the new 
dynamic world always provides, as we move into the next millennium.
  During the cold war, we confronted one adversary on several fronts. 
Today, we confront several adversaries on several fronts. One of the 
concerns that we must be very vigilant about over the next few years is 
not placing America's interests in the world in a position to be 
blackmailed by nations who would threaten those interests by 
threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction and for us, 
essentially, not only to be militarily incapable of responding to that 
blackmail and not having the leadership and the will to say we are not 
going to do that, that isn't going to happen. Actions have 
consequences. Inactions have consequences.
  America and her allies have done very well over the last 50 years to 
help

[[Page S6005]]

stabilize a very unstable world. Partly, that has been the result of 
our word meaning something, our commitment meaning something. But if we 
don't have the military assets and the resources to be able to call 
upon that capacity to stop tyranny and war and instability, then in 
fact we place America in a terrible position and we threaten America's 
security through the possibility of blackmail.
  We must harbor our national defense resources wisely, of course. But 
when we do use them, we must follow the principles of the Powell 
doctrine: Overwhelming force deployed decisively in the pursuit of 
clear objectives.
  Rebuilding our military will not be cheap. America needs to 
understand that. This bill heads us in the right direction, but much 
more is going to be required. We must not and we cannot build our 
military based on budget caps or spending goals. Military spending must 
be based on the threats and challenges we face in the world today. We 
must protect our interests and help maintain global stability to ensure 
our long-term growth and prosperity.
  The defense budget must flow from our national security interests, 
not the other way around. The budget cannot drive our national security 
interests. Our national security interests must drive the budget. If we 
must find other means to take those resources and put them in our 
national security budget, then we must do that. That will require 
prioritizing our budget, our resources. It will prioritize what we as 
Americans believe our role in the world to be.
  Every year, the nondefense nondiscretionary budget grows. You have 
heard the numbers in the last 2 days around here. For the last 14 
years, our defense budget has grown smaller. We have cut our defense 
budget over the last 14 years. Every year, these other needs crowd out 
other spending priorities. Nondiscretionary entitlement programs are 
important, but they do us little good if the military is cut back to 
the point that our interests are threatened around the world: oil 
supplies are cut off, sealanes are blocked, citizens and corporations 
abroad are threatened, and our economy declines.

  We must look for savings in the DOD budget, of course, push for 
greater reforms, seek greater efficiencies, and tailor our military for 
future challenges. But we also must be willing to spend as much as we 
need to protect our interests in this very uncertain, dangerous world. 
Having a strong, capable military is only half of the challenge. We 
must also have strong, capable political leadership. That leadership 
must have the respect of the world, so that the world knows that that 
leadership of ours can connect the military capability that we employ; 
knowing when and where to use our military. Strong leadership, anchored 
by clear principles, beliefs, vision, and policy, has always had its 
own deterrent power.
  Dictators fear strong leaders because they know strong leaders will 
act--despite public opinion polls, focus groups, short-term political 
gains, or leverage. Leaders understand that actions have consequences, 
and that inaction has consequences.
  Last week, King Abdullah from Jordan was here and spoke rather 
clearly and plainly to this issue regarding NATO's involvement in 
Kosovo. These are difficult times, but so have they always been. The 
real debate that will consume the American electorate next year, and 
the Presidential politics and this body next year, will be simply: What 
is America's role in the world? What leadership do we care to continue? 
We must recognize that if another country is to replace America as the 
world's leader, that new world leader may not be as benevolent as 
America has been in this century.
  I don't want that kind of a world to be inherited by my 6-year-old 
and 8-year-old. Richard Haas' new book, ``Reluctant Sheriff: The U.S. 
After the Cold War,'' lays it out clearly. That question about the role 
of America in the next century is a legitimate question. There should 
be a relevant debate, with the relevant questions asked: What burdens 
do we want to carry into the next century? Is it worth taking a 
disproportionate share of the world's burdens, which we have always 
had? I believe it is.
  Henry Kissinger's piece in this week's Newsweek magazine, ``New World 
Disorder,'' speaks to this issue. Unexpected events happen in the world 
daily. For example, last Sunday, a Chinese intelligence ship was sunk 
in the South China Sea. Supposedly, the Philippine Navy sunk it in an 
area that is contested. That is how fast flashpoints can bring world 
powers into conflict.
  We need to commit ourselves now to rebuilding the U.S. military, 
reasserting ourselves on the world stage, and accepting the burdens 
that come with leadership.
  Can we imagine Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, or 
Ronald Reagan whining about the burdens of leadership, whining about, 
well, I don't know what the polls show or the focus groups show. Can we 
imagine those leaders governing and doing what they thought was in the 
best interest of our Nation and the world based on the political whims 
and winds of the time? I don't think so.
  America must continue to serve as the rock to which other democracies 
around the world can anchor. We must also continue to serve as the 
beacon of freedom and justice for other nations and other peoples. 
America has always inspired hope around the world, but we cannot lead 
the world without a strong national defense.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a 
quorum, and I ask unanimous consent that the time be equally divided.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, once again we have a BRAC authorization 
measure before us. And once again the same deficiencies that led to the 
far-reaching political distortion of the prior, so-called 
``independent'' BRAC commissions, are ignored.
  I voted against the first BRAC authorization back in February 1989. 
At the time, I was one of only eight senators opposing the measure 
because, I said, it could not avoid political tampering. I was hoping 
to have been proven wrong. Unfortunately, I was not.
  The proposal of my distinguished colleagues, Senators McCain and 
Levin, is well-intended. There is no question that a properly run BRAC 
outcome could lead to funds freed up for force modernization, military 
pay increases, and many other badly needed defense needs, not the least 
of which is readiness. But it's not the motivation of my colleagues 
that I worry about. Rather, I still question whether this process can 
be completely objective. Whoever occupies the White House is also 
likely to be misguided by the same kind of outside pressures and 
political interests that characterized the previous BRAC disasters.
  And, on a more parochial note, I am simply not going to vote to put 
my home state through this process again. We have proven over and over 
and over again that Hill Air Force Base and the other military 
installations based in my state are efficient, productive, and high 
quality. I am not going to vote to make them prove it again in a forum 
where the deck may already be stacked.
  So with all due respect to my colleague from Arizona, I cannot 
support this amendment.
  Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I have listened carefully to the current 
debate on the pending amendment which authorizes a round of military 
base closings commencing in 2001. At this time I do not support a 
further round of base closings. Therefore, I oppose this amendment for 
the following reasons.
  I have repeatedly asked the Department of Defense, military bases in 
the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and the Kentucky Department of Military 
Affairs for information and proof that the past rounds of base closings 
have produced any savings to the Department of Defense or the U.S. 
taxpayer. After repeatedly asking for this information to prove this 
point, it has not been provided to me. Therefore, I need to see proof 
in savings and these savings need to be in ``real'' terms and without 
any accounting gimmicks and projected budgetary outcomes based on 
guesswork.

[[Page S6006]]

  Many criticize the Department of Defense's current accounting 
measures. They say these accounting measures are not soundly based and 
that these measures are used in decisions which result in an unjust 
imbalance between our military base infrastructure and the rest of the 
military. Just because the Department of Defense is reduced in certain 
areas by a certain percentage, doesn't mean that our military base 
infrastructure should be cut at the same percentage level. The 
Department of Defense needs to measure any downsizing of our military 
base infrastructure in a formulaic way rather that just an across the 
board cut done blindly and foolishly.
  Also, I am not convinced that if savings were found from past base 
closings, that the bases in Kentucky, Ft. Knox and Ft. Campbell, would 
be protected and strengthened. I have recently been told by the U.S. 
Army that these bases would not be harmed and that they would benefit 
from any future rounds of closings. The U.S. Army talked of these bases 
as being leading posts in their branches. However, I have not seen any 
new strengths added to these bases from past closings and I have not 
been told of any specific missions which would be added to those bases 
in Kentucky. I need reassurance from the U.S. Army that these posts 
will be protected by seeing the future plans for these posts and the 
specific missions which would be added to them.
  Furthermore, I am not convinced that our military in its current 
state can do more with less. We are in a tangled mission in Yugoslavia, 
we have major troop deployments around the Korean peninsula and around 
Iraq, and we have U.S. troops scattered amongst some 40 other spots 
elsewhere in the world. Our deployments have increased dramatically 
over the past decade. If this trend of increased deployments continues, 
I cannot see the rationality of downsizing our military base structure 
in the midst of this pattern which seems to have no end.
  In conclusion, I have not seen savings from past military base 
closings. Even if I was convinced there were savings, I am not 
convinced that the military bases and the soldiers that serve and work 
at those bases in Kentucky would be protected. I am concerned about 
minimizing our base structure while our soldiers and military do more 
with less. Also, past base closings have been politicized at the 
Presidential level and I fear the process may continue down that path 
again.
  Because of these reasons, I oppose this amendment which authorizes 
another round of base closings.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment 
offered by Senators McCain and Levin authorizing a new round of base 
closures. As the senior Senator from the state that has suffered the 
greatest impact from the previous rounds, I believe that the base 
closure process is deeply flawed and fundamentally unfair.
  The first four rounds of base closure occurred too rapidly and too 
little effort was made to protect local communities from devastating 
lob loss and economic hardship. For those who say that adverse local 
impact is a necessary consequence of reducing military infrastructure, 
I would like to describe how this process has effected California where 
since the first BRAC round in 1988, 29 bases in California have been 
scheduled for closure or realignment.
  Some claim that the process has been streamlined and every effort has 
been made to expedite the transfer of bases to the local community. I 
have also heard claims that base closure can be a boon to the community 
by bringing new opportunities for job creation and economic 
development.
  Now let's look at the facts. The California Trade and Commerce Agency 
estimates that the four rounds of BRAC cost 97,337 military and 
civilian jobs. How many have been created? Less than 17,000. That is a 
net job loss of more than 80,000 jobs.
  The reason we are not seeing job creation or economic growth is 
because the land is simply not being transferred to the local 
communities as was originally planned. The process is so slow and 
bureaucratic that years go by before any development can be done on the 
closed bases.
  Again, the numbers prove this. The 29 closed bases represents 77,269 
acres of land. The Federal Government has retained almost 25,000 for 
itself and 30,000 acres have yet to be transferred. That means that 
local communities have had access to less than 30 percent of the 
property that should have been made available to them. It is difficult 
to create jobs or stimulate economic growth without the land to do it.
  That is the big picture of how the State of California has been 
impacted by the base closure process. Here is the impact at the local 
level.
  Every member of this body who has had a major base close in his or 
her state can tell a base closure horror story, but I believe the 
magnitude of the loss that the city of Long Beach has faced makes it 
unique. In fact, if Long Beach were a state, it would rank in the top 
five in terms of the number of jobs lost due to base closure.
  The Long Beach Naval Station was closed as part of BRAC 1991. This 
resulted in the loss of more than 8,500 military and civilian jobs. The 
direct loss of wage and contract was $400 million with an estimated 
economic loss of another $1 billion annually.
  As the city struggled to deal with this devastating blow, the federal 
government dealt it another. In 1995, the Long Beach Naval Shipyard was 
scheduled for closure. The job loss from this action has been more than 
4,000 and it has caused another $1 billion in total economic loss.
  The city's woes continued during negotiations with the Navy on the 
terms of the conveyance of the Naval Hospital. In 1964, the city had 
sold the property to the Navy for $10. Long Beach had a growing naval 
community and the Navy had, in large part, been a good neighbor. In 
recent years, that has proven not to be the case. The Navy demanded 
$8.5 million for the property. The same piece of property that the city 
gave to them for $10. In an effort to get the conveyance process 
moving, the city reluctantly agreed to the price.
  Now, at a time when the Clinton administration is proposing that all 
current and future economic development conveyances be done at no cost, 
the Department of Defense has thus far refused to renegotiate the deal. 
It appears that the Pentagon, with a budget in excess of $250 billion, 
has a greater need for the $8.5 million than Long Beach with a budget 
of just $330 million.
  This is only one example of the multitude of problems with base 
closure. It is an inefficient, bureaucratic, and ineffective process. I 
believe this is the wrong time to authorize a new round of closure. All 
we would be doing is following one flawed procedure with another.
  As California's example shows, local communities have not been given 
the opportunity to recover from the four previous rounds. Delays caused 
by lack of funding and red tape have prevented the completion of land 
transfers and the beginning of reuse.
  I believe it is essential that we allow enough time for the base 
closures of the 1990's to run their course before we deal them the 
challenges of the 21st century closures. If nothing else, we owe that 
to our local governments. I urge the defeat of this amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I wonder if the good Senator from New 
Hampshire would consider yielding me 3 minutes of his time so we can 
preserve the 10 minutes that we have left for Senator McCain who I 
understand is on his way over.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I yield 3 minutes to the opposition side.
  Mr. LEVIN. I greatly appreciate that.
  Mr. President, we have had several years of debate now about the 
President's alleged role in the last base closure round on the 
privatization-in-place proposals for Sacramento and San Antonio. This 
just simply cannot be allowed to be an issue, and it should no longer 
be an issue. Because of the hard work of the Armed Services Committee, 
we just resolved the depot issue in a fair way.
  Our amendment deals with the privatization-in-place issue by 
including language for the 2001 BRAC round that would allow 
privatization-in-place closing of a military installation only when it 
is recommended explicitly by the Base Closure Commission and when it is 
the most cost-effective approach.
  Our amendment also ensures the entire BRAC process takes place after 
the next administration is in office. The

[[Page S6007]]

base closure statute explicitly recognizes already that the President 
can decide whether or not to have a BRAC round, and he can decide not 
to have a BRAC round simply by deciding not to nominate BRAC 
commissioners. If the new President decides not to have a BRAC round, 
he simply will not nominate the new commissioners. If there is a BRAC 
round, the new Secretary of Defense will oversee the process of the 
statutory steps in the round done under the new administration under 
the timetable which is in this amendment.
  Short of banning people from even thinking about base closures until 
2001, there is just really nothing more that can be done to ensure that 
there will be no politicization at all. I know there were strong 
feelings on the 1995 round. But I don't think we should keep punishing 
the taxpayers and keep spending money which we need for the men and 
women in uniform to have the right pay and the right equipment by 
continuing to raise the allegations which were leveled about the 
Sacramento and San Antonio actions.
  As it turned out, by the way, things came out quite well. The bidding 
team that represented the privatization in place of those two 
facilities lost during a competitive bidding process.
  We have to be willing to take the heat. We can no longer just say 
that the last round was politicized if, in fact, it was cured in the 
next round. We just cannot eternally and constantly look back at these 
allegations and debate what may or may not have happened in the 1995 
round as an excuse for not doing our duty here in 1999 in terms of 
saving the money, which is so essential if we are going to have the 
defense budget rationally devoted and rationally spent. We are talking 
here about a significant chunk of money. We cannot waste this money. 
Our uniformed personnel and our civilian leadership are pleading with 
us to authorize an additional base closing round. This amendment 
assures that it is the next administration--not this one--which will 
determine whether to proceed with a base closing round. All we would be 
doing is authorizing it. The next administration would be the one that 
would be administering this next round. It would not be this 
administration.

  The timetable that we put in here assures every single statutory 
step, from picking the commissioners to do the work that is necessary 
to sending in the recommendations. All of that will take place with the 
new President and not with this President.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, if I could inquire about time. It is 1:30 
now; are we scheduled to vote on base closure at 1:45?
  Mr. LEVIN. The majority leader is correct.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I have followed the base closure 
recommendations, the so-called BRAC issues, for many years, going back 
to my years in the House. We have been down this old BRAC road several 
times before. I have always been opposed to this approach.
  I remember standing in the center well of the House years ago, 
talking to Congressman Armey of Texas. He was talking about his 
concept. I told him that I thought it was an abdication of 
responsibility, but if he wanted to pursue it, here is how to do it, 
and here is how it has to come through the Rules Committee. He took 
notes copiously and pursued it and it went through.
  I think this is one more example where we and the administrations are 
avoiding the tough choices. For years, for 100 years, when there was a 
need to close a base, the administration, the Pentagon, the Department 
of Defense sent up recommendations of surplus or unneeded bases that 
Congress, through the authorization process, appropriations process, 
considered those recommendations and made a decision to close them or 
not.
  Over the years, as it became more and more difficult to close 
remaining bases or to make increasingly tough decisions, these so-
called BRAC rounds gained popularity and were pushed and, in fact, 
passed through the Congress. I don't think this is the way it should be 
done and I maintain it has not worked well.
  In many cases, bases were closed, including several in my State. I go 
quite often now to those former bases as we continue to work to get new 
business and industry to come into those facilities. The tough 
decisions were made. We did our job.
  So the first thing I recommended is let's do our job. I discussed 
that with Secretary of Defense Cohen and he, of course, smiled and said 
yes, but we probably won't get them closed.
  I believe if the case is made and they recommend a surplus, that 
could be done--maybe not as many as they would like, but the process is 
there and we should honor that process.
  We have had these base closure proceedings in the past. They have 
been painful. They cause tremendous upheavals in the defense community. 
In the communities where it happens, millions of dollars have been 
spent trying to defend against closures or, once a closure decision has 
been made, trying to find a way to make use of the base.
  For such communities, losing a base is more than just an economic 
loss; it is an emotional loss and a blow to the core of their identity. 
These are just not nameless, faceless people involved. In most military 
communities, personnel from the base are church leaders, little league 
coaches, and scout masters, not just men and women with money to spend. 
Communities that lose a base lose much more than economic well-being; 
they lose friends, neighbors, and community leaders. I think it is very 
important that we remember what this process does to communities and to 
the people who are involved.
  I maintain the ones that we have had in the past have worked pretty 
well, although some bases are still not fully closed. The environmental 
cleanups have not happened in other instances. Many of these 
facilities, now, are just sitting there.
  I recommend before we go to another round, if we ever do, of base 
closures, we ought to let the ones that have already been recommended 
fully run out the string. Let's see what we have saved.
  I am told a good bit of money will be saved this year from the base 
closures. But if you read the little asterisk down at the bottom, it 
doesn't include, for instance, environmental cleanup costs.
  So if you look at the impact this has had on our communities, on our 
defense installations, and what has actually come from it, I think it 
is not good judgment to go forward with another round now. Think about 
what we are doing. Think about the timing.
  Here we are at a time when our defense capabilities are being 
stretched to the maximum steaming time, time our men and women are out 
on ships and they are on remote assignments, at a time when our troops 
are in combat this very day, we are talking about closing installations 
or closing facilities back here at home.
  Also, a side note: Just last week we passed a bill that provided 
money for construction of more military facilities in Europe, so we are 
going to be adding a half billion dollars in new construction in 
Europe. Maybe it is needed. Maybe that says we have acted too hastily 
in drawing down in Europe. We allowed our facilities--the runways, the 
air traffic control towers, the housing facilities--to deteriorate even 
there. But at a time when we are going to be spending money in Europe, 
we are talking about cutting back here at home. Are American 
servicemembers going to return to find that while the bases overseas 
are being rebuilt there are ``For Rent'' signs on the ones they left 
back home in the United States?

  I think, first of all, the whole idea of doing it through a 
commission is not wise. Second, I do not think we have completed the 
process of the base closure decisions that have already been made. 
Third, the timing could not be worse.
  Let's look at this more. Let's make sure we can stop the free fall 
our defense has been going through in readiness, in morale of our 
troops, in recruitment and retention. It is just one more factor that 
can serve as a discouragement to our men and women in the military. 
Some people say, let's go ahead and do it, the Department of Defense 
wants to do it this way--instead of doing their job, in my opinion--and 
it probably will not affect me.
  I have a list I recommend Senators review before they cast their 
votes. This list will be available in the Senators' cloakrooms. I will 
have them on desks. I will have it in my hand. Look at the bases that 
were on the list that

[[Page S6008]]

were not closed in the past. These will be the ones that probably would 
be first choice to be reviewed again. Just in the State of California, 
you are talking about 15 facilities. It covers the entire country. It 
covers facilities in almost every State.
  When I look down this list, it really scares me, the facilities that 
could be considered for closing, what it would do in those communities 
and what it would do to our military capabilities. So take a look at 
this list before you cast this vote. Maybe sometime in the future we 
will need to take another look at it.
  But I still think there is fallout from the fact that the last 
closure did become tangled up in political decisions. There is a very 
strong feeling that some of the decisions recommended by the BRAC were 
changed or evaded subsequently. I remember Secretary of Defense Cohen 
believing very strongly he was not given the information he was 
entitled to when the Base Closure Commission was acting involving the 
State of Maine. We need to spend more time thinking about this. We 
should get over this hump we are at right now of our military 
capability and the involvement we have now in the Balkans. Maybe 
another year.
  I will tell you what I think we ought to do. Let's try doing it the 
way it was done for 100 years. Let's try doing it through the normal 
process. I support commissions sometimes. I guess the day might come 
when I would support one in this area. But I do not think this is the 
right time and I do not think this is the right way to go about it.
  If the DOD feels further base closures are needed, the most logical 
solution I see is for the Pentagon to identify bases it no longer 
decides are necessary and submit these findings to us. Show the 
Congress where the redundancy and obsolescence are. I have full faith 
that this body is capable of looking objectively at our defense needs 
and determining whether a base has outlived its usefulness.
  Where is accountability in the BRAC process? We in Congress should 
not be abdicating congressional authority to some ad hoc commission. In 
this time of severe military drawdowns and austere budget cuts, I think 
it is all too easy for us to pass the buck and allow a commission, 
which has no obligation to answer to any constituency, to further strip 
our military. I do not think we were elected to leave all the difficult 
choices to a special commission. The average American feels very 
strongly about our national defense, and its important that the buck 
stops here when it comes to ensuring our military readiness.
  So I urge my colleagues, before they vote, look at this list. Think 
carefully about what you are doing. Can we be assured this will be done 
in a totally objective way? What will be its impact on our military 
right now? I thank the chairman of the committee, Senator Warner, for 
his thoughtfulness in this area. He has generally, in the past, been 
supportive of this effort, even when it affected his own State. He has 
stood up and said, We will do our own part. You have to commend him for 
that. But he, this time, has said this is not the right time; maybe 
another day, maybe another way, but not now.
  That is what I hope the Senate will do. I hope the Senate will vote 
against this next round at this time.
  I might emphasize, earlier on there was a recommendation we have two 
rounds, 2001-2005. It was considered we would exclude certain areas and 
allow the others to go forward. I think the principle of that is wrong. 
My own State might be exempted and everybody else might have to deal 
with it--that is wrong. We should not do things that way. We should 
have a fair, across-the-board policy. I think that is the way we should 
do it.
  I yield to the Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is interesting the leader brings up 
``the old-fashioned way,'' because when I was Secretary of the Navy, 
circa 1971, 1972, 1973, I closed the Boston Naval Shipyard and the 
destroyer base, where Senator Jack Reed and Senator Chafee were very 
much interested in that. We did it the old-fashioned way. I must say we 
came down here and we had hearings. I remember in the caucus room, 
Senators Pastore and Pell sat there and grilled me and the Chief of 
Naval Operations for the better part of a day. But it worked out. So 
there is a precedent for doing it the old-fashioned way.
  I say to my distinguished leader, I was the coauthor of the first 
BRAC bill and the second BRAC bill. But the commission concept was 
predicated on trust and fairness. Regrettably, Mr. Leader, that was 
lost in the last round when, as you know, in the California and Texas 
situations, the sticky fingerprints of politics got in there.
  Mr. LOTT. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. Therefore, all the communities across the country, once a 
BRAC process is initiated, they go to general quarters and they hire 
these expensive lobbyists and all types of people to try to make sure 
their case, should it work its way up through the system, is treated 
fairly. That is all they really ask. Unless there is trust in the 
system, we cannot achieve a commission concept of closures.
  Maybe we can induce the Secretary of Defense to try it the old-
fashioned way and give it a shot. I commit to work fairly and 
objectively if you put it right on the table. I thank the leader for 
his strong position.
  Mr. LOTT. I thank Senator Warner.
  Let me point out another instance of another Secretary of the Navy, 
Senator Chafee of Rhode Island. When he was Secretary of the Navy, the 
decision was made, and it was very difficult, but the decision was made 
to basically mothball the Davisville, RI, Seabee base. I think it is 
still maintained in a state of readiness, but the number of troops and 
employees were substantially reduced. But he had done his job. We have 
done our job in the past without a commission.
  By the way, right now there are lawyers and various people going 
around the States saying, get ready, there is going to be another BRAC, 
you better hire me so I can make sure your case is made. I think that 
is wrong and I thank you for your leadership on this issue.
  Mr. President, I urge the Members to vote against this base closure 
commission proposal. I have always opposed this procedure. I opposed it 
in the House in the eighties, even though I remember talking to 
Congressman Armey from Texas about the merits and demerits and how he 
could proceed to get it done. He did it quite well.
  We have been through not one, not two, but 2\1/2\ rounds of base 
closure commissions. I think it is wrong in principle, because we are 
abdicating, once again, our responsibility to make decisions about what 
is best for a strong national defense to a commission. For 100 years, 
if bases, depots, or facilities needed to be closed, the Department of 
Defense made recommendations to Congress, the Appropriations Committee 
reviewed the recommendations and made decisions, and bases and 
facilities were closed. I know of three in my own State of Mississippi 
that were closed in the fifties and sixties, probably with good 
justification.
  I can remember when the Secretary of the Navy was John Warner of 
Virginia. Some tough decisions were made, recommendations were made to 
the Congress, and facilities were closed. The same thing occurred when 
Senator Chafee was Secretary of the Navy. That system worked for 100 
years. Some 15 or 20 years ago, it got harder and harder to get 
Congress to go along with this and the commission idea came along.
  I think we ought to go back and do it the way it was originally 
intended. Let's do our job. I think when Members say we will never have 
any facilities closed, history belies that fact.
  My next point is, we have been through these 2\1/2\ rounds. They were 
a terrible experience for the communities and for the States involved 
that have facilities that are impacted. I maintain that we haven't yet 
quite felt the impact or gotten the benefit of the base closure rounds 
that have already been done. We still have facilities that have not 
been completely closed or the environmental cleanup has not been 
accomplished. We don't know whether we really saved money or not.
  I urge we not go to another round until we have been able to assess 
completely how the earlier rounds worked or didn't work, what the 
cleanup costs were, what the real impact was on the communities.
  I must say, the timing is terrible, at a time when we are asking our 
military men and women for more and more in terms of steaming time, 
time spent on

[[Page S6009]]

remote assignments, and, in fact, at this very moment Americans are 
involved in a bombing campaign in the Balkans.
  Just last week we passed legislation providing about half a billion 
dollars to add to facilities in Europe. At a time when we are spending 
more money for facilities in Europe to upgrade or replace facilities 
that probably we should have already done, we are talking about setting 
up a process to close them in the United States. I don't think that is 
very wise.
  It also comes at a time when our readiness is falling, when our 
retention and recruitment is declining. We are trying to do something 
about that by adding some money for readiness and for the future needs 
of the military, to increase the pay for our military men and women. 
This is just one more little stick in the eye that will affect, I 
think, adversely, the morale of our military men and women.

  Finally, and not the least, I maintain that last time politics got 
very much involved in the base closure round. Bases that were supposed 
to be closed in California and Texas found a way to evade that. It was 
not just one or two States; it happened in several different places. I 
don't think the system worked very well.
  I don't think we should do this now. I think we ought to wait and 
assess what has happened, do it at a time when we are not basically at 
war. Let's wait until the next administration comes in. We don't know 
whether it will be Republican or Democrat. Let's take a look at this 
thing in 2001. If, in fact, we haven't been able to get rid of some of 
the excess or unneeded facilities, and if we are not at war, if we have 
been able to turn around our needs for readiness and the morale and 
retention of our troops, I will take a look at it. I don't think this 
is the right thing to do. I don't think it is the right time. I think 
it is wrong in principle.
  I could have probably found a way to limit this base closure in a way 
that would have been responsible, and it would also probably have 
spared my own State, but I thought that was wrong. I don't think I 
ought to be trying to find a way to spare my own situation and let 
others bear the brunt of the decision. We ought to do it all the way or 
not.
  What we ought to do is let the Pentagon make the recommendations and 
act on them.
  Finally, any Members who think this is fine, don't worry, it will 
affect somebody else, I have a list here of bases, depots, and 
facilities that were on the list of earlier base closure rounds that 
were not closed. These are the likely facilities to be affected. This 
is not a free vote in isolation, where Members can let somebody else 
pay the piper. Members can take a look and see how it would impact New 
York or Michigan or Ohio before casting a vote. Ask yourself when you 
look at the facilities: Are these excess? Are these unneeded 
facilities? I think that might affect your decision.
  We should defeat this. We should go on and pass this very good 
defense authorization bill that has been developed by the committee, 
without this provision in there.
  Maybe another day, another time, would see it differently or we would 
need to vote differently, but not here and now. I urge the defeat of 
the base closure commission amendment.
  I yield the floor and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Voinovich). The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak on the 
amendment for approximately 5 minutes. I probably will not take that 
long.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, all I can assume is that perhaps this vote 
may be getting close because a list was distributed, which can only be 
to try to frighten Members, which has no basis in anything except the 
imagination of some Senate staffer. It is really unfortunate we have to 
get into this kind of damn foolishness. I mean really, this is just 
foolishness. It does not have my State on it, yet three bases were 
``considered'' by BRAC between 1991 and 1995. Whoever is responsible 
for this really ought to be a little ashamed--a little ashamed, maybe.
  The process exists. It was used before. Every single expert, whether 
they be inside or outside the military--unless they are a Member of 
Congress--says that we have to close bases. Find me one, find me one 
military expert, former Secretary of Defense, any general, any admiral, 
any expert, anyone from a think tank, right or left on the political 
spectrum, Heritage Foundation, Brookings--find one. Find one who does 
not say we have too many bases and we have to go through a procedure to 
close them. This procedure was used in years past.
  Strangely enough, strangely enough we have arguments like it costs 
more money to close bases than it does to keep them open. If that is 
the case, we ought to build more bases. If that is the case, we never 
should have closed the bases after World War II. The fact is, that has 
saved billions and will save billions.
  We have young men and women at risk all over the world who are not 
properly equipped, who are not properly trained, who are leaving the 
military--11,000 people on food stamps and we have not even got the 
nerve and the political will, some might even say guts, to do the right 
thing. The right thing is to save money, transfer that money to the men 
and women in the military who are serving under very difficult 
conditions with equipment that has not been modernized, with a 
readiness level that we have not seen since the 1970s, and morale at an 
all-time low. Meanwhile, our commitments grow and grow and grow.
  I guess, given this incredible, bizarre list that some intellectually 
dishonest staffer--intellectually dishonest staffer compiled, we will 
probably lose this vote. But I tell you, this will not be a bright and 
shining hour for the Senate of the United States of America.
  I yield the remainder of my time.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, just to advise the Senate, there is a 
likelihood the Senator from Washington will be recognized for an 
amendment at the completion of this vote. It is still being worked on, 
but we hope to be able to accommodate the Senator.
  The pending business, of course, at the end of the vote, would be the 
Lott amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Do we have any time left on this amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired on this amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent for a minute for the Senator from 
California.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I will not be supporting the McCain 
amendment. I am not supporting it for a very simple reason. I felt the 
BRAC method was very political. It was hyped as: Oh, this is 
nonpolitical; it is going to be based on the merits.
  I was not at all convinced that was the case. When you really sat 
down afterwards and picked the winners and losers, it was pretty clear 
that a lot went into that decision that was political.
  Second, we have not seen, as the Senator from Maine, Ms. Snowe, has 
stated, the kind of savings that we were promised because bases were 
closed and then their missions were recreated somewhere else.
  California got hit so hard I could not even begin to tell you the 
overwhelming economic impact that we have taken. We still have bases, I 
say to my friends, that are sitting there that have not even been 
cleaned up and cannot be reused.
  So I will not be supporting the McCain amendment. I hope it will not 
pass. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
393.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced, yeas 40, nays 60, as follows:

[[Page S6010]]

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 147 Leg.]

                                YEAS--40

     Ashcroft
     Bayh
     Biden
     Bond
     Bryan
     Byrd
     Chafee
     DeWine
     Feingold
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hollings
     Jeffords
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     McCain
     Moynihan
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Smith (OR)
     Thompson
     Voinovich
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--60

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Campbell
     Cleland
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Johnson
     Lautenberg
     Lott
     Mack
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Warner
  The amendment (No. 393) was rejected.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am ready to propound a unanimous consent 
request. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now consider an 
amendment by the Senator from Washington, Mrs. Murray, an amendment re: 
DOD privately funded abortions, that there be 1 hour for debate prior 
to a motion to table, with the time equally divided and controlled, 
with no intervening amendment in order prior to the vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gregg). Is there objection?
  Mr. GRAMM. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President, may I 
propound a request to the chairman?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the chairman yields the floor for that 
purpose.
  Mr. WARNER. I will do that.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, as you know, it takes unanimous consent to 
allow the Murray amendment to come forward. Any person can object, 
because you have two amendments pending. I have, I believe, worked out 
an agreement with the distinguished ranking member to have the vote on 
the reconsideration of the amendment, where there was a tie vote 
yesterday, occur either at 5 or after the disposition of the Kerrey 
amendment, whichever is sooner. If that could be added to your 
unanimous consent request, I think that would be agreeable to both 
sides. I have no objection to Senator Murray bringing her amendment up. 
I simply do not want to leave this matter pending past 5 o'clock, if we 
can avoid it.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to accommodate the Senator. I 
presume you would want 3 minutes for each side to speak to the 
amendment prior to that vote taking place.
  Mr. GRAMM. I would be willing to do that. But, quite frankly, we had 
a time limit. It has been exhausted. If it would accommodate the body, 
I would agree to just have the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. My understanding is the Senator from Michigan does not 
desire any time.
  Mr. LEVIN. Neither one of us is asking for it.
  Mr. GRAMM. I think we have made our cases.
  Mr. WARNER. Let me amend my unanimous consent request to incorporate 
the request from the Senator from Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the 
Senator from Virginia, as modified?
  The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, I just want to see if there 
is any problem on that relative to Senator Kerrey. I don't know why 
there would be, offhand, but we are trying to make sure there is no 
problem. It is fine with me.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to my good friend, we have bent over 
backwards all day to accommodate him. We will continue to do so. 
Whatever the problem, we will solve it.
  Mr. LEVIN. That is fine with me. He has also been very accommodating 
to us. I just want to see if I can get a signal. Do we know whether or 
not Senator Kerrey would have any objection to that?
  Mr. President, may I suggest the absence of a quorum?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we will acknowledge the request for the 
quorum, but I think one Senator seeks recognition for an administrative 
purpose, and I have no objection to that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Tony 
Blaylock, a legislative fellow from my office, be granted the privilege 
of the floor for the duration of the defense authorization bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Might I suggest to the ranking member that another 
Member, the Senator from Colorado, desires to address another matter. 
Rather than putting in a quorum call, I would like to have agreement 
that the Senator proceed.
  Mr. LEVIN. Could we ask the Senator from Colorado about how long his 
remarks will be?
  Mr. ALLARD. Maybe I don't need to have this special provision we 
talked about. I talked with the staff of the chairman, and they said 
all we had to do was file the amendment. I filed the amendment and I am 
happy. I think we are in good shape. It is there, where we can bring it 
up immediately.
  Mr. WARNER. I will put it in the Record as of now that you have done 
that, if you will address the Chair.


                           Amendment No. 396

   (Purpose: To substitute provisions regarding the Civil Air Patrol)

  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we lay aside 
the following amendments for the purpose of introducing my amendment 
No. 396 and then we would go back to the regular order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. WARNER. Reserving the right to object, would you describe in two 
sentences the nature of the amendment so other Senators can be 
acquainted with it.
  Mr. ALLARD. The nature of the amendment is that it strikes a 
provision dealing with the Civil Air Patrol, brings them under the 
direct control of the Air Force. We want to strike out that provision 
and then set up a report and review of an incident that has occurred 
with CAP through GAO and the Inspector General. Real briefly, that is 
what the amendment is about.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous consent 
request?
  Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I could advise the Senator from 
Colorado, in fairness to all colleagues, Senator Inhofe, a fellow 
committee member, has a position, I think, different from yours; is 
that correct?
  Mr. ALLARD. That is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. There could be other Senators, many Senators, interested 
in this Civil Air Patrol issue. I am happy to lay it down, and at such 
time as we can get a reconciliation of viewpoints, we hope to proceed. 
How much time do you think you would need so other Senators----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator from Virginia would suspend for 
a second so the clerk can report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Colorado [Mr. Allard], for himself, Mr. 
     Harkin, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Conrad, Mr. Dorgan, 
     Mr. Cleland, Mr. Craig, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Reid, 
     Mr. Campbell, Mr. Murkowski, and Ms. Snowe, proposes an 
     amendment numbered 396.

  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       Strike section 904, and insert the following:

     SEC. 904. MANAGEMENT OF THE CIVIL AIR PATROL.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that no 
     major change to the governance structure of the Civil Air 
     Patrol should be mandated by Congress until a review of 
     potential improvements in the management and oversight of 
     Civil Air Patrol operations is conducted.

[[Page S6011]]

       (b) GAO Study.--The Comptroller General shall conduct a 
     study of potential improvements to Civil Air Patrol 
     operations, including Civil Air Patrol financial management, 
     Air Force and Civil Air Patrol oversight, and the Civil Air 
     Patrol safety program. Not later than February 15, 2000, the 
     Inspector General shall submit a report on the results of the 
     study to the congressional defense committees.
       (c) Inspector General Review.--(1) The Inspector General of 
     the Department of Defense shall review the financial and 
     management operations of the Civil Air Patrol. The review 
     shall include an audit.
       (2) Not later than February 15, 2000, the Inspector General 
     shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report 
     on the review, including, specifically, the results of the 
     audit. The report shall include any recommendations that the 
     Inspector General considers appropriate regarding actions 
     necessary to ensure the proper oversight of the financial and 
     management operations of the Civil Air Patrol.

  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask for an hour equally divided.
  Mr. WARNER. Fine. I thank the Chair for the guidance. I thought the 
amendment had been logged in.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. WARNER. I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am wondering whether the Senator from 
Virginia would consider the following approach: after the disposition 
of the Murray amendment, that there then be an hour of debate on the 
Kerrey amendment and, immediately following the disposition of the 
Kerrey amendment, that the reconsideration vote occur on the Gramm 
amendment, precluding second-degree amendments to the Kerrey amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will have to ask my colleague to 
withhold that request. I will work on it, and I think we can 
accommodate all interested parties.
  Now, my understanding from the Chair is, we proceed to the 
amendment----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has a unanimous 
consent request pending. Is there objection?
  Mr. WARNER. I am not able to hear the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia had a unanimous 
consent request pending. Is the Senator withdrawing that request?
  Mr. WARNER. No. I thought I had a unanimous consent request to 
proceed to the amendment of the Senator from Washington for a period 
not to exceed 1 hour, at the conclusion of which there would be a 
motion to table and then, of course, a vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, all I want 
to do is work out a time to bring up a vote that we are not even going 
to debate on. I will be happy to have it either after the Kerrey 
amendment or at 5 o'clock. There is some concern here about limiting a 
second amendment, apparently, on the Kerrey amendment. I do not have a 
dog in that fight.
  We are in a position where I can't exercise my right, because we have 
two amendments, now three amendments, that are pending, which makes the 
floor manager sort of a gatekeeper. But it also makes anyone else a 
gatekeeper. All I am asking is if I could get an agreement on a time 
certain basis and/or following something else. I am not trying to be 
difficult to deal with; I just would like to work this out before we go 
on.
  If 5 o'clock is all right, we can stop whatever we are doing at that 
point and have the vote. I do not even require any more debate. I just 
want to settle this issue. I would have to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has the floor. There 
is a unanimous consent request pending.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, so the 
floor managers may have the opportunity to have the consent request, 
would the Chair repeat the request?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is a parliamentary inquiry.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think I can clarify the situation very 
quickly.
  The Senator from Virginia has propounded a UC to permit the Senator 
from Washington to have an hour equally divided, after which time there 
will be a tabling motion by the Senator from New Hampshire and then a 
vote.
  That was before the Chair at the time our colleague from Texas sought 
recognition for the purpose of trying to reconcile an understanding 
between himself and the ranking member. Apparently, at this time, we 
cannot achieve that reconciliation. It is my hope that the two Senators 
can continue to work and will permit the Senate to go forward with the 
amendment of the Senator from Washington.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, may I just suggest that we set the vote at 
5 o'clock and leave the Kerrey amendment alone? The net result is the 
same. The Senator was willing to agree a moment ago to do it. If the 
Kerrey amendment is what is in dispute, it seems that it would have 
produced this result before. So I just urge my friend from Michigan to 
allow us to settle the issue. We are going to do it without intervening 
debate. But the problem is that I have privilege under the rules of the 
Senate, and that is being precluded by the stacking of amendments that 
require a unanimous consent request.
  Mr. WARNER. I think we are ready to solve it. Would the Senator have 
a colloquy with our colleague?
  Mr. GRAMM. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, my understanding is that the chairman has 
no objection if at 5 o'clock we have the vote on reconsideration, even 
though we were in the middle of another debate. I have no objection if 
he doesn't.
  Mr. WARNER. I have no objection.
  Mr. LEVIN. That is probably what will happen. In the middle of debate 
on another amendment, we will go back to the reconsideration. I have no 
objection to that happening at 5 o'clock.
  Mr. WARNER. We have done that before. It may be somewhat 
inconvenient, but it is important to keep the momentum of this bill 
going. We have had superb cooperation from all Senators. I would like 
to make note that we have only had two quorum calls in 3 days.
  Mr. President, I now propound a unanimous consent request that the 
Senator from Washington be permitted to go forward with her amendment 
at this time, with a 1-hour time agreement, equally divided between the 
Senator from Washington and the Senator from New Hampshire, and at the 
conclusion of that hour, there be a motion to table by the Senator from 
New Hampshire and then a rollcall vote. We will get the yeas and nays 
later.
  Mr. GRAMM. We have the 5 o'clock vote on the reconsideration, 
correct?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I add to that a 5 o'clock vote on 
amendment No. 392.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I do not have an objection, but I would 
like to make an inquiry. At some point, I would like to be in a 
position to do what Senator Allard has done, which is to introduce an 
amendment and then lay it aside for the appropriate consideration at 
its due time. Would it be appropriate, after we have taken action on 
the unanimous consent, or as part of the unanimous consent, that I 
would be given an opportunity to introduce an amendment and then lay it 
aside?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I just ask if we could have one variation. 
At the conclusion of the vote on the amendment of the Senator from 
Washington, I would be prepared to work out an opportunity for the 
Senator from Florida to be recognized and lay down an amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous consent 
request of the Senator from Virginia?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________