[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 77 (Wednesday, May 26, 1999)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1106-E1107]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  CRISIS IN KOSOVO (ITEM NO. 6), REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR JONATHAN DEAN, 
                     UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH

                                of ohio

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, May 26, 1999

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, on May 6, 1999, I joined with 
Representative John Conyers, Representative Pete Stark, and 
Representative Cynthia McKinney to host the third in a series of 
Congressional Teach-In sessions on the Crisis in Kosovo. If a peaceful 
resolution to this conflict is to be found in the coming weeks, it is 
essential that we cultivate a consciousness of peace and actively 
search for creative solutions. We must construct a foundation for peace 
through negotiation, medication, and diplomacy.
  Part of the dynamic of peace is a willingness to engage in meaningful 
dialogue, to listen to one another openly and to share our views in a 
constructive manner. I hope that these Teach-In sessions will 
contribute to this process by providing a forum for Members of Congress 
and the public to explore alternatives so the bombing and options for a 
peaceful resolution. We will hear from a variety of speakers on 
different sides of the Kosovo situation. I will be introducing into the 
Congressional Record transcripts of their remarks and essays that shed 
light on the many dimensions of the crisis.
  This presentation is by Ambassador Jonathan Dean, who joined the 
Union of Concerned Scientists in 1984 as advisor on international 
security issues. He was United States Representative to the NATO-Warsaw 
Pact force reduction negotiations in Vienna between 1978 and 1981. 
Before that, he was deputy U.S. negotiator for the 1971 Four Power 
Berlin Agreement with the Soviet Union.
  Ambassador Dean discusses the need to negotiate a peace with Russia 
as the leading mediator. With regards to the peace keeping force to be 
in place after the conflict, Mr. Dean reiterated the necessity to have 
a UN peace keeping force in place rather than a NATO led force. He also 
addresses the importance of having more preventative measures in place 
to help avert such conflicts in the future.

 Presentation by Ambassador Jonathan Dean to Congressional Teach-In on 
                                 Kosovo

       I want to thank the Chairman for conducting these hearings, 
     both as regards the subject matter, which is acutely 
     important for our country, and for the format in which you 
     are doing this. I find this mixture of views to be very 
     useful. I am much more used to the atmosphere in the UN where 
     the NGOs are permitted to come in for 5 minutes to address 
     the delegates from a distance. This is a great device for 
     encouraging dialogue, particularly on this important subject. 
     I've learned a great deal from the two insightful statements 
     we have heard today.
       As we think of a negotiated outcome for the Kosovo crisis, 
     which is what we should be working for hard, we can't forget 
     that Milosevic is responsible for the ongoing, widespread 
     brutal killing of Kosovo Albanians. And it is justified to 
     negotiate with him only in the interest of stopping the 
     killing in Yugoslavia. It's still possible to reach a 
     negotiated settlement on the Kosovo issue, quite rapidly, 
     even within a few days. This is because many issues are close 
     to solution. The removal of Serbian forces, the return of the 
     Kosovars, continuation of Kosovo as an autonomous part of 
     Serbia (at least for the time being), and the presence of an 
     international force. As the Bonn group meeting earlier today 
     showed, the main issue in what is now a three-cornered 
     dialogue--between Milosevic, Chernomyrdin, and the Western 
     NATO countries--is the nature of that force, its armament and 
     its composition. All three parties agree that the force 
     should be legitimatized by a mandate from the Security 
     Council and that is important. Milosevic has been holding out 
     for a lightly armed UN force. The NATO countries for a 
     heavily armed NATO force.
       But this question of the level of armaments is secondary to 
     the issue of the nature of the force itself. President 
     Clinton and other NATO leaders have been insisting that the 
     core of the force be a NATO force, directed by NATO in effect 
     with some Russians and others added. It's very clear that the 
     Administration has in mind the poor performance of the 
     UNPERFOR force in Bosnia, and the more successful model of 
     the successor IFOR force with NATO plus forces from Russia 
     and other partners for peace. Moreover, the Administration is 
     clearly worried that good Security Council guidance on a UN 
     force may not be forthcoming. The position of Russia, China 
     and France in the Security Council is uncertain. Beyond that, 
     a UN force may not be capable militarily of handling possible 
     Serbian resistance.
       There are other factors here that we have to bear in mind. 
     The resistance of the Clinton Administration to acceptance of 
     a UN-directed force in Kosovo. The United States would by 
     implication face a certain implied humiliation if it has to 
     accept a UN force for Kosovo and drop NATO. There is no doubt 
     that the Congressional majority would make life hard for the 
     Administration. And beyond that, the United States would end 
     up having to pay its peacekeeping dues to the UN.
       For his part, Milosevic wants a UN force over a NATO force. 
     Accepting outright NATO occupation of Kosovo would be a very 
     severe domestic defeat for him, possibly his political 
     end. NATO is his enemy. A NATO force in Kosovo could enter 
     and at some point conquer the rest of Serbia. And it could 
     accelerate the secession of Kosovo from Serbia. Both sides 
     are being obstinate on this point and that's the closing 
     point in negotiation over the future of Kosovo.
       I believe that the Clinton Administration should accept a 
     UN force because a refusal to do so confronts NATO with the 
     grim prospect of bombing Serbia to its knees and then going 
     in with ground forces, a long and even more bloody and 
     expensive process. We can improve the past performance of UN 
     peace-keeping forces and the composition of that force for 
     Kosovo. But we will have to work with the Security Council 
     more carefully and that is the big crime of omission if there 
     is one in this picture for the Clinton Administration.
       As regards the Security Council, the warning came last 
     August on Iraq when France, Russia and China voted against 
     the United States in the Security Council on the issue of 
     continuing UNSCOM, the special commission for Iraq. Although 
     it was ready engaged in negotiation with Serbia, the 
     Administration failed to use the time between then and the 
     Holbrooke mission to Milosevic in October, to improve the 
     situation of the Security Council. That was a great omission, 
     in my opinion, because we could have gotten a Security 
     Council legitimation for the actions undertaken by NATO, or 
     possibly even a wider UN military action. For the future we 
     must act to prevent the Security Council from degenerating 
     into cold war paralysis because this would definitely not be 
     in the national interest of the US. I am arguing this point 
     because it is very relevant to whether or not we should have 
     a UN force in Kosovo.
       Among the methods: better diplomacy. One can think of an 
     informal agreement among the five permanent members of the 
     Security Council to limit the veto on certain specified 
     occasions. This is not something that is often proposed, 
     i.e., an amendment of the charter, but an informal 
     understanding. In particular Russia, Britain and Frances 
     would be interested in preventing a degeneration, a 
     deterioration, of the Security Council, which is one of their 
     major claims to international status. They would be 
     interested in talking about some kind of understanding. There 
     is, and has long existed, an informal coordinating committee, 
     of the permanent member of the Security Council.
       Another possibility, that could be done very rapidly, is to 
     establish a General Assembly conflict prevention panel or 
     committee which could act to head off matters of this kind, 
     and could be sued to give legitimation. There is the Uniting 
     For Peace procedure, which could have given General Assembly 
     authority for the present action in Kosovo even in the face 
     of Russian veto in the Security Council
       We all know there is going to be a very intense and quite 
     painful review of humanitarian intervention by bombing, an 
     experiment that it not likely to be repeated. There will also 
     be a review, certainly by NATO, of how it should conduct 
     humanitarian intervention. I personally consider NATO 
     intervention justified, and does represent the implementation 
     of a national interest of the United States in two senses. 
     (1) Stewardship of human rights, or accountability of 
     governments for their performance in this field, is very 
     clearly emerging as an international norm justifying 
     humanitarian intervention

[[Page E1107]]

     of various kinds, not solely of military intervention. (2) As 
     the very example of Bosnia showed, it is not politically 
     possible for a country of eminence of the US to stay outside 
     a long-standing blood-letting and stay on the sidelines. The 
     Clinton Administration, from a position on the sidelines, was 
     forced step by step into intervention is Bosnia and with less 
     delay, but nonetheless with considerable delay, to the 
     intervention in Kosovo.
       I think the big lesson of this entire experience should be 
     that we do have to start with conflict prevention, in the 
     whole meaning of that term, very clearly as a necessary 
     assurance against a very probably degeneration of this kind 
     of armed conflict. The better off we will be as a nation to 
     accept that as part of our national interest, and part of our 
     activities and to do so early. I am saying this with a 
     certain ax to grind, Mr. Chairman, I and my colleagues have a 
     program called Global Action to Prevent War which is also 
     directed at preventing future Kosovos. You can find it on the 
     World Wide Web.

     

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