[Congressional Record Volume 145, Number 75 (Monday, May 24, 1999)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5872-S5876]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   SENATE RESOLUTION 107--TO ESTABLISH A SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHINESE 
                               ESPIONAGE

  Mr. SMITH (of New Hampshire) submitted the following resolution; 
which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

                              S. Res. 107

       Resolved,

     SECTION 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE.

       (a) In General.--There is established a temporary Select 
     Committee on Chinese Espionage (hereafter in this resolution 
     referred to as the ``select committee'') which shall consist 
     of 12 members, 6 to be appointed by the President pro tempore 
     of the Senate upon recommendations of the Majority Leader 
     from among members of the majority party, and 6 to be 
     appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon 
     recommendations of the Minority Leader from among members of 
     the minority party.
       (b) Chairman.--The Majority Leader shall select the 
     chairman of the select committee.
       (c) Vice Chairman.--The Minority Leader shall select the 
     vice chairman of the select committee.
       (d) Service of a Senator.--The service of a Senator as a 
     member or chairman on the select committee shall not count 
     for purposes of paragraph 4 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules 
     of the Senate.
       (e) Rules and Procedures.--A majority of the members of the 
     select committee shall constitute a quorum thereof for the 
     transaction of business, except that the select committee may 
     fix a lesser number as a quorum for the purpose of taking 
     testimony. The select committee shall adopt rules of 
     procedure not inconsistent with this resolution and the rules 
     of the Senate governing standing committees of the Senate.
       (f) Vacancies.--Vacancies in the membership of the select 
     committee shall not affect the authority of the remaining 
     members to execute the functions of the select committee.

     SEC. 2. JURISDICTION.

       (a) In General.--There shall be referred to the select 
     committee, concurrently with referral to any other committee 
     of the Senate with jurisdiction, all messages, petitions, 
     memorials, and other matters relating to United States-China 
     national security relations.
       (b) Effect on Other Committees Jurisdiction.--Nothing in 
     this resolution shall be construed as prohibiting or 
     otherwise restricting the authority of any other committee of 
     the Senate or as amending, limiting, or otherwise changing 
     the authority of any standing committee of the Senate.

     SEC. 3. REPORTS.

       The select committee may, for the purposes of 
     accountability to the Senate, make such reports to the Senate 
     with respect to matters within its jurisdiction as it shall 
     deem advisable which shall be referred to the appropriate 
     committee. In making such reports, the select committee shall 
     proceed in a manner consistent with the requirements of 
     national security.

     SEC. 4. POWERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE.

       (a) In General.--For the purposes of this resolution, the 
     select committee is authorized at its discretion--
       (1) to make investigations into any matter within its 
     jurisdiction;
       (2) to hold hearings;
       (3) to sit and act at any time or place during the sessions 
     (subject to paragraph 5 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of 
     the Senate), recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate;
       (4) to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of 
     witnesses and the production of correspondence, books, 
     papers, and documents;
       (5) to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the 
     Senate to carry out its functions and to employ personnel, 
     subject to procedures of paragraph 9 of rule XXVI of the 
     Standing Rules of the Senate; and
       (6) with the prior consent of the Government department or 
     agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and 
     Administration, to use on a reimbursable, or nonreimbursable 
     basis the services of personnel of any such department or 
     agency.
       (b) Oaths.--The chairman of the select committee or any 
     member thereof may administer oaths to witnesses.
       (c) Subpoenas.--Subpoenas authorized by a majority of the 
     select committee shall be issued over the signature of the 
     chairman and may be served by any person designated by the 
     chairman.

     SEC. 5. TREATMENT OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

       (a) Employees.--
       (1) In general.--No employee of the select committee or 
     person engaged to perform services for or at the request of 
     such committee unless such employee or person has--
       (A) agreed in writing and under oath to be bound by the 
     rules of the Senate and of such committee as to the security 
     of such information during and after the period of his 
     employment or relationship with such committee; and
       (B) received an appropriate security clearance as 
     determined by such committee in consultation with the 
     Director of Central Intelligence.
       (2) Clearance.--The type of security clearance to be 
     required in the case of any employee or person under 
     paragraph (1) shall, within the determination of such 
     committee in consultation with the Director of Central 
     Intelligence, be commensurate with the sensitivity of the 
     classified information to which such employee or person will 
     be given access by such committee.
       (b) Security Officer.--The select committee shall designate 
     a security officer

[[Page S5873]]

     qualified to administer appropriate security procedures to 
     ensure the protection of confidential and classified 
     information in the possession of the select committee and 
     shall make suitable arrangements, in consultation with the 
     Office of Senate Security, for the physical protection and 
     storage of classified information in its possession.

     SEC. 6. TREATMENT OF PRIVATE INFORMATION.

       (a) Rules and Procedures.--The select committee shall 
     formulate and carry out such rules and procedures as it deems 
     necessary to prevent the disclosure, without the consent of 
     the person or persons concerned, of information in the 
     possession of such committee which unduly infringes upon the 
     privacy or which violates the constitutional rights of such 
     person or persons.
       (b) Disclosure.--Nothing in this resolution shall be 
     construed to prevent the select committee from publicly 
     disclosing any such information in any case in which such 
     committee determines the national interest in the disclosure 
     of such information clearly outweighs any infringement on the 
     privacy of any person or persons.

     SEC. 7. PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

       The select committee is authorized to permit any personal 
     representative of the President, designated by the President 
     to serve as a liaison to such committee, to attend any closed 
     meeting of such committee.

     SEC. 8. TERMINATION OF SELECT COMMITTEE.

       Unless specifically reauthorized, the select committee 
     shall terminate at the end of the 106th Congress. Upon 
     termination of the select committee, all records, files, 
     documents, and other materials in the possession, custody, or 
     control of the select committee, under appropriate conditions 
     established by the select committee, shall be transferred to 
     the Secretary of the Senate.

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I rise today just as the 
Cox report is about to enter the public domain. This report--a 
bipartisan report by Congressman Chris Cox of California and 
Congressman Norman Dicks of Washington--will go to an issue of great 
importance to the United States; it is the issue of Chinese espionage 
in the United States.
  I am rising on the Senate floor today to introduce legislation--which 
I will do at the conclusion of my remarks--establishing a bipartisan 
select committee to examine Chinese espionage against United States 
national security interests, responding to what is increasingly being 
viewed as the greatest security breach against the United States in our 
history--the loss to China of our most sensitive nuclear warhead data 
over many years from the Los Alamos National Lab, and from other 
national security facilities and programs.
  Through no one's fault, and with the best of intentions, 
congressional efforts to examine this matter have been disjointed and 
inconsistent. I respect every Senator on both sides of the aisle who 
has been working and doing their best to try to get to the bottom of 
this, especially the chairmen of those committees with some claim to 
jurisdiction over the Labs and over this whole issue of Chinese 
espionage.
  Unfortunately, that is the problem. There are too many individuals 
conducting too many independent investigations, if you will, and too 
many committees going down the same path. The result has been a 
duplication of witnesses, many of whom have come back and testified 
four or five times before the Senate. I don't think this makes a lot of 
sense.
  I think my colleagues on these respective committees--and I chair a 
subcommittee on the Armed Services Committee with direct jurisdiction 
over this matter, so I say that as one who would be involved in such an 
investigation--will agree that there is too much duplication. We need 
to streamline this effort and we need to put the full weight of the 
Senate behind it. That means an investigation, a true investigation, 
the power to call witnesses and administer oaths, and a unified focus 
of our shared bipartisan concern.
  I have had the privilege to serve on two such bipartisan committees. 
One, the Senate Ethics Committee, is a nonpartisan committee, really, 
of three members from each party. We look at all the matters before us 
in a truly nonpartisan way. That is exactly what needs to be done here.
  I also served on the Senate Select Committee on POWs and MIAs a few 
years ago, where Senator John Kerry was the chairman and I was vice 
chairman. It was a bipartisan effort. That is what it is going to take 
in the Senate, just as the House has been well-served by its committee 
chaired by Congressman Cox of California and Congressman Dicks of 
Washington. It was a bipartisan effort and it has come to a 
bipartisan--and unanimous--conclusion.
  We need to do this in the Senate. We need to take what was in that 
report, review it carefully, find out where it leads, and take 
appropriate action. But I do not think we are going to accomplish that 
if we are going to have all of these witnesses called in five, six, 
seven, or eight times before all these different committees, and not 
have one consistent message. It will waste a lot of money and time. I 
think it is better to consolidate, which is why I am calling for a 
select committee.
  I am not interested in scoring partisan points here. This is concerns 
the national security of the United States of America. No partisan 
points were scored in the classified presentation I attended the other 
day with Congressman Dicks and Congressman Cox. It was presented in a 
way that I felt was truly bipartisan. Members of both parties were 
there. It is a lot bigger than that. The national security of the 
United States is a lot more important than any of the partisan attacks. 
We all want answers. We deserve answers, and we deserve to put these 
witnesses under oath, under threat of perjury, and to speak before the 
Senate--together, not as five or six different committees of 
jurisdiction.
  The Cox committee did heroic work in the House--much of it despite 
obstacles put in their path by the administration. They had to dig and 
claw to get the information, and the report that will be released 
tomorrow has been blocked for several months by the administration.
  It is time for the Senate now to do its part, to focus its collective 
concern about these matters into a coherent and effective committee. I 
believe a select committee with a specific intent, with the opportunity 
to call witnesses, to put people under oath, and to have investigators 
look into this is the correct approach. Otherwise, it is going to be 
defused all over the Government and we are going to have all kinds of 
stories popping up from this committee and that committee, this 
subcommittee and that subcommittee, and this Senator and that Senator, 
and it will all be disconnected.
  So I urge colleagues to support this legislation. I urge our leaders 
to support it as well. I think it is a good idea. It has worked in the 
past when we have had serious issues like this. And our effort here is 
to gain the truth, to get the facts. I believe this select committee 
will get the job done.
  I want to review briefly what has happened, and why I think it is so 
important to have a select committee.
  About 5 months ago, a special congressional committee investigating 
security problems with China questioned whether the Department of 
Energy had adequate safeguards to protect its nuclear secrets. On 
February 1, 1999, President Clinton responded, saying safeguards were 
``adequate'' and getting better.
  That was the statement of the President on February 1. With all due 
respect, and being as nice about it as I can, that was not true then. 
It is not true now.
  One week later, on February 8, Mr. Lee failed a polygraph test. More 
than a month later, the FBI finally searched his computer. This is not 
something one can take lightly. When the President says that safeguards 
were ``adequate'' and getting better, that simply was not true.
  Between the time the Justice Department refused the FBI's request for 
a court order to search Lee's computer and Lee's firing, there were 
more than 300 break-ins involving the computer network on which Lee had 
allegedly transferred nuclear secrets.
  When Ho Lee was hired by Los Alamos National Laboratories in 1978, he 
first came under suspicion in 1982 when he made a telephone call to a 
scientist from Lawrence Livermore Lab who had been fired as a result of 
an investigation into evidence that a spy had passed neutron bomb 
secrets to China.
  In 1989, when Lee's 5-year security renewal was up for review, Energy 
Department officials learned of the FBI's inquiry into Mr. Lee. But a 
file put together on Lee that was sent to DOE headquarters for security 
review was ``lost.'' And it was not until 1992 that the Department 
hired an outside contractor to reconstruct the ``lost'' file.
  In 1994, a Los Alamos employee reported to security officials that 
Lee was ``embraced'' by a Chinese intelligence officer during a 
delegation

[[Page S5874]]

visit, and that Lee had discussed with the Chinese the nuclear weapons 
code similar to the ones he is now suspected of stealing.
  In 1995, the Energy Department and the CIA began to learn the record 
of China's alleged espionage.
  In early 1995, scientists at the Los Alamos Nuclear Lab had told Mr. 
Notra Trulock, then intelligence director at the Energy Department, of 
their fears that China had achieved a remarkable breakthrough in its 
nuclear tests. About that same time those fears were raised, U.S. 
intelligence files showed that a Chinese agent had handed over a secret 
document to American officials containing evidence that China had 
stolen design data on American nuclear warheads and missiles.
  In 1996, the CIA concluded American secrets had been stolen. Lee 
emerged in early 1996 as the FBI's ``prime suspect'' at the 
Laboratories.
  In 1996, Mr. Trulock tried to raise warnings about espionage at the 
Laboratories but was thwarted by his superiors at the Energy 
Department. Trulock said he finally talked to administration officials 
as early as April of 1996. He said he met with Sandy Berger. He said 
Mr. Berger had said subsequently that he briefed Mr. Clinton and took 
steps to address the problem.
  We are in 1996 now--3 years ago. President Clinton denied that. But I 
will get to that in a minute.
  Like all employees, Lee had signed a waiver permitting his e-mail and 
personal computer to be reviewed without his knowledge. Despite the 
waiver, the Justice Department, in 1996, decided that a court warrant 
would be needed before his computer could be searched, and denied the 
request.
  Coincidentally--or not--in 1996, President Clinton relaxed all 
controls on sales of advanced computers to countries like China. The 
next year, his administration resisted congressional efforts to 
retighten those controls. The Cox committee reportedly concluded that 
some of the computers sold to China went to organizations involved in 
military activities, and they might have been used for military 
purposes--like upgrading nuclear weapons or developing more accurate 
missiles.

  When something goes to China, it does not just go to private 
industry. It goes to the military too. Let's make sure we understand 
that.
  The relaxation of export controls on technology is something I have 
been hammering away at in my subcommittee--the Strategic Forces 
Subcommittee--in the Armed Services Committee for seven years. I have 
watched these controls relax in this administration. I have watched the 
State Department and the Defense Department and the Justice Department 
lose the fight time after time after time to the Commerce Department.
  In 1996, President Bill Clinton shifted licensing responsibility for 
some commercial satellite sales from the security-oriented State 
Department to the business-friendly Commerce Department.
  I do not know what most Americans think about all of this, but I am 
going to say what I think about it. I think this is the worst breach of 
national security in the history of the United States of America. It is 
not just about Los Alamos, as we are going to find out tomorrow when 
this report is declassified when we can talk about it in more detail. 
Unfortunately, I cannot talk about some of it today. But I urge 
everyone to get a copy of it and you will see what I am talking about. 
The Rosenbergs in 1953 were executed, in my view, for less than what 
has happened here.
  I have seen, time after time, witness after witness from this 
administration come before the Armed Services Committee--either taking 
the fifth amendment, refusing to come, or fleeing the country, or lying 
under oath, or being unable to remember. That is one thing during some 
financial inquiry about who gave how much money to some candidate. But 
I am going to tell you one thing. I am not going to stand for people 
coming before the Senate--when the security of the United States of 
America is at stake, when nuclear weapons have been transmitted to a 
foreign nation who is an enemy of the United States--I am not going to 
stand for people coming before this Senate and not telling the truth.
  I will say it on the record: somebody is going to be held accountable 
for what has happened. Somebody is going to be held accountable. Every 
nuclear weapon in the United States arsenal has been compromised--every 
one of them, every warhead. I am not going to stand by and take no for 
an answer. I am not going to stand for this being obfuscated all over 
the Senate and all over the country with defused, mixed messages. We 
will get to the bottom of this. Nobody in this Senate should have any 
objection to that. Whoever did this, whoever is responsible for this, 
wherever it leads, needs to be held accountable, period.
  In 1996, the American intelligence community concluded that China had 
stolen the secret design information about the neutron bomb. In April 
1997, the FBI recommended measures to tighten security at the Labs.
  No action was taken; no action.
  In July 1997, Mr. Trulock, concerned about lack of progress, went 
back to the White House to ask for assistance. He gave National 
Security Adviser Sandy Berger a fuller briefing. Berger briefed the 
President of the United States as early as July 1997. Twice in 1997 the 
Justice Department rejected a request by FBI counterintelligence 
officials to seek a search warrant authorizing more aggressive 
investigative techniques, including a wiretap and clandestine searches 
of homes, offices, and computers. The request for a wiretap was turned 
down by a political appointee, Frances Townsend. A request for a 
wiretap was turned down.
  The numbers of wiretaps authorized each year is classified, but we 
know there are hundreds in any given year. We also know that seldom are 
more than two or three in a given year denied. Put yourself in Frances 
Townsend's place at the Justice Department for a moment. Somebody comes 
in from the FBI and says, we have a problem. Somebody stole all the 
nuclear weapon secrets from the United States of America and sent them 
to China. We have a suspect. We need to wiretap him. And your answer 
is, no.
  Now, I am not going to accept some feeble explanation about why that 
happened. Somebody is going to answer that question in my presence in 
this Senate before I leave here; I state that right now.
  In August of 1997, FBI Director Louis Freeh recommended Mr. Lee's 
access to classified information be cut off immediately. What happens? 
Lee is still granted access to top secret warhead data despite the 
recommendation. What is going on? This kind of thing does not happen 
unless somebody makes it happen and wants it to happen.
  When the FBI Director says no, the answer is no. But somebody decided 
that Mr. Freeh was not going to have the last word here. They decided 
that Mr. Lee was going to continue to have access to top secret warhead 
data.
  During the 1998 congressional investigation into satellite export 
controls, Trulock has said, acting Energy Secretary Elizabeth Moler 
ordered him--I emphasize the word ``ordered,'' because I heard him say 
it in my presence--ordered him not to disclose the Chinese espionage in 
testimony before the U.S. Congress. A political appointee in the Energy 
Department ordered Mr. Trulock, a subordinate, not to tell the 
Congress.
  Now she denies it. Clearly, we need these two witnesses to come forth 
in public session before this select committee. Let the public decide 
who is lying and who isn't.
  Mr. Lee retained access to classified information after he came under 
suspicion of spying, from October 1997 to October 1998.
  On April 28, 1999, the Clinton administration finally admitted that 
secret nuclear weapons data had been compromised. They finally admitted 
it when Bill Richardson, the new Secretary of Energy, to his 
everlasting credit pushed this issue and refused to stand for it 
anymore.
  Wen Ho Lee was fired on March 8. His computer was not searched until 
the following week. They found he had transferred legacy codes covering 
many U.S. nuclear weapons from the classified to an unclassified 
computer system where they could be vulnerable to outsiders. In a 
computer search, more than 1,000 top secret weapons files had been 
deleted after being improperly transferred from a highly secure 
computer system.

[[Page S5875]]

  Those are the facts as I can outline them without going into 
classified materials. I point out in the framework of the last 4 or 5 
months, this information has been withheld from the public. Certain 
Senators and Congressmen, if they took it upon themselves, could get a 
briefing on the Cox report, but it was not allowed to be released.
  What happened? What did the President know and when did he know it? 
That sounds familiar.
  March 19, 1999, at a press conference, the President assured the 
public, ``There has been no espionage at the Labs since I've been 
President.'' Let me repeat that: ``There has been no espionage at the 
Labs since I've been President.''
  And, ``No one reported to me that they suspect that such a thing has 
occurred.''
  The President, in March of this year, March 19, says, ``There has 
been no espionage at the Labs since I've been President,'' and, ``No 
one reported to me that they suspect that such a thing has occurred.''
  Mr. Berger told the Cox Committee he didn't speak with the President 
about Chinese spying for at least a year, but he did say he did it in 
early 1998. Berger's aides now say he remembers informing Clinton in 
July of 1997.
  Mr. President, this is serious business. When atomic secrets in 1953 
were passed to the Russians, a man and a woman--a husband and a wife--
were executed. We have got to get to the bottom of this. Any Senator 
worth his or her salt, regardless of political party, ought to be ready 
to go on this with no nonsense.
  We are not going to accept ridiculous ``I don't remember'' answers 
anymore. I do not want to hear any of this. And I do not want to be 
bound by some committee rule where I have 5 minutes to ask a question, 
and the witness answers for 4\1/2\ minutes, and I cannot ask any more. 
I want the time to ask my questions. I want the time for every Senator 
to ask these questions on behalf of the American people.
  I have never in my life seen anything like the witnesses they have 
paraded before the committees of this Congress that I have been a party 
to--Government Affairs Committee investigations, the Armed Services 
Committee--time and time and time again, saying ``I don't remember, I 
can't recall.''
  That is not good enough. That does not cut it. And it does not cut it 
on the part of the President of the United States, either. He should 
have been up here testifying during his impeachment trial. By golly, if 
we have to have him come up here and testify on this, then bring him up 
here. This is the national security of the United States we are talking 
about. This is classified, nuclear, codeword-level information that has 
been passed, and the President needs to tell us what he knows, if he 
knows anything.

  According to the New York Times, what counterintelligence experts 
told senior Clinton administration officials in November of 1998 is 
that China poses an acute intelligence threat to the weapons labs--an 
acute intelligence threat to the weapons labs. We now know the 
President had been briefed in November of 1998 about FBI and CIA 
suspicions, and in January had even received the secret Cox report 
detailing those security lapses during the Clinton watch.
  What is going on here? All right, so he does not tell us the truth 
about Monica Lewinsky. But this is national security. According to Mr. 
Berger, his own National Security Adviser, President Clinton was told 
about the problems at the weapons labs in July of 1997 or February of 
1998.
  On May 9, 1999, Tim Russert, on ``Meet The Press,'' extracted from 
Energy Secretary Bill Richardson the acknowledgment that President 
Clinton was ``fully, fully briefed,'' an admission for which, news 
reports say, Richardson was savaged by Clinton aides.
  Here is the explanation. Clinton put in ``at the labs'' and ``against 
the labs'' because we technically don't know if the stolen info came 
from the labs or somewhere else. Richardson also said, ``there have 
been damaging security leaks. The Chinese have obtained damaging 
information during past administrations and the current 
administration.''
  Perhaps this spying started in previous administrations, but this 
administration knew it was going on and did not respond to it. That 
just does not cut it. This is not about ``what is is.'' This is about 
the security of the United States of America.
  On May 23, 1999, the deputy intelligence director at the Department 
of Energy suggested the White House was informed about China's theft of 
United States nuclear secrets much sooner than it has acknowledged.
  The inaction from this administration did not come in a vacuum. It 
came in the thick of a 1996 reelection effort that we now know included 
campaign contributions from those with ties to the Chinese Government, 
ties to the military, and ties to the intelligence organization. Mr. 
Berger first briefed in April of 1996, and not until 2 years later does 
the White House move to tighten security after receiving more detailed 
evidence in 1997. NSC sought a narrowly focused CIA report to cast 
doubt on Energy Department claims.
  At the same time the FBI and CIA were investigating the source of the 
Los Alamos leak, Vice President Al Gore was passing the hat among 
wealthy Buddhist nuns, the President was serving coffee at the White 
House to PLA arms dealer Wang Jun, and the administration responded 
favorably to a request from the man who would be the Democratic Party's 
largest single donor in 1996, Loral chairman Bernard Schwartz, to 
transfer authority over licensing of satellite technology from the 
State Department to the Commerce Department. Two years later, Loral 
would be granted a Presidential waiver to export its technology to 
China, even though it was under criminal investigation by the Justice 
Department for previous technology transfers.
  Wake up, America. Wake up. What is going on here? Who knows what? 
Officials from those two companies, I have news for you. You are coming 
in here, and you are going to answer some questions as well.
  In April of 1996, Energy Department officials informed Mr. Berger 
that Trulock had uncovered evidence which showed that China had learned 
how to miniaturize nuclear bombs and it appeared the Chinese had gained 
that knowledge through the efforts of a spy at the Los Alamos Labs. 
Berger was told the spy might still be there.
  What action did the White House take? Absolutely nothing. But the 
warning came at an awkward time, the verge of the 1997 Strategic 
Partnership Summit with Beijing. The administration was also facing the 
congressional investigations into charges that the P.R.C. had illegally 
funneled money into their 1996 Clinton-Gore reelection campaign. I do 
not know where these dots connect or if they connect, but there were a 
lot of dots. Mr. Berger assigned an NSC staffer to look into things and 
asked the CIA to investigate. The CIA's report comes back that the 
Trulock analysis was an unsupported worst case scenario. That is not 
what he told us in private.
  Finally, in February of 1998, President Clinton formally ordered the 
reforms into effect. But, curiously, Energy Secretary Federico Pena 
never followed the order and soon after left the Cabinet.
  Reforms were not instituted until Bill Richardson did so in October 
of 1998, 30 months after Trulock's first warning, 9 months after the 
President's directive. In the meantime, Assistant Secretary Moler 
orders Trulock not to tell Congress because it could be used against 
President Clinton's China policy.
  Do not tell Congress? If this Senate tolerates that kind of action, 
we deserve all the criticism we get and 10 times more. We have 
oversight responsibility. This area, the labs and the security of those 
labs and those weapons, is directly under this Senator's supervision 
and oversight responsibility as the chairman of the Strategic Forces 
Subcommittee. I am going to tell you something; I do not accept that 
answer. I am not going to accept that answer. Someone is going to talk, 
and whoever is accountable, in my view, if they did these things, they 
are going to go to jail, because that is where they belong. We are 
going to find out where this path leads, if it is the last thing I do.
  Political contributions poured in and United States technology flowed 
out to China day after day, week after week, month after month, year 
after year--flowed out to China, made possible by

[[Page S5876]]

the easing of export controls to this strategic partner of the 
President's.
  We are going to hear that this is China bashing. This is not China 
bashing. This is the national security of the United States. I hope 
when the American people read the Cox report, they will understand that 
the Chinese gained vital information on every nuclear warhead in our 
arsenal. They now have the missile to fire it, the warhead to put on 
it, and the targeting information to direct it at any city in the 
United States of America--all thanks to the relaxation of export 
controls, and to the fact we left a spy in our labs.
  When are we going to wake up? All through March and April of 1999, 
the White House fought over the release and declassification of this 
report. No wonder they do not want it released. The Cox report believes 
China is still spying. I believe they are too. This has to be 
investigated.
  In conclusion, we need a bipartisan select committee to find out 
where this trail leads, wherever it leads.

                          ____________________